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Abstract
MEN SET ON FIRE
ALGERNON SIDNEY & JOHN ADAMS:
REMODELING ANGLO-AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM
By
DEBORAH B. CHARNOFF
Advisors: Richard Wolin and David Waldstreicher
This dissertation examines the political ideas of Algernon Sidney and John Adams, seventeenth and
eighteenth-century republicans from England and America, respectively, in order to clarify the nature of
early modern Anglo-American republicanism. Historians, political theorists, and legal scholars have
grappled for years with the nature of republicanism; yet we continue to lack clarity in our understanding,
having consistently failed to take into account critical elements that inform the tradition, especially
essential layers of law, along with elements of balance. The consequence has been obfuscation of the
very nature of republicanism. Re-centering the tradition enables us to synthesize the disparate
historiographic legacy, and elucidates our understanding. Particular consideration is given to Sidney and
Adams’ biographical milieu, including family, political, and historical circumstances. The analysis also
places into perspective other political ideas, and convincingly establishes why John Locke’s “liberal” ideas
fall within the early modern Anglo-American republican tradition.

iv

For Ger

I have applied my self to studdy, a littell more than I have done formerly,
and though one who beginns at my Age, cannot hope to make any considerable Progresse that Way,
I find soe much Satisfaction in it, that for the future I shall very unwillingly
(though I had the Opportunity) put my self into any Way of living that shall deprive me of that Entertainement.
Algernon Sidney letter to his father, the 2nd Earl of Leicester, June 13, 1661 1
****
I ought to apologize for the immoderate length of this paper. But general assertions
are only to be confuted by an examination of the particulars, which necessarily fills up much space.
John Adams, Novanglus III 2

The title of this dissertation is from Algernon Sidney’s Discourses Concerning Government, revised ed., Thomas G.
West, ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1996) (hereinafter “Discourses” or “DCG”), Ch. III, §19, p. 433 (III.19.433):
“When a magistrate … sets up an interest … in himself, repugnant to the good of the publick. … [t]his creates a most
fierce and irreconcileable enmity. …When men’s spirits are thus prepared, a small matter sets them on fire.”
*******
1

nd

Algernon Sidney to Robert Sidney, 2 Earl of Leicester, June 13, 1661, Arthur Collins, ed., Letters and
memorials of state, in the reigns of Queen Mary, … part of the reign of King Charles the Second, and
Oliver’s usurpation. Written and collected by Sir Henry Sydney, … Sir Philip Sydney, and his brother Sir
Robert Sydney …Robert, the second Earl of Leicester, … Philip Lord Viscount Lisle … Whereunto is
added, genealogical and historical observations, Volume 2 of 2 (London: T. Osborne, 1746) [Ecco reprint
from the Trinity College Library Watkinson Collection, undated] (“Collins’ Sidney family documents, Vol.
2”), pp, 718-20, 719.
2

John Adams, Novanglus III, Feb. 6, 1775, Papers of John Adams (“PJA”) Vol. 2, Dec. 1773-Apr. 1775
(Boston, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 254.
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INTRODUCTION
The Scholarship Bog

[B]alance is the key to conceptualizing the multiple lineages of European political thought.
Cary J. Nederman, Lineages of European Political Thought 1
Only systematic comparison and intertwined narratives count; all else is mere juxtaposition.
Deborah Cohen & Maura O’Connor, Comparison & History 2
.

The story is well known: quite marvelously, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson became dedicated
pen-pals after retiring to their respective homes in Braintree, Massachusetts and Monticello, Virginia,
having reached and then passed their eighth and seventh decades, respectively.3 The result was the
fantastic stream of letters gifted to posterity that traveled between the two former Presidents between 1812
and 1826, with Adams predictably much more prolix than Jefferson.4 Books, TV and film coalesce and

1

Cary J. Nederman, Lineages of European Political Thought, Explorations along the Medieval/Modern
Divide from John of Salisbury to Hegel (Washington, DC: The Catholic University Press, 2009), pp. xx.
2

“Comparative history serves primarily to separate the important from the incidental and thus to point the
way towards causal explanations.” Peter Baldwin, “Comparison and Generalizing: Why All History is
Comparative, Yet No History is Sociology,” Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National
Perspective, Deborah Cohen & Maura O’Connor, eds. (New York & London: Routledge, 2004), Ch. 1, pp.
1-22, 18. On juxtaposition, see id, pp. xx-xxi.
3

Darren Staloff, Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson: The Politics of Enlightenment and the American Founding
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2005), pp. 230-31. One might compare the famous correspondent relationship
of Adams and Jefferson to today’s IM-mates or Facebook friends who regale each other in “real time” with
the latest information of interest. The profound difference is that letter-writing among the intellectual elite
of the eighteenth-century was not only a means of exchanging gossip; it served the vital function of
transmitting current events, political ideas and opinions – personal, national and international – that might
otherwise have no ready, and certainly no timely means of disclosure. It also created a consciouslyformulated historical record. People wrote for personal reasons, too: “In both his public and his private
lives, Jefferson wrote in order to structure his own life, and to try to bring into existence the world as he
wished it to be.” Annette Gordon-Reed and Peter S. Onuf, “Most Blessed of the Patriarchs: Thomas
Jefferson and the Empire of the Imagination (New York & London: Liveright Pub. Corp. 2016), pp. 12-13.
Epistolary writing also was a rhetorical art in the Ciceronian sense – an important form of artful persuasion.
Would that we still wrote that way today! As for the impact of rhetoric, “Commentators on classical
Athenian democracy understood its fragility. They had seen how skillful orators could become
demagogues and tyrants. They knew that the assembly could not always discern the difference between
talented but unscrupulous speakers and truly virtuous leaders.” Quoting Demosthenes and Thucydides,
American historian James T. Kloppenberg turned to Isocrates, who “emphasized the importance of uniting
the ability to speak well with moral excellence; the first quality without the second spelled trouble for democracy.” It spelled trouble generally. E.g., the “learned Adams had gained, and the eloquence he hoped to
develop, might ‘be employed wisely to persuade’ or ‘employed wickedly to seduce.’” James T.
Kloppenberg, Toward Democracy: The Struggle for Self-Rule in European and American Thought (Oxford
University Press, 2016), pp. 35, 272.
4

The Adams-Jefferson Letters reflect a ratio slightly higher than two-to-one. One hundred fifty-eight letters
are published in the collection, 109 from Adams and 49 from Jefferson, equating to about one letter a
1

have frozen our images of these men: the portly, optically-challenged Adams with his nose singularly
close to his eyes’ target, pouring over an epistle from the stately Jefferson, engrossed by each word
committed by the Virginian to paper, while the slightly stooped, aged but no less enigmatic, prepossessing
Southern gentleman that Jefferson had always been was merrily imbibing Adams’ piquant prose. Both men
were polymaths, bibliomaniacs, and lawyers.5 But the differences between them were equally obvious:
Jefferson’s soigné appearance, his trig physique and stature, versus Adams’ New England austerity,
diminutiveness and inclination to rotundity; the former’s suave manner vis-à-vis the latter’s gregarious but
sometimes unvarnished bordering on solecistic demeanor; Jefferson’s sangfroid and mellifluous carriage in
contrast to Adams’ tendency to burble and natter, his unquiet mien; the Virginian’s aristocratic,
slaveholding, plantation world, so different from the New Englander’s modest farm and simple Boston city
life; the former’s tact, in contradistinction to the latter’s irascible obnoxiousness; Jefferson’s pawky, behindthe-scenes, substratic, politically manipulative style, a man prone to tergiversation in juxtaposition to
Adams’ naïve frankness; the former’s dislike of government versus the latter’s embracing of it; Jefferson’s
deism or perhaps, some suggest, his atheism, at variance with Adams’ puritanically-influenced
Protestantism; and as this study will establish, Jefferson’s radical, democratic republicanism, so
distinguishable from Adams’ much more classical and mainstream republican ideas.6

month for over thirteen years. The book also includes fifty-one letters between Jefferson and Abigail
Adams, evenly split. See The Adams-Jefferson Letters, The Complete Correspondence between Thomas
Jefferson & Abigail & John Adams, Lester J. Cappon, ed. (Chapel Hill, NC & London: University of North
Carolina Press, 1959) (repr. 1987), p. xxix. Looking at the entirety of the correspondence between Adams
and Jefferson, “Adams wrote nearly four letters to Jefferson for every one that Jefferson wrote to him.” R.
B. Bernstein, “John Adams: The Life and Biographers,” A Companion to John Adams and John Quincy
Adams, David Waldstreicher, ed. (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), p. 23. Jefferson was far from
the only old friend with whom the retired Adams engaged in epistolary dialogue. See, e.g., The Spur of
Fame: Dialogues of John Adams and Benjamin Rush 1805-1813, John A. Schutz & Douglass Adair, eds.
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1966).
5

Another parallel: Jefferson wrote to a friend that he “labour[ed] grievously under the malady of
Bibliomania.” Thomas Jefferson to Lucy Ludwell Paradise, June 1, 1789, cited in “A Place of Reading,
Personal Libraries: Jefferson,” http://www.americanantiquarian.org/Exhibitions/Reading/jefferson.htm (93-17). As for Adams, in 1768 he wrote in his Diary, “To what Object are my Views directed? What is the
End and Purpose of my Studies, Journeys, Labours of all Kinds of Body and Minds, of Tongue and Pen?
Am I gasping at Money, or Scheming for Power?... I am mostly intent at present, upon collecting a
Library, and I find that a great deal of Thought, and Care, as well as Money, are necessary to assemble
an ample and well chosen Assortment of Books.” Adams Diary, Jan. 30, 1868, Diary & Autobiography of
John Adams (“JA D&A”), Vol. I, L. H. Butterfield, ed. (New York: Atheneum, 1964), p. 337.
6
Of course, there is a vast array of scholarship on Jefferson, some of which is referenced in Notes to the
2016 Gordon-Reed/Onuf collaboration, “Most Blessed of the Patriarchs.” Jefferson’s traits, private and
public, personal and political, fill the pages of this recent monograph, e.g., “The masterful politician, one

2

As adamantine as the leaders were in their political convictions, their reflections evolved.7 For
example, one of the topics raised by Adams in 1812 and again years later in their celebrated correspondence, was his preoccupation with political ideas, including those of Algernon Sidney, a seventeenthcentury Englishman whose major work, Discourses Concerning Government, was of pivotal importance in
Sidney’s conviction and subsequent execution for high treason as an enemy of Charles II. Adams’ 1812
shared ruminations on this subject were triggered by Jefferson’s reflections about his own disengagement
from politics: “But whither is senile garrulity leading me? Into politics, of which I have taken final leave. I
think little of [France and England], and say less. I have given up newspapers in exchange for Tacitus
and Thucydides, for Newton and Euclid; and I find myself much the happier.”8 On the eve of war in early
1812, Adams commiserated. “What an Exchange have you made? Of Newspapers for Newton! Rising
from the lower deep of the lowest deep of Dulness and Bathos to the Contemplation of the Heavens and
the heavens of Heavens.” Indeed, Adams expressed regret that he had spent so much time on political
ideas. “Oh that I had devoted to Newton and his Fellows that time which I fear has been wasted on Plato
and Aristotle, Bacon (Nat), Acherly, Bolinbroke, De Lolme, Harrington, Sidney, Hobbes, Plato Redivivus
[Neville], Marchmont Nedham, with twenty others upon Subjects which Mankind is determined never to

of the best of his generation, abhorred direct conflict and sought to avoid it in any way he could.
…Madison Hemings, his second son with [the slave] Sally Hemings, recalled that Jefferson ‘hardly ever
allowed himself to be made unhappy any great length of time,’ attributing great powers of self-control to
his father, who he also said had a ‘smooth and even’ temperament … an outward appearance of
equanimity…. .” “Most Blessed of Patriarchs” is a fascinating analysis of Jefferson’s very private albeit
incontrovertibly hypocritical nature. See Annette Gordon-Reed and Peter S. Onuf. “Most Blessed of the
Patriarchs”: Thomas Jefferson and the Empire of the Imagination (New York & London: Liveright
Publishing Corp, 2016). For details, see Appendix B.
7
“One must approach the letters not as systematic treatises but as flashes of wisdom arising from the
lurking desire both men felt to search life out on its fundamental terms.” Rush Welter, “The Adams-Jefferson Correspondence, 1812-1826,” American Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Autumn 1950), pp. 235-50, 237.
8

Jefferson to Adams, Jan. 21, 1812, The Adams-Jefferson Letters, p. 291. One can contrast this Jeffersonian perspective with his 1771 interest in “Politics and Trade,” as well as “Law,” and the importance of
reading in these fields and others, for “everything is useful which contributes to fix in the principles and
practices of virtue.” In recommending books that a well-read gentleman should own, Jefferson wrote, “Of
Politics and Trade I have given you a few only of the best books, as you would probably chuse to be not
unacquainted with those commercial principles which bring wealth into our country, and the constitutional
security we have for the enjoiment of that wealth.” Eight books were specified, including “Sidney on
government,” and “Locke on government.” Thomas Jefferson to Robert Skipwith, Aug. 3, 1771, Thomas
Jefferson: Writings, Merrill D. Peterson, ed. (New York: The Library of America. 2011), pp. 740-45.
3

Understand, and those who do Understand them are resolved never to practice, or countenance.”9
All of this was heartfelt. But, of course, both men continued their lifelong absorption in politics,
reflecting and commenting on governance, both current and historic. In 1823, twelve-and-a-half years
after his initial reflections to Jefferson on Sidney and others, Adams returned to the subject. Once again
his thoughts were prompted by Jefferson’s cogitation, this time about the “rivers of blood” that “must yet
flow” in order for men around the world to “recover the right of self-government.”10 Adams’ response was
different than it had been in 1812: “It is melancholy to contemplate the cruel wars, dessolutions of
Countries, and ocians of blood which must occure, before rationale principles, and rational systems of
Government can prevail and be established.” This time Adams found solace in Sidney’s republicanism, “I
have lately undertaken to read Algernon Sidney on Government. There is a great difference in reading a
Book at four and twenty, and at Eighty Eight, as often as I have read it and fumbled it over; it now excites
fresh admiration.” At the same time, Adams lamented the fact that, “this work has excited so little interest
in the literary world.” To Adams, the lack of appreciation of Sidney “show[ed] the slow progress of Moral
philosophical political Illumination in the world.”11
The contrast is plain. In 1812 Adams sarcastically observed that mankind was “determined never
to Understand” the ideas of a host of political thinkers, from Plato and Aristotle to Sidney and other early
modern English republicans. He bemoaned the fact that even those who understood the ideas were
“resolved never to practice, or countenance” them. Widespread indifference to Sidney and other political
thinkers gave Adams cause to conclude that perhaps all these years he had been wasting his time. But
by 1823, in a letter to Jefferson that zeroed in on Sidney, Adams wistfully wished that earlier in life he had
had a more profound appreciation for the Englishman’s republican ideas. Yet the “facts on the ground,”
as far as the status of Sidney’s ideas among the intellectual elite, were remarkably unchanged. “Political
illumination” was slow; Sidney’s republicanism was neither generally understood nor appreciated.12

9

Adams to Jefferson, Feb. 3, 1812, The Adams-Jefferson Letters, pp. 294-95.

10

Jefferson to Adams, Sept. 4, 1823, id, p. 596.

11

Adams to Jefferson, Sept. 18, 1823, id, p. 598. Adams’ friend Dr. Benjamin Rush also “read Sidney
upon government …[w]hen a young man,” as no doubt did most of the highly educated Americans. Rush
to Adams, March 13, 1809, The Spur of Fame: Dialogues of John Adams and Benjamin Rush 1805-1813,
John A. Schutz and Douglas Adair, eds. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1966), p. 148.
12

Adams was preaching to the choir; for Jefferson had appreciated Sidney for some time, and in fact
4

We remain in the same boat today. At the risk of falling into that “sterile, unproductive, and even
nauseating” category of historical debate that critics abhor, this study returns to the well-worn subject of
the nature of early modern Anglo-American republicanism, that is, the republicanism that developed in
England and then migrated across the Atlantic.13 The obvious question is, why bother? The
historiography is immense and entangled. Controversy and academic interest seems finally, to at least

thought that others did, too. Eight years before Adams’ “countenance” letter, when asked by the preacher
and author Mason Locke Weems what he thought about Weems publishing Sidney’s works, Jefferson
stated, “the world has so long and so generally sounded the praises of his Discourses on government, that
it seems superfluous, and even presumptuous, for an individual to add his feeble breath to the gale.” In
Jefferson’s view, Sidney’s Discourses constituted “in truth a rich treasure of republican principles,
supported by copious & cogent arguments, and adorned with the finest flowers of science.” Indeed,
Discourses was “probably the best elementary book of the principles of government, as founded in natural
right, which has ever been published in any language: and it is much to be desired in such a government
as ours that it should be put into the hands of our youth as soon as their minds are sufficiently matured for
that branch of study.” Much later, in an 1825 extract of minutes of the Board of Visitors of the University of
Virginia, Jefferson and his colleagues passed a resolution that “as to the general principles of liberty and the
rights of man, in nature and in society, the doctrines of Locke, in his ‘Essay concerning the true original
extent and end of civil government,’ and of Sidney in his ‘Discourses on government,’ may be considered as
those generally approved by our fellow citizens of this, and the United States.” Report to the President and
Directors of the Literary Fund (extract), “From the Minutes of the Board of Visitors, University of Virginia,
1822-1825,” Thomas Jefferson Writings (New York: The Library of America, 2011), p. 479.
In “An Oration Delivered at the State-House in Philadelphia, to a very Numerous Audience; on Thursday the
1st of August, 1776,” (Philadelphia, repr. London: J. Johnson, 1776), pp. 27-28 & inside cover, which may
not (apparently was not) ever delivered, Samuel Adams, probably the most consequential of the original
Massachusetts Bay agitators, stated, “This day presents the world with the most august spectacle that its
annals ever unfolded. Millions of Freemen deliberately and voluntarily forming themselves into a society for
their common defence and common happiness. – Immortal Spirits of Hampden, Locke, and Sydney! will it
not add to your benevolent joys to behold your posterity rising to the dignity of Men and evincing to the
world the reality and expediency of your Systems, and in the actual enjoyment of that equal liberty, which
you were happy, when on Earth, in delineating and recommending to mankind! –.“. This document is part of
the important Marvin and Sybil Weiner Spirit of America Collection, Florida Atlantic University (“FAU/Weiner
Collection”), which I had the privilege of accessing as a fellow in the 2018-2019 Huntington Library-Florida
Atlantic. University Libraries Joint Fellowship program.
Unsurprisingly, in an erudite 1839 discourse delivered on the Jubilee (fiftieth anniversary) of the United
States Constitution by John Quincy Adams, sixth President of the United States (1825-29) and son of John
Adams, JQA cited Algernon Sidney and John Hampden as English republicans who were well-known
heroes in the fight for English liberties. For more details about JQA’s references to the revolutionary
inspiration of Sidney’s ideas, see Appendix B.
13
Alan Gibson, Understanding the Founding, the Crucial Questions, 2nd ed. (Lawrence KS: University
Press of Kansas, 2010), p. 134. Recognizing, as Scott did, that “the battlefields of the seventeenth century
itself are becoming increasingly hard to see under the great piles of bleached bones left by historians
murdered by their colleagues,” which “landscape has become a problem for students,” one nevertheless
seeks to escape the “vacuousness with which scholars were handling the concept” of republicanism and
the “crash of republicanism.” Jonathan Scott, England’s Troubles (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.
22; Michael P. Winship, “Godly Republicanism and the Origins of the Massachusetts Policy,” William and
Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 63, No. 3 (July 2006), pp. 427-62, 428 & n.2.

5

some degree, to have waned. There is no doubt among scholars that there was something labeled
“republicanism” that existed in Europe and America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. We
know that not everyone who advocated or wrote about it, and there were many, had the same view of
what “it” was. There is consensus that American political theory can no longer simply be viewed as a
consequence of economically-driven priorities, although Progressive historian Charles Beard had a very
good point, Gordon Wood has emphasized, upon which scholars should continue to reflect.14 Experts
also concur that it is insufficient to wrap the American story of founding principles in the mantle of
Lockean liberalism; republican ideas were an integral part of early American intellectual thought.15 So why
should intellectuals of all stripes dither any longer on this subject?
The answer is that the subject still begs for clarification. Neither logomachy nor hair splitting is
intended. There remains an impressive array of conflicting scholarship and the opportunity to synthesize
the wisdom contained in it with both the ideas and actions of key historical actors who advocated and
fought for republican principles. There are well-recognized elements to early modern Anglo-American
republicanism; but these elements are not necessarily defined in the same way by their devotees, not to
mention by early modern Anglo-American scholars. As he was wont to do, echoing Cicero, Adams quite
sensibly said, “Terms must be defined before we can reason.”16 At the same time, historian James

14

For a discussion of the Beardian paradigm and, particularly, Gordon Wood’s reflections on Beardian
history, see Appendix B. Wood’s methodological advocacy of contextual history, with particular emphasis
on motivational circumstances, was an effort “to urge historians not to get too carried away with
exclusively intellectual explanations of the [American] Revolution.” Underlying social and material
circumstances were important, too. Gordon Wood, The Idea of America: Reflections on the Birth of the
United States (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), pp. 54-55. While this study is not about the causes of
revolution, the intention is to consider the impact of social and material circumstances – the actual
circumstances the protagonists experienced – on Sidney and Adams’ republican ideas. As Wood stated,
“That’s the way we still use ideas. Who reads a book and absorbs the whole thing? Rather, we select
those parts that seem relevant or meaningful to us. We pick and choose the ideas from those available to
us that seem most appropriate and that make our experience and circumstances most meaningful. But it
is our experience that is determinative.” Id, p. 77. For a classic study of the causes of revolution, see
Part I of Lawrence Stone’s 1972 monograph, The Causes of the English Revolution, 1529-1642 (London
& New York: Routledge, 2005). For interesting comments on The Idea of America, see Paul O. Carrese,
Review, “Gordon S. Wood, The Idea of America…,” American Political Thought, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring
2012), pp. 158-61.
15

See, e.g., Peter C. Myers, “Locke on the Social Compact: An Overview,” The American Founding and
the Social Compact, Ronald J. Pestritto and Thomas G. West, eds. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2003), Ch. 1, pp. 1-35 (American constitutionalism “neither originates nor receives its classic exposition in
the work of any American…. [I]ts classic exposition … appears in the political philosophy of John Locke.”)
16

Adams to John Taylor, April 15, 1814, Founders Online, National Archives, last modified June 13, 2018
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-6278, 11-3-18. [This is an Early Access
6

Kloppenberg wisely cautioned, terms can have fundamentally different meanings to different authors,
especially in different political cultures, which necessitates particular sensitivity in a study over time and
distance; in short, terms can be misleading.17 Historian David Wootton spent pages of his introduction to
Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776 agonizing over whether it was even possible
to provide a single definition of republicanism.18 Indeed, one subsection of Wootton’s introduction was
entitled, “The Unintelligible Word.”19 Eric Nelson began his book on The Greek Tradition in Republican

document from The Adams Papers. It is not an authoritative final version.]. In De Officiis, On Obligations,
Cicero began his essay to his son by noting that he would like to first define the term obligation, “For
every rational approach to instruction on any subject ought to begin with a definition, to ensure that
people know what the topic under discussion is.” Cicero, On Obligations, P. G. Walsh, ed. (Oxford & New
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 5. Note that the almost reflexive reliance on Cicero by both
Sidney and Adams was passed down to John Quincy Adams.
17
James T. Kloppenberg, “In Retrospect: Louis Hartz’s “The Liberal Tradition in America,” Reviews in
American History, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Sept. 2001), pp. 460-78, 465. Kloppenberg repeated these words of
caution in his recent study. “Comparative historical studies are complicated by the fact that meanings
change over time and across languages, and as a result of later interpretations, yet meanings remain at
least sufficiently stable to enable what we call communication.” James Kloppenberg, Toward Democracy:
The Struggle for Self-Rule in European and American Thought (New York: Oxford University Press,
2016), p. 15. Legal scholar John Philip Reid asseverated that, “to understand the eighteenth century
constitution we must first understand what words meant in the eighteenth century.” John Phillip Reid, The
Concept of Representation in the Age of the American Revolution (The University of Chicago Press,
1989), p. 138; Introduction, Comparison and History, Deborah Cohen & Maura O’Connor, eds. (New York
& London: Routledge, 2004), pp. ix-xxiv.
18
“Republicanism is perhaps as slippery to define as puritanism and is subject to even more heuristic
abuse.” Michael P. Winship, “Godly Republicanism and the Origins of the Massachusetts Polity,” The
William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 63, No. 3 (July 2006), pp. 427-62, 428; David Wootton,
“Introduction,” Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776, David Wootton, ed. (Stanford
University Press, 1994), pp. 1-41, 1-7.
19
In an effort to avoid getting bogged down in the historiographic mire, suffice it to say that there are
different approaches to intellectual and political history even among scholars who embrace contextualism.
Consider the following statements, for example, from two eminent historians. First Kloppenberg:
“Assuming that we scholars know Americans’ deeper or more authentic aspirations has inspired a
generation of scolding or wishful thinking masquerading as history, political science, or cultural studies –
on both ends of the political spectrum. Individuals have different ideas about human motivation. …
Rather than presuming to… discern deeper longings buried beneath behavior we dislike, it is more fruitful
to examine the struggles that have shaped our nation from a different point of view – the perspectives of
those who fought them.” James T. Kloppenberg, “Requiescat in Pacem: The Liberal Tradition of Louis
Hartz,” The American Liberal Tradition Reconsidered: The Contested Legacy of Louis Hartz, Mark
Hulliung, ed (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 2010), pp. 90-124. Then there is historian Cary
Nederman’s perspective: “A genuinely historical reading of a theoretical text must therefore transcend the
author’s self-ascribed intention regarding his own activity. …Because expressions may contain more
than an agent is aware of, the analyst can never, in his quest for understanding, concentrate exclusively
on the reconstruction of conscious purposes. How then is the historian of political thought to establish
with precision the appropriate historical context for an author’s work (a difficulty largely obviated by an
intentionalist approach such as Skinner’s)? How do we know what historical processes and forces were
of concern to a given text or thinker?” Nederman reminded us that, “a theorist brings to the text a vast
range of historically constituted principles, assumptions and values, imbedded deep in his contemporary
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Thought with “the premise that the question ‘what is the essence of republicanism?’ is badly posed.”20
Putting this study in the starkest terms, while there is some scholarly consensus about certain
elements of republicanism, other essential theory components have received short shrift or less. Brilliant
scholars primarily in three disciplines – history, political theory and law – have extensively analyzed the
subject matter, sometimes with great insight.21 Yet their studies frequently talk past each other, most
notably the perspective of fellow experts who have pursued the matter from different disciplinary
perspectives. Some scholarly differences are unimportant and, indeed, can lead down a lovely path to an
inconsequential dead end. But other differences have resulted in a misunderstanding of both the nature of
republicanism and of historical circumstances – in short, a misunderstanding of history, intellectual and
otherwise. This is true, for example, with respect to the confusion over republican views on monarchy. If
there is foundational confusion about the very nature of early modern Anglo-American republicanism, we
create difficulties for scholars, who build their understanding of modern political thought on top of this
muddle.22 Not to be melodramatic, but our lack of clarity about early modern Anglo-American
republicanism risks creating an intellectual house of cards.
Alan Gibson wisely observed that, “After graduate school, few scholars go back to challenge the
methodological assumptions and intellectual frameworks underlying the approaches that they have
adopted. Furthermore, whatever they claim, even fewer scholars operate outside the contours of the

experience, which influences both the shape and substance of his thought. Insofar as the elements of an
author’s historical experience function as hidden premises, unexamined postulates buried far beneath his
stated words and concepts, it becomes the primary task of the historian to uncover them and to relate
them to a particular text or tradition.” Accordingly, “the study of the history of political theory must aim at
reconstituting the theorist’s subject matter, his historical world. What is required, in effect, is the
integration of a constellation of available historical information – political, social, economic, intellectual,
biographical – into a coherent picture of the setting in which a text was composed.” Nederman, Lineages
of European Political Thought, pp. 24-25.
20

Eric Nelson, The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 17.

21

Not surprisingly there are also scholars of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century literature who have
wandered into the wonderful republican morass in their study of politically-infused fiction. Most
noteworthily, see Annabel Patterson, Early Modern Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
22

Professor Charles McIlwain was driving at the same point when he observed, “I would spare you these
dry details if I could, but I know of no safe road by which we may arrive at true generalizations in history
except the narrow and sometimes devious path through the concrete details, and by the most minute and
careful examination of them. Generalizations without such a basis – and we have too many of them – are
not merely worthless; they are often in their practical results very dangerous.” Charles Howard McIlwain,
Constitutionalism Ancient & Modern (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966) (1st ed. 1940), pp. 74-75.
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conventional intellectual frameworks that are both the product and progenitor of scholarship.” Here, then,
we have an opportunity. “[W]hen historiography is pursued seriously, it can be more fundamental than
direct interpretation of historical thinkers because it can lead us to examine the assumptions on which we
begin interpretation of those writings.” 23 I am greedy; my intent here is to accomplish both: to combine the
direct interpretation of the political works of Sidney and Adams, two important seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century republican thinkers on each side of the pond (and hence manifestly part of the early
modern Atlantic republican tradition), in their historical context, with an appreciation of the assumptions,
lacunae, and contradictions within the scholarship that may be leading us astray in understanding the
nature of that tradition.24
The outcome of this effort will be proof positive that in defining an early modern Atlantic republican
tradition there has been some consensus that republicans emphasize liberty, participatory government, the
consent of the governed and the importance of virtue (albeit a concept inconsistently defined), while they
reject absolute monarchy and recognize the right to rebel against tyranny and corruption (albeit with diverse

23
Gibson, Understanding the Founding, p. 232. This seems to be what Thomas Kuhn meant when he
said that, “paradigm workers rarely interrogate their own assumptions.” Sidney A. Pearson, Jr.,
Introduction to Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Jr., American Interpretations of Natural Law: A Study in the
History of Political Thought (New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers, 2016), p. xv.
24
This intent explains this study’s preoccupation with Kloppenberg’s Toward Democracy, which sought to
wipe the pesky republican tradition off the historical map of political ideas. James T. Kloppenberg, Toward
Democracy: The Struggle for Self-Rule in European and American Thought (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2016). Toward Democracy is informed by this effort and there are innumerable examples of it. To
take just a few, when Kloppenberg described the history of the quest for self-government, “securing the
integrity of the law,” the ability to “make decisions according to rules or laws chosen for good reason,”
“constitutional government,” “popular sovereignty,” the “shared assumption that all citizens should have
the capacity to shape their own lives,” the rejection of “privileged rights,” and the preference for “mixed
government or representative democracy over direct democracy,” Kloppenberg was actually talking about
the evolution of republicanism, and what those at the time called republican governance, not democracy.
Indeed, Kloppenberg conceded that the American colonists, for example, “rejected the idea of democracy
as an unbalanced and therefore unstable and undesirable form of government.” Id, pp. 4-5, 8.-9, 12, 188;
cf. n. 56, and the approach of European attorneys Besson and Martí. Legal historian G. Edward White
made the following observation about analyzing history that resonates here: “For more than a half century
various writers interested in the history of historiographical trends and the philosophy of history have
debated whether historical writing is necessarily directed toward deriving general causal explanations of
the past, or whether it simply involves the re-creation of the motives, attitudes, values, and shared
understandings of past actors. If historical writing is necessarily causal, history would be best placed
among the social sciences; if it is essentially concerned with describing how past actors thought and felt
and understood their worlds, it might be best placed among the humanities.” White’s conclusion: “I find
the distinctions too stark; historical writing strikes me as containing both causal and descriptive components, sometimes ordered and sometimes not.” G. Edward White, Law in American History, Volume I:
From the Colonial Years through the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 10. On
Kloppenberg, see also my Final Reflections, n.8 & accompanying text.
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views about when and by whom such rebellion rightfully can be exercised). Other ascribed elements of
republicanism will be set aside, including the suggestion that the theory repudiates all forms of monarchy,
the notion that the form of government is an essential component of republicanism, and the conviction that
republicans spurn commerce. Notwithstanding the wide bandwidth of ideas that embrace republicanism’s
core principles, a political theory is distinguishable that we can comfortable term early modern AngloAmerican republicanism.25 Reestablishing the center, or what fairly can be understood as a mainstream
conception of the theory from among the world of republican ideas is an important step in achieving the
perspicuity that we lack.26 This enterprise will produce another result: we will finally have a thorough
intellectual basis for exploding the distinction between republicanism and what later became known as
liberalism.27 It will become clear that this distinction is no more valid a differentiation than the variety of

25

One theorist described a republican tradition “not of a single thread but of multiple interwoven strands,”
another way of describing this wide bandwidth. Iseult Honohan, Civic Republicanism (London & New York:
Routledge, 2002), p. 5.
26
As will become particularly evident in Ch. Two, it is important to distinguish between mainstream
republicanism and mainstream Whiggism. I agree with Worden that, “while at various times the posthumous Sidney can be fairly termed a radical Whig, or a country Whig, or an Independent Whig, he is
rarely a mainstream Whig, and never a court Whig.” Blair Worden, “The Commonwealth Kidney of
Algernon Sidney,” Journal of British Studies Vol. 24, No. 1 (Jan. 1985), pp. 1-40, 27.
27

In an effort to avoid “the deepest fault line in contemporary scholarship on Anglo-American thought,”
namely, “the divide between the liberal and republican, or Lockean and civic humanist, schools of
interpretation,” political scientist Lee Ward endeavored to shift the debate to Whiggism and “the politics of
liberty” in seventeenth-century England and eighteenth-century America. Ward did not, however, shed
this infamous “fault line” in his analysis of the ideas of James Tyrrell, Algernon Sidney, and John Locke,
who he categorized as “conservative” or “moderate” Whig, “republican” or “liberal.” Lee Ward’s The
Politics of Liberty in England and Revolutionary America (Cambridge University Press, 2010)[first pub.
2004], pp. 1, 8. A protégé of neo-Straussian Michael Zuckert, Ward focused on the impact of natural law
on these thinkers – what he termed “modern natural jurisprudence,” a subject of the present analysis of
Sidney and Adams’ ideas. Ward chose to focus on the three theorists who wrote major rebuttals to
Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha – a subject that obviously is fundamental in this study, too. But Ward’s
approach was very different. For example, contrary to my own findings, Ward argued that in embracing a
natural law foundation to their thought, Tyrrell, Sidney, and Locke rejected the “respectable anti-absolutist
tradition and the classical and Christian assumptions underlying it.” Id, p. 12. This study suggests quite
the opposite. Interestingly, Ward’s study also crossed the Atlantic; but Adams is not his focus. The three
American thinkers of importance to Ward as intellectual descendants of Tyrrell, Sidney, and Adams were
James Otis, Thomas Jefferson, and Thomas Paine. While the ideas of these men are part of the story
told here, in my own view Ward entirely missed the boat by paying relatively short shrift to Adams,
assuming, which clearly was Ward’s intention, the goal is to understand the roots of revolutionary
American political thought. Additionally, by featuring three and three thinkers on each side of the pond,
Ward unintentionally emphasized distinctions rather than commonalities or what I term “reestablishing the
center.” Rather than viewing “liberty” as the overarching concept defining these thinkers, as Ward did,
this study presents republicanism as the necessary overarching concept, of which liberty is one
component. We need not be afraid of this label as long as we systematically define and analyze it! In
this way, we can sensibly assess its applicability to the ideas of any theorist. To understand
republicanism systematically requires analysis of well-known although sometimes contested elements of
10

contretemps that exist among accepted members of the Anglo-American republican tradition. Various
scholars have alluded to this necessity; none have systematically explained why it makes sense to place
Locke's liberalism within the republican fold.28
Of greatest importance, we will be adding to the mix, and integrating with the well-recognized
elements of republicanism, two additional, critical elements that inform the early modern Anglo-American
republican tradition. Re-centering the tradition through a detailed analysis of the work of two mainstream
early modern republicans in England and America will establish that two contentions are a vital part of the
theory; yet they have not taken the pivotal place in the historiography of republicanism that they deserve:
(i) that law, in multiple ways, is the only thing that protects men from each other; and (ii) that balance
throughout government and society, and related principles of moderation, including toleration, is not only
valuable to society generally but is critical to the maintenance of a republic. “He is wise through the know-

the theory, along with the importance of moderation and toleration and, most importantly, an appreciation
of the multiple layers of law that are integral to republicanism -- not only, or even primarily natural law.
In sum, there is a republican umbrella under which fall a range of thinkers, whether or not one categorizes
them “to the left,” in the middle or “mainstream,” or “to the left.” Critically, all represent variations on a
theme. In considering Ward’s study, note, too, the valuable review of The Politics of Liberty by Douglas
Bradburn: “The Origin of a Species: The Making of Whig Political Thought,” Book Review, H-Net Review
in the Humanities & Social Sciences (May 2005), https://www.h-net.org/ reviews/showpdf.php?id=10496
(1-4-19).
28

For example, in an acclaimed book on changes in legal assumptions about childhood in early modern
England and America, the author expressed skepticism about the segregation of "Lockean liberalism"
from "Classical Republicanism." Holly Brewer, Children and Anglo-American Revolutionary Ideology
(Chapel Hill, NC & London: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), p. 15 & n.12. Indeed, Brewer expressed this idea much more assertively in a 2016 article, “Slavery, Sovereignty, and ‘Inheritable Blood’:
Reconsidering John Locke and the Origins of American Slavery,” American Historical Review (Oct. 2017),
pp. 1038-78, 1043 n.10. “Many scholars, following in the wake of J. G. A. Pocock’s The Machiavellian
Moment … differentiate between Locke’s ideas and broader ‘republican’ thought. However, Pocock’s
view of Locke was shaped by Peter Laslett and Macpherson’s narrow definition of Locke’s liberalism,
which in turn paved the way for a somewhat bizarre bifurcation of ideas between liberalism and republicanism.” Brewer considered Locke to be the “leading proponent of ideas about equality and consent.”
She lumped Locke together with Sidney and Harrington, “whose work was remarkably similar.” Michael
Zuckert is another scholar who desegregated liberalism and republicanism. See Michael P. Zuckert,
Natural Rights and the New Republicanism (Princeton University Press, 1994), p. xviii. Other experts
challenge Brewer and Zuckert's characterization of the scholarship. See, e.g., the analysis of the differences between "republican" and "liberal" and "the tensions between them" in John Pocock’s 2002 “Afterword,” J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, Richard Whatmore, intro. (Princeton University Press, 2016) [orig. pub. 1975] (“MM”), p.
556. And then there are scholars who viewed republicanism as a species of liberalism. See Gibson,
Understanding the Founding, pp. 137-38, citing multiple works by political scientist J. David Greenstone.
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ledge of the truth,” said Sidney.29 Because the basket of ideas that scholars ascribe to Anglo-American
republicanism has been materially incomplete, our understanding of the tradition remains woefully flawed.
Determining the truth of early modern Anglo-American republicanism is the goal of this study. Stated
another way, it is my purpose to put “the history and theory of republicanism … fully on the same page.”30
The best way to “remodel” republicanism is through a detailed analysis of the work of a
seventeenth-century Englishman and an eighteenth-century American whose ideas can be placed in the
context of fellow republicans to assess their viability as mainstream thinkers within the republican
tradition.31 As stated over thirty years ago but still true today, “the usual practice” is to place Sidney “in a
special category of radical whigs or disguised republicans with political ideologies too individualistic and
even eccentric to be treated as representative of their party.” This historiographic tendency is less
pervasive but still very much alive today (although I would replace the word “party” with political
philosophy). I also agree with the authors’ pithy retort that, “The view may be mistaken.”32 In sum, one
could compare other republicans; but the case for comparing Sidney and Adams is compelling.
First and foremost, both men were political theorists who wrote major "centrist" tracts about
republicanism. They represent the two sides of the Atlantic coin of mainstream Anglo-American
republicanism. The depth and breadth of scholarship on seventeenth and eighteenth-century England
and America is enormous. Relevant fields of study include the English Civil Wars when republican ideas
were an essential part of historical circumstances, as well as analyses of the American Revolution,

29

DCG, II.1.85.

30
Martin Dzelzainis, “Harrington and the Oligarchs: Milton, Vane and Stubbe,” Ch. 1, Perspectives on English
Revolutionary Republicanism, Dirk Wiemann & Gaby Mahlberg, eds. (Surrey, England & Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2014) (“M&WII”), pp. 15-33, 33. Wiemann is an English literature professor in Germany and
Mahlberg teaches British history in the UK. They are the editors of two collections of essays on “English
republicanism” by European scholars. The 2013 work is European Contexts for English Republicanism
(Surrey, England & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013) (“M&WI”).
31

On the “general problem” of the relationship of ideas to reality in the history of political thought (in the
context of early medieval thought), there are three identified questions of applicability to political history
generally and this study specifically: (i) Who wrote the political work and for what audience; (ii) What is the
transmission’s context, as ideological content may vary accordingly (i.e., content changes according to a
work’s intended use); and (iii) How much is a writer’s view shared by his contemporaries. Janet Nelson,
“Kingship and Empire,” The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought c. 350 – c. 1450, J. H. Burns,
ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 211-51, 212-13.
32

Corinne C. Weston and Janelle R. Greenberg. Subjects and Sovereigns: The Grand Controversy over
Legal Sovereignty in Stuart England (Cambridge University Press. 1981), p. 213.
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including its predicate and aftermath when, once again, republican ideas were integral to political life.33
These are the historical contexts of Sidney, Adams and the Anglo-American republican tradition.34 We
also must be mindful of the fact that the strategy and impact of Whig history affects these analyses.
In contrast to the footnoted Sidney, Adams is omnipresent, although often not featured in studies
of the American Revolution, and his ideas have been described in scholarship on the Founders, whether
in iterations that link Adams and others to prior generations of Englishmen (but not Sidney), or work
focused exclusively on eighteenth-century American political thought.35 Adams ideas are explored in a
number of texts.36 There are studies of legal history that include Anglo-America in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Early modern republicanism also is analyzed by jurists and political theorists. Each
man is the subject of thorough biographies, some of which emphasize their protagonist’s intellectual
development. But the relationship of Adams' ideas to Sidney's republicanism is not part of this scholarship
-- a fact no doubt attributable to Sidney’s relative obscurity. If any comparisons are made, scholars

33
Beyond Harrington, who was Pocock’s “crucial figure,” historians generally reference a cluster of early
modern English republicans; that list typically includes Marchamont Nedham, Henry Neville, Edmund
Ludlow, John Milton, sometimes Andrew Marvell, and sometimes Algernon Sidney. See, e.g.,
Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution, 1603-1714 (London: Routledge Classics, 2002), p. 183;
Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman, pp. 6, 22-55. Fink also identified some lesserknown figures, as did historian Blair Worden. Fink, p. 87; Blair Worden, “Republicanism, Regicide and
Republic: The English Experience,” Republicanism, a Shared European Heritage, Vol. 1, Republicanism
and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe, Quentin Skinner & Martin von Gelderen, eds. (Cambridge
University Press, 2002)(“Republicanism I”), pp. 184-90. On Pocock and Harrington, see MM, p. viii, and
John Pocock, “Machiavelli, Harrington and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century,” The
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 22:4 (Oct. 1964), pp. 549-83, 552. Books on the American
Revolution abound. Most recently, see Rick Atkinson, The British are Coming: The War for America,
Lexington to Princeton, 1775-1777 (Volume One of the Revolution Trilogy) (New York: Henry Holt and
Co. 2019).
34

Carswell rightly observed that because of the political complexity of the times, as evidenced by the
necessity for Sidney to use a cipher when communicating with his brother-in-law Northumberland “to
cover a secret correspondence about the dangerous political times they saw ahead”; there was “mistrust
and dissimulation which almost wantonly came to pervade the political world in which Algernon grew to
manhood. Always endemic, it was to become epidemic, so as to make it almost impossible for historians
to give the satisfactory account of the fabric and structure of politics of the mid century for which the
modern mind craves; for nothing was quite what it seemed to be.” John Carswell, The Porcupine: The
Life of Algernon Sidney (London: John Murray, 1989), p. 14.
35

For a sampling of Founders texts, see Appendix B.

36

Particular recognition should be given to the path-breaking work of Zoltán Haraszti in John Adams &
the Prophets of Progress (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964)[first pub., 1952]. For scholarship on
Adams, see Appendix B.
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typically emphasize the relationship between the ideas of Adams and Locke. Of course, there is a
separate field of scholarship on Locke, liberalism, and Lockean liberalism in contrast to republicanism.
This includes studies about Locke in seventeenth-century England and the importance of Locke's ideas in
America.37 All these discrete but often interrelated currents of scholarship bear on the thesis of this study.
None of it directly addresses the “missing” elements of republicanism in the historiography to which this
study subscribes; indeed, some of it is a contributory cause of this omission.
In short, the case for comparing the republicanism of Sidney and Adams is compelling. No
scholarship explores their common reliance on law as the structural foundation of their political theory, or
republicanism’s emphasis on balance and moderation. Their ideas also have not been clearly
distinguished from those advanced by other well-known republicans; there will be opportunity here to do
so. For example, it will become clear that Locke and his liberalism belongs within the republican fold; but
the major elements of early modern Anglo-American republicanism must first be established before the
views of the "liberal" Locke can be related to it. To select only Sidney or only Adams and contrast either
man's views to Locke would be insufficient to re-center Anglo-American republicanism.
Another reason it makes sense to compare the republican contexts and ideas of Sidney and
Adams is to appreciate certain similarities in experiences and the very deliberately, clearly and thoroughly
stated ideas that are the product of those experiences.38 Jefferson and Harrington, for example, were
republicans, but they espoused notably idiosyncratic and what some might term radical forms of
republicanism.39 Another factor is that Sidney and Adams’ ideas are not significantly encumbered with
other elements that inform the views of other early modern republicans, such as the heavy religious
emphasis in John Milton's theory (although there is no doubt that religious ideas underlie aspects of

37

For texts on Locke, see Appendix B.

38

Ryerson very recently made this point: Adams “left a full and often intimate record of what he was
thinking and doing, and even what he was feeling.” While mention is made by Ryerson of Sidney from
time to time, particularly as a republican author of whom Adams was fond, along with Harrington and
Locke on this point, no comparison is made. Richard Alan Ryerson, John Adams’s Republic: The One,
the Few and the Many (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), p. x.
39

“The Jeffersonian vision was progressive, radical, and democratic.” Staloff, Hamilton, Adams,
Jefferson, p. 247. “His immersion in the culture of the French intelligentsia validated the radical
republican principles he so eloquently articulated on his return to Virginia.” Gordon-Reed & Onuf, “Most
Blessed of the Patriarchs,” p. 197.
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Sidney and Adams’ thought, and there is no doubt that Milton was a republican).40 When Worden asked
the following two questions about Milton’s interests, we know that we have a very different emphasis from
Sidney and Adams: “Would the Puritan Revolution, as Milton initially hoped, prepare the way for the
‘shortly expected’ Second Coming? Were the English to have the role in the second dispensation, the
Gospel, that had been allotted to the Israelites under the first, the Law?”41 There also are unusual
parallels in both the historical circumstances of Sidney and Adams and their personal experiences. For
example, both men were formulating republican ideas in the face of, during and after revolution. There are
other republicans whose views overlap, e.g., James Madison, but whose context and audience is clearly
distinguishable.42 There are contemporaries of Adams whose views one might consider but, for various
reasons, e.g., a less centrist position or much less substantial scholarship on republicanism (John
Dickinson on both counts), they are less compelling for our purposes.43 There also are those who wrote
brilliantly about republicanism, but whose views materially changed over time, e.g., Alexander Hamilton

40
Milton’s ideas changed as he went through this volatile period of English history. In the 1640s, as a
young man, he “allied himself unequivocally with the Presbyterian cause,” but by 1646 he had publicly
rejected the Presbyterian’s Westminster Assembly of Divines, famously writing a poem that included the
line, “New Presbyter is but old Priest writ large.” He was not a conventional Puritan, or raised as such;
and the “mature Milton saw himself as a man apart, ordained by God to achieve great things in divinely
inspired poetry, and it is as a would-be poet-prophet that he finally approached the world in the hope of
correcting its ills.“ Here we can see a dramatic difference from the activist politicians Sidney and Adams
and their sense of themselves. At the same time, Milton was a humanist and rationalist, not a religious
enthusiast or mysticist. But “[f]or Milton, being an Independent in political and ecclesiastical matters
increasingly came to mean being alone…. The result was a contradiction,” with Milton defending freedom
of conscience in some works, but also hoping “naively that such a free exchange of ideas would allow for
a supreme truth to emerge which any rational, conscientious Christian should be able to see for
themselves and agree on.” As we shall see, this perspective was far from the pragmatic, hand’s on
approach to improving civil society to which Sidney and Adams were committed. Noam Reisner, John
Milton’s ‘Paradise Lost,’ (Edinburgh University Press, 2011), Ch. 1, Mapping and Making Paradise Lost,”
pp. 1-29, 3-4; Blair Worden, “Milton’s Republicanism and the tyranny of heaven,” Machiavelli and
Republicanism, pp. 225-45.
41

Blair Worden, Literature and Politics in Cromwellian England: John Milton, Andrew Marvell,
Marchamont Nedham (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 41.
42

On the unattainable craving to reach and establish the “original intent” of Madison and others at the
Constitutional Convention, see Christopher Collier, “Essay Review: The Historians versus the Lawyers:
James Madison, James Hutson and the Doctrine of Original Intent,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History
and Biography, Vol. 112, No. 1 (Jan. 1988), pp. 137-44. Of course, there is an entire body of scholarship
on original intent.
43

We could put Jefferson in this category, too. He corresponded profusely; but Jefferson only published
one book, Notes on the State of Virginia, written when he was in his late thirties (1782), and from which
he clearly departed, certainly in his actions, over the course of his sustained lifetime. Gordon-Reed &
Onuf, pp. 4-10, 83, 282-91.
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and again, James Madison.44 Other political theorists are relevant, e.g., the natural law theorists -Grotius, for example; but Grotius is neither Anglo-American nor republican.
Sidney and Adams were both republican theorists and major political activists, an uncommon
combination.45 There are interesting other parallels, most notably that both men were subject to markedly
cosmopolitan influences which unquestionably informed their ideas.46 It is important to make
comparisons that make sense. As the inference from the old adage goes, you can compare apples to
oranges if you are seeking to understand fruit.47 Here, the fruit is the Anglo-American republican tradition,

44

For a snapshot of the evolution of Hamilton’s thinking, see Staloff, Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson, pp. 5663.
45

As an early twentieth-century scholar wrote about Adams, “Of American statesmen he alone wrote
treatises on government.” Francis Newton Thorpe, “The Political Ideas of John Adams, The Pennsylvania
Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 44, No. 1 (1920), pp. 1-46, 44-45.
46

“Unlike most writers in the history of Western political thought, John Adams was not exclusively or even
primarily a political thinker but lived a long life full of legal and political activity at the highest level.”
Ryerson, John Adams’s Republic, p. ix. Both Jonathan Scott and Blair Worden have focused on “the
mindsets of author-politicians and political authors to show how a republican value system or ‘commonwealth principles’ might have translated into political action.” M&W, p. 6 & n.28. I am particularly indebted
to the extraordinary scholarship of Scott and Worden. While I do not always agree with their conclusions
(nor do they always agree with each other), their profound knowledge, insights, and work are pivotal in
understanding the times and ideas of seventeenth-century England, English politics, and Algernon
Sidney. These men have an entire body of work, but see, e.g., Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 21; Blair
Worden, “The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney,” Journal of British Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Jan.
1985), pp. 1-40. Note here, as well, that I could not agree more with Eric Nelson’s analysis in The
Royalist. Revolution of “two rival accounts” by historians and other scholars of political thought and action,
“of the causal significance (or lack thereof)” of political beliefs. Are political ideas and principles simply
“along for the ride,” “instrumental rationalizations,” or is there “a more robust causal role to social and
political theory,” with people legitimating (or, one could add, delegitimating) action by analytically justifying
or rejecting it, or in some circumstances, utilizing ideas to “impose constraints on what political actors do,”
including what the authors of those ideas do. I wholly subscribe to the second view. While it may sometimes be the case, it is not sensible to cynically conclude that the ideas men subscribe to are invariably
rationalizations of selfish action they self-interestedly want to take without regard to the ideas to which
they espouse commitment. This is certainly the case with Sidney and Adams, who virtually always “put
their money where their mouth was,” so to speak. As Nelson stated, “we should begin by trying to take
seriously the accounts that agents give of the content of their own beliefs and of the relation between
those beliefs and their actions.” This does not mean blind trust in such explanations; but it is the right
starting point. See Eric Nelson, The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding
(Cambridge, MA & London: The Belknap. Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), pp. 24-26.
47
See, e.g., Heinx-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocha, “Comparative History: Methods, Aims, Problems,”
Comparison and History, Ch. 2, pp. 23-39, 27; cf. Marta Petrusewicz, “The Modernization of the
European Periphery; Ireland, Poland, and the Two Sicilies, 1820-1870: Parallel and Connected, Distinct
and Comparable,” Ch. 10, id, pp. 145-63, 147 (perhaps we do comparative history best when we
compare the incomparable, “comparer l’incomparable” i.e., “building comparisons around common
questions tested on diverse – temporally and spatially – cultural situations.”) Petrusewicz’s language
seems inconsistent; but her comment goes to the question, what is the right comparison? i.e., what is the
“fruit” that constitutes our subject-matter. See id, Cohen & O’Connor, Introduction, p. xx.
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and Sidney and Adams are particularly useful in facilitating our understanding of that tradition.48
Commonalities and divergences under the republican umbrella will become apparent. This is not
unusual. The same thing would hold true if we were to poll the ideas of any thinkers we might group, e.g.,
democrats, conservatives or, in seventeenth-century England, royalists. We cannot make comparisons if
we are unable to simplify; at the same time, it is easy to oversimplify and “homogenize.” The one thing
that is imperative to avoid is, “A lifetime of scholarship,” after which “you end up sounding like a fortune
cookie.” Effective comparisons are “made in the interstices of their empirical foundations,” so that
arguments are formulated “about differences and similarities among a range of cases that allow us to
understand the general issue at hand … better than had we limited our scope to one” thinker.49 Sidney
and Adams’ views are very useful barometers of early modern Anglo-American republicanism precisely
because, in most respects, they echo, although they are not identical to their compatriots’ views.
Finally, it would be foolish to ignore the fact that the outcomes of their stories also make an
analysis of the republicanism of Sidney and Adams uniquely compelling. An American "Founding
Father," Adams became the first Vice President and second President of the United States.50 The
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In an essay collection on “English revolutionary republicanism,” the editors took stock of the many
aspects of recent republican scholarship. They approvingly noted that cultural materialists Alan Sinfield
and James Holstun rejected “a perceived ‘consensual idealism’ that retrospectively homogenizes and
pacifies a conflict-riven historical situation. Far from uniting its speakers, the ‘language’ of republicanism
… provides the condition of possibility for ideological contests to be played out between antagonistic
camps that have to share a common code in order to combat each other in the first place.” This may go a
bit too far. Antagonistic camps did not exist within the fold of early modern English republicanism. But
there was a range of ideas on each republican component, some broadly shared and others more
idiosyncratic, some held by just one man, others by many. M&WII, pp. 1-12, 4-5.
49
Baldwin, “Comparing and Generalizing,” Comparison and History, pp. 1-22, 11. “To a certain degree,
the meanings intended by historical writers and speakers, and those understood by historical readers and
listeners, are lost to us, because we inherit knowledge and understandings through which we inevitably
filter all the texts we encounter. Even though historians should acknowledge the obstacles that stand in
our way, we can strive for understandings as close to the meanings intended by those whom we study as
we can achieve.” Kloppenberg, Toward Democracy, pp. 14-15. While comparative historical studies “are
complicated,” and the meaning of words change, that doesn’t mean that we should not try to recover their
intended meaning. Id.
50

Note, however, the scholarly tendency to overlook or fail to appreciate the extraordinary contribution of
Adams to the formation of the American republic, particularly vis-à-vis Jefferson. See, e.g., the recent
incorrect assertion by Gordon-Reed & Onuf that, “There is little doubt that [Jefferson] was the central figure
in the early American republic. No one’s contribution to and participation in the formation of the American
Union was of longer duration and more sustained influence.” “Most Blessed of the Patriarchs,” pp. xxiv-xxv
(emphasis added). That is not to disagree with Jefferson’s perception of himself: “Thomas Jefferson
viewed himself as the real father of this country.” Id, p. xx (emphasis in original). For Adams, the Gordon17

Sidney/Percy family also can be deemed "founding," arriving in England in the eleventh century with
William the Conqueror. Following family tradition, Sidney served in Parliament. But in contrast to Adams'
trajectory, Sidney was ostracized from his country for many years and then, when he finally returned,
executed after a political trial of great notoriety. Was this entirely due to the conspicuous fact that the
American Revolution succeeded whereas, contrary to the mainstream Whig perspective, from Sidney's
vantage point the English revolution may well have been characterized as a failure? Consideration will be
given to whether there was something in Sidney and Adams’ ideas about the nature of republicanism
that, in combination with their historical contexts, meaningfully contributed to these extraordinarily divergent outcomes. Both men were celebrated in their time. While Adams may not be lionized in the way
some of the other Founding Fathers are (and he undoubtedly would have liked to be), nevertheless he is
a cherished, admired, and pivotal figure in American history and political thought whereas Sidney has
been overshadowed by fellow English theorists and politicians, particularly Harrington and Locke on
theory and the Earl of Shaftesbury and others with respect to politics. We must consider whether there is
something about the nature and contexts of their republicanism that lent itself to these divergent legacies.
In sum, to understand early modern Anglo-American republicanism, Sidney and Adams’ ideas,
experiences and outcomes is the best starting point. The Cambridge School's recognition of the critical
importance of context remains as compelling a methodological starting point today as it did when Quentin
Skinner advocated that approach 44 years ago in "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas."51
We have two men, a century apart, on two different continents, whose shared ideas constitute mainstream republicanism. One could make other comparisons, and perhaps this work will lead to further
consideration of other theorists’ relative place within the republican pantheon. But it is sensible to begin
our reconsideration of the nature of the early modern Anglo-American republican tradition with an
examination of the contexts and ideas of Algernon Sidney and John Adams. First, however,
historiographic context is essential.

Reed/Onuf emphasis on Jefferson as “a republican patriarch” or an “’enlightened’ patriarch” would have
been an oxymoron. See, e.g., id, pp. xvi, xx, 61, 143-45, 163, 294.
51

Skinner offered sage advice on how an historian should practice his craft in his early essay, “Meaning
and Understanding in the History of Ideas.” The essay outlined the way to analyze a text to arrive at its
non-anachronistic meaning. See Appendix B for a description of Skinner’s approach and some of the
many scholarly analyses of his and Pocock’s ideas.
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To enter the domain of historiography one has to pass through the thorny thicket
in which scholars are sorted out by “schools.” The dangers in such exercises
have been persistently deplored by scholars of almost all persuasions.
Alfred F. Young, “American Historians Confront the Transforming Hand of Revolution” 52
Coke can hardly be let out of an inquiry into the intellectual origins of the English Revolution,
Yet he presents difficulties. He was a lawyer, not an intellectual.
Christopher Hill, Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution Revisited 53

A. The Historiography
Republican thought has been the subject of vast scholarship.54 It remains a contentious subject
today. This scholarship has many facets. Understanding the types and content of scholarship extant, the
nature of the consistencies and inconsistencies within this large body of work, and identifying likely
assumptions, lacunae, and contradictions present there is a necessary predicate to this study. In so
doing, we are laying the historiographic context within which to view the republican ideas of Sidney and
Adams.
To first take a bird’s eye view, one must begin by examining the roots of early modern republicanism, which takes us to the classical world. There is a medieval transition that is rarely addressed in early
modern historiography, which tends to jump from ancient Rome to Renaissance Florence. Law is one of
the factors that is vitally important in this transition, pre-dating Renaissance republicanism, an essential
precursor political theory to early modern republicanism and about which extensive interpretation and
historiography abounds. Since our interest is in early modern Anglo-American republicanism we must
next turn to the body of republican analyses that began with the pioneering work of Zelda Fink in 1945

52
Alfred F. Young, “American Historians Confront ‘The Transforming Hand of Revolution,’” Alfred F.
Young & Gregory H. Nobles, Whose American Revolution Was It? Historians Interpret the Revolution
(New York University Press, 2011).
53

Christopher Hill Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution Revisited (Oxford & New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997)[1st ed. 1965], p. 227.
54

Among the many important contributions are Fink, The Classical Republicans; Robbins, The
Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman; Pocock, MM; Quentin Skinner, “The republican ideal of political
liberty,” Machiavelli and Republicanism, Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner & Maurizio Viroli, eds. (Cambridge
University Press, 1993); Maurizio Viroli, Republicanism (New York: Hill and Wang, 2002); Philip Pettit,
Republicanism (Oxford University Press, 1999); Paul Rahe, ed., Machiavelli’s Liberal Republican Legacy
(Cambridge University Press, 2006). For an overview of the historiography of an Atlantic republican
tradition, see Robert E. Shalhope, “Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding
of Republicanism in American Historiography,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Jan.,
1972), pp.49-80; Daniel T. Rogers, “Republicanism: the Career of a Concept,” The Journal of American
History, 79:1 (Jun., 1992), pp. 11-38; Robert E. Shalhope, “Republicanism and Early American
Historiography,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Apr., 1982), pp. 334-56.
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and Caroline Robbins in 1959 that identified, respectively, seventeenth-century English classical republicans and English "Commonwealthmen" as the intellectual progenitors of the eighteenth-century American
revolutionaries.55 The ideas of Robbins and Fink became a springboard for scholarship that defined an
Atlantic republican tradition. The path breaking work of Pocock, in combination with the innovative
scholarship of Bernard Bailyn and Gordon Wood, connected English republican theory with American
revolutionary ideas and advocates.56 It also shifted early American historiography away from the
economic focus of American Progressive historians to a study of the ideas that underlay the formation of
the Republic.57 Predictably, scholarship about an Atlantic republican tradition then fractured into multiple
schools of thought.58 In addition to the work of political scientists and historians, there is important legal
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Fink, The Classical Republicans; Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman.

56

Pocock, MM; Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1992). Bailyn’s protégé, the renowned historian Gordon Wood, has focused
intensely on the language and discourse of the Founding, as well as post-Revolutionary American
republicans during the Constitutional debates of the 1790s. Wood’s prolificacy includes Empire of Liberty:
A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); The Idea of
America: Reflections on the Birth of the United States (New York: Penguin, 2011); Revolutionary
Characters: What Made the Founders Different (New York: Penguin, 2006); The Radicalism of the
American Revolution: How a Revolution Transformed a Monarchical Society into a Democratic One
Unlike Any that Had Ever Existed (New York: Vintage Books, 1991); and The Creation of the American
Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1969) [repr. 1998].
57

Legal historian G. Edward White noted what may be a parallel distinction in the study of legal history. He
described three perspectives among twentieth and twenty-first century American legal historians. See
Appendix B. In my own view there is value in each of these methodologies. Particularly important to keep
in mind is the present-ness of the law. In this study, because our interest is not uniquely in law and its
relationship to history, we are less concerned with the impact of historical themes on law than on how law
impacted one of those themes, viz., republicanism.
58

In his article on Pocock’s republicanism thesis, Jacob Soll bifurcated the historiography, defining one
major divide although it is clear that there are more than two historiographic perspectives. Indeed, Soll
himself noted that the Florentine culture “was not simply ideological. It was deeply rooted in historiographic and legal culture,” suggesting another historiography – that of the law – in connection with
Pocock’s republicanism thesis. But as to the major historiographic divide, Soll had this to say: “As
historical methodology has become more complicated and many fields have faced evolution and hybridization – the sort of rich complexity called for by [Daniel] Rogers [in his 1992 classic article, “Republicanism: The Career of a Concept”] – historians of “ideas in context” have sought to keep their context simply.
Paradoxically, a movement that had sought to historicize philosophical texts has become quite textual
itself, sticking to the discourse history of the 1970s and limiting its view to purely high-minded
conversations between great authors…. What have emerged are essentially two camps of historiography,
each deaf to the other’s claims. While the history of political discourse has not taken into account new
methodology or foundation works on the European Enlightenment, the field of early American history has
generally moved toward a social and cultural history of politics, excluding the study of the high political
culture of the founding fathers. Jacob Soll, “J.G.A. Pocock’s Atlantic Republicanism Thesis Revisited:
The Case of John Adams’ Tacitism,” Republic of Letters: A Journal for the Study of Knowledge, Politics,
20

scholarship on republicanism.59 The twenty-first century has brought new perspectives on the subject.60
The historian…should count not only days and years, but also, and above all, generations and centuries
if he is to “avoid the Scylla of disordered detail and the Charybis of meaningless generalities.”
Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Out of Revolution 61

and the Arts, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (Dec. 01, 2010), pp. 21- 37, 22, 27, http://arcade.stanford.edu/sites/
default/files/article_ pdfs/roflv 02i01_Soll_121510_0_0.pdf (9-12-17).
59
For an intriguing description of the difference between the “gifts” of the historian and the lawyer, see
William Michael Treanor, “Morton Horwitz: Legal Historian as Lawyer and Historian,” Transformations in
American Legal History: Essays in Honor of Professor Morton J. Horwitz, Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L.
Brophy, eds. (Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 319-26. E.g., “The term “legal historian” is almost an
oxymoron.” Id, p. 319. See also Charles Donahue Jr., “Whither Legal History?” id, pp. 327-43.
60
See, most importantly, Berman, Law and Revolution II. In a 2009 compilation, José Luis Martí and
Samantha Besson (M&B), a Spanish and Swiss lawyer, respectively, brought together international
scholars to address what they term “legal republicanism.” Incorporated in Legal Republicanism are
articles by political scientists, including Philip Pettit – perhaps best viewed as a former historian who has
migrated to political science and theory – as well as lawyers, including Mortimer Sellers, and professors of
philosophy and political theory, including Iseult Honohan. While the last Part of the book covers French
Republicanism and the Scottish Enlightenment, with some historical references, one look at the Index
quickly establishes that it was fellow contemporary political scientists, theorists and philosophers whose
ideas were the focus of the contributors’ attention, not historical figures. In other words, this is an
academic debate among designated political theorists about legal republicanism. Not surprisingly, neither
Sidney nor Adams is mentioned by M&B; each thinker is mentioned by one (but not the same)
contributor. In a string citation, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Paine, and Jefferson, an interesting assortment,
are referenced by M&B as “first modern republicans” who “deeply influenced … many neo-republican
authors,” i.e., presumably, current theorists. Setting aside Pettit, none of the many well-known historians
who have written about republicanism were among those who contributed to this compilation. Indeed, the
editors repeatedly emphasized that of the scholars and scholarship needed to address republicanism,
historians apparently are unnecessary. E.g., “legal republicanism remains largely unexplored qua legal
doctrine and deserves more attention by philosophers and legal scholars”; “one of the major difficulties
hampering the development of a republican theory of law has been that philosophers are usually unable
to deal with a concrete and detailed analysis of actual institutions and that legal scholars often ground
their institutional analysis on insufficient theoretical and normative foundations. In our view, then, one of
the priorities should be … to consolidate ties among political philosophers and legal scholars who are
working on republican theory”; the “chapters in this volume … involve an act of philosophical, political and
legal reflection”; “the controversy surrounding the interpretation of the rule of law and its requirements
simultaneously pertains to political theory, normative legal theory, and jurisprudence.” José Luis Martí and
Samantha Besson, Legal Republicanism: National and International Perspectives (Oxford University
Press, 2009), pp. 6, 7, 9, 36.

Perhaps the reason why historians and history are paid short thrift in Legal Republicanism is because the
focus of the text and the scholars who contributed to it was on the present implications of the theory
called republicanism – indeed, the sub-theory M&B termed “legal republicanism.” Even with respect to
legal republicanism, however, the editors characterized the concept as an “interestingly ambiguous”
expression that has two “different, although partly related, levels of doctrine,” including “a normative
theory about the content, the structure or the form of the law,” and second, it referred to “a republican
normative jurisprudence or legal philosophy.” Id, p. 26. Note that this description, whether applied or
theoretical, does not state that legal republicanism is a political theory about how government is best
structured which, of course, was the purpose of Sidney and Adams’ writing on republicanism, as well as
the work of many others.
61

Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Out of Revolution: The Autobiography of Western Man (Providence,
1993)[orig. pub. 1938], pp. 304-05, 340-41, cited by Berman, Law and Revolution II, p. 21.
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Ideas can’t be pinned down like butterfly wings.
Russell Shorto, Amsterdam62

i. Republicanism’s Ancient Roots
One cannot overemphasize the influence of history in the formation of early modern ideas, and
republicanism is no exception. One might say that the chronological beginning of the historiography of
republicanism is scholarship about its ancient roots. For the most part, these studies tend to assume
familiarity with the ancients across early modern culture. Today, however, providing an evidentiary basis
for this sort of assumption by means of the history of the reception of ideas and book history is a thriving
field. 63 It is highly problematic to attribute a particular historical source to a particular position by a
particular political thinker even if attribution is made by an author. As historian Trevor Colbourn once wryly
observed, “problems of causation remain difficult for historians.”64 What we can say with confidence is that
well-educated “men of substance” in both early modern England and colonial America thoroughly studied
the history and political ideas of ancient Greece and Rome. Indeed, Latin, ancient history, literature,
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Russell Short, Amsterdam: A History of the World’s Most Liberal City (New York: Vintage Books, 2013),
p. 188.
63

See, e.g., Peter Burke, The Fortunes of the Courtier: The European Reception of Castiglione’s
Cortegiano (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). See generally the
recent multi-volume series on The Reception of British and Irish Authors in Europe, Elinor Shaffer, series
ed., School of Advanced Study, University of London. The history of the book as a field of study is
explored in a raft of monographs. As literary scholars Jennifer Richards and Fred Schurink point out,
“[m]uch of the best work in the field has responded to Darnton’s challenge” in “What is the History of
Books?,” Daedalus 111 (1982), pp. 65-83, “to analyze reading within a wider framework of the production,
circulation and consumption of books.” Jennifer Richards and Fred Schurink, “Introduction: The
Textuality and Materiality of Reading in Early Modern England,” Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol. 73, No.
3 (Sept. 2010), pp. 345-61, 346.
64

Blair Worden similarly stated, “Of course, the influence of political philosophies on the actions of hardpressed politicians is never easy to trace exactly. The relationship between ideas and events is likely to
prove as vexing a problem to the student of seventeenth-century classical politics as it has been to
historians of puritan politics. We must be careful not to claim too much. But it would be a pity to claim too
little.” Blair Worden, “Classical Republicanism and the Puritan Revolution,” History and Imagination:
Essays in honor of H. R. Trevor-Roper, Hugh Lloyd-Jones, Valerie Pearl & Blair Worden, eds. (New York:
Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1981), pp. 182-200, 183; Trevor Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience: Whig
History and the Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution (Indianapolis, IN: The Liberty Fund, 1998)
[orig. pub. 1965], pp. xviii-xix. See also Law in American History, Vol. I, p. 7, in which White observed,
“Making causal connections between the existence of noteworthy historical phenomena, such as the Declaration of Independence, the Revolutionary War, the drafting and ratifying of the Constitution, the Louisiana Purchase, and the Civil War, and other ‘forces,’ ‘attitudes,’ official decisions, or events has been a
recurrent self-appointed task for historians ever since the genre of historical writing came into being.”
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philosophy and politics were the heart of their education. Of course Latin was the lingua franca of the
educated. The early modern educated man studied the ancients in a way that we, as twenty-first-centurians, are challenged to truly appreciate. Once again Colbourn hit the nail on the head in the context of
early America: “The Revolutionary leaders were men of substance – propertied, educated. They read.”65
In the humanist tradition, if one was a student or sufficiently well off to have leisure time, reading
(and composition) would have been a constant commitment and pursuit.66 Indeed, early modern readers’
engagement with or “use” of the book has been a preoccupation in book history.67 Educated men were
taught from a very young age to read Latin, and some learned Greek, enabling them to choose to study
ancient history and other books in their original language.68 Ancient history and literature were often used
to teach these languages. As Adams’ reflections to Jefferson suggest, it would not have been unusual for
political thinkers to repeatedly return to the books that they studied as young men and, not surprisingly, to
gain new insights from them. Indeed, re-reading books was routine – something we rarely do today.69
We need not determine the level and nature of reading by the general public in early modern
England and colonial America, although studies increasingly abound on the subject, in order to appreciate
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Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience, pp. xviii-xix.

66
“The book is ubiquitous in the portrait of the humanist intellect. …Humanist pedagogy was preoccupied
with the constitution of the ideal reader. …[H]umanism educated and enabled readers to perform their
own readings, and to construct their own, often dissenting, values and polities.” Reading, Society and
Politics in Early Modern England, Kevin Sharpe & Steven N. Zwicker, eds. (Cambridge University Press,
2003), pp. 4, 18; see also Richards & Schurink, “Introduction: The Textuality and materiality of Reading in
Early Modern England.”
67

On book “use,” see William H. Sherman, Used Books: Marking Readers in Renaissance England
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Bradin Cormack & Carla Mazzio, Book Use, Book
Theory 1500-1700 (University of Chicago Press, 2005); see also Andrew Cambers, Godly Reading: Print,
Manuscript and Puritanism in England, 1580-1720 (Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History)
(Cambridge University Press, 2014).
68

In his college years, John Adams “long[ed] to be a master of Greek and Latin.” His first job out of
college, before he studied law, Adams was as a Latin Master in a Worcester grammar school. John
Adams Diary, Jan. 14, 1756, JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 1 n.1; John Adams Revolutionary Writings, 1755-1775
(“JA I”), Gordon Wood, ed. (New York: The Library of America, 2011), p. 623. Several years later while
studying and apprenticing for the bar, Adams asked his legal mentor whether he should study Greek.
The practicing lawyer, Mr. Putnam, was not enthusiastic. “[I]t is a matter of meer Curiosity.” John Adams’
Diary, Apr. 24 & Aug. 29, 1756, & Oct. 25, 1758, JA D&A, Vol. I, pp. 12-13, 26, 30.
69

Focus on the book as a cultural phenomenon has been the subject of an entire new discipline, the
history of the book. See Appendix B.
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the value of history to those able to obtain an elite education.70 We have catalogues of public libraries, for
example, as well as the libraries of many early modern thinkers, including the monumental Sidney and
Adams family libraries, which suggest a profound interest in the study of history and political thought. In
his book John Adams & the Prophets of Progress, in summarizing the Adams collection scholar Zoltán
Haraszti observed, “It is the library of a statesman – and of an eighteenth-century statesman, whose
interest embraced all fields of knowledge. Naturally, law and government make up its larger part.” This
led directly to historical texts, for “History was, of course, indispensable for the study of law and
government.” In addition to books on English history that “went as far back as Camden’s Annals, Adams
possessed the works of the great French and Italian historians, with many other volumes on the history of
Spain, Russia, the Netherlands, Sweden, and even Portugal. But the most impressive group in the field
are the Greek and Roman histories. The works of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, and of
Tacitus, Sallust, and Livy are mostly in huge sixteenth- and seventeenth-century folios.” The related
classical texts of poets, philosophers and orators supplemented ancient history books. “The sets of
Homer, Plato, Aristotle, Horace, Ovid, Lucretius, Cicero, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, etc. are all complete.
They are all ‘Opera omnia quae extant,’ and not single stray volumes.” Adams’ earliest preserved
possession was a small textbook edition of Cicero’s Orationes, with the note ‘John Adams Book 1749/50’
repeated half a dozen times on the title page.”71 A comparable description could be made of the Sidney
Library; indeed, it has been.72
Of course the existence of books in a library does not guarantee that its owners read them.73 On
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For major works on reading in early modern England and America, see Appendix B.

71

Haraszti was the Keeper of Rare Books and Editor of Publications of the Boston Public Library for
many years, responsible for oversight of most of the three thousand volumes of the Adams Library. His
book on Adams included many passages taken from Adams’ marginalia in his own books – more than a
hundred of which contain Adams’ marginal notes. Haraszti’s work is extremely valuable to anyone
interested in the thought of John Adams and, notwithstanding its age, John Adams & the Prophets of
Progress constitutes an extremely insightful analysis of Adams’ thoughts (although I would differ with
Haraszti only to the extent that he emphasized, I would say overemphasized, Adams’ “feeling of
persecution” and “jealousy” of his compatriots. Haraszti, John Adams & the Prophets of Progress, p. 15.
72

See Introduction, The Library of the Sidneys of Penshurst Place Circa 1665, Germaine Warkentin, Joseph L. Black & William R. Bowen, eds. (Toronto, Buffalo & London: University of Toronto Press, 2013).
73
Historians are confident that in early America, translations, popularizations and secondary surveys of
ancient history books were often preferred by the general reading public to the book itself. Colbourn, The
Lamp of Experience, p. 26; see also Wood, The Idea of America, p. 60 (“While some in the Englishspeaking world do own and read the ancient authors in Latin, most generally preferred translations,
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the other hand, ready and frequent references to ancient texts in the works of those intellectuals with
access to such libraries would certainly suggest that the original sources were read and studied – indeed,
imbibed! This fact is omnipresent in Sidney and Adams’ work. Sidney’s citation to ancient and other
scholarly texts is ubiquitous; his writing positively abounds with such references. Similarly, in addition to
ever-present classical references, Adams’ correspondence over the years and his books are chocked full
of both commentary and marginalia that attest to a deep-rooted familiarity with ancient texts and history.74
On the subject of governance the early modernists, including Sidney and Adams, relied particularly on
Cicero (first century BCE), who relied as well on earlier ancient texts. “For two thousand years, every
educated European and American read Cicero.”75 They also relied on the more “modern” theorist Niccolò
Machiavelli (fifteenth century CE), who in turn relied on Cicero and the ancient texts on which he relied.76

popularizations, and secondary surveys such as Thomas Gordon’s Sallust and Tacitus, Basil Kennett’s
Roman Antiquities, Walter Moyle’s dabblings in antiquity, Charles Rollin’s popular histories, Thomas
Blackwell’s Memoirs of the Court of Augustus, Oliver Goldsmith’s history of Rome, and Edward Wortley
Montagu’s Reflections on the Rise and Fall of the Antient Republicks.”).
74

Just to take one of innumerable examples, in his Autobiography, written in the early 1800’s, Adams
noted that the erudition of a man with whom he began his legal studies invalidated the advocacy of a
gentleman who he characterized as a “Disbeliever of Every Thing,” whose arguments against religion
could be found in Lucretius, “together with many more.” Autobiography, JA D&A, Vol. III pp. 264-65.
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Richard, Greeks & Romans Bearing Gifts, p. 11. One has to be careful with Cicero. Reliance on all his
work that has survived is legitimate to support our current understanding of the Roman thinker. But in
Sidney’s and even Adams’ time, some of Cicero’s important political work, particularly major portions of
On Obligations, had not yet been recovered. The exception is the Dream of Scipio, which was a passage
from The Republic that was separated from the main text, known in the Middle Ages, and which “became
a highly formative influence on medieval and Renaissance views of the world.” Cicero: The Republic and
The Laws, Niall Rudd, Intro. & Notes by Jonathan Powell and Niall Rudd (Oxford & New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008) [orig. pub. 1998], pp. ix-x.
76

Examples abound. For instance, Cicero’s The Republic, only available in part in the sixteenth and
seventeenth century, was a dialogue on politics in the Greek tradition. Writing to his brother about his
work in progress, Cicero explained, “I am writing the political treatise I mentioned. It’s a pretty heavy and
laborious work. But if it goes according to plan, the effort will have been well spent. Otherwise I shall
throw it into the sea on which I am looking out as I write, and I shall start on other things, since I can’t stay
idle.” Cicero used the Greek term for political, which referred to a branch of philosophy concerned with
the theory of the city-state or the polis, and considered part of the study “of ‘ethics’, the theory of human
character and behaviour.” One can simply look to the work’s title to appreciate Cicero’s salute to Plato.
Without resolving the question of which portions of this text Sidney and Adams may have studied, we can
simply note that Cicero relied on numerous Greek and Roman figures, real and mythical, from earlier
ancient history, including Plato (429-347 BCE); Homer (late eighth century BCE) and Achilles, the hero in
Homer’s Iliad; the Greek god Apollo; Pericles (c. 495-429 BCE), “the most famous of all Greek
statesmen”; Cleisthenes, the Greek sixth century BCE leader who “reorganized the Athenians into ten
tribes”; Quintus Ennius (239-169 BCE), the father of Latin poetry; and Cato the Censor and Cato the
Younger (234-149 and 95-46 BCE), famous Roman leaders and, in the case of Cato the Younger, a
champion of the Roman republic. See the editor’s Introduction and appended Index of Names used by
Cicero in Cicero The Republic and The Laws, pp. ix-xxxi & 222-42. On Cicero’s letter to his brother and
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In short, we have layers of reliance on ancient works, the interpretation of which cannot easily be
disentangled from such works’ subsequent exegesis.77
A second momentous early modern reality is the birth and the explosion of modern journalism,
white and yellow, and the rise of the public sphere. Stuart and Civil War England, as well as colonial and
revolutionary America, experienced a skyrocketing quantity of political pamphlets and other circulated
publications thanks to the success of the printing press.78 Public literature challenged, endorsed and
explored the political issues of the day.79 Many of these works spoke in terms of the ancients; some did

the term political, see p. xi; on his references to Plato, Homer, Achilles, Apollo, Pericles, Cleisthenes,
Quintus Ennius, and the Catos, see pp. 236, 230, 222, 223, 235, 226 & 225.
In the case of Machiavelli, it is more tedious to pull out his classical references in the Discorsi, but most
conspicuously, he relied on Polybius (c. 200-118 BCE), the Greek historian who lived in Rome in the
second century BCE who also significantly influenced Cicero, and on Titus Livy’s History of Rome,
Machiavelli’s ostensible subject matter. Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy (Oxford World’s
Classics), Julia Conaway Bondanella & Peter Bondanella, tr. & ed.21 (Oxford University Press,
2008)("Discorsi"). Machiavelli, of course, also referred to numerous other major and lesser-known
historical figures and places. See Appendix B.
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To the extent there was any reversion to the importance of history in Legal Republicanism, it was
entirely in the context of how to apply legal republicanism today. In an Introduction footnote, M&B stated,
“On the importance of historical studies in understanding this political tradition, see Honohan, Civic
Republicanism,” a political theorist’s text. The editors noted that, “Three chapters in this volume are
intended to contribute to this inclusive historical effort,” referring to the French and Scottish Enlightenment
chapters. These chapters were written by a political philosopher, political scientists and a law professor.
Even if we consider this to be historical analyses, they are the tip of the iceberg and certainly not the
primary historical tradition out of which Anglo-American republican thought, among others, originated.
M&B, Legal Republicanism, pp. 4-5, ns. 4&5. This is one of those disciplinary distinctions that tends to
drive political scientists (and apparently lawyers and political theorists) away from the work of historians
and vice versa. While I was trained in and practiced law, my vantage point as an historian rejects the
proposition that understanding republicanism’s place in history is not an essential piece of the puzzle of
correctly understanding the nature of republicanism at any time. Accordingly, given the subject-matter of
Legal Republicanism, effort has been made throughout this study to address the issues raised by M&B
and their fellow essayists. Overall, my own sense is that in this compilation there is a muddling of issues
that are important from an historical point of view; this muddling is another instance of well-meaning
scholarship creating misguided perceptions. Accordingly, many of my comments challenge various
theses presented by this book’s contributors.
78
One could reference this pamphlet literature across the time frame and geography with which this study
is focused. Just to provide one example, see The American Revolution: Writings from the Pamphlet
Debate 1764-1776, Gordon Wood, ed. (Washington DC: Library of America, 2015). For a fascinating
pamphlet collection, see the FAU/Weiner Collection.
79
See, e.g., Godfrey Davies, The Restoration of Charles II 1658-1660 (London: Oxford University Press,
1955), pp. 118, 170 (“The attitude of the Rump toward the freedom of the press and religious liberty
deserves wholehearted praise. The historian must acknowledge with gratitude, even though his burden
becomes heavier, that neither Parliament nor the Council of State imposed any shackles on the press….
Five issues of … Mercurius Britanicus, appeared from December 3 to January 4 [1659-60]. They
contained favorable news, the justification of Monck’s proceedings, and criticisms of English officers and
their journal, Mercurius Politicus …. Other propaganda took the form of tracts and broadsides.”)
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not. But the existence of a “well-established culture of the vernacular printed word” placed age-old
political issues in a conspicuous and often confrontational manner in a rapidly growing public eye not
subject to the control of those who ruled. Pandora was out of its box – a very modern phenomenon.
Additionally, the popularity of the pub, inn, and coffee house, as well as other well-recognized gathering
places, e.g., the Liberty Tree in colonial Boston, all public spheres, provided ready locales for the
exchange of au courant political ideas.80 While the illiterate might have some of these materials read to
them, voluminous political copy, not to mention the practice of Protestantism, by their very nature
encouraged people to read.81
Early modern republicanism has, then, as its deepest roots, the political ideas of many ancient
thinkers including, of course, Plato and Aristotle, with scholarly emphasis on one or the other or both
according to each scholar’s particular interpretation of republicanism. In his study of ancient Greek
influence on early modern republicanism Eric Nelson singled out Plato and Aristotle “because they
constituted by far the most important sources for Greek ethical and political theory in Renaissance and
early-modern Europe -- not because these two authors reflected the mainstream of Greek political
philosophy.”82 Republicanism that expressly or implicitly relied on ancient Greek and/or Roman roots is
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See The Politics of the Public Sphere in Early Modern England, Peter Lake & Steven Pincus, eds.
(Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 2007).
81
In discussing the relationship of Charles I to his public, Richard Cust explained this point very cogently.
“The conduct of politics in England was transformed during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries by developments in pamphleteering, the circulation of news and popular drama. Appeals to a
wide, politically informed, public had become the order of the day, and news management and public
relations had become essential means of manipulating opinion, for the monarch as much as for any other
politician. This was where Charles missed out on opportunities to sell himself and win hearts and minds.”
Richard Cust, “Charles I: A Case of Mistaken Identity,” response to Mark Kishlansky, Past & Present No.
205, pp. 201-212, 208 (2009). See generally The Politics of the Public Sphere in Early Modern England,
Peter Lake & Steven Pincus, eds. (Manchester & New York: 2007); Reading, Society and Politics in Early
Modern England, Kevin Sharpe & Steven N. Zwicker, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2004); Glenn
Burgess, “The Impact on Political Thought: Rhetorics for Troubled Times,” The Impact of the English Civil
War, John Morrill, ed., pp. 67-82. On Protestantism and literacy in America, see Monaghan, Learning to
Read and Write in Colonial America, pp. 11-12.
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Eric Nelson, The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 16
n.61. Cf. Jean Hampton, “Democracy and the Rule of Law,” The Rule of Law: Nomos XXXVI, Ian Shapiro,
ed. (New York & London: New York University Press, 1994), Ch. 1, pp. 13-44, 13 (“we should understand
contemporary democracy as a style of government quite unlike the ancient Greek democracies heavily
criticized by early modern political theorists, insofar as it is based on the idea of the rule of law and not, as
ancient Greek democracies were, on the rule of human will.”)
27

often termed “classical republicanism.”83 We can readily become sidelined by the Enlightenment
controversy over the “ancients” versus the “moderns” in which there was a rejection by the latter of the
wisdom of the former and the emergence of a “modern” republicanism accordingly removed from classical
republicanism.84 A later school of scholars, the Straussians and progeny, continued this anti-classical
theme. The neo-Straussians contend that early modern republicanism shed its classical heritage.85 But
even with these theorists republicanism’s roots remain important; for to understand what has been left
behind we must come to terms with the ideas that classical republicanism embraced. We cannot escape the
fact that those who ostensibly “shed” or rejected classical republicanism nevertheless were influenced by it
sufficiently to opt out. As Colbourn said, “they read,” and what they read, and what they were taught,
included the ideas of ancient historians, political thinkers and philosophers.
Republicanism’s classical roots are directly and resoundingly confirmed by the early modern
republicans themselves – a primary source largely and surprisingly ignored in the historiography.
Sidney’s great uncle Philip told his younger brother, Sidney’s grandfather, to read the classics, and this
prioritization was handed down to each generation.86 John Adams wrote, “Let us dare to read, think,
speak, and write…. Let us … read the histories of ancient ages; contemplate the great examples of
Greece and Rome.”87 Benjamin Rush, Adams’ friend, fellow signatory of the Declaration of Independ-
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Honohan set forth an interesting set of criteria applicable to a “broad ideal summary of classical
republicanism as it had evolved up to the eighteenth century.” This would include “some sense” of a
“self-governing” citizenry; a “founder or law-giver to establish their basic institutions,” which could be a
single sovereign or a “’mixed’ government”; “the rule of established laws” that guarantee freedom; an
active citizenry; the primary problem of corruption, understood “quite broadly”; independent, propertyowning active citizens; a community of citizens; political obligation “rooted in the citizens’ membership of
the republic.” All in all, per Honohan, “classical republicanism was suited to small states.” It will become
evident that the early modern republicanism of Sidney and Adams dovetails with a great deal of what
Honohan described. Honohan, Civic Republicanism, pp. 5-6.
84

See Benjamin Constant, “The Liberty of the Ancients compared with that of the Moderns,” Constant:
Political Writings, Biancamaria Fontana, tr. & ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 307-28.
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See ns 27 & 128.
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See letters from Philip to Robert Sidney, undated [likely May 1578] & Oct. 18, 1580, Philip Sidney to
Hubert Languet, Feb. 4, 1574, and Philip Sidney to Edward Denny, Whit Sunday [~May] 1580, Sir Philip
Sidney: The Major Works, Katherine Duncan-Jones, ed. (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press,
2008), pp. 279-80, 284-94, 397-400.
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John Adams, “VI. ‘A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law,” No. 4, Oct. 21, 1765, PJA Vol. 1,
Sept. 1755-Oct. 1773, pp. 123-28, 126. As one scholar put it, for Adams “the problem of man was threefold, and each of the three aspects must be analyzed dispassionately: the nature of man; the civil state of

28

ence, medical doctor and all-around academic progressive involved in the founding of Dickinson College,
published an essay in 1789 in which he proposed banishing the study of Latin and Greek from the
university curriculum because it “undermined morals and religion by exposing youngsters to the ‘indelicate amours and shocking vices both of gods and men.’”88 Rush sent Adams the essay knowing it would
provoke him. Rush was not disappointed. “I should as soon think of closing all my window shutters, to
enable me to see, as of banishing the classics to improve republican ideas,” snarled Adams.89 Adams
was echoing the view of the ancients themselves. For instance, Livy maintained that, “The study of history
is the best medicine for a sick mind; for in history you have a record of the infinite variety of human
experience plainly set out for all to see; and in that record you can find for yourself and your country both
examples and warnings, fine things to take as models, base things, rotten through and through, to avoid.”90
While it is self-evident that Western classical heritage chronologically must begin with the Greeks,
the historiographic dispute among scholars vigorously asserts itself even here. First of all, beyond Plato
and Aristotle there were other important Greek influences on early modern republicanism, e.g.,
Thucydides, Polybius, and others; and both the interpretation, and the degree and priority of influence of
virtually any of the ancient thinkers is hotly disputed. It is one thing for an early modern thinker’s ideas to
have been generally influenced by his classical education; it is another thing for an early modernist to
advocate specific ideas of particular ancient philosophers or historians. Looking at the bigger picture,

man; and the extent and uses of men’s learning. Around these three considerations Adams grouped his
other inquiries and concerns.” Welter, “The Adams-Jefferson Correspondence, 1812-1826,” p. 237.
88
David Freeman Hawke, Benjamin Rush, Revolutionary Gadfly (Indianapolis, IN and New York: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1971), p. 367.
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Id, p. 368. Compare this Adams’ view with Jefferson urging Madison to ban books in the University of
Virginia Law School curriculum because, he told Madison, “I think we are the best judges.” According to
Staloff, “Madison was not willing to actually ban books from an institution of higher learning, but he
agreed to a set of suggested texts.” Staloff, Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson, p. 357.
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Richard, Greeks & Romans Bearing Gifts, p. 13, citing Livy’s History of Rome. Of course, Machiavelli
reiterated the view that history provided the best lessons by which to gain political wisdom. “Preface to
Autograph Manuscript,” Discorsi, pp, 15-16. In Civic Republicanism, Honohan did a beautiful job of
explaining the value of studying history. He reminded us of the “winding” nature of history in which “our
circumstances may bring us closer to some parts of the past than others,” that history “may warn us
against reinventing the wheel,” that the history of ideas “may not resolve issues but it can raise the level
of the debate,” that to understand a theory we have “to understand the question to which it claims to be
an answer,” that studying history makes us aware of the fact that there may be “a variety of answers
possible to the central questions that concern us.” Honohan, Civic Republicanism, p. 3.
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some scholars strenuously believe that early modern republicanism is much more closely (if not wholly)
linked to Roman thought generally than to the ancient Greeks; others have the opposite view.91 What is
relevant to our understanding of the historiography and the nature of early modern republicanism is not
necessarily the answer to these questions but, perhaps more importantly, the nature and relative
importance of the matters in dispute.
A less scholarly but delightful account of republicanism’s ancient roots is Carl Richard’s Greeks
and Romans Bearing Gifts, which did not focus on Plato and Aristotle at all.92

Richard reminded us of

the importance of storytelling. “It has been said that those who control a society’s stories control the
society.” Richard analyzed the impact of the ancients on the American Founding Fathers, and particularly
the political lessons learned; for the Founders’ storytellers were the historians of ancient Greece and
Rome. They were their heroes in a way that filmmakers are today.93 Richard explored the ideas of ten of
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Nelson is probably the most well-known advocate of the primacy of ancient Greek influence, and he
legitimately challenged the tendency by Pocock and others to merge the ancient Greek and Roman
traditions into a single, homogenous synthetic Graeco-Roman political theory. See Eric Nelson, The
Greek Tradition in Republican Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2004). Skinner, on the other hand,
went the other way, articulating the primacy of ancient Roman concepts to later ideas about
republicanism. Skinner focused on Machiavelli and early modern England but, unlike Pocock and others,
did not venture into early modern America. See, e.g., Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism
(Cambridge University Press, 2008); Skinner, "Machiavelli's Discorsi and the Pre-humanist Origins of
Republican Ideas," and “The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty,” Machiavelli and Republicanism, pp.
121-41, 293-309; Skinner, "The idea of negative liberty: philosophical and historical perspectives,"
Philosophy in History, Richard Rotty, JB Schneewin & Quentin Skinner, eds. (Cambridge University
Press,1984), pp. 193-221; see also W. R. Newell, “How Original is Machiavelli?: A Consideration of
Skinner’s Interpretation of Virtue and Fortune,” Political Theory, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Nov., 1987), pp. 612-34;
Benjamin Straumann, “Is Modern Liberty Ancient? Roman Remedies and Natural Rights in Hugo
Grotius’s Early Works on Natural Law,” Law and History Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 2009), pp. 55-85.
Because of the essentiality of Tully – Cicero – to early modern English and American republican thought
(not to mention the influence of Tacitus and Plutarch), it seems to me that Roman influence is most
fundamental; but, of course, Cicero absorbed the ideas of the Greeks in his own writing. See, e.g.,
Wood, The Idea of America, Ch. 2, “The Legacy of Rome in the American Revolution,” pp. 57-79. In this
regard, it is very odd that Jonathan Scott does not identify Cicero when he talks about the most important
ancient classical influences on Sidney: “From the range of Sidney’s sources as a whole, it is possible to
select six writers of outstanding importance. They are two Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle; two
Roman historians, Livy and Tacitus; and two relatively moderns, Machiavelli and Grotius. These could be
divided again, according to the previous discussion: behind Sidney’s classical republicanism lie Aristotle,
Livy, and Machiavelli; behind his Christian natural-law theory Plato, Aristotle and Grotius.” Scott I, p. 17.
This may well contribute to Scott’s lack of appreciation of the impact of law on Sidney’s republicanism,
discussed in detail in Ch. 4.
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Richard’s book focused on the ancient storytellers who most influenced the Founders; presumably, that
is why Plato and Aristotle are not featured, although Richard repeatedly referenced their ideas.
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Richard, Greeks and Romans Bearing Gifts, pp. ix-x.
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the ancients the Founders admired, of whom three were ancient Greeks (historians Herodotus and
Thucydides, contemporaries; and orator Demosthenes); one of whom was a Greek historian living at the
time of the decline of ancient Greece and the rise of ancient Rome (Polybius); and six of whom were
ancient Romans (relative contemporaries Cicero and Sallust, a legal advocate-statesman-political theorist
and an ancient historian; and a century later, the historians Livy and Tacitus, and the biographers
Plutarch and Seutonius). The particular influence of a specific ancient thinker on early modern
republicanism can be debated, and will arise in connection with our study of the republican ideas of
Sidney and Adams, most particularly with respect to Cicero. What is relevant here, in considering the
historiography of republicanism, are Richard’s overall findings that, “from the Spartans the Founding
Fathers learned the importance of individual liberty to a republic. From the Persian Wars, they learned
about the inherent strengths of republican government, which enabled them to defend themselves against
strong, centralized monarchies like Persia or Great Britain.” Then there were the Greeks. “From the fall
of Athens they learned that majority rule must be tempered by checks and balances in order to avoid mob
rule. From the fall of Greece to Macedon and Rome they learned that a certain amount of centralization
was necessary to avoid fragmentation and interstate warfare.” And of course, there were the Romans.
“From the early Roman republic they learned the importance of individual and societal virtue to the
success of the republic. From its decline and fall, they learned to be wary of ambitious individuals.
Finally, from the Roman emperors, they learned that just as vice led to tyranny, tyranny led to greater
vice, producing the most degraded society imaginable.” Ergo, “One can question the validity of any of
these lessons; but beyond question is the fact that the Founding Fathers were greatly influenced by these
stories. The Greek and Roman classics gave them the courage to face the great challenges of their time,
providing an indispensable illusion of precedent for their actions.”94
The point to be highlighted is that Richard’s was an integrated approach. He saw no need to
decide between the influence of the Greeks and the Romans on early modern republican thought, at least
in revolutionary America. His conviction was that through their intensive exposure to the ancients, both
Greek and Roman, the early modernists integrated lessons learned from classical history and theory,
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Richard, Greeks and Romans Bearing Gifts, p. 181.
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including ideas that related specifically to republicanism, its strengths and weaknesses, and how best to
protect and preserve a republic. In contrast to Richard’s integrated approach, there is substantial
scholarship that challenges the “true” meaning of early modern republicanism by claiming that it is derived
from specific concepts used in either ancient Greece or Rome; according to this view, a specific ancient
meaning is the intended early modern definition. This picture can be further refined (and obscured) by
interpretations that contend that a particular ancient Roman scholar adopted a particular ancient Greek
interpretation – what we might call a bootstrap methodology that ties ancient Greek thought inextricably to
its Roman effect and thus, to the early modernists. For example Professor Eric Nelson began his extraordinarily erudite study of The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought with a description of how Cicero, by
rendering the Greek term politeia as the Latin word respublica, “with one innocuous gesture” branded Plato
as a republican, “ensuring that for the next two millennia important political theorists would derive their
view of the ‘republic’ from a Greek philosopher who had never even heard the term.”95 The methodological
reliance on early modern republicanism’s ancient roots resulted in a host of divergent pictures by historians
of what early modern republicanism was all about. Setting aside the question of whether, and when we can
rightfully assume that reference to an ancient source by an early modern republican constituted endorsement of that source’s definitions and meanings, or that source’s source’s definitions and meanings, where
do the important controversies lie?
Scholarship on the ancient roots of early modern republicanism include the work of Paul Rahe, a
neo-Straussian and author of the book, Republics Ancient & Modern, The Ancien Régime in Classical
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Eric Nelson, The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 1.
One of the complicated things about Nelson’s thesis on the primarily Greek roots of early modern
republicanism is that it is indisputable that early modern republicans referred repeatedly, and without
regard to their origin, to both ancient Greece and ancient Rome. Clearly the early modernists saw in both
historical contexts useful examples, actions and ideas to support their concept of republicanism. Nelson
could distinguish this methodological approach from his own argument, which concerned the nature of
early modern republicanism, not the early modernist practice of referencing both ancient Romans and
ancient Greeks. Overall, perhaps Nelson overstated the significance of Greek ideas to the republicanism
of the English early modernists. Undoubtedly there are specific links between ancient Greek and early
modern republican thought, such as Harrington’s reliance on Plato. At the same time, as we will review in
detail, Roman republicanism, and particularly, the ideas of Cicero, are strikingly and closely tied to the
republican ideas articulated by Sidney and other seventeenth-century Englishmen, in significant part
because of their shared emphasis on law. Indeed, Cicero’s De officiis (On Obligations) happens to be
one of the earliest books associated with Sidney’s grandfather, Robert Sidney, Sir Philip Sidney’s brother
and the 1st Earl of Leicester. John Adams’ first book also was by Cicero. On Cicero and the 1st Earl of
Leicester, see The Library of the Sidneys of Penshurst Place Circa 1665, p. 18.

32

Greece; numerous works by Quentin Skinner of the so-called Cambridge School of historians, who has
written extensively on the subject and whose “neo-Roman” liberty speaks for itself; John Pocock’s
breathtaking tome, The Machiavellian Moment, which likely begat the avalanche of scholarship on early
modern republicanism, particularly the study of the American revolutionaries; Pocock linked AngloAmerican early modern republicanism to Machiavelli, to whom he connected the ancients, particularly
Plato; Eric Nelson’s The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought, the thesis of which is that while early
modern republicanism was not uniform, the importance of Harrington and Montesquieu’s ideas to the
early modernists resulted in a decidedly Greek analysis of republicanism by early modernists.96 One
further topic deserves mention, the ancient Biblical roots of early modern republicanism. This matter has
arisen frequently in the historiography in connection with one particular republican debate, namely, the
legitimacy of monarchy. On the subject of governance many early modernists approach this question by
reference to whether the ancient Israelites were punished for their desire to have an earthly monarch in
addition to their “Supreme Monarch.”97 Innumerable studies are less devoted to the subject than those
already mentioned but nevertheless rely on particular classical republican sources to support a precise
view of the roots of early modern republicanism.98
The issues at stake with respect to republicanism’s ancient roots begin with the question whether
there is a coherent Graeco-Roman republican inheritance, or is this concept an inappropriate conflation?
If there is no such inheritance, are there classical roots to early modern republicanism and, if so, should
they be characterized as Greek, Roman or both? Moreover, what significance do we attach to this
characterization? Of what value is it in understanding the ideas advocated by early modern republicans?
The answers to these questions also determine how we approach other issues that are pivotal in understanding the early modernists, including (i) What is liberty? The earliest-known record of the use of the
word “freedom” or “liberty” appears in a Sumerian clay document that was written over four thousand
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Nelson, The Greek Tradition, p. 154. Cf. Benjamin Straumann, “Ancient Caesarian Lawyers in a State
of Nature: Roman Tradition and Natural Rights in Hugo Grotius’s De iure praedae,” Political Theory, Vol.
34, No. 3 (June 2006), pp. 328-50, who explained how Grotius relied on Roman law and on Cicero in his
formulation of natural law.
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Eric Nelson, The Hebrew Republic, Jewish Sources and the Transformation of European Political
Thought. (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press, 2010).
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See Appendix B.
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years ago, in about 2300 BCE.99 Aristotle’s liberty in his Politics is made up of two components: “for all to
rule and be ruled in turn,” and “that a man should live as he likes.”100 Contrast this perspective from that of
Plato in the Laws: “Authority does not simply tolerate the liberty of the citizens but rather constitutes its
condition of possibility. That is, true liberty depends on submission to a single legitimate power, that of
the law.”101 Nelson melded these ideas with the comment that, “neither Plato nor Aristotle particularly
values freedom … as ‘non-dependence.’ The freedom they value is the condition of living according to
nature” – is that what Plato means by the law? – which in most cases requires men to “depend upon their
intellectual and moral superiors.”102 (ii) What is the nature of justice and its importance? For example,
Cicero stated in On Obligations, which he considered his manifesto and masterpiece and with which
English and American writers in the seventeenth and eighteenth century were intimately familiar, that
“obligations of justice, involving as they do the welfare of mankind (and nothing should be more hallowed
in our eyes), are to be given precedence over the pursuit of knowledge and its obligations”). Justinian’s
Code (both the Digest and the Institutes) defined justice as “a constant and enduring will to attribute to
everyone his own right. The precepts of law are these: to live honourably, not to harm another, to
attribute to each his own.”103 (iii) What is virtue, and what is its role in society? Virtually the entire text of
De Officiis, On Obligations, written by Cicero to his son, is about how to utilize one’s virtue in the service
of one’s state.104 There is no question but that republicans value virtue. At the same time, what is
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101

The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, Christopher Rowe & Malcolm
Schofield, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 279, discussing Plato’s Laws.
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Nelson, The Greek Tradition, p. 10 & n.38.
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Cicero, On Obligations, p. 52 (Book I, §154); The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political
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types of obligation arise from each of them individually. ”Cicero, On Obligations, Book I, ¶15, pp. 7-8.
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possibly most interesting as well as most overlooked about mainstream republican theory is its pragmatic
effort to design a state that is not dependent on it. (iv) Why is consent so important, and is civic
participation an essential, important, or unimportant element of republicanism? Thucydides, for example,
stated in the famous Funeral Oration by Pericles, that “[W]e [Athenians] alone think that a man who does
not take part in public affairs is good for nothing, while others only say that he is ‘minding his own
business.’” The “others” to which Thucydides referred is a quotation from Plato’s Republic.105
Historians frequently answer these questions by means of retrospective assumptions, e.g., by
arguing that a particular early modernist believed that virtue meant X and that, accordingly, early
modernist’s ideas came from ancient historian Y or philosopher Z. Understanding the facts on the ground
– the basis for the historian’s findings – can be useful in raising our consciousness about the need to
examine, in the Gibsonian sense of pursuing historiography seriously, “the assumptions on which we
begin interpretation of those writings.”106 In our analysis of republicanism it is apparent that we must
understand which tail is wagging which dog; that is, are we interpreting an early modernist so as to fit him
into a prior conception of republicanism, and then utilizing the views of particularly selected (cherrypicked?) ancient thinkers to buttress that interpretation, or are we genuinely considering the matter from
the perspective of those thinkers who advocated republican ideas in early modern England and America?
In the latter instance, do we know upon whom the early modernist relied, and the significance they placed
on that reliance? Does it matter whether the early modernist specified who he was relying upon, whether
his interpretation of that ancient thinker was sound, what, if anything, he intended, and what we can
deduce from his reliance? Finally, should we interpret the early modernist according to our own
perception of his sources or should we constrain ourselves to his?
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Thucydides, On Justice, Power, and Human Nature: Selections from The History of the Peloponnesian
War, tr., with Intro. & Notes by Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis, IN & Cambridge, UK: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1993), p. 42. Of course there are many subsidiary issues related to such things as commerce,
the related issue of agrarianism, and the nature of property and its role in society. These matters were
important to Harrington, for example, but of little import to Sidney. But they are age-old differences. For
example, Plato believed that, “the unrestricted flow of property corrupts citizens and topples the rule of
reason;” consequently, the polis must “either abolish private property (as in the Republic) or sharply
restrict its accumulation (as in the Laws).” Nelson, The Greek Tradition, p. 13. Cicero had a very different
view. E.g., “Cicero regarded the conflicts over the Gracchan redistribution of land as the beginning of the
end for the Roman Republic.” Walsh, “Introduction,” Cicero: The Republic and The Laws, p. xix.
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Gibson, Understanding the Founding, p. 232.
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There is surely no field of study within the broad tradition of
Western political theory that has been so grossly underrepresented
in recent English-language scholarship as the Latin Middle Ages.
Cary J. Nederman, Lineages of European Political Thought 107
The emphasis of our study lies in disclosing the roots of liberty,
not as some vague ideal, but as it endures into the present as the pulse
of effective governing institutions. Such liberty is inseparable from rule of law,
and its rise must be sought particularly in patterns and traditions
of medieval and Renaissance England’s public order.
Ellis Sandoz, The Roots of Liberty 108

ii. The Medieval Link
There is a tendency for republican scholarship to focus on ancient republicanism and then,
without explanation, fast forward to early modern republicanism, directly linking (or, in Pocock’s case,
disconnecting) the two, perhaps with a brief pit stop in Renaissance Italy. In fact, a world of political
discourse intervened. While it is true that some Renaissance and early modern thinkers expressly
rejected scholasticism, the main academic methodology of the medieval period, we detrimentally
oversimplify when we ignore over a thousand years of scholarship without regard to the influence of
important medieval thinkers whose ideas bear on early modern republican thought.109 This approach
throws the baby out with the bathwater, for early modern republicans did expressly rely in their work on
important medieval thinkers. The most critical omission that this approach elides is early modern
republicanism’s profound reliance on law and medieval legal theory.110
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Divide from John of Salisbury to Hegel (Washington DC: The Catholic University Press, 2009), p. xiii.
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Ellis Sandoz, “Editor’s Introduction: Fortescue, Coke, and Anglo-American Constitutionalism,” The
Roots of Liberty: Magna Carta, Ancient Constitution, and the Anglo-American Tradition of Rule of Law,
Ellis Sandoz, ed. & intro. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1993).
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On scholasticism, see John Kilcullen and Jonathan Robinson, "Medieval Political Philosophy", The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford
.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/medieval-political/ (12-8-18); Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought:
The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanist Strains (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961)[orig. pub. 1955], esp.
Ch. 2, “The Aristotelian Tradition,” & Ch. 5, “Humanism and Scholasticism in the Italian Renaissance,” pp.
24-47, 94-119; J. H. Burns, “Scholasticism: survival and revival,” The Cambridge History of Political
Thought 1450-1700, J. H. Burns, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2006), Ch. 5, pp. 132-55. For a
brilliant study on the evolution of the idea of the Renaissance see the classic work by Wallace K.
Ferguson, The Renaissance in Historical Thought: Five Centuries of Interpretation (Toronto University
Press, 2006)[first ed., 1948].
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See Robert W. Shaffern, Law and Justice from Antiquity to Enlightenment (Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield Pub., 2009); Paolo Grossi, A History of European Law, Laurence Hooper, tr. (London: WileyBlackwell, 2010). On the important continuities in republican arguments from at least the thirteenth
century into the modern period, see generally Nederman, Lineages of European Political Thought,
passim. Nederman sensibly rejected the notion that there is an unbroken continuity between medieval
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A dash through some of the most important medievalists (beyond the legal theorists) who tend to
get lost in the jump from ancient theory to the Renaissance must include the twelfth-century English
Dominican John of Salisbury (1120-1180), whose challenge to a corrupt pope’s authority in Policraticus
raised the specter of dethroning delegitimized authority. John wrote prolifically and, among other things,
argued that liberty was essential to the development of virtue, which he defined as “moderation in all
things.” (This led him to conclude that wives should not be bought, sold or inherited!) John of Salisbury
“lent heavily on Roman law,” and is considered to be a Christian humanist in outlook and in his comfortlevel with reliance on classical “pagan” authorities in addition to sacred Christian texts. John of Salisbury’s
view was humanistic in its advocacy of the viva activa, of moderation and in the embracing of the pursuit
of happiness.111 Brunetto Latini (1210-1294), a thirteenth-century Italian priest and philosopher, wrote the

and early modern or even modern political thought, pace the arguments of medieval historians Brian
Tierney, Francis Oakley and Kenneth Pennington to the contrary; he also rejected the antithetical
argument that there is an inseparable divide between medieval and early modern or modern political
thinking, a view expressed by John Pocock, Marcia Colish, Constantin Fasolt and others. In Nederman’s
view, neither of these “wholly incommensurable historiographical visions,” termed the continuity thesis
and the rupture thesis, are valid. Id, p. xix.
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Joseph Canning, A History of Medieval Political Thought 300-1450 (London: Routledge, 2005) [orig.
pub. 1996], pp. 110-14; Kevin Guilfoy, "John of Salisbury", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall
2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/john-salisbury/ (914-14); Antony Black, “The Individual and Society,” The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought c.
350 - c. 1450, J. H. Burns, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 588-606, 594-95; Cary J.
Nederman, “Toleration, Skepticism, and the ‘Clash of Ideas’: Principles of Liberty in the Writings of John of
Salisbury,” Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration Before the Enlightenment, J. C. Laursen
& C. J. Nederman, eds. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998); Cary J. Nederman, “A Duty
to Kill: John of Salisbury's Theory of Tyrannicide,” Review of Politics, Vol. 50 (1988), pp. 365-89.
In an article on legal humanism, jurist Mark D. Walters began with philosopher and legal scholar Ronald
Dworkin’s thesis that “all judges are by necessity philosophers,” and “law’s empire embraces not just
decisions about rights made in the past, but also rights implicit in the theory of political morality that those
decisions presuppose.” Dworkin maintained that the “truth about what is just (or moral or legal) is
obtained through a process of reflection that oscillates between considerations of beliefs or convictions
about particular examples or paradigm cases of justice (or morality or legality) and a general theoretical
structure that shows those beliefs to constitute a unified and justifiable body of convictions, with the
expectation that both particular beliefs and general theory will be refined until a satisfactory point of
equilibrium is reached.” While Dworkin’s “law-as-integrity” is described as “the traditional common law
method,” Dworkin did not provide that linkage. Walters endeavors to do so, establishing theoretical links
between Dworkin’s jurisprudential ideas and the first generation of English lawyers in the late sixteenth
century whose ideas were “informed by humanist values and methods” that “supplemented older
positivist and natural law explanations of the common law.” These lawyers moved away from the
“abstract and fragmented methods of medieval scholasticism,” “highly artificial logic” that was much more
“rigid” and based on “archaic forms of action and pleading,” towards “more practical and holistic
approaches to intellectual inquiry centred upon fresh readings of classical sources.” Like humanism
generally, “[c]ommon law humanism … denied the distinction between theory and practice.” Mark D.
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famous text Li Livres dou Tresor, Treasure Books (1260), on the subject, inter alia, of ethics, rhetoric and
city government. Latini emphasized the altruistic love of community and country. He viewed the city as
the essential political community and the true form of civilized society.112 An important element of Latini’s
thought was the idea that good government requires the rule of law, an idea which, in Renaissance
scholar Lauro Martine’s view, establishes that Latini was enormously influenced by Cicero.113 The
Dominican priest Ptolemy of Lucca (c. 1236-1327) completed the unfinished work of Thomas Aquinas, On
the Government of Rulers (1306), combining the principles of northern Italian governance with scholastic
Aristotelian political theory. Out of Aristotle’s six forms of government Ptolemy favored monarchy but
argued for “tempered” monarchy in which both aristocrats and the people are given some share of
governance.114 This avoids tyranny and gives to the people some sense of what today we would call
ownership and empowerment. Completely out of sync with the prevalent view of his times but as the
early modern republicans were to emulate, Ptolemy glorified the ancient Roman republic not the Roman
empire. His method was also unconventional: Ptolemy utilized manifold examples, rather than elaborate
scholastic proofs. He also dwelt on issues such as the Christian virtue of caritas, altruistic love, and its
relationship to the common good, arguing that caritas put the common good before individual good.115
Finally, one cannot fail to mention the Italian priest who was also trained in medicine, Marsilius of Padua
(c.1275-c.1342). In The Defender of the Peace (1324) Marsilius maintained that temporal and spiritual

Walters, “Legal Humanism and Law-as-Integrity,” The Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 67, No. 2 (July 2008),
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Republic, Book One, ¶49, p. 22.
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debates of early modern England. Ptolemy of Lucca, On the Government of Rulers, De Regimine
Principum, James M. Blythe, tr. (Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997); see John
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York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973) [ ACLS Humanities E-Book repr., 2008], p. 189.
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authority should be distinct and separate, and that a secular authority ought not to have any power over
Church matters and vice versa. Altruism was both unnecessary and unrealistic in politics – an issue true
to Sidney’s and Adam’s heart. Marsilius posited the necessity of the consent of the governed as a means
of maintaining political stability, thereby also suggesting that ultimately, power rested in the people, viz.,
popular sovereignty.116 A Marsilius contemporary, William of Ockham (c.1287-1347), was an English
Franciscan friar and scholar who wrote a series of political works in which he argued, inter alia, that
ownership of property was contrary to natural law in a state of nature before the Fall but since then,
communities were entitled to enact laws binding on members of the community that recognized property
rights. Communities also had the power to establish a preferred form of government in accordance with
the consent of the governed. In exceptional circumstances, Ockham argued, if the ruler became a tyrant,
the people had the right to depose the ruler or change the form of governance.117
As already suggested, the historiographic tendency is to gloss over the medievalists. This
approach is further exacerbated by the profound fifteenth-century (and continuing) Catholic/Protestant
divide, and the unsurprising deliberate disassociation by many early modern Protestant thinkers from their
Catholic roots, including the ideas of prior Catholic thinkers. But as we shall see in the case of both
Sidney and Adams, medieval Catholic thinkers had a discernible influence on early modern
republicans.118 None of this takes away from republicanism’s powerful ancient roots; but it does present a
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See Cary J. Nederman, “Empire and the Historiography of European Political Thought: Marsiglio of
Padua, Nicholas of Cusa, and the Medieval/Modern Divide,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 66, No. 1
(Jan. 2005), pp. 1-15; Robert W. Dyson, Nature, Morality and Politics, 400-1450: Normative Theories of
Society and Government in Five Medieval Political Thinkers (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2003).
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William of Ockham is most famously known for his scholastic problem-solving method called
Ockham’s razor, which averred that among competing hypotheses that are valid, it is logical to select the
one with the fewest assumptions. For an overview of the ideas of William of Ockham, see Joseph
Canning, A History of Medieval Political Thought 300-1450 (London: Routledge, 2005) [orig. pub. 1996],
pp. 154-61; “William of Ockham,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2016),
https://plato.stanfod.edu/entries/ockham/ (2-10-19); Arthur Stephen McGrade, The Political Thought of
William of Ockham (Cambridge University Press, 1974).
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It was St. Augustine, “the dominant influence in medieval theology,” who in The City of God stated that
God “does not intend that … [man] should have lordship over any but irrational creatures; not man over
man, but man over the beasts,” and that, “Justice removed, then, what are kingdoms but great bands of
robbers?” Kilkullen, “Medieval Political Philosophy,” citing Aurelius Augustine, The City of God against the
Pagans, R. W. Dyson, tr. (Cambridge University Press, 1998), XIX.15, p. 942 & IV.4, pp. 147-8. The
early modern (sixteenth-century) Catholic theologians Francisco Suárez and Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet,
products of the medieval Catholic tradition, also influenced the early modern republicans. For example, in
De legibus, published in 1612 and included in the Sidney and Adams libraries, Suárez maintained that
man is naturally social; that men gather in communities which require governance; that communities are
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more complex and nuanced picture.
There is one major exception to the “non-medieval” historiographic approach to early modern
republicanism, and that is legal scholarship. This striking difference should come as no surprise. Indeed,
there was so much interest in the academic study of law in the twelfth century that the era has been
labeled the “big bang.”119 Roman law, and particularly the ideas of several extremely important ancient
Roman jurists and advocates (oratores), particularly Cicero, is one major source of the Western legal
tradition, at its height from 27 BCE to 235 CE, during which more than two thousand books were written
on the law. Most of Justinian’s sixth century Corpus iuris civilis, the compilation of Roman law, was made
up of the works of the classical jurists. As legal scholar James Gordley persuasively argued, the unique
contribution of Roman jurists was that they did not borrow from Greek philosophy but founded their own
intellectual tradition.120 Thus there is an independent strand of thought, some of which relates to political
ideas, that stemmed from Roman legal theory. Canon law also has been influential; and Roman and
canon law evolved significantly, and often synergistically, during medieval times, together constituting the
ius commune, the common law utilized in much of Europe.121 Medieval jurists, like the humanists that

formed by the consent of the governed, who choose the form of governance (rule by one, a few, many or
the whole); and that a ruler cannot be opposed by his people unless he lapses into tyranny, in which case
the people have a “right of war” against him. All of these statements are familiar mainstream republican
ideas. In contradistinction, Bossuet was an absolutist. If we are to understand the nature of Sidney and
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“The study of canon law began as rapidly and mysteriously in the Middle Ages as that of civil law.
Study was based on the Decretum, composed, according to tradition, by Gratian in Bologna,” home of the
first university of law, “in about 1140. The Decretum was a collection of excerpts from Church Councils,
the writings of the fathers, and other sources that Christians regarded as authoritative.” The number of
such authoritative texts grew over time, in contrast to the fixed body of civil law promulgated by Justinian,
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came centuries later, sought to produce a version of the Corpus iuris civilis that was as close as possible
to the original one promulgated by Justinian; they also wrote “glosses” or notes on the text and applied
the Code to new cases, explaining its application.122
The other distinct category of medieval legal foundations of early modern republicanism is the
analysis of the English common law and its roots in ancient constitutionalism. Pocock’s study of the
ancient constitution was a pivotal contribution to this historiography.123 The importance of the ancient
constitution and the common law to republican theory is a subject that virtually all disciplines have
explored and, indeed, seems to continue to be contested territory. We will pay substantial attention to
this work in our consideration of Sidney and Adams’ ideas.
Reducing all of this complex history to one sentence, jurisprudential work often approaches
republicanism through a very different prism than does other republican historiography.
I do not believe there is any worse example in a republic
than to make a law and then not to observe it.
Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy 124

iii. Machiavellian and Renaissance Republicanism
There is no debate among scholars whether Niccolò Machiavelli’s ideas influenced the early
modern republicans. The answer is yes. There is, however, substantial debate from that point on,
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including just what that influence was, in terms of both degree and kind.125 For one thing, there are very
different historiographic interpretations of Machiavelli. Since the 1975 publication of Pocock’s
monumental The Machiavellian Moment, if anything the debate has intensified.126 This historiographic
phenomenon is manifest in the emergence of what is known as the Atlantic republican tradition, the
Pocock construct utilized to discuss commonalities in the political ideas behind the successful fifteenth
and sixteenth-century Renaissance city-states, the seventeenth-century English Civil War, and the
eighteenth-century American Revolution.127 Pocock’s linkage of three historical contexts across four
centuries and two continents not surprisingly triggered the admiration and, in some cases, the
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Substantial analyses of the Discorsi and republicanism pre-date The Machiavellian Moment. There is
no question, however, that Pocock’s work marks a watershed in the scholarship. Whether it is simply the
publication of Pocock’s 1975 work, the advent of Atlantic basin scholarship, contemporaneous events,
other factors, or a combination of these possibilities that triggered a renewed focus on republicanism
does not appear to be addressed in the scholarship. Pocock is one of several preeminent scholars who
formed the so-called Cambridge School in the 1960s, a group of historians who pioneered the pursuit of
intellectual history through an understanding not only of famous texts, but also by considering the specific
contexts of a book’s subject matter and within which an author worked. Pocock’s work focused on the
symbolic nature of an author’s language. John Dunn, another Cambridge School scholar, probed
biographies. The third leading Cambridge School historian, Quentin Skinner, is known for his emphasis
on “speech acts,” illocutionary statements, or verbal and written expressions that themselves can be seen
as actions, such as a warning or an order. For a discussion of the Cambridge School and contextual
history, see “What is conceptual history?”, Concepta, International Research School in Conceptual
History and Political Thought, http://www.concepta-net.org/conceptual_history (2-9-19). Another way to
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they refer. As Skinner explained, “It was Pocock above all who taught my generation to think of the
history of political theory not as the study of allegedly canonical texts, but rather as a more wide-ranging
investigation of the changing political languages in which societies talk to themselves.” Quentin Skinner,
Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 105. In post-Machiavellian Moment
historiography, Skinner is perhaps the leading contributor to the extensive scholarship on republicanism,
writing profusely about its application in a variety of contexts, particularly seventeenth-century
revolutionary England. Skinner’s formulation, along with Pocock’s definitive work, continues to have
enormous influence.
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approbation of a raft of scholars, some of whom applauded this reorientation while others rejected it.128
The Machiavellian Moment recharged the debate on the politics of republicanism, one pivotal aspect of
which is Machiavelli’s political treatise entitled Discourses on Livy, or Discorsi.
Machiavelli was a statesman and scholar who worked for the Florentine Republic in the early
sixteenth-century. He was born in 1469. At the surprisingly young age of twenty-five, Machiavelli became
an important Florentine official.129 He worked for the city-state government from 1498 to 1512, serving in
important emissarial and other functions.130 After losing his position because the republic failed and the
Medici returned, Machiavelli turned to writing, authoring most of his works about Florence, governance
and politics, Italian political history, and other subjects.131 The Discorsi was published posthumously in
1531. But the conventional wisdom on Machiavelli, and the source of his infamy, stems from The Prince,
an essay he authored that is an advice or “mirror for princes” book for those who newly acquire power
(and, particularly, for the then-current Medici prince). On the basis of this little book Machiavelli often is
credited with a “take no hostages” immoral if not amoral approach to governance – a political philosophy
which, when attributed to a modern political figure, is pejoratively termed “Machiavellianism.” Clearly this
view of Machiavelli is inimical to quattrocento political thought, which idealized the extraordinary
capacities of man, the nature of freedom, politics and political society, and the ideals and way of life to
which man should aspire and be wed. A fair reading of Machiavelli, however, eliminates this issue, as a
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“take no hostages,” “Machiavellian” approach to governance is not what Machiavelli actually advocated;
realpolitik is.132
The Machiavellian Moment placed Machiavelli in the starring role of pivotal link between the
ancients and the (early) moderns and, perhaps unbeknownst to scholars of early modern England and
America, interpreted Machiavelli in what can fairly be viewed as a minority, if not controversial perspective, at least relative to the understanding of Machiavelli articulated by Renaissance scholars. Pocock’s
Machiavelli and his ideas were then utilized by the Cambridge School and others in support of their interpretation of the early modern Anglo-American republicans, including Algernon Sidney and John Adams.
Machiavelli’s ideas do very much rely on ancient Greek and Roman thinkers, particularly Cicero,
and therefore it is not surprising that in many ways the ideas of the early modern republicans echo or
dovetail with Machiavelli’s thought. Accordingly, reference will be made from time to time to Machiavelli’s
concurrence (or dissent) from the major elements of early modern Anglo-American republicanism. While
Machiavelli’s influence, in both substance and method, is palpable in the work of the early modern
republicans, at the same time, and regardless of how one views Machiavelli’s ideas, it is difficult to wedge
Machiavelli as the critical link to the ancients given the early modernists’ direct and thorough familiarity
with classical literature. The early modernists had no need to rely on a Machiavellian moment for this
linkage.133 No doubt Machiavelli’s ideas encouraged the early modernists’ reliance on ancient thinkers
given Machiavelli’s constant reference to them. But this was common practice for the early modernists
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See ns. 147, 157, 158.
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Pocock’s moniker, “Machiavellian Moment,” identified multiple historical junctures: it was the moment
and manner in which Machiavellian thought appeared, and “certain enduring patterns in the temporal
consciousness of medieval and early modern Europeans led to the presentation of the republic, and the
citizen’s participation in it, as constituting a problem in historical self-understanding with which Machiavelli
and his contemporaries” contended; it was the moment in “conceptual time” when the Florentine republic
confronted its own temporality, and most particularly, the effort at that moment to remain “morally and
politically stable” in the face of the tide of irrational events “spoken of as the confrontation of ‘virtue’ with
‘fortune’ and ‘corruption’”; the Machiavellian moment also had a continuing history from the Renaissance
to modern times when “secular political self-consciousness continued to pose problems in historical selfawareness.” MM, pp. vii-viii. Essential to Pocock’s thesis was the notion that the pre-Renaissance,
scholastic, Christian view of the world centered on a universal order and authority, with an apocalyptic
view of temporality that was beyond time, in the modern historical sense. In contrast, in Renaissance
Florence’s republic, the “timeless continuity of the hierarchic universe” was broken into “particular
moments.” Id, pp. 50-54. Pocock’s thesis was his characterization of the Machiavellian moment as “an
important paradigmatic legacy” evident in English and American thought of the seventeenth and
eighteenth century.
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themselves, fostered by their educational steeping in the classics. Perhaps of greater importance is the
independent influence of Machiavelli’s independent political ideas, and the learning to be had from
Machiavelli (and other Renaissance thinkers), who wrote about, and struggled with the establishment of
republics in the city-states of Renaissance Italy. Certain themes resound, such as the nature of liberty,
the importance of civic involvement, the nature and significance of virtue in leadership, government and
citizenry, the value of trade and commerce, the problems with hereditary leadership, the necessity for
pragmatic and timely decision making, and other familiar republican themes that will resonate as we
discuss Sidney and Adam’s ideas.134
In addition to Pocock, the other brilliant Cambridge School scholar whose work pivotally relies on
Machiavelli is Quentin Skinner. Like Pocock, much of Skinner’s analysis focuses heavily on Machiavelli’s
Discorsi and how Machiavelli’s classical republicanism became an essential part of the political landscape
of seventeenth-century England.135 That is not to say that Pocock and Skinner’s understanding of republicanism are the same. Nelson has stated that Skinner took Hans Baron’s insight that Italian Renaissance
republicanism rested on a particular interpretation of Roman, not Greek theory and history, and used it as
the starting point for a comprehensive critique of Pocock in The Foundations of Modern Political Thought,
Machiavelli and Republicanism, Liberty Before Liberalism, and other Skinner scholarship.136
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The inevitability of war, and therefore the need to prepare for it, is another Machiavelli theme, and one
with which Sidney was particularly comfortable. See Jonathan Scott, Review, Classical Humanism and
Republicanism in English Political Thought 1570-1640 by Markku Peltonen; Milton and Republicanism by
David Armitage, Armand Himy and Quentin Skinner; Review, “Sidney. Court Maxims,” by Hans W. Blom,
Eco Haitsma Mulier and Ronald Janse, The English Historical Review, Vol. 112, No. 448 (Sept. 1997),
pp. 949-51, 50-51 (“It was, above all, the centrality of war, both to their experience and to his writings,
which would make Machiavelli indispensable to the republicans of the Interregnum. …On the subjects of
war, flux and change, Sidney was seventeenth-century England’s most faithful and distinguished
Machiavellian.”)
135
Of course, Machiavelli wrote a number of works other than the Discorsi, although only one of his books
was published before his death, and that was The Art of War. Other works include (but are not limited to)
The Prince, Florentine Histories, Mandragola, and the Life of Castraccio Castracani of Lucca. Scholars
have debated when Machiavelli wrote The Prince and the Discorsi because of the ostensible inconsistencies between these two works – a nonexistent problem, in my view. For a discussion of this matter,
and particularly with regard to the views of Hans Baron about Machiavelli and civic humanism, see John
M. Najemy, “Baron’s Machiavelli and Renaissance Republicanism,” The American Historical Review, Vol.
101, No. 1 (Feb. 1996), pp. 119-29.
136

I am not convinced that Skinner’s work is “a comprehensive critique” of Pocock, although I understand
Nelson’s characterization given his own emphatic conclusion that Italian Renaissance republicanism is
Greek, not Roman in origin. See n.95 and Nelson, The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought.
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There are four essential facets of Skinner’s interpretation of classical republicanism, with an
emphasis on Machiavelli, with which this study will take issue. First, Skinner maintained that for
Machiavelli and the classical republican tradition, liberty, which is essential to a republic, is not possible in
a monarchy; consequently, a republic cannot be a monarchy, republicanism cannot survive in a
monarchy, and a monarchy cannot be republican.137 In one scholar’s pithy observation, when we talk
about republicanism, one approach is that of Quentin Skinner, in which the term is used “to describe
commitment to kingless government.”138 A second disputed facet of Skinner’s classical republican is his
definition of the Greek concept of virtù, a subject considered at some length in Ch.Three. In sum, Skinner
(mistakenly) is convinced that Machiavelli’s commitment to “the dictates of necessity” required his
abandonment of the classical concept of virtù or virtue.139 Third, and related to the first Skinnerian
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With respect to the thorny question of the relationship between liberty and monarchy, perhaps the view
of Skinnerians is most tellingly stated in the two-volume set of essays edited by Skinner and Martin van
Gelderen in which Part I of Volume I is entitled, “The Rejection of Monarchy.” Quentin Skinner and Martin
van Gelderen, “Introduction,” Republicanism I, p. v; see Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli, a Short History
(Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 60-61; cf. Quentin Skinner, “Pre-humanist origins of republican ideas,”
Machiavelli and Republicanism, pp. 140-41 (“It is true that he is not completely consistent in drawing the
corollary that servitude will prove inevitable under monarchical forms of government. But in general he
makes a sharp distinction between the freedom of republics and the slavery imposed not merely by tyrants but even by the best kings and princes.”). In Liberty Before Liberalism, Skinner clarified (or obfuscated?) his chosen terminology by noting that while he previously had “spoken not of the neo-roman but
the republican theory of liberty … this usage now seems to me liable to mislead.” Liberty Before Liberalism, p. 11 n.31. Skinner later explained that his theory of liberty cannot fairly be described “as a
specifically republican one,” although republicanism and his theory were “close[ly] link[ed].” Id, p. 55, n.
176. That is because “in the strict sense,” republicanism opposes the institution of monarchy; but some
writers, such as Locke, who are not avowed republicans, also support this theory “and use it to undergird
their repudiation of monarchy.” Id, p. 55 n. 177; see also id, p. 22, n. 65 (“it is not inherently republican in
the sense of embodying a repudiation of the institution of monarchy.”) In short, Skinner maintained that
his theory of liberty was inclusive of republicanism, but also applied in other circumstances. What is
important here, however, is that Skinner had no doubt that liberty was not possible in a monarchy.
138
Worden, “Republicanism, Regicide and Republic,” p. 307. Worden interestingly contrasted Skinner’s
anti-monarchic, “constitutional” republicanism with Pocock’s “civic republicanism,” which is value-laden
but not necessarily anti-monarchic, and which Worden termed a “gentrified Machiavellianism.” Id, p. 308.
He also defined his own views as concurring with Skinner in “thinking of republicanism as a constitutional
principle,” but as diverging from Skinner in not being “a repudiation of monarchy; for me it has been
commitment to the introduction of republican architecture. Though Skinner is concerned with the
application of his definition only to a small group of thinkers, the definition itself would cover all those who
carried through the abolition of kingship in 1649. Mine covers few or none of them.” Id, p. 327.
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Skinner maintained that virtù is not translatable as virtue, nor can it be reduced to any one word in the
English language; indeed, it is difficult to give virtù its due in a sentence or two. Preface, Machiavelli, a
Short History, p. x. A hoard of scholarly dissections of Machiavelli’s work focus on the meaning of this
term. Harvey Mansfield’s book on the subject interestingly suggested that the difficulty Machiavelli’s
translators have with finding an English word for virtù is a reflection of our squeamishness – a reluctance
to face the question of evil. Harvey Mansfield, Machiavelli’s Virtue (Chicago University Press, 1996), p.7;
cf. Judith Shklar, “Montesquieu and the new republicanism,” Machiavelli and Republicanism, p. 268
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proposition, is the flawed argument that the form of government is an essential feature of classical
republicanism; specifically, Machiavelli’s republic had to be a representative form of government, thereby
excluding monarchy.140 Not surprisingly, a great deal of attention is paid by Skinner and his intellectual

(“Virtue is the love of equality”). Virtù originates from the ancient Greek word, ver, which means masculinity; accordingly, its meaning is often mistakenly limited to common attributes of virility, from the same root,
which is not what virtù means. For our purposes, it is satisfactory to use the words interchangeably.
140
Skinner traced the ideology of English self-governing republicanism to thirteenth-century Italy and the
world of the Italian commune; Machiavelli, on whom Skinner relied, then traces republicanism further back
in time, to antiquity. Skinner, “Pre-humanist origins of republican ideas,” Machiavelli and Republicanism,
p. 122. “The central contention of the theory I am examining is thus that a self-governing republic is the
only type of regime under which a community can hope to attain greatness at the same time as
guaranteeing its citizens their individual liberty. This is Machiavelli’s usual view, Harrington’s consistent
view, and the view that Milton eventually came to accept.” Skinner, “The republican ideal of political
liberty,” Machiavelli and Republicanism, p. 303. As Skinner explained in Liberty Before Liberalism, if you
are a liberal in contrast to a republican, the specific form of government is not the critical determinant in
assessing whether people are free; citizens can be free in a monarchy and oppressed in a republic.
Rather, liberals believe that freedom depends on “the Silence of the Law,” i.e., whether the law leaves
room, either literally or in its coercive capacity, for the individual to exercise his will. Liberty Before
Liberalism, p. 9, citing Hobbes’ Leviathan. In contradistinction, said Skinner, classical republicans base
their theory of individual liberty on their concept of a free state, the civitas libera. Free states and free
persons are defined by their capacity for self-government – the ability to be “settled in a state of freedom.”
Liberty Before Liberalism, p. 9, citing Hobbes’ Leviathan, p. 13. When a leader can preempt the
prerogatives of the citizenry, those citizens are not free, whether or not the leader in fact preempts; and a
person cannot be free in a state that is not free.

Thus, Skinner argued that for classical republicans, the form of government is pivotal; it must provide a
means by which its citizens can participate. “[W]hat made the ancient Romans a free people…[was]
because ‘no laws could be imposed upon them without a consent first had in the people’s assemblies’.”
Skinnerian classical republicanism accordingly required a form of governance run by and for virtuous men
in which representative government rules. In one analysis, Skinner maintained that in the Discorsi, Book
II, Ch. 2, Machiavelli found it “indispensable to maintain an elective system of government.” Quentin
Skinner, “Machiavelli’s Discorsi and the pre-humanist origins of republican ideas,” Machiavelli and
Republicanism, pp. 121-141, 140. Note, however, that this simply is not what Machiavelli said there.
This chapter of the Discorsi is not about elections. It is all about the value of freedom, as evidenced in
many of the ancient Greek and Roman city-states. The most interesting statement in this Discorsi
chapter is about why people in Machiavelli’s time were not lovers of freedom in the same way as the men
of antiquity. Machiavelli attributed this to Christianity and religious education, which “place[s] a lower
value on worldly honour” than did the pagans. “Our religion has defined the supreme good as humility,
abjection, and contempt of worldly things,” whereas “ancient religion located it in greatness of mind,
strength of body, and in all the other things apt to make men the strongest.” Machiavelli also lauded
commerce here, recognizing that wealth, competition and prosperity were among the benefits of a society
that did not live in servitude. Overall, if one wants to characterize Machiavelli’s emphasis in the Discorsi
as far as what was indispensable to maintaining a republic, it was law, e.g., “in every republic there are
two different tendencies, that of the people and that of the upper class, and that all of the laws which are
passed in favour of liberty are born from the rift between the two. …[M]en never do good except out of
necessity, … hunger and poverty make men industrious and laws make them good.” Discorsi, Bk II, Chs.
3 & 4, 158-59 & Bk I, Ch3, 28-29. Whether consent to the law was required by “all its citizens,” which
Skinner averred, is unclear. See Liberty Before Liberalism, p. 27, citing Marchamont Nedham, The
Excellency of a Free State.
Note that in Liberty Before Liberalism Skinner referred a number of times to Sidney’s ideas. But he
incorrectly characterizes them, e.g., Skinner cited Sidney for the proposition that majority rule is required
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progeny to how one ensures that a government has the right form and that virtù exists, is fostered, and
remains in the people and the republic’s leaders. Such republics require enormous control: a tightly
controlled government and people; otherwise, left to their own devices, either or both the form of
government or the behavior of people will degenerate.141 Finally, the fourth essential but incorrect Skinner
proposition about Machiavellian republicanism is that successful republics abjure commerce because it is
destructive to the exercise of virtù.142 In the editors’ introduction to their two-volume essay collection on
republicanism, Skinner and van Gelderen suggest that there are “ambiguous implications” in the
republican tradition with respect to commerce. On the one hand, “the ancient moralists believed that
freedom acts to release all kinds of energies, including those which enable prudent and courageous men
to amass fortunes for themselves.”143 On the other hand, the proper focus of the vir civilis, the civil life, is

in order for there to be freedom. Id, pp. 28-29. But to the contrary, in the very section and page on which
Skinner relied, DCG, II.5.104, Sidney discussed the validity of plurality – “that all things should be
determined by the plurality of voices” – and, in general, reiterated his view, which we shall explore,
repeatedly expressed in Discourses, that men can freely execute their right to frame a society in whatever
manner they choose, i.e., “in the establishment of monarchies, aristocracies, democracies, or mixed
governments, according to the variety of circumstances.” DCG, II.5.99 &104.
141

Here one can contrast the analysis of theorist Philip Pettit, who distinguished his own similar ideas
from Skinner’s thesis, emphasizing that “the interference suffered in living under a coercive but fair rule of
law must count as a secondary offence against freedom. Such a rule of law will not compromise
freedom, in the manner of a dominating agency, but it will condition freedom. …[I]t will reduce the range
or ease with which people enjoy undominated choice.” Philip Pettit, “Keeping Republican Freedom
Simple: On a Difference with Quentin Skinner,” Political Theory 30:3 (Jun., 2002), pp. 339-56, 342.
Skinnerian republicanism is explored in the context of various nation-states. In the case of Polish
republicanism, for example, “republican ideology rejected delegation of power”; indeed, “legislative power
which was too autonomous was held to endanger liberty.” Anna Grzeskowiak-Krwawicz, “Antimonarchism in Polish Republicanism in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” Republicanism, Vol.
1, Ch. 3, pp. 43-59, 52. Similarly, in an article primarily about Rousseau, Kant and Machiavelli, the author
stated that for Rousseau, in a free society “a government of the people by the people,’ must be founded
on rules of conduct and an ordering of relationships” which constituted “institutionalized morality.” Werner
Maihofer, “Ethos of the republic and the reality of politics,” Machiavelli and Republicanism, pp. 283-92,
288. The issue of control is particularly conspicuous in the ideas of the French revolutionary republicans,
such as Sieyès. See, e.g., Richard Whatmore, Republicanism and the French Revolution, an Intellectual
History of Jean-Baptiste Say’s Political Economy (Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 97; Andrew Jainchill,
Reimagining Politics after the Terror, the Republican Origins of French Liberalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2008), pp. 62-67.
142

See generally Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776. On the issue of wealth
and virtue in Scottish enlightenment thought, see Richard B. Sher, “From Troglodytes to Americans:
Montesquieu and the Scottish Enlightenment on Liberty, Virtue, and Commerce,” Republicanism, Liberalism and Commercial Society, pp. 368-402. On the views of Gabriel Bonnot de Mably during the French
revolutionary period on the incompatibility of liberty with wealth, luxury and commerce, see Johnson Kent
Wright, A Classical Republican in Eighteenth Century France (Stanford University Press, 1997).
143

“Introduction,” Republicanism, Vol. I, p. 6.
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to focus on the good of the community. Those who acquire wealth were therefore disparaged as
pursuing “a base and even an unpatriotic pursuit.”144 Ambiguities notwithstanding, in his own work
Skinner was much more emphatic. He asserted that the “same dislike of ‘luxurious habits’ as a threat to
political liberty” that was articulated by pre-humanist writers such as Bruno Latini was reiterated “with
even greater vehemence” by Machiavelli in his Discorsi.145 The pursuit of private wealth is the first of
several dangers on which Machiavelli dwelt because it threatened the people’s liberty in Skinner’s
republican form of government.146 As will become evident, however, while republicans were wary of the
potential corrupting influence of the very wealthy, including merchants, they certainly did not abjure
commerce.147
In 1955 the historian Hans Baron labeled the unique worldview of the Italian Renaissance,
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Id. Given the allegedly anti-commercial bent of classical republicanism, a new so-called “modern
republicanism” distinguished itself by being solicitous to and supportive of commerce. See, e.g., Rachel
Hammersley, “English republicanism in Revolutionary France: The Case of the Cordelier Club,” The
Journal of British Studies, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Oct. 2004), pp. 464-81, 481. On the misguided conception of a
republican anti-commercial bent, see Ch. Three.
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Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. 1, The Renaissance, p. 163; see Cary J.
Nederman, “Commercial Society and Republican Government in the Latin Middle Ages,” passim.
146

For some scholars but NOT Skinner, a further feature of classical republicanism becomes apparent
when one moved from the context of Renaissance Italy to (early) modern times. These scholars
maintained that what distinguished Machiavelli’s classical republicanism from “modern” republicanism,
such as occurred in seventeenth-century England, eighteenth century France, and eighteenth-century
America, was that the latter form of governance could function in a large nation-state, whereas classical
republicanism need not have been able to do so in the Italian city-state in which it was derived. For these
scholars, republicanism was an anachronism in the modern world because it could not function, given the
size of modern countries. See, e.g., Rachel Hammersley, French Revolutionaries and English
Republicans: The Cordeliers Club, 1790-1794 (Woodbridge, UK: The Boydell Press, 2005), p. 32, which
describes how neither Montesquieu nor Rousseau thought that republics were suitable to the modern
world of large states.
147

There is much more to Renaissance republicanism than The Prince and the Discorsi, including
Machiavelli’s other work, valuable in understanding his ideas, and the work of other Renaissance
scholars who wrote about governance. For example, the Florentine City Chancellors Coluccio Salutati
and Leonardo Bruni both wrote political treatises, as did Machiavelli’s contemporary, Francesco
Guicciardini. See, e.g., Coluccio Salutati, Political Writings (The I Tatti Renaissance Library), Stefano U.
Baldassarri, ed., Rolf Bagemihl, tr. (Harvard University Press, 2014); Leonardo Bruni, In Praise of
Florence: The Panegyric of the City of Florence & An Introduction to Bruni’s Civil Humanism, Alfred
Scheepers, tr. (Amsterdam, NL: Olive Press, 2005); Francesco Guicciardini, Maxims and Reflections
(Ricordi), Mario Domandi, tr., Nicolai Rubinstein, intro. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1992). There is a host of other humanist works by Florentines and other Italian Renaissance thinkers,
including Pico della Mirandola, Lorenzo Valla, Alamanno Rinuccini and others. Pocock addressed a little
of this in The Machiavellian Moment as did Skinner in his work. Many analyses of Renaissance
republicanism, however, including those by Pocock and Skinner, rest predominantly on the Discorsi.
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focusing on Florentine intellectual thought, as “civic humanism,” and concluded that the ideals these civic
humanists embraced, and the existence of an intellectual movement highly committed to those ideals, was
a product of particular events that took place in Quattrocento Florence.148 Leonardo Bruni has been
labeled by one historian as “the exemplar” of Florentine civic humanism. James Hankins, the English
translator of Bruni’s History of the Florentine People and the foremost scholar on Bruni, called him “the
most important representative of the ‘civic humanism’ of the early Renaissance.”149 Civic humanism is
sometimes described as simply an appreciation of the work of the ancients and the obsessive determination to translate as much of their work as possible from Greek, or from poor Latin translations.150 Perhaps
one way to think about civic humanism is to consider not only what the civic humanists did, but why:
“Beginning in 1400, historical thinking permeated every level of human knowledge. From the arts to the
sciences, Europeans began thinking about their world in historical, secular terms. When early humanist
scholars attempted to understand the course of human events, they created tools of explanation and the
verification of historical accuracy.” As a result, beginning “in earnest with Florentine humanists, scholars
across Europe sought to make the study of the past critical, accurate, and applicable to practical affairs of
state…. To understand medicine, warfare, politics, and even religion, one had to know historical precedent,
and to do so it was necessary to master the interpretive tools of historical understanding.”151 In short, the
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See Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance.
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Athanasios Moulakis, “Realist constitutionalism,” Renaissance Civic Humanism, pp. 200-22, 202;
Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People, Vol. 1, James Hankins, ed. & tr. (Harvard University
Press 2001), p. ix. Bruni had a long and distinguished career in Florence, and was effectively adopted “as
a son” by Coluccio Salutati, who was the chancellor of Florence, the leading government administrator,
from 1375 to 1406. In addition to being a politician, Salutati was a leading intellectual, author and teacher
who surrounded himself with a group of promising young men, his brigata. Bruni was Salutati’s favorite.
Bruni, like Salutati’s other disciples, had the free run of Salutati’s library, which was the best library in
Tuscany. History of the Florentine People, I: xii; “Letter from Salutati to Pope Innocent VII, Congratulating
Him on the Appointment of Leonardo Bruni as Apostolic Secretary,” David Thompson, tech. ed., Gordon
Griffiths, tr., James Hankins, tr. The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni: Selected Texts (Medieval &
Renaissance Texts & Studies), (New York: Renaissance Society of America, 1987), Appendix I, p. 47;
Martines, The Social World of the Florentine Humanists, pp. 147-48.
150

See Jacob Soll, “Introduction: The Uses of Historical Evidence in Early Modern Europe,” Journal of the
History of Ideas, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Apr. 2003), pp. 149-57, 152-153.
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“Intellectual historians during the past fifty years have grappled with the historical worldview that slowly
permeated European learned culture between 1400 and 1750. They have examined how historians
viewed and wrote history and how this shaped the secular attitude and the birth of the utilitarian modem
state. However, no one has systematically shown the influence of what Peter Burke aptly called, ‘the
Renaissance sense of the past’ outside the domain of history.” Id.
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ability to critically read, understand and critique Latin and Greek, “a vessel of historical culture from which
every student in Europe drank,” were necessary humanist prerequisites. Rhetorical conventions were “the
cement” that held together that knowledge.152 Beyond tools, however, was the understanding of man,
particularly political man. Sensitive, thoughtful men were looking for the answers to age-old questions,
such as what made men succeed or fail. Why did some cities grow strong while others became weak?
Why did free men become prey to tyrants? Were philosophers the best citizens? “As history enshrines
political experience, thinkers grew profoundly interested in the past. In the Middle Ages political
philosophers were theologians, in the Renaissance they were historians.”153
The survival of Florence in the face of its staunch Milanese enemy may have cemented the
embracing of civic humanism, which “fused a mood into an attitude of life.” 154 The Florentines saw
themselves as heirs to the Greek and Roman civic traditions, particularly Cicero. Preeminent was the
value of civic virtue, the ideal of living the good life through one’s dedication to the community.
Throughout Bruni’s writing there is an obvious parallelism between his characterizations of the good man
and the qualities of a good state. For Bruni there are two aspects of a man’s life – the interior, selfreflecting, contemplative component that can lead to the assumption of virtuous values (and religion), and
the exterior, active life of engagement in affairs of state.155 Both are elements of the good man, to which
there are corresponding characteristics in an admirable community. Unlike Petrarch, for example, who
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History became “an authoritative mode of proof” and, as such, a means to power. Students read
Aristotle, Quintillian and Cicero in Latin to learn rhetorical theory. Eloquence was “the very material of
logic – the expressive building blocks with which it was possible to forge knowledge out of observation.”
Id, pp. 155-56.
153

J. H. Plumb, The Italian Renaissance, (Boston, MA: Mariner Books, 2001), p. 35.
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Id, p. 58. The extraordinary developments in association with civic humanism for which the Renaissance is famously known were painting, sculpture and architecture. In his brilliant cultural study of the
Renaissance, historian Peter Burke noted, “The problem of explaining the clustering of so many
outstandingly creative individuals in this period – as in the case of ancient Greece and Rome – is one
which has concerned historians since the Renaissance itself.” Burke, The Italian Renaissance, p. 27.
155
The relationship between humanism and Christianity is an entire historiographic subject. As Plumb
stated, the “men of the Renaissance, by the range of their inquiries, by the freshness of their skepticism,
and by the sharpness of their observation, gave impetus to, and helped to acquire intellectual acceptance
for, the search for truth on earth instead of in heaven.” Plumb, The Italian Renaissance, p. 19. At the
same time, Renaissance Italy was a profoundly religious place. Margaret King, ed., tr., intro., Renaissance Humanism: An Anthology of Sources (Indianapolis, IN & Cambridge, UK: Hackett Publishing
Company, Inc. 2014), pp. 198-200.
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highly favored the contemplative man and life, Bruni consistently sought to meld the benefits of both
man’s interior and exterior self, his “interior” reflections as well as his “exterior” behavior, e.g., to adopt
wise laws and sound actions by the state.156 In this regard Bruni is perhaps the most systematic and
pragmatic of the civic humanists. Machiavelli is sometimes juxtaposed against this intellectual approach,
and it is Machiavelli who became known as the father of Renaissance thought and, indeed, modern real
politik.157 Indeed, we cannot leave the quattrocento civic humanists without noting that if you delve more
deeply into their work, including Bruni’s, there is a strong element of realism that would be familiar to
Machiavelli readers; in short, there is no inseparable divide. As we shall see, and pace Skinner’s
interpretation, there is certainly hope for, and not abandonment of goodness and virtù in both the civic
humanists and Machiavelli.
Finally, there is one essential aspect of Machiavelli’s republicanism that has not been
emphasized in the literature and is important to highlight here, and that is Machiavelli’s reliance on the
law. Machiavelli not only grew up in a family that historically embraced a Florentine republic; it was also a
family that was known for its skilled advocacy. We do not know if Machiavelli had any legal training; it is
possible. We do know that his father was recognized for his legal acumen and likely arbitrated legal
disputes. He also owned what was, in the Quattrocento, a serious legal library – i.e., an unusual number
of legal texts that Machiavelli no doubt absorbed.158 There are many ways in which Machiavelli’s analysis
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Bruni wrote about Petrarch’s preference for the contemplative life in a funny way, emphasizing
pragmatic issues of money: “Having given himself to these studies and thus showing his virtue, Petrarch
was much honored and favored while still young, and was called by the pope to be secretary of his court;
but Petrarch never agreed, nor did he value money. Nevertheless, so that he could lead an honorable life
with leisure, he accepted benefices and became a regular cleric; he did this not so much by his own
choice as constrained to it by necessity, for little or nothing remained from his father and in marrying off
his sister almost all the paternal inheritance was spent.” Lives of Dante and Petrarch, The Humanism of
Leonardo Bruni, Selected Texts, p. 97.
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“Machiavelli became the political teacher of Europe. Generations of readers in courts and universities
learned from him to scrutinize the making of political decisions with a hard, new realism and a clear sense
that some forms of deceit are not to be avoided by any ruler who hopes to survive.” Anthony Grafton,
Introduction, Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, tr., George Bull (London: Penguin Books, 1999), p. xxvii.
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Pulitzer-prize winning biographer Sebastian de Grazia observed, with respect to Machiavelli’s exposure to the law, “Had the program of his early education continued, Niccolò would have proceeded with a
legal and literary curriculum, as he no doubt did, and arrived at a thorough grounding in the law and the
great Latin authors. Disabilitated perhaps by a tax indebtedness of his father, he never attained membership in the lawyers’ guild. He managed nonetheless to obtain a high government post, one usually reserved for lawyers.” Sebastian de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), pp. 17-18.
Historian Elena Fasano Guarini commented on the “particular juridical and institutional tone” of Machiavelli’s prose. Elena Fasano Guarini, “Machiavelli and the crisis of the Italian republics,” Machiavelli and
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relied on the law. By way of example, in Book 1 Chapter 1 of the Discorsi, Machiavelli described how
cities were founded. He identified two qualities of the builder(s) of a city that were recognized as indicia
of the builder(s) ability. The first was the identification of a good geographic site. The second was “in his
organization of the laws.”159 Machiavelli acknowledged the weak nature of man: “[M]en never do good
except out of necessity, but where choices are abundant and unlimited freedom is the norm, everything
immediately becomes confused and disorderly.” This is where the law came in. “Hence it is said that
hunger and poverty make men industrious and laws make them good.”160 The same rule applied to a
leader: “[A] prince freed from the restraint of the laws will be even more ungrateful, variable, and
imprudent than a people. The variations in their conduct arises not from a different nature (for this in all
men is the same, and if there is a surplus of good, it resides in the people), but from having more or less
respect for the laws under which one or the other lives.”161 Machiavelli was talking about constitutional
monarchy. The legal system was a safety valve in society, not only restraining the impulses of a prince,
but providing a means by which citizens’ grievances could be redressed.162 “Concerning this incident, …
how useful and necessary it is for republics to provide through their laws a means of venting the anger
the multitude feels towards an individual citizen, because when such legal means are not available, they
will resort to illegal ones.163 These ideas inform Sidney and Adams’ republicanism.
The people are in their nature so gentle, that there never was a government yet, in which
thousands of mistakes were not overlooked. …That there are no instances of resistance,
until repeated, multiplied oppressions have placed it beyond a doubt, that their rulers had
formed settled plans to deprive them of their liberties. …Even Machavel himself allows,
that not ingratitude to their rulers, but much love is the constant fault of the people.
John Adams, Novanglus No. 1164

Republicanism, pp. 17-40, 26. Machiavelli’s emphasis in his political analysis on the rule of law is a likely
product of a legal background if not a law degree, as well as the influence of his father’s legal expertise
and legal library. For further details on Machiavelli, law and his father’s legal influence, see Appendix B.
159

Discorsi, Bk1, Ch1, 10.
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Id, Bk1, Ch3, p28.
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Id, Bk1, Ch58, pp.142-43. There is a rich body of scholarship on Renaissance jurisprudence and legal
humanism. See Appendix B.
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As fifteenth-century jurist Claiude de Seyssel pointed out, “Jurisprudence consists not in speculation
but in action.” Kelly, “Vera Philosophia,” p. 270.
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Discorsi, BkI, Ch7, 39.
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Adams, Novanglus No. 1, Jan. 23, 1775, PJA, Vol. 2, Dec. 1773-April 1775, pp. 231-32.
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iv. From Machiavelli to Early Modern Anglo-America
It is in the context of Machiavelli, and the transition from his ideas to those of seventeenth-century
Englishmen and then to the eighteenth century American republicans, that most of the intellectual wars
have taken place over the nature of early modern republicanism. Giving deserved recognition to this
historiographic battleground enables us to move on from it. Surprisingly, the historiographic trajectory
largely omits an essential articulation of early modern republicanism, and that is the advocacy of the
theory and the application of its practice in the sixteenth and seventeenth-century Dutch Republic.165
Nevertheless, Pocock’s brilliant development of the Atlantic republican tradition remains a historiographic
watershed, creating an analytical framework (even if one abjures “fixed schema,” as Nederman, for
example, does) for grappling with the ideas and events of two revolutionary periods in early modern
England and then colonial America. While I do not subscribe to Kloppenberg’s resolution, I do wholeheartedly agree with his stated goal in “The Virtues of Liberalism,” viz., to find “a way out” of “the polemics
of discord” among partisans of competing interpretations of American colonial and early national history
(and, as well, of early modern English history) who deserve an Inferno-like fate “similar to the one Dante
prescribed for schematics” in The Divine Comedy.166
Turning to this historiography, Pocock was a member of the Cambridge School that, in the 1960s,
deemphasized famous texts, instead embracing the specific contexts of a book’s subject matter and
author.167 In The Machiavellian Moment Pocock argued that Renaissance scholars drew upon ancient,
classical republicanism in their analyses of the grave political crises that were occurring in Italy. This
same political philosophy was then invoked and applied in England and America in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, positing Pocock’s Machiavellian moment as “an important paradigmatic legacy” for
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No doubt the language barrier is one reason. For an appreciation of the political world of the early
modern Dutch Republic, see Martin Van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt 1555-1590
(Cambridge University Press, 1992); Maarten Prak, The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century
(Cambridge University Press, 2005); Jonathan Israel The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall
1477-1806 (Oxford University Press. 1995). For additional references, see Appendix B.
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James T. Kloppenberg, “The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early
American Political Discourse,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 74, No. 1 (June 1987), pp. 9-33, 9-10.
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See n. 131.
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subsequent republican theory.168 Pocock’s “Machiavellian Moment” identified multiple historical junctures:
it was the moment and manner in which Machiavellian thought appeared, and “certain enduring patterns
in the temporal consciousness of medieval and early modern Europeans led to the presentation of the
republic, and the citizen’s participation in it, as constituting a problem in historical self-understanding with
which Machiavelli and his contemporaries” contended; it was the moment in “conceptual time” when the
Florentine republic confronted its own temporality, and most particularly, the effort at that moment to
remain “morally and politically stable” in the face of the tide of irrational events “spoken of as the confrontation of ‘virtue’ with ‘fortune’ and ‘corruption.’” The Machiavellian moment also had a continuing history
from the Renaissance to modern times when “secular political self-consciousness continued to pose
problems in historical self-awareness.” Essential to Pocock’s thesis was the notion that the preRenaissance, scholastic, Christian view of the world had centered on a universal order and authority with

168
Pocock devoted considerable analysis to the English invocation of Machiavelli. In his view, the
triggering event was the issuance by King Charles I of His Majesties Answer to the Nineteen Propositions
of Both Houses of Parliament. In it, Charles declared England a mixed government “rather than a
condescending monarchy,” viz., not a relationship between king and people in which “mutual intelligences
of love and protection descending, and loyalty ascending … pass … between a king and his people.” MM,
p. 359. Pocock viewed this as “a crucial document in English political thought, and among other things
one of a series of keys which opened the door to Machiavellian analysis.” Id., p. 361. Cf. Wootton,
“Introduction,” Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, p. 12. (“There was no space in this early
seventeenth-century world for civic humanism. That space was opened up, Pocock believed, by the Civil
War. After the execution of the king, James Harrington had sought to understand the course of modern
history, and to do so had turned to a study of the writings of Machiavelli.”) Once again, I find Pocock’s
explanation too abstract and theoretical to account for the linkage between Machiavelli’s republicanism
and mainstream or centrist republicanism of seventeenth and eighteenth-century England and America.
Charles I was just as much a believer in absolute, divine right monarchy as his father and, contrary to
Pocock’s suggestion, I believe he would have characterized England as a “condescending” monarchy.
As one historian put it, “Charles I, then, did not create anxiety for parliaments, though he greatly focused
and to some extent directed its course.” Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 59. Pocock rightly recognized that
His Majesties Answer identified England as a mixed and balanced constitution; however, there is
considerable question as to “whether the king actually read the crucial passage,” and also whether it was
an error by the kings’ ministers to include this idea in the Answer. See The Struggle for Sovereignty:
Seventeenth-Century English Political Tracts, 2 vols., Joyce Lee Malcolm ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,
1999), Vol. 1, https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/810#IfMalcolmV1_footnote_nt105 (12-5-18). Undoubtedly,
the King’s advisors were endeavoring to politically finesse an unhappy Parliament. But in the same
document, Charles averred, “But we call God to witnesse, that as for Our Subjects’ sake these Rights are
vested in Us, so for their sakes, as well as for Our own, We are resolved not to quit them, nor to subvert
(though in a Parliamentary way) the ancient, equall, happy, well-poised, and never-enough commended
Constitution of the Government of this Kingdom, nor to make Ourself of a King of England a Duke of
Venice, and this of a Kingdom a Republique.” The document continued to describe the powers vested in
King, Commons and Lords, and the “Government according to these Laws is trusted to the King,” with the
ancient right to approve taxes and certain impeachment rights vested in Commons, and with Lords
trusted with a Judicatory power. None of this is new. None of these statements suggest Charles I’s
willingness to weaken the authority of kingship in England.
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an apocalyptic view of temporality beyond time in the modern historical sense.169 In contrast, in
Renaissance Florence’s republic, the “timeless continuity of the hierarchic universe” was broken into
“particular moments.”170 Skinner’s substantial body of work was closely related to Pocock’s paradigmatic
legacy but did not “cross the pond” to discuss the Anglo-American republican connection.
To step back for a minute from Pocock and The Machiavellian Moment and focus on American
historiography, sixty-two years earlier, in 1913, American historian Charles Beard published An Economic
Interpretation of the Constitution. Called Progressive School theory and the work of a materialist and
social democrat, Beard’s approach dominated American historiography into the 1960s. Beard’s thesis
was that the delegates to the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention, which included many of the
American Founders, were driven in their decision-making entirely by self-serving, mercantile interests.
Gordon Wood called Beard’s book “the most influential history book ever written in America.”171 Forrest
McDonald, who had many quarrels with Beard, also wrote that, “no historian who followed Beard in
studying the making of the Constitution has been free from Beard’s view of it.”172
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Wootton put it well: “It was in Machiavelli, Pocock argued, that this new way of thinking achieved its
classic exposition. Hence the paradox of Pocock’s title: the Machiavellian Moment lasted three hundred
or more years. What made it momentary was its preoccupation with historical contingency.” Wootton,
“Introduction,” Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, pp. 1-41, 11.
170

MM, pp. 50-54. Pocock’s description of Machiavellian moments was obscure; additionally, the emphasis on historical consciousness was likely overstated and probably erroneous. To the extent that historical consciousness was present in republican thinking at all, it was of absolutely no central importance; for
first and foremost, republicanism is about how governance should be practiced, not how it should be conceived, i.e., thought about as an historical phenomenon. I do think that in 1955 Hans Baron brilliantly
identified historical self-consciousness as a vital component of Renaissance thinking, which became
known as Renaissance humanism beginning with the ideas of Petrarch and then adopted in Renaissance
Florence by Salutati, his protégé Leonardo Bruni, and many others, particularly as a way of looking at
man’s role in civic society, so-called civic humanism. As Baron emphasized, historical self-consciousness
was also reflected in Renaissance art. See Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance, passim.
Indeed, the self-conscious adulation of man was one of the hallmarks of Renaissance thought and art.
But I do not see historical self-consciousness as a pivotal element of Renaissance republicanism. Of
course, this is a completely different proposition than the pervasive reliance by republicans on historical
events to illustrate their ideas. While Machiavelli was a Renaissance humanist in various ways, one way
in which he was not a humanist was his rejection of idealistic and theoretical conceptions of man and
idealistic and theoretical approaches to governance, one example of which is Pocock’s concept of
historical self-consciousness.
171

For the historiography of Beard’s economic thesis, see Gibson, Understanding the Founding, Ch. 1,
pp. 19-49. The quotation from Wood is in a note in the Introduction to the Second Edition of Gibson’s
book, pp. 4 & 275 n.3.
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At the same time, McDonald “has suggested that Beard deliberately slanted data, ignored important
facts, and set forth misrepresentations to promote his broader goal of jarring the historical profession out
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Beard’s economic thesis was the prevailing orthodoxy in American historiography for half a
century. Finally, in the 1950s, Beard’s ideas were challenged by Louis Hartz’s liberal doctrine, which
maintained that from the beginning, British American political thinking was dominated by Lockean
ideas.173 In a 2001 retrospective analysis, historian James Kloppenberg succinctly recapped Hartz’s
theory of American exceptionalism, which he described as simple and elegant.174 Hartz contrasted
American history with “the convulsions of European revolutions and restorations,” insisting that
American commitment to Lockean liberalism enabled it to avoid such upheavals; but it also enforced
conformity, a “stultifying presence and ‘moral unanimity’” imposed by "this fixed, dogmatic
liberalism of a liberal way of life." America lacked feudalism, emphasized Hartz, and therefore could
embrace liberalism. Unfortunately, said Kloppenberg, Hartz never explained what he meant by
feudalism, Locke, or liberalism.175 (As Kloppenberg also pointed out, Locke was no Lockean, per
Hartz’s sense of the word, given the depth of Locke’s Calvinist convictions.176) Historian J. Patrick
Diggins was more simpatico, explaining that Hartz was interested in showing that American
liberalism became pervasive because of its unobtrusive growth, which was enabled by “the absence
of feudalism and the presence of Lockeanism. The first condition meant that America had no
aristocracy that … as a class, resisted social change, denigrated the value of labor, and ridiculed the
idea of equality.” This conviction was derived from Tocqueville’s recognition that Americans were
born equal and therefore did not have to struggle against class structures to become so. As we will
establish in Part Two, John Adams’ notion of aristocracy was much broader; he believed that an
aristocracy existed in every society.

of its sterile and unrealistic view of the Founders.” Gibson, Understanding the Founding, Ch. 1, n.6, pp.
21 & 281.
173

Louis B. Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York, 1955).
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“He conceded that his approach could be characterized as a ‘single factor’ analysis with two
dimensions: ‘the absence of feudalism and the presence of the liberal idea.’ … America lacked both a
‘genuine revolutionary tradition’ and a ‘tradition of reaction’ and contained instead only ‘a kind of selfcompleting mechanism, which insures the universality of the liberal idea.’ … In order to grasp this allencompassing liberal tradition, Hartz argued, we must compare America with Europe.” Kloppenberg, “In
Retrospect,” pp. 460-61.
175

Id.

176

Id, p. 464.
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As to the presence of Lockeanism, we have the causal explanation for modern liberalism, an
explanation that will be interesting to reflect back upon when we consider Adams’ political ideas:
“The second condition meant that Americans would be property conscious, would value individual
natural rights even if they were more sensed than understood, and would regard liberty as consisting
more of resistance to political authority as opposed to the classical duty of participating actively in
the workings of government.” According to Diggins, such conditions “produced a mentality that
precluded the possibility that America would have either a reactionary aristocracy or a revolutionary
working class.”177
The next major shift in American Founding scholarship was the work of historian Bernard Bailyn,
who in 1967 published The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Soon thereafter, in 1969,
Bailyn’s protégé Gordon Wood published The Creation of the American Republic. Both historians
brilliantly shifted early American historiography away from the Progressive historians’ emphatically
economic perspective, but also away from Hartz’s approach, convinced that republican ideas undergirded
the American Revolution.178 The Bailyn, Wood, and Pocock method constituted a direct challenge to the
thesis, imbedded in the Progressive approach as well as in other methodologies (e.g., Marxist and
Namieran), that ideas are merely projected rationalizations of underlying interests and rarely, if ever,
motives for behavior.179 A profusion of scholarship followed. Relying upon the extensive pamphlet
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J. Patrick Diggins, “Knowledge and Sorrow: Louis Hartz’s Quarrel with American History,” Political
Theory, Vol. 16, No. 3, (May 1988), pp. 355-76, 360-61. Interestingly and in contrast, in addition to the
formidable challenge by Pocock to the significance of Locke in early American political thought, John Dunn
later argued that it was a myth that Locke was an especially authoritative political thinker, as opposed to
his influence as a philosopher in eighteenth-century England and America. John Dunn, “The Politics of
Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth Century,” John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, John
W. Yolton, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 45-80, cited in Pocock’s review, inter alia, of
Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic in The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 3,
No. 1 (Summer, 1972), pp. 119-134, 127. Given Dunn’s status as a Locke expert, this was a very
significant admission. Dunn’s conclusion is evident, for example, in Jefferson’s solitary reference to Locke,
and on the subject of metaphysics, in his long-term correspondence with Adams, and Adams’ naught use
of Locke in his reciprocal profuse correspondence. See The Adams-Jefferson Letters.
178
Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution; Wood, The Creation of the American
Republic.
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Gibson, Understanding the Founding, Ch. 3 & pp. 97-98. For Namierians, “ideology in the sense of a
coherent and motivating system of legitimating beliefs is subordinate to the oppositions of competing
material and selfish interests, whereas for more recent historians it is precisely a coherent body of beliefs,
an ideology in Geertz’s sense of the term, that sustains political life in the face of the deeply pragmatic
and opportunistic nature of the modern administration of state power exemplified in the twenty-year rule
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literature previously ignored or unavailable to historians that flooded the colonial world beginning in the
mid-eighteenth century, Bailyn emphasized the pivotal importance of republican ideas and ideological
factors in early American political thought.180 Unlike Pocock, Bailyn did not deny Locke’s influence in
eighteenth-century America; but he surrounded Locke with so large a mass of rival publicists and pamphleteers that his singularity disappeared. Wood similarly relegated Locke to inconsequentiality. Wood’s
emphasis, however, was somewhat different than Bailyn’s, the latter of whom was riveted by the fears
expressed by the American colonists, whereas Wood’s focus was on the juxtaposition of classical
republican ideas in a decidedly new, modern setting.181 The preeminence of the “public good” was the
idealistic goal of the American revolutionaries, a goal that Wood argued was quashed after the Revolution
by the Constitution’s individualistic, “liberal” emphasis. “Nothing could be more radical than this attempt to
make every man independent. The Revolution became a full-scale assault on dependency. Instead of
creating a new order of benevolence and selflessness, enlightened republicanism was breeding social
competitiveness and individuality; and there seemed no easy way of stopping it. …The Revolution was
the source of its own contradictions.”182 Economic historian Joyce Appleby explained (while also highly
critical of the thesis) that Wood’s was not a tale about a successful revolution in America but an ironic
story that ended with the residual effects of dashed political aspirations.183 Like Beard and in a different
way like Hartz, Wood saw the Revolution as a failed opportunity to institute democracy. Collectively, the
Bailyn/Wood/Pocock theses and related work are termed the republican synthesis paradigm.184

of Robert Walpole but continued by his compromising successors.” Ideology and Form in Eighteenthcentury Literature, David H. Richter, ed. (Lubock, TX: Texas Tech University Press,1999), p. 35.
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Shalhope, “Towards a Republican Synthesis”; see also Rogers, “Republicanism: The Career of a
Concept,” a well-written but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to end the lengthy historiographic debate
over the intellectual origins of the American Revolution.
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On the matter of fears, see Chapter 2 of Wood’s The Idea of America, entitled, “Conspiracy and the
Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century,” pp. 81-123.
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Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, pp. 179, 230.
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Joyce Appleby, “The Radical Recreation of the American Republic,” The William and Mary Quarterly,
Third Series, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Oct. 1994), pp. 679-683, 680.
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Gordon Wood’s 1969 Creation of the American Republic was described as, “One of the half dozen most
important books ever written about the American Revolution.” Jack P. Greene, Review, “The Creation of the
American Republic, 1776-1787; by Gordon S. Wood. 653 pp....,” Oct. 26, 1969, p. BR26. In his preface to
the 1998 edition of the book, Wood distanced himself from the utilization of paradigms with some words of
wisdom: “It is a mistake to argue about the transition from republicanism to liberalism in large abstract
terms, as one ‘paradigm’ replacing another. Such ‘paradigms’ may be helpful in organizing the details of
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Perhaps the academic saturation of liberalism at the time of the 1975 publication of The Machiavellian Moment contributed to Pocock’s book constituting a Machiavellian moment in itself; for here was
the creation of a new historiographic paradigm through which to thread early modern political thought
from the Renaissance and Machiavelli to English republicanism and then to extend it even further, to
America, establishing Pocock’s subtitle, the “Atlantic republican tradition.” This unquestionably constituted a historiographic watershed, leading to a profusion of scholarly work on republicanism, liberalism,
and related topics.185 In 1985 Forrest McDonald challenged Bailyn, arguing that the motivations of the
American revolutionaries were more complex than Bailyn’s simplified republicanism. Most effectively,
McDonald targeted Beard, castigating the quality of the workmanship that led to Beard’s findings.186
Diggins argued that America was nothing if not Calvinist and Lockean – guilt-ridden and acquisitionist, a
“tragic embrace.” Diggins restated the older view that goes back to Hartz and Tocqueville that Lockean
liberalism and Protestant Calvinism were the main themes in American political culture, not Machiavellian

the past, but we historians need to be wary of their capacity to distort what actually happened. Only by
appreciating the distinctiveness and complexity of the past will we be able to move beyond our ever more
precious historiographical debates and actually advance our understanding of how we Americans came to
be what we are.” It goes without saying that this cogent argument applies to understanding people other
than Americans. Gordon S. Wood, “Preface to the 1998 Edition,” The Creation of the American Republic
1776-1787 (Chapel Hill, NC & London: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), p. xiii.
185

As previously indicated, Pocock’s ideas did not come out of thin air. Much earlier, Zelda Fink’s work
on The Classical Republicans (1945), Caroline Robbins scholarship beginning in the 1940s on the
eighteenth-century commonwealthmen, and Joyce Appleby’s impressive body of work beginning in the
1960s, which included consideration of “the new republican synthesis,” shifted the study of AngloAmerican political thought away from the previously dominant and in-vogue Hartz liberal paradigm.
186

Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, KA:
University of Kansas Press, 1986). Historian François Furstenberg recently explained the profoundly
negative dimensions of Hartz’s thesis. “Many people lump the so-called consensus historians together,
but this is a mistake, for Hartz, unlike many of his contemporaries, was no friend to American liberalism.
His argument was a virtuoso performance but simple in conception: The United States was ‘a liberal
society, lacking feudalism and therefore socialism and governed by an irrational Lockianism.’” According
to Hartz, “Because Americans had been ‘born equal,’ no dialectical spark ever ignited History’s motor.
American history—if one can even call it that—was just a long, essentially uninterrupted unfolding of the
liberal seed.” In short, said Furstenberg, “Hartz had come not to praise American liberalism, nor even to
bury it; he came to lament ‘the psychic heritage of a nation “born equal”’ whose ‘colossal liberal
absolutism’ entailed ‘the death by atrophy of the philosophic impulse.’” This was “a crushing intellectual
tradition ‘reducing insight to platitude, transforming philosophy into the complacent after-dinner speech’ of
‘a thousand chamber of commerce epigoni.’” Moreover, “liberalism’s hegemony in America was not just
an aesthetic or intellectual problem for Hartz; it was a political and perhaps even existential one: ‘the
tyrannical force of Lockian sentiment’ had exerted so great a ‘compulsive power’ on the United States
‘that it has posed a threat to liberty itself.’” François Furstenberg, “Hartz is Dead. Long Live Hartz,”
Reviews in American History, Vol. 40, No. 2 (June 2012), pp. 319-24, 319, citing Hartz, The Liberal
Tradition in America, pp. 15, 285, 206, 31, 11.
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civic humanism. Appleby also vigorously challenged the republican synthesis’ rejection of liberalism as an
American founding principle. In short, sundry challenges have been made to the republican synthesis
paradigm, the most interesting by Pocock himself who, in his 2009 monograph on Political Thought and
History, acknowledged that “historical inquiry is anti-paradigmatic, in the sense that it multiplies without
theoretical limitations the problem-situations, contingencies and contexts in which any historical
occurrence may have been situated.”187 Returning to The Machiavellian Moment, while there have been a
variety of adaptations, it is indisputable that its Teflon sustainability is the launching pad from which
scholars still propel.
Gibson’s conviction that scholars must address methodology as a part of understanding history
leads to the exploration of the variety of meanings of key concepts, such as liberalism, republicanism,
democracy, and interest.188 Gibson’s emphasis on the essentiality of scholars’ assumptions is
compelling, as the ideas of generations of historians who have written about republicanism are thoroughly
entangled in the intellectual history itself. Debates having to do with the American Founders are part of
broader debates, e.g., whether the Founders were simply pursuing their own economic interests is part of
the issue of the continuing viability and legitimacy of the Constitution and the political system it created;
the debate over whether the Founders’ conception of their political system should be characterized as a
species of liberalism or republicanism is a debate about the Founders’ conception of human nature –
whether man is a political animal, for instance, and the necessity for virtue in a republic – as well as
understanding the proper ends of government and, “ultimately the defining characteristics of the American
character.” One can characterize the linguistic contextualists’ debate and their “great books” opponents
as “nothing less than a debate about the relationship of philosophy and history.”189
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“Preface,” J. G. A. Pocock, Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method (Cambridge
University Press, 2010)[orig. pub. 2009], p. xiii. Pocock has had a “dual existence as a maker of
paradigms who, at the same time, questions them,” as he did “in his ‘Political Ideas as Historical Events:
Political Philosophers as Historical Actors.’” This makes Pocock “difficult to understand and define.” That
difficulty is compounded by the fact that “notoriously few” American historians actually read The
Machiavellian Moment in its entirety. “Thus, Americanists have never confronted Pocock’s rich set of
historical references and his debt to the history of scholarship and historiography, a vibrant and
rejuvenated field.” Jacob Soll, “J.G.A. Pocock’s Atlantic Republicanism Thesis Revisited,” p. 24, citing D.
Kelley, “What is Happening to the History of Ideas,” Journal of the History of Ideas 51 (1990), pp. 3-25.
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Gibson, Understanding the Founding, p. 232.
Id, p. 233. In my view Gibson’s comments about methodology are more valuable than his summary of
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In “The Virtue of Liberalism,” Kloppenberg sought to heal the divisive wounds, arguing that “a
singularly unpromising escape route, a rediscovery of the virtues of liberalism,” could be joined with the
Protestant Christian and classical republicanism traditions to explain the decisive moments at which the
American Revolution was launched and then constitutionally formulated.190 Immediately thereafter, said
Kloppenberg, these traditions diverged. In Kloppenberg’s view, at the center of this phenomenon were
the themes of individual autonomy and popular sovereignty. In his most recent (2016) monograph,
Kloppenberg shifted the debate over substantive issues to the paradigm of democracy and its historical
antecedents in Europe.191 Kloppenberg made a number of methodological observations with which I very
much concur. First, it is now incontrovertible that it is useless to study ideas detached from their historical
setting. Kloppenberg also challenged the validity of “grand patterns of development,” that “fit events to a
preconceived pattern,” which I take to be an indictment of the Pocock paradigmatic approach, “because
such patterns may distort our understanding by imposing meanings different from those that ideas had
historically.” 192 Instead, he wisely endorsed a hermeneutical approach to historical inquiry that tries to
reconstruct ideas “as they were thought” by attempting to uncover the intent of those who thought them
and wrote about them, while also striving to find larger patterns of change. Kloppenberg maintained, for
example, that Puritanism had a significant impact on certain Founders.193
Kloppenberg may be correct but, contrary to his suggestion, it is doubtful that Puritanism is a
meaningful barometer or category by which to analyze the ideas of the American Revolution. First of all,
the Founders were not Puritans; those from New England, where Puritanism had thrived, might have had
strong Puritan roots; but Puritanism no longer dominated New England life by the middle of the eighteen-

the work of other historians examining the origins of the American Revolution.
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Kloppenberg, “The Virtues of Liberalism,” p. 11, accord, Daniel T. Rodgers, “Republicanism: The
Career of a Concept,” Journal of American History 79, No. 1 (1992), pp. 11-37, 37-38. Historian Peter
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th century.194 Moreover, as Kloppenberg made clear, the dissenting tradition encompassed a vast range
of ideas as to how one’s religious convictions should impact one’s other views, such as whether
commitment to God required selfless obedience to earthly authorities or the very opposite. In short, it is a
risky business to draw inferences about prevalent ideas and opinions from the general label of
Puritanism, or even its subdivisions or sectarian progeny. Such an analysis must be highly individualized.
I also do not agree with Kloppenberg’s understanding of republicanism, which enormously
emphasized the importance of virtue and “the individual’s responsibility to adhere to the moral law.” As we
shall see, republicanism is misunderstood if one focuses excessively on virtue. This miscue understandably led Kloppenberg, referring to Montesquieu, Adams, and Madison, to conclude that republicanism
was not useful to “a nation attempting to establish itself on a foundation of natural rights, equality, and the
pursuit of happiness.”195 Kloppenberg’s misapprehension of republicanism constitutes another instance in
which the historiography has led a scholar away from what republicanism is all about.196 It also resulted
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In an 1811 letter to his dear friend. Benjamin Rush, John Adams reminisced about “the Theatrical
Exhibitions of Politicks,” of which “Our Citizens in our great commercial Cities … are great Masters.”
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Liberty.” Adams to Rush, June 21, 1811, John Adams: Writings from the New Nation 1784-1826, Gordon
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In their introduction to Legal Republicanism, entitled “Law and Republicanism: Mapping the Issues,”
M&B divided republicanism into a multitude of subgroups, a process that seems to eviscerate any effort to
understand whether there is a viable political theory that simply can be called “republicanism” and, if there
is, what it is and how it relates to other political theories, e.g., liberalism. See, e.g., the discussion of
liberty in Ch. Three. Per M&B, because “Republicans disagree about what constitutes the primary or core
value(s) in contemporary republicanism,” there is no effort to define a political theory called
republicanism. M&B, Legal Republicanism, p. 8; cf. Honohan, Civic Republicanism, passim. This is an
antipodal approach from my own. One needs to separate the wheat from the chaff and understand what
makes sense for us to term “republicanism”; the urge to segregate rather than integrate does not facilitate
our understanding of the theory. Note, too, the confusion caused by Kloppenberg’s recent brilliant study,
Toward Democracy, which is ostensibly about democracy but is actually about republicanism – a term
that Kloppenberg seems to want to sweep under the proverbial intellectual rug. In both texts, words and
terminology seem to be used rather casually. To cite one example of many, in the Introduction to Legal
Republicanism the editors stated, “Republicanism is a well-known political and democratic theory,” and “A
republican lawyer is expected to endorse a strongly democratic theory of legal authority. The law’s
legitimacy stems from its adoption by democratic institutions, showing due respect to actual disagreements among citizens.” M&B, Legal Republicanism, pp. 3, 30-31. But republicanism is not a democratic
theory in any normative sense of either word; and what is “a political and democratic theory,” what is a
“strongly democratic theory of legal authority,” and why do we need “democratic institutions” to legitimize
the law? None of this is self-evident.
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in the flawed conclusion that republicanism is a completely different tradition than liberalism.
It will become clear in this study that political liberalism – liberalism as applied to political matters –
is a form of republicanism.197 This proposition runs headlong into the debate, previously described, over
the role that liberal ideas played during the American revolutionary period, particularly vis-a-vis ideas
described as republican. It is further complicated by political theorist Richard Ashcraft’s thesis in Revolutionary Politics that Locke was a political radical, however else one might describe his politics, and that
Locke’s ideas were also influential during the seventeenth-century Restoration period in English history.
Political liberalism is generally considered to focus on the rights of individuals and the protection of
those rights. In its starkest, Hobbesian form, it is market liberalism – the unregulated albeit natural pursuit
of self-interest.198 Negative liberty, or the right to be free from the interference of others unless one’s
actions are themselves interfering, is usually associated with liberalism.199 To its critics, liberalism
threatens unfettered individualism. The countervailing view is that liberalism is not an endorsement of

As indicated throughout this study, republicanism is an umbrella under which various views of republican
thought coexist. Perhaps this is akin to what M&B are saying. But in Legal Republicanism there is no
effort to define or describe the umbrella. Other issues are confusing, e.g., the relationship between a
communally-oriented republicanism and “a deliberate defence of democracy”; the nature of an Aristotelian
type of republicanism given Aristotle’s strict, highly selective view of who was entitled to participate in
governance – to vote – even accounting for the many centuries’ bias that excluded women and others
from participation; and political equality need not imply socialism in any way, which M&B’s discussion
suggested. In sum, befuddling combinations and associations of terminology tends to obscure rather
than elucidate the subject-matter. Perhaps most importantly, my own dissatisfaction with this analysis is
that the very concept dubbed “legal republicanism” is problematic given the fact that the law, in a multiple,
tiered fashion, is a fundamental part of republicanism period, viz., of everything that falls under the
umbrella. Accordingly, it would be incorrect to suggest that there is something called legal republicanism
that relates to law, but that other “forms” of republicanism do not.
197
The word “liberal” was part of seventeenth-century lexicon, but it was used as an adjective to suggest
abundance or generosity; it also referred to something that was suitable for a free man or gentleman – one
not tied to a trade – such as liberal arts. Its Middle English origin was via Old French from the Latin word,
liberalis, free man, which is derived from liber, which means free. “Liberal,” Oxford Dictionary of English (3
ed.), ed., Angus Stevenson (Oxford University Press, 2010; online ed., 2012), Oxford Reference online, 916-13, http://www.oxfordreference.com. ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/view/10.1093/acref/9780199571123.001.
0001/m_en_gb0468560#DWS-013046 . The intellectual tradition termed “liberalism” is a post-hoc label
when applied to Locke’s ideas, although he is often described as the father of liberalism. Joan McGregor,
“Liberalism and Democracy,” Philosophy East and West, Vol. 38, No. 3 (July 1988), pp. 334-46, 335 n.5.
In this context its use is inherently anachronistic, for the political application of the term did not occur until
the nineteenth century, first in Spain and then in France. Alberto Sahagun, PhD Dissertation, “The Birth of
Liberalism: The Making of Liberal Political Thought in Spain, France, and England, 1808-1823,”
Washington University in St. Louis, 2009, pp. 23-27.
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atomism, greed and selfishness. Indeed, it is not about self-interest at all; it is about individual rights.200
Economic historian Joyce Appleby maintained that the concept of economic liberalism was a pivotal
movement in eighteenth-century Britain that was transmitted to America. Economic liberalism included
the desire for the democratization of economic opportunity, economic growth through lower-class mobility,
and economic rationalism. Reflecting the historiographic confusion, Appleby stated, “Deliverance from
the strictures of classical republicanism came from the ideology of liberalism, from a belief in a natural
harmony of benignly striving individuals saved from chaos by the stability worked into nature’s own
design.” This idea was first manifest “in very local clashes over economic rights in the middle
decades of the eighteenth century,” in which “ this naturalistic recasting of human experience
appeared as the universal law of self-interest among radical agitators in the 1760s.” The concept
of economic liberalism then “acquired final validation as part of the plan of nature and of nature's
God in Thomas Jefferson's apotheosis to individual liberty.”201 Paradoxically, liberalism has come to
endorse increased government involvement in American citizens’ lives as an effective means of
enhancing and protecting individual rights. This is not necessarily straightforward. As Diggins pointed
out, it was the very liberal President Jimmy Carter “who assured Americans, in direct contradiction to what
the Federalist authors had advised – not to mention his alleged mentor Reinhold Niebuhr – that
government is bad and the people essentially good.”202 Some term these different perspectives “laissezfaire” or “classical” liberalism versus “welfare state” or “modern” liberalism. But it was liberal theorist Hartz
who first detected that, “American liberalism contained a conservative time bomb.”203
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In Political Liberalism, political theorist John Rawls’ “aim” was to “try to express the idea of public
reason in an acceptable way as part of a political conception of justice that is broadly speaking liberal.”
What does this mean? Rawls began with the principle that, “in a democratic society public reason is the
reason of equal citizens who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive power over one
another in enacting laws and in amending their constitution.”204 In political liberalism this coercive power is
exercised by the citizenry, and is invoked only “in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which
all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of the principles and ideals acceptable to
them as reasonable and rational. This is the liberal principle of legitimacy.” Glancing over the principles
and definition of Rawls’ political liberalism it is obvious that pivotal to his analysis is the foundational role
of law. Throughout his work, Rawls referred to natural law, the social contract, rule of law, and various
legal processes. Rawls spelled this out specifically when he endorsed the views of legal scholar Frank
Michelman in an article entitled “Law’s Republic.” “I take American constitutionalism – as manifest in
academic constitutional theory, in the professional practice of lawyers and judges, and in the ordinary
self-understanding of Americans at large – to rest on two premises regarding political freedom: first, that
the American people are politically free insomuch as they are governed by themselves collectively, and
second, that the American people are politically free in that they are governed by laws rather than
men.”205 On this last point Michelman relied, inter alia, on John Adams.
It is intriguing that Rawls asserted that the ideal of citizenry imposes a moral duty, which he
labeled “the duty of civility,” to be able to explain to one’s fellow citizens how the principles one advocates
and endorses by one’s vote “can be supported by the political values of public reason. This duty involves
a willingness to listen to others, and a fair-mindedness….”Here Rawls seemed to be advocating what
Renaissance scholars would term civic humanism – the responsibility of good citizenship – as a part of
political liberalism. On the other hand, reliance on an ideal as part of one’s political theory places Rawls
and liberalism on the periphery of republicanism, the pragmatic advocates of which are generally
reluctant to think in ideal or utopian terms. Rawls specifically called this value “the ideal” of public reason
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– “The union of the duty of civility with the great values of the political” – which ideally enables citizens to
govern themselves “in ways that each thinks the other might reasonably be expected to accept; and this
ideal is supported by the comprehensive doctrines reasonable persons affirm.”206
Interestingly, Rawls considered this perspective “in some ways reminiscent of Rousseau’s Social
Contract,” which confirms the similar placement of Rousseau, as an idealist, on the republican periphery.
At the same time, there are features of Rawls’ liberalism that are not associated with Rousseau: “It is
incorrect to say that liberalism focuses solely on the rights of individuals; rather, the rights it recognizes
are to protect associations, smaller groups, and individuals, all from one another in an appropriate
balance specified by its guiding principles of justice.”207 Once again, this sounds like republicanism:
protecting people from each other, balancing, justice which, by definition, is intended to be the outcome of
the law.208 Rawls referred from time to time to Locke, particularly in connection with the following
principles: (i) toleration; (ii) what I would term Locke’s extreme resistance theory -- that “persons are
capable of a certain natural political virtue and do not engage in resistance and revolution unless their
social position in the basic structure is seriously unjust and this condition has persisted over some period
and time and seems to be removable by no other means”; (iii) what Rawls termed Locke’s “idea of a
dualist constitutional democracy,” which distinguishes between the people’s constituent power
(sovereignty?) and the ordinary power, “in everyday politics,” of legislators and executives; (iv) concepts
of public and private autonomy, applicable to “justice as fairness and in other liberal doctrines going back
to Locke”; and (v) the social contract.209 In short, Rawls incorporated important principles of the liberal
Locke in explaining and supporting his own concept of political liberalism. If Locke’s ideas fit within the
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including the body of work by John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Cass Sunstein, Joseph Raz, Mark Lilla,
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umbrella of republicanism, there is every reason to believe that Rawls’ political liberalism would too.
It is agreed, of course, that laws were invented for the safety of citizens,
the preservation of States, and the tranquility and happiness of human life.
Cicero, Laws 210

B. Legal Scholarship
Legal scholarship encompasses legal history, written by both historians and lawyers, and legal
theory (jurisprudence).211 British and American legal scholars have focused on the relationship, and
similarities and differences, between English and American principles of law including the nature of
constitutionalism and the rule of law.212 This work includes but is not limited to analyses of republicanism.
It will be evident throughout this study that English constitutionalism and common law are featured in both
Sidney and Adams’ work. One should begin this review of legal studies with one of the most impactful
analyses of these legal matters done by an historian and political scientist not a lawyer, Prof. Charles
McIlwain, who probed the legal linkage of English and American political institutions and ideas in his
studies of the High Court of Parliament and its Supremacy, and The American Revolution: A Constitutional Interpretation, published in 1910 and 1923, respectfully.213 There is then the sometimes brilliant and
large body of jurisprudential oeuvre of John Philip Reid beginning in the 1970s, which further explored
common constitutional values of seventeenth and eighteenth-century England and America, as did the
later work of M. N. S. Sellers.214 More recently a host of scholars have delved into this subject matter,
most notably, jurist Harold Berman in his two-volume study on Law and Revolution.215 In a 2011 article
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on the historiography of American colonial law in The American Journal of Legal History, law professor
and political theorist Scott D. Gerber reviewed the development of colonial American legal history. Priceless is Gerber’s quotation from the former Dean of Duke University School of Law, that post-modern legal
scholarship is “the sort of legal philosophy that gives bullshit a bad name.” Among other questions that
Gerber raised was, “Who is qualified to write the history – intellectual or otherwise – of American colonial
law?” and the rift among scholars over this question. I appreciate Gerber’s bottom line, which was that, “If
intellectual history was good enough for the two most influential political historians of colonial America,
Bernard Bailyn and Gordon S. Wood, it should be good enough for legal historians of colonial America.” 216
Beyond the willingness of lawyers to explore the ideas of colonial American law is the question of what
are the scholarly resources on which they can rely. The same question applies to intellectual historians
and political scientists. Looking at the matter from the vantage point of the historian, the substantial body
of legal scholarship on republican ideas, quite curiously, is commonly ignored and certainly not thoroughly
integrated into the historiography that is made up of the closely related analyses by historians and political
theorists – a synthesis (or at least a start) that is one subsidiary goal of this study.217

also Berman’s important article, "The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale," Yale Law
Journal 103 (1994), pp. 1651-738. On American law generally, see Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M.
Hayden American Law: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
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In an article on Thomas Jefferson’s legal education, David T. Konig, who is both a professor of law and
a professor of history, wrote that “major biographers” have either paid little attention to Jefferson’s legal
practice “or denigrate it.” Quoting from Saul Padover’s book Jefferson, published in 1942, the Virginian is
described as “not cut out to be a lawyer. His mind was too inquisitive, too speculative, and above all, too
much given to ideas as such to be happy in jurisprudence…. A man with an innate sense of style,
Jefferson was repelled by the dry, flatulent legal verbiage, with its plethora of ‘whereases’ and its
underlying chicanery. He often jeered at things ‘lawyerish.’” David T. Konig, “Whig Lawyering in the
Legal Education of John Adams,” The Libraries, Leadership, & Legacy of John Adams and Thomas
Jefferson, Robert C. Baron & Conrad Edick Wright, eds. (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing and the
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The body of relevant legal scholarship is vast. Footnoted here is a solid sampling.218
We close our Introduction with the thought with which we began. Our failure to take into account
critical elements of Anglo-American republicanism has resulted in a skewed understanding of the tradition
which this study corrects. All relevant scholarship will be considered without regard to its originating
school of thought, e.g., Straussian, Pocockian, or other perspective, or the discipline from which it comes,
e.g., history, political science or law. In short, I will not live by only one paradigm or school of
historiography. As one political scientist recently observed, reliance on a paradigmatic method
“predetermine[s] the answers.”219 Instead, an analytical method akin to Jonathan Scott's approach will be
utilized -- a selective integration of the advantages of various intellectual frameworks, including those of
Pocock and Skinner, which Scott described as "a comparative thematic analysis of republican writing."220
Consideration will be given to the ideas of other republican writers. Part One will address Sidney’s
historical context and republican ideas; in Part Two we will establish the profound connection between the
ideas and contexts of Sidney and Adams. The study will close with a few reflections. In addition to
clarifying well-known components of Anglo-American republicanism, emphasis will be placed on the
extraordinary importance to republican thought of the Law and concepts of balance and moderation,
aspects of republicanism that have been woefully ignored.221 By elucidating the nature of Anglo-American
republicanism, which remains confused in the literature, and recalibrating our understanding of the tradition
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through a demonstration and substantiation of the theory's primary mainstream ideas, we will be able to
“remodel” early modern Anglo-American republicanism, establishing the well-recognized tenets of the
theory and our best understanding of what they mean. Sidney's pivotal importance as a republican
thinker will become very clear – a fact entirely obscured in the literature. Sidney was a vital link from the
European to the American arm of the Anglo-American republican tradition. Findings also will suggest why
Sidney has not been given his due by whig historians and other scholars notwithstanding his stature
among contemporaries and early Americans. On the western side of the pond emphasis will be placed on
the parallel nature and importance of Adams' republican ideas.
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PART I: SIDNEY
CHAPTER ONE
The Complex World of Algernon Sidney
But yet, O man, rage not beyond thy need,
Deem it no gloire to swell in tyranny.
Thou art of blood; joy not to make things bleed.
Though fearest death; think they are loath to die.
A plaint of guiltless hurt doth pierce the sky.
And you, poor beasts, in patience bide your hell,
Or know your strengths, and then you shall do well.
Philip Sidney, The Old Arcadia1

In 1659 Algernon Sidney left England for the Baltic. Sidney was one of several English leaders
charged with the pressing mission of re-establishing the Dutch-English partnership and effectuating peace
among the bickering northern European kingdoms. The specific goal was to avoid a blockade in the North
Sea that would have had significant adverse effects on England’s vital trade interests. Unbeknownst to him
as he cast sail, Sidney was not to return home for eighteen years, the victim of the demise of the
Commonwealth and the triumphant restoration of the Stuarts.2 Whatever animosity may have existed by
the royalists against the likes of Sidney, many of his political compatriots signed the required apology to,
and plea for mercy from Charles II for the error of their ways; they then returned to their normal, largely
aristocratic lives, contritely enjoying life, and sometimes politically functioning and assuming leadership
roles in the Stuart England of Charles II and James II. Sidney did not. Although we cannot say with
certainty because he made no effort to reconcile with the Stuarts, it certainly is possible that Sidney also
could have returned to England had he done so early on, as most others did. Sidney did not. In perhaps
his most poignant words among many to his disconsolate father, Sidney explained his dilemma and
consequent decision: “But I knowe people will say I straine at knats and swallowe camels; that it is a
strange conscience, that lets a man runne violently on, till he is deepe in civill blood, and then stays at a
fewe words and complements. ... I cannot helpe it if I judge amisse; I did not make myself. …I walk in the
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Sir Philip Sidney, The Major Works, including Astrophil and Stella, Katherine Duncan-Jones, ed. (Oxford
& New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 110.
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Jonathan Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677 (Cambridge University Press,
2004)(“Scott I”), pp. 124-32.
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light God hath given me.”3
Herein lies the mystery of Algernon Sidney: a man of principle, a patriot, a man of pride, a man of
conscience, a man of God, a political dynamo capable, quite remarkably and figuratively speaking, of
swallowing camels in pursuit of his cause, willing and able to shed his fellow Englishmen’s blood, yet a
man intolerant of even inconsequent, albeit pesky knats. Disentangling the personal from the political is a
particularly thorny problem with Sidney. It will become clear in our exploration of Sidney’s world and his
ideas that the two are inextricably and multiplicatively linked. One also can zoom the lens out and quickly
appreciate that one of the ubiquitous challenges in analyzing early modern Anglo-American republicanism
generally is the complex political and personal contexts of each player involved in what were major
political movements, and, quite literally, revolutionary historical events. This challenge applies not only to
Sidney but also to John Adams, both of whom were part of a collection of men who expressed related,
evolving, sometimes different, and even opposing ideas amidst politically volatile times, within a highly
influential circle of politically astute and often politically involved family and friends. To begin to address
the matter, we turn to Sidney’s world.
We thinke our selves most fortunately borne under such a starre, as we have bene inabled
by Gods power to have saved you under our reigne, from forreigne foes,
from Tyrants rule, and from your owne ruine; and doe confesse, that wee passe
not so much to be a Queene, as to be a Queene of such Subjects, for whom (God is witnesse,
without boast or vaunt) wee would willingly lose our life, ere see such to perish.
Elizabeth I, the “farewell” Golden Speech, 1601 4
If seventeenth-century authors used models based on the history of Rome
to interpret their own lives, generations of historians after 1649
have taught their lessons through the fall of the monarchy of Charles I.
Mark Kishlansky, “Charles I: A Case of Mistaken Identity”5

A. Algernon Sidney’s Historical Context: Early Modern England
Algernon Sidney’s life corresponds with the most turbulent time in English history, including the
English historical event most studied, “the defining historical moment” that has “riveted the attention of
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Algernon Sidney to his father, the 2nd Earl of Leicester, Aug. 30, 1660, Sydney Papers: Consisting of a
Journal of the Earl of Leicester, and Original Letters of Algernon Sidney (Breinigsville, PA: Nabu Public
Domain Repr., 2010), p. 197.
4
The ‘Golden Speech’, 30 November 1601 (SP 12/282 ff.137r-141v), http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
education/resources/elizabeth-monarchy/the-golden-speech/ (9-5-18).
5

Mark Kishlansky, “Charles I: A Case of Mistaken Identity,” Past & Present, No. 189 (Nov. 2005), pp. 4180, 42.
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contemporaries and has fascinated historians ever since,” the downfall of Charles I.6 According to
Sidney’s twentieth-century intellectual biographer, Jonathan Scott, the two things that make seventeenthcentury English history unique are “the length and depth of its experience of political instability,” and “its
astonishing intellectual fertility.”7 But Sidney’s roots are very deeply enmeshed in English history long
before the complex times to which Scott refers; indeed, from the time of William the Conqueror and
perhaps earlier. Atypical in his pedigree yet as much a product of his times as any other Englishman, to
understand Sidney’s ideas it is important to not only summarize events but perhaps, more importantly, to
endeavor to convey the perspective and mood of those formulating ideas in the context of this turbulence.
Two issues informed and dominated this outlook: (i) the role played by religion in Tudor and Stuart
England, and the related impact of the Protestant struggles on the mainland of Europe, a consequence, in
significant part, of the Counter-Reformation, as well as England’s role in, and English perceptions of
these events; and (ii) the nature of the English monarchy, and the related issue of the historical role of the
English nobility in affairs of state. A third theme of lesser significance to this study but of broad import
historically is the mushrooming significance of trade and international business to the well-being of
England. These themes and related activity waxed and waned in the domain of public affairs but all were
omnipresent from the time of Henry VIII and played a part in English history throughout the period of the
English Civil Wars, shaping the English perspective, including that of Algernon Sidney.
The Stuart dynasty was a radical change from that of the Tudors in a number of respects, but
noteworthy for important continuities too. Foremost among the latter was the dominance of antagonistic
and aggressive religious convictions along with what fairly may be termed the religious paranoia that
dominated English politics. Henry VIII’s creation of the Church of England in 1534 during his lengthy rule
(r. 1509-1547) was the launching point for Catholic and Protestant divisiveness in England and, indeed,

6

Id, p. 41. For a brilliant and complex treatment of the fall of Charles I, see John Adamson, The Noble
Revolt: The Overthrow of Charles I (London: Phoenix, 2009).
7
Jonathan Scott, England’s Troubles (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 21. Historian John H.
Plumb defined political stability as “the acceptance by society of its political institutions, and of those
classes of men or officials who control them.” John H. Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in England
1675-1725 (London: Macmillan, 1967), p. xvi; cf. Stephen Taylor, “Afterword: State Formation, Political
Stability and the Revolution of 1688,” The Final Crisis of the Stuart Monarchy: The Revolutions of 168891 in their British, Atlantic and European Contexts, Tim Harris & Stephen Taylor, eds. (Woodbridge,
Suffolk, UK: The Boydell Press, 2015), pp. 273-304, 275-80. An easy way to think of political instability is
the lack of such acceptance.
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reciprocal persecution.8 Henry’s children Edward and Mary each radicalized the English religious
environment by his and her own strident convictions – Edward as a Protestant and Mary as a Catholic.9
The rest of English society followed suit, with leading English noble families taking sides, along with the
gentry and common folk, in this massive Christian fissure. As one historian has mildly observed, “In the
historiography of religious toleration in Europe, the sixteenth century is considered to have been a dark
period.”10 By the time Edward and Mary had died after brief reigns (1553 and 1558), their sister Elizabeth
was immensely chary of religious zeal – even of precise religious affiliation.11 When Elizabeth became
queen in 1558, the majority of English men and women were not yet Protestants; for Elizabeth, “caution
was essential.” Accordingly, Elizabeth did not disclose the government’s religious program. Indeed, it
took twenty years before public opinion began to openly “cleave England into two opposing camps.”12

8

Henry’s religious separation from Rome was driven by dynastic, not spiritual fervor; the new Church of
England, later identified as the Anglican Church, became independent from Rome but was not very
different liturgically from the Catholic and, for that matter, from what had fundamentally been the only
Christian perspective existent in Western Europe for over a millennium. In short, notwithstanding the
parallel timeframe, Henry was not particularly interested in adopting the ideas associated with Luther
(1483-1546) or Calvin (1509-1564). According to one scholar, King Henry was very much involved in
defining his new, “true religion,” seeking to claim a “middle way” between Rome and Zurich, the papacy
and Calvin. It should be noted that this perspective is contrary to the predominant viewpoint of historians
based, in significant part, on John Foxe’s polemical tract, Acts and monuments. See G. W. Bernard, “The
Making of Religious Policy, 1533-1546: Henry VIII and the Search for the Middle Ground,” The Historical
Journal, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Jun. 1998), pp. 321-49.
9

King Edward VI (r. 1547-53) established the Act of Uniformity in 1549 that required a single, Protestant
form of worship. His older sister Mary was the daughter of Katherine of Aragon, the child of the
religiously fervid Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain. Mary rescinded this law, thereby effectively returning
the Church of England to its liturgical practices under her father, Henry VIII, even though Mary was a
devout Catholic and favored the restoration of Catholicism in England. In 1553 Mary declared that she
would not impose Catholicism on her people absent a parliamentary repeal of Protestant legislation.
Nevertheless, she persecuted Protestants. Jacqueline Rose, Godly Kingship in Restoration England: The
Politics of the Royal Supremacy, 1660-1688 (Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 43-44, 228 n.1, 163.
10

Muriel C. McClendon, “Religious toleration and the Reformation: Norwich magistrates in the sixteenth
century,” in England’s Long Reformation: 1500-1800, Nicholas Tyacke, ed. (The Neale Colloquium in
British History) (London: University College London (UCL) Press, 1998), pp. 87-116, 87.
11

“Of religious feeling, in the ordinary sense of the word, she probably had little. Her cold, entirely
humanist outlook, nourished by classical study, kept her apart from the deeper spiritual currents of her
time…. The speculations of theologians were to her no better than ‘ropes of sand or sea-slime leading to
the moon’, and the doctrines for which they slaughtered each other merely a ‘dream of fools or
enthusiasts’.” John Bennett Black, The Reign of Elizabeth 1558-1603, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press,
1965), p. 4; McClendon, “Religious toleration and the Reformation: Norwich magistrates in the sixteenth
century,” England’s Long Reformation: 1500-1800, p. 87.
12
“On 17 November 1558, when she succeeded her half-sister, Mary, on the throne, there was no
glimmering of the splendid future in store for Elizabeth. England was ‘ragged and torn with
misgovernment’; the treasury was empty; the principal fortresses of Portsmouth and Berwick were falling

75

The state of religious foreboding and political ennui that were the natural outcome of decades of
conflict in England were captured in an audacious 1580 letter to the Queen by the young courtier Philip
Sidney, Algernon’s great-uncle. Philip warned Elizabeth, “your subjects … are divided now into mighty
factions (and factions bound on the never-dying knot of religion).” Philip described to his queen the
nature of the heart-wrenching religious divide that split country and families in England. “[T]he one of
them, is to whom your happy government hath granted the free exercise of the eternal truth;…. These …
are they your chief, if not your sole, strength.” In contrast, said Philip, “The other faction…is the Papists;
men whose spirits are full of anguish, some being infested by others,” i.e., forced to oaths, “whom they
accounted damnable; some having their ambition stopped, because they are not in the way of advancement; some in prison and disgrace; … many thinking you are an usurper; … all burthened with the weight
of their conscience.” Added to the Catholic faction, said Philip, were “all discontented persons, such as
want and disgrace keeps lower than they have set their hearts; ... This double rank of people, how their
minds have stood, the northern rebellion, and infinite other practices, have well taught you.”13 The
Northern Rebellion, a quashed 1569 uprising, had been undertaken by English Catholic noblemen
including a relative on the other side of Algernon Sidney’s family, Thomas Percy, 7th Earl of Northumberland, Algernon’s maternal great-great uncle. The purpose of the revolt was to replace Elizabeth with a
Catholic, Mary Queen of Scots.14
The greatest gift with which Elizabeth endowed her people was stability, a result of both her
lengthy rule – forty-five years, from 1558 to 1603 – and her reluctance to allow religion to control and

into ruin; the country was bare of munitions; and a huge debt of more than £266,000 had to be liquidated,
part of which was owing to foreign creditors, and charged with a ‘biting’ interest…. So insecure did the
state of affairs appear that few expected the new régime to last, and many calculated on its speedy
downfall.” Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, pp. 1, 13; John Guy, Tudor England (Oxford University Press,
1988), p. 252.
13

“Sir Philip Sidney to Queen Elizabeth, Anno 1580, Dissuading Her from Marrying the Duke of Anjou,”
The Miscellaneous Works of Sir Philip Sidney, Knt., William Gray, ed. (Boston: T.O. H. P. Burnham,
1860), pp. 289-303, provided as an etext at http://www.luminarium.org/editions/sidneyeliza.htm (9-9-18).
14

On the Northern Rebellion, see John Guy, Tudor England (Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 272-75;
J. B. Black, The Reign of Elizabeth 1558-1603, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 134-44;
David Loades, Elizabeth I (London & New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2003), pp. 166-68, 181;
Christopher Haigh, Elizabeth I: Profiles in Power (Essex, UK: Pearson Education Ltd, 1998) , pp. 55-60.
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dominate political decision-making.15 Religion remained important; and there was religious persecution in
Elizabethan England.16 But England became a pervasively Protestant country during Elizabeth’s reign,
with a Protestant national church; thus, the continuing fervid fear of popery in Stuart England cannot be
explained by contemporaneous events, for by the seventeenth century Catholics made up but a small and
declining part of the English population.17 Contributing to English stability, and notwithstanding “the selfdenying virtues of the christian religion,” was a burgeoning, secularizing and educationally-oriented English
commercial culture with a thriving community of merchants who engaged in prosperous national and

15

The stability to which I refer here is the wider and deeper social stability that relies on the political
stability that Plumb defined. See n. 7. To that end, the Elizabethan Religious Settlement of 1559 reestablished Protestantism as the official religion of the Church of England after the “bloody” rule of Mary,
with the English monarch at its head. The Henrician reforms of Elizabeth’s father were revived, and the
“whole of Mary’s reactionary legislation was swept away” – for which Pope Pius V duly declared Elizabeth
a heretic and excommunicated her. “Although the Elizabethan Church had been broadly Calvinist in
doctrine and emphasized preaching over sacraments, there had been tensions: between those who
wanted further reform and those who did not; between those who sympathized with the godly and those
who urged the need for a harsher stance towards the Puritans. The 1590s had seen the rise of a group
of avant-garde conformists … who challenged the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, placed a greater
emphasis on ceremonialism, and even called for the beautification of churches. Elizabeth herself had
favoured a sacrament-centred style of piety.” Tim Harris, Rebellion: Britain’s First Stuart Kings (Oxford
University Press, 2014), p. 96; Papal bull Regnans in Excelsis, Feb. 25, 1570, Papal Encyclicals Online,
http://www.papalen cyclicals.net/Pius05/p5regnans.htm (12-7-13); Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, p. 14;
Rose, Godly Kingship, pp. 27-28.
16

In 1571 laws were passed that prevented Catholics from entering Parliament; priests were anathema
and were often killed, including the Jesuit Edmund Campion, who was grotesquely executed. Catholic
recusants also faced crippling fines. But Catholicism survived. England very much remained a religiously
polarized country. “Even three generations after the Reformation, Wales and the north of England
remained predominantly Catholic. The west of England had a substantial Catholic minority and as much
as 20 percent of the entire nobility and gentry were Catholic.” Predictably, the aggressive legal action
taken against Catholics radicalized them, and “also gained the sympathies of many young Protestant
courtiers. The explosion of opinion and argument that followed the Reformation led not only to wars of
religion but also to the skeptical humanism of the late Renaissance” in which, as we shall see, the Sidney
family played a significant role. Leanda De Lisle, After Elizabeth: The Rise of James of Scotland and the
Struggle for the Throne of England (New York: Ballantine Books, 2007), pp. 20-21. For a general
discussion of religious conditions in England during Elizabeth’s reign, see McClendon, “Religious
toleration and the Reformation: Norwich magistrates in the sixteenth century,” Tyacke, England’s Long
Reformation, Ch. 4, pp. 87-115.
17
Twentieth-century historians defined the essential history of the English reformation in terms of the
thirty years between 1529 and 1559, “a manageable three-course meal preceded by a few late medieval
aperitifs and rounded off with a small cup of Elizabethan coffee with one or two dissenting digestifs,”
namely, Puritanism (anti-episcopacy English Protestantism, which also sought greater “purity” in Church
doctrine and practice) and Recusancy (the status of those refusing to attend Church of England services).
Historians today tend to characterize the English reformation as a process, not an act. Scott, England’s
Troubles, pp. 29, 133, citing Patrick Collinson, “Comment on Eamon Duffy’s Neale Lecture and the
Colloquium,” Tyacke, England’s Long Reformation, pp 71-86, 71.
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international trade.18
But for a brief respite in Elizabethan England religious requirements were less dogmatic and
religion somewhat decentered, or at least joined by additional important national influences and priorities,
including exploring the New World, primarily for the purpose of increasing the wealth and power of
England.19 This was accomplished both by enriching the monarch – particularly through pirating and
plundering – and enriching the people of England through trade.20 As a Swiss observer remarked after
spending time in late-1590s London, “Most of the inhabitants are employed in commerce; they buy, sell,
and trade in all the corners of the globe. …There are also many wealthy merchants and banquiers in this
city … so that inexpressibly great treasures and vast amounts of money may be seen here.”21 London’s
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Monsieur de Maisse, French ambassador to England during the reign of Elizabeth, wrote in his journal
that, “at London there are infinite houses of charity and hospitals, and almost throughout the whole realm
…insomuch that one hardly sees a beggar,” and that there were “several fair colleges where the children
are taught at the expense of the Queen and the public.” Indeed, “there is no youth in the world, poor or
rich, that has greater chance of learning than in England.” De Maisse, A Journal of All That Was
Accomplished by Monsieur de Maisse, Ambassador in England from Henry IV to Queen Elizabeth, Anno
Domini 1597, G. B. Harrison, ed. (London, 1931), in Leanda de Lisle, After Elizabeth, p. 183; Black, The
Reign of Elizabeth, p. 278.
19

For instance, Elizabeth was more lenient towards Puritan views on the Prayer Book; royal exemptions
were granted for “stranger” churches such as the Waloon, Huguenot and Dutch church; and in London
and several other cities, there were “flourishing congregations of non-Anglican worshippers,” who were
“exempt from parish and episcopal authority.” Elizabeth also determined to call herself the Governor of the
Church of England not the Head of the Church, a clever way to minimize the appearance, at least, of the
power of the Church of England. In her view it was wrong “for anyone, man or woman,” to be the Head of
the Church, “as it usurped Christ’s place.” At the same time, the Elizabethan Catholic community was
diverse, and many Catholic nobility and gentry “adamantly professed loyalty to the Queen.” Mark Goldie,
“Toleration and the Godly Prince in Restoration England,” Liberty, Authority, Formality, John Morrow &
Jonathan Scott, eds. (Exeter, UK: imprint-academic.com, 2008), Ch. 3, pp. 45-65, 56; Carole Levin, The
Reign of Elizabeth (Hampshire, UK & New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 24; Louis Montrose, The Subject of
Elizabeth: Authority, Gender, and Representation (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press,
2006), p. 169.
20

“Early Tudor Englishmen were, [t]o all intents and purposes, … passive spectator[s] of the world’s farflung maritime activity.” But after 1550, “the expansion of industry at home made distant markets a
necessity.” During Elizabeth’s reign “spoliation of the Spaniard became a patriotic duty.” The result was
that through trading and buccaneering, “the greatest period of English exploit on the sea” began. In the
troubles between Spain and England, for example, while there were obvious religious issues, including
Spain’s patronage of polemical Catholic literature that was smuggled into England by committed Jesuits,
and political opposition grounded in religious opposition, it was the animus over competing economic
interests that was the foremost cause of acrimony and hostility. For a detailed discussion of England’s
economic expansion, the famous voyages and adventures of Francis Drake and Thomas Cavendish, the
creation of regionally targeted trading companies, the support of the Crown and the financial backing of
peers of the realm, as well as the “quest for Cathay,” see “The Expansion of England and the Economic
and Social Revolution,” Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, Ch. VII, pp. 235-79.
21

On the growth and dominance of the city of London, as well as the boom of trade, see Appendix B.
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commercial success underlay the increasing competitive powerhouse that England became vis-à-vis its
Dutch, Spanish and French international trade rivals. In the second half of the sixteenth century “wealth
poured into the country” as a result of booming international trade.22 London had always been the center
of England’s wealth and a feisty, independent city with which English monarchs had to cope.23 The
extraordinary growth of London and the inevitable turbulence associated with it was of concern to
Elizabeth and then, in the seventeenth century, to the Stuarts as well as Cromwell.24 “All the tumults in
the Low Countries began in Antwerp, Ghent, Brussels, and other principal cities,” while “all ours grew
from the greatness and strength of London.”25
Queen Elizabeth had Henry’s acute intelligence and charm, which facilitated her capability as a
ruler and her popularity with the English people. Biographer Catherine Drinker Bowen described Elizabeth
as, “if possible, a more skillful politician that her father.”26 With great acumen, she “cultivat[ed] the art of
ambiguity.”27 One of her courtiers described the Virgin Queen as “absolute and sovereign mistress of her
graces, and that of all those to whom she distributed her favors were never more than tenants at will, and
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Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, p. 335.
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Even at the time of Edward IV, who ruled during the fifteenth-century War of the Roses, London was
both the key determinant in securing the English throne and a major headache for the monarch. Scott,
England’s Troubles, p. 86; see A. L. Brown, The Governance of Late Medieval England, 1272-1461
(Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 153-55.
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Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 86, citing Norman G. Brett-James, The Growth of Stuart London (London
1935), p. 21; Ian Archer, The Pursuit of Stability: Social Relations in Elizabethan London (Cambridge,
1991), pp. 259-60.
25

Scott termed the government and population of London “the most important domestic determinants” of
England’s Troubles, the appellation utilized to describe seventeenth-century English political instability.
Plumb rightfully characterized London as “the enigma nearer at hand … divided in itself.” While many
merchant-leaders were “drawn to authoritative and patriarchal concepts of society,” London was used to
its political independence. Its leaders were acutely aware of the fact that the central government was
dependent on the financial power of London “to survive,” but also that their prosperity was dependent on
government policy. Scott, England’s Troubles, pp. 21, 88; Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in
England 1675-1725, pp. 24-25.
The quotation above is from the [Sixth] Dialogue of Court Maxims, a text attributed to Algernon Sidney.
Court Maxims, Hans W. Blom, Eco Haitsma Mulier and Ronald Janse, eds. (Cambridge University Press,
1996), pp. 71-72. See Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 86. As will become clear in the discussion of Court
Maxims’ authenticity, it has not been established that this is the case; indeed, it seems highly unlikely.
26
Catherine Drinker Bowen, The Lion and the Throne: The Life and Times of Sir Edward Coke (15521634) (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1957), p. 11.
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James S. Hart, Jr., The Rule of Law, 1603-1660: Crowns, Courts and Judges (Studies in Modern
History) (Abington, UK & New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 10.
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stood on no better ground than her princely pleasure and their own good behavior.”28 Indeed, the classical concept of the Great Chain of Being, metaphorically and expressly avowed in the sixteenth-century,
placed God at the top, beneath which stood the multiple orders of English society beginning with the
monarch, followed by the social levels of nobility, gentlemen, and commoners, “down to the last dregs of
[living] things.”29 People knew from whence they came, and understood their place in perhaps the
comforting, albeit unequal order of English society.30 Obedience was expected from their subjects by
early modern English monarchs.31
Like her father Henry, Elizabeth was a conciliar monarch.32 In the highly symbolic Rainbow
Portrait of Elizabeth I, painted at the beginning of the seventeenth century and near the end of her reign,
the Queen holds a rainbow, adjacent to which is the motto, non sine sol iris – no rainbow without the sun.
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Sir Robert Naunton, Fragmenta Regalia (1641), The Harleian miscellany; or, A collection of scarce,
curious and entertaining Pamphlets and Tracts, as well in Manuscript as in Print, found in the late Earl of
Oxford’s library, Vol. 5 (London, 1810), p. 124.
29

On the concept of the Great Chain of Being, see Appendix B.
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“The mediaeval conviction that national well-being depended on maintaining a hierarchy of classes,
bound together by reciprocal obligations and ascending privileges, and presided over by a monarch who
claimed the allegiance of all, had not broken down in England.” John Addington Symonds, Sir Philip
Sidney (New York: Harper & Bros., 1887), p. 184.
31

As Kishlansky reminded us, “We must beware of the fallacies inherent in equating a seventeenthcentury monarch with a twenty-first-century politician. The king was not attempting to create voting
majorities, nor did he use his bounty to attract adherents. Loyalty and deference were implicit in all
political relations with the king and we should not be surprised when apparent disloyalty was met with the
strongest reactions. Someone who is called ‘Majesty’ from sunrise to sundown, who is lectured on his
responsibilities as God’s chosen vice regent on earth by the leading clergymen of the realm, and who
sees his relationship to his subjects as analogous to a father’s relationship to his children is unlikely to
think first about compromise when his wishes are opposed.” Mark A. Kishlansky, “Charles I: A Case of
Mistaken Identity,” Past & Present, No. 189 (Nov. 2005), pp. 41-80, 50. Kishlansky was referring to the
Stuart monarchs; but his analysis applies equally to the Tudors.
32

This was the way of medieval English kings. “Edward IV and Henry VII were successful rulers in great
part because they availed themselves of the services of hard-working and experienced councilors….
Opinion was most thoroughly tested in time of Parliament, but Parliaments were not regularly in session
under the Yorkists and early Tudors until the Reformation Parliament assembled in 1529. Councillors thus
worked to the mutual benefit of king and realm: they took the political temperature and assumed
administrative responsibility; they built up networks of contacts at Court and in the provinces, making
themselves the eyes and ears of the prince as well as his executives.” Guy, Tudor England, pp. 10-11.
During Henry VIII’s rule the increasingly complex nature of English society led to the transformation of the
King’s Council into a well-organized, effective organization “whose mandate was broadened to include all
matters of policy and government, at both the central and local levels. It’s [sic] operations were multidimensional,” and included the consideration of central and local government policy and the administrative
monitoring of those policies, legislative authority through the issuance of royal proclamations, and judicial
power through the prerogative courts (Star Chamber and High Commission). Hart, The Rule of Law, p. 5.
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Elizabeth’s sumptuous cloak is adorned with eye the monarch and ears but not mouths, symbolizing the
advisory role of her councilors.33 Privy Councillors were Elizabeth’s most vital advisors and together with
the queen constituted a small, powerful and highly effective governing body.34 There was no legal bar to
Elizabeth’s unilateral decision-making, but there were effective practical ones, particularly money.35
Notwithstanding the stated divine right of Queen Elizabeth – “God hath made me His instrument to
maintain His truth and glory, and to defend this kingdom from dishonor, damage, tyranny, and
oppression” – the English tradition of royal consultation with the peers of the realm had not only solidified
into a political given, but had gradually expanded.36 By the time Elizabeth ruled, “absolute” monarchy
was qualified by the necessity of dialogue with the English hoi polloi, ostensibly represented by the men
of Parliament’s Commons.37 Amongst Elizabeth’s court retinue and many admirers was Algernon
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One of Elizabeth’s counselors was Robert Cecil, who likely commissioned the portrait. After the fall of
Essex, Cecil became a powerful courtier and the man in charge of the elaborate entertainments staged
for the Queen; he also was a distant cousin of Algernon Sidney. The Rainbow Portrait likely was
commission-ed for one such event. Roy Strong, Gloriana: The Portraits of Queen Elizabeth I (London:
Random House, 2003), pp. 157-61.
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In 1583 there were eighteen men on Elizabeth’s Privy Counsel in contrast to the fifty that served on the
Counsel during the rule of Mary Tudor. Five of Elizabeth’s Privy Councilors sat in the House of
Commons, and the rest in the House of Lords. Bowen, The Lion and the Throne, p. 537.
35

Elizabeth called very few parliaments – only eight between 1558 and 1593, one every four to five years;
and she summoned Commons for the precise purpose of voting necessary tax money. “By tradition they
were mere invites,” of lesser status that the Queen’s Great Council of Lords Spiritual (the bishops), Lords
Temporal (the peers), and Honorable Judges, who had pride of place at Westminster, either in the ornate
Painted Chamber or in the House of Lords.” Evidence of the pecking order was the fact that “Lords met in
a chamber much larger than the ancient chapel, with its choir stall arrangement, in which the House of
Commons met, notwithstanding the fact that there were five times as many members of Commons than
Lords in 1593 when Sir Edward Coke was the Speaker of the House of Commons. Commons was ‘jealous
of slights put upon them by the Upper House, and though time was – centuries of time – when they dared
not say so, they had begun to dare it now.’” Bowen, The Lion and the Throne, pp. 9-11, 538.
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Elizabeth’s Golden Speech, Nov. 30, 1601, A Compleat Journal of the Votes, Speeches, and Debates
..., S. D’Ewes, ed. (London, 1693), pp. 659-60; repr. Sources and Debates in English History 1485-1714, ,
Newton Key & Robert Bucholz, eds. (Chicester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 101-02.
37
The composition of the Commons was still not representative of the country’s population, coming
mostly from aristocrats’ sons who were not peers, the increasing profusion of attorneys in England, and
the gentry. Bowen, The Lion and the Throne, p. 10. Elizabethan government was both “royal and
conciliar at every level. The king had great but not independent power, and the English had a tradition of
calling over-mighty kings to account.” Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 74; see also Glenn Burgess, Absolute
Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1996), Ch. 2,
“’Absolutism’ and Monarchy in Early Stuart England”; Calendar of the Carew Manuscripts, Preserved in
the Archiepiscopal Library at Lambeth, J. S. Brewer & W. Bullen, eds. (London, 1869), pp. lviii-lvix, from
The National Archives (Public Record Office), Kew, SP 63/20/66, see Sources and Debates in English
History 1485-1714, p. 80. Parliamentary approval was the quid pro quo for the imposition of taxes
routinely required by the monarch, particularly in times of war, with which these centuries abound. As an
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Sidney’s great-uncle, the famous Elizabethan courtier, literary talent, soldier, and tragic hero, Sir Philip
Sidney. Philip’s father, Sir Henry Sidney (1529-1586), who was Algernon’s great-grandfather, was also
an important member of the Elizabethan Court, as was Mary Sidney Herbert (1561-1621), Sir Philip’s
sister and wife of the 2nd Earl of Pembroke.38
After decades of jockeying by courtiers and foreign princes, and with the absence of an heir
presumptive, James VI of Scotland, the Queen’s second cousin, became James I of England when
Elizabeth died. “The accession of James VI to the English throne in 1603 marked the restoration of the
adult male monarchy for which Henrician supremacy was designed.”39 James had already ruled Scotland

MP stated years later, “When we have raised the King’s supply we may go home like fools, as we came.”
Paul Seaward, The Cavalier Parliament and the Reconstruction of the Old Regime, 1661-1667
(Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 266. On the Sidney and Percy lineage, see Appendix A.
38

Bowen, The Lion and the Throne, pp. 33 and 610, citing Brome Whorwood, member for Oxford, in J.
Milward, Diary (ed. 1938), pp. 40-41. Additionally, government was not yet comprehensively centralized,
so that it was not only London that had considerable independence, but the towns and villages of England
were to some degree self-governing as well. In order to obtain the taxes that he (or she) needed, the
monarch had to appeal to and satisfy these constituencies. If he did not, he created much bigger
problems for himself and, of course, did not achieve the goal that he sought: revenue. On the other hand,
while Parliament became involved in matters of revenue, there was still a vast realm of princely activity
that was reserved for the monarch, including international policy. It was Elizabeth who, in 1593, decreed
that, “matters concerning the royal prerogative, called ‘matters of state,’ could be discussed in a
parliament only with the express permission of the monarch.” Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II:
The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA & London:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 457, n.36. In fact, “Until the Civil War disrupted
it, there was in each county a recognizable and relatively stable governing hierarchy: a handful of noble or
greater gentry families who monopolized the most prestigious positions …; a large number, perhaps
twenty or thirty, of ‘country’ gentry families…; and a still larger number (several hundred in each of the
larger counties) of local, lesser, ‘parochial’ gentry….” David Underdown, Pride’s Purge: Politics in the
Puritan Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 25; Markku Peltonen, “Citizenship and
Republicanism in Elizabethan England,” Republicanism, Vol. 1: Republicanism and Constitutionalism in
Early Modern Europe: A Shared European Heritage, Quentin Skinner & Martin Van Gelderen, eds.
(Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 85-106; see also W. K. Hinton, “The Decline of Parliamentary
Government under Elizabeth I and the Early Stuarts,” Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1957),
pp. 116-32, on what Hinton terms parliamentary and “unparliamentary” government; Scott, England’s
Troubles, p. 75; Blair Worden, The Sound of Virtue: Philip Sidney’s Arcadia and. Elizabethan Politics
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).
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Henry VIII’s will, confirmed by Parliament, declared that the rightful heirs to the English throne would
have been the heirs of Edward Seymour, the Earl of Hertford, who was a descendent of Edward III
through Henry VIII’s sister, Mary Brandon, the Duchess of Suffolk. Elizabeth had “an almost primordial
dread of naming a successor,” or even permitting discussion of the subject. She thought naming an heir
would hasten her death; she also was “scarred” by the plots and revolts that had taken place during the
reigns of her siblings, Edward and Mary. Once James was the King of England, he had his first
parliament set aside Henry VIII’s will. Interestingly, Algernon Sidney’s great-uncle Sir Charles Percy, the
brother of Henry Percy, the 9th Earl of Northumberland, was one of the two men sent by the Privy Council
after Elizabeth’s death as the official messengers to James Stuart, declaring him to be the king of
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for thirty-seven years (technically James ruled from the age of one, but with the aid of regents during his
childhood); he became the infant king of Scotland after the Scottish lairds overthrew his Catholic mother,
Mary Queen of Scots.40 Unlike his mother James was brought up as a Protestant, receiving a rigorous,
humanist education from James Buchanan, his senior tutor, a man considered the foremost Latin scholar
in Europe, a founding father of Presbyterianism and, interestingly, a monarchomach. James later rejected
many of Buchanan’s ideas, but he proved to be a scholar, described by a contemporary as a man of
“remarkable intelligence,” with “lofty and virtuous ideals.” To his detriment James also was someone with
“a high opinion of himself.”41 He began his rule of England twenty years before Algernon Sidney’s birth; but
James’ importance, in terms of understanding Sidney’s ideas, is considerable.42

England. John Guy, The True Life of Mary Stuart Queen of Scots (Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin,
2004), pp. 148-49; De Lisle, After Elizabeth, pp. xxi, 13-17, 122, 246-47; Rose, Godly Kingship, p. 61.
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Years later, at the Restoration, “Scotland and England were two independent kingdoms; James VI of
Scotland had inherited the English crown back in 1603, but his attempts as James I of England to bring a
closer union of the two countries had foundered. Although Oliver Cromwell’s conquests of Scotland and
Ireland had brought about a temporary political union in the 1650s, this was dissolved at the Restoration.
Scotland and England had separate constitutions, separate legal systems and laws, separate
administrative and ecclesiastical structures.” In contrast, since Ireland had been claimed by conquest, as
Sir Edward Coke explained in Calvin’s Case (1608), “Ireland was a distinct dominion, yet the title thereof
being by conquest, Ireland might by express words be bound by the Acts of the Parliament of England.”
Nevertheless, in 1641, Ireland’s House of Commons passed a resolution that the Irish were a free people,
to be governed in accordance with English common law and the statutes passed by the Irish Parliament.
The issue of the proper law governing Ireland was not resolved until after the Restoration. Tim Harris,
Restoration: Charles II and His Kingdoms (London: Penguin Books, 2006), pp. 22, 27; cf. Jonathan Scott,
“England’s Houdini: Charles II’s escape from Worcester as a metaphor for his reign,” Liberty, Authority,
Formality: Political Ideas and Culture, 1600-1900, John Morrow & Jonathan Scott, eds. (Exeter, UK:
imprint-academic.com, 2008), p. 68, n.4. Scott believed that France was “incomparably more important”
to Charles II than either Ireland or Scotland. I agree. At the same time, the geographic proximity of
Scotland and the violent history of the north made Scotland a unique threat; and the French relationship
with the Catholic Irish made Ireland a menacing launching pad for France.
41
De Lisle, After Elizabeth, Chs. 1 & 2. The quotation is by Mary Queen of Scot’s former emissary,
Monsieur de Fontenay. Id, p. 44.
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In his book on Elizabeth I, historian Christopher Haigh depicted the English response to James I in the
early years of his rule, relying on the views of Fulke Greville, the “former friend of Algernon’s great uncle
Philip Sidney and follower of Essex,” who wrote “an analysis of Elizabeth’s success which was a coded
commentary on the defects of James’s early rule.” By about 1610 “Greville was praising as qualities of
the Queen what had in her lifetime seemed defects – her frugality, her reluctance to create peers.” The
accession of James I was the reason for this change in perspective. “In direct comparison with James,
she was praised for what she did not do – she did not search out precedents to extend her prerogative;
she did not provoke Parliament to defend its liberties; she did not devise oppressive financial expedients;
she did not allow favourites independence; and she did not intimidate councilors by firm statement of her
own views. Some of this picture was accurate, some was gross distortion – but most of all it was a mirror
reflection of James rather than a portrait of Elizabeth.” Greville’s sketch of the queen was elaborated
upon by William Camden, whose history of Elizabeth’s reign was written between 1608 and 1617.
Christopher Haigh, Elizabeth I (Harlow, England: Pearson Education Ltd, 1998), p. 173. On the matter of
83

James Stuart wrote The Trew Law of Free Monarchies: or The Reciprock and mutuall duetie
betwixt a free King and his naturall Subjects, published in 1598 before his accession to the English
throne, as well as Basilikon Doron, published the following year. James had Basilikon Doron reprinted in
England and on the Continent in an expanded version when he became the king of England in 1603.43
Both treatises endorse the theory of the divine right of kings, a political doctrine that can be viewed as the
most important immediate intellectual cause for the rise of English republicanism.44 In The Trew Law of
Free Monarchies James relied extensively on the ideas of the sixteenth-century French legal thinker Jean
Bodin, who endorsed absolute monarchy, drawing the analogy between God’s absolute rule over the
universe and the monarch’s absolute rule over his people. Bodin developed a systematic theory of
indivisible sovereignty – “not merely a superiority but a total supremacy, a single ultimate human lawmaking authority from which all other human lawmaking authority is derived.” He was also the first major
theorist to wholly exempt the sovereign from any obligation to comply with the law. 45 James is very clear
that his intent is to make the people subservient subjects who “frame all [their] actions according to these
grounds as may confirm you in the course of honest and obedient subjects to your king in all times.”
Such obedience would enable the people to be “armed” against the “siren songs” of those who “praise or
excuse the by-past rebellions that [broke] forth either in this country or in any other.”46
It is surprising that most scholars have not focused intently on King James’ work, which clearly
foreshadowed the arguments of Robert Filmer in Patriarcha, written about twenty years later. Filmer also

revenue, see, e.g., Burgess, “The authority to tax and the duty to pay,” Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart
Constitution, pp. 106-11.
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Victor Skretkowicz, “Shakespeare, Henri IV, and the Tyranny of Royal Style,” Challenging Humanism:
Essays in Honor of Dominic Baker-Smith, Ton Hoensalaars and Arthur F. Kinney, eds. (Newark, DL:
University of Delaware Press, 2005), pp. 179-208, 196.
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Included in King James’ essay is a discussion of the “true pattern of divinity” on which monarchy is
founded, and the “law of nature” on which his argument is based. James I, The True Law of Free
Monarchies and Basilikon Doron, Daniel Fischlin & Mark Fortier, intro. & ed. (Toronto: Centre for
Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 1996), p. 52; Berman, Law and Revolution II, p. 234.
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Berman, Law and Revolution II, pp. 234-35. The Trew Law of Free Monarchies was addressed to the
Scottish people: “Accept, I pray you, my dear countrymen, as thankfully this pamphlet that I offer unto you
as lovingly it is written for your weal. I would be loath both to be fashious and feckless. And therefore, if
it be not sentious, at least it is short. It may be ye miss many things that ye look for in it. But for excuses
thereof, consider rightly that I only lay down herein the true grounds to teach you the right way, without
wasting time upon refuting the adversaries.” James I, The True Law of Free Monarchies, p. 49.
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Id.
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relied extensively on Bodin.47 It is Patriarcha that Algernon Sidney’s Discourses Concerning
Government, John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, and James Tyrrell’s Patriarcha Non Monarcha
are designed to rebut. Sidney referred to The Trew Law of Free Monarchies as well as to statements by
Filmer in Patriarcha that quote from it.48 The two treatises contained many of the same arguments.49
Both men founded absolute monarchy on Scripture although, as we shall see, Filmer’s argument was
Adamite – based on the role that God assigned to Adam – whereas James derived absolute monarchy’s
divine source from God’s creation of a Jewish kingdom. Just as God, in his absolute power, selected
monarchs to accomplish his will on earth, which is manifested as God’s law, it was the absolute power of
the king to maintain the society in accordance with his own will, manifested as human law. In this form of
government there was a “mutual duty” between “a free and absolute monarch” and “his people.” The
king’s obligations, set forth in Scripture, were renewed through the coronation oath. It is in this context
that James made the statement, blasphemous to some, that “Kings are called gods by the prophetical
King David because they sit upon God his throne in the earth..”50 While “a good king will frame all his
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A clear exception is the recent (2012) work by Cesare Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer (1588-1653) and the
Patriotic Monarch (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2012), especially Ch. 4, “Filmer’s
patriarchalism in context: ‘popularity’, King James VI and I, Parliament and monarchists”; see also
Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, Ch. 2, “‘Absolutism’ and Monarchy in Early
Stuart England.”
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DCG, II.15.398, II.15.401, III.46.572-73. Both Tyrrell and Locke were also very familiar with Filmer’s
work. See J. W. Gough, “James Tyrrell, Whig Historian and Friend of John Locke,” The Historical
Journal, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Sep., 1976), pp. 581-610, 584.
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A thirty-year effort to amass information on the now dispersed Sidney Family Library recently
culminated in the publication of an extremely useful reference book entitled, The Library of the Sidneys of
Penshurst Place circa 1665, Germaine Warkentin, Joseph L. Black, and William R. Bowen, eds. (Toronto,
Buffalo, NY & London: University of Toronto Press, 2013). For details on the Sidney Library, vast for its
time, see Appendix B.
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James characterized himself as “a loving Father,” a “careful watchman,” “a natural father” and God’s
“lieutenant.” In accordance with Scripture, the king’s office was to administer justice, advance the good,
punish evil, establish good laws, procure the obedience of the people, decide all controversies,
accountable “to that great God who placed him as his lieutenant over them upon the peril of his soul to
procure the weal of both souls and bodies,” and to be “a good pastor, to go out and in before his people.”
There is nothing more important, said James, than that the people have a correct understanding of their
form of government, which is a “free monarchy.” After James became the king of England, he said, “The
State of Monarchie is the supremest thing upon earth: For Kings are not only GODS Lieutenants upon
earth, and sit upon GOD’s throne, but even by GOD himself they are called GODS.” James I, The True
Law of Free Monarchies, pp. 51-82; James I, “A Speech to the Lords and Commons of the Parliament at
White-Hall, on Wednesday the XXI. Of March. Anno 1609 [1610],” The Political Works of James I, C. H.
McIlwain, ed. (Harvard University Press, 1918), p. 307; see also Berman, Law and Revolution II, pp. 23445.
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actions to be according to the law, yet is he not bound thereto but of his good will and for good examplegiving to his subjects.” For “Kings were the authors and makers of the laws, and not the laws of the
kings.”51 Here we have the direct refutation by King James, which Filmer repeated, of the antimonarchical
views that had been articulated by Calvinist thinkers as well as by Catholics who were committed to papal
supremacy and therefore wary of over-powerful kings.52
Aside from his intellectual posture, James I was an accepted if not a popular king in a Protestant
country nervously observing the highly successful Counter-Reformation’s impact on the European
continent.53 James was a notorious spender, indulging himself, his family, his friends and his sycophantic
favorites while concomitantly his kingdom had significant problems, including the exorbitant, draining effect
of constant war and the adverse impacts of chronic inflation.54 The King took expedient and highly
unpopular stopgap measures to generate revenue.55 Lacking Elizabeth’s appreciation for “the inherent
power of ambiguity,” James’ inclination to outspokenly pronounce his unpopular views was both
provocative and alienating.56
The most controversial political debate early in James’s reign was not about his divine right to
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As the thirteenth-century jurist Henry de Bracton famously said, “The king must not be under man but
under God and under the law, because law makes the king.” Henry de Bracton, De Legibus et
Consuetudinibus Angliae (On the Laws and Customs of England), Vol. 2, George E. Woodbine. ed.,
Samuel E. Thorne, trans. (Buffalo, N.Y., 1968), p. 3; Berman, Law and Revolution II, p. 235; Hart, The
Rule of Law, 1603-1660, Ch. 3, “James I: Of Kings and Kingdoms.”
53

There were issues about James I’s character, including favoritism shown to vapid, obsequious men,
and a lack of sincerity, discretion and for many, common decency. This behavior diminished the king’s
prestige. Indeed, “In the months before he was crowned he had already revealed many of the flaws by
which he is remembered: his incontinence with money, his intemperate attraction to young men, his
arrogance and lack of charm or dignity. Above all, ordinary people complained that they missed ‘that
generous affability that their good queen did afford them.’” J. W. Clayton, Personal Memoirs of Charles
the Second with Sketches of his Court and Times, Vol. I (London: Charles J. Skeet, 1859), pp. 4, 9; De
Lisle, After Elizabeth, p.286.
54
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For example, when the 1621 Parliament ended without providing James with sufficient funds given the
fact that England was now involved in the Thirty Years War, James’ Council responded as they had done
previously, requiring the collection of “benevolences.” “Wealthy subjects were called before the Council
in London and asked not if, but now much, they were willing to give.” This generated resistance, in prior
years under the leadership of Oliver St. John and, by 1622 with William Fiennes, Viscount Saye and Sele
(the name of one man) urging his fellow Englishmen to refuse to contribute. The Council sent Saye and
Sele to prison. Id, pp. 98-102.
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Id, p. 11.
86

rule, which was not a new claim, but about the 1606 Oath of Allegiance, passed by Parliament after the
Gunpowder Plot, a 1605 Catholic conspiracy to blow up Parliament (the men and the place), as well as
the King. The Oath of Allegiance contested the pope’s claim that he had the power to depose kings, and
required Catholic recusants to “abhor, detest, and abjure, as impious and heretical, this damnable
doctrine and position, that princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed or
murdered by their subjects.”57 The Oath triggered a raft of treatises, some by James I and, in opposition,
among others, by Catholic theologians Francis Suarez and Jesuit Cardinal Robert Bellarmine, both of
whom Filmer attacked in Patriarcha. Ironically, part of the Catholic argument was that the king’s power did
not come from God but from his people (and therefore was secondary to that of the pope), an argument
that led to very different conclusions but was central to Sidney’s republicanism.58
Closest to home, while Scotland had “reformed” in the sixteenth century, Ireland remained
predominantly and threateningly Catholic.59 Spain and France, England’s neighboring powerhouse states,
were staunchly Catholic absolute monarchies. There were no Spanish Protestants (or anything else – the
Spanish had ejected Moors and Jews from Spain in the fifteenth century). But in France by the late
1550s, ten to fifteen percent of the population had become Protestant. The French Protestants, called
Huguenots, were viciously persecuted from the time of Luther, culminating, most calamitously, in the
1572 St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre witnessed by Algernon’s great-uncle Philip.60 That tragedy
marked the beginning of the Huguenots’ significant dispersion to countries more tolerant of their beliefs,
including the Low Countries and England.61 The French monarchy’s persecution of Huguenots was
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“The global Huguenot diaspora emerged from the ashes of a French Protestant church decimated by
the policies of Louis XIV. The 1598 Edict of Nantes guaranteed limited rights to France’s Huguenots, but
the Sun King spent much of his reign chipping away at those privileges, finally revoking the edict entirely
in October 1685.” Once royal dragoons began terrorizing Protestants, and “forc[ing] distressed
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potentially moderated by the 1598 Edict of Nantes, which proposed religious freedom of conscience; but
this moderating impulse, never seriously applied, was revoked a century later, in 1685, by Louis XIV’s
Edict of Fontainebleu.62 The northern portion of the Low Countries, the United Provinces, importantly
emerged as a religiously tolerant Protestant territory, but the region that would ultimately become
Belgium, the Southern Netherlands, remained Habsburg and Catholic.63 As a result of the brutal Thirty
Years War (1618-1648), what was left of the population of the Holy Roman Empire – in some areas,
absolute devastation -- was a Swiss cheese of jurisdictions more Protestant than Catholic, but with a
significant Catholic resurgence, particularly in regions that would much later become Poland, Slovakia,
Austria, and Hungary. Italy, not yet a nation-state, remained a diversity of political territories, albeit nondiversely Catholic, including the Papal State, well into the nineteenth century.64
The result of this complex European religious and political picture is not surprising: an “authentic

As had occurred with the Jews and the Moors in Spain, many Huguenots “continued to pray in private. At
the same time, many resolved to leave the kingdom, and, by late 1685, in spite of heavy penalties, a
steady stream of Huguenots had left France by sea and land in every direction.” Owen Stanwood,
“Between Eden and Empire: Huguenot Refugees and the Promise of New Worlds,” The American
Historical Review, Vol. 118, No. 5 (Dec. 2013), pp. 1319-44, 1322.
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On the Huguenots, see Geoffrey Treasure, The Huguenots (Yale University Press, 2014); on the St.
Bartholomew’s Day massacre, see Diefendorf’s Introduction, The St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre and
the primary sources therein.
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Following the approach utilized by the Dutch scholar Martin Van Gelderen, the use of the words
“Dutch,” “Netherlands” and “Low Countries” are all references to the people and place in the northwest of
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the Transaction of Augsburg, within the so-called Burgundian circle of the Holy Roman Empire, to
become the United Provinces. The Seventeen Provinces included the Benelux and French Flanders’
portions of modern-day northwestern France. It also included Holland, home of the Orange family, whose
princely title was based on their inheritance of a principality, Orange, which (ironically) was located in
southern France, not in the Low Countries. Following the 1549 Pragmatic Sanction, the Low Countries
became the patrimony of Philip II. Martin Van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt 15551590 (Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 1; Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise,
Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 37.
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“The actual loss of population [during the Thirty Years War] is hard to gauge with accuracy. A detailed
inquiry… reveals a decrease of two-fifths in the towns, of one-half in the open country [in Germany]. This
loss affected the male and female population almost equally…. The old legend that the population
dropped from sixteen to four million people, rests on imagination: both figures are incorrect. The German
Empire, including Alsace but excluding the Netherlands and Bohemia, probably numbered about twentyone millions in 1618, and rather less than thirteen and a half millions in 1648.” Some authorities disagree
with these figures, which are impossible to establish with certainty. “But a legend surrounds this war
which makes it unique in German, if not in European history. Until at least the middle of the nineteenth
century no estimate of the loss of life and wealth was too extravagant for belief”; and undoubtedly, there
was an extraordinary disintegration of society. C. V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War, Anthony Grafton,
ed. (New York: The New York Review Books, 2005), pp. 490-97.
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… siege mentality of English Protestantism … above all fear by an encircled enclave of invasion.”65
European religious issues were intertwined with English dynastic concerns throughout the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. Moreover, Protestant “enthusiasm” rocked seventeenth-century England. This
explains, for example, the extraordinary nervousness of the English about both the Stuart inclination
towards Catholicism and the association of Scotland with France.66 It also explains the love-hate
relationship between the English and the Dutch, who were fierce trade rivals, which sometimes provoked
war; but their shared religious convictions often proved to be more powerful and, ultimately, created a
close political allegiance.67 In 1677 this connection culminated in the marriage of James II’s Protestant
daughter Mary to Prince William of Orange, the royal couple who, in 1688, were invited by Parliament to
jointly rule Britain in what posterity calls the Glorious Revolution.68
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Mary Queen of Scots, James I’s mother, grew up in France as the future wife of the dauphin, and
became the wife of French King Francis II, who died shortly after becoming king. France and Scotland
were Catholic countries, and their common enemy was England. James is described as a man who
“would tolerate Catholics but not Catholicism.” De Lisle, After Elizabeth, p. 142. One consequence of
Elizabeth’s failure to publicly name James as her heir was the latter’s inability before he became the king
of England to gain insight into the complexities of English religious divisions and fears, later hampering
James’ ability to anticipate reactions to his policies. For example, notwithstanding the king’s emphatic
denials in the early years of his reign, it was rumored in the countryside that James intended to implement
a policy of Catholic toleration, a frightening proposition anathema to the English. Diana Newton, “Sir
Francis Hastings and the Religious Education of James VI and I,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 41, No. 4
(Dec. 1988), pp. 917-934, 933.
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The close family bond between the Stuarts and the Oranges had begun the generation before. Mary
Henrietta, the mother of William III of Orange, was also a Stuart; indeed, she was Charles II and James
II’s sister, and the eldest daughter of Charles I. Mary Henrietta therefore was both the aunt and the
mother-in-law of William III’s wife Mary, making William and Mary first cousins. Charles I was both
William and Mary’s grandfather. Mary wed William when she was eleven. Clayton, Personal Memoirs of
Charles II, pp. 59, 89. See generally Tony Claydon and W. A. Speck, William & Mary (Oxford University
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(London & New York: Routledge, 2016) [orig. pub. Ashgate, 2005]; Maarten Prak, The Dutch Republic in
the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 537-38;
Adamson, The Noble Revolt, pp. 152, 281-83, 640 n. 81. K. D. H. Haley, William of Orange and the
English Opposition 1672-4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953).
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James I was succeeded by his son Charles, whose notoriety rests not on something significant
about the man or the monarch but rather on the fact that he was the seventeenth-century English king who
was summarily tried and executed by his own parliament.69 It is with Charles I that the complex series of
events leading to the disintegration of English civil society began to swirl around the monarchy. Beyond the
pervasive disruption to normal life documented by a raft of scholars, volatile political events encompassed
the entire country in decades of instability and bloody civil war.70 Englishmen experienced a chaotic,
tense, politically turbulent and, for those caught in the midst of it, a frightening and often deadly series of
crises. After unsuccessfully trying to prevent monarchists who seemed intent, to varying degrees, upon
nullifying the meaningful participation of Parliament in governance, the leadership of the country
splintered.71 The result was internecine war and the replacement of a traditional dynastic monarchy with
an inexperienced military republic that evolved into the military dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell, which was
then replaced with a dysfunctional parliamentary republic. Quite remarkably, after all the effort, chaos and
loss of life expended to dethrone the Stuarts, Parliament ultimately opted to walk away from the political
changes initiated by its predecessor parliament. Instead it restored the old dynasty, albeit absent the
executed king. The restored Stuart regime began on good terms; but ultimately it was rejected for reasons
akin to those that had led to civil war in the first place, replaced by the new, albeit familially-related
monarchy of William and Mary.
The subject of this dissertation is neither the English civil wars nor the intricacies of “England’s
Troubles.” But these events make up the complex political and social context in which Algernon Sidney
reached adulthood and became a wartime military commander, battle casualty and hero, member of
Parliament, diplomat, hunted exile, author, wandering but cosmopolitan European, returning (but not
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prodigal) son, renewed political activist, political dissident and perhaps conspirator and, finally, adjudged
and executed traitor. Understanding this abstruse historical context is the essential predicate for
understanding Sidney’s ideas.
This [play] do we advance as a mark of terror to all traitors, and treasons;
to show how just the heavens are in pouring and thundering down a
weighty vengeance on their unnatural intents, even to the worst princes…
Ben Jonson, Sejanus his Fall 72

B. The Personal Context: Sidney’s Family
The breadth and depth of Sidney family intertwinement with the kings and queens of England and
beyond is truly breathtaking. And yet it is evident that something else – something more – drove
Algernon Sidney. It cannot be gainsaid that Sidney was a political romantic, with lofty ideals. That said,
he had absolutely no interest in utopias – neither the idea nor such imagined places.73 To understand
Sidney’s republican commitment we turn first to the historical and familial pelisse in which Sidney was
wrapped and from whence he came, including the predominant intellectual influences that informed his
experience.
Then will be the time to die nobly, when you cannot live nobly.
Sir Philip Sidney, The Countesse of Pembrokes Arcadia 74

i. A Noble Family
Sidney was a true blue-blooded Englishman.75 “[T]hough I am not a peere, I am of the wood of
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Ideology and the Law in Early Modern Europe, Essays in Honor of J. H. M. Salmon (University of
Rochester Press, 1995), Ch. 1, pp. 3-19, p 19.
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For example, in discussing the impossibility of functioning under Filmer’s patriarchal system, Sidney
said that this could only be accomplished “in the fabulous Island of Pines,” a reference to the (impractical,
unreal) utopia devised by Henry Neville in his essay, The Isle of Pines. DCG, II.4.96.
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Sir Philip Sidney, The Countesse of Pembrokes Arcadia, 8th ed. (London: Simon Waterson & R. Young,
1, p. 320.
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The “Sidneys’ close and sustained personal interaction with members of the royal court” in the 1500 to
1700 period “can only be rivaled by a few other influential families.” In particular, in early modern England
the following six families were considered the most elite among the English nobility: the Herberts, Percys,
Cecils, Sidneys, Talbots and Howards. Algernon was both a Sidney and a Percy. Michael G. Brennan,
The Sidneys of Penshurst and the Monarchy, 1500-1700 (Hampshire, England & Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2006), p. 1. Note, too, that this blue-blooded status continued after Sidney, e.g., two of the 1st
Earl of Leicester’s daughters “were the ancestresses of five Prime Ministers,” including Winston Churchill.
Carswell, The Porcupine, p. 8.
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which they are made.”76 Algernon Sidney was born in 1623. His mother was a Percy; her brother was
Lord High Admiral of England and the 10th Earl of Northumberland, “probably the oldest, and certainly
historically the best known, noble family in seventeenth-century England,” with roots back to William the
Conqueror.77 Indeed, unlike many of his contemporaries, Sidney was careful not to deem William a
“Conqueror” but, rather, a leader who was made king by the English.78 This was a family tradition: in his
commonplace book, Sidney’s grandfather, the 1st Earl of Leicester, identified William of Normandy as the
legitimate heir of Edward the Confessor; it was Harold, the earl of Wessex, who was the usurper and
oath-breaker.79 Sidney’s statement also echoed the words of his famous great-uncle, Sir Philip Sidney
who, a century earlier, had asserted his own link to the most illustrious ranks of the nobility through his
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The quotation is taken from Sidney’s Apology, written while he was in the Tower of London after his
conviction for treason. Sidney was not a peer because he was the second, not the first son of the 2nd Earl
of Leicester. In early modern England rank descended as primogenitural property owned by the eldest
male heir of a nobleman. Unsurprisingly, primogeniture was one of the English traditions at which Sidney
frustratingly chafed, and which Filmer, a first son, wholeheartedly embraced. Sir Robert Filmer, Patriarcha
and Other Political Works, see, e.g., DCG, I.7.25, I.13.37, The republican Henry Neville, like Sidney a
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concerning Government,” Two English. Republican Tracts, Caroline Robbins, ed. (Cambridge University
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Pocock, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 109. It should also be noted, as well, for the benefit
of those who are not English, that a peer is a member of the English peerage or ranked nobility. The rank
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“Tho the name of Conqueror be odiously given to William the Norman, he had the same title to the
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acclamatus,” viz., “In great exultation he was accepted by the clergy and people, and was acclaimed king
by all.” It was also noted that, “Several of the old Anglo-Saxon chroniclers cited by Sidney in this section
were available to him in a collection published by Henry Savile, Rerum Anglicarum scriptores post Bedam
(London, 1506),” i.e., they were in the Sidney Library. DCG, II.5.107 & n.28; see also DCG III.10.377
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Robert Shephard, “The Political Commonplace Books of Sir Robert Sidney,” Sidney Journal Vol. 21,
No. 1 (2003), pp. 1-30, 25-26. For the official view of the British government on the succession of William
the Conqueror, see https://history.blog.gov.uk/2016/01/05/the-death-of-edward-the-confessor-and-theconflicting-claims-to-the-english-crown/ (3-17-18).
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mother, Mary Dudley Sidney who, like Algernon’s mother, was the Duke of Northumberland’s eldest
daughter: “I am a Dudley in blood, that Duke’s daughter’s son, … and truly am glad to have cause to set
forth the nobility of that blood whereof I am descended.”80
Sidney’s uncle, Algernon Percy, the 10th Earl of Northumberland, was described by a fellow
aristocrat as “the greatest and proudest peer of his time.”81 The Percys were patriots, a family known as
the undisputed king and guardian of the North, “scourge of Scotland,” and a major player in the
Plantagenets’ medieval arrogation of kingship. Henry Percy (1364-1403), known as Sir Harry Hotspur
and the 2nd Earl of Northumberland, was a military leader and a diplomat; he became the self-proclaimed
“Protector of the Commonwealth,” leading a rebel army in opposition to Henry IV. In short, for centuries,
the Northumberland clan was the noble family that challenged monarchy (opposing the first king of the
Lancastrian branch of the Plantagenet dynasty in the early fifteenth century).82 In 1403 Hotspur was killed
in the Battle of Shrewsbury and the northern rebellion ended.83 The Northumberlands remained military
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Sir Philip’s grandfather (his mother Mary Dudley Sidney (1531-1586)’s father) was John Dudley, Earl of
Warwick and Duke of Northumberland, descendent of a line of Northumberland dukes who had been
executed for their opposition to the English monarch. This was the fate of John Dudley, who was
beheaded in 1553. Michael G. Brennan & Noel J. Kinnamon, A Sidney Chronology 1554-1654
(Hampshire, UK & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. xix-xxiii; Brennan, The Sidneys of
Penshurst and the Monarchy, 1500-1700, p. xiv. The quotation is taken from Miscellaneous Prose of Sir
Philip Sidney, Katherine Duncan-Jones & Jan van Dorsten, eds. (1973), p. 134. During the first half of
Queen Elizabeth’s rule, the Sidney-Dudley “axis at the English court” was an indicia of a powerful and
chivalric bond of familial allegiance and loyalty. Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 11.
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Clayton, Personal Memoirs of Charles the Second, Vol. 1, p. 52.
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The northern county of Northumberland, originally referring to the land occupied by those Angles north
of the Humber River, the “Northanhymbri,” is a large region of England with ancient origins as an
independent kingdom that resisted William of Normandy, who consequently despoiled the area in 1069.
Northumberland’s border with Scotland was divided up into marshes; it was the first line of defense
against the Scots in the later Middle Ages. Local lords wielded vast power, particularly “the Percies of
Alnwick.” “In 1377, some eleven generations after his Norman ancestor stepped ashore in England and
made his way to the North, a Percy was created earl – the earl of Northumberland – by King Richard II….
This Percy, too, was himself a king: the King in the North, guardian of the Anglo-Scottish frontier.” Rose,
Kings in the North, p. 1. Even during the reign of Elizabeth I, feudal loyalties were strong. About 5,700
rebels supported the (failed) 1569 Catholic rebellion led by the Catholic earls of Northumberland and
Westmoreland. Guy, Tudor England, p. 275. In short, the Northumberland clan was known for its
pedigree, military prowess, power, and independence. See George Wilson Meadley, Memoirs of
Algernon Sydney: By G. W. Meadley. With an Appendix (London: Thomas Davison, Whitefriars, 1813), p.
4 (“Sydney Memoirs”). On the medieval history of Northumberland, see John Cannon, “Northumberland,”
The Oxford Companion to British History, Oxford University Press, 2009 Online Ed., http://www.oxford
reference.com.ez proxy.gc.cuny.edu/view/10.1093/ acref/ 9780199567638.001.0001/acref9780199567638-e-3118 (12-7-13); Rose, Kings in the North, Intro., pp. 1-19.
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Hotspur’s legendary reputation is memorialized by Shakespeare, who utilized Henry Percy as a major
character in several of his plays. Hotspur “appears with his father Northumberland as a supporter of
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leaders and frequently served in France on behalf of the English monarchs. Family history between Henry
VIII and the English civil wars is “an unbroken succession of prisons, scaffolds, and graveyards” because
the Percy clan functioned as an independent political force in early modern England that, ultimately, was
crushed by the monarchy.84 History repeats itself. Thomas Percy, the 7th Earl of Northumberland (15281572), was a leader of the Catholic northern earls who revolted against Elizabeth, which led to his
execution.85 Patently, the Percy family was “known for its opposition to the throne.”86 The idea of absolute
monarchy would have been wholly incompatible with this centuries-old Northumberland political tradition.
Returning to the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Henry Percy, the 9th Earl of Northumberland
(1564-1632), “inherited land stretching over eight counties across England and Wales. His immense
wealth had allowed him to stand apart from the [Elizabethan] Cecil and Essex factions during the
1590s.”87 The 9th Earl was a champion of religious toleration, protecting the many Catholics who lived in
northern England.88 Algernon Sidney had a close relationship with his uncle, Algernon Percy, the 10th
Earl (1602-1668), who the Earl of Clarendon described as “in all his deportment a very great man.”89 By

Bolingbroke in Richard II. In 1 Henry IV he leads the rebellion against Henry, but is killed by Prince
Harry…. Historically, Harry Percy (1364–1403) was older than Henry IV, though Shakespeare casts him
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Companion To Shakespeare, 2003 Online Edition (copyright 2016), http://www.oxfordreference.com.ez
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the decline of noble power: this is misleading. The rebellion was strikingly non-feudal: nine-tenths of the
known rebels were not tenants of the leaders…, and there was much more of a popular movement than
has been supposed.” Haigh, Elizabeth I, p. 59. On the revolt of the Northern Earls, see n.14.
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“Introduction,” The Correspondence (c. 1626-1659) of Dorothy Percy Sidney, Countess of Leicester,
Michael G. Brennan, Noel J. Kinnamon & Margaret P. Hannay, eds. (Surrey, England, UK: Ashgate,
2010) (“Dorothy Percy Sidney Correspondence,”) p. 2.
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Leandra de Lisle, After Elizabeth: The Rise of James of Scotland and the Struggle for the Throne of
England (New York: Ballantine Books, 2007), p. 74. On the fine education of Algernon Percy, the 10th
Earl, in part in the Tower of London, see G. R. Batho, “The Education of A Stuart Nobleman,’ British
Journal Of Educational Studies, 5 (1957), pp. 131-43 (about Northumberland’s career).
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Northumberland told the French Ambassador to England, “he had no great share of fidelity or esteem
for James,” both because of the king’s intolerance of Catholics and his peace overtures to Spain. De
Lisle, After Elizabeth, p. 74; Maximilien de Béthune, Duc de Sully, Memoirs of the Duke of Sully, Prime
Minister to Henry the Great, Charlotte Lennox, tr., Vol. 3, Book XV, pp. 78-79 (London: W. Miller, 1810 ),
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Scott I, pp. 45-46; see also G. Drake, “Annotated Bibliography for the Life of Algernon Percy, 10th Earl
of Northumberland,” The Colorado College Studies, 13 (1975), pp. 5-14.
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this time, the Percy family was “one of the richest and most powerful families in England.”90 In sum,
Sidney’s Northumberland roots provided him with more than one prototype of the proud, independent
English nobleman.
The Sidney family was also famous, not only in England but in Europe. Sidney’s great uncle, Sir
Philip Sidney (1554-1586), was a darling of the Elizabethan era.91 “Philip was the hero and ornament of
their race, as his father, Sir Henry, had called him, Lumen familiæ suæ.”92 British Victorian poet, literary
critic, and historian John Addington Symonds described Sir Philip as “the ideal of his generation,…the
sweetest interpreter of its best aspirations.”93 Indeed, Philip was mythically remembered as the
Elizabethan man who embodied knightly virtue, a gentleman of the Court as well as a product of
cosmopolitan intellectual and political culture, a man of military prowess, champion of international
Protestantism’s fight against persecution in England and abroad, and defender of the oppressed. He also
was a highly-regarded poet, author of the famous, complex and scandalous literary narrative The
Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia, the title of which alludes to the Greek mythological home of Pan.94
Arcadia is actually composed as two (the old and new) Arcadias, a literary florilegium described as “so
innovatory in fact, that they have never been satisfactorily pigeon-holed either as ‘novel’, ‘romance’,
‘comedy’, or ‘heroic poem’…. Sidney’s is not only the earliest English sonnet sequence properly so
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Ironically, one of Sir Philip Sidney’s godfathers was the very Catholic Philip II of Spain, after whom he
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intolerant ruler who precipitated the Spanish war with the Dutch. “Sir Philip Sidney,” DNB, Vol. LII, p. 219;
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pastoral poetry, is an outcome of much reading of foreign literature.” Sir Philip Sidney, DNB, Vol. LII p.
231. Cf. Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, p. 289 (“On the whole it is probably true that much of the poetry
of the period sprang from the fancy rather than from the depths of the soul’s experience. It is certainly
true of the sonnet…. [O]nly Sidney, Spenser, and Shakespeare embodied a real experience in their
sonnets.”) Charles I is said to have quoted an excerpt termed "Pamela's Prayer" from Sir Philip’s Arcadia
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described: it is also arguably the best.”95 In what sounds eerily like Algernon’s perspective, the New
Arcadia is also a political statement in which Sir Philip described the best government as popularly and
constitutionally limited monarchy that optimally, in Europe, would consist of multiple free Protestant
monarchies linked through marriage, creating a long-term politically stable world of international
Protestantism.96 (One scholar has suggested that it was precisely this aspiration – a creed! – that made
the Queen inordinately wary of Philip as a potential “leader of a powerful international combine that could
have made him a threat to the security of her crown.” This fear then transferred to suspicion of Philip’s
younger brother, Algernon’s grandfather Robert, and was the cause of Robert’s “rustification” i.e.,
assignment to the boonies in lieu of a more prestigious and deserved government post.97) To add further to
his renown, Philip is known as the man through whom the work of classical sixteenth-century scholar
Justus Lipsius and other Neostoic writers was “well received” by English intellectual circles in the 1580s.98
In sum, according to Irish novelist and poet C. S. Lewis, Sir Philip’s work “rises out of the contemporary
Drab almost as a rocket rises.”99
As a young man Philip traveled to the French Court in the company of Francis Walsingham, a
member of Parliament (MP) who became one of Queen Elizabeth’s most trusted advisors, Privy Council
member and, in 1573, Secretary of State. In 1570 Walsingham was appointed England’s ambassador to
France.100 In addition to his familiarity with France’s Catholic royalty and nobility, Philip was on close
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Lewis, English Literature in the Sixteenth Century Excluding Drama, pp. 318, 324, 347. Lewis described Sir Philip’s poetry as “Golden,” which was “not here used in a eulogistic sense. By ‘Golden poetry’
I do not mean simply good poetry (that is another question) but poetry in its innocent – as the theologians
would say, its ‘once-born’ -- condition.” But additionally, “Even at this distance Sidney is dazzling. He is
that rare thing, the aristocrat in whom the aristocratic ideal is really embodied.” In another scholar’s view,
“the ‘golden period’ in Elizabethan literature began not with the publication of Spenser’s Shepheards
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Walsingham was originally sent to Paris in 1571 to negotiate the possible marriage of Henry, Duke of
Anjou, to the English queen, a marriage that Philip Sidney imprudently (and brazenly) publicly opposed by
writing an open letter to Elizabeth in which he called Anjou “the son of the Jezebel of our age,” Catherine
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terms with French Huguenot leadership. He was treated as a friend and equal by Prince Henry of
Navarre, and was present at Notre Dame when Henry married Margaret, the French king’s sister. Philip
took shelter at the English ambassador’s residence several days later during the St. Bartholomew’s Day
massacre in August 1572 when “Paris swam with the blood of the Huguenots.” Immediately thereafter, he
left France.101
It is not possible to overstate the impact of the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre on the
Huguenots of France and the world of international Protestantism that was an essential part of the Sidney
family identity. Four to six thousand Huguenots died in Paris and elsewhere in France as a direct result of
the events identified collectively as the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre. The French Protestant Church
was devastated, not only from these losses but also from subsequent Huguenot persecution, emigration,
and conversion to Catholicism.102 The Huguenot Reform Church lost two-thirds of its members.103 “The
grim lesson of the massacre – how sacred ideas so easily become the helpmate of barbarous acts –
poses a moral dilemma that should be rehearsed before one’s conscience.”104 Among other things the
massacre fortified the monarchomach movement, a school of European Protestant thought that
strenuously opposed absolute monarchy to the point of suggesting, if not justifying tyrannicide.105 The

de Medici. Levin, The Reign of Elizabeth, pp. 52-54. The French king personally welcomed Philip, and
bestowed the title of baron and “gentleman in ordinary of the royal bedchamber.” The patent bestowing
this honor on Sidney stated: “‘That considering how great the house of Sidenay was in England, and the
rank it had always held near the persons of the kings and queens, their sovereigns, and desiring well and
favourably to treat the young Sir Philip Sidenay for the good and commendable knowledge in him, he had
retained and received him’ etc.” Warren, Sir Philip Sidney: A Study in Conflict, p. 22.
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When the news of the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre reached Rome, “Te Deums were sung, and
commemorative medals struck. In contrast, in England the Court went into mourning.” Id, p. 23;
Diefendorf, The Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, p. 25.
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There were many issues. “The wider controversy surrounding freedom of conscience was not so
straightforward a matter as forbidding or permitting Reformed worship, persecuting or putting up with
Protestants. There were also practical issues such as the state’s refusal to recognize Huguenot baptism,
burials, and above all, marriages. Theoretically, the crown also barred Protestants from military
commissions, the legal professions, and a host of other public pursuits. Confessional affiliations
profoundly influenced civil status.” Raymond A. Mentzer, “Review, The Huguenots and French Opinion,
1685-1787: The Enlightenment Debate on Toleration by Geoffrey Adams,” Church History Vol. 64, No. 1
(Mar. 1995), 129-30.
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Ralph E. Giesey, “The monarchomach triumvirs: Hotman, Beza and Mornay,” Bibliothèque
d’Humanisme et Renaissance 32:1 (1970), pp. 41-56, 41.
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The term “monarchomach,” sometimes deemed synonymous with “king-killer,” was apparently coined
as a pejorative term by the Scottish Catholic royalist William Barclay (1548-1608). Daniel Lee, “Private
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monarchomachs are generally considered to include the Scottish Calvinist jurist George Buchanan
(1506–1582) who (ironically) had been James Stuart’s tutor; a French itinerant Calvinist named Nicolas
Barnaud (1538–1604); the Frenchman Philippe Duplessis-Mornay (1549–1623); and four Frenchmen who
immigrated to Switzerland: Hubert Languet (1518–1581) who accompanied Sir Philip when he toured
Europe after the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre, along with Théodore de Bèze (1519–1605), François
Hotman (1524–1590) and Simon Goulart (1543–1628). All these men were jurists whose work relied
extensively on Roman law, and were highly influenced by the Protestant Christian humanist and
Reformation scholar Philipp Melanchthon (1497-1560).106 Messrs. Hotman, Bèze and Mornay are often
called the “monarchomach triumvirs.”107 Scholars debate who wrote the famous anonymous 1579 right-ofresistance tract, Vindicaie Contra Tyrannos. Mornay is generally considered to be the author, or Languet,
or both.108 Mornay became a close friend of Sir Philip after they both survived the St. Bartholomew’s Day
massacre by taking refuge in Walsingham’s home. “The horrors of St. Bartholomew must, however, have
made a terrible impression on [Philip’s] mind; for there was no street in Paris which did not resound with
the shrieks of the assassinated, the curses of their butchers, and the sharp ring of musketry.”109
Vindicaie was published seven years after the massacre during a time when the plight of French
Protestants in a country under the rulership of a strong, absolutist Catholic monarchy – at the time,
Charles IX – was increasingly hostile. While there are important methodological and philosophical
differences among the monarchomachs, they all sought to justify the French Religious Wars and the
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Huguenot efforts to live peaceably with, if not overthrow the French Catholic regime.110 The
Melanchthonians and monarchomachs generally advocated pan-European “international” Protestantism
as a means of enhancing political stability.111
Prior to the massacre William of Nassau, the Prince of Orange (also known as William the Silent),
who was a leader of the Dutch Revolt against the Catholic Spanish that became the Eighty Years War,
spent time in France assisting the nobleman Gaspard de Coligny, one of the Huguenot leaders murdered
on St. Bartholomew’s Day.112 Conversely, Huguenot theorists including Sir Philip’s tutor Languet and his
friend Mornay spent considerable time in the Netherlands supporting the Dutch Revolt.113 In short, there
was an international Protestant elite.114 Five years after the massacre Philip Sidney was so highly
regarded in European Protestant elite circles that when Prince William became “intent upon engineering a
political union of the two provinces of Holland Zeeland with the crown of England,” he “hoped to marry his
daughter Marie of Nassau to Philip Sidney” in order to ensure that the powerful English Earls of Leicester
and Warwick, Philip’s uncles, would actively support Orange’s goals.115 This seemed like a sensible
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2014), p. 133; Mack P. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK & New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); The French Wars of Religion: How Important Were Religious
Factors? J. H. M. Salmon, ed. (Boston: D. C. Heath & Co. 1967).
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Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 67. There is an earlier Percy-Orange family connection. When
he was about thirty years old, in 1612, Count Henry of Nassau (later the 2nd Duke of Orange), who was
the son of William I the Silent, stayed at Essex House, the Percy’s London estate, and apparently
became interested in the young Dorothy Percy, Algernon’s mother. This was about four years before
Dorothy married Robert Sidney, the 2nd Earl of Leicester and Algernon’s father. “Here is whispering that
the Count Henry of Nassau hath a month’s mind to my Lord of Northumberland’s daughter, which if it
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approach given the extreme reluctance of Elizabeth, over the contrary entreaties by many of her Privy
Councilors, to be drawn into the continental religio-political conflict.116 The Queen’s perspective was
largely economic: English merchants shipped cloth to Antwerp, their principal Continental market.
Unsurprisingly, Elizabeth wanted the Netherlands to return to the stabler status quo ante under Spanish
control but with recognition of the rights of the Dutch.117 Elizabeth also had an aversion to war and a
respect for the sovereign rights of her fellow monarchs. Additionally, she believed in the doctrine
generally accepted throughout Europe that a country’s religion was determined by its ruler.118
Elizabeth’s views were wholly inconsistent with those of Philip II of Spain and William of Orange.
Philip demanded unconditional Dutch submission as a precondition to any peace negotiations. William of
Orange was equally uncompromising. “Eighty years of struggle had taught him the futility of seeking a
compromise with a monarch who was dominated by a fixed idea, who notoriously kept no faith with
heretics, and whose hatred of himself was implacable.”119 Once again, however, behind the scenes of

should fall right might prove a great match for her.” It did not come to pass. The Letters of John Chamberlain, ed. N. E. McClure, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, PA: Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society, 12:
1949), 1:424-25, 441, cited in Dorothy Percy Sidney Correspondence, p. 7.
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As discussed throughout this chapter, the noble pedigree of the Sidney/Percy family is unsurpassable.
Nevertheless, why would a prince, specifically William of Orange, want to marry his daughter to a
nobleman? The answer may lie in the Orange pedigree: William of Nassau was himself the son of a
German Lutheran nobleman. The source of William’s princedom was an inheritance of title, along with
numerous valuable manors in the Netherlands from his uncle. Suddenly William was a leading Dutch
citizen. At the time the Orange family was still Catholic, and William was brought to the Court of the Holy
Roman Emperor Charles V to receive “a proper Catholic education.” Charles V was the leader of the
Habsburg dynasty; his parents were the Queen of Castile and the King of Spain. Van Gelderen, The
Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt 1555-1590, p. 34.
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The territorial unification of the Netherlands began in the fourteenth century when Philip the Bold, the
Duke of Burgundy, acquired Flanders and Artois in 1384. In the fifteenth century the Burgundian and
Habsburg dynasties merged through marriage. When Philip the Fair married Juana of Castile, he united
the Habsburgs and Spanish against the threat of the French. The son of Philip and Juana was the future
Charles V, not only King of Spain, but elected as Holy Roman Emperor. By the sixteenth century Charles
accomplished the territorial unification he sought when he acquired additional states that became part of
the Low Countries. Id, pp. 16-17.
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Pursuant to the terms of the 1555 Peace of Augsburg between Charles V as Holy Roman Emperor
and the German princes who supported Luther, Protestant services were allowed within the German
territories in areas where the ruler was Protestant. Catholic services were similarly allowed in comparable
circumstances. Prak, The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century, p. 16. This principle was later
embodied in the Treaty of Westphalia, 1638.
119
Elizabeth abominated war. According to the French diplomat and ambassador to England Bertrand de
Salignac de Lamothe Fénélon, “Elle est un femme nourrie à la paix et repo…veut jouir son état tant
qu’elle vivra sans guerre ni trouble,” viz., she is a woman nursed on peace and repose; she wants to
enjoy her state as long as she lives without war or trouble. As Elizabeth herself stated in a speech to
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government positioning there existed a network of noble alliances among Protestants as well as among
Catholics that sought to persuade, cajole, threaten and coerce their respective governments into the
position they desired. This explains the Orange family’s interest in Sir Philip. It also explains the Sidney
family connection to Huguenot leadership, further evidenced by an inscription in a book that belonged to
Robert Sidney, the 1st Earl and Sir Philip’s younger brother, dated 1584, and entitled Discours sur le
moiens de conserver’-estat et la religion au Pays Bas. It states, “This booke was given me by the Excellent
princess of Orange 1595.”120 Almost certainly this is a reference to Louise de Coligny, the fourth and last
wife of William of Orange and the mother of Frederick Henry, the future Prince of Orange. Louise was the
daughter of the Huguenot leader Gaspard de Coligny, murdered during the St. Bartholomew’s Day
massacre – another Dutch Protestant-French Huguenot connection that favored an internationalist view of
Protestantism.121
Sir Philip did not marry into the Orange family, instead wedding Walsingham’s daughter.122 But
Philip, Walsingham and Mornay spent the summer of 1577 together when Mornay was given a diplomatic
mission to England for eighteen months on behalf of Henri III, the King of Navarre.123 The “intimacy which

parliament in 1593, “my mind was never to invade my neighbours, or to usurp over any; I am contented to
reign over mine own, and to rule as a just prince.” Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, pp. 334 & n. 1, 336.
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Germaine Warkentin, “Robert Sidney and His Books,” Sidney Journal 25:1-2 (2007), pp. 31-42, 38.
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A much more controversial example of high nobility allegiance was the “huguenot-politique
combination under the leadership of Anjou (Alençon)” who favored “open intervention on the side of
Orange” in the 1578 timeframe. “Anjou, in fact, was the Coligny of 1578. His plan was to wrest the
Netherlands from Spain, unite them by a marriage alliance with England” – perhaps the Sidney
connection? – “and so create a powerful protestant federation, under French protection, to balance the
designs of the Spaniard and Guise.” The Spaniard was Don John of Austria, the new governor of the
Netherlands, who had “entered into a compact to establish catholic supremacy” in the Netherlands,
England and France. “Both schemes were in the highest degree dangerous to England, although at the
moment they existed only in the brains of their promoters.” Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, pp. 340, 344.
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After Philip Sidney died his widow Frances Sidney, née Walsingham, married Robert Devereux, the
Earl of Essex, who had been Queen Elizabeth’s favorite and the step-son of her earlier favorite, Robert
Dudley, also the Earl of Essex. As will become clear, these people are all part of the extended Sidney
family. Christopher Hibbert, The Virgin Queen: Elizabeth I, Genius of the Golden Age (Cambridge, MA:
Perseus Books, 1991), p. 228; see also Appendix 1, Sidney and Percy family trees.
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Henri (1553-1610) was the first French Bourbon king. He became Henri III, King of Navarre, at
nineteen (1572), and Henry IV, King of France, at thirty-six (1589). In 1598, Henri promulgated the Edict
of Nantes granting religious tolerance to the Huguenots. Henri also was the father of Louis XIII, as well
as the nephew of the famous Huguenot leader, Louis de Bourbon, prince de Condé. Henri was
assassinated in 1610 by a Catholic fanatic. See W. J. Stankiewicz, Politics & Religion in SeventeenthCentury France: A Study of Political Ideas from the Monarchomachs to Bayle, as Reflected in the
Toleration Controversy (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1960), Ch. II, “The Edict of Nantes,” pp. 52-91;
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developed between the Duplessis-Mornays and the Walsinghams” in the summer of 1577 “readily
included Philip.”124 (Indeed, this is probably when Walsington began to consider Philip as a potential sonin-law.125) There are other Sidney family-Huguenot-international Protestantism connections. It was
Mornay who founded the famous Huguenot Academy at Saumur in 1593 after Henri IV’s politique decision to convert to Catholicism.126 Saumur was the French academy that Algernon and his older brother
Philip attended when his father was stationed in Paris.127 Additionally, the Huguenot monarchomach
François Hotman was described in 1616 by Leicester’s father, the 1st Earl, as “mine old friend” when the
latter apparently provided news to Leicester about his son Robert’s contemporaneous journey to Paris.128
After the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre Sir Philip travelled throughout Europe, stopping at the
court of the religiously tolerant Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian II, and then visiting Venice, where he

Geoffrey Treasure, The Huguenots (New Haven, CN & London: Yale University Press, 2014), Chs.
Eighteen, Nineteen, & Twenty, “The Struggle Intensifies,” “Henry IV, King of France,” & “The Edict of
Nantes,” pp. 195-235, 131, 245.
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In 1583, when Sir Philip was still “of considerable interest to foreign powers,” Henri of Navarre’s agent,
Ségur, came to England to obtain an alliance with Queen Elizabeth for the French and Dutch Protestants.
With a letter of introduction from their mutual friend Mornay, Ségur met Sir Philip, who took Ségur to the
estate of his sister Mary Sidney Herbert. Mary was married to Henry Herbert, the 2nd Earl of Pembroke, a
powerful aristocratic, the nephew of Catherine Parr (Henry VIII’s last wife), and a partisan of the Queen’s
favorite, Robert Dudley, the Earl of Essex. Sir Philip also introduced Ségur to Archibald Douglas, who
represented James VI of Scotland at the English court. Here is an indication that by the 1580s, the
Sidneys and Dudleys were anticipating (or certainly hedging their bet) that James was the likely successor to Elizabeth. Finally, it should be noted that Philip was not an angel. For example, in 1579 he again
got in trouble with the Queen, this time for talking back to the Earl of Oxford, Sir William Cecil’s son-inlaw, during a tennis match at Court. Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 88; Haigh, Elizabeth I, p. 62.
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Mornay “propounded the thesis that it was improper amongst Christians to persecute each other. As
he put it, both Roman Catholics and Reformed Protestants sought their own ‘welfare: both are afraid to
offend Christ: both tend to the same Christ. Or should it be said that for following different roads we
should cut each other’s throat?’” Van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt 1555-1590, p.
222. As one scholar observed, Mornay “was a living example of the theory that men can be highly
creative in spite of an extremely hostile environment.” Stankiewicz, Politics & Religion in SeventeenthCentury France, p. 38.
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Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 141. Years later another figure in Algernon Sidney’s life,
William Penn, also attended Saumur (from 1662-64). “Penn, William (1644-1718),” Biographical
Dictionary of British Radicals in the Seventeenth Century, Vol. III: P-Z (Sussex, UK: The Harvester
Pr3ess, 1984), pp. 24-28, 25. On Saumur, see n. 176.
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“Introduction,” Dorothy Percy Sidney Correspondence, citing Domestic Politics and Family Absence;
The Correspondence (1588-1621) of Robert Sidney, First Earl of Leicester, and Barbara Gamage Sidney,
Countess of Leicester, Margaret P. Hannay, Noel J. Kinnamon, & Michael G. Brennan, eds. (Aldershot
and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), pp. 197-200.
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befriended the renowned Renaissance painter Tintoretto, and the Council of Ten granted him a license to
bear arms. After returning to England Philip joined his uncle Robert Dudley, Earl of Essex, who was
serving as the commander-in-chief of Queen Elizabeth’s forces fighting the Spanish in the Low
Countries.129 Philip became the governor of Flushing, a strategic outpost on the coast of Zeeland – a role
that his brother Robert later assumed – and died in 1586 at the battle of Zutphen fighting the Spanish.130
Eulogies abound after the young hero’s death.131 The “legend of Sir Philip’s martyrdom” was well known in
Algernon’s lifetime, particularly with the 1652 publication of Sir Philip’s popular biography.132 Sir Philip died
from injuries he received in battle, selflessly giving his flask of water to a common soldier who also
suffered a mortal wound. Poignant, indeed! But it is important to recognize that Philip’s gesture was not at
odds with his longstanding philosophy. Notwithstanding his familial status and nobility, Sir Philip had
inscribed in his shield the words, vix ea nostra voco, meaning, “These things I hardly call our own,” which
has been taken “for a sign that he attached no undue value to noble birth.” This interpretation is reinforced
by the statement made by a very respectable character in Arcadia that, “I am no herald to enquire of men’s
pedigrees; it sufficeth me if I know their virtues.”133
Sir Philip was not the only famous Sidney. Sir Henry Sidney (1529-1586), Algernon’s great-
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Ironically, the 1st Earl of Leicester “was no match for the political genius of Oldenbarnevelt,” the
pensionary of Holland and the man with whom Grotius later worked for many years. For an analysis of
Dudley’s failed mission to the Netherlands, see Van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt,
pp. 56-59, 199-204; Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 220-40. The quotation about Oldenvarnevelt is in
Van Gelderen, p. 58.
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Philip Sidney was a critic of Elizabeth’s political and military restraint. Nevertheless, for “the young
governor this is not (as later it is to be for his brother Robert, who was governor from 1589 to 1616) a
back-of-beyond outpost, watery, windy, uncultured and forgotten. As his correspondence makes clear,
Philip saw it from the start as what it was: a strategic treasure, a rook or a castle, a key piece in a game
that was itself the key to a still larger conflict. ‘How great a jewel this is to the Crown of England and to
the Queenes safety … the better I know it the more I fynd the preciowsness of it,’ he wrote to Leicester in
the same letter.” Roger Kuin, “Sir Philip Sidney and World War Zero: Implications of the Dutch Revolt,”
Sidney Journal 30.2 (2012), pp. 33-55, 33-34; Haigh, Elizabeth I, p. 176.
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The eulogy on the laurel-wreath carved on Sir Philip’s tombstone states, “This is that Sidney who as
Providence seems to have sent him into the world to give the present a specimen of the ancients, so it did
on a sudden recall him and snatch him from us as more worthy of heaven than of earth.” It apparently
was written by the antiquarian William Camden. When Philip Sidney died, “Duplessis Mornay bewailed his
loss ‘not for England only, but for all Christendom.’” Warren, Sir Philip Sidney: A Study in Conflict, pp.
173, 176.
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This famous biography of Sir Philip was written by his dear friend Fulke Greville. See Sir Fulke
Greville’s Life of Sir Philip Sidney: Etc., First Published in 1652 (Nabu Press Reprint, 2014).
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Symonds, Sir Philip Sidney, pp. 3-4.
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grandfather and Philip’s father, grew up as the constant boyhood companion of Henry VIII’s son Edward,
the future king of England. In fact one of Henry Sidney’s godparents at his christening was Henry VIII,
after whom he was named.134 Both of these honors were bestowed because of the role played by Henry
Sidney’s father, Sir William Sidney, with respect to Edward, the King’s only legitimate son. Perhaps one of
the most well known facts in English history is Henry VIII’s obsession with the necessity to produce a
male heir. One can evaluate the regard held by the King of Sir William Sidney, Algernon’s great-greatgrandfather, when he placed the welfare and education of the one-year-old crown prince Edward in Sir
William’s hands. In appreciation of the service of Sir William and his family, after he became king Edward
VI granted the Kent estate and manor of Penshurt Place to the Sidneys in perpetuity, a property with
centuries’ old royal significance.135 Penshurt became the epicenter of the Sidney family for generations.
In 1550 Sir Henry also was knighted by Edward VI.136 In classic English understatement, it is evident that,
“The esteem in which [Henry] was held by Edward rendered him an influential personage at Court.”137
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Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 20.
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Id, p. 23. Neostoically influenced poet and playwright Ben Jonson, whose play Sejanus His Fall
depicted the tragic dichotomy of “treachery and loyalty, of fortune and constancy” on the matter of
following a royally absolute king regardless of his fortune or ability, also wrote an early seventeenthcentury poem, “To Penshurst,” which is a Sidney family panegyric. It celebrated the hospitality – good
householdership – of the Sidneys. Hospitality was considered at that time to encompass a wide range of
family attributes including “care of the poor, …fulfillment of classical and contemporary ideals of virtue
and courtesy (including liberality, the Stoic tradition of natural law, the cardinal virtues, and tenets of civic
humanism). Thus, by exemplifying such traditional qualities, Jonson’s Sidneys set an idealized standard
of classically-informed moderation and other virtues against which contemporaries might measure
themselves.” Jonson’s poem echoed contemporaneous royal proclamations by the court of James I that
encouraged hospitality because it contributed to the public good by reducing the likelihood of disorder,
thereby constituting an independent legacy and a distinct component of service to the state. Good
householdership of a country estate also required sound local governance, including serving the official
and unofficial role of judge and law enforcer and, as a cultural standard, extended to acquiring goods,
traveling, and forming networks with other men. Lisa Celovsky, “Ben Jonson and Sidneian Legacies of
Hospitality,” Studies in Philology, Vol. 106, No. 2 (Spring, 2009), pp. 178-206, 180, 189. On Sejanus His
Fall, see Parmelee, “Neostoicism and Absolutism,” pp. 18-19. For a fascinating study of Penshurt’s
architecture and its modifications with an emphasis on locating the quarters of the very large Sidney
library (c.5000 volumes) within the structure of Penshurst Place, see Susie West, “Studies and Status:
Spaces for Books in Seventeenth-Century Penshurst Place, Kent,” Transactions of the Cambridge
Bibliographic Society, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2002), pp. 266-92. The reference to the library’s size is on page
274.
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Henry Sidney was one of the four principal gentlemen of the privy chamber when Edward became
king. “Henry Sidney in particular was much prized by the prince for his ‘comeliness of person, gallantness
and liveliness of spirit, virtue, quality, beauty and good composition of body.’” Brennan, The Sidneys of
Penshurst, pp. 20-21.
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“Sir Henry Sidney,” DNB, Vol. LII, pp. 210-16; Scott I, pp. 48-50. In a late nineteenth-century family
biography, the author contended that, “without inflicting any injustice upon the reputation of either Sir
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This fact was sadly proven on July 6, 1553 when “Sir Henry held the king in his arms as he died.”138
There is a complicated story here about the dicey continuing public service of the Sidneys during
the reigns of zealous Protestant Edward VI, perfervid Catholic Mary, and then clement Protestant
Elizabeth – a highly improbable achievement. The astounding nature of this accomplishment is
compounded by the failed attempt at the death of Edward by part of the greater Sidney family to put Lady
Jane Grey on the English throne. The greater Sidney family referenced here is John Dudley, Duke of
Northumberland, father-in-law of that Henry Sidney brought up at the Court with Prince Edward and,
accordingly, grandfather of Sir Philip and great-great-grandfather of Algernon Sidney.139 Dudley also was
the father-in-law of Jane Grey, had been close to Henry VIII, and effectively became King Edward’s
regent when the young man first assumed the throne.140 Once again, the Sidney family’s nonpareil
aristocratic profile is legendary – there was no higher status in English society other than “princes of the
blood.” Dudley was executed when the Jane Grey conspiracy failed. Notwithstanding this nefarious
family association, Sir Henry Sidney became a member of the government during Elizabeth’s reign and
was appointed Lord President of Wales. He spent many years serving the Queen in that capacity as well
as in her conquest of Ireland, where he served unhappily as governor (with the title Lord Deputy).141 Sir

Philip or Algernon Sidney, it may be safely declared, without fear of contradiction, that Sir Henry was the
greatest character which his family, the Sidneys of Penshurst, ever produced.” Philip Sidney, Memoirs of
the Sidney Family – Primary Source Edition (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1899), p. 8.
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Public Record Office, Kew (SP 12/159/38), A Sidney Chronology, p. xxii; Brennan, The Sidneys of
Penshurst, pp. 23-24.
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“Sidney Family Table and Family Tree,” Dorothy Percy Sidney Correspondence, pp. xv-xxix; see also
Appendix A.
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Indeed, it was at Syon House, a rural mansion on the Thames about ten miles west of central London
owned by John Dudley, that “Lady Jane Grey was formally offered the crown of England by her father-inlaw, John Dudley, Duke of Northumberland.” Brennan et al, “Introduction,” Dorothy Percy Sidney
Correspondence, pp. 5-6 n.9.
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Henry Sidney was the Lord Deputy of Ireland from 1565-1567, 1568 to 1571 and 1575 to 1578. Henry
Sidney’s effort to re-establish English hegemony in Ireland in the 1560s “generated dreams of conquest
and colonization.” Levin, The Reign of Elizabeth, p. 52. Lord Deputy of Ireland was a vital leadership
position in the English government, and was an appointment bestowed upon generations of the Sidney
family. Robert Devereux held the position in 1599, and was entitled Lord-Lieutenant, which was a title of
“higher distinction” than that of Lord Deputy, although both offices carried essentially the same powers in
the capacity of chief governor of Ireland. Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy, who married into the Sidney
family, was Lord Deputy of Ireland in 1600. Years later, in 1641, Algernon Sidney’s father, the 2nd Earl of
Leicester, was appointed Lord Lieutenant of Ireland by Charles I. Cromwell appointed Algernon’s brother
Philip as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in 1646. Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, p. 521; Brennan & Kinnamon,
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Henry was one of those advisors who unceasingly encouraged Elizabeth to intervene on behalf of the
Protestant Dutch against the Spanish. Henry’s brother-in-law (and brother of the executed John Dudley)
was Robert Dudley, the 1st Earl of Leicester.142 Leicester was the Englishman romantically linked to
Elizabeth for many years who aspired to marry the Queen – an ambition that Henry Sidney supported.143
Sir Henry was a valued diplomat, sent on a mission by Elizabeth to the Court of France to mediate
between the clashing Guise and Condé (Catholic and Huguenot) factions, and to Scotland to excuse the
postponement of the proposed meeting between Queen Elizabeth and Mary Queen of Scots.144
In précis, with respect to Algernon Sidney’s roots, one can hardly imagine a more aristocratic,
public service and internationalist Protestant pedigree.
Returning to the Sidney/Percy narrative, in 1585 Robert Dudley, the 1st Earl of Leicester, led
English forces Elizabeth sent to the Low Countries to support the Dutch revolt against the Spanish. With
Leicester was Sir Philip, assigned as Leicester’s deputy and the governor of Flushing, one of two
“cautionary” towns given to the English in exchange for their support of the Dutch following the vacuum in
leadership left by the death of the French Duke of Anjou and the assassination of the Prince of Orange,

A Sidney Chronology, pp. 269, 280; Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts (HMC), De L’Isle Manuscripts, VI, p. 555: Leicester’s ‘Diary of Events, 1636-50,’ in Adamson, The Noble Revolt, pp. 339, 666
n.205.
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According to one source, in 1561 Henry Sidney and his wife, Mary Dudley Sidney were involved in a
scheme by which Robert Dudley would marry Queen Elizabeth and if not re-establish Catholicism in
England, at least ensure a conciliatory policy in England towards the Catholic Church. Perhaps this is not
surprising; in September 1566 the young Edmund Campion was a protégé of Henry Sidney and in 1571,
Sidney saved Campion from arrest by sending him a warning that allowed his escape from Ireland to the
continent. Campion also praised Henry Sidney at the end of his 1571 treatise, first published in 1633,
entitled A historie of Ireland. See Montrose, The Subject of Elizabeth, pp. 120 & n.5, 275; A Sidney
Chronology, pp. 10, 18, 28-29. Probably the most famous of Elizabeth’s courtiers, Robert Dudley, was a
trusted councilor and favorite of the Queen who, among many other things, was a prominent sponsor of
the important component of Elizabethan statescraft known as the Cult of Elizabeth. Part of that Cult was
drama; for example, Leicester arranged for the production of The Lady of May, a play written by his
nephew Philip Sidney, when he oversaw the entertainment for Elizabeth and her court in 1578 at his
Wanstead estate outside of London. Montrose, The Subject of Elizabeth, pp. 105-09. On Henry Sidney’s
appointment as a privy counselor, and the delicate matter of the role of the English in the Netherlands,
see, e.g., Guy, Tudor England, pp. 279-89.
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When Robert Dudley’s prospects dimmed because of the suspicious death of his wife, Sir William
Cecil, who opposed Dudley, was successful in removing Sir Henry Sidney from the Court via his
assignment to Wales. Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 35. For a brief statement of Essex-Cecil
antagonism, see Haigh, Elizabeth I, pp. 105-06.
144

Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, pp. 55, 77; Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 37.
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both in June 1584.145 In the complex way in which English titles live, die, and then are resurrected,
Elizabeth’s Dudley died in 1588 as a figure estranged from the Court, passing on the Leicester title to his
stepson, Robert Devereux, who became another royal favorite. Years later, in 1601, when Devereux
destroyed his privileged status by trying and failing to instigate a rebellion against the Queen in favor
(ironically) of the succession of James Stuart, he was executed.146 The Leicester earldom, however, was
subsequently revived; Devereux’s nephew, Robert Sidney, became the 1st Earl of Leicester. But years
earlier Robert was known simply as Philip’s younger brother and, at the age of twenty-two, accompanied
his father Henry and brother Philip to the Low Countries. Within a year, both older men had died – Henry at
home, and Philip abroad, making Sir Robert, recently knighted by the Queen, the very young head of the
Sidney family.147
Sir Robert spent many years in the Queen’s service, although his efforts to gain positions of the
highest stature, such as Privy Council membership, were unsuccessful. Throughout his military and
diplomatic career on behalf of the Crown (as well as his extensive Continental tour), Sir Robert gained vast
international political exposure, interacting with the Dutch, the French, and diplomats and government
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The Duke of Anjou, Hercule-Francois (1554-1584), was the fourth and youngest son of the French
King Henry II and Catherine de Medici. From 1566 to 1576 Anjou was known as the duc d’Alençon; he
then became known as the duc d’Anjou. With Anjou’s death in June 1584, and in the absence of a Valois
heir, Henri de Navarre, the Huguenot prince, became the heir apparent, raising fears of a civil war in
predominantly Catholic France. These fears were compounded by the assassination of the Prince of
Orange in the same timeframe. Queen Elizabeth sent Sir Philip to France “ostensibly to offer
condolences” to the Court “on Anjou’s death but also to explore an Anglo-French alliance against Spain in
the Low Countries. The deaths of Anjou and Orange [led] to England’s direct involvement in the Dutch
wars.” Brennan & Kinnamon, A Sidney Chronology, pp. 28, 92-93.
Interestingly, although Sir Philip Sidney had been involved in the negotiations with the Dutch envoy over
English intervention in the Low Countries, in the same timeframe Sir Philip made an unsuccessful attempt
to join Sir Walter Drake’s expedition to the West Indies and the Americas. Indeed, there is some
suggestion that earlier that year Sir Philip unsuccessfully sought to accompany Sir Walter Raleigh’s
second expedition to the land found by Raleigh the year before which became the colony of Virginia. Sir
Philip was a busy man; in this same time frame he was attempting to secure a pension from Elizabeth for
James Stuart. Id, pp. 92-93, 97-100.
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Robert Shephard, “The Political Commonplace Books of Sir Robert Sidney,” Sidney Journal 21:1
(2003), pp. 1-30, 3-5. In 1600 Sir Robert Sidney described both the 67-year-old Queen Elizabeth and his
personal familiarity with her: “’I do see the queen often,’ said Sir Robert; ‘she doth wax weaker since the
late troubles, and Burghley’s death often draws tears from her goodly cheeks; she walketh out but little,
meditates much alone; and sometimes writes in private to her best friends.’ Indeed, said Sir Robert, “‘her
Highness hath done honour to my poor house by visiting me,” but she “was much wearied in walking
about the house.’” Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, pp. 493-94.
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officials from many countries.148 When Sir Philip died, Sir Robert was the “chief mourner” in the
extraordinary 700-man funeral procession to St. Paul’s Cathedral.149 Months later, in October 1587, Sir
Robert relinquished command in the Netherlands after a highly controversial and unsuccessful tenure.150
He was not yet twenty-four. Sir Robert remained in England because of the anticipated invasion of the
Spanish armada, “immers[ing] himself in the military preparations, … personally supervis[ing], with
considerable success, Elizabeth’s inspiring visit … to the assembled English forces” at Tilbury, where the
Queen gave perhaps her most celebrated speech.151 After the naval confrontation was over Queen
Elizabeth, that self-described “weak and feeble” woman, sent Sir Robert on a mission to Scotland to
discuss the menacing Spanish. This was a prestigious embassy to thank the King of Scotland, James VI,
for his support of England’s resistance to Spain. According to one historian, this was “by far the most
important personal relationship” of Sir Robert’s public career. Elizabeth described Sir Robert to James VI
as “this gentleman, a rare young man and a wise.”152 The Scottish King was also impressed; not
surprisingly, the political career of Sir Robert rose when James VI of Scotland became James I of
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Id. On Leicester’s controversial and unsuccessful military mission in the Low Countries, see n. 145.
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Elizabeth’s very famous speech at Tilbury included the legendary pledge, “I am come amongst you, as
you see, at this time, not for my recreation and disport, but being resolved, in the midst and heat of the
battle, to live or die amongst you all, to lay down my life for my God and for my kingdom and for my
people, my honour, and my blood, even in the dust. I know I have the body of a weak and feeble woman,
but I have the heart and stomach of a king, and a king of England too, and think foul scorn that Parma or
Spain, or any prince of Europe should dare to invade the borders of my realm. The “Speech of Queen
Elizabeth Against the Spanish Armada, August 1588,” has been generally accepted as historically
credible, viz., “there is no reason to doubt its authenticity.” Patrick Collinson, Elizabeth I (1533-1603),
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford University Press, 2004) (“ODNB”), http://dx.doi.org/
10.1093/ref:odnb/8636 (12-2-16). The scene of the speech is also lionized, and included Elizabeth’s
arrival among her soldiers flanked by Robert Dudley, 1st Earl of Leicester, and Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl
of Essex. Sir Robert was also there. Recall that the Earl of Leicester was the brother of Lady Mary
Sidney (née Dudley), Algernon Sidney’s paternal great-grandmother (on the Sidney side of the family),
which made the Earl Algernon’s great-great-uncle. Meanwhile Devereux was the brother of Lady Dorothy
Percy (née Devereux), Algernon’s material grandmother (on the Percy side of the family), and therefore
was Algernon’s great-uncle. In short, the Sidney/Percy family connections to Queen Elizabeth abounded.
See “Speech to the Troops at Tilbury,” OMICS International website, www.research.omics
group.org/index.php/Speech_to_the_Troops_at_Tilbury (12-2-16). On the family tree, see Appendix 1.
On Sir Robert’s role, see Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 97.
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Id, p. 101.
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England.153 James entitled Sir Robert Baron Sidney of Penshurst (1603), Viscount Lisle (1605), a Knight
of the Garter (1616), and Earl of Leicester (1618).154
The 2nd Earl of Leicester, Algernon’s father and another Robert, was an exceedingly bright and
studious young man who was sent to Oxford when he turned twelve, much younger than was customary.155
Following in the footsteps of his father Robert and his uncle Philip, Leicester commanded a regiment in the
service of the United Provinces, still fighting Spain. He also served in Commons and, upon the death of his
father, became a peer and member of the House of Lords.156 Leicester wrote fluently in five languages. He
deserves primary credit for creating the massive Sidney Library, conservatively estimated at 4,800 volumes,
e.g., with 481 titles under the letter A! Sold off long ago, the Sidney Library seems to have been started by
Leicester’s literary uncle, Sir Philip. It was Sir Robert, the 2nd Earl, who made the Library what it was, a
significant and important collection; he was the family’s most prodigious book collector.157 Leicester’s “vast
reading centered on the politics, religion, history, and customs of the various nations of the world” – not a
surprising background for the intellectual who was Algernon’s father.158 These interests were reflected in
the Sidney Library, in which Algernon studied when he was home.159
The Sidney Library catalogue (and the family commonplace books) reflected “a preoccupation with
writers in the Machiavellian tradition: Polybius (whom the 1st Earl read in Latin and German), Livy (of
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After this mission Sir Robert returned to Flushing as the new Governor and remained in that role until
1616, when Flushing was restored to the Dutch. Leah S. Marcus, Janel Mueller & Mary Beth Rose,
Elizabeth I. Collected Works (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 358-59,
cited in Brennan & Kinnamon, A Sidney Chronology, pp. 119, 122. By the time James became King of
England, Sir Philip and then Sir Robert had cultivated a personal relationship with him. Thus, quite
astutely, Sir Robert was already a Stuart man when he was invited to attend the coronation of James I, as
well as the celebrations at Windsor. See Arthur Collins, Letters and Memorials of State in the Reigns of
Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth, King James (2 vols: 1746), vol. II, p. 247, cited in A Sidney Chronology, p.
174.
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Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 114.
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Brennan & Kinnamon, A Sidney Chronology, p. 188.
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R. W. Blencowe, Sydney Papers: Consisting of a Journal of the Earl of Leicester, and Original Letters
of Algernon Sydney (Breinigsville, PA: Nabu Public Domain Reprints, 2010)[orig. pub. London: John
Murray, 1825], p. xv.
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Leicester’s father-in-law also was a scholarly man with a “well-stocked library” that included “many
books on medicine, science, astronomy, military affairs, travel, architecture, and the classics.” Dorothy
Percy Sidney Correspondence, p. 3.
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Scott I, p. 55.
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The Library of the Sidneys of Penshurst Place Circa 1665, p. 5.
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whom the 2nd Earl made a detailed study), Tacitus and Machiavelli himself.”160 The work of the Huguenot
resistance theorists Hotman, Beza, Mornay and Languet were also extensively represented.161 There was
an extraordinarily rich collection of law books and related jurisprudential studies, a feature of the library
that scholars do not emphasize. The overwhelming majority of the books were printed, and the limited
number of Library manuscripts largely comprise “legal, political, financial, and other kinds of texts that
circulated widely in manuscript in the period, including titles by John Selden.”162
We gain further insight into the nature of a well-educated Sidney/Percy family member from a study
of a commonplace book likely written in the 1590s that is preserved among the private papers at Penshurst
and that probably belonged to the 1st Earl of Leicester, Algernon’s grandfather.163 The 1st Earl left his family
four “large, partly filled commonplace books.” Quotations in the commonplace books are primarily in English
and Latin, although there are also some in Greek and French.164 Authors cited include ancient classical
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Blair Worden, “Classical Republicanism and the Puritan Revolution,” History and Imagination, Essays
in Honor of H. R. Trevor-Roper, Hugh Lloyd-Jones, Valerie Pearl & Blair Worden, eds. (New York:
Holmes & Meier Pub. 1981), pp. 182-200, 186; Robert Shephard, “The Political Commonplace Books of
Sir Robert Sidney,” Sidney Journal, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2003), pp. 1-30; see also Germaine Warkentin, “Ins
and 0uts of the Sidney family library,” The Times Literary Supplement (London, England), Dec. 6, 1985,
Issue 4314, pp. 1394, 1411.
161

On the most cursory review there are at least twenty-two texts in the Sidney Library by Lipsius,
including Leicester’s own “heavily annotated” copy of Lipsius’ edition of Tacitus, which is in the British
Library; three texts by de Bèze, eight books by Mornay, and seven books by Hotman. This is but the tip of
the iceberg, in terms of books related to international Protestantism, such as Melanchthon’s humanist
treatises, Grotius’ works, as well as the foundational work of Tacitus that are included in the 1665
catalogue of the Sidney Library. For example, when one compares the authors and texts cited by
Parmelee In her article on “Neostoicism and Absolutism in Late Elizabethan England” with the Neostoic
texts in the Sidney Library, almost everything Parmelee cites is included there, and of course then some.
For example, there is also a collection of works by Isaac Casaubon, the strident critic of Lipsius. In this
regard, Houston’s comment that Algernon Sidney was more influenced by Buchanan than by the
Huguenot thinkers Beza and Mornay misses the mark, for it fails to recognize that Huguenot influence Tacitean, Neostoic and monarchomach - on generations of Sidneys was profound, informing the ideas
and, particularly, the world view, of Algernon Sidney and his entire family. The Library of the Sidneys,
passim; cf. Houston, Algernon Sidney, p. 128.
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The Library of the Sidneys, p. 8.
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There is a trove of information about Philip and Robert Sidney contained in their commonplace books
and other primary sources that goes beyond the scope of this study. See, e.g., Warkentin, “Robert
Sidney and His Books”; Kuin, “Sir Philip Sidney and World War Zero: Implications of the Dutch Revolt.”
164

A note on the cover of the commonplace book states, “Paperbooke or Commonplace book of some
Learned man wherin are many usefull things, but I know not whose it was” – a statement that makes it
less likely to be Robert’s even if it was written by a family member. (The manuscript is not in Robert’s
handwriting, but this is not unusual; it could have been penned on Robert’s behalf by another family
member, acquaintance or employee.) Fred Schurink, “Manuscript Commonplace Books, Literature, and
Reading in Early Modern England,” Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol. 73, No. 3 (2010), pp. 453-69, 458.
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writers, such as Cicero, Isocrates, Livy, Tacitus, and Persius; Renaissance and other early modern authors
including Patrizi, Polydore, Vergil, Machiavelli, Bodin and Lipsius; and the English and Scottish authors
Buchanan, Sir Thomas Smith, and Sir Philip Sidney.165 Historians were “particularly well represented.”166
Citations were often to political history texts popular in England around 1600. Interestingly, they reflected a
view of historical change that was largely political in nature, and related to the character of the ruler, “in
contrast to the chroniclers and historians who dominated the market for history writing for the greater part of
the sixteenth century … who viewed historical change in terms of … the fulfillment of God’s providence.”
The works from which Sir Robert quoted were “considered to be particularly instructive for those preparing to
play a role in contemporary political life.” They were “goal-oriented.”167 In that sense, one sees a parallel to
the ideas of the Renaissance legal humanists, who were convinced that the correct understanding of their
own times and law necessitated a realistic understanding of history. The legal humanists considered history,
along with philology and philosophy, to be absolutely necessary fields of knowledge for a lawyer (and, of
course, innumerable politicians were lawyers); the focus was not on religion. One could apply one’s
understanding of history, for example, to the applicability (or inapplicability) of Roman law to contemporary
times and places. While history “might indeed be the path to wisdom,” it “proceeded not by way of general
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Works by all of these authors except Thomas Smith are listed in the 1665 catalogue of the Sidney
Family Library. This is another instance where it seems inconceivable that the huge Sidney Library did
not include a particular text, viz., Sir Thomas Smith’s De Republica Anglorum (1583), one of two wellknown treatises (the other by John Aylmer) in which the author, an English diplomat and member of
Queen Elizabeth’s privy council, discussed the nature of the English polity, which he characterized as a
mixed not a pure monarchy because “the most high and absolute power in the realm of England consisteth in the parliament.” Anne McLaren, “Reading Sir Thomas Smith’s De Republica Anglorum as Protestant Apologetic,” The Historical Journal, Vol. r42, No. 4 (Dec.,1999), pp. 911-39, 935-36; W. K. Hinton,
“The Decline of Parliamentary Government under Elizabeth I and the Early Stuarts, Cambridge Historical
Journal, Vol. 13 No. 2 (1957), pp. 116-32, 121; Schurink, “Manuscript Commonplace Books,” p. 458.
166
“The Latin headings under which the compiler has entered extracts are similar to the commonplace
topics recommended by schoolmasters and university tutors; they include “Deus Angeli, Intelligentiae
Mentes &[c.]: (God, angels, intelligences, minds, etc.), “De literis, artibus et earum Doctoribus” (on
literature, the arts, and authorities on those subjects), “Respub[lica]” (the state), “Vitia” (vices), “Virtutes”
(virtues), “De Vita priuata in Domo” (on private life in the household), “De Affectionibus” (on emotions),
“De Mulieribus” (on women) and “De Nobilibus & Aulicis” (on nobles and courtiers). In addition to these
general headings at the top of the page, the author has listed specific instances of these categories (such
as particular virtues) in the margins of the quotations.” Schurink, “Manuscript Commonplace Books,” pp.
457-58.
167

The exception to this is the book’s substantial use of Philip Sidney’s Arcadia, although even some of
those quotations are included under the heading, Respublica. Schurink, “Manuscript Commonplace
Books,” p. 459.
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ideas; rather, as Poliziano put it, ‘its elements are persons, causes, place, time, mode, instrument, material,
thing.” Notwithstanding the religiosity of his times, Poliziano’s list did not include revelation. François
Hotman similarly said that laws varied according to geography and history, viz., “according to the seasons
and mutations of manners and conditions of a people.” It was “an article of faith with all the legal humanists,
a distinguished line of scholars which led from Valla through Poliziano to the great masters,” including
Hotman and Jacques Cujas, that a thorough understanding of ancient culture was mandatory. At the same
time, one had to understand “changes of meaning in time,” and therefore “lawyers had to become historians
too.” For “history was superior to philosophy, Valla contended, precisely because it dealt with particular
instead of general – with human instead of natural – truth.”168 The 1st Earl similarly sought to understand the
politics of his times through the prism of various histories.169 Note that the works of Cujas, his pupil Pierre
Ayrault and, of course, Hotman were featured in the Sidney Library. Indeed, Ayrault was the 2nd Earl’s
“constant companion.”170
Furthermore, “the contents of the [1st Earl of Leicester’s] commonplace book reflect the antimonarchical and republican tradition that scholars have identified with the Sidney family.” Other scholars
agree, noting that the 1st Earl’s commonplace books indicate a “pervasive skepticism of monarchy, as a
political system,” and characterizing it as a “missing link in the family’s political tradition” between Robert
Sidney, Sir Philip, and “later generations of the Sidney family, including Robert’s grandson Algernon.”171
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See Donald R. Kelley, “Legal Humanism and the Sense of History,” Studies in the Renaissance, Vol.
13 (1966), pp. 184-99, 184-86, 188, 194-95.
169
Focusing on two manuscript commonplace books that belonged to the 1st Earl that concern political
topics, one scholar noted that, “Unlike most earlier humanists, [Sir Robert] Sidney drew his examples
overwhelmingly from the Middle Ages and more recent times, rather than from classical Greece or Rome,
and his approach to politics was keenly pragmatic and instrumental, rather than moral. The political world
they reveal is not governed by Providence, but is wholly determined by human action under specific
circumstances. Rational calculations can therefore predict political outcomes and guide political choices.
Sidney’s approach in these volumes owed much to Jean Bodin and especially to the revival of interest in
Tacitus in the decades around 1600.” It is reflected in, but also quite different from the work of his
grandson Algernon, as we shall see. Schurink, “Manuscript Commonplace Books,” p. 459; Robert
Shephard, “The Political Commonplace Books of Sir Robert Sidney,” Sidney Journal, Vol. 21, No. 1
(2003), pp. 1-30, 3.
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See The Library of the Sidneys of Penshurst Place Circa 1665, p. 28 & passim.
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Schurink, “Manuscript Commonplace Books,” pp. 458-59 (a literature scholar relying on Worden and
Scott); Warkentin, “Robert Sidney and his Books,” p. 36 (also a literature scholar); Shephard, “The
Political Commonplace Books of Sir Robert Sidney,” p. 3 (English historian).
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Given the long history of Northumberland challenges to the monarchy, there is no “missing link”; rather,
there is conspicuous continuity in the Sidney/Percy family’s skepticism about the ability of an all-powerful
monarch to protect England’s best interests.172
The commonplace books of the 2nd Earl of Leicester continued the family tradition in both form
and substance; and the commonplace books of both the 1st and 2nd Earls were handed down from father
to son.173 It is evident that Leicester, the 2nd Earl, was the true intellectual heir of his uncle, Sir Philip, as
well as a brilliant and cosmopolitan nobleman who served as Ambassador Extraordinaire to Paris in 1636
during the reign of Charles I.174 Algernon and his older brother Philip went with their father on this and
other diplomatic missions.175 It was during Leicester’s assignment to France that Algernon was educated
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Note the inclusion in the Sidney Library of a work by Thomas Norton, lawyer, poet, Protestant
extremist, and torturer of Jesuit Edmund Campion and others. The essay is entitled To the queens
majesties poure deceived subjects of the north countreye, drawen into rebellion by the earles of
Northumberland and Westmerland (London: H. Bynneman f. L. Harrison,1569). See The Library of the
Sidneys of Penshurst Place Circa 1665, p. 146; Sidney Lee, “Norton, Thomas (1532-1584),” DNB, 18851900, Sidney Lee, ed., Vol. XLI (London: Smith, Elder., 1895), pp. 221-25.
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There are four large folio volumes of notes in Leicester’s own handwriting, a “sewn booklet,” as well as
numerous loose sheets and booklets that date from 1630 and possibly as early as 1615, until the early
1660s. Warkentin, “Humanism in Hard Times,” pp. 239-40; Shephard, “The Political Commonplace Books
of Sir Robert Sidney,” p. 30; Schurink, “Manuscript Commonplace Books,” p. 458 & n.16. On the 2nd Earl’s
study practices, see Germaine Warkentin, “The World and the Book at Penshurst: The Second Earl of
Leicester (1595-1677) and His Library,” The Library, 6th ser., 20 (1998), pp. 325-46, 341-42 and passim.
174

It was in this timeframe that the infamous ship money controversy began, in which Charles I sought to
levy new taxes, previously imposed only on maritime counties, on inland shires in order to provide the
king with a new source of revenue independent of Parliament. The major factor driving the King was the
continuing cost of war. John Hampden was one of the men who opposed the new tax, refusing to pay,
which led to a legal proceeding that Hampden lost. Ironically, the commitment of Hampden and others,
including Oliver Cromwell, to this legal action in opposition to various perceived injustices, led to their
chartering a ship to leave England for America. But for the initiative of Archbishop Laud, who blocked the
voyage, Cromwell would have immigrated to America, and English history would be very different.
Dorothy Percy Sidney Correspondence, p. xxiv; Clayton, Personal memoirs of Charles II, pp. 61-63; Hart,
The Rule of Law, 1603-1660, pp. 6-7.
175

In 1640, when the family was in Paris, Sidney’s youngest brother Henry, later the Earl of Romney, was
born. Time passed and Henry became a ladies’ man, getting himself into trouble at a very young age
when he wooed, with unknown success, the Duchess of York – i.e., the wife of the king’s brother and heir,
James, the Duke of York. According to the editor of Henry’s letters, “it may be inferred that he was her
[his mother’s] favourite son,” as well as the brother that Lady Dorothy Sunderland, his sister, “loved best.”
It should be noted, as well, that by the time the statements were made from which these inferences are
drawn Algernon had for many years been marooned on the continent. Henry Sidney, Robert Willis
Blencowe and Dorothy Smythe, Diary of the Times of Charles, the Second by the Honourable Henry
Sidney, afterwards Earl of Romney; including his correspondence with the Countess of Sunderland and
other distinguished persons at the English Court, Volume 1 (London: British Library, Historical Print
Editions; orig. ed. 1843 [undated](“Diary & Correspondence of Times of Ch. II”), p. xiv.
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at Saumur, the famous Huguenot school, while his father maintained high-level Huguenot contacts in
Paris, including a friendship with the great French nobleman and rebel, Henri Duc du Rohan, a member
of one of the great aristocratic families of Europe.176 Du Rohan was at the forefront of the Huguenot
resistance movement in the 1620s, particularly after the declared Huguenot suppression by the French
monarchy.177 This led to the Anglo-French War of 1627 in which the English endeavored to support the
rebel Huguenots. After the fall of La Rochelle and the defeat of the uprising, in 1638 during the time that
the Sidneys were in Paris, du Rohan published Of the Interests of Princes and States which popularized
the political strategy that “interest alone is forever sure,” (also translated as “interest alone can never lie,”
and “interest alone can never fail,”) a concept that Leicester utilized in correspondence with the English
Court while a diplomat in Paris.178 In his voluminous commonplace books and other papers Leicester
reflected on matters of law and morality, and dabbled with “the opinions and fencyes of men,” particularly
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Scott I, pp. 53, 75-76. Saumer was renown as a Protestant academy and the town for which it was
named was a beautiful medieval, mercantile center located southwest of Paris, “one of the homes of the
French Reformation.” Prior to its revocation, the Edict of Nantes had impacted Saumur, making the town
and its region a place that “cultivate[d] the practice of mutual toleration” and comfortable coexistence
among the city’s Catholics and Protestants. The academy was founded in 1591 by Sir Philip Sidney’s
friend, the philosopher and Huguenot Governor Philippe Duplessis-Mornay. It was closed in 1685 with
the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Nigel Smith, Andrew Marvell: The Chameleon (New Haven &
London: Yale University Press, 2010), pp. 128-33; Treasure, The Huguenots, pp. 313-14; John Hearsey
McMillan Salmon, The French Religious Wars in English Political Thought (Westport, CN: Greenwood
Press Reprint, 1981), pp. 134-37, 184-85.
177
The successful capture of La Rochelle by the French monarchy marked the end of major regional
disputes in France, and the beginning of the extraordinary national domination by the increasingly
absolutist French monarchy of Louis XIII and his chief minister, Cardinal Richelieu – a subject, not
surprisingly, on which Algernon also later commented. On Richelieu’s policies towards the Huguenots,
see Stankiewicz, Politics & Religion in Seventeenth-Century France, Ch. III, pp. 92-135; DCG II.11.141,
II.28.275, III.44.567.
178

The Duke of Rohan, A Treatise of the Interest of the Princes and States of Christendome (London,
1663); Ralph E. Giesey Rulership in France, 15th – 17th Centuries (Hampshire, Great Britain & Burlington,
VT: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 73-78; see Scott I, p. 76. The full quotation in the 1663 English edition of the
treatise is, “The Prince may deceive himselfe, his Counsell may be corrupted, but the Interest alone can
never faile. According as it is well or ill understood, it maketh States to live or die. And as it always
aimeth at the augmentation, or at leastwise the conservation of a State, so likewise to get thither, it ought
to varie according to the times.” Id, [unnumbered] p. 7. This complete thought is much closer to
Machiavelli’s advice about the priority that should always be placed on conserving the State and also to
Algernon Sidney’s pragmatism; it is less akin to the “reason of state” self-serving relativism to which it
typically is equated. This is particularly the case when one combines this thought with the recognition,
later expressed in the treatise, that in matters of state, neither our desires nor violent passions should
divert the prince from the consideration “by reason alone” of the best interest of his state. Id,
[unnumbered] pp. 43-45; cf. Scott I, p. 76. In short, one can readily manipulate both interest language
and du Rohan’s interest treatise.
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their skepticism and relativism.179 In addition to du Rohan, while in Paris Leicester befriended the great
Dutch-born jurist and political theorist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), who was then Swedish Queen
Christina’s resident ambassador in Paris.180 Scott found it likely that Algernon Sidney met Grotius; he was
silent about whether Sidney knew du Rohan but it seems unlikely as du Rohan was busy fighting various
Thirty Years War battles in the 1630s, dying in one of them in 1638.181
Grotius was a member of one of the wealthy families that ruled the Dutch city of Delft as part of
the oligarchic republic.182 His family members also were shareholders in the powerful Dutch East India
Company, formed in 1602 as an international trading company. The East India Company’s wealth was
vast and its power enormous – its gross income during its first year of operation exceeded the English
government’s ordinary revenue. As did Leicester with respect to his uncle Sir Philip, Grotius could reflect
proudly on his relatives, who had fought courageously one generation earlier to free the Dutch from the
clutches of the Spanish. “[M]any of Grotius’s writings display the intense patriotism engendered by that
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Scott I, p. 55 & n.38, citing Leicester’s commonplace books, in which the Earl “wrote interchangeably
… in five languages (English, Latin, French, Spanish, and Italian).” The editors of The Library of the
Sidneys described the 2nd Earl as paradoxically embodying “the political culture of anti-absolutism …
reflected through the operations of an obsessively orderly, precedent-conscious mind.” Whether in
Penshurst, Denmark, Paris, or elsewhere, Leicester prepared annotations while reading, and carried “an
amazing number” of his books with him in trunks when traveling. The Library of the Sidneys, p. 26. It is
also because of the 2nd Earl’s decision to start a journal on Dec. 31, 1646 that “we owe many of the most
vivid descriptions of the next six dramatic years.” This is all the more unusual because during this
timeframe Leicester “rarely left Penshurst,” instead gathering extremely current information from friends
and family members, as well as news sheets, parliamentary papers, and eye-witness accounts. Carswell,
The Porcupine, p. 50.
180

Queen Christina was an intellectual in her own right; she abdicated in 1654 and converted to
Catholicism. Brennan, A Sidney Chronology, p. 301.
181
Scott I, p. 54; Richard Tuck, “Grotius and Selden,” The Cambridge History of Political Thought 14501700, J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2006), Ch. 17, pp. 499-529, 508.
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“Technically, the United Provinces was a kingdom with a vacant throne.” Richard Tuck, “Introduction,”
Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Richard Tuck, ed. & intro., from the Jean Barbeyrac ed.
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005), Vol. 1, p. 10, http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1425 (10-28-14). See
Appendix B. The correspondence between the United Provinces’ politico-religious context, on the one
hand, and the religious divisions at play in England’s civil war and struggles over forms of governance, on
the other, is apparent. Tuck maintained that that the difference is that in England the Commons won,
whereas in the Netherlands, the republican oligarch Johan van Oldenbarnevelt and his secretary and
adviser, Grotius, lost. In my own view the outcome is not particularly different. In both cases the royal
family of Orange and a powerful, albeit not absolute monarchy ultimately trumped republicans who
opposed them in both nations.
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struggle,” a sentiment on which Leicester also would have been raised.183 The patrician business families
that governed the Dutch States did not want to be subject to the control and authority of a centralized
government but, rather, were determined to rule their own States themselves. Notwithstanding the fact
that the Dutch revolt had been led by a prince of Orange, a “republican bias” inclined Dutch leadership to
“regard monarchical systems as arbitrary, effete and corrupt,” and the connection between the Houses of
Orange and Stuart only reinforced that bias. The same prejudice existed in reverse for English royalists,
who disapproved of the republican Dutch.184
Grotius’ ideas about the right to rebel were greatly influenced by the Thirty Years War. Like
Leicester, Grotius received a thorough humanist education; he also had a fine legal education.185 Grotius
worked closely with the Dutch leader Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, chief minister of the United Provinces;
for over twenty years, he held various diplomatic and government positions. In 1619, Grotius supported
his mentor in what became a failed military coup to gain religious toleration for Arminians in the Dutch
Republic.186 Oldenvarnevelt was tried and executed. Grotius was sentenced to life imprisonment but
escaped two years later and spent most of the rest of his life in Paris, which is where he met Leicester.187
Grotius’ ideas will be discussed in conjunction with Sidney’s political theory, but several points bear
emphasis here.

183

Richard Tuck, “Introduction,” Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Richard Tuck, ed. & intro.,
from the Jean Barbeyrac ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005), Vol. 1, p. 9,
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1425 (10-28-14).
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Faber, The Brave Courtier, p. 95. On republican/monarchist tensions in the Netherlands, see Israel,
The Dutch Republic, Chs. 18-22 on Dutch politics during the Early Golden Age (1588-1647) and Chs. 2931 on Dutch politics in the Later Golden Age (1647-1702), pp. 421-546, 700-806.
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Grotius was a child prodigy who composed Latin verse at the age of eight, studied at Leiden University
by age eleven, and served as a member of a Dutch diplomatic mission to the Court of Henri IV of France
when he was only fifteen (1598). Grotius was brought along on the mission by Johan van Oldenbarnevelt,
the chief minister of the United Provinces. Oldenbarnevelt’s title was Advocate of the States of the
province of Holland. Tuck, “Grotius and Selden,” The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700,
Ch. 17, p. 499; Tuck, “Introduction,” The Rights of War and Peace (2005), p. 9.
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Stephen C. Neff, “Introduction,” Hugo Grotius On the Law of War and Peace, Stephen C. Neff, ed.
(Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. xiii-xviii. Because of the clarity of Neff’s very recent translation,
where possible I have utilized the Neff translation in quotations from Grotius. On the other hand, to obtain
this clarity, Neff has edited out – “ruthlessly” pruned – the vast number of illustrations from classical
literature and history as well as Biblical history included in this Grotius work. Accordingly, if my quoted
statement has been excised from Neff’s edition, I have quoted from the 2005 Tuck translation.
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Tuck, “Grotius and Selden,” p. 500-01.
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There are a number of commonalities between Grotius and Leicester. They were relative
contemporaries; Grotius was twelve years older. Both were intellectuals steeped in humanist learning who
were functioning in the highest diplomatic circles. Both were tolerant internationalist Protestants living and
working in an intolerant Catholic France. There is a family connection: Leicester’s father was a friend of
the celebrated Flemish philosopher Justus Lipsius (1547-1606), who also was a friend and teacher of
Grotius’ father.188 “[T]he resigned monarchism of Lipsius” was the “most influential” articulation of early
modern political Stoicism, making Lipsius not only a family connection but also a conspicuous
philosophical link between Grotius and Leicester.189 Lipsius, Grotius and, interestingly, the famous English
jurist John Selden, were “all men acquainted with one or another of the Sidneys.”190 Lipsius was not only a
neo-Stoic but Europe’s foremost Tacitus scholar, another subject on which Leicester was reared. (Essex,
too, was a patron of Tacitus and friend of Dr. Henry Savile, who translated Tacitus.) The ancient Roman
senator, historian and political theorist had emphasized reason and constancy in a changing, decaying
world. During the 1590s, Tacitus was particularly appreciated for his view that the past was “too complex
and recalcitrant to be reduced to straightforward moral lessons.” Disillusioned late-Elizabethan courtiers
and critics of venality and corruption identified with Tacitean wisdom, as did subsequent generations of
European thinkers who were experiencing the extraordinary destruction and upheavals of the Thirty Years
War. The 1665 Sidney Library catalogue is filled with references to the works of Lipsius and Tacitus.191
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Id, p. 502; Peter Burke, “Tacitism, skepticism, and reason of state,” Burns & Goldie, The Cambridge
History of Political Thought 1450-1700, p. 485.
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Id, p. 492; see generally Thomas Wiedemann, “Reflections of Roman political thought in Latin
historical writing,” The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, Christopher Rowe and
Malcolm Schofield, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 517-31.
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The Sidney Library, p. 9. Selden wrote the most famous attack on Grotius’ thesis about sovereignty
over the high seas. Neff, Hugo Grotius On the Law of War and Peace (2012), p. xvii.
191
Lipsius was an important and early contributor to reason-of-state literature, as well as influential in the
rise of Tacitism in the late sixteenth century. In Six Books of Politics, Lipsius discussed “what maintains a
kingdom and what overthrows one,” distinguishing between “small,” “medium,” and “large” deceits or
dissimulations. “This book demonstrates – if demonstration be needed – the link between the rise of the
idea of reason of state and the revival of Tacitus.” It also patently demonstrated the influence of
Machiavelli. The “dispassionate, objective analysis of power politics associated with the Tacitean outlook”
is evident in Leicester’s commonplace books, as are Machiavelli’s ideas. Leicester’s brother Sir Philip
was a good friend of the English translator of Tacitus, Sir Henry Savile. Leicester’s heavily annotated
copy of Lipsius’ edition of Tacitus’s works is now in the British Library. Guy, Tudor England, p. 415; Burke,
“Tacitism, skepticism, and reason of state,” p. 485; Womersley, “Sir Henry Savile’s Translation of Tacitus
and the Political Interpretation of Elizabethan Texts,”; Warkentin et al, The Library of the Sidneys of
Penshurst Place circa 1665, pp. 11-12, 230-31, 285, 317, 342.); Robert Shephard, “The Political
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Among the many subjects about which Leicester’s friend Grotius wrote are the laws of war and peace,
religious toleration, and natural law theory, scholarship to which Sidney is profoundly indebted.192
And to the English court assemble now,
From every region, apes of idleness!
Now, neighbour confines, purge you of your scum:
Have you a ruffian that will swear, drink, dance,
Revel the night, rob, murder, and commit
The oldest sins the newest kind of ways?
Be happy, he will trouble you no more;
England shall double gild his treble guilt,
England shall give him office, honour, might.
William Shakespeare, King Henry IV Part II (1600)193

ii. “An Order of Men …to Restrain Exhorbitances”
Underlying the grandeur of the Percy and Sidney families was the historical place of the nobility in
English society and, as well, on the European continent. From the vantage point of the western side of
the Atlantic, this is an abstruse picture.194 There existed in England and throughout early modern Europe
an uppermost echelon of society, the elite among the elite, that intermarried over many generations; as a
result, virtually all of the leading noble families, particularly the most grand of the grandees were, for
better and for worse, “family.”195 In seventeenth-century England there were less than two hundred titled,

Commonplace Books of Sir Robert Sidney,” Sidney Journal, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2003), pp. 1-30, 8-9, 18-19.
192
It is unclear whether Leicester and Grotius continued their friendship after Leicester left Paris. Neither
Grotius’s voluminous published correspondence nor Leicester’s correspondence included in the De L’Isle
papers contain any letters between the two. This is suggestive but not dispositive. What we do know is
that Leicester “clearly admired Grotius,” purchased many of Grotius’ legal works for the Sidney Library,
and often cited Grotius in his own, detailed commonplace books. Germaine Warkentin, “Humanism in
Hard Times: The Second Earl of Leicester (1595-1677) and His Commonplace Books, 1630-60,”
Challenging Humanism: Essays in Honor of Dominic Baker-Smith, Ton Hoenselaars and Arthur F.
Kinney, eds. (Newark, DL: University of Delaware Press, 2005), pp. 229-53, 242-43 & 253 n.59.
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William Shakespeare, King Henry IV Part II (1600), Act IV, Scene V.
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Perhaps this is a good illustration of the phenomenon described by John Pocock in his essay entitled,
“The politics of historiography”: “Why should not the history of one long-established political culture be
difficult for the inhabitants of another to understand? Why should it not present difficulties which only its
inhabitants have either the need or the means to understand, which others may come to understand only
as their needs and means direct and enable them?… What makes it difficult to understand is, in all cases,
although for differing reasons, what makes it both necessary and valuable to understand.” J. G. A.
Pocock, “The politics of historiography,” Political Thought and History, Essays on Theory and Method
(Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 257-71, 271.
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Beneath the top echelon of nobility was the lesser nobility and the squirarchy. Morley described the
latter group as part of England’s Norman heritage. “In the English imagination, which has always
cherished the term ‘gentleman’ in its sense of embodying some lost and perhaps never existent chivalric
ideal, there is also the other term, some-time synonymous with it, though possessing a more territorial
significance – ‘squire’.” Squire referred to “the good knight of Norman blood, seized of a Saxon manor,
who, century after century, tills his land, serves in Parliament, obediently rides off to foreign wars and dies
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non-royal members of the English peerage, the families of which constituted the often ancient, and
always elite members of the aristocracy.196 Peerage was a hereditary “dignity” bestowed (and subject to
removal) by the monarch; sometimes titles could also be non-hereditary. As one historian stated in the
context of Elizabeth I’s nobility, “This brilliant world was a small one.”197 This did not necessarily mean
that within the “greater” family of a member of this high aristocracy there was political solidarity, although
sometimes it did. But sometimes it meant having enormous power; sometimes it meant ready access to
pivotal people in position of power. It also could mean death by association. Unquestionably, membership in this very small club signified that one was uniquely positioned and privileged in society, and often
closely connected to royalty. Within Philip Sidney’s sixteenth-century prose pastoral romance Arcadia is
an eclogue that maintained that members of the nobility are “natural protectors of the people against
tyranny.” A strong nobility limited the power of the monarch, and thereby “insure[d] the state against
tyranny.”198 Sidney’s maternal grandfather, the 9th Earl of Northumberland, was one of the English leaders
who gathered together immediately after Elizabeth I’s death to grapple with how to peacefully and safely
handle the accession of James Stuart. Addressing the Privy Council Northumberland declared that, “with
the Queen dead they had no legal authority and that the nobility had been treated with contempt for too
long and would tolerate it no longer: it was up to them to take charge.” He also said that, “if any man
should offer to make any proposition to the King” contrary to the consensus of the nobility’s leadership,
“he should instantly raise an army against him.” Northumberland’s outburst ended the bickering.199

in battle, after giving ‘many mighty blows’; or returns as simply as he went, with a notched sword and
many great stories for the winter evenings. The man who gives service for his land, who believes that his
honour resides like a country fairy in his armorial shield and that any act of injustice, treachery, cowardice
or greed will smirch those simple colours.” Morley, A Thousand Lives, p. 116.
196
There are a number of guides to the English system of peerage now available on the web. See
Cokayne, George Edward, ed. (1887). Complete peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain and
the United Kingdom, extant, extinct or dormant 1–8 (1st ed.). London: George Bell & Sons,
https://archive.org/details/completepeerage o01coka (8-6-14)(1910 ed); Burke’s Peerage was established
in 1826, www.burkespeerage.com (8-6-14); see also www.cracroftspeerage.co.uk (8-6-14).
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De Lisle, After Elizabeth, p. 4.
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In the absence of a police force or standing army it was essential that a partnership exist between the
monarch and the magnates – the most prominent leaders of the English nobility; for “the territorial power
and personal authority” of the nobility “were vital to the running of the country.” Guy, Tudor England, pp.
7, 409.
199

Godfrey Goodman, The Court of James the First (from the original manuscript), 2 vols. (London,
1839), cited in De Lisle, After Elizabeth, p. 122.
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In Elizabethan England the Ciceronian concept of accomplishment as service to the state evolved
to demand intellectual achievement by the lay leaders of English society. To be a patriot one had to be
learned. No Englishman more self-consciously and successfully personified this concept than Algernon’s
great-uncle, Sir Philip. “By combining classical learning with medieval knighthood it created the ideal of the
gentleman, that powerful civilising influence of the next 400 years: of that ideal, Sir Philip Sidney, who fused
knightly ‘courtesy’ with humanistic learning and the Elizabethan courtier’s love of poetry, stands as the first
English embodiment.”200
Being noble meant not only that it was all-important to have an exceptional, humanist education; if
possible, one must gain a cosmopolitan, European perspective. Clearly the Sidney/Percy family
subscribed to this view. Sir Philip’s tour of the continent with his traveling companion and tutor, the
famous monarchomach Hubert Languet, and the consequent influence on Philip and later Sidneys of the
Christian humanist Melanchthon, is a salient, indeed a quintessential illustration of this superior learning
and refinement. Philip was well educated in England. He was then introduced to the greater world,
traveling for three years with Languet, one of the most learned Huguenot scholars on the Continent.201
Renaissance man that he was, in Europe Philip hobnobbed with kings, emperors, fellow noblemen,
famous scholars and other useful future networking contacts. He also improved his mastery of Latin and
other languages; voluminously read; and translated ‘Cicero into French, then from French into English,
and then back into Latin again by an uninterrupted process.’”202 Upon returning to England at the ripe
age of twenty, Philip reported to Languet, “I am glad that you approve of my decision to give up the study
of astronomy; but as to geometry, I don’t know what I ought to do…. Of Greek I wish to take in only
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G. R. Elton, England Under the Tudors (London & New York: Methuen, 1985), p. 431; cf. Donald
Stump, “Sidney’s Critique of Humanism in the New Arcadia,” Challenging Humanism: Essays in Honor of
Dominic Baker-Smith, Ton Hoenselaars & Arthur F. Kinney, eds (Newark, DL: University of Delaware
Press, 2005), pp. 154-78. Stump argued that while Sir Philip began as a devotee of the humanist project,
over time, having experienced humiliating financial problems and political frustration, he became much
more pessimistic, subordinating humanism to Protestantism, and emphasizing the primacy of religious
faith and personal integrity.
201

Languet was educated in Italy after which, for three years, he was “in the company” of Melancthon.
Thereafter, he worked on behalf of “many missions and embassies by various protestant princes in
Germany.” The Correspondence of Sir Philip Sidney and Hubert Languet, Steuart A. Pears MA, ed.
(London: William Pickering, 1845; reprinted by Hardpress Publishing, undated), p. xvi.
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Biography of Sir Philip Sidney, 1554-1586, The Poetry Foundation,
https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems-and-poets/poets/detail/philip-sidney (5-28-17).
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enough for a proper understanding of Aristotle, for though translations are made almost every day I
suspect that they do not express the author’s meaning clearly and aptly enough,” a thought worthy of an
Italian Renaissance scholar, e.g., Lorenzo Valla, and many others. Philip continued in his letter to his
mentor, “Besides, I am very much ashamed to be following the little sidestreams, as Cicero puts it, while
disregarding the main sources.”203 Devotion to the classics was de rigueur. Moreover, “in the sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries, a modern-minded man could react against medieval obscurantism and
feel that his love of the ancient world was progressive, not reactionary.”204 The opportunity to learn about
and love the ancient world was imbibed by the likes of Philip Sidney, and many (albeit not all) of the later
generations of the Sidney/Percy family.205
One feature of this humanistic education was the encouragement to learn new languages. Aside
from enabling European aristocrats to comfortably interact with each other, it allowed men to read ancient
texts in their original Latin, Greek or Hebrew.206 Henry Sidney’s diplomatic role was facilitated by his
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Letter from Philip Sidney to Hubert Languet in Sir Philip Sidney: The Major Works, Katherine DuncanJones, ed. (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 280, 287-90. Six years later, in a
letter to his friend Edward Denny, who was seeking his counsel, Philip described in great detail the best
way to experience “the delight of knowledge, one of the notablest effects of that which makes us differ
from beasts.” Above all else, Sir Philip said one should study Cicero’s On Obligations. For more details
about Sir Philip’s views on necessary reading for a self-educated man, see Appendix B.
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Faber, The Brave Courtier, p.129.
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As one scholar explained, Philip’s education was “in a true sense liberal.” The Italian Renaissance
“new learning” and humanist methodology were “being applied with equal enthusiasm” in English public
schools. “Ancient literature, including the philosophers and historians of Athens, formed the staple of a
young man’s intellectual training. Yet no class at once so frivolous and pedantic, so servile and so vicious,
as the Italian humanists, monopolized the art of teaching.” Moreover, “Roger Ascham, the tutor of
princes; Sir John Cheke, at Cambridge; Camden, at Westminster; Thomas Ashton, at Shrewsbury, were
men from whom nothing but sound learning and good morals could be imbibed.” Indeed, “England
enjoyed the rare advantage of receiving both Renaissance and Reformation at the same epoch. The new
learning … was penetrated with sober piety and enlightened philosophy instead of idle skepticism and
academical rhetoric. Thus, the foundations of [Philip] Sidney’s culture were broadly laid; and he was
enabled to build a substantial superstructure on them.” John Addington Symonds, Sir Philip Sidney
(Cambridge University Press, 2011)[1st pub. 1886], p. 196.
206

Rare for a female, even a monarch, Queen Elizabeth I was extremely learned; the scholar and
educator Roger Ascham considered her to be his “brightest star.” During the two years that Elizabeth
studied with Ascham when she was 15 and 16, she learned Greek every morning, first reading the Greek
Testament and then reading and translating Isocrates, Sophocles, Demosthenes and other classical
authors. In the afternoon, Elizabeth studied Latin, reading almost all of Cicero’s works and a great deal of
Livy; she also read Saint Cyprian, and Melanchthon’s Loci Communes, an acclaimed commentary on
statescraft and Protestant theology. Fluent in French, Italian, Latin, Greek and, in her later teens,
Spanish, when she was sixty-four she took the breath away from the Polish ambassador by replying to
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fluency in French and Italian, for example, to which he added a working knowledge of Spanish and,
indubitably, a thorough understanding of Latin. His son Robert, Algernon’s grandfather, was even more
linguistically impressive, having mastered Latin, French, German, Italian and Spanish.207 Taking the
Grand Tour thus became the increasingly popular way for an elite member of English society to improve
his linguistic breadth. Henry Percy, the 9th Earl of Northumberland, Dorothy Sidney’s father and
Algernon’s grandfather, provided direction to his son about his anticipated tour: “Yow must consider, the
ends of yowr travels is not to learn apishe iestures, or fashions of attyres or varieties of costely meates,
but to gayne the tonges, that hereafter at yowr leisures, you may discours with them that are dead, if they
have left any worth behind them; talke with them that are present, if yow haue occasion; and conferre with
them that are absent, if they haue bestowed vpon vs any thing fit for the view of the world.” The point,
said Percy, was that “by comparing the acts of men abroade with the deeds of them at home, yowr
carriage may be made cummely, yowr minde riche, yowr judgement wyse to chuse that is best, and to
eschew that is naught.”208 Percy recommended that the young man take notes; otherwise he would
forget some of his experiences. Not only in this consistent with Philip and Robert Sidney’s experience,
but the instruction to take notes was the method assiduously embraced by Algernon’s father Leicester
and, in all likelihood, by Algernon (although perhaps not as rigorously as his inveterate father) throughout
his turbulent lifetime.209 As Leicester opined in a letter to his wife when he was stationed in Flushing, it

his “bombastic speech…with a torrent of Latin.” J. E. Neale, Queen Elizabeth I (Chicago: Academy
Chicago Publishers, 2001), p.14; Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, pp. 4-5; Guy, Tudor England, p. 251.
207
In 1580 a Hebrew grammar book was dedicated to Philip Sidney. For our purposes it is unnecessary to
pursue the question of whether Sir Philip could read Hebrew; what the dedication minimally suggests is his
support, financial or otherwise, of the study of Hebrew texts in the original language, not in translation. A
Sidney Chronology, p. 80.
208
R. E. W. Maddison, “Studies in the Life of Robert Boyle, F.R.S.: Part VII. The Grand Tour,” Notes and
Records of the Royal Society of London, Vol. 20, No. 1 (June 1965), pp. 51-77, 51.
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Similarly, in response to Robert’s request that Philip provide him with advice based on his experience,
Sir Philip wrote to his younger brother Robert in 1578 when the latter embarked on his tour of Europe.
First and foremost, Philip told his younger brother, your purpose in “being a gentleman born,” is “to furnish
yourself with the knowledge of such things as may be serviceable to your country, and fit for your calling.”
While the change of air is nice, said Philip, “the warmest sun makes not a wise man.” He advocated
learning languages, “of good serviceable use.” Most important is that Robert should “right inform” his
mind “with those things which are most notable in those places which you come unto … who rightly
travels with the eye of Ulysses doth take one of the most excellent ways of worldly wisdom.” For more
details on Philip’s brotherly advice, see Appendix B.
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was not enough for his children to receive an academic education, because “tutors know so little of the
world.”210 Cosmopolitanism was an indispensable trait in high noblemen, those privileged few who had
the opportunity to travel extensively. There were families in which this asset was especially nurtured. The
Sidney/Percy clan was one such family.
Algernon’s father sought to provide all his sons with at least some of this refinement and
sophistication.211As will become evident, in the case of Algernon and his younger brother Henry, Leicester
was extremely successful. According to Scott, historians have tended to significantly underestimate the
cosmopolitan perspective of the English, who were riveted upon events on the European continent.
During the Interregnum, for example, the Commonwealth newspaper Mercurius Politicus, edited by
Marchamont Nedham, reported in detailed weekly papers on “the affairs of England, Scotland, Ireland, the
United Provinces, Flanders, France, Spain, Scandinavia, the Holy Roman Empire and Italy without
categorical distinction or relative weighting of any kind.”212 Scott’s insight is well taken. But reading about
events on the Continent is still not the same thing as living them, particularly at the very highest levels of
state politics and in the nonpareil social circles in which the Sidneys traveled. One cannot overstate the
fact that profoundly informing Algernon’s ideas was an acute awareness of the cosmopolitanism, political
engagement, vital international responsibilities and relationships of generations of his family.
The emphasis on what we would call progressive education is profoundly reflected in another indicia
of the Sidney family commitment to the continuing value, as an adult, of humanistic pursuits, namely, what
is known as the Essex Circle (a/k/a the Essex-Sidney Circle or the Walsingham-Sidney-Pembroke-Essex
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A Sidney Chronology, p. 150. Another example of the cosmopolitanism of the Sidneys from the time
of Elizabeth if not earlier is the case of Sir Henry Sidney’s niece, Jane Dormer. Jane was one of Queen
Mary’s “most trusted ladies, saying the rosary with the queen and regularly sleeping in her bedchamber.”
When Mary died, Jane “exiled herself to the Spanish Netherlands, and later to Paris and Spain,” having
married the Spanish Duke of Feria. Varkentin, “Robert Sidney and his Books,” p. 36; Brennan, The
Sidneys, pp.3, 21-22, 25, 31.
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It should also be noted here that cosmopolitanism sometimes went far beyond the continent of Europe.
Algernon’s mother Dorothy had an uncle, George Percy, who was one of the original founders of
Jamestown and an early governor of that English colony. When George Percy returned to England in
1612 from Jamestown, it is likely that fourteen-year-old Dorothy heard about life in the New World from
both George and from her father’s friend, Sir Walter Raleigh. “Introduction,” Dorothy Percy Sidney
Correspondence, p. 7.
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Scott, England’s Troubles, pp. 15-16.
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Circle).213 The Essex Circle developed under the tutelage of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, supported
by Leicester’s stepson, Robert Devereux, the 2nd Earl of Essex.214 Both men were related to Algernon
Sidney.215 This Circle of spiritual, philosophical, political and literary companions, including both patrons
and students of the arts, link Dudley, Sir Francis Walsingham and Sir Philip until these men died in the
1580s, with “the ‘Areopagus’ of English poets,” viz., the high court or apogee of humanist artistry that met
at Essex House, the London home of Devereux.216 Essex inherited the property from Dudley, Sir Philip’s
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The “Sidney circle formed the coherent core” of the Essex faction, including Sir Robert Sidney,
Penelope (a/k/a/Lady Rich, who was Sir Philip’s “Stella” and Essex’s sister), and Roger Manners, Earl of
Rutland, who was Sir Philip’s son-in-law (long after Philip’s death). Robert Sidney was one of the men
who kept lines open to Robert Cecil, leader of the anti-Essex coalition. Other faction “admirers” included
the Earl of Southampton Henry Wriothesley, the Earl of Bedford Edward Russell, William, Lord Sandes,
William Parker, Lord Monteagle, Edward, Lord Cromwell, Sir Charles Danvers, and Sir Christopher
Blount. There are additional men “more tenuously linked to Essex.” Several of these men, including
Robert Sidney, “kept lines open to Cecil, and … refused to countenance overt revolt.” Guy, Tudor
England, p. 441.Not surprisingly, there is substantial overlap between the Essex political “faction” and the
literary Essex Circle, but without diving in deep, the distinctions are obscure. Compare, e.g., id, pp. 415 &
441. The subject is very complex, manifest by Montrose’s thesis that the cult of Elizabeth was neither “a
quasi-mystical object of belief nor … a mere courtly game but rather” it was “a core component of
Elizabeth statecraft” in which elements of “devotion, diversion, and duplicity were inextricably mixed.” This
made literature, through which messages could be more cleverly even if not subtly conveyed, as well as
parallel or sometimes distinct political expression, meaningful on various levels. See Montrose, The
Subject of Elizabeth, p. 113.
214
Essex was “a dyed-in-the-wool supporter of the tolerant, left-wing Protestant group that took shape
under his stepfather, who was also [Sir Philip] Sidney’s uncle and Elizabeth’s favorite, Robert Dudley,
Earl of Leicester…. Leicester had intimate connections with the English supporters both of William of
Orange… and of Orange’s immediate ally in France, Henry III of Navarre.” Essex Circle members were
ardent supporters of the tens of thousands of French Huguenots who were fighting for the right to practice
their faith. This support continued notwithstanding the politically motivated conversion to Catholicism of a
man who had been their Huguenot hero, Henri de Bourbon, known as Henry III of Navarre and then Henri
IV of France. See Skretkowicz, “Shakespeare, Henri IV, and the Tyranny of Royal Style,” pp. 179-80.
Skretkowicz is an English scholar and an expert on Philip Sidney, having produced definitive editions of
The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia (The New Arcadia, 1987). Id, pp. 320-21.
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See n. 151 and Appendix A.
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This study cannot begin to scratch the surface, much less do justice to the scholarship extant on the
literary contributions of members of the Essex Circle. There is, for example, a journal, the Sidney
Journal, devoted significantly to analyses of Essex Circle members’ literary works. Interestingly, Essex
House was next to the Middle Temple in London, one of the four principal Inns of Court. In the
Elizabethan era the inns of court “were known as the third university” because increasingly, members of
the gentry finished their education there. The inns became “fashionable academies,” and in addition to
the law, and familiarity with legal processes, members would study anatomy, astrology, geography,
history, mathematics, theology, and foreign languages. Note, too, that. students at the inns of court as
well as at Cambridge and Oxford often attended lectures and tutorials without completing a formal
degree. “The late-Elizabethan universities were renowned for their vitality and breadth of learning.” Peter
Dawkins, The Shakespeare Enigma, in “Shakespeare Patronage,” July 2005, on the website of The
Francis Bacon Research Trust, http://www.fbrt.org.uk/pages/essays/ essay-shakespeare%20patronage.
html (4-20-14); Guy, Tudor England, pp. 421-23.
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uncle. Dudley also was Essex’s stepfather (and therefore Philip and Robert Sidney’s “step” first cousin). At
different periods of her reign Dudley and later Devereux were Elizabeth’s favorites. To illustrate the
cultural importance of the Essex Circle, we know that “at least twelve months before writing Love’s
Labours Lost, Shakespeare successfully insinuated himself into the Essex-Sidney circle…. [W]hen
Shakespeare gained admittance to Essex’s group, he adopted their antityrannical politics, placing tyranny
and usurpation at the heart of The Rape of Lucrece.”217
In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the Tudor humanists were intellectuals whose
“new humanism” was associated with the neostoicism and Tacitism of Machiavelli and Lipsius by way of
Seneca and, of course, Tacitus. The Tudor humanists included ex-members of the so-called Essex Circle
who “moved into the ambit of Prince Henry [of Navarre, later King Henry IV of France]” when the Circle
disbanded with Essex’s demise.218 The Essex Circle championed the idea that aristocratic honor would
be revived by allying with the literary arts. It expressed English political doctrine through literary works
that relied on Anglicized ancient texts, and included admiration for the Roman republic and the corollary
monarchomach concept that tyrannical kings could be opposed and even killed. “By the 1570s, Sir Philip
Sidney’s circle was involved with a collective enterprise of reading both classical and modern authors to
extract political wisdom.”219 These ideas were articulated in many works beginning with Sidney’s Arcadia,
but also in Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece, in which literature, politics, ancient history, and
philosophy are combined in vernacular literature.220 In sum, the Essex Circle maintained a civic humanist
perspective while also reflecting the stoicism and skepticism of Seneca and Tacitus.221
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For monographs on Essex Circle literary works, see, e.g., Matthew Woodcock, Sir Philip Sidney and
the Sidney Circle (Horndon, Devon, UK: Northcote House Pub., 2009); Tom W. N. Parker, Proportional
Form in the Sonnets of the Sidney Circle (Oxford & New York: Clarendon Press, 1998); Skretkowicz,
“Shakespeare, Henry IV, and the Tyranny of Royal Style,” pp. 180-81.
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Jacob Soll, “J.G.A. Pocock’s Atlantic Republicanism Thesis Revisited: The Case of John Adams’
Tacitism,” Republic of Letters: A Journal for the Study of Knowledge, Politics, and the Arts, Vol. 2, Issue 1
(Dec. 01, 2010), pp. 21-37, 28, www.arcade.stanford.edu/rofl_issue/volume-2-issue-1 (9-5-18).
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In a 2011 article Pauline Kewes reviewed the complex contextual perspective of the Essex Circle.
Kewes observed that, “Received wisdom has it that in the realm of political and ethical thought the later
sixteenth century witnessed a transition from Ciceronian humanism, characterized by a concern about
active life, civic virtue, and true nobility – especially in the sense of aristocracy of merit – to a new
humanism indebted to the stoic and skeptical ideas of Seneca and Tacitus, and marked by an abiding
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For reasons that will become clear, it is worth reviewing key membership in the Essex Circle. It
included Henry Wriothesley and his wife, Elizabeth Vernon, the 3rd Earl and Countess of Southampton;
Robert Devereux and Frances Walsingham, the 2nd Earl and Countess of Essex; Penelope Devereux,
known as Lady Rich; Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy; Henry and Mary Herbert, Earl and Countess of
Pembroke; Edward de Vere and Ann Cecil, Earl of Oxford and spouse; and the brothers Francis and
Anthony Bacon. Margaret Dakin (or Dakins) and Thomas Sidney also may have been members. In the
Essex Circle we have an exceedingly formidable group within the Tudor humanist movement and a
Sidney aristocratic coterie of the highest order. To be specific, Elizabeth Vernon, the Countess of
Southampton, was a lady-in-waiting to Queen Elizabeth, and Robert Devereux’s first cousin. Among
other works, several Shakespeare narrative poems were dedicated to her husband, Henry Wriothesley,
who was a patron of the arts. Wriothesley was imprisoned in the Tower at the downfall of Essex, and
released by King James upon his assumption of the throne.222 Lady Mary Herbert, née Sidney, was a
scholar in her own right as well as a translator, and the poet sister of Sir Philip and Robert Sidney. When
one reviews a selected list of manuscript and printed texts in the 1554 to 1654 timeframe that were
dedicated to Sidney family members, one of the things that is striking is the number of dedications to

preoccupation with tyranny, courtly corruption, and decline of virtue, expressed in a language of prudence
and reason of state.” Moreover, it is understood that this “broad ideological transition is assumed to have
run parallel to a shift of interest from Livy, chronicler of Rome’s earliest republican glory, to Tacitus, who
described her inexorable degeneration under the emperors.” But this understanding is not correct.
“[N]ewer work in the field suggests that neither changes in intellectual climate nor shifts in historiographic
taste and polemical deployment of history were so straightforward or thoroughgoing. In England,
Malcolm Smuts argued, ‘we do not find a transition from one kind of humanism to another so much as an
ongoing conversation, in which constitutionalist, ethical and reason of state arguments interact with each
other.’ Late Elizabethan Tacitism,” noted Kewes, “is a case in point.” Pauline Kewes, “Henry Savile’s
Tacitus and the Politics of Roman History in Late Elizabethan England,” Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol.
74, No. 4 (Dec. 2011), pp. 515-51, 525; see also Markku Peltonen, Classical Humanism and
Republicanism in English Political Thought, 1570-164 (Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 135-36.
On the other hand, David Womersley showed how Savile’s translation of Tacitus, on which the Essex
Circle, Sidneys, and humanists generally relied, shifted to a recognition of the right to rebel against
tyrannical kings such as the infamous Nero, following Machiavelli’s perspective and reversing the
previously predominant view that rebellion was evil and inevitably failed. David Womersley, “Sir Henry
Savile’s Translation of Tacitus and the Political Interpretation of Elizabethan Texts,” Review of English
Studies, Vol. 42, No. 167 (Aug. 1991), pp. 313-42.
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Southampton “was one of the most handsome and accomplished members of Elizabeth’s court.” Like
Northumberland and Cumberland, he resented the influence and power of the Scots and others of those
closest to James. He also supported Northumberland and Cumberland’s belief in religious toleration (as
well as their hostility to Spain). In fact, early in James’ reign, Southampton was arrested for allegedly
plotting to kill some of James’ Scots favorites. De Lisle, After Elizabeth, p. 205.
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Lady Mary.223 Penelope Devereux was Sir Philip Sidney’s beloved and famous “Stella,” the subject of his
sonnets, as well as the Earl of Essex Robert Devereux’s sister. After Philip died Penelope became
Mountjoy’s mistress and, much later, his wife.224 Frances Walsingham, the Countess of Essex, was
statesman Francis Walsingham’s daughter and Philip Sidney’s wife. After Philip died, Frances married
Robert Devereux, the 2nd Earl of Essex, who was executed for treason in 1601, at which point the Essex
Circle disbanded and its members migrated to other humanist colloquies. Francis Bacon was a friend and
associate of Devereux, as was Francis’ brother Anthony. Francis was a highly gifted Renaissance
England scholar whose advancements in the scientific method caused him to be known as the father of
empiricism.225 Francis also was an MP and lawyer who later, under James I, served as Attorney General
and Lord Chancellor. Francis’ brother Anthony served abroad for thirteen years in Walsingham’s
intelligence corps; he also “most probably” authored The State of Christendom, a “trenchant dissection of
European politics” written about 1594-95 in which Roman history is used effectively to attack the Spanish
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Among the texts dedicated to Lady Mary Herbert were Bishop Gervase Babington’s 1583 dedication of
A Brief Conference Betwixt Man’s Frailty and Faith, poet Abraham Fraunce’s 1588 dedication of The
Arcadian Rhetoric, and Edmund Spencer’s dedicatory sonnet in his 1590 publication of The Faerie
Queene (Books I-III).223 One “client” of Mary Herbert was Samuel Daniel, author of the late sixteenthcentury epic poem The Civil Wars, a multi-volume text about the fall of Richard II and the rise of Henry
Bolingbroke, who became Henry IV. Daniel’s Neostoic emphasis was on the dilemma between the
decidedly adverse consequences of innovation and the ugly character of usurpation versus the corruption
of a king. Lady Mary was also Robert Dudley’s niece and, as the wife of Henry Herbert, entitled the
Countess of Pembroke. Dorothy Percy Sidney Correspondence, p. 2; Parmelee, “Neostoicism and
Absolutism,” Politics, Ideology and the Law in Early Modern Europe, pp. 14-15.
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Because it was understood that “the nobility and higher gentry had many couples trapped in unhappy
marriages,” King James and his wife Anna apparently had no reluctance to show favor to “beautiful
women like Essex’s sister Lady Rich, who lived openly with Lord Mountjoy and had several illegitimate
children by him.” De Lisle, After Elizabeth, pp.221-22 and n. Mountjoy and Penelope Rich were
eventually married by Mountjoy’s chaplain, William Laud, later Archbishop of Canterbury and advocate,
with the support of Charles I, of high Anglicanism. Mountjoy had more than one “greater Sidney”
connection: his cousin, Sir Christopher Blount, married Devereux’s mother after Robert Dudley’s death in
1588, and participated in Devereux’s failed coup, which led to his own execution. Black, The Reign of
Elizabeth, pp. 440-41.
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Shephard noted parallels between the method advocated by Francis Bacon, who was also influenced
by Tacitus in his analysis of the natural sciences, and Leicester’s organizational method in his
commonplace books. In particular, Bacon’s tables on natural phenomena, such as winds, resemble the
tables in Leicester’s commonplace books on political phenomena. Bacon and Leicester must have
known each other given their relationship to Essex, but they do not seem to have been close friends as
there is no surviving correspondence between them. Shephard, “The Political Commonplace Books of Sir
Robert Sidney,” pp. 19-20 n.49. Locke’s analysis, much more than Sidney’s, echoes Bacon’s empirical
approach. See Ch. 2; see also Paul A. Rahe, “Antiquity Surpassed: The Repudiation of Classical
Republicanism,” Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776 (Stanford, CAL: Stanford
University Press, 1994), pp. 233-69, 245 (Bacon, Descartes, Sprat, Petty, Locke and the new science).
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and their aggressive imperialism.226 Edward de Vere, the 17th Earl of Oxford, was not a Sidney family
member, extended or otherwise, but an Elizabethan court playwright and poet, as well as a patron of the
arts. Margaret Dakin was the widow of Essex’s brother Walter, who then married Thomas Sidney - Philip,
Robert and Mary Sidney’s younger brother. Then there is Essex and Robert Sidney, not to mention
Shakespeare, who was not a Sidney family member! Essex was a minor poet himself; his “common way”
was “to evaporate his thoughts in a Sonnet … to be sung before the Queen.”227 He also had his own company of actors, as did other Elizabethan members of the Court.228 Robert was the author of a manuscript
of poems and songs, as well as the employer and patron of the poet and playwright Ben Jonson.229
In sum, “the ‘Areopagus’ of English poets,” the well-known Essex Circle, was very much a Sidney
family affair, with several extraordinarily noteworthy “extended family” members.230 Sir Philip was Essex’s
role model. Arcadia was written in two versions between 1579 and 1584 and first published in 1590, with
an expanded “complete” edition published in 1593, the same year that Shakespeare published his
humanist poem, Venus and Adonis. 231 In the next generation, Robert Sidney’s daughter, Lady Mary
Wroth, was the author of Pamphilia to Amphilanthus, which was a sequence of songs and sonnets, as
well as The Contess of Montgomery’s Urania, a prose romance, and Love’s Victory, a pastoral drama.
Urania is said to depict the marriage of Mary Wroth’s brother Robert Sidney and his wife Dorothy. Robert
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Kewes, “Henry Savile’s Tacitus and the Politics of Roman History in Late Elizabethan England,” p.
537.
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Burgess did not identify either Essex or Robert Sidney in his list of Essex Circle members, perhaps
because he is focused on the Essex Circle in the aftermath of Essex’s demise, although this still does not
satisfactorily explain the omissions. Also identified as Essex faction members are Sir Edward Dyer and
various others. Compare Guy, Tudor England, pp. 441-42 & 409, citing R. Strong, The Cult of Elizabeth:
Elizabethan Portraiture and Pageantry (London, 1977), p. 81. On Margaret Dakin and Thomas Sidney,
see Skretkowicz, “Shakespeare, Henri IV, and the Tyranny of Royal Style,” p. 180.
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Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, had a company of players that, in 1574, was the first to receive the
royal licence. Guy, Tudor England, p. 428.
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“There is some evidence in the [Sidney Library] catalogue that Robert in his youth shared Philip’s
interest in contemporary Italian poetry.” Warkentin, “Robert Sidney and his books,” pp 32-33, 36 and 33
n.3, referencing Croft, The Poems of Robert Sidney (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 4-9. It should
be noted that the Circle included other scholars as well: Sir Henry Savile was warden of Merton College,
Oxford and then provost of Eton; he translated Tacitus’ Histories and Life of Agricola. Henry Cuffe was
regius professor of Greek at Oxford. Guy, Tudor England, p. 415.
230
There were other humanist talents within the Sidney family: “One of the most important aspects of
Robert Sidney’s life was his music.” Warkentin, “Robert Sidney and his books,”, p. 40.
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Skretkowicz, “Shakespeare, Henri IV, and the Tyranny of Royal Style,” pp. 181-82.
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and Dorothy were Algernon Sidney’s parents.232 In fine, we have not only the most exalted aristocratic
lineage but with it, the loftiest intellectual pedigree.233
One final Sidney family literary detail should be mentioned. There is an intriguing question about
to whom the Sidneys wrote. “The question of audience – for whom did [Philip] Sidney write? – is an
important one to ask, though a hard one to answer, for it must have a bearing on a yet more fundamental
question: why did Sidney write at all? There is no evidence that he intended any of his works except his
intemperate Defence of his uncle, the Earl of Leicester, to see print: it is to the accident of his death that
we owe the fact of their publication during the 1590s.”234 The same basic question and intent haunts
Algernon Sidney and his work.
Nevertheless, there was a well-known, talented, resonant Sidney family literary tradition and flair.
Sir Philip was the most renowned family author but certainly far from the only one. Arcadia was an
important literary achievement of which the family was acutely aware and proud. Algernon’s father,
Leicester, “knew his Arcadia as well as his Bible and quotes both books constantly in his letters.” Leicester
wrote all his life, penning what might best be described as personal intellectual memoirs. He was also a
bibliophile, amassing an extraordinarily large private library. Sir Philip’s sister Mary, the Countess of
Pembroke to whom Arcadia was dedicated, was also a literary bluestocking, a talented poet and a
translator in her own right. Leicester’s sister Dorothy followed the family literary tradition and seems to
have been well known among the aristocracy for her epistolary skill.235 In précis, it certainly should be no
surprise that expository talent was something with which Algernon Sidney, the most evident intellectual
heir to this legacy, was imbued.
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Unlike Leicester and Essex, Elizabeth I was not a major patron of the arts. Haigh, Elizabeth I: Profiles
in Power, p. 176. On Lady Mary Wroth, see Dorothy Percy Sidney Correspondence, pp. 2, 11.
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It was “with Essex’s revolt and execution in 1601 that the Neostoic movement was to veer sharply from
the path it had taken in the rest of Europe,” which was to support monarchism, including absolute
monarchism, because of its constancy and the fear of the much more adverse impacts of rebellion. In
Parmelee’s view, this English, “more Tacitean” form of Neostoicism that emphasized “the corruption of
tyrants of Roman history” eventually became “a refuge for malcontents and cynics in the Jacobean court,
and a target of suspicion for budding English absolutists rather than a basis for their monarchist political
theory.” Sidney, and later Adams, both embraced this Tacitean form of Neostoicism. Parmelee,
“Neostoicism and Absolutism,” Politics, Ideology and the Law in Early Modern Europe, p. 13.
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Katherine Duncan-Jones, “Introduction,” Sir Philip Sidney: The Major Works, pp. vii-viii.
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Cartwright, Sacharissa, pp. 24-25.
129

Algernon likely co-authored two anonymous political pamphlets, one entitled Englands Great
Interest in the Choice of this New Parliament dedicated to all her free-holders and electors, 1679, which
focused on popery and arbitrary government. William Penn is the generally recognized author. The other
Algernon Sidney likely pamphlet is entitled A Just and Modest Vindication of the Proceedings of the Two
Last Parliaments, published in 1681 and probably co-authored by Sidney and the jurist Sir William Jones.
Vindication addressed the subject of the multiple parliamentary prorogations that Charles II had imposed,
and the necessity to curb the power of the throne. Algernon may have authored some of the Cassandran
Court Maxims, and he unquestionable authored an unfinished Discourses manuscript. The latter two texts
were intended for unknown audiences; perhaps, as was the case with Sir Philip, Discourses was meant for
Algernon’s eyes only without any thought whatsoever of publication. During his trial on charges of high
treason Sidney said that he “burned more paper of my own writing than a horse can carry.”236 He (selfservingly) described the Discourses manuscript as a polemical piece made up of general principles in
response to Filmer, “not calculated for any particular government in the world.” Moreover, Sidney
observed, “the ink is so old”; while no one “knew when they were written,” the papers submitted in his trial
were “perhaps 20 or 30 years” old, and therefore, by implication, without any contemporary political
significance.237 In a love poem written many years earlier, Sidney similarly described the purpose of his
writing, which was not with the thought in mind of publishing. Instead, Sidney said, he was “writing only
today that which I shall read the next week or month, and then burn, having no other intention but to ease
my troubled thoughts, and to attain to the knowledge of myself, by setting down neatly the true state of my
mind,” so that he “little care[d] for those rules which are necessary to those who depend on others
judgments.”238 This would have been a very familiar habit: it was what his father had always done. At his
trial Sidney explained, “I believe there is a brother of mine here has forty quires of paper written by my
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The Trial of Colonel Algernon Sidney at the King’s-Bench, for High Treason: 35 Charles II. A.D. 1683,
col. 878, Cobbett’s Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other
Crimes and Misdemeanors from the Earliest Period to the Year 1783, with Notes and Other Illustrations,
Vol. IX (London, 1811).
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Id, cols. 866, 901; Apology, p. 12; see Worden, “The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney,” p.
14.
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“Of Love, by Algernon Sidney, Esq., never published,” A Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts,
…of the Late Lord Somers, 2nd ed., Vol. Eighth [of Thirteen], Walter Scott, ed.,. (London: T. Cadell and W.
Davies, et al., 1812), pp. 612-19, 617.
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father, and never one sheet of them was published; but he writ his own mind to see what he could think of
it another time, and blot it out again, may be.”239 This was both a common humanist practice and a
Sidney/Percy family tradition.240 It is true that after Sidney’s work was published posthumously talented
men opined that Sidney was a gifted writer, e.g., “widely admired by Keats, Shelley, Bryon, and Coleridge
among others.”241 But again, this does not betoken an intention by Sidney to share his work with the public.
Returning to the aristocratic milieu of the Sidney/Percy family, perhaps the most well-known
attribute of English aristocratic stature was military prowess, the warrior attribute of the feudal nobility and
the personification of the Elizabethan chivalric figure. While “Henry VIII was away at his wars in France,
popular legend recounted, James IV had treacherously attempted to seize the throne of England. But
through the valour of his loyal servants, led by the Howards and including Sir William Sidney, the
constitutional integrity of the Tudor kingdom had been heroically preserved.”242 The duty and honor of
military service was embraced by every generation of the Sidney/Percy family.
Truth and myth combined to create the characteristics of blue-blooded nobility, of which both Sir
Philip and Algernon Sidney, mortally and seriously injured in battle, constitute exemplars. The Sidney/
Percy family legacy was carried as a mantle by Algernon in a manner that later, in the eighteenth century,
was recognized by French Baron Charles Montesquieu, who studied and sometimes quoted Sidney.
Montesquieu said that constitutional monarchy, as distinguished from “a despotic prince,” is “monarchical
government … in which a single person governs by fundamental laws,” and it is “by nature” made up of
intermediate, subordinate, and dependent powers. The “most natural intermediate and subordinate
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Cobbett’s Complete Collection of State Trials, Vol. IX, col. 878.
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“The practice of keeping notebooks and commonplace books in general was one of the most
widespread activities of the educated classes in contemporary England,” and “constituted the primary
intellectual tool for organizing knowledge and thought among the intelligentsia.” Warkentin, “Humanism in
Hard Times,” p. 237, citing Peter Beal, “Notions in Garrison: The Seventeenth-Century Commonplace
Book,” in New Ways of Looking at Old Texts: Papers of the Renaissance English Text Society, W. Speed
Hill, ed. (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1993), pp. 131-47, 131, 134.
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“Great men have been among us; hands that penned/ And tongues that uttered wisdom – better none:/
The later Sidney, Marvel Harrington,/Young, and others that called Milton friend.” William Wordsworth's
poems: Part The Second - Sonnets Dedicated To Liberty, http://www.readbookonline.net/read/3394/
13209/ (12/13/10); see Scott I, pp. 8-9. There are modern scholars who disagree, Laslett being perhaps
the most infamous of them.
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Brennan, The Sidneys, p. 11.
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power,” said Montesquieu, “is that of the nobility. This, in some measure, seems to be essential to a
monarchy, whose fundamental maxim is, No monarchy, no nobility; no nobility, no monarchy.”243 Interestingly, and to be discussed in connection with John Adams’ republicanism, there is no question that
Montesquieu was adored by the decidedly non-aristocratic early American republicans. But this attribution, while correct, is potentially misleading because Montesquieu’s values were far from new; they were
deeply imbedded in the centuries-old culture of European high nobility, evidenced by the actions and
views articulated by generations of the Sidney/Percy family as well as others with whom they associated.
When Queen Elizabeth died and the Privy Council debated how to “hand the crown to the King of Scots,”
Henry Percy, the 9th Earl of Northumberland and Algernon’s great-uncle, took charge. What happened in
England as a result of the havoc wreaked by the English Civil Wars is that the fault line changed – the
focal point for the intense loyalty, sacrifice and commitment that this sense of responsibility inculcated.244
For generations, both within the Sidney/Percy family and throughout society, the precept was prosaic that
the monarch was the protector of the people. James I said so himself, and this view was echoed in all
sorts of texts.245 On the other hand, the “insurance” that guarded the efficacy of this precept was the high
aristocracy. With Algernon Sidney and others, this responsibility remained although a role emerged for
the people as well. On the other hand, with Sidney’s younger brother, for example, the prince was the
focal point. In both instances, the motivation, sense of responsibility, commitment to public service, and
underlying family values were inherited principles by which Sidney/Percy men were expected to live.
Algernon Sidney was part of an important English dynasty albeit not the royal one, and his
environment as a teenager and young man was decidedly intellectual, cosmopolitan, political, noble,
French, and Huguenot with a pervasive overlay of international Protestantism. These influences are
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Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Complete Works, 4 Vols., The Spirit of Laws
[1748] (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2011) [orig. pub. London: T. Evans, 1777], Vol. 1, p. 45; see
Worden, The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney, p. 2; Robert Shackleton, “Montesquieu and
Machiavelli: A Reappraisal,” Comparative Literature Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1964), pp. 1-13, 8-10.
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De Lisle, After Elizabeth, p. 122. According to Adamson, it was this sense of the critical role of the
English nobility in creating a balanced society that drove Essex and others to radicalize their political
objectives in opposition to Charles I. See Adamson, The Noble Revolt, passim.
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Burgess pointed to sermons, homilies, tracts and treatises by the clergy. Burgess, Absolute Monarchy
and the Stuart Constitution, p. 91.
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profoundly reflected in Sidney’s ideas.246
If we want to understand his works through the dense clouds
of time and prejudice, we must begin with the man.
Maurice Viroli, How to Read Machiavelli 247
I would not have the House to question my servants,
Muchless one that is so near me.
King Charles I speech to Parliament regarding the Duke of Buckingham, March 29, 1626 248

iii. Algernon’s Life: Phase 1
In addition to his extraordinary family, Algernon Sidney was undoubtedly an exceptional man.
There is no dispute about his personality: courageous, bold, charismatic, bellicose, obstinate, passionate,
and dramatic, with a dictatorial temper.249 “It is not that Sidney didn’t suffer fools gladly; he would not
suffer them at all.”250 Beyond temperament, Sidney upheld the family intellectual tradition. He received an
outstanding humanist education, although we do not know precisely how; he seems to have been an
autodidact, perhaps also privately tutored after completing his early formal schooling.251 In all likelihood
the tutor was his father; after all, the 2nd Earl was considered to be the right man to teach the King’s son.
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Pocock has asked what kind of a republican a man from such an aristocratic background might be.
The answer is, perhaps typical: consider the Kennedys of Massachusetts, or Thomas Jefferson of Virginia
who was, worse than a republican, a democrat! J. G. A. Pocock, “England’s Cato: The Virtues and
Fortunes of Algernon Sidney, ” The Historical Journal, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp. 915-35, 921. It will
be extremely interesting to see how and why similar ideas informed John Adams work as well, for Adams
certainly lacked the Sidney pedigree.
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Maurizio Viroli, How to Read Machiavelli (London: Granta Books, 2009), p. 14.
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“The King’s Reply to the Address Of The House Of Commons,” March 15, 1626, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS.,
22,474, fol. 19, see Hist. of Engl. Vi. 78, in Samuel Rawson Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of
the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), p. 48.
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For a more negative take on these attributes, see Caroline Robbins, ed., Two English Republican
Tracts (Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 41-47.
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Scott I, p. 9. “Algernon Sidney, a writer in politics, reminds us so often of an earlier writer in politics, his
great-uncle Sir Philip Sidney. Both men have the haughty and inflammable temper of the Sidney family.
Both became legends more through their deaths than through their lives.” Blair Worden, “Classical
Republicanism and the Puritan Revolution,” History and Imagination: Essays in Honor of H. R. TrevorRoper, Hugh Lloyd-Jones, Valerie Pearl, Blair Worden, eds. (New York: Holmes & Meier Pub. 1981), Ch.
14, pp. 182-200, 185.
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For example, he did not attend Oxbridge. “Sidney or SYDNEY, Algernon,” DNB, Vol. LII, pp. 202-10,
202. Carswell asserted that Leicester entered Philip and Algernon in Grey’s Inn, a “first gesture” towards
a formal education. There is also an indication in the family accounting records that Sidney was outfitted
for school in 1634, viz., when Sidney was about eleven. “Apart from this there is no record of Algernon’s
having attended any school or university.” Carswell thinks that the rector of Penshurst, Dr. Henry
Hammond, may have tutored Sidney. Carswell, The Porcupine, pp. 9-10.
133

We know of the extensive intellectual resources at Sidney’s disposal in the grand Sidney Library, of which
we know he availed himself.252 The combination of Sidney’s aristocratic heritage, unusually cosmopolitan,
sophisticated upbringing, and thorough, humanist education undoubtedly created a man with an
exceptionally a-parochial view of the world, “free from that enthusiasm which so generally prevailed.”253
Interestingly, what people most noticed when Sidney was on trial for high treason in 1683 was that his lifelong prickly temperament was replaced by quietude.254 Whether this was something other than fatalism is
unclear.255 Scott argued that Sidney’s “dominating and indomitable personality” and his “chronic inability
to cooperate with or defer to the judgement of others” frustrated his ability to accomplish his goals.256
Perhaps this is too harsh. It was Sidney’s principles more than anything that seem to have gotten in his
way – something we can appreciate given his Ciceronianism, with which this chapter began.257
Sidney’s childhood corresponded with the dramatic events of the English civil wars. Indeed, one
can track his growth and development by reference to major events leading up to, during and after the
series of seventeenth-century deadly English crises. In 1621, James I summoned Parliament for the first
time in seven years, and then in 1622 he summarily dissolved it. Sidney was born the following year.258
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“He had inherited his father’s passion for study and one suspects he spent much of his time in the
Penshurst library.” Carswell, The Porcupine, p. 15.
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Meadley, Sidney Memoirs, p. 28.
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“Thus it was in his darkest moment that Sidney finally achieved the certainty and calm, and with it the
liberty, which had evaded him throughout his life.” Scott II, p. 300.
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Meadley reported, for example, that between his conviction for treason and his execution, Sidney
“consulted with some independent ministers, in preparing to meet his fate, and to them expressed a deep
remorse for whatever sins he had committed, and a firm confidence in the mercies of God. But, as his
religion consisted rather in the devout feelings of his own mind, than in any sort of external ceremonies,
he engaged none to attend him at the hour of death.” Meadley, Sydney Memoirs, p. 274.
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There is a letter to an anonymous friend, undated, in which Sidney confirmed this perspective; however, according to Worden and Scott, “it was forged in the early stages of the Sidney whig myth industry.”
Scott I, p. 148. The statement in question is the following: “Shall I renounce all my old principles, learn
the vile court arts, and make my peace by bribing some of them? Shall their corruption and vice be my
safety? Ah no, better is a life among strangers, than in my own country on such conditions. While I live I
will endeavour to preserve my liberty, or at least not consent to the destroying of it. I hope I shall die in
the same principles in which I have lived, and will live no longer than they can preserve me.” Algernon
Sidney to Unknown Recipient, undated, Blencowe, Sydney Papers, pp. 199-204, 200. Whether forged or
not, and while more biting and dramatic than Sidney’s writing, Sidney probably would have agreed with its
content.
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Sir Robert and Dorothy Percy Sidney had fifteen children, nine daughters and six sons, many of whom
died in childhood. Four sons and three daughters survived well into adulthood: Philip, Algernon, Robert,
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Within three years James I was dead, but not before his son Charles had married Louis XIII’s Catholic
younger sister, Henrietta-Maria, with a secret contractual commitment from the Stuarts that the future
queen would be allowed to practice her religion and raise her children as Catholics – a concession of
enormous political consequence.259
In 1626, when Sidney was three, the hated George Villiers, 1st Duke of Buckingham so favored by
the Stuarts, was impeached by Parliament.260 In retaliation for Buckingham’s imprisonment, the King
dissolved Parliament. But when Charles became desperate for money, Parliament was reconvened, one
result of which was the 1628 issuance of the Petition of Right.261 In Charles’ Answer, “’his majesty’
confirmed con brio that “the prerogative of a king is to be above all laws, for the good only of them that
are under the laws, and to defend the people’s liberties.’”262 Later that year Buckingham was
assassinated. Without delving into all of the details, this was also the timeframe in which the English sent
ships to France, but were unsuccessful in assisting the French Huguenot population in the coastal

Henry, Lady Dorothy Sidney Sutherland, known as Waller’s Saccharissa, Lady Lucy Sidney Pelham, and
Lady Diana Sidney. Dorothy Percy Sidney Correspondence, p. xviii (family tree); Blencowe, Sydney
Papers, p. xvi & n.*; Attachment I, Sidney family tree.
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As one author histrionically wrote, in arranging for his son Charles’ marriage to a Catholic princess,
James I “doomed the race of Stuart to everlasting exile.” Clayton, Personal Memoirs of Charles the
Second, p. 2. The nineteenth century essayist Isaac D’Israeli reported a second, earlier secret
commitment by Henrietta-Maria: “We must first bring forward a remarkable and unnoticed document in the
Embassies of Marshal Bassompierre. It is nothing less than a most solemn obligation contracted with the
Pope and her brother the King of France to educate her children as Catholics, and only to choose
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she performed this treasonable contract.” Disraeli maintained that this “piece of secret history opens the
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Literature, Vol. III, http://www.spamula.net/col/archives/2005/11/the_secret_hist.html (7-14-14), pub. by
Bibliobazaar (undated).
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The Petition of Right focused on the following grievances: (i) the King’s subjects should not be taxed
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fortification of La Rochelle, the stronghold and, until then, the safe haven for French Protestants.263
Needless to say this political move alienated Parliament and, one would suspect, particularly troubled the
Sidney/Percy family given its close ties with the French Huguenot community.
The first four years of Charles I’s reign were fraught with crises, albeit minor ones in comparison to
the tragedy unfolding on the Continent with the raging Thirty Years War. The English king remained
desperate for funds; Parliament was determined not to increase his treasury without important concessions,
including restrictions on the royal prerogative. In 1630 the royal heir was born, followed three years later by
a brother – Charles and James. With the demand for religious conformity in England and, for some,
persecution, the Great Migration of Puritans to Massachusetts Bay also took place in the 1620s and ‘30s.264
1629 marked the beginning of Charles’ Personal Rule, the eleven-year period during which the king refused
to convene and ruled without Parliament. Sidney and his older brother Philip left England in 1632
accompanying their father, appointed as British special envoy to Denmark.265 Sidney was nine.
In 1637, one year after Leicester became Ambassador Extraordinaire to France, the Scottish
Rebellion began, triggered by Charles’ determination to control religion in Scotland.266 Leicester had
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According to one scholar, Leicester’s decision in this timeframe to make “an apparently brilliant
investment” and buy a large plot of land on which to build a family mansion in London, not far from
Westminster and still known as Leicester Square, ultimately ruined the family financially. The Sidneys
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On the matter of religious conformity Charles can be viewed as clumsily following in the footsteps of
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hoped to fill the vacant position of Secretary of State, and was disappointed when the post was given to
Sir Henry Vane, his Kent neighbor.267 Once again, Leicester took Philip and Algernon abroad, this time for
three years. The King summoned Leicester back to England in 1639 when Charles was at York with an
army raised to oppose the rebellious Scots.268 Philip departed for the north in August 1640, serving as a
military commander in the regiment of his uncle, the 10th Earl of Northumberland. In such turbulent times
neither Philip nor Algernon could take a Grand Tour; but both had already lived, studied and traveled
abroad, likely with even greater cosmopolitan effect. When Leicester returned to Paris his older sons did
not accompany him. Alone at Penshurst and seventeen years old, Sidney immersed himself in the vast
Sidney Library; he also may have written his Essay on Love, first encountered Filmer’s Patriarcha, and
begun writing what later became known as Discourses Concerning Government.269
After eleven years of Personal Rule, Charles finally convened Parliament in late-1640 because of
his military defeat several months earlier by the Scottish Covenanters at Newbury, which left the north of
England under Scottish occupation.270 The Long Parliament lasted for the next twenty years
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notwithstanding civil war and various other interruptions, finally dissolving itself at Charles II’s Restoration
in 1660. It began, however, under the leadership of John Pym in Commons, supported in Lords by
Francis Russell, 4th Earl of Bedford and Robert Rich, 2nd Earl of Warwick (and son of Penelope Devereux
Rich, Sir Philip Sidney’s Stella, the inspiration for his famous Astrophel and Stella), all “like-minded critics
of Charles’s regime.” The King viewed these men as “an English Fifth Column, intent on exploiting the
Scottish crisis to advance its own political ends.”271 He was right. They attacked William Laud,
archbishop of Canterbury and principal adviser to the king and William Wentworth, the Earl of Strafford,
the two men considered to be behind the King’s decision-making that had emasculated Parliament and
intolerantly dealt with nonconformism.272 At this juncture, in 1641, Leicester finally completed his
Versailles post and left the Continent.273 He was appointed the new Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, an
extremely prestigious and politically important post vacated by the notoriously unpopular Strafford. In
what was to be the opening fray in another escalating conflict between Parliament and the King, Strafford
was arrested and convicted by Parliament of “endeavouring to subvert the ancient and fundamental laws
and government of His Majesty’s realms of England and Ireland, and to introduce an arbitrary and
tyrannical government against law.”274 Strafford was executed in May 1641, hence the job opening for
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Hampden, Arthur Haselrig, William Strode, and Denzil Holles), thereby fomenting if not triggering civil war.
See Master Pym His Speech in Parliament, on Wednesday, the fifth of January, 1641, Concerning the
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Majesty (London: 1641), FAU/Weiner Collection.
272
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For a detailed analysis of the rise and fall of Strafford, see Adamson, The Noble Revolt, Prologue
through Ch. 10, “Strafford Nemesis,” pp. 1-306. Strafford represented the undisguised threat to
Parliamentary participation in government in his “energetic, clear-sighted, and ruthless” exercise of the
king’s prerogative. The charges against Strafford included not only treason against the person of the king,
but the novel claim that he had committed treason against the commonwealth. “[N]one of the charges
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England’s senior executive in what was, in effect, the colony of Ireland.275
For complex reasons Leicester’s appointment was revoked.276 Instead, Charles “resolved to
confer the vacant post of Governor to the Prince” on Leicester, “the second of the Sidney family” to fill this
role. In an impressive replay of the honor bestowed upon his grandfather Sir Henry, Leicester was
considered the most qualified candidate for the critical role of overseeing the education of the royal heir.
“This nobleman was remarkable, even in his youth, for those studious habits which distinguished him in
after-life.”277 The appointment as the prince’s education “governor” provides a salient indicia of the quality
of Algernon’s education – home schooling – after he completed his studies in France. Unfortunately for
Leicester, in another series of events best described as poor timing, members of the House of Lords were
asked to sign a letter “reprobating” Commons for its failure to support the King’s military enterprise
against the Scottish incursion into England. Leicester could not bring himself to sign, whether because of
his disapproval of the King’s aggression towards the Scots, a futile effort to remain neutral, the
allegiances of his sons, or the personal offense taken at the King’s lack of respect towards him,
particularly with regard to his revoked appointment as Ireland’s Lieutenant Governor.278 Regardless of his
reasons, the consequence was that the King declined to act on Leicester’s appointment as the Prince’s
Governor, a juncture effectively marking Leicester’s retirement, i.e., his removal from events at Court and
permanent retreat to the family estate at Penshurst.279
In addition to targeting Strafford, in the early 1640s Parliament impeached, imprisoned, tried and
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executed Archbishop Laud.280 This dramatic political saga was underway when Leicester returned to
England. Laud was the leader and symbol of what became known as the Laudian movement that
reclaimed wealth and power for the Church of England and made every effort to stamp out nonconformism.281 Until his impeachment Laud was very close to King Charles.282 Unbeknownst to Laud and the
King, this moment in The Troubles constituted the beginning of the ascendency of nonconformism, with
the Church of England’s dismantlement, including the abolishment of episcopacy, (further) sale of Church
lands and possessions, imprisonment or exile of many bishops, and criminalization of the use of the Book
of Common Prayer.283 As was true for all of the major confrontations of the day, “while some MPs urged
Charles to reform the Church, as many welcomed his refusal to do so.”284 Leicester was not a religious
extremist in observance or advocacy although, as with his politics, it is not entirely clear exactly where he
stood religiously. “Leicester’s religious position was probably clear to him (he attended the Huguenot
temple at Charenton while serving as ambassador in France), but not apparently to others. As early as
1639 Laud had described Leicester as ‘a most dangerous practicing Puritan, none like… [him] in the
kingdom.’”285 Ironically, years later (1650s), the vicar of Penshurst, John Maudit, who Cromwell forced
Leicester to accept, would attack Leicester from the Penshurst pulpit for what he considered his “popish
ways.” Whatever his denomination or leaning, there is no question, however, that the “practice of his faith
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was an important element in Leicester’s family life at Penshurst.”286
The religious breadth of the Sidney Library suggests that its devotee had a religiously curious and
relatively open mind. Scholars who have studied the Sidney Library catalogue have described the 2nd
Earl’s collection and his voluminous notes as “primarily documents of a reader struggling to understand
what Richard Tuck described as ‘a European political world of the most extraordinary instability and
savagery, wracked by wars of religion and dynastic conflict.’”287 A significant component of the primary
documents in the Sidney Library were theological texts from most Christian religious perspectives,
including a host of critiques by scholars, kings and others. The Library also included an important
collection of canon law texts. Ecumenical in scope, the Library was amply supplied with religious books
in a number of languages, including all sorts of Bibles (sixteen different editions in eight languages), a raft
of Anglican books, but also Lutheran, Calvinist, monarchomach and nonconformist theological studies, as
well as Catholic works, Hebrew Bibles, and numerous controversial studies.288 Leicester’s heavily
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Hammond, the “brilliant and scholarly Royalist vicar” of Penshurst, fled. During the next six years there
were three vicars at Penshurst, one of whom was apparently an alcoholic. When the 1650 Parliament
began purging the Laudian ministry, it abolished the Sidney family’s rights of church patronage at
Penshurst. It then “intruded” another vicar, John Maudit, this time an evangelical minister who had
preached to the army, including Cromwell. Leicester would not go to Penshurst church after Maudit was
there, both because Maudit was being imposed on him and because he did not like the man. Instead, he
transferred his family’s devotional activities to a neighboring parish. Leicester became involved in a very
acrimonious dispute with Maudit, litigation that Leicester won in a court case of scandallum magnatum,
defaming a lord. This caused Maudit to write an appeal to Cromwell in which he characterized the “Earle
of Leycester” as “a wicked man a cruell oppressor & an enemie to Reformation”! Warkentin seemed to
suggest that the source of Leicester’s dispute with Maudit, and his unwillingness to attend Penshurst
while Maudit was vicar there, was in significant part a consequence of Leicester’s aristocratic pride.
While this was undoubtedly part of Leicester’s personality, in this case one cannot ignore the fact that
Hammond was an extraordinary scholar, described in the OED as a minister who can legitimately claim to
be the father of English biblical criticism. Leicester was a formidable intellectual in his own right, and was
no doubt extremely disturbed when his brilliant vicar was forced to leave Penshurst, particularly when he
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Power and Property at Penshurst, 1651-59,” Sidney Journal, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2006), pp. 1-13; “Hammond,
Henry (1605-1660),” DNB, Vol. XXIV, Leslie Stephen & Sidney Lee, eds. (New York: Macmillan and Co.
1890), pp. 242-46.
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For example, there were at least eleven books that were either written by, or associated with the
controversial Huguenot scholar David Blondel, whom Leicester likely encountered at the Paris Huguenot
Church, Charenton, and whom he suggested in a 1638 letter to Archbishop Laud that he should read! Id,
p. 9. On the various Bibles, see Warkentin, “Humanism in Hard Times,” pp. 245-46; The Library of the
Sidneys, pp.29, 86-87 (at least sixteen different editions of the Bible in six languages). Note, too, the
inclusion of texts by John Stillingfleet and the mathematician John Wilkins, men associated with the
141

annotated Bible is another indicia that he was devout; so is his devotion to biblical study.289 It is important
to recognize as well that the religious perspective of Algernon and no doubt Leicester were informed by
the ideas of a half-century earlier, when Protestant and (pagan!) classical ideals “coexisted with little
difficulty,” which was plainly not the case in this later period of the Long Parliament, with “the puritan
emphasis on man’s helplessness and depravity,” and the extreme fear verging on panic about imagined
cabals to force popery upon the English.290 At the same time, Leicester was not entirely tolerant; for
example, he had no respect for the Levellers, whom he characterized as men who were “invit[ing] the
people to overthrow all property as the original cause of sin, and by that to destroy all government,
magistracy, honesty, civility and humanity.” He also scoffed when categorized by Archbishop Laud, in
1639, as “a most dangerous practising Puritan, none like … [him] in the kingdom.” Other Englishmen
were suspicious of Leicester’s religious beliefs when he was observed attending Charenton, the major
Huguenot church in France and “the headquarters of French Protestantism.” Meanwhile, in the 1650s,
the “intruded” vicar of Penshurst, John Maudit, castigated Leicester for his “popish” ways!291
Returning to mid-1641 and Leicester’s return to England, until this time there had been a core of
politically moderate noblemen amenable to political compromise who had been part of the oppositional
junto challenging the autocratic actions of King Charles. This included Northumberland, Pembroke and
Leicester, all members of the Sidney/Percy clan.292 These men were less politically radical than some of
their allies, e.g., William Fiennes, Viscount Saye and Sele. Until the King “humbled” one of these men, the
Earl of Pembroke, by stripping him of his duties and refusing even to communicate with him directly, there
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was a possibility of political rapprochement. “[T]here had been bridges – fragile, true, but still crossable – on
which the men such as Northumberland, Pembroke, and Leicester might still have returned to a ‘king’s
party’ that was committed to maintaining England’s post-Triennial Act constitution, leaving behind the
radical ‘new Councillors’ like Warwick and Essex.” Unfortunately, “Charles himself foreclosed this option.
Motivated partly by a high-minded sense of justice, partly, it seems, by puerile pique, the king destroyed
these bridges, beginning with this exemplary punishment of the Earl of Pembroke.” This left a large
proportion of the pre-1640 Privy Council – “including some of his most powerful and longest-serving officers
of state – with no place to go, but onwards towards a quasi-republican England in which the king’s powers
were reduced to a state of irrelevancy.”293 Gradually but discernably MPs who had held important positions
of leadership became not only alienated from the King, but sufficiently radicalized to join with those who
sought a more extreme solution to the conflict than the imposition of limitations on Charles that had been
the thrust of moderates’ reformist efforts. The perception changed from a tolerable kingdom to a realm that
was “not only authoritarian, but ‘something far more draconian: a “Straffordian” autocracy, reliant for its
solvency, more than likely, on Spanish subsidies (as Strafford had sought in May 1640) or subventions from
such Catholic magnates as the Earl of Worcester.”294 Charles had joined his arbitrary rule with the threat of
Popery, an irredeemably menacing combination.
In 1641, when Algernon was eighteen, coincident with these events and the Sidneys’ return to
England, the Long Parliament passed the Grand Remonstrance, a long list of grievances against the
King.295 Sir Edward Coke, renowned jurist and then Speaker of the House of Commons, led this charge.
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distaste by country gentlemen of efforts to centralize government control. This was a generally uniform
perspective by local communities until the Grand Remonstrance and the dispute over the militia, which
led the nation to split, dividing local communities. At the same time, “All over England in the winter of
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The Grand Remonstrance perceived there to be “a malignant and pernicious design of subverting
fundamental laws and principles” of English government, the sources of which were Jesuit Papists, the
Bishops and corrupt part of the clergy, and court councilors and courtiers pursuing private ends in
promoting the interests of foreign princes and states.296 Meanwhile, in October 1641, Catholics in Ulster
rebelled, massacring about 3,000 Protestants and magnifying fears of a Popish Plot.297 A year later, in
1642, Parliament issued its Nineteen Propositions demanding a sharing of power with the King; in this
timeframe an English army was sent to Ireland to quash the rebellion. Algernon, now nineteen, and his
brother Robert, sixteen, participated in this grisly military action as troop commanders, serving under the
command of their twenty-three year old brother, Philip, who was the officer in charge of his father’s
regiment of horses.298 In his famous Response to the Nineteen Propositions, written by the king’s
councilors, Charles likely provided more legitimacy to Parliament’s claims for an independent political role
than he intended; indeed, according to Pocock, this royal articulation constituted the Machiavellian
Moment that triggered the English republican experiment.299 Without delving into the details of the Irish
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monarchy. Pocock viewed this as “a crucial document in English political thought, and among other
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uprising and its complex relationship with those English aristocrats who likely had qualms about
suppressing Irish opposition to a king who showed little respect for the English Parliament and his own
nobility, what is important is that by 1642 England had dissolved into war.300
In Pride’s Purge the historian David Underdown described the parliamentarians who collaborated
in military opposition to the King in 1642 as “a coalition…united by dislike of the Crown’s allegedly
arbitrary, illegal government and violations of ‘Liberty and Property’, of the court’s extravagance and
frivolity, of Arminian innovation in the Church, and of a vaguely sensed yet passionately feared popish
design to destroy English religious and political independence.”301 (Note that these cries were echoed –
indeed, mimicked – a century-plus later by the British American colonists.302) Professor John Adamson’s

things one of a series of keys which opened the door to Machiavellian analysis.” Id, p. 361; cf. David
Wootton, “Introduction,” Republicanism, Liberty and Commercial Society, 1649-1776, David Wootton, ed.
(Stanford University Press. 1994), p. 12. (“There was no space in this early seventeenth-century world for
civic humanism. That space was opened up, Pocock believed, by the Civil War. After the execution of
the king, James Harrington had sought to understand the course of modern history, and to do so had
turned to a study of the writings of Machiavelli.”) Henry Neville (1620-1694), a friend of Harrington, was
another Machiavellian; but contrary to the suggestion of scholars that Neville translated Machiavelli’s
Works, Neville’s very recent and careful expert, Gaby Mahlberg, concluded that this “may be the result of
a number of successive instances of the reliance of one historian on another, eventually turning
speculation into established ‘truth,’” an endemic problem that informs historical suppositions, including
important ones related to Sidney, such as the authorship of Court Maxims. See Ch. Two. Gaby
Mahlberg, Henry Neville. And. English republican culture in the seventeenth century (Manchester
University Press, 2009), pp. 210-11.
300

War was triggered in part by events in Ireland, notwithstanding the fact that there were those who “felt
that peace was essential for economic reasons, for without it trade would collapse, rich and poor would
be ruined, and in the inevitable ensuing disorders ‘greater oppression will certainly follow on men of the
best ranks.’” Smith, “The Impact on Government,” in The Impact of the English Civil War, p. 37. For
more details, see Appendix B.
301

Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 7. On English Arminianism, see Appendix B.

302

See, e.g., Bailyn’s description of the “chain-reacting personal polemics: strings of individual exchanges
… in which may be found heated personifications of the larger conflict.” To take one example of
innumerable, in a “Letter to the People of Pennsylvania,” 1760, the author (likely Joseph Galloway)
stated, “If Charles and James dispensed with penal statutes in order to introduce popery, your former
g_____rs [governors] have dispensed with the laws and fundamentals of your liberties and privileges in
order to introduce slavery.” Pamphlets of the Revolution, Vol. I 1750-1765, Bernard Bailyn, ed.
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 5, 269. See also John
Adams to Hezekiah Niles, Feb. 13, 1818, Founders Online, National Archives, last modified June 13,
2018, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-6854 (12-18-18), p. 233; copy in
Fau/Weiner Collection (“The people of America had been educated in an habitual affection for England as
their mother country; and while they thought her a kind and tender parent (erroneously enough, however,
for she never was such a mother) no affection could be more sincere. But when they found her a cruel
Beldam, willing like lady Macbeth, to ‘dash their brains out;’ it is no wonder if their filial affections ceased
and were changed into indignation and horror.”)
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explanation is more nuanced. In his view, in 1640 there were powerfully led groups in both Lords and
Commons who believed that they had no choice but to deal with Charles I’s regime and a more radicalized, religiously enthusiastic group (indeed, several groups) who sought a “Venetianized commonwealth,”
with a weak, “doge-like” king. Within two years these factions united against Charles.303 Among the
grievances that bound the men together, most of whom were members of the high aristocracy, was
resentment for “what they perceived as the ousting of the ‘ancient nobility’ from its proper place in the
king’s counsels.”304 Enormous effort was made to persuade Charles of the error of his ways; the English
nobility understood that the historic resort to rebellion was no longer viable. Noble arsenals were small,
and the execution of the 2nd Earl of Essex after his rising against Elizabeth proved that this sort of option
was unrealistic. The English leadership also turned to the courts, e.g., when the MP John Hampden
unsuccessfully challenged the unilateral imposition by the King of the infamous Ship Money tariff. When
the case was decided in the King’s favor of the King, the possibility of protection by means of legal
redress closed; instead, they adjudged there to be a “debasement of the law.”305
The majority of the parliamentarian gentry fought the war for limited, largely political, constitutional
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In 1640 Charles introduced the Church of England’s agreed-upon Canons, Orders, Ordinances, and
Constitutions, and stated, on the subject of Popery, “Yet, as We have cause to fear, ayme at Our own
Royall person, and would fain have Our good Subjects imagine that We Our Self are perverted, and do
worship God in a superstitious way, and that we intend to bring in some alteration of the Religion here
established. Now how far We are from that, and how utterly We detest every thought thereof, We have
by many publike Declarations, and otherwise upon sundry occasions, given such assurance to the world,
as that from thence We also assure Our Self, that no man of wisdom and discretion could ever be so
beguiled as to give any serious entertainment to such brain-sick jealousies.” Etc. Constitutions and
Canons Ecclesiasticall; Treated upon by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, Presidents of the
Convocations of the respective Provinces of Canterbury and York, and the rest of the Bishops and
Clergie of those Provinces; And Agreed upon with the Kings Majesties License in their several Synods
begun at London and York. 1640. (London: Robert Barker, 1640), FAU/Weiner Collection, p.4.
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Adamson, The Noble Revolt, p. 31. Notwithstanding their high aristocratic pedigree, Sidney/Percy
family and extended-family members were often at the forefront of challenges to the almighty power of
the monarch. For more details on the alienation of the nobility, and the connection between poetry, prose,
politics and the Sidney/Percy family, see Appendix B.
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Adamson, The Noble Revolt, pp. 30-35. On the political context, there is a raft of scholarship. See,
e.g., Sommerville, Royalists And Patriots; Glenn Burgess, Absolute Monarchy And The Stuart
Constitution; Christopher Thompson, “The Origins Of The Politics of The Parliamentary Middle Group,
1625-29,” Transactions Of The Royal Historical Society, 5th Ser. (1972), Vol. 22, pp. 71-86; Richard Cust,
Charles I and the Aristocracy, 1625-1642 (Cambridge University Press, 2013) Kevin Sharpe, The
Personal Rule of Charles I (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 220, 224, 268, 597-8, 8234.On the ship money case, see, e.g., M. D. Gordon, “The Collection of Ship Money in the Reign of
Charles I,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 3rd ser., 4 (1910), pp. 141-62. On the legal
theme, see Hart, The Rule of Law, 1603-60.
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and associated legal goals; some also sought to moderately reform the Church of England. One can say,
however, as a contemporary did, that war “arose from ‘all the united prerogatives and exorbitances of an old
monarchy, and the defence of the people to reduce it to its just limits.’” Most of the King’s opponents had no
desire for radical reform; to the contrary, the goal was to leave “the essential framework of government and
society intact.” After all, the king’s opponents were, “above all else, country gentlemen.”306 There was,
however, a parliamentary minority whose ambitions were much greater, and who proved to be remarkably
powerful. These men sought political and social justice. More profoundly, they were intent upon “a total and
complete reconstruction of Church and State in the interests of ‘Godly Reformation,’” the genesis of the welldeserved appellation, the Puritan Revolution.307 But if one finds the truly revolutionary nature of the Civil War
to be religious, then one must conclude that neither Sidney nor other members of his family were
revolutionaries.308 The Sidney/Percy clan lacked religious enthusiasm. Their “enthusiasm” was a bona fide
belief in the inclusive cause of international Protestantism. The Puritan bent of the Godly Reformation and its
intolerant attachment to only one particular form of Protestant worship was anathema to this family. The
absence of such an allegiance was a trademark of the Sidney/Percy clan’s religious observance generally
and Algernon’s ideas specifically.309
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Harris, Rebellion, p. 9, quoting the parliamentary general John Lambert; Underdown, Pride’s Purge pp.
7, 29.
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“’Religion was not the thing at first contested for’ in the Civil War; yet Cromwell added his well-known
sequel: ‘but God brought it to that issue at last.’” Id, p. 9. It is interesting to note in this regard that as
early as the 1630s Cromwell was a lay conventicle preacher, giving sermons secretly in an underground
church. According to Morrill, Cromwell’s “obsessive Biblicism” was “intense and immediate, a personal
encounter between a man convinced he was a divine instrument and a God who spoke in a still small
voice through his prophets and saints.” John Morrill, “How Oliver Cromwell Thought,” Liberty, Authority,
Formality, Ch. 5, pp. 89-111, 89-90, 110-11. This is reminiscent of Martin Luther’s experience.
308

Pearl makes the same point about the leaders of the non-doctrinaire middle group in Commons in the
critical 1643-49, led by Oliver St. John, and including Samuel Browne (St. John’s agent and cousin), John
Crewe, William Pierrepoint, Sir John Evelyn, Nathaniel Fiennes (second of William Fiennes, Viscount
Saye and Sele). “[L]oyalty to one form of Church government was not the cause that bound them…
[T]hey did not fight for a form of church government – that was only as the pillars of the tabernacle, ‘the
shell to the kernel.’” “The ‘Royal Independents’ in the English Civil War,” pp. 73, 91, 95.
309
The same observation can be made with respect to many of those radically opposed to Charles II’s
reign, including the Rye House Plot participants. If Richard Greaves is correct that religious issues were
crucial in drawing people into that conspiracy, this would have excluded Sidney from the net. See Richard
L. Greaves, Secrets of the Kingdom. British Radicals from the Popish Plot to the Revolution of 1688-1689
(Stanford University Press, 1992); but see the critique of Secrets of the Kingdom in Paul Seaward’s review, The English Historical Review, Vol. 110, No. 439 (Nov. 1995), pp. 1275-76 (e.g., “More disappointing is Greaves’s failure to analyse more deeply the nature of the conspirators and their conspiracies.”).
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This was a war that split cities, communities, neighbors, and families. Inevitably, most of the
English nobility chose sides.310 An early Sidney biographer noted, “It is remarkable indeed, that of all the
nearest relatives and connexions of Lord Leicester, no two individuals followed precisely the same course
in the political contentions of that period, though it cannot, with fairness, be imputed to any one of them,
unless we except his eldest son, Lord Lisle [Algernon’s brother Philip], whose conduct is the most
questionable, that he acted otherwise than upon principle.”311 In the Sidney/Percy family, Algernon and
Philip fought on behalf of Parliament. Their younger brother Robert sat out the war, first because
Leicester had procured a military commission for him serving the Netherlands’ States-General before the
Civil War broke out; he rose to the rank of colonel by 1648. Later, during Charles II’s exile, “Robert Sidney
was often with the King, and shared too many of his tastes.”312 Their brother-in-law, Robert Spencer, Lord
Sunderland, took up arms for the King.313 Sidney became a colonel in the parliamentary forces,
reorganized into the New Model in the 1644-45 period. He was seriously wounded at the Battle of
Marston Moor (July 2,1644), the deadliest battle of the war that was won by the combined Scottish and
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For an interesting discussion of how the gentry and nobility made these decisions and the
consequence after the Civil War, see chapter two of Underdown’s Pride’s Purge entitled, “The Civil War
and the Communities.”
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Blencowe, Sydney Papers, p. xxxii.

312
When England declared war on Holland in 1665 Robert returned to England, where he “spent a good
deal of time at Court, but he did not manage to retain the royal favour and considered himself badly used
by his old comrades in exile.” Cartwright, Sacharissa, pp. 192-93. Plumb described Charles II as a man
without the “single-minded dedication to the business of government” necessary to establish a strong
monarchy. “It was the unbuttoned ease, the air of summer relaxation that he brought to the monarchy,
rather than his sexual license, that undermined the awe and respect of his courtiers, servants, and
supporters and provided so much grist to his enemies and to those who wished to belittle the monarchy.”
Whether Algernon’s brother Robert fit this description, it was actually “the behaviour of Charles II’s close
associates” that was “wanton, obstreperous, and lewd,” as well as “exhibitionist.” Both Charles II’s Court
in exile and back in England after the Restoration “lacked confidence, a sense of grandeur, all belief in its
own inevitable destiny. The King and his courtiers were haunted by the thought that they might be back in
Brussels, Cologne, Paris, or Strasbourg. This and the air of deceit, the lack of candour about his religion,
and the monstrous web of suspicion that his prevarications inevitably created, prevented that sense of
identity between monarch and men of affairs that was an essential feature of centralizing monarchy.”
Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in England 1675-1725, pp. 14-15.
313

Lord Sunderland was an English peer who died at the Battle of Newbury in September 1643.
Sunderland’s wife, Dorothy Sidney, was Algernon, Robert, Philip and Henry’s sister. Dorothy was an
intellectual in her own right, but may have been best known as the extraordinary woman to whom the
poet Edmund Waller addressed his enchanting and popular verse, “Sacharissa.” Blencowe, Sydney
Papers, p. xxxii; Cartwright, Sacharissa, p. 192. All of this harkens back to the Essex Circle phenomenon.
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English parliamentary forces, one division of which was led by Cromwell.314 Sidney exhibited both
“gallantry” in action and a “reckless bravery” reported in five different parliamentary journals.315 Thus
began Sidney’s elevation to the pantheon of famous (and infamous) family members whom he admired
and emulated.
Meanwhile Leicester was the one family member who made conspicuous but ultimately
ineffectual efforts to remain neutral.316 A manifest exception to the norm, Sidney’s father neither declared
allegiance with the royalists nor took overt action in support of the parliamentarians. As described, albeit
in a later context, Leicester “had cooled down into an embodiment of the popular idea of aristocratic
apathy.”317 Some authors attribute this neutrality to Leicester’s propensity for indecision. It seems more
likely that it was a conscious, deliberate choice to try to straddle an impossible fence, ultimately
necessitating sequestration at the family estate at Penshurst.318

314

The New Model Army “got rid of cautious aristocratic generals like the Earls of Essex and
Manchester,” and created within it a spirit of “intoxicating” millenarianism. Underdown, Pride’s Purge,
p. 14. On the gruesome battle of Marston Moor, see Appendix B.
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E.g., “Colonel Sydney, son to the Earl of Leicester, charged with much gallantry at the head of my
lord’s regiment of horse, and came off with much honour, though with many wounds, to the grief of my
lord, and many others, who is since gone to London for the cure of his wounds.” Ash’s Intelligence from
the Armies in the North, No. 6, Sydney Memoirs , p. 18 n.*; “Colonel Sidney charged with much gallantry
in the head of my Lord Manchester’s regiment of horse, and came off with many wounds, the true badges
of his honour.” “Algernon Sidney,” DNB, Vol. LII, p.203.
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See, e.g., “The Journal of the Earl of Leicester,” Feb. 9, 1646, Blencowe, Sydney Papers, pp. 6-12.
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Blencowe, Sydney Papers, p. xxxii; Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, p. 186.
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There is an issue here as to whether Leicester’s actions were personal, political or both. He was a
peer of the realm, a member of the House of Lords, which traditionally served as the bulwark, the
mainstay of the throne. No doubt in that capacity Leicester had been promised a leadership role in
Ireland. The king then reneged on this promise for reasons that are not worth detailing here, causing
great anguish, embarrassment, and cost to Leicester, who petitioned the Queen, to no avail, asking “what
I have done to alter his Majestye’s just and gratious purpose towards me”? Leicester did not even receive
the courtesy of a response. When subsequently asked to stand with the Lords who supported the king,
Leicester declined. Indeed, “Lord Leicester was the only peer at Oxford, who refused to subscribe” to “a
letter, which was to be signed by all the peers in the King’s service, ‘disavowing and reprobating all the
acts done by the pretended authority of Parliament,’ according to Clarendon’s History of the Rebellion.
Leicester responded to a request that he sign this document with a letter that provided the following
explanation: “I have now no way so modest to express it, as by desiring humbly the liberty of excusing
myself from the subscription, wherein the name of so inconsiderable a person as I am, cannot be
missed.” Blencowe, Sydney Papers, pp. xxix-xxx. Perhaps the most generous way to think of Leicester’s
political stance is that he was a moderate who through neutralism sought “to preserve the ordered fabric
of society.” In considering a similar position among members of the English gentry, Underdown
explained, “For most of these men, the explanation for their hesitations lies not so much in their being
especially untrustworthy or unreliable, as in their preference for an uncommitted independence, in which
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Sidney went to London to recuperate from his battle injuries. In April 1645 he was recommissioned by Lord Fairfax, then military leader (lord general) of the parliamentarians, to be a colonel
of horse in the New Model; however, Sidney was unable to remain in military service because of his
injury.319 Given the riveting political and other issues associated with the civil war historians often do not
dwell on the deadly nature of the conflict. A fair estimate of the mortality rate is 180,000, three to six
percent of England’s population at the time, a percentage comparable to British losses during World War I
and likely more than the percentage of British casualties in World War II.320 But this war took place almost
entirely in England. The English countryside was devastated and civil disorder was the norm, along with
acute and increasing poverty. “But neither death nor destruction is sufficient measure of the chaos
created by civil war. The bonds that held society together were everywhere strained, and often broken.”
As stated in the Act ordering the king to be tried for high treason, “Charles Stuart…hath prosecuted [a
wicked design] with fire and sword, levied and maintained a cruel war in the land against the Parliament
and kingdom, whereby the country hath been miserably wasted, the public treasure exhausted, trade

the tight bonds of neighbourliness and kinship that bound together the local establishments, counted for
more than support for party policies.” Underdown, Pride’s Purge, pp. 56-57.
319

“Algernon Sidney,” DNB, Vol. LII, p. 203. Carswell stated that it was on March 18, 1645 that Sidney’s
name was approved to be colonel of one of eleven cavalry regiments in the New Model Army, reporting
directly to Cromwell. Sidney received orders in April to join his regiment for the campaign that led to the
battle of Naseby, decisive in making Parliament “sovereign in England.” Because of his injury, he was
unable to do so. Carswell also made the interesting point that there were stages between 1642 and 1646
whereby Parliament increasingly “exercised the sovereignty formerly wielded by the King” which was “all
based on the legal doctrine of privilege. That Parliament had privileges was undoubted. So was the doctrine that each House could define (and alone define) its privileges. Therefore anything a House chose to
do could be said to be its privilege, and resistance to the House’s decision was a breach of privilege
punishable by the House at its absolute discretion.” In short, Parliament was exercising absolutism. John
Carswell, The Porcupine: The Life of Algernon Sidney (London: John Murray, 1989), pp. 43-45 & n.†.
320

Charles Carlton, “The Impact of Fighting,” The Impact of the English Civil War, pp. 17-31; cf.
Kishlansky, A Monarchy Transformed, p. 160: “The Wars of the three Kingdoms was a devastating
experience that marked generations of Britons. The combat that began with the Scottish invasion of
England in 1640 quickly spread throughout the archipelago. There were permanent military
establishments in Ireland and Scotland and near-continuous warfare in England for four years beginning
in 1642 Perhaps as many as one out of every eight adult males participated directly in the fighting;
perhaps twice that number were involved in sieges. Civilians frequently fared worse than combatants, as
private property was commandeered, casual violence grew, and taxes increased to as much as ten times
pre-war levels. Though atrocity stories were stock-in-trade of the propaganda distributed by both sides,
there can be no doubt that some of the outrages described took place and that many which took place
were never described. The number of casualties remains speculative, though the proportion was
probably higher than in any British military engagement until the First World War.”
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decayed, thousands of people murdered, and infinite other mischiefs committed.”321
Not only were families and communities split, but the government was split, too. Charles
continued to claim supreme authority in both civil and military affairs, carrying his executive, including the
Privy Council, with him – first establishing headquarters in York and then at Oxford. Parliament built an
entirely new executive, pressured by the Army, which was now acting as an overt political force. The
“Army created for the defence of Parliament found that its purposes could be achieved only by forcing
Parliament to reform itself.” While it retained ultimate power and authority, Parliament delegated specific
functions to a variety of committees, including the military Committee of Safety.322 There were also
committees to raise money for the parliamentary war effort, including a draconian group that confiscated
estates of royalists and Catholics (deemed “delinquents”); and there were religious committees – the
Committee for Scandalous Ministers that ejected royalist clergy from the Church of England, and the
Committee for Plundered Ministers which provided “godly” support for clergy expelled from royalist areas
of the country. Local governments similarly functioned by powerful committees that were loathed by the
populace. All of these committees were given extralegal powers, outside of common law. For example,
they could search property and seize goods, and imprison without establishing cause and without a trial.
“No monarch had ever claimed such complete freedom from the law.” It is therefore not surprising that by
1647 or the year after, parliamentary rule, by this time completely dominated by Cromwell and the
Roundheads, was “widely seen as far more tyrannical than Charles I had ever been.”323
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John Walter, “The Impact on Society: A World Turned Upside Down?” Morrill, The Impact of the
English Civil War, pp. 104-122, 110; Hill, The World Turned Upside Down; Kishlansky, A Monarchy
Transformed, p. 160; “An Act of the Commons. Of England Assembled in Parliament for Erecting of an
High Court of Justice for the Trying and Judging of Charles Stuart, King of. England,” Jan. 6, 1649, The
Trial of Charles I, A Documentary History, David Lagomarsino & Charles T. Wood, ed. (Hanover, NH &
London: Dartmouth College Press, 1989), p. 25.
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The Committee of Safety was later replaced by the Committee of Both Kingdoms when Scotland
entered the war, which, in 1648, became the Committee of Derby House, where it met. Smith, “The
Impact on Government,” The Impact of the English Civil War, p. 39; “Committee for Both Kingdoms,”
Stephen C. Manganiello, The Concise Encyclopedia of the Revolutions and Wars of England, Scotland,
and Ireland, 1639-1660 (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2004), p. 124, http://books.google.com/books?id
=an-eXXA3DBMC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA2#v=one page&q= Committee%20of%20Both%20Kingdoms&f=false
(12-13-13).
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It was in this timeframe that the so-called Putney Debates took place in which the Army Council
debated issues of constitutionality, including the Levellers’ democratic ideas that were rejected by
Cromwell as well as his son-in-law and political protégé Henry Ireton. Henry Marten, a regicide and
recognized republican, was one of the parliamentarians who supported Leveller doctrines and the
Leveller leader John Lilburne. In the 1649 to 1653 period, Sir Henry Vane the Younger was the political
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With the Parliamentary victories at Marston Moor and Nasby in 1644 and 1645, followed by the
surrender of King Charles in 1646, the war wound down; but royalists continued to fight, and the second
phase of war lasted for several more years. Algernon was offered a position as colonel of one of the
eleven cavalry regiments of the New Model Army but, again, because of the lingering effects of his injury
he was unable to serve. He accepted the governorship of Chichester, a garrison near the southern coast
of England proximate to Petworth, the estate of his adored uncle, the 10th Earl of Northumberland, a
property at which the King’s four youngest children were in custody; this was also near the Pelhams’
estate, the parliamentary family whose heir, John Pelham, married Sidney’s sister Lucy. Algernon
officially left the army. In late 1645 at the age of 23 he won election to the Long Parliament.324
Notwithstanding the historiographic perception of Sidney as a radical, it is very important to
understand that consistent with the position of his uncle, the 10th Earl, who was a leader in the House of

opponent of Henry Marten on this issue; on the other hand, he cooperated with Marten on other issues.
(Note, too, that “the witty, erratic Henry Marten, with his mistresses and his cheerful spells in a debtors’
prison,” was “not even Puritan[].” As Carswell stated, “Nobody could have been less of a puritan than
Marten, and his notorious womanizing earned him the double distinction of being denounced as a
‘whoremaster’ by both Charles I and Cromwell.” But Marten was an important member of Commons and
a leading regicide. Somehow Marten escaped death at the Restoration. While I am unsure, Carswell
believed that the “serious-minded Algernon” would not have approved of Marten; they did sometimes
work together. Smith, “The Impact on Government,” The Impact of the English Civil War, pp. 39-40;
Carswell, The Porcupine, Ch. V, “The Great Business,” pp. 54-70 (but note Carswell’s incorrect
understanding of republicanism and the Commonwealthmen, as discussed in Chs. Two and Three, infra,
based in part on a reliance on Court Maxims); see generally Underdown, Pride’s Purge, Ch. IV, “The
Collapse of the Independent Party” and pp. 8, 76, 86-87; Rowe, Sir Henry Vane the Younger, pp. 31-32,
152-56. On the Levellers generally, see David Wootton, “Leveller Democracy and the Puritan
Revolution,” The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, pp. 412-42. On Henry Marten, see
Sarah Barber, A Revolutionary Rogue: Henry Marten and the English Republic (Phoenix Mill: Sutton
Publishing. 2000).
324
Sidney actually entered active service in the army one more time, joining his brother Philip, Lord Lisle,
who had been appointed Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. Because of the complicated relationship between the
parliamentary military and civilian leaders appointed in Ireland, further muddled by the increasing power of
the New Model Army in Commons, Lisle and Sidney were not supported with the military forces they had
been promised, and were ultimately forced to leave Ireland soon after they arrived. Sidney was then
appointed governor and, later, lieutenant of Dover, which provided an income to him for a number of years;
but he experienced similar military-political difficulties that finally led to his military retirement. Once in
Parliament, on Nov. 1, 1647, Sidney was named to the Committee for the Affairs of Ireland in the Star
Chamber. Carswell speculated that had the New Model troops been sent to Ireland with the Sidneys, as
promised, “history might have taken a different course,” as the New Model may have been preoccupied
with Ireland and not have taken the king out of the hands of Parliament or marched on London. West,
DCG, Forward, p. xxix; “Algernon Sidney,” DNB, Vol. LII, pp.203-204; Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst,
p. 151; House of Commons Journal Volume 5:1 November 1647, Journal of the House of Commons:
volume 5: 1646-1648, British History Online, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx? compid=25215&
strquery=Sydney (2-24-14); Carswell, The Porcupine, pp. 52-53.
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Lords, and likely coincident with the ideas of Leicester, the young Algernon Sidney almost certainly
belonged to the “middle” or moderate group of politicians who straddled Lords and Commons seeking to
reach a settlement with the King in 1647 and, again, in 1648.325 Even at this early stage of his political
career Sidney likely did not fit a stereotype. Northumberland, Leicester and Sidney were not Puritans or,
for that matter, religious idealists or extremists of any stripe.326 Neither was Algernon a conservative
country gentleman. He was a high nobleman with a cosmopolitan outlook and the associated aristocratic
attributes of military experience and intellectual prowess.327 In view of his close relationship with his uncle
and the conflicted views of his father, it is probable that Sidney comfortably sought the middle ground. As
Worden stated, “Our rare sights of him in the later 1640s suggest that he may then have been closer to
his father’s neutralism than to the republicanism for which the later Algernon was notorious.”328 How wide
a swing that represents is an interesting question.
In Pride’s Purge Underdown shed further light on the complex and shifting parliamentary
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The parliament that went to war against the king in 1642 was a coalition of two “contradictory” groups,
one “radical and revolutionary,” the other “moderate and reformist.” This complex political alignment
“accounts for most of our difficulties when we try to grasp the central meaning of the Puritan Revolution.”
Many active MPs were Puritans, “religious idealists who strained towards the Godly Reformation.” Pace
Archbishop Laud, Leicester was not a Puritan, and neither. was his son Algernon. But as Underdown
described, those who were, were Puritans “with one half of their minds.” At the same time they were
proper and conservative country gentlemen, members of “the old-boy network of the Universities and the
Inns of Court, reverencing Parliament, the Common Law and its new bible, Coke’s Institutes. In short,
although opposed to the king, these men were “firmly attached to that stable system of interlocking
hierarchies of which they themselves formed the summit.” Underdown, Pride’s Purge, pp. 7-8. On the
subject of Leicester, there is a certain amount of ambiguity about his political views; he is consistently
described as “[a]t heart a natural,” associated with “that moderate party of the Presbyterians, of which his
brother-in-law, the Earl. Of Northumberland, may be considered the leader.” Id, p. 48; Blencowe,
Preface, Sydney papers, p. xxxi.
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Apparently, the King was wary of appointing Leicester as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland because he
viewed him as a Puritan, a characterization at which Leicester scoffed. Scott I, p. 84. “And I have many
reasons to thinke that for my going to Charenton the Archbishop [Laud] did me all the ill offices he could
to the King; representing me as a Puritan, and consequently in his method an enemy of monarchical
government.” Blencowe, Sydney Papers, pp. xvi-xvii n. † & Note A (manuscript copied from Leicester’s
commonplace book, Jan. 5, 1640).
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“The insignia of the Garter, worn daily at the king’s express command, proclaimed its wearer’s fellowship with the nobility’s inner elite, his possession of both social rank and royal favour – the two preconditions of major power in the England of Charles I. To Algernon Percy, 10th Earl of Northumberland,
however, these marks of princely esteem signified something more than simply personal accomplishment.
They witnessed a revolution in the fortunes of a dynasty.” Adamson, The Noble Revolt, p. 1.
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Blair Worden, “The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney,” Journal of British Studies, Vol. 24, No.
1 (Jan. 1985), pp. 1-40, 6. Of course, one of the reasons for the “notoriety” is the attribution of Court
Maxims to Sidney, along with Sidney’s execution. The latter cannot be denied; the former is.
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allegiances after the war, i.e., over the 1645 to ‘48 period, precisely when Sidney became an MP. Scott
also approaches the issue, albeit with some trepidation, in his two-volume intellectual biography of
Sidney. These parliamentary allegiances were created out of the earlier war and peace parties, and were
loose coalitions that gradually evolved into the Independent and Presbyterian parties. “One major
component of the Independent alliance between 1645 and 1648 was the middle group” who wanted
peace, but not “a peace of surrender.”329 It was this middle group to which Sidney likely belonged.330 In
Lords, the middle group was “well represented” by, among others, Sidney’s much-admired uncle,
Algernon Percy, the 10th Earl of Northumberland, described by the editor of Leicester’s personal journal
as leader of the moderate Presbyterians.331 The moderates wanted “to tie the King’s hands by a
surrender of his militia power, preferably for twenty years; to subject his choice of ministers to
parliamentary approval, with royalists disqualified; and to obtain a clear-cut abolition of episcopacy and
the establishment of a Presbyterian system for at least three years. Few of them were enthusiastic about
Presbyterianism…. Above all, they wanted a final settlement, a restoration of legality.”332 In an October
1648 letter to the Duke of Buckingham Sidney wrote, “for now that all men are inclined to a peace with the
king and his party, much more gentleness is to be expected than at another time.”333 The politically
peripatetic Marchamont Nedham described these men as “the Johns of all trades in religion,” men who
“had no special system of politics … who tried to act as a ‘balancing power’ between the king and
Parliament.”334 The irony of the comment cannot go unmentioned. As Paul Rahe noted about the
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Id, pp. 62, 71.
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To better understand where Sidney stood politically, to the extent that the evidence might permit,
would require the study, particularly, of Parliamentary voting records and unpublished correspondence,
valuable work not considered material to the primary issues under consideration here. The most detailed
assessment is contained in Scott I, Chs. 5 & 6, “Diplomacy and War 1635-48,” and “Republic 1649-53,”
pp. 75-112. The one difficulty with Scott’s assessment is that it frequently relied on Court Maxims as a
statement of Sidney’s views, a matter of dispute. See Charnoff, “A Second Look at the Question of Who
Authored Court Maxims”; see also Carswell, The Porcupine, pp. 45-53.
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Blencowe, Sydney Papers, p. xxxi. According to Weston and Greenberg, Robert Rich, the second
Earl of Warwick, and Sir Thomas Barrington were two other important peers in the middle group. Weston
and Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns, p. 70.
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Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p 105.
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Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, pp. 24-25.
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On the complex makeup of the “middle group,” and the critical lesson that Sidney likely learned from the
middle group’s failure to find a viable political compromise, see Appendix B.
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mercurial and exceedingly prolific Nedham, “No darker pot ever insulted a kettle.”335 Nedham was
notoriously “a man of dapper conscience and dexterity extraordinaire” who a contemporary described as
“transcendently gifted in opprobrious and treasonable Droll.”336 A friend of Milton, he “remodeled” his politics 180 degrees repeatedly, first supporting Cromwell and the Roundheads in the newsbook (the first
newspapers) Mercurius Britanicus (1643-46), pivoting and editing the Cavalier newsbook Mercurius
Pragmaticus (1646-50) to “write his majesty back into his throne”; he then swiveling again to Mercurius
Politicus (1650-60) first on behalf of the Rump, then Cromwell’s nominated Parliament, next the Protectorate, and then the Rump twice again.337 As to the middle or moderate 1645-48 parliamentary group,
these men were effectively straddling the war and peace parties as an immediate goal; but in the long
term they were politically more conservative and much less religiously radical than either other group.338
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Paul A. Rahe, “An Inky Wretch: The Outrageous Genius of Marchamont Nedham,” The National
Interest, No. 70 (Winter 2002/03), pp 55-64, 59.
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Id, pp. 58-59, citing James Health, A Brief Chronicle of the Late Intestine War, the second impression
greatly enlarged (London: n.p., 1663), p. 492. For a detailed, insightful account of Milton, Marvell, and
Nedham, and their literary and political connections and distinctiveness, see Worden’s Literature and
Politics in Cromwellian England.
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While Rahe characterized Nedham as “first and foremost a practical man,” he was also an intellectual
journalist, a “gifted scrivener” who was “venal” and “mercenary,” fascinated with Machiavelli and interest
theory. Nedham was particularly hostile to the “enforced uniformity and discipline sought variously by
Anglican Royalists and Presbyterian divines.” In 1650 Nedham’s religious radicalism was reflected in a
statement he wrote in Mercurius Politicus: “Churchmen of all Religions and Nations are of the same
humor, to imbroile the world up to the ears in Blood rather than part with one Tittle of that Power and
Profit, which may serve to satisfie the avarice and Ambition of their Interest and order.” Per Rahe,
Nedham and his parliamentary allies “threw their weight behind the Independents,” but in their “radical
interpretation of the Protestant doctrine of the priesthood of all believers and contending that ‘with God
there is no respect of Persons’, they harbored intentions regarding the Christian religion far more subversive than their godly republican allies ever imagined.” In summarizing the man, Rahe concluded, “It was
almost as if moral and political dexterity was for Nedham itself a matter of principle.” Rahe, “An Inky
Wretch,” pp. 58-63 & citations at p. 58 n. 10, including Blair Worden, “Marchamont Nedham and the
Beginning of English Republicanism,” Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776
(Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 45-81, 60-68, 71. For a contemporary opinion of Nedham, see
Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, p. 30.
338
As we will see, the matter of religion was inextricably tied to the issue of the role of the king. At the
beginning of the war Parliament’s at most modest interest in religion was expressed in an ordinance
prohibiting stage plays; but by the 1645-46 timeframe, religion took center stage. “The Long Parliament
was in the end divided by the religious dispute of Presbyterians and Independents, which involved
religious practices such as the replacement of the Book of Common Prayer with the adoption of the
Directory, new laws for the ordination of ministers, and other new religious rules, and religious issues
came to dominate Parliamentary proceedings.” It is important to understand that “[b]oth main political
groups, Presbyterians and Independents, included men who had a wide range of religious views,
explaining why the term Independent had a different meaning in its religious context than in its political
one. There were moderate Presbyterians and moderate Independents. In some cases, such as when
the Independents grouped around the young Sir Henry Vane, no one knew what their religious opinions
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Ultimately, the ability of the Independent party and the moderates to control political decisionmaking collapsed when the king escaped from army custody at the end of 1647, fracturing the delicate
Independent alliance that jockeyed between the more extreme peace and war factions as well as the
religiously extreme views in the Long Parliament. This has a strikingly familiar ring, as the king repeated a
foolhardy strategy that pushed the moderates towards a more radical solution. Efforts at a negotiated peace
that would preserve the monarchy proved illusory.339 It is unclear exactly where Sidney fit in this delicate
equation. But we can fairly deduce from what we otherwise know that Sidney was likely a moderate who
was also a maverick, often aligned with but independent from both the Independents and the Presbyterians.340 As Worden stated, “Sidney valued his independence too highly to allow anyone to count on his

were, ‘perhaps not even Sir Harry himself.’” Underdown, Pride’s Purge, pp. 15-23, 71-72; Valerie Pearl,
“The ‘Royal Independents’ in the English Civil War,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 5th ser.,
v. 18 (1968), pp. 69-96; Scott I, pp. 78-828.
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Underdown elaborated further on the pivotal role played by the middle group in the rise and demise of
the Independents, and the pivotal issue of politics, not religion. Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 75. See
Appendix B.
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Scott pointed out that Sidney allied with the Saye/Northumberland group that straddled Commons and
Lords and attempted to reach a settlement with the king in 1647 and again in 1648; note, too, that the
jurist and politician John Selden was a part of the political “middle group” in the 1646-1648 timeframe,
which was the context for Sidney’s familiarity with and “charming” anecdotes about Selden. Scott
declined to enter the scholarly debate about “the nature and name of this ‘middle’ group” because
“available details of Sidney’s precise activities in these years are too slim to warrant it.” Nevertheless,
Scott observed that “the general outline of the group’s political, religious, and personal make-up fits
Sidney’s own beliefs and later associations perfectly.” For example, Sidney teamed with Sir John Evelyn
in Commons. Evelyn was a “leading member of [Oliver] St.John’s [middle] group, … often paired with
Heselrige and Vane”, the former of whom Carswell calls the “great demagogue” of “the increasingly
militaristic minority,” and the latter of whom he termed “a leading parliamentary light” of the coterie termed
the Commonwealthmen; Pearl thoroughly described Evelyn’s leadership role in the “’middle group’ …
firmly labelled Independent” in the Long Parliament. Scott I , pp. 80, 88-89; Pearl, “The Royal
Independents in the English Civil War,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 5th ser., v. 18, p. 72;
Carswell, The Porcupine, p. 58.
Worden pointed to the incident in 1650-51 when Sidney’s appointment as governor of Dover (apparently
in lieu of the Dublin governorship that had recently been granted to and then taken from him), which
ended with a quarrel between Sidney and the army stationed there. Philip, “not always one to take his
side, could explain the army’s hostility only by Algernon’s ‘relations to a sort of people who are looked
upon with a most jealous eye.’ That elliptical remark probably alluded to Algernon’s grand aristocratic
connections, which were not always Roundhead ones, e.g., possibly with “middle group” leaders such as
William Pierrepoint, “the wealthy, second son of the earl of Kingston” whose “way of life was that of a
great, stylish, land-owning aristocrat, fond of the social round.” As Scott pointed out, Sidney “could not
escape his background and connections,” which included not only Pierrepoint, but Aylesbury (a former
member of the Leicester household and a Buckingham friend), Sir John Temple (excluded at Pride’s
Purge), Hammond (Temple’s brother-in-law and by 1648 the King’s personal chaplain), Northumberland
and, of course, Sidney’s parents, who became the official hosts of the King’s children in 1650. Sidney,
after all, would have been perfectly comfortable with a man like Pierrepoint, as well as other men who
travelled in these circles. Alternatively, maintained Worden, and in my own view less convincingly, the
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vote.” In this regard, he was both a “rare bird” in Parliament, as well as “no insignificant figure.”341
One indicia of Sidney’s good standing with the middle group is the fact that on November 27,
1647 the twenty-four-year-old Sidney was “involved with the Lords’ four propositions for negotiations with
the king; and is a teller for propositions for treating with the king.”342 Commons tellers counted votes when
there was any question about a parliamentary decision’s outcome. Tellers were “the most identifiable
part of the political management process.” Apparently, the Speaker chose the tellers, and “his choice can
scarcely have been random.” Typically, the role was given to an advocate of a position, but “this was far
from invariably the case.” The Parliamentary journals suggest that tellers also were often given that role
repeatedly. Over time, Sidney served repeatedly as a teller and also functioning as an important member
of numerous committees that were running the new republican government. As with other “repeat” tellers,
Sidney’s role “implies that a certain measure of skill and importance was attached to the position.”343 In
short, without knowing precisely where Sidney stood in the shifting political winds extant at the end of the
Civil War, what we do know is that Sidney worked with or at least alongside the middle group and, over
time, became a rising and important political figure in Parliament in the late 1640s and early ‘50s.344
In fine, the moderates represented a politically and religiously eclectic group that generally favored
constitutional monarchy.345 They were drawn together in their common determination to reach an

Dover army’s dissatisfaction “might have pointed to Sidney’s growing cooperation with a group of civilian
MPs who were interested in republican ideas and were becoming increasingly resentful of the army’s
political pretensions,” including Henry Nevile and Thomas Chaloner. As discussed in Ch. Three, Sidney’s
intellectual connection with Neville is dubious. But regardless of which interpretation one adopts, Sidney
certainly routinely allied with the moderate “middle group,” although he also was known to be a political
maverick. Pearl, “The ‘Royal Independents‘ in the English Civil War,” p. 85; Worden, “Commonwealth
Kidney,” pp. 6-7; Scott I, pp. 90, 99.
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Worden, “Commonwealth Kidney,” p. 7.
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Sidney Chronology, p. 283. Teller references are unattributed but presumably come from Pariamentary records, e.g., The History of Parliament, http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org. (9-11-18).
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It has been suggested that the publication in late 1651 of Fulke Greville’s The Life of the Renowned Sir
Philip Sidney may have occurred because of Algernon Sidney’s “increasing prominence in politics.”
Sidney Chronology, p. 298.
344
Paul Seaward, “Divisions, Tellers and Management in the 17th-Century House of Commons,”
Institutional Practice and Memory: Parliamentary People, Records and Histories. Essays in Honour of Sir
John Sainty, Clyve Jones, ed. Parliamentary History, Vol. 32, Issue 1 (Feb. 2013), pp. 79-102; see also
“Tellers,” https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/tellers/ (4-10-18).
345
Pearl characterized Oliver St. John, brilliant attorney and leader of the moderate “middle group” in
Commons, as “a ‘premature constitutional monarchist’ who tries to serve Parliament and the king at the
same time, pragmatically loyal to both as far as his Janus-like stance permits.” This tenue is reminiscent
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acceptable accommodation with the King that effectively would limit both the exercise of his prerogative
and an increasingly powerful episcopacy. “St. John’s tolerance of the outward forms of religion and his
dislike of dogmatic sectarianism were attitudes shared by many of his colleagues and acquaintances,” an
“almost ecumenical Protestantism.”346 Notwithstanding numerous efforts to do so, ultimately the
moderates failed – in all likelihood, a difficult lesson for Sidney. In this period Leicester commented in his
journal about the terrible cost of war, and the foolish romanticism of it.347 War does not provide men with
the rights to which they are entitled – a Leicester statement that, in import, is remarkably similar to
Sidney’s view unveiled many years later about the people’s right to consent to their form of government,
and related ideas associated with popular sovereignty. “And no other reason can be given for this almost
infinite variety of constitutions, than that they who made them would have it so; which could not be, if God
and nature had appointed one general rule for all nations.”348
Some scholars attribute the failure of the parliamentarians and the King to reach an agreement
exclusively to Charles I’s reckless decisions; others seem to recognize, perforce, the inability of Charles to
agree to a resolution that perhaps for time immemorial would impoverish the power of the throne. There is
substantial evidence to support both views. Adamson suggested the latter point in connection with the
moderates’ 1641 proposals before the King lost the war; but the statement applies, as well, to the late
1640s: “these changes in law and political culture reduced the monarch’s personal powers to a point where
King Charles and any future monarch would be little more than a cipher-king.”349 Relying on medieval
jurists such as Glanville and Bracton, the King unequivocally maintained that “only God can make an heir,”
and that kingship was a trust committed to him by God. “For Charles, the issues were very clear. The

of the position taken by Sidney’s father, the Earl of Leicester. Note, too, Pearl’s remark that if “there is
one quality that characterize[d]” St. John, who in addition to his reputation as parliamentary leader had
become renown for his handling of Hampden’s defense in the ship money case, it was “his legalism, his
respect for the law; yet in saying this, the contradiction appears, for he was also essentially a pragmatist,
an early ‘tacker’ in politics.” Here we have the classic false dichotomy that has often led historians away
from an appreciation of the significance of law and legal thinking in the pragmatic world of politics and
political ideas. Pearl, “The ‘Royal Independents’ in the English Civil War,” Transactions of the Royal
Historical Society 5th ser., v. 18, pp. 75-76.
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Id, p. 81.
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Blencowe, Sydney Papers, p. 94.
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DCG, III.31.505.
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Adamson, The Noble Revolt, p. 341.
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Bible enjoined all subjects to obey their King.”350 Indeed, law was the expression of the King’s judgment,
and it was only through kingship “that subjects could enjoy true liberty as experienced under the law.”351
Ultimately Cromwell lost patience with the King and Parliament’s Herculean efforts to appease
him.352 Per Underdown, “The Army was in control.”353 Not only did the Newport negotiations fail, but so
too did Saye’s tearful entreaties to the King.354 “The Army created to defend Parliament found that its
purposes could be achieved only by forcing Parliament to reform itself.”355 In December 1648 in what
became known as Pride’s Purge, Cromwell, aided by his military phalanx, forcibly ejected from Parliament
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Lagomarsino & Wood, “Introduction,” The Trial of Charles I: A Documentary History, pp. 6, 9 &. The.
statement that only God can make an heir is from Glanville.
351

Id, pp. 6-8. Although captive, King Charles engaged in steely negotiations with the parliamentarians for
a peaceful resolution. Charles probably was just procrastinating, refusing to compromise his absolutist
principles that were wholly at odds with the views of the opposing and victorious army. See Underdown,
Pride’s Purge, Ch. V, “The Treaty of Newport.” Meanwhile, Charles sent Queen Henrietta out of the
country, where she was both safe and, while there was still some hope that the royalists might prevail, able
to sell crown jewels to raise desperately needed funds for the King. Leicester’s son Robert, Algernon’s
younger brother, was part of the royal entourage at The Hague with the Queen in 1649. Indeed, Robert
became the lover of Lucy Waters, a former mistress of Charles II who also was there. At the time Waters
was almost certainly already pregnant with Charles’ son, the future Duke of Monmouth. During the
exclusion crisis in the late-1670s, there were claims that Robert Sidney was Monmouth’s real father.
Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 154; Cartwright, Sacharissa, p. 192.
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Behind this statement lies another one of those complex of facts that seem to make the English civil
wars impenetrable. In sum, between (a) the time the war began, and England’s leadership was divided
over issues of politics and religion but united in their opposition to what was considered to be the extreme
exercise of the royal prerogative, and (b) the occurrence of Pride’s Purge, enormous shifts took place in
the political control of counties and towns and, indeed, in the views of individuals, including Cromwell.
While moderate views predominated for some time, even within the context of the civil war, ultimately the
most radical views reached the zenith of power with, among other outcomes, tyrannicide. See generally
Underdown, Pride’s Purge, Ch. VI, “The Purge,” pp. 143-72. Included in the political imbroglio between
1646 when Parliament triumphed, and Cromwell’s coup d’état in April 1653, when Cromwell “swept away
the Rump,” the “little group” of Commonwealthmen flourished, perhaps twenty “in all – men identified with
neither the compromising ‘Presbyterians’, the religious enthusiasts, the social reformers, the military
chieftains, the lawyers, or the business men who between them formed that strange Parliament.”
Apparently, in 1647 Cromwell invited these men to dinner “as a group,” and infuriated them by “his
indifference to forms of government,” and losing patience with Ludlow, “hurl[ing] a cushion at his head.”
There is no record as to whether Sidney attended this dinner or likely would have. (Carswell’s description
of the Commonwealthmen is not entirely correct given his inclusion in the group of the very religious Sir
Henry Vane, not to mention his suggestion that Commonwealthmen rejected pragmatism!). Carswell, The
Porcupine, p. 58; see The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, Lieutenant-General of the Horse in the Army of
the Commonwealth of England, 1625-1672, Volume 1 – Primary Source Edition, Charles Harding Firth,
ed. (Nadu Reprint, undated, of reprint by Henry Frowde in London & MacMillan & Co. in New York of
edition by Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1894), pp. 184-86.
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Scott I, p. 91.
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Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 76.
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those MPs he considered unfriendly to his plans. Those plans included charging the king with high
treason, and putting him on trial.356 As Underdown, the preeminent historian of Pride’s Purge,
dramatically described, “When Colonel Thomas Pride stood at the top of the stairs leading to the House
of Commons on that December morning in 1648, he was directing the first scene of a revolution which
within a few weeks turned England into a republic.”357 A remnant of Commons remained after Pride’s
Purge, in which some 143 MPs considered unsympathetic to Cromwell were expelled.358 The remaining
motley crew became known as the Rump, “this fag end, this veritable Rump of a parliament with corrupt
maggots in it.”359
On January 1, 1649 the Rump declared that, “by the fundamentall laws of this Realme, it is
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“In 1640, when the Long Parliament met, there were no open Presbyterians in the Commons; by 1645
a majority of the House were Presbyterians, of one sort or another. In 1640, with the exception of Vane,
there were no Independents; by 1645, they were a significant number. By the end of the war Baptists are
beginning to appear out of the sectarian underworld; later, after 1648, millenarian enthusiasm produces a
handful of Fifth Monarchy Men. Each surge of the revolutionary tide, in other words, opened up new
choices. …Religion was not the determining, nor perhaps even the most important, issue in the split in the
parliamentarian movement that produced Pride’s Purge and the revolution of 1648-9. Yet it cannot be
doubted that it was of great importance indeed.” Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 23; Kenneth L. Campbell,
Windows into Men’s Souls: Religious Nonconformity in Tudor and Early Stuart England (Landham, MD:
Lexington Books, 2012).
357

“The men who led Parliament into war in 1642, and the overwhelming majority of their committed or
reluctant gentry supporters, were moderate reformers in both Church and State. In the end, in 1648, they
were pushed aside by a handful of revolutionaries; a small handful in Parliament, though supported by a
much larger number of lesser men in the Army and the country at large.” These men were motivated “not
so much by any sharply distinguished theology as by a Puritan determination to achieve the reformation
of society fiercer than that exhibited by the original leadership. For them, at least, Puritan idealism would
triumph over constitutional conservatism. For them a reform movement would become a revolutionary
one.” Underdown, Pride’s Purge, pp. 7, 23.
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There are many colorful descriptions of Cromwell’s military intervention in the parliamentary process.
See Appendix B.
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This is a description by the purged MP Clement Walker. The Long Parliament is the term used to refer
to the Parliament first convened by Charles I in November 1640, which did not end notwithstanding its
culmination in the Rump until 1653, when Cromwell dissolved the Rump Parliament. (Technically, the
Long Parliament was not dissolved until 1660, paving the way for the Restoration.) Blair Worden, The
Rump Parliament, 1648-1653 (Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 2-4. Different accounts provide
slightly different numbers, but relying primarily on Worden, in 1648 the nominal number of members of
the House of Commons was 507. Worden, Pride’s Purge, p. 209. Twenty seats were vacant when the
Purge began. In fact, only about sixty or seventy MPs regularly attended the post-regicide Rump out of
the 200 or so who remained after Cromwell’s purge. Algernon Sidney was one of them. “Introduction,”
John Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates [1649], William Talbot Allison, ed. (New York: Henry
Holt & Co., 1911), pp. 9-10. See generally Worden’s extremely detailed analysis of “The Purgers and the
Purged,” Pride’s Purge, Ch. VIII, pp. 208-56.
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Treason in the King of England (for the time being) to levy war against the Parliament.”360 In his journal
Leicester set forth the Rump resolution that eliminated kingship: “this House doth declare, that the office
of a King in this nation and to have the power thereof in any single person, is unnecessary, burdensom,
and dangerous to the liberty, safety, and publick interest of the people of this nation, and therefore ought
to be abolished, and that an act be brought to that purpose.” He also recorded that, “by order of the
House of Commons, that they did not intend to alter the statutes and fundamental laws of this
Kingdom.”361 Even if the intent was true, this was an impossible goal given the elimination of the
monarchy, a form of government embedded in English law. Many Rump members were named as
commissioners responsible for the King’s trial. The Act ordering the trial stated, “Whereas it is notorious
that Charles Stuart … hath had a wicked design totally to subvert the ancient and fundamental laws and
liberties of this nation, and in their place to introduce an arbitrary and tyrannical government,” to prevent
the future “enslaving or destroying of the English Nation” the King must be tried for treason. It is hard to
imagine a less objective law or a more foregone conclusion. Only twenty out of the designated 150 trial
commissioners were required for a quorum; about 70 actually attended the trial.362
Sidney, now 26, and his brother Philip, at 30, were members of the Rump, and both were
appointed as commissioners; both declined to participate and withdrew. “My two sons Philip and Algernon
came unexpectedly to Penshurst Monday 22d, and stayd there till Monday 29th Jan. [1649] so as neither
of them was at the condemnation of the King.” Philip and Algernon’s withdrawal was consistent with
Leicester’s view that “it was the men of solidly established rank and status who drew back.”363 Much later,
in a letter to his father, Sidney recalled that when Cromwell said, “I tell you wee will cut off his head, with
the crown upon it,” Sidney had replied that he would have no hand in “this business.”364
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See Proceedings in Parliament: January 1st-February 3rd, 1648, Historical Collections of Private
Passages of State: Vol. 7, 1647-48 [orig. pub. D. Browne, London, 1721], British History Online,
https://www.british-history.ac.uk/rushworth-papers/vol7/pp1379-1431 (4-4-19).
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“Journal of the Earl of Leicester,” Feb. 6 and 7, 1649, Blencowe, Sydney Papers, pp. 63-64.
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The Trial of Charles I, A Documentary History, pp. 25-26, 49-52.
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Journal of the Earl of Leicester, Jan. 25, 1649, Blencowe, Sydney Papers, p. 54. Underdown reported
the absence of Algernon Sidney from the House of Commons’ proceedings “after the 20th” of December
1649. Underdown, Pride’s Purge, pp. 166 n.69, 187.
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Philip was never at the High Court, though a Commissioner; Algernon, who also was a Commissioner,
“was there sometimes, in the Painted Chamber, but never in Westminster Hall,” i.e., at the trial.
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Two months later, after a trial in which Charles I was not permitted to speak, fifty-nine
commissioners sitting on a High Court of Justice signed a warrant for the King’s execution, which took
place on January 30, 1649.365 By another month so were his key supporters.366 The Rump began to

Blencowe, Sydney Papers, p. 53. Sidney reported that he was at Penshurst when Commons passed the
act to try the king. He returned to London and listened to the debate among those nominated as judges
as to how the court action would proceed. After hearing the ideas of these men, Sidney, by his own
description, spoke up. “I did positively oppose Cromwell, Bradshawe, and others, whoe would have a triall
to goe on, and drewe my reasons from theis tow points: first, the king could be tried by noe court;
secondly, that noe man could be tried by that court.” Of course, Sidney’s legal reasoning went unheaded.
“This being alleged in vaine, and Cromwell using these formall words (I tell you wee will cut off his head,
with the crowne upon it,) I replied: you may take your own course, I cannot stop you, but I will keep myself
clean from haveing any hand in this businesse, immediately went out of the roome and never returned.”
Sydney to Leicester, Oct. 12, 1660, Sydney Papers, p. 237.
The editor of the Sydney Papers, Sir Robert Blencowe, reported that according to Clarendon the army
was divided into three groups – one that advocated the open trial of the king, another his private
assassination, and a third that legal proceedings against Charles progress “no farther than deposition,
though probably secured by banishment or imprisonment.” Note I, Blencowe, Sydney Papers, pp. 281-83.
Sidney alluded to these events in a much later (1660) letter to his father and, enigmatically, his own
“intention,” at the time, which he characterized as “not very fit for a letter.” Because the 1660 letter likely
would have been opened by Charles II’s men at the very time Sidney was seeking the king’s permission
to return to England to see his gravely ill father, it would have been imprudent to include further details. It
was Blencowe’s conclusion that Algernon’s likely preference in 1649 was the third option, i.e., that legal
action against Charles progress no farther than deposing the king, followed by banishment or
imprisonment. This would have been consistent with his position about what was not lawful to do. It will
be worthwhile to reconsider this possibility when we analyze Sidney’s views on law, and his opinion that
the King could not be tried by any court and no man could be tried “by that court,” a view Underdown
pejoratively characterized as “Sidney’s legalistic objections.” Of course, the King also “demurred to the
jurisdiction of the Court, affirming that no man, nor body of men had power to call him to an account,
being not intrustede by man; and therefore accountable only to God for his actions.” Blencowe
convincingly argued that it “is altogether incredible” that Sidney would have favored regicide but, rather,
sought “a concurrence of both Houses of Parliament in the deposition of the King,” an approach he
considered legitimate and reconcilable with the position of the Presbyterian party, “with whom Sydney
was chiefly connected.” Blencowe, Sydney Papers, Note I, pp. 281-84; Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 184:
The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, Lieutenant-General of the Horse in the Army of the Commonwealth of
England, 1625-1672, Volume 1 – Primary Source Edition, Charles Harding First, ed. (Oxford at the
Clarendon Press, 1894), p. 215.
365

Sir Philip, Algernon’s renowned and deceased great-uncle, was with Charles I on the scaffold: “[O]ne
of the prayers that Charles supposedly had in his possession on the scaffold, and which is printed in
editions of [Charles I’s purported autobiography] Eikon Basilike from March or April 1649, is in fact taken
almost verbatim, and without acknowledgement, from a pagan prayer by the heroine Pamela in Sir Philip
Sidney’s The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia (first published in 1590). This was proof for Milton, not
only of the insubstantiality of a book that relied on plagiarized material, but of how the king substituted,
without scruple, heathen idolatry for Christian inspiration. Milton clearly felt that he had scored a crucial
polemical blow with this revelation.” Nicholas McDowell, “Milton, the Eikon Basilike, and Pamela’s Prayer:
Re-Visiting the Evidence,” Milton Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 4 (2014), pp. 225-34, 225. For one first-hand
account of the King’s trial and execution, see The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, Vol. I, pp. 213-20.
366
Blair Worden, “Republicanism, Regicide and republic, The English Experience,” Republicanism and
Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe: A Shared European Heritage, Vol. I, Quentin Skinner and
Martin van Gelderen, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 69-71. For example, the Earl of
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“amputate” its “redundant constitutional limbs.” Less dramatically but more paradoxically, in the postregicide period, “The Rump silently and imperceptibly achiev[ed] its own Thermidor.”367 On May 19, 1649
England was declared a Commonwealth and a Free State. The Rump abolished the House of Lords and
the office of the King and appointed a Council of State to function as the executive. Not surprisingly
Leicester duly recorded this momentous event, noting in his journal that the Commonwealth and Free
State was “without any King or House of Lords,” and was announced a few days after an act “declaring
many things to be treason, namely to oppose the settling of the Commonwealth, &c.” From Leicester’s
perspective, “The people murmured and began to rise” when the Act “taking away Kingly Government
and establishing a Free State” was proclaimed by the Lord Mayor of London; they were suppressed by
Roundhead cavalry.368 The following year a new loyalty oath, the Engagement to the Commonwealth,
was required of all office holders and ministers. In contrast to the views expressed by his older brother, in
the aftermath of the regicide Sidney openly opposed a proposal to require Council members to declare
their approval of the King’s execution, and the abolition of monarchy and Lords. In his view, “Such a test
would prove a snare to many an honest man, but every knave would slip through it.”369 In taking this

Holland, who was the romantic partner of the Countess of Carlisle, Dorothy Leicester’s sister, was
executed on March 9, 1649, along with Holland’s associates. Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 155.
367

David L. Smith, “The Impact on Government,” The Impact of the English Civil War, pp.32-66, 48. “It is
as though the Jacobins in the French Revolution, having ousted the Girondins and set up the Committee
of Public Safety, immediately begin to display the caution of the Thermidorian reaction – without an
intervening Thermidor.” Underdown attributed this sequence of events to the fact that the revolutionaries
of Pride’s Purge “still retained strong vestiges of their constitutional past.” Underdown, Pride’s Purge, pp.
5, 258.
368
Smith, “The Impact on Government,” The Impact of the English Civil War, p. 48; Journal of the Earl of
Leicester, Sydney Papers, p. 73.
369

“In February 1650 Lord Lisle [Philip Sidney] advised his father Leicester and his uncle Northumberland
to take it [the oath]: ‘if things should break now, we which are the engagers should carry a very ill
character upon us, but if it grow general it will grow nothing’.” This suggests that “Philip was seeking to
protect himself; if everyone signed the oath, it would be much less likely that anyone would be singled out
for doing so. Northumberland soon subscribed, as did several other peers, and Leicester was able to
follow suit without feeling that he was betraying his order.” Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 264. As Sidney
indicated, this oath-taking business proved perilous only to the honest, which amounted to a very small
circle that included Sidney. Indeed, the situation ironically repeated itself at the beginning of the
Restoration, when Charles II required the entire country to take an oath of allegiance. Sidney clearly
articulated this aspect of his character in one of his letters to his father. “But whatsoever my fortune is, I
hope I shall shewe unto your lordship I am not capable of base compliance with fortune, in relation to any
person whatever, nor an indecent action; and before I swerve from this rule, I hope God will put an end
unto my life. Your lordship may perhaps think you have a sonne that is headstrong and violent, or guilty
of somme other faults, of which he is often accused; but you shall not finde I have any quality that is
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position, Sidney “utterly refused to sanction the usurpations of Cromwell,” thereby incurring the
opprobrium of Cromwell’s circle.370 This marked Sidney’s “spectacular” and controversial return to
Parliament, now the Rump, which ultimately adopted a milder oath, in May 1649, that endorsed a British
republic without a king or House of Lords.371 Sidney believed, at least in later recollections, that as a
result of his confrontational opposition to the originally-proposed oath of allegiance Cromwell and other
regicide leaders considered him to be their enemy.372
In addition to its confrontation with kingship, Cromwell’s government lost patience with the
Levellers, the religious nonconformists who sought a more radical religious and social resolution to the
war. Among other things the Levellers advocated a redistribution of property to equalize or “level” English
society. “Do not that Levelling Principle tend to the reducing all to an equality? Do it think to do so? or do
it practice towards it, for Propriety and Interest? What was the Designe, but to make the Tenant as liberall
a fortune as the Landlord? Which I think if obtained, would not have lasted long. The men of that Principle,

dishonourable to you, or your family.” See Sidney to Leicester, Sept. 21 & Oct. 12, 1660, Blencowe,
Sydney Papers, pp. 223, 238.
370
Id; Robert C. Winthrop, Algernon Sidney: A Lecture Delivered Before the Boston Mercantile Library
Association, Dec. 21, 1953 (Boston: S. K. Whipple & Co., 1854), p. 15. Note that Underdown recorded
Sidney as a conformist, but without a certain date of conformity, nevertheless suggesting that by Feb ’49,
Sidney was supporting the actions of the Cromwellians. See Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 385. I concur
with Worden that the situation was more complex. Another complicated and at times impenetrable matter
beyond the scope of this thesis is the evolving nature of Cromwell’s views, particularly as distinct from his
revolutionary “circle.” While he began as the revolutionaries’ leader, Cromwell needed the support of
members of the middle group to maintain the stability of his new government. Thus, Worden noted, “If
ever Cromwell were to undo the events of December 1648-January 1649, it was the ‘royal independents’
whom he would have to approach, and it was through St John that he would have to approach them.”
Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament 1648-1653 (Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 179.
371

For a discussion of the intricate and evolving views and allegiances of parliamentarians who joined the
Rump, including the oversimplification of terming MPs either revolutionaries or conformists (Underdown’s
understandable terminology), the dissipation of revolutionary purpose after the execution of the king, the
need for the Rump to “secure respectability in the eyes of the legal profession” and how that impacted its
membership, the uncertain but continuing role of the “royal independents” led by Oliver St. John in the
post-execution, early Rump era, and the driving motivation that led to participation in the Rump by MPs
who sought to avoid military control of government, see Worden, The Rump Parliament, passim, and
particularly Ch. 2, “The Limits of Revolution,” and Ch. 9, “Problems and Policies, February 1649,” pp. 3360, 163-85. The quotation on the legal profession is at page 178. On Sidney particularly, in this
timeframe, see Scott I, Ch. 6, “Republic 1649-53,” pp. 92-112.
372

“I have too well learnt, under the government of the Cromwells, what it is to live under the protection of
thoes, unto whome I am thought an enemy, to expose myself willingly unto the same.” Sidney to
Leicester, July 28, 1660, Sydney Papers, p. 189; ; see also Sidney to Leicester, Oct. 12, 1660, id, p. 239.
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after they had served their own turns, would have cried up Interest, and Property then fast enough.”373 By
March 1649 the Leveller leadership, which had supported the military, was imprisoned. As Leveller cum
Quaker Gerrard Winstanley wrote, “All men have stood for freedom, …and those of the richer sort of you
that see it are ashamed and afraid to own it, because it comes clothed in a clownish garment. … Freedom
is the man that will turn the world upside down, therefore no wonder he hath enemies.”374
Having challenged the autocracy of Cromwell, Sidney acquired dangerous adversaries; but, as
time revealed, he was neither ashamed nor afraid to own it. Indeed, true to himself and with remarkable
consistency, Sidney was “the man that would turn the world upside down.” In contrast, as Leicester
pejoratively characterized him, Cromwell was one of those “richer sort” that Leveller Winstanley had
identified: “it is fit to observe how Cromwell and the rest will prosper, after the taking away of the late King’s
life, and other persons, Lords, &c.”375 In short, while Cromwell, from a well-to-do yeoman’s family, sought to
eliminate monarchy, his was not a social revolution, and he was not reluctant to personally profit from his
own autocracy. In fairness it seems clear that Cromwell’s motivation was decidedly religious and only
secondarily political. Unlike many courtiers around Charles I and later Stuart monarchs about whom Sidney
railed, Cromwell’s self-gain was largely incidental. Nevertheless, Cromwell consistently sought to affirm the
established order of society even as he placed himself at the top of its hierarchy.376
After the execution of the King in January 1649 and notwithstanding his well-known
contemptuous remark about Cromwell’s oath, Sidney returned to the Rump and served on a series of
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Oliver Cromwell, His Highnesse the Lord Protector's Speech to the Parliament in the Painted
Chamber. The one on Munday the 4th of September; The other on Tuesday the 12. Of September, 1654.
Taken by One who Stood very near him, and Published to prevent mistakes, pp. 7-8.
374

Gerard Winstanley, A Watch-Word to the City of London and the Armie: wherein you may see that
England’s freedome which shold be the result of all our victories is sinking deeper under the Norman
power (London, 1649), pp. 316-17.
375

Interestingly Leicester was completely intolerant of the Levellers, noting in his journal that an author
that wrote frequently on behalf of the Levellers “endeavours to invite the people to overthrow all propriety,
as the original cause of sin; and by that to destroy all government, magistracy, honesty, civility, and
humanity…. It is a wonder that it hath bin so long suffered; …and such as would not be permitted in any
Christian State, nor even amongst the Heathen.” “Journal of the Earl of Leicester,” Sydney Papers, pp.
77, 79; see Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down, p. 107.
376

For a thorough and fascinating analysis of Cromwell and his times, see Blair Worden, God’s
Instruments: Political Conduct in the England of Oliver Cromwell (Oxford University Press, 2012). E.g.,
“Cromwell never supposed that radical programmes were necessarily more pleasing to God than
moderate ones.” Id, p. 18.
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Committees, becoming a well-known, very hard-working parliamentarian.377 The extent of his
responsibilities is apparent from a review of the many committees and matters of foreign affairs with
which Sidney was involved, and amounted to his effectively functioning as Minister of State.378 In his
sister’s view, “At least Algernon’s public career was beginning to thrive.”379 He served on the committee
that recommended that Lords and the monarchy be abolished, which occurred in March 1649, thereby
eliminating his father’s membership in Parliament.380 At the same time Sidney spent considerable time at
Penshurst, where two of the royal children, Princess Elizabeth and the Duke of Gloucester, were placed
under the protection of Leicester and his wife from June 1649 until August 1650.381 Sidney’s

377
The commitment of a core group of MPs to the success of the Rump is described in detail by Worden,
who successfully challenged the notion that the Rump was made up of an elite clique that was
“oligarchical, dilatory and corrupt.” To the contrary, “The sheer quantity of business undertaken by the
Rump, the Council of State and the innumerable parliamentary committees is astonishing, a tribute to the
formidable industry of the leading rumpers,” one of whom was Sidney. Worden, The Rump Parliament,
pp. 87-89.
378

On Sidney’s numerous appointments as a teller and committee activist until Cromwell dissolved
Parliament, see Sidney Chronology, pp. 283-300 (May 1647-Dec. 1653).
379

Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 155.

380

Sidney also was a commissioner for Kent and Glamorgan in the Assessment Bill in April 1649,
continued to sit on the committee of Irish Affairs, and served on a committee that was considering how to
more equitably distribute parliamentary seats in a future general election. His committee work,
encompassing the treasury, the army, law reform, excise duties, ministers’ petitions, Ireland, and
Scotland, became extensive during 1652 and 1653. Id, pp. 155, 157-58.
381

Algernon had five unmarried sisters residing with his parents at Penshurst, as well as his youngest
brother Henry and his oldest sister Dorothy, the widowed Countess of Sunderland. It is not surprising that
he was close to home; three of his sisters died between 1648 and 1651. Michael G. Brennan and Noel J.
Kinnamon, A Sidney Chronology 1554-1654 (Hampshire, UK & NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), pp. 29192. During this time, Algernon also spent time at the family seat of the Northumberlands, his uncle’s
home and Algernon’s intimate link to the Percys. Indeed, when Sidney became Strangford’s sole trustee
in July 1655, he had been living at Petworth, the Northumberland estate in Sussex, and to manage the
trusteeship he moved to Leicester House in London. Scott I, pp. 47, 65. It was in this timeframe (1651 to
1658) and continuing that, much to his regret and as a favor to his father who was infuriated about the
matter, Algernon became involved in the complex legal battles of his brother-in-law (and cousin), the 2nd
Viscount Strangford, who was engaged in scandalous and financially destructive behavior, and who
moved out of Penshurst in mid-1653 to return with his tail between his legs less than two later. Algernon’s
aunt Barbara (Leicester’s sister) had married Viscount Strangford (previously, Thomas Smyth [sometimes
Smith] before he became a viscount), both of whom died in the mid-1640s, leaving an infant son, Philip.
Philip came to live with the Sidneys at Penshurst. The teenager Philip and the Leicester’s daughter
Isabella married at age 16 and 15 respectively, with Leicester’s disapproval (and Dorothy Sidney’s
approval). Philip immediately began “frittering away” Isabella’s £3,000 settlement to finance “a lavish
Covent Garden lifestyle.” Leicester was “infuriated and scandalized.” Algernon tried to stay friends with
the young couple, but “soon found himself ensnared in Strangford’s financial debts and expensive legal
actions against the trustees of his estates, since he was still a minor.” Algernon gained significant legal
experience, spending “substantial time between 1651 and 1658 attempting to guide his cousin and
brother-in-law’s chancery action” for embezzlement. Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, pp. 156-57.
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parliamentary career continued to rise in the 1650s as he assisted in drafting legislation to end the Rump
and was a scrutineer (a designated supervisor) during the elections for the new Council of State, which
took place late in 1651.382 Sir Henry Vane the Younger, known as Harry Vane, was a prominent
parliamentary leader at the time and, among other things, sat with Sidney on the financial committee of
Navy and Customs administration.383 Pace the suggestion by Worden, Scott and others that Sidney
lacked the personality of a political leader, in this time frame he seems to have naturally taken to that role,
at least vis-à-vis his peers. In contrast, although active, his older brother Philip seems to have been more
of a follower. “Philip also served on all but the third of the first five councils elected during the
Commonwealth and was briefly Lord President of the fifth council in 1653. But it was the shrewd and
immensely hard-working Algernon who was the most personal use to Cromwell.” Sidney was elected to
the Council of State in November 1652. By January 1654, Sidney “was also recognized as an influential
spokesman on foreign affairs, reporting to Parliament on such matters as the Portuguese treaty, military
operations in Ireland, and diplomatic dealings with Louis XIV and the Swedish Ambassador. At the same
time, Cromwell trusted him with a wide range of domestic issues, such as provisions for the fleet, the Poor

Regardless of how one views Sidney’s motives, and Scott is less than generous in that regard, it is indisputable that legal problems with the Strangfords dominated Algernon’s life from at least 1654 to 1659 and
years later, from 1677 to 1679 after Sidney returned to England. According to Brennan and Kinnamon,
this preoccupation dates from 1651. In sum, familial legal responsibilities were an important, very timeconsuming, distasteful, and generally overlooked component of Sidney’s activity on behalf of his father for
years, viz., during the 1650s and 1670s. See Scott I, pp. 63-67; Sidney Chronology, pp. 295. 299.
382

The Council of State was the executive arm of the Commonwealth, directing foreign and domestic
policy under the authority of Parliament (the House of Commons) after the execution of the king and the
abolition of the House of Lords. See, February 1651: Act Constituting a Council of State [13 February,
1650/51 ], www.british-history.ac.uk/ no-series/acts-ordinances-interregnum/pp500-504 (4-10-18); see
generally www.archontology.org/nations/uk/england/commonwealth/01_coun_state.php (4-10-18); “The
Council of State, 1649-60,” bcw-project.org/church-and-state/the-commonwealth/council-of-state (4-1018). See Scott I, p. 100 (“it was in 1652, and particularly the Council of State elections in November, that
Sidney decided to commit himself completely to the Republic.”).
383

Sidney seems to have first met Henry Vane the Younger in 1632 when Algernon and Philip accompanied their father on Leicester’s three-month diplomatic mission to the Court of Danish King Christian IV
(who was English Queen Anne’s brother). “Harry” was an attaché associated with this embassy. A
Sidney Chronology, pp. 247-48. But the Vanes also were neighbors to the Sidney’s; Raby Castle was
“Vane’s Penshurst.” In 1652-53 Vane was on several Councils of State and committees with Sidney; both
men were particularly interested in foreign affairs and military preparedness. Vane’s political biographer
characterized the years 1649 to 1653 as “the apogee of Vane’s political power. Violet A. Rowe, Sir
Henry Vane the Younger: A Study in Political and Administrative History (London: The Athlone Press of
the University of London, 1970), pp. 177, 248, & n.2, 275 (Appendix F); Scott I, pp. 100-02; Carswell, The
Porcupine, pp. 20-21.
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Law, and the investigations of abuses of offices and clerks.”384
Thus, notwithstanding mutual personal animus, Sidney was an important member of the Cromwell
government. Unfortunately, it was at this juncture that Cromwell gave up trying to work with the Rump and
summarily dissolved it. By then Sidney already had attended eighty-two meetings and was very busy on
the committee for foreign affairs, particularly on matters related to the Netherlands and Ireland.385 He not
only viewed the dissolution with fervent disrespect, Sidney also must have been enormously disappointed
after investing so much time in work he believed would benefit England.386 Sidney was in the House of
Commons when Cromwell forcibly ejected the MPs from Whitehall on April 20, 1653.387 Cromwell
interrupted Vane, who was speaking at the time, with a derisive, Biblically-laced speech, dissolving the
Rump of the Long Parliament: “It is high time for me to put an end to your sitting in this place, which you
have dishonored by your contempt of all virtue, and defiled by your practice of every vice; ye are a
factious crew, and enemies to all good government; ye are a pack of mercenary wretches, and would like
Esau sell your country for a mess of pottage, and like Judas betray your God for a few pieces of money.
Is there a single virtue now remaining amongst you? Is there one vice you do not possess? Ye have no
more religion than my horse.” 388
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Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, pp. 157-58; see also Sidney Chronology, pp. 298-99. If Sidney
had not been a leader, why was James II so opposed to his return home, indeed, to his influence, in the
1670s?
385

For the politics and circumstances of the Dutch Republic and England, particularly during Cromwell’s
rule, and the threat posed by the royalist-minded Orangists, see Appendix B.
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Philip had been appointed ambassador to Sweden in March 1653 but he resigned, pleading ill health,
when Cromwell disbanded the Long Parliament. Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 159.
387

Sidney Chronology, p. 299.
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Cromwell’s speech continued, pejoratively lambasting the parliamentarians: “[G]old is your God; which of
you have not barter’d your conscience for bribes? Is there a man amongst you that has the least care for
the good of the Commonwealth? Ye sordid prostitutes have you not defil’d this sacred place, and turn’d the
Lord's temple into a den of thieves, by your immoral principles and wicked practices? Ye are grown
intolerably odious to the whole nation.” Cromwell’s puritanical gut emerged loud and strong. “You were
deputed here by the people to get grievances redressed, are yourselves become the greatest
grievance.[Y]our country therefore calls upon me to cleanse this Augean stable, by putting a final period to
your iniquitous proceedings in this House; and which by God's help, and the strength he has given me, I am
now come to do.” Accordingly, he explained, “I command ye therefore, upon the peril of your lives, to
depart immediately out of this place. Go, get you out! Make haste! Ye venal slaves be gone! So! Take
away that shining bauble there, and lock up the doors. In the name of God, go!” The Writings and
Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, Vol. III, W. C. Abbott, ed. (Harvard University Press, 1947), p. 470,
http://www.nationalarchives.gov. uk/education/civilwar/g6/cs1/s6/ (6-16-18); Ludlow’s Memoirs, Vol. I, pp.
168

Leicester recorded for posterity Sidney’s well-known account of what happened next. Sidney was
the man seated to the right of the Speaker when Cromwell and his soldiers arrived. “After the Speaker
himself had been ordered to retire, Sidney still sat unmoved. Cromwell told General Harrison to put him out
also, and Harrison thereupon attempted to persuade him to retire; but he was not to be persuaded to desert
his place, and it was only when violent hands were laid upon him, that he spared the necessity of bloodshed
and yielded to superior force.”389 Sidney left Parliament. A few months later a new assembly resolved to call
itself “a Parlement.”390 Vane, Sidney, and others withdrew from politics until 1659.391 The new “Barebones”
Parliament was not elected but selected by Cromwell and his military cronies, who were interested in
appointing those “divers persons fearing God”; it was about a 130-person nominated assembly.392 As

352-55. On Vane, see Rowe, Sir Henry Vane the Younger, p. 261, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.
uk/education/civilwar/g6/cs1/s6/ (6-16-18).
389

Leicester recorded the events third-hand, most likely from his sons’ accounts. “The Parliament sitting
as usuall, and being on debate upon the Bill with the amendments, which it was thought would have bin
passed that day, the Lord General Cromwell came into the House, clad in plain black clothes, with gray
worsted stockings, and sate down as he used to do in an ordinary place. After a while he rose up, putt off
his hat, and spake; at the first and for a good while, he spake to the commendation of the Parlement, for
theyr paines and care of the publick good; but afterwards he changed his style, told them of theyr injustice,
delays of justice, self-interest and other faults; …and pointing particularly upon some persons, as Sir. R.
Whitlock, one of the Commissioners for the Greate Seale, Sir Henry Vane, to whom he gave very sharpe
language.” Cromwell then gave orders for the Commons to be abandoned. “Then the Generall, pointing to
the Speaker in the chayre, sayd to [Colonel] Harrison, ‘Fetch him downe;’…then Harrison went and pulled
the Speaker by the gowne, and he came downe. It happened that day, that Algernon Sydney sate next to
the Speaker on the right hand; the Generall sayd to Harrison, ‘Put him out,’ Harrison spake to Sydney to
go out, but he sayd he would not go out, and sate still. The Generall sayd again, ‘Put him out,’ then
Harrison and Wortley putt theyr hands upon Sydney’s shoulders, as if they would force him to go out, then
he rose and went towards the doore.” Cromwell had won. “All being gon out, the doore of the House was
locked…. A Declaration was published by the Lord Generall and his Counsell of Officers, shewing the
causes of dissolving the Parlement.” Journal of the Earl of Leicester, Sydney Papers, pp. 140-41; Sidney
Chronology, p. 299; Winthrop, Algernon Sidney: A Lecture, pp. 15-16.
390

Journal of the Earl of Leicester, Sydney Papers, p. 149.
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Henry Vane’s biographer also commented on this scene. In April 1653, Vane was “at the pinnacle of
power…. [H]e must have believed his position was unassailably secure.” Vane was speaking when
Cromwell entered the Commons with his troops; within an hour, Vane’s power had been destroyed.
Rowe, Sir Henry Vane the Younger, p. 261; see also id., pp. 275-76 (Appendix F); Brennan, The Sidneys
of Penshurst, pp. 159-60.
392
On Cromwell’s Barebone’s Parliament, see Austin Woolych, Commonwealth to Protectorate (London:
Phoenix Press, 2000), pp. 136-37; Woolych, “The Calling of Barebones Parliament,” The English
Historical Review, Vol. 80, No. 316 (Jul., 1965), pp. 492-513; “The Civil War” on the Parliament website,
www.parliament.uk, at http://www.parlia-ment.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/parliamentary
authority/civilwar/overview/rump-dissolved/ (5-16-14); Ludlow’s Memoirs, Vol. I, pp. 357-68; Sidney
Chronology, pp. 299-300; Underdown, Pride’s Purge, pp. 339. On Cromwell’s difficulties with the
Anabaptists and Barebones, see C. Eden Quainton, “Cromwell and the Anabaptists during 1653,” Pacific
Historical Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Jun., 1932), pp.164-78.
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Blackburne put it, “Cromwell had succeeded; but he lost the support and favour of some of the best men in
England.”393 Philip Sidney was appointed to Barebones; he was no threat to Cromwell. As a staunch
Cromwellian, Philip sat on two Councils of State, as well as councils of the Protectorate and Cromwell’s
House of Lords. Philip strongly disapproved of Algernon’s disdain for Cromwell. By now Sidney was a vocal
opponent.394 The alienation was mutual.
By the end of 1653 Cromwell dissolved Parliament altogether. Through a new constitutional
document, “the Instrument of Government,” sovereignty was placed in “a single person,” as well as “a
Parliament.” Because of Cromwell’s difficulties with even his newly selected MPs, a series of parliaments
were convened and dismissed – in the fashion of the Stuarts – and Cromwell ruled alone with the aid of
key supporters, both military and civilian.395 As Worden aptly put it, “To Sidney, the dissolution, and
Cromwell’s elevation to the protectorate eight months later, constituted an unpardonable usurpation.”396 In
contrast, Philip remained a Cromwellian. Sidney retired to Penshurst, dabbled in poetry, visited The
Hague and Jan de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, tended to family financial and other affairs and
perhaps, as some suggest, devoted himself to reading, the study of history, and the science of
government, preparing himself for the authorship of (or, as we shall consider, continuing to work on)
Discourses.397
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Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, p. 42.
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DCG, III.9.370; cf. The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 159 & 167 n.17, citing HMC, Report on the
Manuscripts of Lord De L’Isle and Dudley Preserved at Penshurst Place, 1925-66 (“In 1683 Algernon
bitterly wrote of Cromwell: ‘you need not wonder I call him a tyrant, I did so every day in his life and acted
against him too.’”).
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On Cromwell’s approach to his new Parliament, see Oliver Cromwell, His Highnesse the Lord
Protector's Speech to the Parliament in the Painted Chamber. The one on Munday the 4th of September;
The other on Tuesday the 12. Of September, 1654. Taken by One who Stood very near him, and
Published to prevent mistakes (London: T.R. and E.M., 1654). It was in this period, in March 1657, that
some of his supporters presented Cromwell with the Humble Petition and Advice, in which the power of
the Council was reduced substantially, and recommended that Cromwell proclaim himself King. The
Protector accepted other measures in the Humble Petition but declined the Crown. See Blair Worden,
God’s Instruments: Political Conduct in the England of Oliver Cromwell, (Oxford University Press, 2012);
Ludlow Memoirs, pp. 368-78.
396

Worden, “Commonwealth Kidney,” p. 8. Interestingly, Worden concluded that while Sidney “contrived
to irritate the protectoral government and appears to have been harassed by it, he does not seem to have
figured prominently in the republican resistance to Cromwell.” Id.
397
Sidney Chronology, p. 301. “Johan de Witt was a brilliant intellectual – a mathematician as well as a
lawyer, who contributed to the development of linear algebra and whose work was admired by Isaac
Newton – who was also strikingly attractive and, although the scion of one of the aristocratic Dutch
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It was in this timeframe that the well-known Julius Caesar incident took place. According to Scott,
the story is myth.398 But there is consistent evidence to support this particular Sidney anecdote. In the
summer of 1656, “by way of amusing the household at Penshurst,” Sidney put on Shakespeare’s Julius
Caesar “in the great hall of the Castle. A large audience of friends and neighbours assembled to witness
the performance.”399 By this account Sidney was the hero of the evening, playing the part of Brutus, albeit
appearing to direct his disparaging speeches to Cromwell. The “applause which he received from the
audience, reached London, and became the talk of the town. This made Lord Lisle furious.”400 We have a
record of the irate letter that Philip (a/k/a Lord Lisle) sent to his father complaining about the terrible
impression that the incident gave Cromwell of the Sidney family, as well as Philip’s embarrassment and
jealousy. “In my poore opinion, the business of your Lordship’s house hath passed somewhat unluckily,
and that it had been better used to doe a seasonable courtesy to my Lord Protestor, than to have had
such a play acted in it, of public affront to him; which doth much entertain the towne. I have been in some
places where they have told me they were exceedingly pleased with the gallant reception of the chief
actor in it, and by applauding him, they put him severall times upon it.” Philip went on to chastise his
father’s exhibition of favoritism towards Algernon. “[A]nd in earnest, I thinke, laying all other matters aside,
this which hath appeared most eminently upon this occasion is very extraordinary; that the younger sonne
should so domineer in the house, that not only in regard to this matter which I have spoken of, but at all
times, I am uncertayne whether I can have the liberty to looke at it or no, for it seems, it is not only his
chamber but the great rooms of the house, and perhaps the whole, that he commands.”401
There is no doubt that by this time Sidney had no respect for Cromwell. “For Sidney, as for many

families, an ardent republican. At the age of twenty-eight, he was named grand pensionary of the States
of Holland, the closest thing the country had to a prime minister. De Witt took it as his mission to keep the
nation on its course of representative government.” Russell Short, Amsterdam: A History of the World’s
Most Liberal City (New York: Vintage Books, 2013), p. 175; Meadley, Sydney Memoirs, pp. 50-52.
398

Scott I, p. 1 n.2; cf. Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 160. Even if fabricated, which is not
evident, by Scott’s own account there are other instances of Sidney comparing Cromwell to Caesar.
Scott I, p. 105 & n. 44; see Winthrop, Algernon Sidney: A Lecture, p. 16; see also DCG, III.12.383.
399

Cartwright, Sacharissa, p. 143. The parallels with his forebearers’ involvement in theater is evident.
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Id.
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Lisle to Leicester, June 17, 1656, Meadley, Sydney Papers, pp. 314-16 (from the original Manuscript
at Penshurst).
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of his republican colleagues from the disbanded Rump, opposition to Cromwell became something of a
personal creed.”402 We can infer that Leicester shared this sentiment since he permitted the Julius Caesar
performance at Penshurst that June.403 James Harrington’s Oceana, Marchamont Nedham’s The
Excellency of a Free State, and Sir Henry Vane’s A Healing Question were all published in 1656, three
republican tracts and authors. But Harrington and Vane did not write Cromwell’s propaganda; it was John
Milton, both religiously-inspired and committed to freedom of conscience, who responded to Cromwell’s
critics and rationalized his autocratic policies, as did Nedham and later Andrew Marvell.404
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Scott I, p. 113.
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In this same timeframe, after Cromwell’s imposition of the rule of the Major-Generals in 1655 because
of the First Protectorate Parliament’s uncooperativeness, Henry Neville and other republicans—likely
including Sir James Harington (or Harrington, a cousin of the political theorist James Harrington), Thomas
Challoner, Thomas Scott, Henry Marten, Sir Arthur Haselrig, and even Sir Henry Vane (the younger), with
whom Neville had worked, published pamphlets opposing what they considered to be a “new erected
Royalty” without basis in law, and sought election in the parliament that Cromwell was required to
convene because of an escalating war with Spain. Standing for his home county of Berkshire, Neville
was not elected; however, there probably were “undue practices” which caused his defeat. Mahlberg,
Henry Neville, pp. 48-54; on the dissolution of the Rump and the role of the military, see Underdown,
Pride’s Purge, pp. 287; Vane’s A Healing Question Propounded was one such work, published in 1656,
which argued that the divisions among those who supported the “Good Old Cause” would evaporate if the
Army were made subject to Parliament, and not the other way around. Vane was summoned before
Cromwell’s Council to explain his “seditious book.” He responded by denying the lawful authority of the
Council. Vane was imprisoned on the Isle of Wight for four months. Sir Henry Vane, A Healing Question
Propounded (1656); Rowe, Sir Henry Vane the Younger, pp. 204-07.
404
Shklar, Political Thought & Political Thinkers, p. 227. As an important literary figure John Milton is most
famous for his epic poem Paradise Lost, published in 1667. He also was a well-known Cromwell
devotee, and a highly effective polemicist in support of the Commonwealth and the Protectorate. Noam
Reisner, John Milton’s ‘Paradise Lost’ (Edinburgh University Press, 2011), Ch. 1, Mapping and Making
Paradise Lost,” pp. 2-3. Milton was fifteen years older than Algernon Sidney. We have no reason to
believe that Sidney personally knew Milton; aside from the absence of records to that effect and the age
difference, Milton would not have traveled in the same circles – he was the son of a successful London
scrivener. Their paths would not have crossed during the war as Milton did not serve in the military.
Milton’s work was not in the Sidney Library, at least not in the 1665 catalogue. Sidney and Milton both
were in France (and possibly Italy) in the 1638-39 timeframe; but Sidney was fifteen/sixteen, and mostly
attending Saumur; Milton was thirty/thirty-one, and meeting with European literati.

A decade plus later both men knew of each other. In Discourses Sidney alluded to Milton’s Second
Defence, written in 1653 after the expulsion of the Rump, published in 1654 but actually “justify[ing] events
of 1647-51,” viz., regicide, abolishment of Lords, and the establishment of the Commonwealth. Blair
Worden, Literature and Politics in Cromwellian England: John Milton, Andrew Marvell, Marchamont
Nedham (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 271. Milton and Marchamont Nedham, and later Andrew
Marvell, worked for Cromwell in the office of John Thurloe, Cromwell’s Secretary of State. Advocacy,
propaganda or, as Milton put it, writing “for God and country,” had become an essential part of the defense
of the Commonwealth, in addition to conventional military defense. In 1650-51, Nedham’s The Case of the
Commonwealth and Milton’s Latin Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio, were domestic and international
apologies. “Both men responded malleably to the coups of the Interregnum, and served, as few other men
of letters and ideas did, the successive regimes of the decade: the Rump, Barebone’s, the protectorate,
the restored Rump.” Id, pp. 8, 10, 33. These works, and the subsequent 1654 paired works of A True State
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Cromwell died in September 1658. The Interregnum, which had begun with the execution of the
king in 1649 and the Commonwealth created by abolishment of the monarchy, did not thrive. There were
four separate constitutions in 1659 and 1660.405 The reconstituted Rump was expelled by the Army and
restored a second time. Cromwell’s son Richard briefly and unsuccessfully tried to step into his father’s

of the Case of the Commonwealth and Defensio Secundo by Nedham and Milton, respectively, were
prompted by the formidable work of Frenchman Claude de Saumaise, known as Salmasius, who
powerfully attacked the regicide. Id, pp. 33, 39. Salmasius had argued in Royal Defense of Charles I
(1649), on which other authors had relied, that it was natural for men to be organized monarchically since
bees were organized that way. DCG, II.8.122 & n.2; see Scott I, p. 106.
Milton also knew of Sidney. The context was Milton’s encouragement in Defensio Secundo of specific
men on whom Cromwell should depend. “The work which you have undertaken is of incalculable
moment. …And this you can, in my opinion, in no other way so readily effect, as by associating in your
councils the companions of your dangers and your toils: men of exemplary modesty, integrity, and
courage: whose hearts have not been hardened in cruelty, and rendered insensible to pity by the sight of
so much ravage and so much death, but whom it has rather inspired with the love of justice, with a
respect for religion, and with the feeling of compassion, and who are more zealously interested in the
preservation of liberty, in proportion as they have encountered more perils in its defence.” Milton
cautioned Cromwell against yes-men. Cromwell needed independently-minded allies, men prepared to
both debate and fight, “to engage the enemy in the field.” Milton was even more specific, feeling
“irresistibly compelled to commemorate the names of some of those who have most conspicuously
signalized themselves in these times.” Among those named “for their political wisdom and their civil
virtues, whom you, Sir, have admitted into your councils, and who are known to me by friendship or by
fame” was “Sydney (a name indissolubly attached to the interests of liberty).” In Milton’s view it was “To
these men, whose talents are so splendid, and whose worth has been so thoroughly tried,” Cromwell
“would without doubt do right to trust the protection of our liberties; nor would it be easy to say to whom
they might more safely be entrusted.” John Milton, The Second Defence of the People of England,
Against an Anonymous Libel Entitled, “The Royal Blood Crying to Heaven for Vengeance on the English
Parricides,” The Prose Works of John Milton, Vol. 2 , Rufus Wilmot Griswold, ed. (Philadelphia: John
Moore, 1847), pp. 477-527, 521-23, http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/milton-the-prose-works-of-john-miltonvol-2 (9-14-18); Worden, Literature and Politics in Cromwellian England, pp. 271, 279.
405
At one point in this volatile process Sidney and a number of other republicans, including Neville, Sir
James Harington, Ludlow, Vane, Haselrig and Challoner, were again elected to the Council of State. In
this same timeframe Neville was also involved in (the political philosopher) James Harrington’s Rota Club,
a debating society that met from September 1659 to February 1660 at Mile’s coffee-house, also known as
the Turk’s Head in London, to engage in “theoretical debates about principles often seen as utopian,” such
as those contained in Harrington’s Oceana. Sidney was not part of this group; whether he would have
been is doubtful. For example, Harrington’s notion, in Oceana, of creating “a reflective senate, which may
distinguish but never decide between alternative courses of action, from a decisive popular assembly,
which must decide between them by casting ballots in silence without ever debating” would have been
ridiculous to the pragmatic Sidney. See Pocock, “Introduction,” Harrington: The Commonwealth of Oceane
and A System of Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. xxii. In any event, by this time Sidney had
left on a diplomatic mission abroad. David Allen, "Political Clubs in Restoration London,” The Historical
Journal (Sept. 1776), Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 561–80; David Underdown, "The Harringtonian Moment," The
Journal of British Studies (Spring 1979), Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 171–79; Steve Pincus, "’Coffee Politicians
Does Create’: Coffeehouses and Restoration Political Culture," The Journal of Modern History (Dec.
1995), Vol. 67, No. 4, pp. 807–34; Mahlberg, Henry Neville, pp. 55-56.
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shoes.406 Philip Sidney remained by Richard’s side.407 The republic then continued without a Cromwell.408
Algernon returned to Parliament as did other republicans, including Vane, Harrington (the MP, not
the theorist), and a collection of more radical thinkers. Sidney was one of thirty-one members of the
Council of State appointed by Commons in May 1659 to serve as an executive for the restored Rump.409
Eight of these men, including Challoner, Hasilrig, and Ludlow, had been regicides. “More questionable
appointments, from the Republican point of view,” were two men, one of whom was Sir Anthony Ashley
Cooper,” John Locke’s mentor.410 There were three main factions in the January 1659 Parliament: those
who wanted to maintain the status quo (the Cromwellians); to their right, crypto-royalists and moderate
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According to one report, Richard Cromwell’s opening speech to Parliament “recommended immediate
attention to the arrears of the Army and to other money-exigencies, with zealous prosecution of the war
with Spain, and consideration of what might be done for the King of Sweden, the cause of European
Protestantism, and English interests in the Baltic.” David Masson, The Life of John Milton, Volume 5 (of
7), 1654-1660, Book III, Ch. 1, §1, Part 12, “The Protectorate of Richard Cromwell: Sept. 3, 1658-May 25,
1659,” at http://www.hotfreebooks.com/book/ The-Life-of-John-Milton-Volume-5-of-7-1654-1660-DavidMasson--12.html (12-7-16). For a funny review of Masson’s copious biography that included so much
peripheral history, see “The Life of John Milton: Narrated in Connection with the Political, Ecclesiastical,
and Literary History of His Time. Vol. II by David Masson,” The North American Review, Vol. 114, No.
234 (Jan.1872), pp. 204-18; see also Review, The Life of John Milton Vol. I, The North American Review,
Vol. 88, No. 183 (Apr. 1859), pp. 575-76; review of The Life of John Milton Vols. IV and V, The North
American Review, Vol. 126, No. 262 (May-June 1878), pp. 537-42; see also Davies, The Restoration of
Charles II, 1658-1660, Chs. 1-5, pp. 3-85.
407

In a way, so did Henry Neville, although he sought a reconciliation between the republican faction in
Parliament and the army. Mahlberg, Henry Neville, pp. 55, 160. While “many of the gentry could accept
the. Protectorate as the best government we have, many could not. It was still, after all, a military
regime.” Reservations about the Protectorate continued, including among some of the gentry, and while
the. Protectorate appealed to some moderates, the memory of Pride’s Purge and the Rump left a bitter
taste. When the Army overthrew the. Protectorate in April, 1659 because of its “moderation,” the Rump
was recalled, with some of the “old Commonwealthsmen” returning. On Feb. 21, 1660, Monck restored
the “secluded” MPs; the return of the King was imminent. Underdown, Pride’s. Purge, pp. 345-51.
408
“The only way to deal with the Army was to get the soldiers on their side, pay them and take their
grievances seriously. Under those circumstances, the Army and the republicans literally joined forces.
The Army pressured Richard into dissolving Parliament on 22 April 1659, and only two weeks later helped
the republicans to restore the Rump.” Id. Richard Cromwell abdicated on May 25th, and was treated
kindly with his debts discharged. He lived 53 years more. Masson, The Life of John Milton, Volume 5 (of
7), 1654-1660, Book III, Ch. 1 §1, Part 12.
409

Others in the group included Sir Henry Vane, Sir Arthur Hasilrig, Lieut.-General Ludlow, Henry Neville,
and Thomas Challoner. Mahlberg, Henry Neville, pp. 55, On the work of the restored Rump, see
Godfrey Davies, The Restoration of Charles II 1658-1660 (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), Ch.
VII, “The Rump in Power,” pp. 101-22. On the functioning of the powerful Council of State established by
a May 19, 1659 Act of Parliament, see Davies, The Restoration of Charles II, 1658-1660, pp. 101-05.
410

Masson, The Life of John Milton, Vol. 5, Book III, Ch. 1 §1, Part 13. The other “questionable”
appointment to the Council was Sir Horatio Townshend, who was a cousin of Fairfax, “one of the
wealthiest men in Norfolk” who “was in secret communication with Charles II., and had express
permission from him to accept the present appointment.” Id.
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Presbyterians; and to their left, so-called republicans, some of whom, including Vane, favored a Commonwealth “set up for oligarchy,” others of whom were considered “really republicans.”411 Historian Gaby
Mahlberg is silent about Sidney while naming Ludlow, Neville, Harrington and Mildway to the far left
group, which would suggest Sidney was not part of this faction but, more likely, if aligned with any group,
was with Vane, Lambert and others advocating “oligarchy.”412 According to Judith Shklar, the gentry did
not accept the theorist Harrington’s ideas, and “at no time did Oceana become the intellectual weapon,
the verbal gunpowder, of the Independents. …Even in the mad last year of the Commonwealth, Neville
could muster only eight or ten supporters for Harrington’s scheme in Parliament,” likely because of his
“overly democratic notion” of constant rotation in office and/or, as Burnet averred, because of Harrington’s
“paganism.”413
One of the facts that does not appear to have been factored in sufficiently is that at least one-half
and probably two-thirds of the MPs were new.414 These young men were not only inexperienced, they
were unattached to the issues that drove the older MPs, e.g., the former lacked the latter’s dreadful
memories of civil war and its consequences. In all likelihood most of these new MPs were more interested in moving on, and therefore much less amenable to arguments, such as those made by Vane, that
England needed to reestablish a parliamentary republic without the influence much less the control of a
powerful military.415
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Clarendon MS 62, fol. 114, cited in Mahlberg, Henry Neville, pp. 54-56 and 76 n.175.
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None of these groups were fixed; depending on the issue, allegiances changed. For example, when
Lambert walked into Parliament and expelled the Rump, setting up “yet again” a Council of State to which
Vane was elected, Lambert seems to have acted entirely without Vane’s approval. Rowe, Sir Henry Vane
the Younger, pp. 228-29.
413

Shklar, Political Thought & Political Thinkers, p. 226. Davies stated that in the January 1659 elections,
“more than half the members were newcomers to Westminster, and many of these were young men .”
Davies, The Restoration of Charles II, 1658-1660, p. 48.
414

Shklar, Political Thought & Political Thinkers, p. 211.
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“You [the Commons] are now in clear rightful possession of this government, which cannot be
disposed of but by your consent.” Vane’s Speech in Commons, Thomas Burton, Burton’s Diary, J. T.
Rutt, ed., 4 vols. (London, 1828), vol. iv, p. 71, cited in Rowe, Sir Henry Vane the Younger, p. 211 n.7.
Note, however, that in the tug of war between the Council of State and the military, and Parliament’s
determination to subordinate the military to it, there was at least one instance, and likely more, in which
Vane, Ludlow and others sought to appease the army leaders, whereas Sidney joined Neville and
Hesilrige were much more uncompromising on this issue. See Davies, The Restoration of Charles II,
1658-1660, pp. 105-06.
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In July 1659 Sidney left England bound for the Baltic, a member of the Commonwealth delegation
assigned to mediate a peace treaty of vital interest to England between the kings of Sweden and
Denmark. The Parliamentary leader and Cromwellian John Thurloe explained to Commons in February
1659 that, “if the Swedish king were allowed to capture Copenhagen the Sound might be closed to British
vessels, but if the Dutch saved it they would be ‘insupportably insolent’.” Vane biographer Violet Rowe
observed that “the subject was very complex, and most of the M.P.s inexperienced.”416 Once again, a
Sidney/Percy was functioning in a vital diplomatic role as had generations of the family. Sidney’s “blunt
style horrified the European diplomats”; but he was a talented negotiator.417

If the general distraction and confusion which is spread over the whole kingdom doth not
awaken all men to a desire and longing that those wounds which have so many years
together been kept bleeding, may be bound up. all we can say will be to no purpose.
Charles Stuart, The Declaration of Breda 418
“I am all day dreaming of another Game.”
Henry Neville, The royall game at Picquet, 1656 419

416
Rowe, Sir Henry Vane the Younger, p. 213; see also Davies, The Restoration of Charles II, 16581660, Ch. XI, “Foreign Relations,” pp. 190-214. For more specifics on England’s perspective on the Baltic
conflict, see Appendix B.
417

Forward, Thomas G. West, DCG, p. xxx. Sidney corresponded with his father while he was
endeavoring to resolve the difficulties between the Swedish and Danish kings. He spoke very highly of
the King of Sweden, Charles X, “a man of exceedingly good wit, valiant, industrious, vigilant, thinks
nothing is well done either in military or civill businesse, which passeth not through his hands; and his is
thought to understand affaires of both natures, better than any man in his court or army.” Sidney then
contrasted the King of Swedish with his Danish opponent, Frederick II of Denmark: “On the other side, the
King of Denmark is a heavy sleepy man, understands very littell of businesses of peace or warre, is
sweyed much by some littell people about him, and if the constitution of the kingdom would permit it, a
German groome of the chamber, that is the queen’s favorite, and, by hir means, his, would have more
power in the government than all the senate.” Sidney’s own reaction to these diverse personalities was
pragmatic, skeptical, and once again reminiscent of Machiavelli’s perspective on leadership: “This
uncertainty of affairs, makes me uncertaine of my owne concernements heare, and my return home.”
Little did he know. At the same time, Sidney actually made real political progress. Months later, in a
follow-up letter to Leicester, he stated, “I am much joyed at the expectation of peace heare, as thinking of
exceeding importance unto England, and convenience unto myself, by putting an end to my banishment
heare.” Sydney to Leicester, Sept. 13, 1659 & March 1, 1660, Blencowe, Sydney Papers, pp. 166-167,
179; see also “Letters of Algernon Sydney, Taken from the Sydney Papers,” Thomas Hollis, ed,
Discourses concerning government by Algernon Sydney with his letters trial apology and some memoirs
of his life (2010 ECCO reprint of Hollis edition, 1763), pp. 5-13 of Letters, unnumbered pp. 501-09 of text.
418

The Declaration of Breda, April 4, 1660. Old Parliamentary History, xxii. 238. See Masson's Life of
Milton, v. 697; House of Lords Journal Volume 11:1 May 1660.
419

Possibly unpublished Henry Neville pamphlet, The royall game at Picquet, 1656, modified and
(re)published in 1659 and cited in Gaby Mahlberg, Henry Neville and English Republican Culture in the
Seventeenth Century: Dreaming of Another Game (Manchester & New York: Manchester University
Press & Palgrave, 2009), p. 53.
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iv. Algernon’s Life: Phase 2
In February 1660, “Pride’s Purge was at last undone” as General Monck made his way to London
and restored the MPs who had been secluded from Parliament.420 In God’s Instruments, Worden made the
important point that the “Restoration was the restoration of parliament before it was the restoration of the
monarchy.”421 By the Spring of 1660 sentiment among the majority in Parliament, in significant part a result
of popular dissatisfaction, was that restoring the monarchy would be the most acceptable means of avoiding
anarchy.422 The reconstituted Long Parliament dissolved itself in March after passing legislation to return a
Convention Parliament to reestablish the monarchy. Charles returned to England at the end of May 1660,
prompting “enthusiastic rejoicing throughout the realm.” Leicester precisely reported in his journal, “The
King Charles 2d made his entry into London” on Tuesday, the 29th of May 1660.423 While Sidney was busy
working on treaty terms in the Baltic, the Commonwealth collapsed and Charles II became king. A
contemporary stated, “it is not to be imagined that our countrymen did desire a king for any other reason
than that they were made to believe that this king would take off all their burdens, see justice duly
administered, piety promoted, virtue cherished, vice punished, the nation’s treasure employed for its own
benefit, and the credit, honour, strength, and power thereof increased both at home and abroad.”424 The
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Underdown, Pride’s Purge, pp. 351-53; Davies, The Restoration of Charles II, 1658-1660, Chs. XIV, &
XV, “The Rump and Monck’s March to London,” & “Monck and the Long Parliament,” pp. 256-306.
421

Blair Worden, God’s Instruments, p. 258.

422
Smith, “The Impact on Government,” in The Impact of the English Civil War, pp. 48-49. Tim Harris
brilliantly and succinctly summarized this complex Pocockian Moment, as well as the best historiographic
approach to it. “We cannot hope to understand Restoration politics, in other words, unless we look at
Parliament and the church and set both in their appropriate social context. Rather, in Harris’ view, we
must “explore how public opinion came to be shaped….We need to go outside England, to investigate the
European context more generally. And if we are going to take a British approach, we need to look at
Ireland, Scotland, and Wales….The consensus among modern historians is that the Restoration was
brought about ‘from below.’” Accordingly, “The republic did not fall because of the machinations of
Charles II and a dedicated band of followers who always had remained loyal to his cause….The republic
essentially collapsed from within, as a result of popular agitation out-of-doors during the autumn and
winter of 1659-60: a threatened tax strike, a petitioning campaign against illegal government by the army
or the purged Parliament, street demonstrations, and widespread popular demands for a freely elected
parliament (that most realized would vote to restore the king.)” Harris, “What’s New about the
Restoration?” p. 193.
423

The Journal of the Earl of Leicester, Blencowe, Sydney Papers, p. 158.

424
Court Maxims, First Dialogue, p. 7. The author also provided the following insights into why the
English welcomed the Restoration: “It was generally believed that the king, being warned by his father’s
end, would have been far from entrenching upon the people’s privileges. That, having been brought up in
the school of affliction, he had there learned temperance in his prosperity. That the experience he had
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Convention Parliament that recalled Charles II passed the Indemnity and Oblivion Act, an act of clemency
that, among other things, pardoned almost everyone involved in the Interregnum except those who had
actually executed Charles I. Sidney was not among those “excepted,” i.e., he was not black balled with the
regicides. The Act effectively made the Interregnum illegal and, as a matter of law, fictional: “to bury all
Seeds of future Discords and rememberance of the former … the long and great Troubles Discords and
Warrs that for many Yeares past beene in this Kingdome.”425
The preceding December Sidney had written to Bulstrode Whitelocke, a prominent fellow MP who,
unlike Sidney, was a man who successfully swam with the tide.426 Sidney’s letter reflected his awareness
of the problems at home: “If the government in England doe continue on the good old principles, I shall
be ready to serve them; if it returns to monarchy I desire nothing but liberty to retire, finding myself a very
unfit stone for such a building.”427 The government based on “good old principles” was not to be and by
late May 1660 Sidney’s comments to his father were significantly different than the views he had
expressed a few months earlier. “Since the Parliament hath acknowledged a king, I knowe, and

gained when he was abroad would so have armed him against the deceits and flatteries of courtiers that
he would yield to nothing but reason and justice.” The consequence was that, “All believed he would be
the lively pattern of a perfect prince. The old Cavaliers measured the hopes of their reward by the
opinions they had of their service. The Presbyterians thought that their present merit in showing
themselves so zealous for his establishment would have cancelled the aversion conceived against them
for what they had done against his father…. The Independents and other sects believed the declaration
made at Breda and, contenting themselves with liberty of conscience, relied upon the promises made
unto them that they should enjoy it. The soldiers thought they should be continued in their employments.
The ministers that they should enjoy the living of which they were possessed.” In short, “Everyone by the
new change expected what they wanted or desired.” Court Maxims, First Dialogue, pp. 5-6.
425
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Shufling, cutting and dealing in a game at Pickquet (1659), pp. 4-5, quoted in Mahlberg, Henry Neville, p.52.
This is one instance of many in which we see Sidney much more respectful to established leaders, and
particularly to his father, than was Neville and other more radical republicans, reflecting Sidney’s continued
ties with, and tolerance of the views of a great diversity of people. Pace suggestions made by some
scholars, for Sidney it was never his way or the highway. See also Sidney’s correspondence with his father
in Blencowe, Sydney Papers.
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Elder & Co, 1900), Vol. 61, pp. 110.
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acknowledge, I owe him the duty and the service that belongs unto a subject, and will pay it.” Sidney’s
only qualification was the necessity for a moderate implementation of the rule of law: “If things are carried
in a legall and moderate way, I had rather be in employment, than without any.” Thus, “If I am trusted, I
shall performe my duty with as much fidelity and care, as any that I have ever undertaken in my life. But if
thoes that have gone my way are suspected, designes carried on, in which, such as I am, should be unfit
instruments; or, that amongst a multitude of pretenders, which is certainly much greater than can possibly
be satisfied, I should be left out.” In short, he said, “I am allmost as well contended with a private life, or
liberty to goe beyond sea.”428
Charles II accepted the reforms to which his father consented, including an agreement not to levy
prerogative taxes, a Triennial Act that required the king to call Parliament every three years, abolishment
of the feared prerogative Courts of Star Chamber and High Commission, and the loss of judicial authority
by the Privy Council. Nevertheless, the king’s powerful prerogative – the discretionary right to take all
sorts of actions independent of express authority to do so – remained intact.429 As Sidney lamented to his
father in the context of his own predicament, “Where is the law or rule, to which such pleadings should be
reduced, by which such controversies should be determined?”430 Sidney’s plaintive cry is completely on
point; after all, the “most important goal” of the Civil War had been “the limitation of monarchical
prerogative.” Yet once again the executive consisted of the King with his Privy Council, Lords was
restored, and the legislative function returned to the King-in-Parliament.431 The most contentious subject

428

Sidney to Leicester, May 28, 1660, Blencowe, Sydney Papers, p. 186.

429

Jurist Steven J. Burton considered discretion to be “the power to choose between two or more courses
of action each of which is thought of as lawful. …Judges also have discretion when the law is
indeterminate with respect to results. …Descriptively, we think that judges sometimes have discretion, not
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In 1664, Parliament repealed the Triennial Act of 1641, which had required that the king convene
Parliament at least every three years and that local sheriffs issue election writs if this was not done.
Parliaments were still supposed to be called every three years; but there no longer was an enforcement
mechanism to accomplish this. Harris, Restoration, p. 51; Smith, “The Impact on Government,” in The
Impact of the English Civil War, p. 49; Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 9.
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remained religion; Anglican interests prevailed.432 Arguments favoring intolerance of non-conformists and
Catholics were often about politics, not religion – conventicles, for example, were “nests of sedition.”433
From the vantage point of the king, it is vital to recognize that the “fundamental difficulty to which
Charles II returned, and which confronted him throughout his reign, lay in the fact that it was not the loyal
friends of the monarchy who restored the King to his own in 1660, but its former enemies.”434 After years
of civil war and the experiment of a failed republic, “the English polity still lacked safeguards against an
inept or deranged monarch.”435 Never mind an inept or deranged monarch! The English polity lacked
safeguards against the inclinations, the predilections, and the extensive “prerogatives” of a perfectly
competent king.436 Charles II was such a king. He was described by the contemporaneous Whig
historian Gilbert Burnet as a man who delivered himself up “to a mad range of pleasure” when he first
returned to England. This indictment, however true, stands in stark contrast to the distinctly antihedonistic Puritan atmosphere that preceded the Restoration. At the same time, while this king had “no
sense of religion,” he was “no atheist.” More importantly, as far as his governing capabilities were
concerned, “he ‘had a very good understanding,’ and ‘knew well the state of affairs both at home and
abroad’, while ‘his apprehension was quick, and his memory good’. He also ‘had a softness of temper
that charmed all who came near him’, and ‘was affable and easy.’” In the opinion of Shaftesbury, the
King also was “much the abler man” than his brother, the Duke of York. In sum, Charles II was intelligent,
quick-witted, and flexible – qualities his father, Charles I, lacked. Even if less moral a leader, the son was
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The most important thing that was accomplished by the Convention that was convened to recall
Charles II, which “was not a legal parliament,” was the passage of the “generous” Act of Indemnity and
Oblivion in August 1660, which “offered pardons for crimes committed against the monarchy over the past
two decades,” while exempting thirty-three men from the pardon, of whom one-third ultimately were
executed. Sidney was not listed as an exempted individual. The Convention also exhumed and
desecrated the bodies of Cromwell, Ireton, Pride and Bradshaw. Charles II’s rule was dated as if it had
begun immediately upon the execution of his father, in January 1649. Thus, “legally,” 1660 was the
twelfth year of Charles II’s rule. Harris, Restoration, pp. 47-49, 55.
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Perhaps this is another of putting what Harris concluded in his overview of restoration historiography:
“In answer to the question – “What did the Restoration settle?” – most would now agree: ‘not very
much.’” Harris, “What’s New about the Restoration?” p. 195.
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“arguably more fit to be a king.”437
When Charles II became king, many of Sidney’s fellow parliamentarians, including his brother
Philip who had been a dedicated supporter of the Protectorate under both Oliver and Richard Cromwell,
denounced their prior actions and sought the King’s forgiveness. Sidney refused to either condemn his
own prior acts in opposition to the monarchy or ask the king for mercy.438 Forever proud, and truthful, he
refused to apologize for something for which he did not feel apologetic. Instead, he chose self-exile. “I
choose this voluntary exile, as the least evill condition that is within my reach. It is bitter, but not soe much
soe, as the others that are in my prospect.”439
Sidney described to his father the thought process that led him to this decision. He had wavered
between opinions expressed by friends. But ultimately, his decision was certain. “My resolution upon that
is easily taken, for though I can very joyfully retire myself, into as private a life as any man in England is
in, I have too well learnt, under the government of the Cromwells, what it is to live under the protection of
thoes, unto whome I am thought an enemy, to expose myself willingly unto the same.” In short, Sidney
had already suffered as a citizen and leader of the Commonwealth who rejected the assumption of
autocratic power by the Protector, Oliver Cromwell. He wasn’t interested in being in that position again,
this time with Charles II. Sidney did not reject the institution of monarchy wholesale. To the contrary, he
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said, “I acknowledge that I owe all duty and service unto the king, as to my lawfull soveraigne; and would
live quietly under his government, as any man within his dominions.” Sidney’s condition was an overt act
of accommodation by the Crown. “[U]nlesse he did by somme act of favour or trust, shewe that he is
reconciled to me, as unto others, that have, as well as I, bin of a party contrary unto his and his father’s, I
shall be ever suspected, and often affronted, and upon every littell tumult that may happen, be exposed to
ruine.” Again, he emphasized to his father, “I know the uneasinesse of this posture by experience, and
can find noe other way of preserving myself from it, but by keeping one this side the sea.”440
Sidney wrote a flurry of letters to his father in this timeframe to which he received no response
and, by late August 1660, he had become much more despondent. “Sir John Temple sends me word,
your lordship is very intent upon finding a way of bring me into England, in such a condition as I may live
theire, quietly and well.” Sidney expressed appreciation for the thought, but urged his father to “lay that
out of your thoughts; it is a designe never to be accomplished. … I had rather be a vagabond all my life,
than buy my being in my own country at soe deare a rate.” Sidney knew that most would not understand
his decision, and that he “straine[s] at knats, and swallowe[s] camels”; indeed, he was a man who people
considered able to “earnestly endeavour to extirpate a long established monarchy, and then cannot be
brought to see his error.” Sidney knew this wasn’t true; but it was hard enough for Sidney to understand it
himself – “I have enough to answeare all this in my owne minde” – much less to explain it to others. He
asked for his father’s forgiveness, not knowing whether he would ever return home or see him again.441
Sidney had not been a regicide; indeed, he had not favored or approved (as far as we can tell) and
definitely had not considered lawful the execution of Charles I. But as a good ambassador, and after the
fact while serving in the Baltic as a representative of the Commonwealth, Sidney had publicly defended
this notorious act of his government; he therefore was not surprised that people believed he “had a hand in
it.” As he said to his father, “Your lordship doth perfectly understand the duty of my place, you may judge
how good a servant I had been, if I had waved justifying the authority that had employed me, in a thing of
such importance.” In short, as the Commonwealth’s plenipotentiary, both protocol and honor required that
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Sydney to the Earl of Leicester, Aug. 30, 1660, Blencowe, Sydney Papers, pp. 196-98.
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Sidney defend the regicide. From his vantage point, he had no other choice.442
On a more injudicious note Sidney also had infamously inscribed the following declaration in a
welcome book at the University of Copenhagen when visiting there during his negotiations: Manus haec
inimica tyrannis/Ense petit placidam sub libertate quietem: This hand, hostile to tyrants, seeks with the
sword a quiet peace under liberty.443 The inference was that Charles I if not all the Stuarts were tyrants.
Leicester was very upset when he learned that Sidney had done this. But Sidney’s response to Leicester’s
consternation suggests that he was quite comfortable with the statement; indeed, it was a sentiment that
he had expressed frequently, in language that was distinctly republican.
It seems that Terlon, the French Ambassador to Denmark, was the first to be offended by the
epithet, misunderstanding the phrase as “a libel on the despotism of his own country.” This response was
due to the intrigues by the French to help the Danish move from an elective to a hereditary and absolute
monarchy.444 Apparently no one else shared Terlon’s interpretation, instead viewing Sidney’s statement as
a Stuart condemnation. Sidney, however, did not consider the inscription either a public or an important
act; in fact, he did not think the statement particularly controversial.
Here is an instance in which Sidney’s personality was anything but diplomatic. The inscription was
imprudent. A fellow Englishman who was there and obviously disliked and/or disapproved of Sidney
sought to embarrass or perhaps get Sidney in trouble by gossiping about the motto when he returned to
England; and through an undisclosed grapevine, Charles (before his restoration) learned of Sidney’s
imprudent behavior. The future monarch was not happy. Unfortunately for Sidney, soon thereafter
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Sidney explained to his father that this was always his public posture: “he never did disavow it.” The
only exception was in private, with the King of Sweden and Grand Maitre of Denmark. Sydney to
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Charles was “restored.”445 Failing to appreciate his indiscretion Sidney wrote to his father with both
conviction and naiveté, describing his commitment to peace in the Baltic and his perspective on his
statement about tyrants: “I followed my orders, and my opinion of what I thought was good for England. …
I did my diuty, and troubled myself noe further … and if the king be such a person as they say he is, I
expect he should have a better opinion of me for this, than of thoes that betrayed their masters and
brethren.”446 Had he been a king inclined to forgive Sidney, none of this would have mattered.
Sadly, this was not the case. Sidney became a hunted man, viewed as a dangerous opponent to
Charles II whether at home or abroad. This was Sidney’s reality even though at the time of Charles I’s
execution Sidney had neither led nor approved of the decision (or the process or both) to kill the king
much less been a part of it. Obviously, then, there was something else that was viewed as threatening
about Sidney. What distinguished him from the many other parliamentary leaders who had supported the
Commonwealth? Perhaps there is a clue in statements by Charles II a decade later, after Sidney had
been roaming around Europe for years. In a 1670 response to an inquiry from the French government,
for Sidney was living in France at the time, King Charles stated that he “did not care where Sidney lived
provided he did not return to England, where his pernicious sentiments, supported with so great parts and
courage, might do much hurt.” Shortly thereafter the English king went even further, advising the French
that he would rather that Sidney live in the remote Languedoc area of France than in Paris, and that
Sidney “could not be too far from England.” According to Minister Colbert’s dispatches, King Charles
“spoke of Sidney as ‘un homme de coeur et d’esprit,’ and it is clear that he was regarded,” presumably by
the King and those close to him, “as the ablest man among the exiles.”447
Once Sidney decided not to try to return home in 1660, in his status as an outcast he lingered in
Scandinavia. Finally he left, both because he lacked funds to continue to live in the lifestyle appropriate to
his recent diplomatic stature, and because rumors circulated that he was going to be arrested by the
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Danes and handed back to the English.448 During this time (1660-63), there were numerous plots by
English radicals to overthrow the king or implement marked change including, most significantly, the
toleration of nonconformists, as well as acclimations motivated by other perceived injustices.449 There is
no indication that Sidney was involved in this deeply-rooted and usually hostile activity, nor is there any
reason to believe that he would have been involved given his recognition of the legitimacy of the restored
monarchy because it was sanctioned by Parliament.450
Sidney traveled across Europe and settled in Italy.451 En route in Germany he met ex-Queen
Christina of Sweden, who had scandalously given up her throne and converted to Catholicism.452
Christina provided Sidney with an introduction to the highest circles in Rome; indeed, her closest friend
there, Cardinal Azzolini, became Sidney’s good friend.453 Staying in Italy for about three years (1660-63),
Sidney enjoyed a wide range of acquaintances within the Cardinalate that are reflected in perspicacious
observations and one tract that he sent to his father, a set of character studies of the cardinals.454

448

Scott I, p. 146.

449

Those perceived injustices included burdensome taxes, the sale of England’s port of Dunkirk, which
had been acquired by Cromwell (and, from Charles’ perspective, constituted a bastion of potential
sedition), the martyrdom of the regicides and others, including Sir Henry Vane, lingering commitment to
the republican “Good Ol’ Cause,” and the felt need to suppress Catholicism. Greaves, Deliver Us From
Evil, passim.
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It also should be noted that it was in 1664 that the Turks laid siege to Vienna, prompting one of the few
times that Louis XIV provided support to the Holy Roman Empire. Indeed, Louis was nicknamed “the
Most Christian Turk.” Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, p. 125. As a result of Turkish aggression,
the possibility was suggested to Sidney, which King Charles would not permit, that Sidney lead English
soldiers in support of the Emperor against the Turks, an honorable mission that Sidney hoped would be
attractive to the Court because it would keep Sidney and cohorts who would follow him out of England.
Sidney also desperately needed the income and the purpose. Unfortunately, his hopes were dashed.
Sidney to Leicester, Dec. 11, 1663, “Letters of Algernon Sydney Taken from the Sydney Papers,” pp. 5657, appended to Discourses concerning government by Algernon Sydney with his letters trial apology and
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Scott I, p. 148. “I have had a very cold, wet, and troublesome journey through the mountains of
Bavaria and Tyrol, and in somme places dangerous, by the overflowings of the torrents. After one
fortnight thoes ways will be hardly passable, until the snowes are all fallen, and the frost followe upon
them. I have bin here a week, and tomorrow I intend to begin my journey towards Rome.” Sidney to
Leicester, Oct. 12, 1660, Sidney Papers, p. 235-40; Cartwright, Sacharissa, p. 151.
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Upon arrival, Sidney’s first comment at least that we have, was that Rome was not as prosperous as it
had been when he had visited as a boy but, nevertheless, “the company of persons excellent in all
Sciences, which is the best thing strangers can seeke, is never wanting.” Second, the Cardinals did not
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By this time Sidney was a sad man, in his own words, “forsaken of my friends, poore, and
knowne only to be a broken limb of a shipwrecked faction.”455 Yet while he lacked financial security,
Sidney’s family status, along with his prior and newly-made contacts in Rome, enabled him to cultivate
friendships at the very highest level of the papal court, hobnobbing with cardinals, enjoying both their
hospitality and intellectual stimulation. This was very fortunate, for as a second son Sidney lacked
independent financial means. Pocock relished this “intriguing [Roman] episode” in which Sidney, the
“freethinking nobleman” with “independence of mind,” was so at ease among Jesuits and papists.456 But
considering Sidney’s noble status and worldly background, his prior extensive travels in Catholic and
Protestant Europe, and his disinterest in religious extremism, it is not at all surprising. If Pocock is
suggesting that in Rome Sidney showed his true hypocritical colors, this is not the case.457 What is so
exceptional about Sidney’s views about religion are not the ideas that he personally held, but his
unwavering conviction that everyone is entitled to hold views that they choose. This distinguishes Sidney

“want [i.e., lack] any Quality, that makes Men estimable; and they are soe farre from the Loosenesse of
Life, of which they have bin formerly and ordinarily accused, that I have not yet seene any of that Order
doe an indecent Thing, nor speake a loose Word.” Sidney to Leicester, Nov. 19, 1660; Blencowe, Sydney
Papers, pp. 241-44; Sidney to Leicester, Jan. 29/Feb 8, 1661, Discourses “Hollis ed,” Letters of Algernon
Sydney taken from the Sydney Papers, pp. 31-33. On the uncertainty about dates in Rome, see Scott I, p.
153. On the details of Sidney’s stay in Rome, see Scot I, Ch. 10, “Rome 1660-63”; Sidney to Leicester,
July 14, 1661, Sydney Papers, pp. 251-54. Among other things, Sidney reported that with respect to one
cardinal he admired, “I do not think he hath so well joined the theory and practice of business … he hath
lived more among books and papers, than men. He ever aims at perfection … forgetting that the
counsels, as well as the persons of men, are ever defective; and that in human affairs, governors and
ministers are not so much to seek what is exactly good, as what is least evil, or least evil of those things
he hath the power to accomplish” – a very Machiavellian thought.
Note, too, that during his Roman sojourn Sidney apparently hosted Dr. John Mapletoft, tutor to his Uncle
Northumberland’s son. Mapletoft was a “close and lifelong friend of John Locke.” This is the nearest we
get to a connection between Locke and Sidney, and it did not involve Locke. There is no record of this
meeting. Scott I at 157.
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Pocock astutely observed that Sidney’s ease with the Roman Catholic priestly hierarchy is a reflection
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from Locke, for example, who in the 1680s, at least, excluded Catholics from this principle and, as we
shall see, did not accept Catholic beliefs as legitimate notwithstanding his advocacy of toleration.458
In Rome Sidney lived a “not entirely grim” life, remaining aloof from the expat English community
there, spending the summer studying his books and writing to Leicester in great detail about the cardinals
he befriended.459 Sidney described himself as living “as a hermite in a palace.” When he grew tired of this
luxurious reclusivity Sidney crossed Europe, meeting in Switzerland in 1663 with the regicide Edmund
Ludlow and other Englishmen who had escaped the restored monarchy; next he travelling on to Holland,
known for its “strange freedom of political discussion in boats and inns.”460 At some point in the three-year
interval between his life in Rome and his move to France Sidney assumed the mantle of the English
activist perhaps cum revolutionary, meeting with European Protestant leaders and thinkers and agitating
wherever it made sense to do so to gain support for an insurgent – he might have said opposition –
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As will become clear, Locke believed that Catholics’ loyalty was first and foremost, to the pope; they
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During the sweltering summer months of 1661 Sidney was able to resituate himself in a beautiful
country villa at Frascati, outside of Rome, that was owned by Prince Pamphili, nephew of the previous
pope. “Whilst everybody at Rome is panting and gasping for life in the heat, which they say this year is
much greater than ordinary, I enjoy so fresh an air, as to have no reason at all to complain of the sun.
Here are walks and fountains in the greatest perfection, and though my natural delight in solitude is very
much increased this last year, I cannot desire to be more alone that I am, and hope to continue. My
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desire; I have no intention of seeking very little more than quietness and retirement.” Sidney to Leicester,
June 3 & 23, 1661, Collins’ Sidney family documents, Vol. 2, pp. 716-21; Cartwright, Sacharissa, pp.
154-55; see Scott I, pp. 151, 159.
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movement to restore the English republic.461
There are many anecdotes related to this period of Sidney’s life. Likely of greatest significance
politically is that when Sidney was in the Netherlands he stayed with the English expatriate Benjamin
Furly, a successful international merchant and a committed, open-minded Quaker who shared his home
with a number of important English refugees. Years later Locke also stayed with Furly.462 Sidney’s
subsequent correspondence with Furly suggests that he was influenced by, and trusted and relied upon
Furly for various crucial tasks that Sidney could not undertake himself, such as determining the best way
to invest his inheritance on the Continent so that it would be available when he moved to Gascony, which
was his intention by 1677-78.463 While in Holland Sidney also met and worked with Grand Pensioner
Johann DeWitt, leader of the country and a Dutch republican who Sidney greatly admired. This
association had begun much earlier. In 1653, when Sidney retired from public life, he had visited DeWitt
in The Hague.464
By the 1660s, Sidney had narrowly escaped several assassination attempts by agents of the
English monarchy, an indication of his continuing jeopardy as well as the unremitting hatred or fear (or
both) of King Charles, whether because of a misguided view of Sidney’s role in the regicide, or his
apprehension of Sidney’s power as an oppositional leader (or both). Sidney’s perspective seems to have
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Not surprisingly, Furly and William Penn, also a Quaker, became good friends. Furly seems to have
immigrated to the Netherlands at the beginning of the Restoration, living first in Amsterdam and then
Rotterdam, where he created a thriving business. The Quaker expat was widely recognized as a scholar
in his own right, writing in English, German, Dutch and French. His library also was well known for its
prodigious size, wealth of manuscripts, and rare imprints. A champion of Quaker rights in Rotterdam, in
1677 Furly met the English Quaker leadership, including Penn, Robert Barclay, and George Fox, when
they arrived from England to tour Germany and Holland. Furly later served as Penn’s agent and a
prominent promoter of German and Dutch emigration to America. Julius Friedrich Sachse, Benjamin
Furly: “An English Merchant at Rotterdam,” Who Promoted The First German Emigration to America
(Philadelphia: repr. fr. the Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Oct. 1895), pp. 1-12.
463

Indicative of Sidney’s friendship with Furly is the fact that Sidney signed his letters, “Your truly affect
freind”; he also bequeathed to Furly a large silver goblet that was in the possession of Furly’s
descendants over two hundred years later. Letter from Sidney to Furley, Nov. 29, 1677, Original Letters of
John Locke, Algernon Sidney and Anthony, Lord Shaftesbury, with an analytical sketch of the writings
and opinions of Locke and other metaphysicians by T. Forster (London: J. B. Nichols and Son, undated;
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Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, p. 51.
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been very different. “[I]f I were not thought at court to have far more” influence with his “old companions”
than he did, the Court “would not trouble themselves with me soe much as they doe.”465 Meanwhile, in
the United Provinces, the English seized three of the judges who had tried and executed Charles I; they
were taken home and put to death in April 1662. Dutch collusion in this macabre intrigue earned the
lasting animosity of some of the English exiles, particularly Ludlow, a parliamentarian and regicide who
broke with Cromwell and, in exile, became the titular leader of the English radical underground.466 A
decade later Ludlow was still unwilling to even try to work with the Dutch to restore the Commonwealth
without an abject apology for this stealthy betrayal. Sidney thought Ludlow’s position was politically
impractical and therefore foolish.467
Soon thereafter Sidney and others resistant to Stuart absolutism received another heart-felt blow.
Sir Henry Vane the Younger, exempt under the Act of Indemnity and Oblivion but granted clemency, had
been summarily arrested, tried and executed by Charles II in June 1662 even though he had not
participated in the regicide. There was no general outcry from the Cavalier Parliament, which had only
weakly resisted the King for what certainly seemed to be an unlawful and tyrannical act.468 Vane had
alienated a number of MPs in his determination “to defend the commonwealth against the enemies, both
within and without.” For example, at least from 1643 Vane made an enemy of the powerful royalist John
Maynard, who became the lead prosecutor at his trial.469 Over time Vane provoked the hostility of many
MPs through the significant political power he wielded, his scathing comments, and his sarcasm and
impatience with those with less subtle and intelligent minds (which meant many people); one scholar
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The rather harsh picture that we have of Sidney’s pragmatic perspective is strictly Ludlow’s (by way of
Scott), and comes from unpublished portions of the Voyce from the Watchtower manuscript upon which
Ludlow’s Memoirs were originally based, which is now located in the Bodleian. See Scott I, pp. 168-81,
citing to the Ludlow manuscript at pp. 1058-9, 1065-66, 1079-82, 1105, MS Engl. Hist. C.487 Edmund
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even posited a marked ruthlessness. At the same time, many MPs were new and therefore perhaps not
deferential to Vane, unlike those like Sidney who recognized Vane’s brilliance and experience, and were
persuaded by “the force of his Arguments.”470 Of most significance in thinking about Sidney’s later fate is
that many MPs, new and old, vehemently disagreed with some of Vane’s ideas, particularly his very
broad concept of religious toleration, which was threatening. As Sidney explained, Vane’s successes
“stir’d up the envy and hatred of a great many against him, who often endeavord to ensnare him.”471
Scholars hypothesize that Vane was executed because he posed too much of a threat to the monarchy in
recklessly and brazenly arguing during his trial that the power of the king was subsidiary to the power of
Parliament. But this does not explain why Vane was singled out in the first place and tried for treason.
Like Sidney, both Vane’s nonconformist and political ideas, combined with his natural, proven leadership
abilities, made him particularly dangerous. One week before Vane’s execution Charles criticized Vane’s
insolence, particularly his refusal to acknowledge a supreme power in England other than “a parliament:
and many things to that purpose.”472 Weston and Greenberg maintained that Vane was bold to the point
of reckless during his trial. But the truth is that there had been decades of enmity between the Stuart
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Houston took issue with Scott “imaginatively” suggesting that Sidney’s closest ally in the Rump was
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Weston and Greenberg’s hypothesis about the reason why Vane posed a threat to Charles II fits (too)
neatly into their thesis, namely, that the major controversy of “the Stuart century” was whether legal
sovereignty – who makes the law? – rested in the two houses of Parliament, the king, or all three. One
theory of legal sovereignty was based on the proposition that, as Charles espoused, “subjects and
sovereigns were ‘clean different things.’” Weston and Greenberg call this the order theory of kingship: the
king is “the supreme governor of the realm.” Presumably, this is also called absolute monarchy. The order
theory of kingship is juxtaposed to what is termed a community consent theory, which also entails a
coordination principle, viz., that the king is one of three coordinate estates of Parliament each of which
has no more power than either of the other two. As a practical matter, this meant that Commons and
Lords could gang up against the King and eviscerate his power and authority, which explains why Charles
would have aggressively opposed it (not to mention his conviction that he was king by divine right, as his
father and grandfather had been). One might consider Weston and Greenberg’s community consent
theory to be a form of constitutional monarchy, and recognize that the degree of “eviscerat[ion]” was
determined, in part, by the existence or non-existence of “the negative,” also termed veto power. Weston
and Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns, pp. 1-7, 154-57, 328 ns. 16 and 17, and passim.

190

kings and Vane that fueled the fire generated by the specific fight over Parliament’s power that likely led
to Vane’s summary trial and execution. Vane’s perceived murder profoundly impacted Sidney and we can
see that anger infuse his writing, e.g., his letters, and in his panegyric on Vane.473
No doubt Sidney was became disappointed and frustrated in former colleagues whose ideas he
found ineffectual and perhaps naïve. In a letter that post-dates Vane’s execution, Sidney tells his father
that he had been encouraged by his friends to think he could return to England, particularly with
Parliament endorsing the King. But when he saw how Vane and others had been treated there, he knew
he could not return. He wrote also about his honor – that he was “not capable of … indecent action,” and,
presciently as it turned out, that there were “many things” that were “more to be apprehended than a
hatchet.”474 The change in Sidney’s mood can be attributed to Vane’s unjust execution as well as the
execution of other compatriots, One can add to these depressing realities Sidney’s enormous disappointment at having to remain on the Continent, removed from his family and irrelevant to the highflying
political world from whence he came and for which he had been so well groomed. “I cannot but rejoice a
little to finde, that when I wander as a vagabond through the world, forsaken by my friends, poore, and
knowne only to be a broken limb of a shipwrecked faction; I yet finde humanity and civility from those who
are in the height of fortune and reputation,” referring to his friends at the Vatican.475 He also lost faith in
Parliament: “It is very true, thoes that weare of it, have of late runne into extream great extravagances,
and the ill management of theire power is the cause of theire destruction,” suggesting parliamentary
incompetence and perhaps corruption.476 Sidney was not only critical of Charles II, but also of the English
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Parliament. It did not take until the eighteenth century and the pleas and diatribes of the British
Americans for a political outcry to be made against the corruption of Parliament!477
Coincident with Sidney’s increasing alienation from the English government, in the mid-1660s
France became the United Provinces’ new ally when, once again, war broke out between Great Britain
and the Low Countries.478 To add to the instability of England, in 1665 a bubonic plague outbreak in
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Cf. Eric Nelson, The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding (Cambridge, MA &
London: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 4-7 (“the American war … was emphatically not a ‘war of
the crown’; it was, rather, ‘the war of the parliament’…. It was the erosion of monarchical power in the
wake of the parliamentarian revolutions that had corrupted the balanced constitution of Great Britain…. A
broad resurgence of Royalist constitutionalism in the 1780s…. For these patriots, the imperial crisis
brought about a change in world view, not a shift in tactics…. A thoroughgoing ideological realignment….
They all agreed, in Wilson’s words, that ‘the people of America did not oppose the British king but the
parliament.’”)
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The First Anglo-Dutch War took place between 1652 and 1654 under the aggressive policy of
Cromwell and the Rump, which sought unsuccessfully to dominate maritime trade, although the English
were more successful in their naval warfare than the Low Countries. The treaty that ended the First
Anglo-Dutch War included a secret provision, orchestrated by the republican Grand Pensioner Johan
DeWitt, in which the Dutch promised not to permit young Prince William of Orange, whose father had died
but who was at this point only a toddler, to become the Stadholder of Holland. In short, this was the first
“exclusion” agreement, executed long before the Shaftesbury faction’s effort to exclude the Catholic Duke
of York from the English line of succession. History certainly undid this secret proviso. DeWitt was
assassinated in 1672 in The Hague by an Orangist mob after an unsuccessful effort to bar the House of
Orange from leadership through a Perpetual Edict. In 1672, the Perpetual Edict was revoked, and
William of Orange became the Stadholder of the Low Countries. In the Second Anglo-Dutch War, from
1665 to 1667, the Dutch were militarily victorious, conducting a raid on the Medway in which Dutch ships
sailed up the Thames, destroying English defenses and ships and humiliating the English. The Third
Anglo-Dutch War took place between 1672 and 1674, and was part of King Charles II’s effort, by means
of his infamous secret Treaty of Dover with Louis XIV, to beat the Dutch and gain valuable strategic
coastal locations. There was another naval conflict between the Dutch and the English over a century
later (1780 to 1784) that is called the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, which had to do with Dutch support of the
American revolutionaries. In 1688, the Prince of Orange successfully invaded England and was crowned
King William III of England. See Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 1096-1107; see also Prak, The Dutch
Republic in the Seventeenth Century, particularly Ch. 4, “The armed forces,” pp. 61-74. For a useful,
brief summary of the facts and circumstances of the Anglo-Dutch Wars, see Ronald. H. Fritze, “First
Dutch War (1652-1654),” “Second Dutch War (1665-1667),” and “Third Dutch War (1672-1674),” in
Historical Dictionary of Stuart England, pp. 167-70.
For a fascinating study of the diplomacy and strategy of the Dutch and the English immediately preceding
and during the Third Anglo-Dutch War, including the role of Peter Du Moulin, an intellectual Huguenot
émigré to England who became, in the author’s view, William of Orange’s principal secret agent in
England, helping to forge the successful de-coupling of French and English interests, see K. H. D. Haley,
William of Orange and the English Opposition 1672-4 (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1953). Of course
Sidney was not in England or the Netherlands in the 1672 to 1674 timeframe, living in the south of France
and associating particularly with the French, especially the Huguenot aristocracy with whom his family
had had close ties for generations, and with whom the Sidney family shared a commitment to
international Protestantism rather than to religiously divisive nationalism. See Scott I, pp. 222-30.
192

London decimated the population; the Great Fire of London occurred the following year.479 It was in this
context that Sidney and other Englishmen urged the republican Grand Pensioner de Witt and the Dutch
government to cooperate with the republican English exiles – outlaws, in fact – in their efforts to restore
the English commonwealth.480 Sir George Downing, English ambassador to The Hague, reported in May
1665 that he “Hears that Ludlow, Algernon Sidney and others of that gang are in the country, and have
private conferences with some of the government.” A month later Downing stated, “Intelligence
concerning Ludlow, Sidney, Capt. Philips, Col. Woogan: is trying to find out what they are doing.” By
July, he reported that Ludlow is still “in these parts”; no mention is made of Sidney.481 The most trenchant observation about these political efforts, made by Worden, is the recognition that the Dutch, who
might have naturally sympathized with Sidney and his politics, “alas, foresaw in a restored English
republic a return to the vigorous anti-Dutch policy of the 1650s, a policy Sidney found himself unable to
explain away.” In short, the allegiance that Sidney sought from the United Provinces and then from
France made no strategic sense for either country to pursue.482
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and St. Paul’s Cathedral. Mark Heumann, “Plague of London (1665)” and “Fire of London (1666),”
Historical Dictionary of Stuart England, pp. 307-10.
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Houston quoted from the Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers (Oxford at the Clarendon Press,
1912), in which Downing reported that Ludlow and Sidney "were very lately at Amsterdam: and, by De
Witts advice, they and the rest of them are scattered for a time severall ways, to avoid theyr being too
much talked of, and because, as De Witt let them know, matters were not yet ripe for them." Houston,
Algernon Sidney, p. 40, citing Downing to Clarendon, May 26, 1665, Calendar of the Clarendon State
Papers, Vol. V, p. 487, and Downing to Clarendon, May 26, 1665, in T. H. Lister, Life and Administration
of Edward, First Earl of Clarendon (London: Longman, Orme, 1837), Vol. III, p. 388. The quotation is
actually from Lister, in which Downing's letter appears. In the Calendar, it stated, "Hears that Ludlow,
Algernon Sydney and others of that gang are in this country and have private conferences with some in
the government." A few weeks earlier, on June 9th, Downing had written to Clarendon that, “Algernon
Sidney was for certain, ye 15th instant, N.S., at Breda, whither he came from Zeland, passing as a
French man; but being known by a Lieutenant there, he confessed to him who he was, and yt he came
from Zeland, and intended for ye Hague; and others of yt gang are flocking hither” – a little bit mysterious.
Lister, Life and Administration of Edward, First Earl of Clarendon, Vol. III, p. 384.
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Worden, “Commonwealth Kidney,” p. 10. Meadley’s Memoirs listed a series of reasons why DeWitt
gave “little countenance” to the proposed invasion. While he was attached in principle to the cause of the
English republicans, “as a statesman, he justly doubted the policy of the undertaking, being aware, with
Machiavelli, how little reliance should be placed on the promises of exiles.” Second, such a policy might
provoke France’s resentment, involving them in “the incalculable evils of a protracted war.” Third, there
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In 1666, rather than accept the urging of the exiles to support an English rebellion, the Dutch
demurred; instead, they introduced Sidney to the French ambassador. It is unclear whether this was to “fob
Sidney and his nagging coterie” of English exiles off on the French, as some scholars suggest, or because
the Dutch required French consent before they could oppose the English king. There is another complicated
story here as Sidney increasingly lost the support of fellow exiles who were less aggressive than he, leading
to his traveling to Paris on his own, e.g., Sidney was unable to persuade Ludlow to join him. Whether
Ludlow declined because he suspected the sincerity of the Dutch and the French, resented the past seizure
of his regicide friends “with the connivance of the [Dutch] states general,” disliked Sidney and/or was simply
fearful, quite legitimately, for his own safety, the point is that Sidney failed to arouse fellow English republican exiles to action. In Paris Sidney’s political clout evaporated. Holland and France’s war with England
ended in 1667, eliminating France’s motivation to even consider the exiles’ position.483 Sidney lost his
political relevance, at which point he threw in the towel and began an eleven-year sojourn in rural France.484
This was a very politically complex time in England and France. In 1661, after Mazarin’s death,
Louis XIV at age twenty-two took the reins of power himself, embarking on a policy of “glorious
expansion.” France was the dominant political power in Europe, and looked greedily to the spoils that
would result from an annexation of the commercially wealthy Dutch Republic. The Second Anglo-Dutch
War, mismanaged on the English side, took place between 1665 and 1667, and included the humiliating

was no reason to believe that the English would rise when the Parliament was so firmly behind the king.
Fourth, Holland’s ruin would follow from the success of the English. Accordingly, DeWitt’s interest was to
weaken English trade and destroy their fleets. Meadley, Memoirs, pp. 147-48. Some historians surmise
that this was when Sidney wrote Court Maxims (1664-65), a subject worthy of substantial further
consideration. See Ch. 2. Compare Court Maxims, pp. xxvii-xxviii with DCG, p. xxxi; see generally Scott
I, Part Three, “Restoration and Exile,” pp. 143-249. Meadley contended that soon thereafter, when Sidney
was in the south of France, “it is more probable, that, pursuing his political inquiries, he digested the
material of his Discourses concerning Government, in this seclusion from more active scenes.” Indeed,
“no other portion of his life afforded adequate leisure for the important task.” Meadley, Memoirs, p. 152.
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Indeed, unbeknownst to everyone but the very few diplomats and royals who were directly involved, it
was in 1667 that the process began that culminated in the Secret Treaty of Dover between Charles II and
Louis XIV, allying them much more closely vis-à-vis Holland than those not privy to the agreement could
possibly have appreciated. Besides significant money going from Louis to Charles and an agreement to
begin a war with the Dutch, an ostensible willingness to publicly affiliate as a Catholic was the other major
and remarkable component of the secret treaty between the kings. See R. Hutton, “The Making of the
Secret Treaty of Dover, 1668-1670,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 29, Issue 2 (June 1986), pp. 297-318.
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Sidney’s nephew, George Savile, Marquess of Halifax, also spent several years in the Huguenotdominated south of France, but in the 1650s. Halifax, Complete Works, J. P. Kenyon, ed. & intro.
(Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 7; Scott I, p. 217.
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disaster of the Medway, in which the Dutch sailed up the Thames and captured and hauled back to the
Netherlands the English flagship, the HMS Royal Charles.485 The following year England joined a Triple
Alliance with the Dutch Republic and Sweden to offset the worrisome power of France. Nevertheless,
France avoided the intended purpose of the Triple Alliance through secret negotiations with England
designed to destroy the Dutch Republic. The secret negotiations produced a secret treaty, termed the
traite simulé, discussed within the Privy Council but not with Parliament, in which France and England
agreed to attack the Dutch. Concealed from most of those who were involved in the traite simulé was an
even more secretive treaty in which Louis XIV pledged further financial and, if necessary, military support
to Charles II, enabling him for a time to avoid calling Parliament to obtain needed revenue.486 The
principal provisions of this very secret Treaty of Dover, in toto, were (a) a commitment by Charles, at his
own initiative, to declare himself Catholic, for which he was to receive two million francs from Louis XIV to
cope with the disturbances likely to result from his religious declaration; (b) Louis’ commitment to preserve peace with Spain but, at the death of the Spanish king without issue, Charles would assist Louis in
making good his claim to the Spanish throne; and (c) an agreement by Louis and Charles to make war
against Holland, for which France would pay Charles three million francs a year for as long as the war
lasted.487
Obviously, Sidney was not involved in any of these intrigues; indeed, “[b]etween 1667 and 1677
Sidney is rarely visible.”488 He lived in the south of France under the protection and largesse of
aristocratic French Huguenot friends – a source of his comments in Discourses about France and its
powerful aristocracy, which understands its rights and stands up for them.489 Sidney lived as a French
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Morley, A Thousand Lives, pp. 19-27. For an insightful analysis of Charles II’s motives, French
leanings, and historiographic underestimation, see Faber, The Brave Courtier, Ch. 4, “The Busy Scene,”
pp. 91-128.
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The full text of the Secret Treaty of Dover (1670) remained secret until 1830. The public Treaty was
signed on Dec. 21, 1670. Gary M. Bell, “The Secret Treaty of Dover, Historical Dictionary of Stuart
England, pp. 163-65; Ronald Hutton, “The Making of the Secret Treaty of Dover, 1668-1670,” Historical
Journal 29 (1986), pp. 297-318.
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There were sojourns elsewhere; but for our purposes, they are not pertinent. See Scott I, Ch. 14, pp.
222-49.
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“[T]ho the French do not complain of every grievance, and cannot always agree in the defence and
vindication of their violated liberties, yet they very well understand their rights…[and if] the king… do
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provincial aristocrat and became known as “Le Comte de Sidney,” welcomed by the related and powerful
Huguenot families of de Bouillon, Turenne, and de la Rochefoucauld with whom his family had been
connected for generations. These men, along with their relative Condé, were the aristocratic remnants of
the great rebellion against Louis XIII known as The Fronde, about which Sidney was fully acquainted, and
they remained powerful in Louis XIV’s Court.490 For example, Turenne was Mareschal of France and
Louis XIV’s military instructor; Maurice-Godefoir, the Duc de Bouillon, retained the exceptional title of
prince etranger, second only to royalty, “the princes of the blood,” within the hierarchy of the French
nobility.491 Sidney was not out of place in this milieu. He was a patriotic Englishman; but he also was
urbane, a cosmopolitan nobleman who had lived and travelled for years throughout Europe. Moreover,
generations of close family connections linked him to leading Huguenots and others. At the same time,
Sidney may well have been unhappy in continued isolation, unable to engage in the political battles
raging at home as Charles II secured and then strengthened his autocracy.
Notwithstanding his many years out of the country, Sidney was still not welcome in England. In
1670 the French ambassador to England, Colbert de Croissy, reported to Lord Arlington that Sidney was
in Paris. Arlington’s response was to propose to King Charles that, in view of Sidney’s “pecuniary
difficulties, a pension should be allowed him by the King of France: to which Charles assented, though
there is no proof it was ever received.”492 Apparently, the English king felt it wise to encourage the French
monarch to pay Sidney to remain there.493 It was in this timeframe that Charles first indicated his
indifference to whether Sidney was in Paris or elsewhere, “provided he did not return to England, where

[any]thing against their laws…they may oppose him,” referencing the many rebellions of various dukes
and the most eminent in France. DCG, II.30.294.
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See Scott I, pp. 222-30. Sidney’s perception of the nature of the French aristocracy, and its political
clout, is described in the inverse by historian Nicholas Henschall in The Myth of Absolutism: Change &
Continuity in Early Modern European Monarchy (London & New York: Longman, 1992), in which
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Documents (Boston & New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000).
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Does this substantiate and explain Barillon payments to Sidney? Was the pension due to Sidney
because of his military service and injury? Because the English knew that they had blocked Sidney from
working as a professional soldier, a mercenary, in a northern European army? Because they wanted to
do anything they could to keep him out of England?
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his principles, his genius, and his courage might do harm.” Soon thereafter Charles became even more
cautious, requiring the French to ensure that Sidney stay in his remote locale in Languedoc, “since he
could not be too far from home.”494 George Wilson Meadley, Sidney’s early and highly regarded
biographer, characterized this as the exceptional instance of “a king of England trembling at the name of
an exile, in solitude and want, and invariably speaking of him as a man of ability and courage.”495 One
sees the problem memorialized in a text well-known in England, Baldassare Castiglione’s The Courtier,
who wrote, “the whetstone which cutteth not a whit, doth yet make a tool sharp: therefore although the
Courtier instructeth his prince, yet me think it is not to be said that he is of a more worthiness than his
prince.”496
Years passed. But with the approaching death of his father, the assistance of friends in England
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In an August 4, 1670 letter, Colbert wrote, “Le roi me dit encoure qu’il ne se soucioit pas que le le
Sidney demeur-oit en Paris ou Languedoc, ou en tel autre lieu qu’il lui plairoit, pourvu qu’il ne revient pas
en Angleterre, ou dit-il ses pernicieux sentimens, soutenu d’autant d’esprit de de courage qu’il en a,
pourroient beaucoup nuire.” Three weeks later, Colbert reported, “Qu’il etoit apropos de le laisser
retourner en Languedoc, et qu’il ne pourroit etre trop loin d’Angleterre.” Meadley, Sydney Memoirs, pp.
150-51 & note (which cited Dalrymple Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 61, a discussion of Parliament and King James
II’s 1685 consideration of compensating soldiers injured in the Civil Wars who, as a result, are “not
qualified for their employments.”)
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Meadley, Sydney Memoirs, p. 150. Sidney was also corresponding with Sir William Temple, son of an
old family friend and English ambassador to The Hague, where the Prince of Orange was now in charge
as stadtholder following the mob killing of Johan De Witt in 1672. Sir William’s father, also named William
Temple, had been England’s foremost Ramist scholar in the sixteenth century and had served in the
Netherlands with Philip Sidney; he was Sir Philip’s secretary and was with him when he died. In short,
William Temple was a Sidney family client. In 1641 the younger William’s brother, John Temple, was with
Algernon in the English army serving in Ireland soon after Leicester had been appointed Lord Lieutenant.
Scott I, p. 51. This same John Temple had been a gentleman of the bedchamber for Charles I. Carswell,
The Porcupine, p. 10. Sir John’s son, William Temple, was a foreign affairs advisor to Charles II. Id.
That William’s uncle, the “younger” Sir William Temple, was an old-school moderate, e.g., “He would have
sided with the ancients in deploring any idea that the management of public affairs should primarily be
regarded as a professional activity, with technical expertise, rather than sense and virtue, as its
qualifications.” He “aimed at popular monarchy,” also termed “conciliar monarchy,” viz., constitutional
monarchy. Sir William believed that the King and Parliament “could and should work in harmony with
each other.” Faber, The Brave Courtier, pp. 10, 15, 31, 65. For more details on Sir William Temple’s
ideas, including the reorganization of the King’s Council and the King and Duke of York’s suspicions
about Temple’s close relationship with the Prince of Orange, see Appendix B.
496
Baldassare Castiglione, The Courtier (Il Cortegiano), Thomas Hoby, tr. (The National Alumni, 1907),
p. 336. For a discussion of the profound impact in sixteenth-century England of Castiglione’s The
Courtier, including reference to this quotation, see Richard Faber, The Brave Courtier: Sir William Temple
(London: Faber & Faber, 1983), pp. 63-75. As Faber pointed out, the epitome, the ideal of the courtier
was Sir Philip Sidney, who “was regarded as the most perfect English personification of The Courtier.” Id,
pp. 16, 68. Copies of Castiglione’s The Courtier in Latin, French and Spanish are listed in the Sidney
Library catalogue. The Library of the Sidneys of Penshurst Place circa 1665, pp. 104, 128.
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and France, and heart-felt promises to King Charles to be good, Sidney finally returned to England in
September 1677 by means of a three month “pass.” Sidney wrote to Henry Savile, English envoy to
Versaille and younger brother of the statesman George Savile, 1st Marquess of Halifax, who was Sidney’s
nephew. Sidney expressed his heart-felt thanks for Savile’s help in accomplishing this difficult task. “[T]her
is hardly any worldly thing in my prospect, that I doe soe earnestly desire, …as my hope that my intentions
having bin ill understood at court, …that my remaining in England, shall be in all respects harmelesse, if
not usefull.”497 Sidney’s intentions were at least publicly articulated and likely privately held as entirely
benign: “I think it no ways reasonable that I should stay in England, if the king do not see I may do it
without any shadow or possibility of prejudice unto him.”498 Sidney was fifty-five; he had been away from
home for eighteen years.
What follows, of course, is the story of Sidney’s inability to stay out of politics as political opposition
to Charles II escalated. The political circumstances in the country that led Sidney to assert himself after
such a long absence are worth detailing for reasons that will later become evident. Meadley contended
that until the Opposition leader Shaftesbury died in January 1683, Sidney remained aloof from “the popular
party, or Whigs, as they were now called,” who had formed “an intimate connection” with the Duke of
Monmouth.499 Sidney “at once disliked and despised,” and therefore distrusted Shaftesbury, a man who
Sidney clearly deemed to lack integrity.500 Sidney was not alone in this view. For instance, Dalrymple
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Leicester’s grandson, the Earl of Sunderland, who was influential in royal circles, had assisted in
accomplishing this. Meadley, Sydney Memoirs, at 153; Scott I, p. 246.
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Sidney to Henry Savile, Dec. 18, 1682, Appendix, Discourses concerning government by Algernon
Sydney with his letters trial apology and some memoirs of his life, (Breinigsville, PA: Gale ECCO Print
Editions, 2010), p. 40.
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Meadley, Sydney Memoirs, pp. 224-25. When he wrote his two-volume intellectual biography of
Sidney in the 1980s, Scott thought that Meadley’s early biography of Sidney was “still the best.” Scott I,
pp. 1-2, n.4.
500
“Few politicians of the first rank have made as many outrageous and almost inexplicable blunders as
the first earl of Shaftesbury. His countenancing of the treaty of Dover policy and more particularly his
Delenda est Carthago speech [comparing England to Rome and the Netherlands to Carthage], his issue
of writs for the election of members of parliament without authority from the Speaker, his attempt to
maintain that parliament was dissolved by the long prorogation of 1675 and his extravagant support of
Titus Oates were all errors against which much less astute men might easily have warned him, as indeed
some did.” So why did Shaftesbury do these things? “The explanation generally offered of these and
similar aberrations on his part is that he had few if any principles to restrain him from embarking on any
course that happened to catch his fancy and a confidence in his own cleverness which made him believe
he could extricate himself unharmed from any dilemma in which he might be landed.” One can certainly
see why it would be unlikely that Shaftesbury and Sidney would see eye-to-eye. As Dalyrimple stated,
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described Shaftesbury as, “Void of all honour in politics,” and a man who “coined rumours as they fitted his
purpose, and had men of his party ready who could repeat, and men who could write them, so as to make
them circulate through every part of the kingdom.”501 (Query, was Locke in this last category?) Similarly,
Sidney’s sister, Lady Sunderland, “had the strongest possible aversion to Lord Shaftesbury, and all that
concerned him and his friends.” Meadley diplomatically explained, “The versatile conduct of this nobleman,
in his alternate connection with the court and people, had justly exposed him to suspicion: for, after
bearing a part in the service of the commonwealth, he sat in judgment on his proscribed colleagues; and,
after engaging in the most pernicious schemes of the sovereign, he became his most virulent oppose.
Such inconsistency being repugnant to Sydney’s nobler feelings, they regarded each other with mutual
distrust; and, whilst his lordship took a lead in the measures of their party, no reciprocal intercourse was
maintained.”502
The political ideas of Shaftesbury as leader of the emerging Whig party and the circumstances of
his death will be discussed in Ch. Two, particularly in connection with the work of Shaftesbury’s personal

while lots of men “disliked” Shaftesbury, “they all, except Sidney, who scorned the intercourse, entered
into a communication of measures with him, because they stood in need of his vast party in the city,
which was as daring as himself. Even the Prince of Orange spoke ill of Shaftesbury.” Andrew Browning,
“Review, The First Whigs. The Politics of the Exclusion Crisis, 1678-1683,” by J. R. Jones, The English
Historical Review, Vol. 78, No. 309 (Oct. 1963), pp. 788-89; Dalyrimple, Memoirs of Great Britain and
Ireland, Vol. I, Part I, Book I, pp. 29; id, Appendix to Ch. IV of the Review, p. 372.
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John Dalrymple, Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland, “Review of the Political State of England,” Ch.
3, p. 272.
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Meadley, Sydney Memoirs, p. 225; Cartwright, Sacharissa, p. 239. In his Apology, written while in the
Tower awaiting execution, Sidney addressed “the earl of Shaftesburyes designes,” and the fact that the
Duke of Monmouth and Lord Howard thought Shaftesbury “to be mad.” Sidney reiterated his aversion to
Shaftesbury, noting the “known dislikes” that Shaftesbury had of him, “and I unto him and his wayes.”
Henry Neville and Henry Marten, staunch republicans, also distrusted Shaftesbury, opposing his
nomination as an Army commissioner in February 1660, and there are many others who shared this view.
“The Apology of A. Sydney in the Day of His Death,” Discourses concerning government by Algernon
Sydney with his letters trial apology and some memoirs of his life, 1763 Hollis ed., p. 181; Mahlberg,
Henry Neville, p. 162. The notoriously inconsistent, unprincipled, arrogant, and seemingly erratic
behavior of Shaftesbury is entirely absent from and therefore not taken into account in the eulogistic
characterizations of Shaftesbury, his talented lackey Locke, and the creation and oversight of the colony
of Carolina contained in Holly Brewer’s fascinating analysis of slavery, Locke, and the Fundamental
Constitutions of Carolina. Contrary to Brewer’s conclusion, her detailed analysis tends to prove, not
disprove that slavery emerged “within a liberal paradox.” Brewer, “Slavery, Sovereignty, and ‘Inherited
Blood,’” p. 1042; see detailed discussion in Chs. Two & Five. To put it most simply, the proof is in the
pudding. If Shaftesbury and Locke wanted to ban slavery in Carolina, whether in the original
Constitutions that involved both men in the intimate details of drafting foundational law for the new colony,
or in later editions on which Locke worked assiduously after Shaftesbury’s death, they could have done
so, or at least endeavored to do so. They did not.
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assistant cum intellectual collaborator cum intellectual muse (or vice versa), John Locke. But brief
historical context is important here. Adding to the complexity of the circumstances is the fact that one
cannot attribute Sidney’s lack of involvement in politics in his first years back in England strictly to his
relationship with Shaftesbury even if that was a significant factor. In this same timeframe, as Scott
exhaustively documented, Sidney became embroiled in a Chancery law suit in which his older brother
Philip challenged the assets Leicester had bequeathed to Sidney and their younger brother Henry.
Indeed, Philip was apparently so angry at his father’s bequests that he not only fought his family in court,
but apparently “refused to see his brothers and sisters” for years.503 While Algernon and Henry ultimately
won the lawsuit, “this long and tedious suit in Chancery” undoubtedly required a considerable amount of
Sidney’s time and attention in the 1678-82 timeframe, during which Shaftesbury led the Opposition movement, the goal of which was to change the line of succession.504 It also cemented Sidney’s partnership with
Sir William Jones, with whom he had worked in “Algernon’s other Chancery business against Viscount
Strangford.”505 What, then, were the circumstances that induced Sidney, a man who had been ostracized
from his country for eighteen years because of his politics, to plunge into the political fray once again?
In fact, this process began several years earlier. In 1677 when Sidney was exchanging letters
with Henry Savile concerning an assurance of safety so that Sidney could return to England to visit his ill
father, Sidney stated his apparently entirely innocent intentions. “I will, without any scruple, put myself
entirely upon the King’s word; and desire you only to obtain a Pass to signify it, and that his Majesty is
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Cartwright, Sacharissa, p. 200.
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Gilbert Spencer, who had been Leicester’s steward and was devoted to Henry Sidney, Algernon’s
younger brother, wrote a letter to Henry, then stationed at The Hague, when Henry and Algernon won
their lawsuit against their brother Philip. By this time, Philip was the 3rd Earl of Leicester because the 2nd
Earl had died. “Though your brother Algernon would not concern himself, but was long in churlish humour
– I hear he laughed when he heard how the cause went.” In contrast, said Spencer, “I believe your
brother Leicester will not have so good an opinion of his own law as he used to have – ‘tis though he will
be in a great rage at the verdict. I am sure, if he had had it from him, he would never have let you had a
quiet day, nor a penny legacy; but now I hope he may be made wiser, and you happier, whether he will or
no; and that you may be so, nothing shall be wanting in the duty of, most honoured sir, Your most
affectionate, faithful, And obedient servant, G. Spencer.” Henry Sidney et al., Diary & Correspondence of
Times of Ch. II, p. 236; see Scott II at pp. 90-99. Sidney’s experience was not an aberration. Beginning
in the second half of the sixteenth century, England became a much more litigious place; indeed, “few if
any members of English society could have avoided exposure (usually protracted) to some component of
England’s legal machinery.” It is not a coincidence that between the 1560s and the 1610s, the number of
attorneys expanded enormously, from about 300 to 1000. Hart, The Rule of Law, 1603-1660, pp. 1, 13.
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Scott II, pp. 94-95.
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pleased to send for me…. I have no other business than what solely concerns my person and family. I
desire not to be a Day in England unknown to the King, or his Ministers; and will lose no time in waiting
upon the Secretary, as soon as I can after my arrival.” 506 Sidney assured Savile that if he did not satisfy
the King that his presence in England was harmless, “I desire no more than to return on this side the seas
after the three months, where I intend to finish my days, without thinking any more of living in England.”507
There is no reason to doubt Sidney’s sincerity. In 1677, after almost two decades in exile and
more than a decade isolated in the French countryside away from the political world, Sidney had neither
the intention nor the inclination to become involved once more in English affairs of state. Soon after his
arrival, Leicester died (Nov. 2, 1677). Sidney’s decision to stay thereafter was driven in the first instance
and for the next three years, until July 1680, by his elder brother Philip’s challenge to Leicester’s
bequest.508 Sidney tarried in order to be able to establish his claim, which was financially significant if not
a necessity; he ultimately succeeded by means of the previously described “long and vexatious” suit in
chancery.509 No doubt this played a part in if not caused Sidney’s decision to stay out of politics for
several years, beyond his disdain for Shaftesbury. But contemporaneously political tensions once again
increasingly intensified, as Charles II, in complex and spiraling affronts, challenged Parliament’s
authority.510 Perhaps it was inevitable that Sidney would be drawn inexorably into the vortex. One author
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Sidney, in Nerac France, to Henry Savile, British Ambassador to Versailles, misdated Dec., 1682; the
correct date must be 1677, possibly 1676, as Sidney left France in September 1677. Letters of the
Honourable Algernon Sydney, to the Honourable Henry Savile ambassador in France. In the year 1679,
&c. Now first printed from the originals in Mr. Sydney’s own hand. (Gale ECCO Print Eds., 2010),
reproduced from the Harvard University Houghton Library edition printed by S. Powell for George Ewing,
Dublin, 1742 (“Sidney-Henry Savile letters”), pp. 65-66.
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Id.
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The situation is discussed in a letter from Dorothy Sidney, Countess Dowager of Sunderland, sister of
Philip, Algernon and Henry, to her son-in-law, Halifax: “’Sir William Jones [a prominent jurist] has been
with the Duke [of York], I hear, I know not for what. He says that my brother’s business could not be
determined otherwise than it is, after he had taken so many fees of my brother Leicester.’ The writer is
alluding to the old law-suit between her brothers, which had been so long the talk of the town. [The
brothers] Halifax and Henry Savile both speak of the quarrels of the Sidney brothers in their letters, and
Lady Russell tells her husband that she hears Henry Sidney runs high in his discourse against Lord
Leicester [the eldest brother Philip], ‘what a brother so provoked may be induced to do.’” Cartwright,
Saccharissa, pp. 237-37, 266-67.
509

Meadley, Sydney Memoirs, p. 154.
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As one scholar stated, “Charles II and James II, like James I and Charles I before them, suffered from
inadequate finances, an ill-defined constitutional relationship with parliament, a contentious domestic
religious situation and an unstable multiple-kingdom inheritance.” Harris, Restoration, p. 37. It was also
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finds that when Sidney was “detained in England” because of the “long and vexatious lawsuit” caused by
Philip’s refusal to recognize the legacies Leicester bequeathed to Philip’s brothers, friends urged Sidney
to re-enter public life; thus, he “was persuaded to stand for Parliament twice over.”511
The most telling, albeit not full-proof evidence of Sidney’s mindset comes from a post-1683
memorandum to Louis XIV from his minister Claude de Mesme, comte d’Avaux, the French Ambassador
to the United Provinces from 1679 to 1684, who was spending considerable time with the Dutch
republicans.512 The ambassador wrote, “J’en parlai un des plus considerable republicains de Hollande,”
called the Louvesteiners, “qui avoit un commerce fort etroit avec les principaux membres du parlement
d’Angleterre.”513 On the basis of this conversation, d’Avaux contacted Sidney, “fameux republicain,” and
told him that as long as the Prince of Orange was so powerful in the Netherlands’ Estate General, there
could be nothing more prejudicial to both the English Parliament and the Dutch republic than to allow the

in this timeframe (1682) that Charles II proposed to send young Christopher Monck, son of General
Monck, the 2ND Duke of Albemarle, to the Netherlands to serve as the head of the troops there. “What
subtle working of Charles II's policy was to be served by Albemarle cannot now be followed with certainty.
It can, however, easily be seen that he would be more sure of carrying out his promises to France without
betraying his secret treaty to the astute William of Orange if his English troops in the Netherlands were
under the generalship of a blind adherent of the King and Duke of York. So Albemarle became a pawn in
the dark game between King Charles and Louis XIV. King Charles himself late in the year wrote to his
nephew a letter well calculated to bring Albemarle the coveted prize.” Estelle Francis Ward, Christopher
Monck Duke of Albemarle (London: John Murray, 1915,) p. 149. Charles wrote to William of Orange to
this effect. “So urgent a letter might well be believed to bring about the desired result. Consequently, it
was with surprise and chagrin that the King found that the Prince of Orange had given the appointment to
Henry Sidney. True, he was no soldier, and was as frivolous as any courtier at Whitehall. Burnet says that
he was so set on pleasure that he was not able to follow business with a due application. On the other
hand, he was the brother of Algernon Sidney, so that he had certain ties with the Whigs at home, while
abroad he was known as a personal friend of William of Orange. Not only incensed at the total disregard
of his wishes, but believing that Sidney was far from the man he would choose to have at the head of the
English troops in Holland, the King ended the matter by speedily recaling Sidney to England.” Id, pp.
149-51.
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Cartwright, Sacharissa, pp. 200-01.
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While the subject of the memo apperas to be 1680 events, we know that the memo was written postDecember 1683 because it refers to Sidney’s demise: “qui à eu depuis la tête tranchée.” Memorandum,
d’Avaux, the French minister at the Hague, “despuit 1679, jusqu’ en 1684,” Appendix, Meadley, Sydney
Memoirs, pp. 337-39, 337. Note that Henry Sidney was the English ambassador to The Hague from 1679
to 1681. See “Sidney [Sydney], Hon. Henry (1641-1704), of Jeremy Street, Westminster and Elverton,
Stone, Kent,” The History of Parliament: the House of Commons 1660-1690 (London: Boydell and
Brewer, 1983), “The History of Parliament: British Political, Social & Local History,”- https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1660-1690/member/sidney-%28sydney%29-hon-henry-1641-1704 (13-19).
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Id; see also Scott II, pp. 119 n.58, relying on Negotiations of Count d’Avaux, 4 vols., 1756, vol. I, p.9.
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English king to make an alliance with Orange.514 In short, Sidney consistently viewed the Orangists as a
threat to England, and the union of the English and the Dutch dangerous as long as the Prince of Orange
was as powerful as he was in the States-General, “puisque cer ne seroit que pour opprimer leur liberté
commune,” i.e., as d’Avaux had said, to only oppress the common liberty of the English and the Dutch.
Sidney was well aware of the Orangists’ responsibility for the horrible murder of De Witt, and the Prince’s
profiting politically from the tragedy.515 Of course, Sidney lost his effort to prevent the French from giving
Charles II a great deal of money because this enabled him to operate independently from Parliament,
thereby preventing Parliament’s check on the King’s inclination to ally with the Dutch monarchy. In fine,
the “considerable republican” Algernon Sidney was functioning as an unauthorized diplomat in support of
what he considered to be England’s best interest, which was wholly inconsistent with Charles II’s goals.
For Halifax, too, the closest both men came to idolatry (and treason!) was their shared view that their
country was in some degree their “idol,” requiring their first and final allegiance.516
Thus, English governmental efforts to reactivate the Stuart-Orange alliance ipso facto reactivated
Dutch, French and English opposition to it. Here we have another one of those bizarre family ironies that
reflects the extraordinarily high profile and pedigree of the Sidney/ Percy family. Based at least in part on
his personal relationship with the French envoy to the United Provinces, Sidney was busy working with
the English opposition to stymie efforts by the English king to reach an agreement with the Prince of
Orange while, at the very same time, his younger brother Henry was the English envoy sent to The
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“[Q]ue tant que le Prince d’Orange seroit aussi puissant qu’il étoit dans les états-généraux, il n’y auroit
rien de plus prejudiciable au parlement d’Angleterre, et à la republique de Holland, que de laisser unir le
roi de la Grand Bretagne aved le Prince d’Orange, puisque ce ne serit que pour opprimer leur liberté
commune.” Monsieur le Comte d’Avaux, Appendix, Meadley, Sydney Memoirs, pp. 337-38.
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The author of the Twelfth Dialogue of Court Maxims sarcastically stated (p. 162): “Our next reason
that fixes us in the desire of ruining the United Provinces is to make the prince of Orange master of them.
So shall we kill two birds with one stone: destroy them we hate and fear in Holland, and set up the title
and power of the Orange family, that may help us to destroy our more hated and feared enemies at
home.”
516
“The Character of a Trimmer,” Halifax: Complete Works, p. 96. Scott deemed Sidney a “mutineer” and
deserving “the title of the most fractious sibling of the seventeenth century.” The first categorization is
correct; the second is perhaps unfair. As Scott noted, Charles II’s purpose was to create a Stuart-Orange
monarchic league to contain France – a means of motivating France to have “an Anglo-French royal
rapprochement.” Scott dubbed this “an expensive refitting of the Titanic” because “the only effects of this
reactivation of the Stuart-Orange alliance was the reactivation of its Dutch, French, and English
opposition in turn.” Sidney had consistently voiced this view, e.g., warning Sunderland about the danger
of actions by England that would drive France into Holland’s arms.
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Hague to accomplish this very goal.517
Once again context and timing is critical. Restored to kingship in 1660, Charles II appointed the
relatively moderate royalist, Edward Hyde, 1st Earl of Clarendon, to be his Lord Chancellor.518 Clarendon
had been instrumental in drafting the Declaration of Breda that restored the monarchy and granted a
general amnesty embodied in the Act of Indemnity and Oblivion (1660), the law that pardoned those who
had fought against the king during the Civil Wars with the exception of the regicides.519 Clarendon was
ousted in 1667, in large part due to his incivility to the king’s mistress, Barbara Villiers, who he (rightly)
believed to be collaborating with members of the Cabal of Six that then replaced him – six ministers
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Sidney’s brother Henry was the envoy appointed by Sunderland, Sidney’s nephew, to travel to The
Hague and negotiate with William of Orange on behalf of Charles II. Sunderland oversaw this matter for
the King, while the chief architect of these renewed Orangist collaborative efforts was Sir William Temple,
son of Sidney’s friend and family client, Sir John Temple. Sir William was a contemporary of Algernon
Sidney – five years his junior. Sir William’s grandfather, also a William, had been the secretary of both Sir
Philip Sidney and the Earl of Essex (Devereux). Philip died in Sir William’s arms. Once again we see the
incestuousness of family and professional/ statesmanship relationships. (There were other Sidney/Temple
connections, e.g., Dr. Henry Hammond was the younger William Temple’s uncle who took care of William’s
father when he was dying. Hammond was a royalist chaplain who “was given the living of Penshurst by the
Earl of Leicester” after the latter heard him preach at court.) Sidney to Henry Savile, July, 1679, SidneyHenry Savile letters, pp. 49-50; Scott II, p. 117; Richard Faber, The Brave Courtier, Sir William Temple, pp.
25-26.

Ironically, years later, in a fascinating description of the secret 1688 efforts of various English leaders to
successfully enable the Prince of Orange to invade England and take the throne from James II, Dalrymple
recorded that, “The persons who were thought to have conferred the greatest obligations upon the Prince
of Orange,” in other words, to whom he was most indebted, “were Lord and Lady Sunderland, and Lord
and Lady Churchill: The two former, because one of them imparted the King’s secrets to his uncle Henry
Sidney, who resided with the Prince, and the other to the Princess of Orange” (with the Churchill’s
“obligation” because of their connection to, and communications with the rulers of Denmark). Meanwhile,
Henry Sidney, who had often been at political odds with his brother, is described as “brother to the great
and unfortunate Algernon Sidney,” who “after conducting every step of party in England and in Holland,”
i.e., towing the party line, “prepared now to share or to revenge his brother’s fate.” Dalyrymple Memoirs,
4th ed., Vol. I (Dublin: David Hay, 1773) [John Adams’ copy], pp. 218-20, https://archive.org/
stream/memoirsofgreatbr01dal r#page/n5/search/Algernon (9-19-18).
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Hyde had supported Charles I during the Civil War. Hyde also was a member of the Great Tew Circle,
a group of royalist intellectuals that included Thomas Hobbes and other major thinkers. See Ch. Three.
519

Clarendon had helped secure the marriage of the Prince of Orange to the Duke of York’s daughter
Mary, who was also Clarendon’s granddaughter, as James, Duke of York, was married to Clarendon’s
daughter, Mary. Unbeknownst to anyone at the time, this was the extraordinarily pivotal act that led to the
Glorious Revolution and the empowerment of Parliament. Notwithstanding the various self-interested
actions with which Clarendon was charged, likely largely untrue, he probably was a moderating influence
on the King, who was twenty-one years his junior. Harris, Restoration, p. 76; Claydon & Speck, William &
Mary, p. 105; cf. “Hyde, Edward, Earl of Clarendon (1609-1674),” Ronald H. Fritze & William B. Robison,
eds. Historical Dictionary of Stuart England, 1603-1689 (Westport, CN & London: Greenwood Press,
1996), pp. 239-40.
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(including Shaftesbury) who from 1668 to 1674 served collectively, novelly and ineffectively as Charles’
leading minister.520
It was in 1670 that Charles II signed the famous Secret Treaty of Dover, agreeing to support
Louis XIV’s attack on Holland in return for funds, English military support, and a secret agreement that
Charles would, at the opportune time, declare himself Catholic. This treaty, just focusing on its overt
terms, was an about face by Charles II from the traditional English policy of allying with other European
states, .e.g, Holland and Sweden, in order to contain French expansionism. As one historian observed,
“[t]he year 1672 was a year of crisis both for Europe and for England. In that year Louis XIV attacked the
United Provinces … and his troops … outmanoeuvred the scanty Dutch forces and established
themselves in the heart of Dutch territory at Utrecht. Most of five out of the seven provinces were
overrun, and the remaining two, Holland and Zeeland, seemed to be at Louis’s mercy.” 1672 was the
“zenith” of Louis XIV and France’s power, with other European countries increasingly weak, and the
Huguenots in increasing jeopardy in France. “Only Holland remained as an obstacle on the Continent,”
representing a bastion against absolute monarchy, Catholicism and French control of most of Europe.”521
In this timeframe Sidney was idling in southern France. Meanwhile, the republican experiment of
the Dutch under Johan De Witt’s leadership ended in August 1672 when De Witt was killed by a mob, and
the “chief authority” in Holland became William of Orange, future son-in-law of James, the Duke of York
(both future kings of England).522 Seven years after Clarendon’s ouster, and with the demise of the
unsuccessful experiment of the Cabal of Six in 1674, politics swung to the right in England. Thomas
Osborne, known as Lord Danby, a protégé of Buckingham, became Lord Treasurer. Danby was a
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The Cabal Ministry was so named both because it was a collective advisor to the king but, also,
cleverly, CABAL was an acronym that stood for the ministers who served: Clifford, Arlington,
Buckingham, Ashley-Cooper (Shaftesbury), and Lauderdale. Harris, Restoration, p. 71.
521

Haley, William of Orange and the English Opposition, 1672-4, pp. 1-3.

522
Louis XIV’s invasion of Holland in 1672 led to the famous instance of Dutch resistance during which
the dikes were opened and the countryside flooded to forestall the French incursion. Nevertheless, Louis
“insisted on impossible terms,” which prompted the reaction, the “revulsion of popular feeling,” against the
republican Pensionary, John de Witt, and his mob murder, along with his brother, at The Hague. This is
what led to William of Orange’s assumption of power. Haley, William of Orange and the English
Opposition 1672-4, pp. 4-5. Charles’ daughter Mary, who was raised as a Protestant, was married to
William, the Prince of Orange. See generally Claydon & Speck, William & Mary, passim.
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staunch royalist – a Cavalier who also had been a member of the Cabal Ministry with Shaftesbury.523 With
considerable success but also with dire consequences, Danby sought to strengthen the monarchy and
Anglicanism at the expense of Parliament, Catholics and Dissenters. He effectively manipulated the
political system, increasing both his personal power and that of the King.524 At the same time Danby
unsuccessfully introduced a Test Bill in the House of Lords that would have required all officeholders as
well as MPs to make a declaration against resistance to the King or his agents, and “swear never to
endavour to alter the government in Church and state.” The measure was attacked by Shaftesbury,
Halifax, and other opposition peers. In a subsequently issued pamphlet that became a bestseller,
Shaftesbury characterized the Danby initiative as part of a long-term plan by the administration “to
‘declare the Government absolute and Arbitrary, and allow Monarchy, as well as Episcopacy to be Jure
Divino, and not to be bounded or limited by humane Laws.’”525 Just to get a further flavor of Danby’s
views, in 1676 he issued a proclamation, soon withdrawn, to ban coffeehouses in England because of the
“Defamation of His Majesty’s Government” and to prevent “the disturbance of the quiet and peace of the
Realm.” that they cause!526 Danby was not factually wrong; lots of political grousing took place in coffee
houses. He just had no political sense, not to mention principles. It was in the context of these very
divisive political times that Sidney arrived back in England.
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Danby also happened to be a cousin of the Percys. Cartwright, Sacharissa, p. 57; “Osborne, Thomas,
1st Earl of Danby, Marquis of Carmarthen, Duke of Leeds (1631-1712),” Historical Dictionary of Stuart
England, pp. 361-62.
524

“The standing Parliament gave Danby the opportunity to exploit the now anachronistic Cavalier loyalty
of the survivors of those elected in 1661. Prorogations, adjournments, the powers exercised by the
Speaker gave Danby an immense and permanent advantage. By bribery he could often detach hostile
leaders; by patronage he kept his own supporters satisfied. If at times Danby could be checked, as with
the political test of 1675 or in 1678 over foreign policy, yet there seemed to be no prospect of his power
being brought to an end.” J. R. Jones, The First Whigs (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1961/1985).
525
Harris, Restoration, p. 78. During Shaftebury’s trial for high treason, one witness, Brian Haines, who
had impeached Danby, testified that the King would never grant him a pardon given the fact that the King
was willing to “dissolve[] so many Parliaments for the sake of the Earl of Danby.” Shaftesbury’s response
was that if the King did not grant Haines’ pardon, “we are prepar’d to raise Arms against him” and,
similarly, “if he doth not do it, he can’t expect to be long King of England.” Testimony of Brian Haines,
The Proceedings at the Sessions House in the Old-Baily, London, on Thursday the 24th day of November,
1681. Before His Majesties Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer, upon the Bill of Indictment for HighTreason against Anthony Earl of Shaftesbury (London, Samuel Mearne & John Baker,
1681)(“Shaftesbury Trial”), p. 27.
526

W. M. Lupton, English History from the Earliest Period to Our Own Times (London: Longmans, Green,
and Co. 1876), p. 281.
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In October 1678, Parliament began to investigate Titus Oates’ accusations summarily termed “the
Popish Plot,” in which Catholics were accused of trying to assassinate Charles II so that his Catholic
brother James, Duke of York, could succeed. The plot inflamed longstanding fears of Popery and the
persecution of Protestants in England.527 James was forced into exile, and the intense power struggle
between Parliament and the King began in earnest.
It was a year later, in late-1678, through the infamous disclosure by Ralph Montagu, former English
ambassador to France, the House of Commons learned about the King’s substantial secret payments from
Louis XIV that had significantly contributed to Charles’ ability to do without Parliament. In fact, Commons
was learning only of the “level one” secret parts of the agreement; it still did not know about the religious
and military components of the Treaty of Dover – the “level two” secret agreement within the secret
agreement. The exposure of the treaty provoked controversy – indeed, outrage. One English pamphleteer
argued that “a ‘good Parliament’ might be the means of saving Flanders, Holland, and the Holy Roman
Empire ‘from being reduced to the French Yoke; after which, the ruine of this Kingdom would be an
unavoidable consequence’.”528 The French Yoke, or as the poet Andrew Marvell wrote, “that Romish
Yoak,” very much included, if not meant Catholicism. It was in this timeframe, mid-1677, that Marvell,
Sidney’s contemporary, published his widely disseminated pamphlet, Account of the Growth of Popery, and
Arbitrary Government in England which, among other polemics in the thriving public sphere, fomented an
anti-Catholic frenzy, associating “popery” with other dire examples of despotism.529 Indeed, the pamphlet
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The pamphlet literature on this subject is massive. See n.563; see generally Mark Knights, Politics and
Opinion in Crisis, 1678-81 (Cambridge University Press, 1995).
528

Harris, Restoration, pp. 166-67 & n. 117, citing C.B., An Address to the Honourable City of London,
And All Other Cities, Shires and Corporations, Concerning their Choice of a New Parliament (1681),
epistle dedicatory; Traill, Shaftesbury (the first earl), pp. 141-44.
529

Andrew Marvell, An account of the growth of popery and arbitrary government in England more
particularly, from the long prorogation of November, 1675, ending the 15th of February, 1676, till the last
meeting of Parliament, the 16th of July, 1677, https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A52125.0001.00
1?rgn=main;view=fulltext (9-14-18); see also Andrew Marvell: Complete Poetical Works (Hastings, East
Sussex, UK: Delphi Classics, 2014). Marvell is closely associated with Milton; they were friends and
colleagues. Both also wrote prolifically. Both laced their work, even when not expressly political, with their
evolving political views and, often, religious ideas. From the Lord Protector’s panegyrist, to “an increasingly
bitter satirist and polemicist,” Marvell’s attacks were “in both prose and poetry.” He tutored Lord Fairfax’s
daughter and, in “the 1650s travelled from royalism, first to an ambivalent Cromwellianism, then to an
unambivalent one.” See “Andrew Marvell, 1621-1678,” Poetry Foundation, https://www.poetryfoundation.
org/poets/ andrew-marvell (9-14-18). For more details on Marvell, see Appendix B.
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was considered to be “fuel, among other writings, for the Rye House Plot of 1683.”530 Once again, this was
the context in which Sidney returned to English politics.
Losing patience with his agitating Parliament, on December 30, 1678, the King prorogued the
standing Cavalier or Long Parliament that officially had sat since May 1661; the following month it was
dissolved, ending seventeen years of royalist political dominance.531 Prior to Parliament’s dissolution,
under Shaftesbury’s leadership in 1678 the Commons had tried to impeach Danby for high treason. This
move was provoked not only by Danby’s personality and character that evoked hatred among those who
disagreed with him, but also for actions he had taken, as well as for those he had not, such as bearing the
responsibility for the contemporaneously explosive Popish Plot, for which he clearly was not responsible
but which, nevertheless, he was charged with failing to disclose. Lords refused to commit Danby, and to
avoid the matter Charles prorogued and then dissolved Parliament.532
It was in this context that both the fraudulent Popish Plot materialized and the succession debate
took place. The Popish Plot was foisted on a gullible public by an unscrupulous man named Titus Oates,
who alleged, inter alia, that there was a treacherous conspiracy underway involving Jesuits and other
Catholics determined to murder the King so that his Catholic brother James could replace him on the
English throne. “The Plot” was exposed in the summer of 1678. Shortly thereafter, the Justice of the
Peace (JP) before whom Oates had testified was murdered, a man named Sir Edmund Godfrey, which
created hysteria in London.533
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Smith, Andrew Marvell, p. 3.
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Bitter clashes in the council over exclusion intensified after the prorogation of the first whig parliament.
Shaftesbury denounced those whom he held responsible – Halifax, Essex and Sunderland, Sidney’s
nephew, cousin and nephew, respectively – in the most violent terms. Jones, The First Whigs, p.78. This
likely contributed to Sidney’s dislike of Shaftesbury.
532

The memoirs of Sir William Temple reported the following: “I never saw any man more sensible of the
miserable condition of his affairs than I found his Majesty…. he told me he had none left with whom he
could so much as speak of them in confidence, since my Lord Treasurer (Danby) was gone…. I found
that the council of my Lord Treasurer’s removal had been carried on by the Duke of Monmouth, in
conjunction with the Duchess of Portsmouth [the king’s mistress] and Lord Essex, who was then in the
greatest confidence with the Duke of Monmouth, and by him and Lord Sunderland newly brought into the
Treasury. I found my Lord Sunderland, at least, in compliance with this knot, and that all were resolved to
bring my Lord Shaftesbury again to Court.” Introduction, Diary & Correspondence of Times of Ch. II, p.
xcviii; Jones, The First Whigs, p. 30; Harris, Restoration, pp. 48, 174-79.
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On the Popish Plot, see Greaves, Secrets of the Kingdom, Ch. 1, pp. 5-52.
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A new Parliament met in March 1679, often called the First Exclusion Parliament. When it
immediately turned to the Danby case Charles announced that he had pardoned the man. Commons then
tried to utilize another legal mechanism, a bill of attainder, to proceed against Danby, who surrendered
himself and was imprisoned in the Tower.534 Before the House of Lords Danby challenged the legality of
the Commons’ action, invoking the King’s pardon, which he had obtained. Commons then challenged the
pardon. With continuing debate in Lords and Commons Charles again prorogued Parliament; two months
later, in late-May 1679, Parliament was dissolved.535 It was during this First Exclusion Parliament that
Shaftesbury introduced a bill in Commons to exclude James, Duke of York, from the succession.536
In this frantic environment a political tug of war took place between Parliament and the King over
the issue of succession, an environment that Sidney, with seeming objectivity and uncharacteristic
dispassion if not complete detachment, duly reported to Henry Savile, England’s ambassador in Paris.
Because Savile had been so instrumental in obtaining the necessary papers for Sidney to return to
England, Sidney felt enormously indebted to him. One small way that he felt he could repay this debt was
by keeping Savile current on events in London – a useful window for the historian into Sidney’s
perspective. There were leaders, such as Arthur Capel, the Earl of Essex (unrelated to the prior Earls,
viz., a revived title), who tried to support Charles by creating succession alternatives other than the
Catholic James.537 Halifax and Essex, Sidney’s nephew and cousin, represented one such faction;
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Danby remained in the Tower of London for five years. Id, p. 179; Traill, Shaftesbury (the first earl), p.
145.
535

One can perhaps most easily understand the sense of vulnerability felt by MPs and advocates of
participatory government by a simple list of Charles II’s numerous proroguing of, or discontinuing without
dissolving, Parliament, as well as his complete dissolutions or dismissals of Parliament: March 29 to
October 9, 1673 (prorogation); October 20-29, 1673 (prorogation); November 3, 1673-January 7, 1674
(prorogation); February 24-November 10, 1674 (prorogation); November 10, 1674-April 13, 1675
(prorogation); June-October, 1675 (prorogation); November 22, 1675-February 15, 1677 (prorogation);
July 15-October 21, 1678 (prorogation); December 30, 1678-February 3, 1679 (prorogation); January 24,
1679 (dissolution); May 26, 1679 (prorogation and then dissolution); early October, 1679-January, 1680
(prorogation); January-October 21, 1680 (prorogation); January 10-20, 1681 (prorogation); January 18,
1681 (dissolution); March 28, 1681 (dissolution of Oxford Parliament, the “shortest-lived of all English
Parliaments”). Traill, Shaftesbury (the first earl), pp. 87-175.
536

Political “exclusion” efforts instigated a raft of propaganda, including John Dryden’s famous antiexclusion satire Absalom and Achitophel (1681). See J. R. Jones, The First Whigs: The Politics of the
Exclusion Crisis, 1678-1683 (London: O.U.P. for the University of Durham, 1961); see also The Stuart
Succession Project, stuarts.exeter.ac.uk/ education/moments/exclusion-crisis/ (4-10-19).
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“I continue to give you an account of what I hear, because these irregular motions are often the forerunners of great matters; and as they denote the temper of a Nation, they give good grounds of guessing
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corresponding to the moderate party before the war, they advocated limitations on the Duke of York’s
sovereign powers rather than James’ exclusion from the line of succession – a position that the King
supported, at least with certain conditions.538 These men also favored the Protestant leadership of the
Prince of Orange over the King’s illegitimate son, James Scott, the Duke of Monmouth.539 Like Sidney,
Essex was known as a man of integrity, “one of the most popular among the country leaders” (although
he was considered “stiff and sullen” by the King).540 Essex disagreed with Shaftesbury’s succession
strategy, and sought to block Shaftesbury in Commons. Interestingly, the Duke of York “was particularly
afraid of Halifax and Essex, whom he had long suspected ‘as men that did not love a monarchy as it was

what they will end in…[P]erhaps others have not been so free in telling you the effect of it as I shall be.”
There were a number of succession alternatives that were floated. On the timing of James’s conversion,
he apparently privately converted to Catholicism in 1672, but it was not until 1676 that he was received
into the Catholic Church. At that point, the pope accepted his conversion and removed his objections to
James marrying the Catholic princess, Mary of Modena, which had already taken place in 1673. Speck,
Reluctant Revolutionaries, Englishmen and the Revolution of 1688-89 (Oxford University Press, 1990), p.
123; Algernon Sidney letter to Henry Savile, undated, quoted in Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review,
p. 140.
538

Essex, Arthur Capell, was the son of a royalist officer who had been executed during the Civil War. He
was awarded an earldom after Charles was restored to power. Essex was Algernon Sidney’s first cousin
(in-law), married to Elizabeth Percy, the daughter of Sidney’s namesake uncle, Algernon Percy, the 10th
Earl of Northumberland, with whom Sidney was so close. Northumberland had been a leader in the
House of Lords at the time that the moderate parliamentary faction, of which Sidney was a part, had tried
in vain to find some means of compromise with Charles I at the end of the civil war. See John Adamson,
The Noble Revolt: The Overthrow of Charles I, (London: Phoenix, 2009) esp. Prologue, chs. 1, 2, and 15.
Essex had served as an ambassador to Denmark, been a member of the privy council and, like other
members of the Sidney extended family, lord lieutenant of Ireland beginning in 1672. When he returned
to England, Essex joined the “Country” or opposition group that strenuously opposed Danby’s
government. Of course, Essex and Sidney were on familiar terms.
539

Once again, the English system of titles is a quagmire for the non-Englishman. In sum, titles were
recycled once they were retired, whether because of the absence of an heir or because the monarch
revoked the title for misconduct. The prior 2nd Earl of Essex was Algernon Sidney’s maternal great aunt’s
brother, who also can be described as the 10th Earl of Northumberland’s uncle, the brother of the 10th
Earl’s mother. Just to add further panache to the mix, that 2nd Earl’s maternal great-grandmother was
Mary Boleyn, the sister of the Anne Boleyn who was beheaded by her husband – Queen Elizabeth I’s
mother and the wife of Henry VIII.
540

Green, “Green’s Larger History of the English People,” p. 401; The History and Proceedings of the
House of Lords, from the Restoration in 1660, to the Present Time. Containing The most Remarkable
Motions, Speeches, Debates, Orders and Resolutions. Together with all the PROTESTS during that
Period. AND THE Numbers PRO and CON upon each Division. WITH An Account of the Promotions of
the several PEERS, and the State of the PEERAGE in every Reign. Connected with the Transactions of
the COMMONS, and History of the Times. AND Illustrated with Historical NOTES and OBSERVATIONS.
Together with the DEBATES in the Parliament of SCOTLAND relating to the UNION. To each VOLUME
are added proper INDEXES. VOLUME the First, from 1660, to 1697 (London: Ebenezer Timberland,
1742), p. 110.
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in England.’”541 Sidney was “also thought to favour limitations on the monarchy over the Shaftesbury
proposal to exclude James. The Duke of York wrote, ‘Algernon Sidney and the ablest of the republican
Party said that if a bill of limitation was once got, they should from that moment, think themselves sure of
a republic’.”542 What James understood to be a republic is one thing; what Sidney and others might have
meant, if they indeed made this statement, is another. With the fright generated by the Popish Plot, and
under Shaftesbury’s effective leadership, an intense political campaign ensued to obtain votes in both
Houses of Parliament to exclude James from the throne.543 Sidney recorded that the Shaftesbury and
Shaftesburyites who favored Monmouth were hostile to the Halifax/Essex faction – Sidney’s relatives.544
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James, Duke of York, to Colonel George Legge from Brussels, 22 July 1679, The manuscripts of the
Earl of Dartmouth, HMC, 3 vols. (1887-96), I, p. 36, cited in Mahlberg, Henry Neville, p. 171.
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Mahlberg, Henry Neville, p. 172. Mahlberg referenced Scott II, which relied on James MacPherson,
Original papers, containing the secret history of Great Britain, from the Restoration, to the accession of
Hanover (1775), pp. 111-12; but Mahlberg also noted that, “Scott concedes that otherwise ‘there is little
evidence associating Sidney specifically with the limitations proposal.’” Id, p. 193 n. 199. This is not
surprising; Algernon was not in Parliament.
543

Witnesses during the Shaftesbury trial for high treason had a lot to say about Shaftesbury’s open
attacks on the King. One witness testified that Shaftesbury told him, “That the King was Popishly affected
and did adhere to Popery, and that he took the same methods that his Father before him took, which
brought his Father’s Head to the block, and we will also bring his thither.” Another witness testified, “soon
after the Parliament was dissolv’d at Oxford, I was at my Lord Shaftesbury’s house, where he was
speaking against the King, and said, that he was an unjust man, and unfit to Reign, and that he was a
Papist in his heart, and would introduce Popery.” A third witness stated that Shaftesbury had asked him
how many men he had “in a readiness, when ever occasion shall serve, and to stand by, if occasion
should be, for to assist the Commonwealth of England; for we do really intend to have England under a
Common-wealth and no Crown; and say’s he, we intend to live as we see Holland does, that is, to have a
Commonwealth, and to have no Supream head, particular man, say’s he, or King, nor owe Obedience to
a Crown; and, say’s he, we will extirpate the King, and all his Family as near as he can.” Shaftesbury
Trial, pp. 28-29, 32. Brian Haynes, a fourth witness, described a conversation he had with Shaftesbury at
a Pastery Cooks Shop in June 1681: “pray my Lord said I, among other questions, what Religion is the
King of? truly says he, Mr. Haynes he hath no more Religion than an horse; for faith he, they say Sir, he
was inclined to Popery, when he came first to England says he, he had a tincture of Popery, and was
much inclined that way, but since he was degenerated from all the Principles of Christianity, for he is just
like a perfect Beast.” Id, p. 43. A fifth witness, John Macnamara, testified that Shaftesbury had told him
in April 1681, “That the King deserved to be deposed as much as King Richard the Second, and that he
took the Dutchess of Mazarines advice in every particular, which was the worst of Woman kind.” Id, p.
44.
A year after the Popish Plot, another conspiracy, the Meal Tub plot, was exposed. The Meal Tub plot
was an alleged attempt by a coterie of Catholics to manufacture evidence of a “Presbyterian” plot. This
only renewed the anti-Catholic hysteria originally fomented by Titus Oates’ revelations the year before.
Mark Knights, “The ‘Monster’ Petition of 1680,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 36, No. 1 (March 1993), pp.
39-67, 41.
544
Sidney to Henry Savile, July 16 & Sept. [illeg.], 1679, Sidney-Henry Savile Letters, pp. 52-56. Denzil
Lord Holles, a Civil War Presbyterian associated with the cabal of Charles’ five leading ministers in 1679,
“still supported limitations on a Catholic successor as late as December 1679.” This also was the position
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Writing to Savile, Sidney reflected on how things stood politically in England with an uncharacteristic
bland coolness: “But when I have said what I can upon this business, I must confess I do not know three
men of a mind, and that a spirit of giddiness reigns amongst us, far beyond any I have ever observed in
my life.”545 In the first parlay over his Catholic brother the King did not buckle under but went to the House
of Lords; “and, sending for the Commons, told them, among other things, that he would pass any Bills
which they might devise for the support of the Protestant religion, provided they abstained from
impeaching the succession or the right of the crown in the true line.” This worked; Parliament backed off.

taken by the republican Henry Neville among many others. Mahlberg, Henry Neville, pp. 65, 171. Holles
apparently was the head of the “Presbyterians” in Commons in 1647, the so-called “compromising
majority,” seeking to send the New Model to Ireland both because they were the best British soldiers and
because that would get them out of England. Carswell, The Porcupine, pp. 52-53, 58. Meanwhile, Sidney
described quite clearly the variously staked out positions in a letter to Savile, Halifax’s younger brother:
“The Courtiers did believe, that the King’s yielding that the Parliament should not end with his life … if his
successor proved to be a Papist, would have given entire satisfaction unto the House of Commons. But
to the contrary it is certain, that the supposition that the next in blood must be King, though a Papist, is so
distasteful to them,” the members of the House of Commons, “that nothing will please upon that odious
condition; and as to this particular, it is looked upon as a trick to bring the Parliament to confess and confirm the Duke’s title, that is, a little gilding to cover a poisonous pill.” The consequence was that this put
Commons “upon various counsels; some would impeach him, upon what is discovered of his part in the
Plot: Others incline more to bring in an Act, to exclude him from the succession of the Crown, as being a
Papist, and thereby a friend unto and dependent upon, a foreign and enemy Power.” Sidney then parsed
this group. “Some of those that are of this mind, look “who is fittest to succeed, if this should be; and they,
are for the most part divided between the Prince of Orange and Duke of Monmouth.”
Sidney also provided Savile with his own appraisal. “The first,” meaning the William of Orange, “hath
plainly the most plausible title, by his Mother and his Wife.” Sidney was insightful, in terms of his
understanding of European politics and the influence of republicanism in the Protestant Low Countries.
“[B]ut, besides the opinion of the influence it is believed the Duke of York would have over him,” meaning
William of Orange, because James, Duke of York, was William’s father-in-law, “tis feared that the
Commonwealth-party in Holland, would be so frightened with that, as to cast itself absolutely into the
hands of the King of France, who might thereby have a fair occasion of ruining both England and
Holland.” Looking at this mutatis mutandis, it is clear that William of Orange’s intense focus and purpose
in later agreeing to invade England was to obtain English military and financial support for his war against
France and French aggression towards the Low Countries. “William’s objective from 1672 to his death
can be stated very simply. Fired by his personal resentment at France’s steady occupation of family
lands, and by a deep commitment to a Europe composed of independent nations, the prince’s prime aim
was to contain Louis XIV. In part this policy involved bringing in as many other powers as possible into
conflict with France. Ultimately this would lead William to intervene in England in 1688.” If James
became king and “plunge[d] his realm into an internal conflict, the stadholder knew, it would be impossible
for England to be an effective counter-weight to France.” Claydon & Speck, William & Mary, pp. 15, 30.
Sidney then opined, “I need not tell you the reasons against Monmouth; but the strongest I hear alleged
for him, are, that whosoever is opposed to York, will have a good party, and all Scotland, which is every
day like to be in arms, and doth certainly favour him, and may probably be of as much importance in the
troubles that are now likely to fall upon us, as they were in the beginning of the last. Others are only upon
negatives.” Sidney to Henry Savile, May [illeg.], 1679, Sidney-Henry Savile letters, pp. 20-21.
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Id.
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In contrast, Shaftesbury disowned the outcome and those responsible for it.546
Once again, the depth and breadth of Sidney/Percy family involvement in high politics is
remarkable: three of the new ministers who dominated the reconstructed government after the fall of
Danby were Sidney’s two nephews, Halifax and Sunderland, and his first cousin (in law), the Earl of
Essex.547 Included in the new Privy Council were Halifax, Russell and Sir William Temple, all relations or
close family friends. Shaftesbury, the King’s opposition nemesis, was named Council President. These
were the men advising Charles on how to manage parliamentary politics, among other things. At this late
juncture Sidney was not radically opposed to the government. Indeed, he commented to Savile that if
these men “can well agree amongst themselves, I believe they will have the management of almost all
businesses, and may bring much honour to themselves, and good to our nation.” 548 These are hardly the
words of an anti-monarchist, a rebel, or a “plotter,” much less a revolutionary!
The point of all this convoluted, intertwined English history is to show that it is precisely in the
context of escalating political madness, a madness in which his family was intimately involved, that Sidney
arrived in England and, after eighteen years roaming the Continent, became highly re-politicized. As
Sidney wrote in an early April 1679 letter to Savile, “The fruits expected from the last Parliament having
been lost by little underhand bargains, and as some say, the King and Parliament equally betrayed by
those that were trusted by them, men’s minds seem to be filled with various conceits, and many
Jealousies…. I know not what this will produce, but I never saw men’s minds more heated than at
present.”549 It is difficult to over-emphasize the widespread English fear of papacy reflected in the hysteria
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“I disown anything to do in it, and my Lord Russell [who had sided with Halifax and Essex] … My Lord
Shaftesbury says, he does no more understand the House of Commons than he does the Court. He does
lose ground.” This according to Sidney’s sister Dorothy, Lady Sunderland, who wrote this in a letter to
her youngest brother, Henry Sidney. Cartwright, Sacharissa, p. 297.
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Sidney described this new leadership to Henry Savile: “You will perhaps be surpriz’d to hear, that
yesterday the King did entirely dissolve his Old Privy Council, and chose a new one, consisting of fifteen
Officers of the Crown, ten Lords, and five Commoners; his Majesty retaining unto himself the liberty of
naming a President, calling such Princes of the Blood, as should be from time to time…. To which he was
pleased to add, That he would have no first or principal Minister, no Committee of Foreign affairs, or
Cabinet Council; but that in all things he would follow and rely upon their advice, next unto that of his
Great Council, the Parliament.” Sidney to Henry Savile, April 28, 1679, Sidney-Henry Savile letters, pp.
13-14; see Scott II, p. 114.
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Sidney to Henry Savile, April [illeg.], 1679, Sidney-Henry Savile letters, p. 12.
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Sidney to Henry Savile, Feb. 1, 1679, id, p. 4.
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about the Popish Plot and the alarm in the late 1670s over “an imminent French,” that is, Catholic invasion.
It is interesting to note that notwithstanding the national frenzy, Sidney remarked to Savile, “We have every
day foolish alarms from the French Fleet, and I find no body but the Lord Sunderland and myself that
believe not one word of it.”550 No doubt Sidney’s perspective was very influenced by his comfortable multiyear residence in both Rome and the south of France. However much he did not want England to become
a Catholic country, Sidney was not corybantically terrified of the French or papists; and once again, the
notion that Sidney could possibly align with the very conservative royalist Sunderland on any matter belies
the suggestion that he was a rabid, radical revolutionary.
Sidney and Sunderland notwithstanding, the pervasive view in England was one of fear of the
French: “The last strongholds of Protestantism in north-west Europe were now the Stuart kingdoms of
England and Scotland and the United Provinces, and they faced in France an aggressive neighbour with
clear expansionist ambitions. Not only had Charles done little to meet this threat, he actually appeared to
be in league with Louis XIV,” which indeed he was. William of Orange shared this view of a predatory
Louis XIV.551 Ironically, while Oates’ Popish Plot was fraudulent, Charles II’s plot of alliance with the
Catholic French king was not. “It has been remarkably obtuse for historians to ascribe the resulting fear
of popery to hysteria when there was indeed a real popish plot, masterminded by the King.”552 Perhaps
this is most poignantly illustrated by the fact that in February 1685 Charles privately converted to
Catholicism.553
Secrets notwithstanding, the bloom was once again very much off the Stuart rose. England
became embroiled in a second Restoration crisis, often termed the exclusion crisis.554 When Commons
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Sidney to Henry Savile, April 7, 1679, id, p. 14.
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See n. 544.
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Scott persuasively makes the case that in the 1660s, at the time that he was thinking seriously about
converting, James discussed the matter with his brother, King Charles, “Knowing that the King was of the
same mind.” See Appendix. B.
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Scott, “England’s Houdini: Charles II’s escape from Worcester as a metaphor for his reign,” Liberty,
Authority, Formality, Ch. 4, p. 84. Historians do not agree on the seriousness and motivations for Charles’
conversion. See, e.g., Haley, William of Orange and the English Opposition 1672-4, pp. 3-4.
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On the term Exclusion Crisis, see n. 138. There were three so-called Exclusion Parliaments. The first
was elected in January 1679, and sat from March 6 to July 1679; the second was elected in August and
September 1679, and sat from October 21, 1680 to January 1681; and the third was elected in February
1681 and sat from March 21 to 28, 1681. Mahlberg, Henry Neville, p. 193 n.190. All three so-called
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tried to impeach Danby in late 1678 for his role in King Charles’ secret liaison with the French monarchy,
the King dissolved the Long Parliament. For the first time in eighteen years a general election was held in
early 1679. In this context Penn and Sidney issued their pamphlet, Englands Great Interest in the Choice
of this New Parliament, which focused on popery and arbitrary government, undoubtedly the two issues
of greatest import at the time.555
There were three separate Parliaments convened between March 1679 and March 1681.556 The
first new Parliament of 1679 sat for sixty-one days, of which twenty-one were spent on Danby and fifteen
on the fraudulent Popish Plot.557 Filmer’s Patriarcha was published in 1679 in the midst of the succession
crisis. Patriarcha was particularly relevant in this context because Filmer argued that the best way to
avoid arbitrary governance and popery was the establishment of a strong monarchy, not some other form
of government that enabled resistance.558 During the 1679 Parliament, an exclusion bill was introduced
but Parliament was prorogued by the King in May and subsequently dissolved, with the intended result of
erasing all proceedings against Danby and others before a vote on the bill.559 Sixteen long months of
parliamentless rule followed, with the consequent radicalization and division of public opinion.560 Note the
disunity within Sidney’s family, with his nephew Sunderland aligned as a courtier (royalist), his nephew
Halifax resigning to later champion a proposal to limit the powers of the future king James, the Duke of

Exclusion Parliaments were “accompanied by an outpouring of pamphlet literature” on the subject of
exclusion. Neville’s republican tract Plato Redividus, which grounds government in property, also came
out around the time of the third Exclusion Parliament. As Neville stated, “Dominion is founded in
property.” Henry Neville, Plato Redividus; or, a Dialogue Concerning Government, 1681 (UK: Dodo Press
reprint, undated), p. 16; Mahlberg, Henry Neville, p. 165.
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There is not an academic consensus on who authored, or primarily authored, this pamphlet. The year
before, in 1677, Andrew Marvell had issued his sensational attack on Catholicism and the doctrine of
transubstantiation in the essay, The Growth of Popery and Arbitrary Government. More particularly, from
the long Prorogation of November 1675. Id, pp. 8, 36; Traill, Shaftesbury (the first earl), pp. 143-44; Scott
II, p. 51.
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On “The crisis of parliaments,” see Scott II, Ch. 3, pp. 50-77. Scott holds what is likely a minority view
that these political battles should not be viewed or articulated in terms of an exclusion (or a succession)
crisis, but rather overwhelmingly in terms of the twin dominant issues of popery and arbitrary government.
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Scott II, p. 52.

558

Id, p. 38.
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Traill, Shaftesbury (the first earl), pp. 143-44. At the time, Scottish Protestants had rebelled against
the dangers of popery, prelacy and arbitrary government. Harris, Restoration, Ch. 6, “From Bothwell
Bridge to Wigtown,” pp. 329-76.
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Id, p. 57.
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York, and Sidney’s cousin Essex resigning to later become involved in some way with rebellious plotters
who clearly opposed James’ ascendancy.561 Meanwhile, Algernon’s brother Henry was supporting the
intercession of William of Orange into the British political fray.562 During the 1679-80 prorogation, there
were processions in the streets of London and an intense petitioning campaign directed, it seems, by
Shaftesbury.563 Perhaps most threatening to the Crown was the London sheriff’s election in mid-1680,
won by a wealthy merchant with republican sympathies, Slingsby Bethel – a victory in which Sidney
basked as he had backed Bethel. Meanwhile, it was a failure for Shaftesbury, who had not.564
While Sidney was a prominent republican during and after the Civil War, he had been away from
England for a very long time. He would have been known only by reputation by many MPs, particularly
the younger men.565 “In these eighteen years a remarkable change had come over the face of the
country. Even the Cavaliers, as Shaftesbury remarked, ‘were past their vice.’ A new generation had
sprung up of whom this could not be said; the question was whether ‘virtue was past.’ Apparently it was in
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Helena Charlotte Foxcroft, Life and Letters of Sir George Savile, Vol. I, pp. 196-97, cited in Scott II, p.
57.
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See ns. 572 &. 573.
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Traill, Shaftesbury (the first earl), pp. 158-59. There is substantial scholarly literature on the Exclusion
Crisis and Shaftesbury’s role in it. As O. W. Furley explained in an early article on the subject, “The
attempt at Exclusion was the supreme effort of Shaftesbury to rally the early Whig party, and it was
accompanied by an intensive propaganda campaign, issuing forth a steady stream of pamphlets,
most of which are still extant.” This strategy wasn’t new. “[T]he pamphlet wars of 1640-60 were
prose wars. With the de facto breakdown of censorship, the period saw a staggering output of more
than 20,000 books, pamphlets, broadsides and newspapers: sermons and scriptural commentaries
mixed with satires and fictions, political theory and manifestos – a polyglot Babel of print.” James
Holstun, Introduction, Pamphlet Wars: Prose in the English Revolution (London, England: Frank
Cass & Co., Ltd., 1992), p. 1. With respect to the Shaftesbury-led propaganda strategy during the
Exclusion Crisis, as Furley noted, some of the best pamphlets were printed in Somer's Tracts, The
Harleian Miscellany and State Tracts: A Collection of Treatises relating to the Government, Privately
Printed in the Reign of Charles II, 1693. “[O]thers are now very rare.” When you combine the Whig
literature “with the Tory replies, they form a list of nearly two hundred titles, … the vast majority”
of which were “anonymous products of the moment, written in haste, and printed surreptitiously.”
Furley particularly recognized Ferguson, 'the Plotter,” who “ was indeed one of the cleverest
and most daring exclusionist writers. Ferguson’s connection to Shaftesbury “was undoubtedly
close.” O. W. Furley, “The Whig Exclusionists: Pamphlet Literature in the Exclusion Campaign, 167981,” Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1957), pp. 19-36, 19-20
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Sidney’s involvement in Bethel’s successful election was noted in a 1680 report to Louix XIV by Paul
Barillon d’Amoncourt, the marquis de Branges (1630-91), French ambassador to England from 1677 to
1688. “Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Barillon to Louis the XIVth, 5th December, 1680,” Appendix, Ch. IV
of the Review of Events, Dalrymple Memoirs, pp. 355-61, 357.
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Much earlier, in the 1659 timeframe, there already were “many young men and newcomers to
Westminster, whose ideological outlook cannot be easily determined.” Mahlberg, Henry Neville, p. 54..
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the Court, but not in England itself.”566 Scott unpersuasively contended that Sidney had a strong power
base in London and that he began to use it in the 1679-80 timeframe.567 Blackburne was probably more
accurate when he explained that Sidney “moved among a crowd of younger men, who looked on the last
great survivor of the most purely political movement of the age with respect due to his age and temper,
but not in the least comprehending his aims. His thoughts seemed to move in a wider circle than theirs.
He was to them, though they knew it not, the man of understanding….”568 Sidney was a politically
profound curiosity and an historical artifact to the younger MPs.
In the 1678 period Sidney had, “of course, support[ed] Halifax and Essex, and approve[d] of
Russell; but he touche[d] each event in the ironical manner which seems to have puzzled those who
ought to have known better.” In a 1679 letter Sidney referred in passing to a conversation he had with his
royalist nephew, Sunderland.569 Whig leader Ralph Montague stated in an August 1679 letter to Sidney’s
brother Henry that Sidney’s selection “upon a double return” to Parliament prompted the King to say, “he
believed Mr. Algernon Sydney would prove an honest man.”570 Visiting from The Hague, Henry was
meeting with many prominent people in London including Shaftesbury and the Duchess of Portsmouth
(the king’s mistress), and at the same time never failing to write detailed reports to the Prince of
Orange.571 In April 1680, Lady Sunderland wrote Henry that Algernon had visited her three times of late,
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Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, p. 143.
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Scott II, p. 162.

568

Blackburne also said that, “The men who were to make the cause prosper, the means they were to
use, and the ends they wanted, were repugnant to him.” Whether this refers to Shaftesbury and/or the
Rye House plotters is unclear. Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, p. 144.
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Sidney, Sidney-Henry Savile letters, p. 45.
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Montague also wrote to Henry Sidney that, “If Mr. Henry comes into the house and proves like his
brother, I am afraid I shall not be of his Majesty’s opinion.” Presumably, Montague was teasing Henry,
but the statement is unclear. Henry Sidney, The Times of Charles II, pp. 70-71; Blackburne, Algernon
Sidney: A Review, p. 157.
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Prince William of Orange entertained the Duke of York at The Hague in March and April of 1679,
“when the king sent his brother abroad out of harm’s way.” On the other hand, William was extremely
cautious, and entertained James Scott, Duke of Monmouth and Charles II’s illegitimate son, months later.
“Over the next twelve months William formally opposed constitutional change,” that is, an exclusion bill or
limitations on a Catholic Stuart’s monarchy, “but collected information as Charles’s court vacillated
between trying to face down exclusion, considering accepting it, allowing James to succeed but putting
constitutional limitations on him, and appointing William regent for his uncle.” By the Fall of 1680, Prince
William concluded he had to “come off the fence,” and decided that with exclusion’s increasing popularity,
“acceptance of an exclusion bill was the only way to get monarchy and legislature working together.”
William therefore rejected the constitutional limitations option, “stating that they would be ‘prejudicial to all
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and that he said he would continue to do so. She also commented that they had “not said one word of
any difference” between them.572 In sum, in these politically complicated years Sidney seems to have
functioned as what might be termed a relatively moderate republican, meeting with family and friends of
all political persuasions.
On the other hand, we also know that Sidney unsuccessfully ran for parliamentary office, first in
an early 1679 borough election that he apparently would have won but for the improper interference of
the Court. Later in 1679, after Parliament had been dissolved, Sidney consented to run in another
borough election that he was expected to win until his brother-in-law, Sir John Pelham, his sister Lucy’s
husband, persuaded Henry Sidney to be “brought forward. Algernon declined to be put up against his
brother, and at once retird.”573 While the family lawsuit was “occupying the big lawyers,” the “common talk
of the town” was the “rivalry of Algernon and Henry Sidney in the Bramber election, the angry words on
either side, and the estrangement which has followed.”574 This turn of events seems exceedingly odd. On

the royal family.’” His foremost connection with the English court was Henry Sidney, Algernon’s brother,
to whom he indicated he would “go to England to campaign for exclusion if Charles opted for that
solution.” Claydon & Speck, William & Mary, p. 27.
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Henry Sidney, Earl of Romney, Diary of the Times of Charles the Second, Vol. 2 (Memphis, TN:
General Books, LLC, undated), April 16, 1680 diary entry, p. 7. On the other hand, Sidney seems to
have been described in a letter to him by his friend, the MP William Harbord, as “a spark in your family
who labours hard to confound himself and us too.” While it is utter speculation, this could refer to Algernon’s difference with Henry, who was joined by Harbord in their advocacy of William of Orange as the
best heir to Charles II. (Both Harbord and Henry Sidney accompanied William of Orange when he
invaded England in 1688. Indeed, Henry was the Englishman given the responsibility of conveying the
secret invitation for William to invade England made by the “Seven,” the key group of English leaders who
signed the invitation, written by Henry Sidney). See Charles Harding Firth, “Harbord, William, DNB, 1901
Supplement, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/ Harbord,_William_(DNB01) (9-18-18); Thomas Secombe,
“Sidney, Henry (1641-1704),” DNB, 1885-1900, Vol. 52, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Sidney,_Henry_
(1641-1704)_(DNB00) (9-18-18).
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Whether Sidney lost or retired is not clear. Compare Cartright, Sacharissa, p. 292, with Blackburne,
Algernon Sidney: A Review, pp. 185-86. Blackburne also provided the plausible explanation that
Sidney’s family favored Henry primarily because, “It was necessary to secure the safety of Henry Sidney,
by giving him the privileges of a Member of Parliament” as Henry, residing at The Hague, was dangerously close to the Prince of Orange.
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Cartwright, Sacharissa, p. 205-06. This event is also recorded in a letter to Henry Sidney from the
former steward of his father, Gilbert Spencer. “We have at last now dispatched the business of Bramber,
though we met with great difficulties, lying under several disadvantages, as that of your not being here,
nor in England, nor known to any of them…then, what you should be surprised at, your brother Algernon
made an interest for one Sir Charles Wolsley, who was one of Oliver [Cromwell]’s friends, and he seems
to be mightily disgusted because you should stand at Bramber, where he intended once to stand, which I
have taken upon me to answer to Sir Jo. Pelham, that you knew nothing of it.” Spencer continued, “Penn
(as I presume you will hear by a better hand) wrote to Sir Jo. Pelham that your standing at Bramber would
make a greater feud between you and your brothers then is between you and the elder; unless for an
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the other hand, Pelham was closely tied in with Shaftesbury, and so perhaps this suggests the
motivation.575 A third time that year Sidney ran for public office and the results were a “double return,”
when two people are elected. The selection is then referred to Parliament, and while Sidney was
expected to win, Parliament declared the election void.576
In short, for various reasons, none of which may have been targeted (although they could have
been), Sidney was unable to gain parliamentary office. Cartwright concluded: “Algernon Sidney consoled
himself with the reflection that both he himself and his principles were out of fashion, and that if returned
to Parliament, he would have found himself equally disliked and suspected by both parties, and would
have thereby become the most inconsiderable member of the House. But he watched the course of political events with keen interest, and remained on friendly terms with both Halifax [the moderate Trimmer
and Sidney’s nephew-in-law] and Sunderland [the strident royalist and Sidney’s nephew], the two
Ministers who were so nearly related to him, although he often disapproved of their course of action.”577

expedient, your interest and Sir Jo. Pelham’s credit were engaged for that worthy patriot, C.W. [Charles
Wolsley]: whether this were only cunning in Penn, or true in your brother, I cannot well say; but I believe
you have most cause to take the matter ill from him, who, after he knew you stood, should have turned by
and put in a stranger.” Gilbert Spencer to Henry Sidney, Sept. 1, 1679, Diary & Correspondence of
Times of Ch. II, pp. 114-15. In short, when Henry Sidney decided to run in the borough election in which
Algernon planned to run, Algernon turned around and supported the opposing candidate, who had been
associated with Oliver Cromwell.
575

The intricacies of family interconnections continue. Pelham was a country gentleman from “an old
Sussex family.” By 1680, we know that his elder daughter Elizabeth was married to Edward Montague,
who was related to Ralph Montague, formerly ambassador to France, “chief instrument in the
impeachment of the Lord Treasurer Danby,” “one of the most prominent of the popular party,” “among the
foremost partisans of Monmouth and Shaftesbury,” and chief liaison between Barillon and the Opposition.
Montague was the man who disclosed (“betrayed”) to the House of Commons that the king had
negotiated a secret treaty provision with Louis XIV. Ralph Montague was also married to the “great
match of the day,” the young widow of the 11th Earl of Northumberland, Lady Elizabeth Wriothesley, who
was both the half-sister of Lady Russell and the cousin of the first Lord Sunderland. Accordingly,
Montague’s wife was Algernon Sidney’s first cousin-in-law. In short, there are numerous connections
here between Pelham and both the Sidneys and Shaftesbury. There is also the distinct possibility that
Pelham backed Henry because Algernon’s advocate, William Penn, had opposed Pelham in a 1679
election. “Ralph Montagu,” Dictionary of National Biography online, https://books.google.com/books?
id=eiUJAAAAIAAJ&pg=P A451&source=gbs_selected_pages&hl=en#v=onepage&q&f=false (9-5-18);
Cartwright, Saccharisa, pp. 207, 219-20; Diary & Correspondence of Times of Ch. II, pp. 69-70, n.1.
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Cartwright, Sacharissa, pp. 201-02. Clearly there were MPs who did not want Algernon Sidney to
return to Parliament. Whether this was a royalist-inclined faction or Whig competitors we do not know.
On the phenomenon of highly contested elections and a wider franchise in Restoration and post-glorious
revolutionary England, see Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in England 1675-1725, pp. 27-65.
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Cartwright, Sacharissa, p. 202. It was during this critical timeframe that Sidney maintained a detailed
correspondence with Savile, which he characterized as entirely truthful; indeed, per Blackburne, “All
authorities agree that they are remarkably truthful.” This seems to be the general impression that Sidney
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In sum, Sidney was unable to serve as an MP in the 1680 timeframe, among other reasons
because of likely fraudulent electoral practices, and there is no mention of him in the debates on
Shaftesbury’s divisive exclusion controversy. We know Sidney was intensely involved in family legal
matters in this period. Thus, he was not a significant political player although we can see that he was
modestly politically active. As Blackburne stated, “Algernon Sidney’s figure is dimly seen throughout this
time.”578 Sidney was involved in Bethel’s successful election as London’s sheriff, but that is not surprising
as Sidney knew Bethel from time both spent in the Netherlands in 1663; he also favored Bethel’s
republicanism.579 This particular election was crucially important to non-royalists as a defensive measure.
Astute politicians understood that their greatest risk was a corrupt legal system in which they could
become ensnared, railroaded, jailed or killed. In retrospect, we know this too. What was important about
the London election was that the sheriff had the responsibility of empaneling or returning London’s juries.
Interestingly, “Before 1680, London juries were usually returned by secondaries…. ’Mr Bethell was the
first yt begun to returne the Juryes himself.’” A sympathetic sheriff would be much less likely to arrest
politically targeted individuals; consequently, if the London sheriff was simpatico, one would be much less
likely to be victimized in court. Ironically, it was this very corrupt phenomenon that contributed mightily to
Sidney’s 1683 conviction and execution.
The second Parliament convened after Charles’ substantial prorogation began on Oct. 21, 1680.
Like the 1679 Parliament, it sat for about sixty days. It passed an exclusion bill (Nov. 1680), which was
carried to the Lords. Parliament was prorogued and then, on Jan. 9, 1681, dissolved by the King.580

gave, e.g., to Barillon, the French ambassador to England, who wrote to Louis XIV that, “M. de Sidney est
un de ceux qui me parlent le plus fortement, et le plus ouvertement sur cette matière.” Barillon au Roi,
Sept. 30, 1680, Dalrymple, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 312. Whether this superlative applies, there is no evident
reason for Sidney to have misled Savile; to the contrary. Thus, reliance on Sidney’s views in this
correspondence seems particularly sound.
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Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, p. 159.
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In 1663 Bethel had joined Sidney and others in trying to persuade the regicide Ludlow to join in their
political efforts to enlist the Dutch and/or the French to participate in some sort of plan to return
republicanism to England. Scott I, pp. 170-80. With regard to Bethel’s election as sheriff almost two
decades later, Sidney’s sister, in a letter, noted, “Then you may imagine what he [Algernon Sidney]
pretends to Mr. Bethell to be for ! – A Republic! There can be no doubt!” Cartwright, Sacharissa, p. 282;
see, e.g., Traill, Shaftesbury (the first earl), Chs. IX-XII.
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See n. 593.
220

In this timeframe Sidney seems to have worked closely with the distinguished jurist and parliamentarian Sir William Jones, who was a contemporary, coauthoring the compelling political pamphlet, A
Just and Modest Vindication of the Last Two Parliaments, which detailed how the King had undermined
Parliament’s role by his repetitive prorogations and dissolutions, and was a response to the King’s
Declaration Touching the Reasons that Moved Him to Dissolve the Two Last Parliaments, both written
and published in 1681. Jones also was the father-in-law of Sidney’s nephew, Sir John Pelham, the son of
Sidney’s sister, Lucy Sidney Pelham.581 A response to the king’s April 1681 declaration justifying his
dismissal of two parliaments, A Just and Modest Vindication “was writ … with great spirit and true judgement. Apparently, it was at first penned by Sidney and then a revised draft was made by Somers and
corrected by Jones.”582 While Sidney participated in the drafting of this pamphlet, he apparently did not
consider it his work. For our purposes this doesn’t matter. The point is that Sidney was working closely
with moderate (that is, not radical) men seeking change from within. Jones was Sidney’s friend; he also
was one of the leaders of Commons once Shaftesbury’s power was eclipsed. Jones became Lord Chief
Justice under the 1680 Parliament. He was clearly a prominent and distinguished personage albeit not a
friend of the king.583 Jones “was also – like his friend Sidney – a bitter enemy of Shaftesbury … ‘[Jones]
hated Shaftesbury and…would not willingly come into the room where he was. His personal virtue and
gravity was great, and he could not bear such a flirting wit and libertine as the other was.’” Whether this
means that primary authorship of A Just and Modest Vindication properly lies with Sidney is not clear. But
Sidney is clearly associated in 1681 with this highly distinguished man and with this detailed pamphlet.584
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Letter VIII, Dorothy Sidney, Countess Dowager of Sunderland, to Halifax, Aug. 5, 1680; Some Account
of the Life of Rachael Wriothesley Lady Russell, p. 376 n.17.
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Burnet, History of Our Own Time, p. 276; see Scott II, pp. 186-87.
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According to Burnet, when Jones died from an illness in May 1683, his friends considered it a blessing
because of his closeness to Russell “and others of his set, and having made himself as obnoxious to the
court as any of them, and because of his superior abilities, more dangerous; it was very likely he would
have fallen under the suspicion at least of being engaged in the plot my Lord Russell suffered for, and
have been treated with a particular severity, which his timid nature could not have borne, and might have
drawn confessions from him, injurious to his friends and his own character.” Burnet also reported that Sir
William Temple considered Jones to be not only the greatest lawyer in England, but a very wise man,
very rich, and “of a wary and rather timorous nature.” Burnet, History of My Own Time, Vol. II, p. 343 n.2.
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Scott II, pp. 186, 52, 61 and n.41, quoting North, Examen, also quoted in Diary & Correspondence of
Times of Ch. II, p. 71. Other men are associated with the tract as well, including “the Plotter,” Robert
Ferguson. See Burnet, History of My Own Time, Vol. II, p. 289 n.1.
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During the Second Exclusion Parliament the trial of Lord Stafford, the king’s favorite, took place, a
“deliberately grandiose and public display of muscle” by Commons, for which Charles later exacted
revenge. It was Sir William Jones, Sidney’s acquaintance and pamphlet-writing collaborator, who tried
and convicted Stafford. Sidney did not participate in the Stafford prosecution. Stafford was convicted of
treason and “handed over to Slingsby Bethel, who promptly issued a warrant for his execution, and
accompanied his victim to the scaffold.”585 As victorious as this might have seemed to nonconformists and
others at the time, ironically, as one contemporary put it, “‘Sidney was lost’ in 1683 because his fate was
a precisely organised act of political revenge. He was tried before an ‘abhorrer’ (to whom he objected), by
a politically selected jury à la Bethel (to which he objected), by the rules and procedures of Stafford’s trial
à la Jones (to which he objected).”586 What had been good for the goose became good for the gander.
It was in the second Exclusion Parliament that the bill finally passed in Commons. This was not
the accomplishment of Shaftesbury but of Sir William Jones, who “brought the House unanimously behind
the exclusion bill for the first time.” Support had collapsed for resolving the succession issue by placing
limitations on James’ future rule. Commons and Lords were polarized, for and against exclusion. By now
Halifax had “crossed over” to the King’s faction or, more accurately, to those opposed to the exclusion bill.
Halifax gave a “remarkable” day-long speech in the House of Lords, an action “for which Shaftesbury
never forgave him”; the result was the exclusion bill’s rejection. Shaftesbury’s political stature plummeted.
“He was no longer formidable to the Court.” This not only meant that Shaftesbury was likely in danger,
having opposed the King’s wishes for so long; additionally, Parliament had lost any leverage it had
against a mighty king armed with powerful prerogatives, including the power to prorogue and dismiss
Parliament. “[A]gainst an intransigent crown financial desperation was the only hope a House of
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See Anonymous, The Tryal of William Viscount Stafford for High Treason, In Conspiring the Death of
the King, The Extirpation of the Protestant Religion, The Subversion of the Government, and Introduction
of Popery into this. Realm, Upon an Impeachment By the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses in Parliament
Assembled, In the Name of Themselves and of All the Commons of England (London: John Bill,
1681)[repr. Bibliolife Network, The. Making of the. Modern Law collection, Court Records from Yale Law
Library, 1934]; see Greaves, Secrets of the. Kingdom, Ch. I, “’All That Oppose Popery’: The Popish Plot
and the. Radicals,’” pp. 5-52.
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An abhorrer was a royalist who supported Charles and “abhorred” petitions to reconvene Parliament.
The quotation is from the testimony of under-sheriff Sir Peter Rich to the Lords Committee in 1688, after
Sidney’s execution. Journal of the House of Lords (1688), p. 281. See Scott II, p. 173 & n.70.
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Commons had.”587 At most, the aspiration now was that Parliament could financially starve the King into
submission.
The third and final exclusion Parliament was called by the King to convene in Oxford so as to
avoid the radical politics of London. The session lasted a week, from March 21 to March 28, 1681.588 In
the summer of 1681, a highly incendiary, indeed revolutionary document was found in Shaftesbury’s
cabinet that called for “an ‘Association’ of ‘all true Protestants’ to oppose York ‘by all lawful means, and by
force of arms if need so required’, if he ever sought to set himself up as king.”589 Shaftesbury was
arrested, indicted on charges of treason, and spent months in the Tower. The circumstances were
particularly dire because of the grisly execution of a low-level Shaftesbury man, Stephen College, for
“treasonable words” based in part on witnesses who were to testify against Shaftesbury.590 But
Shaftesbury’s indictment did not succeed; the London grand jury would have nothing of it.591 The
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John Booth, the key witness in Shaftesbury’s trial for high treason, testified about Shaftesbury’s fears;
indeed, even his encroaching paranoia. Note that Halifax was one of the men that Shaftesbury (as well
as James Duke of York) considered dangerous. See Appendix B. Note, too, that it was John Locke who
was the advance man, and made arrangements for Shaftesbury’s retinue at Oxford. Testimony of John
Booth and John Smith, The Proceedings at the Sessions House in the Old-Baily, London, on Thursday
the 24th day of November, 1681. Before His Majesties Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer, upon the
Bill of Indictment for High-Treason against Anthony Earl of Shaftesbury (London, Samuel Mearne & John
Baker, 1681) (“Shaftes-bury Trial”), FAU/Weiner Collection, pp. 21, 26; see Scott II, p. 63.
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Harris, Restoration, p. 100. The republican Henry Neville was no longer politically active in this
timeframe, but he published Plato Redivivus in 1681. Neville did not oppose York’s succession; rather, he
sought constitutional limits on the monarchy. In all likelihood Sidney would have agreed with the following
silver-tongued mockery by Neville that he presented in Plato Redivivus: “I do verily believe, that there are
not a more loyal and faithful people to their prince in the whole world, than ours are.” But as to “his only
brother, (although accidentally he cannot be denied to be a great motive of the people’s unquietness,) all
men must acknowledge him to be a most glorious and honourable prince: one who has exposed his life
several times for the safety and glory of this nation; one who pays justly and punctually his debts, and
manages his own fortune discreetly, and yet keeps the best court and equipage of any subject in
Christendom; is courteous and affable to all; and in fine, has nothing in his whole conduct to be excepted
against, much less dreaded; excepting, that he is believed to be of a religion contrary to the honour of
God, and the safety and interest of this people, which gives them just apprehensions of their future
condition.” Neville, Plato Redivivus; or, A Dialogue Concerning Government, p. 7.
590
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According to the witness John Smith, “My Lord, said I, we can expect nothing but Confusion, from this
Parliament [meeting at Oxford] in this Nature, for then we shall be involved in another Civil-War, nothing
else can put an end to our Miseries, or make this Nation a settled Nation, but a Civil-War.” Smith then
said, “Then my Lord said I, by this means wee shall make an end of Monarchy, or else inslave the Nation
to Popery for ever.” Shaftesbury responded, “No doubt of one say’s he, but we are sure of one, for the
Nation is of our side, and the City you now how they are, and where ever they strike, I am sure the Nation
will, and this I’le stand and dye by.” Shaftesbury was tried under a revised statute defining treason that
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indictment was thrown out in November 1681.592
By 1681, Charles felt free (or at least obliged) to govern without Parliament because of the funds
he was otherwise able to obtain; the last bit of possible leverage was gone.593 Previously, Commons had
effectively created a climate of intimidation that significantly and adversely affected the functioning of the
King. Once Commons lost the political battle and with little chance of regaining comparable political clout,
a series of private discussions took place, primarily among parliamentary leaders, about what to do next.
We have first-hand accounts from participants, carefully analyzed by scholars, as to who was still seeking
conciliation of some sort with the king and who was not.594 In many ways, the fuzziest picture relates to
Shaftesbury – i.e., what he sought to achieve in his adamantine determination, at any cost, to force the
exclusion of James, and why he walked (or ran) away when he did, at a time when the going got rough

was intended “to prevent the Designs” of treason “before they should grow full ripe, and vent themselves
in Overt-Acts.” Accordingly, the new law stated, “if any one should Compass, Imagine, or Intend the
Death of the King, or his Destruction, or any bodily harm, that might tend to his Death or Destruction, or
any Maiming or Wounding his Person, any Restraint of his Liberty, or any Imprisonment of him; or if any
should design or intend to Levy any War against him, either within the Kingdom, or without; or should
design, intend, endeavour, or procure any Foreign Prince to Invade these his Dominions, or any other of
the Kings Dominions, and should signifie or declare this by any Writing, or by any Preaching or Printing,
or by any advised, malicious speaking, or words, this shall be High Treason.” This is the statute under
which Sidney was later tried; it also is the statute that would have been applicable had the Glorious
Revolution been inglorious. Shaftesbury Trial, pp. 26, 3.
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It was also in this timeframe that a petition was presented to King Charles by sixteen peers led by
Essex, Sidney’s first cousin. It was rejected. The petition did not raise the issue of exclusion; it focused on
“wicked plots of the papists” and the right of parliament to meet. Scott II, pp. 72-73.
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As Harris pointed out, this did not mean that his rule was trouble free. While he had been able, finally,
to stymie the agenda of Commons, he could not effectively pursue his own agenda. The King tried to do
so by bringing members of the Opposition into the administration – this was the reason for the famous
Cabal Ministry of 1667-72, with Shaftesbury serving as Lord President. But this approach failed, as the
Council had been “racked by internal division.” Charles also was unable to protect Danby even though he
had pardoned him. Furthermore, Stafford was executed. Charles avoided James’ exclusion, but also
had to send his brother into exile to protect him – first to the Netherlands, and then to Scotland.
Demands were successfully made to remove from office other royal appointments as well, including Sir
George Jeffreys, who became the notorious judge in Sidney’s case and in the Bloody Assizes, the mass
prosecutions and executions following the Monmouth Rebellion. Moreover, the crown lost its grip on local
government including the corporations, particularly London. In this timeframe there also was an
unsuccessful Scottish rebellion, put down by Monmouth at the famous battle of Bothwell Bridge. Harris,
Restoration, pp. 190-97. On Jeffreys, see Robert Milne-Tyte, Bloody Jeffreys: The Hanging Judge
(London: Andre Deutsch, 1989).
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See, e.g., Harris, Restoration, Chs. 4 & 5, “The Remedy for the Disease: The Ideological. Response to
the Exclusionist Challenge,” and “Keeping the Reins of Government Straight: The Tory Reaction in
England,” pp. 211-328.
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but it still seemed possible that conspiratorial efforts might produce their intended result.595
The next year there was some sort of coordinated effort underway under Shaftesbury’s
leadership to raise arms against the king to force James’ exclusion; whether that was all that Shaftesbury
sought to achieve is unclear. Some of those involved in this intrigue still sought to place Monmouth, the
king’s illegitimate son, on the throne. Apparently, this continued to be Shaftesbury’s goal, for which
history has dealt with him harshly.596 This period marked the apogee of Shaftesbury’s power and,
ultimately, by 1682, his demise. After Shaftesbury failed to convince Parliament to exclude James as heir,
he lost another battle from within his midst, unsuccessfully trying to organize and effectuate a rebellion.
This is another complicated story; in sum, the cabal could not agree on the right timing for a multi-faceted
uprising and Shaftesbury became so fearful for his own safety, perhaps quite legitimately, that he fled.
Exiled in Amsterdam, within months Shaftesbury died.597
Perhaps in Shaftesbury’s absence there was a leadership vacuum, for Sidney “was drawn once
again into the centre of political affairs leading attempts to formulate an Anglo-Dutch republican foreign
policy as an alternative to a monarchic union of the Houses of Stuart and Orange.” At the same time, in
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One of the most damning assertions was that in addition to the Tories, Halifax and other moderates
were convinced that “Shaftesbury’s object was not so much the exclusion of the Duke of York as the
elevation of Monmouth, and that he was aiming less at the protection of the Protestant religion than at the
attainment of the position of Mayor of the Palace to a king of his own making.” Traill, Shaftesbury (the first
earl), pp. 177-78. (Note that the “of his own making” language is particularly brutal given the well-known
republican phrase, “laws of their own making.”)
596

E.g., “Shaftesbury may have been honestly convinced that the Duke of York should not under any
conditions be allowed to reign, but he could not have been honestly convinced that Monmouth, of all men
in the world, should be put in the Duke’s place; and it was this inflexible resolve to force a Royal bastard
upon the King and country as heir to the throne which did more than anything else to array all the better
part of the nation against him.” Traill, Shaftesbury (the first earl), pp. 205-06.
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See, e.g., id, Ch. XII.
225

late 1680, Sidney was still meeting with his brother Henry when he was home from The Hague. 598 Henry
was a close confidante of both the Prince of Orange and Lord Sunderland, the latter of whom “was eager
to conciliate” Sidney.599 It is hard to believe that the monarchist Sunderland would have thought this
remotely possible or worthwhile if Sidney was a wild-eyed radical.600 Had Sidney’s reputation been that of
a radical republican fomenter, it simply is not credible that overtures to Sidney would have been made.
The subsequent conspiracy picked up where Shaftesbury’s abandoned plot left off; its purpose
also seems to have been to enthrone Monmouth.601 This was a plot to be triggered by a Scottish rebellion
intended to force the convening of Parliament and undermine Charles’ absolutist authority. Whether it
mandated the overthrow of Charles is unclear. It was this plot in which Sidney may well have been
involved. Additionally, there was a plot to murder the king and his brother as they passed the Rye House
in Hertfordshire on their return from Newmarket to London in March 1683; hence, the label the Rye
House Conspiracy, which rolls together these foiled efforts to end autocratic rule.602 At his trial Sidney
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Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 163. This motivation is also reflected in Blencowe’s Diary of the
Times of Charles the Second, which discussed “this plan of the Guarantee,” that Sidney called “one of Sir
W. Temple’s projects.” In sum, “under the pretence of a Guarantee,” the plan was “to draw Holland and
Spain into a League with England,” which would facilitate the Prince of Orange’s “breaking the peace so
lately made [presumably, with France].” To encourage this. approach, Temple’s views were sought as he
was “taken to be the oracle of those parts.” Temple assured the King’s Council that “there was no such
thing as a party in Holland inclined to oppose the Prince of Orange; that all was submitted to his authority,
and united in desiring such an alliance with us.” But as soon as Henry Sidney, at The Hague, set about
undertaking this pursuit, it was stymied by the French. “Monsieur D’Avaux, the French minister at the
Hague, set all his engines to work to render the whole proceeding abortive.” The consequence was that,
“These counter-projects revived the war of parties in Holland. The Lowenstein [republicans] as greedily
fastened on this of France as the Orange did on that of England.” Diary of the Times of Charles the
Second, pp. 106-07 n.1., relying on v. ii of [James] Ralph, The History of England, During the Reigns of
K. William, Q. Anne and K. George I; with an Introductory Review of the Reigns of the Royal Brothers,
Charles and James, p. 488. However one might want to characterize Algernon’s political goals at this
juncture, he was still an insider of sorts, privy to these political maneuvers and their advocates.
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Cartright, Sacharissa, p. 292.
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Sunderland was a close adviser to James II; he later became a close adviser to William III. Claydon &
Speck, William & Mary, p. 63.
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There are many renditions of the Rye House Plot. See, e.g., Zook, Radical Whigs, pp. 103-13; Scott
II, Ch. 12, pp. 265-91; Harris, Restoration, pp. 309-23; Ford Lord Grey, And of Monmouth’s Rebellion.
Written by Ford Lord Grey in MDCLXXXV. London: Andrew Millar. 1754. Reprint, Forgotten Books.
2012. [Written in 1685.]
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Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 164; T. Sprat, A True Account and Declaration of the Horrid
Conspiracy against the late King (1685), and its appendix: Copies of the Informations and Original Papers
relating to the Proof of the Horrid Conspiracy against the late King (1685); which were printed, with
omissions, from the manuscript Copies of the Informations in State Papers Dom., Car. II, 426, cited in
Doreen J. Milne, “The Results of the Rye House Plot and Their Influence upon the Revolution of 1688: The
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was accused of treasonous membership in a so-called Council of Six, the so-called “Grandees”
conspiring to overthrow the King. Russell and Essex also were implicated. Essex died in the Tower
(suicide or murder). Russell and Sidney were summarily tried and executed.603
The proceedings against Sidney have been described as judicial murder because of the extent of
legal improprieties that took place during the trial. As the subsequent report to William III by his Solicitor
General stated: “Almost all of the circumstances of this trial are originals; the summing up of the evidence
against him was barbarous, being invectives, and no consequences. It was said, he was not only guilty of
the practices he was accused of, but that he could not have been otherwise, because his principles led
him to it; and it might with as good reason have been urged, that he not only was become, but was born a
traitor.” In fine, “they might as well have resolved, that eating or drinking, or the most ordinary acts of a
man’s life, is an overt-act of high-treason.”604
All of the conspiratorial activities against Charles II’s regime failed. After Sidney’s execution,
Monmouth, who had been ejected from England, organized or at least participated in a 1685 invasion and
rebellion led by a clique of exiled dissidents.605 The king’s militia quickly and successfully routed the effort

Alexander Prize Essay,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, Vol. 1 (1951), pp.91108, 91. Whether there was a sharing of information among these two groups, and any concerted efforts,
is debated among scholars.
603

There are independent stories about Russell and Essex as men, leaders, political activists, and victims
that are beyond the scope of this study. Perhaps the most cogent description I have read about Russell
was a statement he made in Parliament in October 1679. Charles II was at Westminster, and “opened
the session with one of those speciously dignified speeches on ‘Unity.’” There was silence after the king’s
speech, and then Russell rose and spoke: “[W]hat was the good of talking about unity when every
Protestant life in the country was in danger?” As for Essex, he was a well-known, admired, and beloved
young nobleman and politician, and it was widely believed, “and not only by the ignorant,” that he had
been murdered in the Tower of London before his trial could take place. Morley, A Thousand Lives, p.
118, 169.
604
“Remarks on Algernon Sidney’s Trial, by Sir John Hawles, Knight, Solicitor General to King William III,
in Appendix to Meadley, Sydney Memoirs, pp. 351-64, 362; John Salmon, “Algernon Sidney and the Rye
House Plot,” History Today, 4:10 (1954).
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A major player in this activity was the rebel and “notorious public figure” Ferguson, described as a
“perpetual plotter,” regardless of the side he was on – “one of the period’s inveterate rebels.” While many
others were captured and executed, Ferguson escaped, to foment trouble another day. Indeed, he was
not only “considered by so many as responsible for the deaths of Russell, Sidney, and Monmouth,” but he
“was involved in plot after plot against the life of William III.” Zook, Radical Whigs, pp.188-89; Greaves,
Deliver Us From Evil, p. 127; Greaves, Secrets of the Kingdom, pp. 295-96. As Zook noted, the political
principles of Ferguson and several other notorious plotters “were hardly the product of the philosopher’s
study, but rather that of the smoky tavern, the noisy coffeehouse, the London prison cell, or the
Amsterdam safe house.” Zook, Radical Whigs, p. xviii. On Ferguson, see especially id, pp. 93-102.
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to foment a general rise by the people. Monmouth was executed along with those found to have
collaborated with him, at least those the government was able to catch. Massive reprisals, known as the
Bloody Assizes, followed.606
Overall, the evidence simply is not clear on precisely when or why Sidney became a political figure
after returning to England, or precisely in what political activity he engaged. Particularly where he is
alleged to have played a leading role or solo appearance it is difficult to know how many activities Sidney
might have been juggling at the same time. Besides the tedious demands of family legal matters and
work on the election of Bethel, this is also the timeframe that the anonymous tract on which he worked, A
Just and Modest Vindication of the Proceedings of the Two Last Parliaments, was published (1681).
It is also in this same timeframe or very soon thereafter (1681-83) that some historians believe
Sidney wrote his lengthy (500+ page) draft of Discourses. It is my own view that while Sidney continued
to work on his treatise during these years as is evident from some of the references in it (although these
also could have been subsequently added by an editor), in light of his many other contemporaneous
activities, as well as the formidable size of the treatise, it is probable that Sidney began working on it
much earlier, and that it is a compilation of work on which he had been engaged, and dabbling, for years.
There may be an important clue in a reference in Cartwright’s book, Sacharissa, which says that Algernon
had “devoted himself to his political writings” while he was in secluded retirement in Nérac, in the south of
France, in the 1660s.607 There is also the suggestion that he may have been writing while at his cardinal
friend’s villa outside of Rome years earlier.608 Meadley, who wrote a memoir of Sidney in the early
nineteenth century, is considered by Scott to be the best of Sidney’s earlier biographers. In Meadley’s
view, the particular papers that were produced and used against Sidney at his trial may well have been
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Following in his own footsteps, Judge Jeffreys was the lead jurist involved in the Bloody Assizes. See
Milne-Tyte, Bloody Jeffreys.
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Cartwright, Sacharissa, p. 194.
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Sidney wrote to his father about applying himself “to studdy,” living “as a Hermite,” and conversing
“with Birds, Trees, and Books,” all sounding remarkably like Machavelli when he described his own
lifestyle as he wrote Discourses on Livy and other work because he was ostracized from Florence and
living in the countryside. See two Sidney letters to Leicester, June 1661, written from Frascati, the villa
outside of Rome belonging to a member of the Vatican elite. Sidney to Leicester, June 3 & 23, 1661,
Collins’ Sidney family documents, Vol. 2, pp. 716-21.
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written when Sidney retired to Penshurst after Cromwell dismissed Parliament, viz., in the mid-1650s.609
Carswell noted that during the “uneasy dictatorship of Cromwell … Algernon had plenty of time in which
to use his father’s large library to do some of the extensive but eclectic reading of history that later went
into Discourses Concerning Government, and develop into the studious, almost solemn figure he later
became, marking him among his contemporaries as the best informed layman they had ever met.”
Certainly, said Meadley, “It is probable, indeed, that the plan of his great work on Government might
already have occupied his mind” by 1654.610 Meadley also found it “more than probable that, pursuing his
political enquiries” while in southern France in the 1670s, Sidney “digested the materials of his
Discourses concerning Government, in this seclusion from more active scenes.” As Meadley noted, “No
other portion of his life afforded adequate leisure for the important task, as his work is evidently the result
of much reading and reflection, combined with a very accurate knowledge of the human character, as
developed by the practice of mankind.”611 This suggestion is intriguingly consistent with a comment made
by Sir George Jefferies, the notorious royalist judge who condemned Sidney; the statement is not from
Sidney’s trial but from a summary of the evidence by Jefferies during the subsequent trial of John
Hampden, another accused Rye House conspirator. According to Jeffries the evidence established that
after “the business had failed in the managery of my lord of Shaftesbury,” Monmouth and Lord Howard
decided that, “there should be a reassuming of the business again,” but that they needed additional
“persons fit to be trusted.” Accordingly, Monmouth undertook to recruit Lords Essex and Russell. But –
and this is the intriguing thought – “And then they began to talk of some more, particularly of Mr. Sidney,
but he was a cynical man, and a philosopher, and they were first to come to him, and to treat with him in
another manner than the rest.”612 Labeling Sidney “a philosopher” is a moniker that cannot be explained
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Sidney seems to have absented himself from Parliament from April 1653, when Cromwell threw out
the Rump, until the Long Parliament was restored in May 1659. Id, pp. 47-58; Scott I, pp.1-2 n.4.
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Meadley also believed that Sidney may also have been working on his General View of Government in
Europe, “confidently ascribed to him by Ralph the historian,” in “this early period.” Meadley, Sydney
Memoirs, pp. 53-54. But the General View has been established to be the subsequent work of Ralph; it is
not Sidney’s.
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Id, pp. 152-53.

612
Thomas Jones Howell, William Cobbett and David Jardine, A Complete Collection of State Trials and
Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors from the Earliest Period to the Year
1783, p. Vol. IX, 34-36 Charles II. …1682-1684 (London: T. C. Hansard, Peterborough-Court, Fleet
Street: 1816), p. 1107. Blackburne also referred to Sidney and Penn together as philosophers, quoting

229

unless Sidney was already well known for his intellectual pursuits including, perhaps, time spent writing
about political ideas, such as his opus Discourses.
Then we have another Sidney biographer from the late nineteenth century, Gertrude Mary Ireland
Blackburne, who stated that after De Witt was killed, “as every biographer has remarked, this must have
been the period in which [Sidney] accumulated his wonderful stores of learning, which made Burnet say
of him, ‘He hath studied the history of government more than any man I ever knew.’”613 Blackburne says
that in the 1679-80 timeframe Sidney “spent a great deal of his time in writing and in study,” and so
perhaps this is the reason for his scholarly reputation. She also noted Sidney’s testimony at his trial that,
“I believe there is a brother of mine here has forty quire of paper written by my father, and neer one sheet
of them was published; but he writ his own mind to see what he could think of it another time, and blot it
out again, maybe. And I myself, I believe, have burned more papers of my own writing than a horse
could carry…. I write my thoughts at one time, that in perusing them at another I may come to knowledge
of myself.” In his youthful poem on love Sidney also had described himself as writing about “what he
knows in himself.”614 In view of the family literary tradition and Leicester’s habit of writing for his own
benefit, Sidney’s description, even if self-serving, is credible. Blackburne also said that Sidney was
“reviewing his old work, … apparently preparing, for eventual publication, his famous (Posthumous)
MSS.”615 We do not know why Blackburne assumed Sidney intended to publish; indeed, we know that
there was a family tradition of writing but not publishing. In this instance, the best evidence is that Sidney
did not intend to publish Discourses.
Finally, we have Sidney’s own description of his treatise. One can dismiss this as self-serving,
too; nevertheless, it is important evidence. In his detailed statement handed to the sheriff when he
mounted the scaffold, subsequently published as The Apology of A. Sydney in the Day of his Death,
Sidney stated, “that the ink and paper evidently shew they were very old, and it was impossible they

from an unknown source, who had in the new State of Carolina a “white canvas” to paint. Blackburne,
Algernon Sidney: A Review, p. 173.
613

Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, p. 136.
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Id, pp. 45-46. Carswell concluded that the 1st Earl of Leicester “wrote entirely for his own satisfaction –
a habit he transmitted to his son.” Carswell, The Porcupine, p. 7.
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Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, , p. 168.
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should have any dependence upon businesse pretended to be now in agitation; such as had bin written
many, perhaps twenty or thirty years agoe, could not relate unto the pretended consultations within ten
moneths.”616 After he was executed this description is repeated in a deposition taken of Sidney’s
personal valet, Messr. Joseph DuCasse, in connection with the 1689 investigation by William III’s Solicitor
General as to whether Sidney’s conviction should be overturned. According to DuCasse, “He [Sidney]
further complained, that the judges and jury did receive, for a second evidence, some scraps of papers,
written many years before, in answer to Filmer’s book, as if they could have any relation with what was
pretended then at his trial.”617 There is no evidence to the contrary.
Discourses was published posthumously in 1698. In addition to the treatise that Sidney authored,
both Locke (anonymously) and Locke’s good friend Tyrrell published rebuttals to Patriarcha in 1689 and
1681, respectively.618 Discourses is a point-by-point, ungainly rebuttal of Sir Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha, a
high-profile royalist tract supporting absolute monarchy that was first published in January 1680 although
written much earlier, well before the Civil War.619 Indeed, it was written around 1637 by Filmer, a staunch
royalist who lived in Sidney’s neighborhood not far from Penshurst in the County of Kent, and we know
that it circulated in the county in manuscript form at the time.620 The families knew each other, as
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“The Apology of A. Sydney in the Day of his Death,” in “Letters of Algernon Sydney, Taken from the
Sydney Papers,” 1763 Hollis edition of Discourses, pp. 169-98, 179.
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“The Information of Joseph DuCasse to a Committee of the House of Lords,” Dec. 11, 1639, in
Appendix, Meadley, Sydney Memoirs, p. 378.
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According to Laslett, Locke was summoned back from France early in 1679 by Shaftesbury to write “a
general, theoretical argument to justify a change in the constitution.” Laslett, John Locke, p. 31. This may
have been his Two Treatises of Government.
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Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer, pp. 190, 193. There is an academic debate about the date of circulation of
the manuscript of Patriarcha – whether it was issued between 1635 and 1642, or later, circa 1648. See
Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, p. 250 n.91; compare Peter Laslett, John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 3, with John Wallace, “The Date of Sir Robert Filmer’s
Patriarcha,” Historical Journal 23, no. 1 (1980), pp. 155-65. The reason that this has any significance is
because the availability of the manuscript would have to have been c.1648 for its purpose to have been to
respond to the Levellers’ arguments about the sharing of property, a view to which Wallace and Ashcraft
subscribed but to which Laslett demurred. See Sir Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, Johann
P. Sommerville, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2004). As we will see, James Tyrrell’s text, entitled
Patriarcha non Monarcha. The Patriarch Unmonarch’d (1681), was a refutation of Filmer and of absolute,
but not constitutional monarchy. Tyrrell (1642-1718) was a friend and a popularizer of Locke, as well as a
polemicist in his own right. Robbins, Two English Republican Tracts, p. 73; see Ch. Three.
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“It was quite common for the intellectual gentry of Kent to publish their work or, if not, to circulate it in
manuscript copies, and Filmer did both. With Patriarcha, he took the latter course…. It would be very
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Sidney’s sister Dorothy was a good friend of Filmer’s daughter. According to Carswell, “The Sidneys
possessed many connections with the Filmers,” including the girls’ friendship and the fact that one of
Filmer’s sons “carried out some important errands” for Leicester in 1640.621 Leicester was even chairman
of the circuit bench on which Filmer sat! On the other hand, another scholar averred that Leicester
“seems to have had little to do with his fellow Kentish intellectuals”; he did not have the genial disposition
of his father.622 Patriarcha is not listed in the Sidney Library catalogue, which was prepared in 1665. But
given Leicester’s intellectual interests, it seems highly probable that he read this text. As Carswell stated,
“It would be very extraordinary if awareness of Patriarcha’s composition, and probably a copy of the
manuscript itself, did not reach so near and great a house as Penshurst very quickly.”623 We do not know
if Sidney saw the manuscript. Carswell found that evidence to support this conclusion can be gleaned
from Sidney’s quotations of Filmer in the pages of the manuscript presented at trial because the
quotations are not precisely the same as the published edition, suggesting that Sidney had been working
from an earlier Patriarcha manuscript.624 Again, we have an intriguing but unsubstantiated theory. On
the other hand, two other Filmer works that were in the Sidney Family Library enormously overlap with the
subject-matter of Patriarcha and, given various uncertainties and omissions in the Library records, it is
certainly possible and probably probable (!) that Patriarcha was there too.625 In sum, it is likely that
Sidney was familiar with Filmer’s ideas decades before Patriarcha was published, and it is probable that

extraordinary if awareness of Patriarcha’s composition, and probably a copy of the manuscript itself, did
not reach so near and great a house as Penshurst very quickly.” Carswell, The Porcupine, pp. 18-19.
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Warkentin, “Humanism in Hard Times,” p. 236.
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Carswell hypothesized that in the 1639-41 timeframe, Sidney “may have just possibly found a
manuscript copy of a work defending absolute monarchy recently completed by a neighbouring squire, Sir
Robert Filmer.” He also described the years between 1638 and 1640 as “a time for brooding and
introspection” for Sidney. Carswell, The Porcupine, pp. 15, 19.
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See The Library of the Sidneys of Penshurst Place circa 1665, pp. 36 (The. Anarchy of a limited or
mixt monarchy), 166 (The Freeholders Grand Inquest touching the K. & his Parl.). For these essay
pamphlets, as well as Patriarcha, see Johann P. Sommerville, Filmer: Patriarcha and Other Writings
(Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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Sidney read Patriarcha much earlier, too.626 As one scholar noted, “Filmer was a hedgehog and not a fox,
and his single-minded devotion to the principles of patriarchy and sovereignty led him to streamline and
simplify orthodox doctrines in new and radical ways.”627 As to Sidney’s refutation, West quipped, “Sidney
sarcastically summed up Filmer’s argument in this way: God ‘caused some to be born with crowns upon
their heads, and all others with saddles upon their backs.’”628
Returning to the contextual narrative, in the early 1680s Sidney also “took a deep interest” in the
work of his friend, the Quaker William Penn. Sidney may have met Penn through his sister Dorothy’s son,
Sunderland, who became close friends with Penn at Oxford in the 1660s.629 Notwithstanding their differing religious perspectives, there are notable parallels between Sidney and Penn. Like Sidney, Penn’s
education included study at the Huguenot Academy at Saumur, although this was many years later, from
1662-64, not in the late 1630s. Penn also travelled throughout Europe, not with Sidney but with Sidney’s
nephew Sunderland. All three spent time in Italy. Sidney was there from 1660-63; but Penn went there
after Saumer, in the 1664-65 timeframe. So there are notable parallels but no evident overlap. Also, en
route back to England through the Netherlands in 1664 Penn stayed in Rotterdam with the Quaker who
was Sidney’s long-time host, friend, and political sympathizer, Benjamin Furly.630 By this time Sidney had
left Italy, traveled to Switzerland to visit with Ludlow and other expats, and then gone on to Holland. It is
possible that Sidney and Penn’s paths crossed at that time, although we have no evidence one way or
the other. Years later, after Sidney returned to England, Penn was a major advocate and, it appears, a
grass-roots organizer behind Sidney’s run for parliamentary office. He worked on Sidney’s behalf to
accomplish that end; but the process was corrupt, Sidney was unsuccessful, and after several attempts
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Carswell pointed to this fact, among others, as support for Sidney’s “apparent ability to compose a
voluminous reply” to Patriarcha “within a fairly short time of its later appearance in print.” Carswell, The
Porcupine, p. 19.
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Houston, Algernon Sidney, p. 94.
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In addition to Sunderland, Henry Sidney and Penn are described as “very intimate” friends, who
together participated, while at Oxford, in a riot that Penn led against Popish practices, for which both
young men were duly expelled. “Introduction,” Diary & Correspondence of Times of Ch. II, pp. xxxviiixxxix; West, “Introduction,” DCG, p. xxxiii. Scott I, p. 216.
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Scott II, pp. 128-30.
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he stopped trying.631 Penn moved on to other things, fostering a new Quaker society in Pennsylvania.
He prepared a written constitution for the territory he acquired in the New World; that document became
part of the original Constitution of Pennsylvania. While he was working on it Penn asked for Sidney’s
comments, as well as Furly’s; both men sent Penn major comments and edits. Penn took the document
with him when he sailed to America in 1682.632 A year later Sidney was executed.
With repeated unsuccessful efforts to participate in the political process as an MP, the evidence
further suggests but does not prove that Sidney gradually became involved with a sub-group of the
opposition now deeply threatened if not radicalized. At his trial Sidney was accused of being in a Council
of Six conspiring to overthrow Charles II.633 Morley questioned whether the “so-called Council of Six” ever
existed.”634 These gnarly issues will be considered further; but for purposes of completing our chronology,
we know that Sidney was arrested early in the sweep of suspects thought to be involved in the Rye

631
There are several 1779 letters from Penn, “Thy faithful [or “true”] friend,” to Sidney explaining what he
thought Sidney should do to challenge the irregularities in the Parliamentary elections for which Sidney
had run in Guildford and Weston. Among other things, Penn offered to go to the following individuals to
discuss “what may amount to an unfair election”: the Duke of Buckingham, the Earl of Shaftesbury, Lord
Essex, Lord Halifax, Lord Hollis, Lord Grey, “&c,” so that they could “use their utmost interest in reversing
this business.” Meadley, Sydney Memoirs, Appendix, letters from Penn to Sidney dated “1st, 1st Month,
79-,” and “29, 5th Month, 79-,” pp. 330-32, 336-37. There is no record of Sidney’s responses, although we
know that he did challenge the first election results. Id, pp. 332-35.
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Cartrwright said that Penn “approved of his friend’s alterations.” whereas Scott suggested that Sidney
was very harsh, thereby offending Penn, who adopted some but not all of Sidney’s suggested changes.
Cartwright, Sacharissa, pp. 200-03; Scott II, pp. 181-82. The October 1681 letter from which it appears
these inferences about the Penn-Sidney relationship were drawn, at least by Scott, does not support the
suggestion that Sidney and Penn had fallen out. Penn was writing because of statements made by others
to him about their friendship: “I meet with this sort of language in the Mouths of Severall; I shall not yet
believe it.” The Papers of William Penn, Vol. Two: 1680-1684, Richard S. Dunn & Mary Maples Dunn,
eds. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), pp. 124-25. The former view seems more
likely given the fact that Penn knew who he was dealing with and must have expected serious comments
and proposed changes from Sidney. Penn was not in England during the events related to the Rye
House Plot. He returned to politics after Algernon’s execution, controversially standing by James II when
he issued a Declaration of Indulgence (1687) that suspended the penal laws applicable to Catholic
recusants and Protestant Dissenters, including Quakers. Halifax: Complete Works, pp. 104, 107 n.3. On
Penn’s allegiance with James II, see Appendix. B. On the Frame of Government of Pennsylvania, 16811682, including Furly and Sidney’s comments, see The Papers of William Penn, Vol. Two, pp. 137-238.
According to the editors of the Penn Papers, “In several particulars, Furly’s criticisms of the Frame of
Government sound much like those attributed to ‘Coloney Sidney.’” Id, p. 227.
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See, e.g., Robbins, Two English Republican Tracts, pp. 28-32.
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Iris Morley, A Thousand Lives: An Account of the English Revolutionary Movement, 1660-1685
(London: Andre Deutsch, 1954), p. 138.
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House Plot, tried, found guilty and, on Dec. 7, 1683, executed.635 Sidney biographies, memoirs and
histories focus extensively and disproportionately on this disturbing end phase of his life, often with
morbid prurient interest.636 Aspects of the plot will emerge throughout this study. But Sidney’s prosecution
is largely irrelevant to the nature of his republicanism, and so we need not dwell further on it here except
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In the last two weeks of his life, while in the Tower of London, Sidney wrote two complementary
papers, first his Apology, a lengthy essay, and also a several-page Last Paper that reflected Sidney’s
adherence, to the end, to his republican principles. As he said in his Apology, “as I had from my youth
endeavoured to uphold the common rights of mankind, the lawes of this land, and the true Protestant
religion, against corrupt principles, arbitrary power, and Popery, I doe now willingly lay downe my life for
the same.” The Apology of A. Sydney in the Days of his Death, Algernon Sidney, Discourses concerning
government by Algernon Sydney with his letters trial apology and some memoirs of his life (London: A.
Millar, 1763)[Ecco Repr.], p. 170 of portion of text after Discourses). Unsurprisingly, the Last Paper was a
ringing reaffirmation of Sidney’s political views, including a summary statement of Filmer’s ideas and
Sidney’s opposition to them, as well as a brief explanation of the major injustices of his trial. (Scott
unfairly termed the Last Paper “one last piece of public relations to perform.”) The Last Paper was a
sensation, even though it “was not actually printed until ‘the Town was (so) full of written [manuscript]
copys’ that the government prohibition no longer served any purpose.” Scott II, pp. 342, 345. Among
Sidney’s assertions were: (i) that “we live in an age that makes truth pass for treason”; (ii) that as to his
“large treatise written long since in answer to Filmer’s book, … I know not why I might not have published
my opinion to the contrary, without the breach of any law I have yet known”; (iii) “I am persuaded to
believe that God had left nations to the liberty of setting up such governments as best pleased themselves”; (iv) “That magistrates were set up for the good of nations, not nations for the honour or glory of
magistrates”; (v) That the right and power of magistrates in every country was that which the laws of that
country made it to be”; (vi) “That those laws were to be observed, and the oaths taken by them, having
the force of a contract between magistrate and people, could not be violated without danger of dissolving
the whole fabric”; and others. These political principles reverberate throughout Discourses. (NB. The
1684 death of Sidney’s sister Dorothy, three months after her brother’s execution, was undoubtedly
hastened by Sidney’s fate. Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 164; Cartright, Sacharissa, p. 305.)
See Sidney’s Last Paper, inserted in full in Memoirs of A. Sydney that are part of the Sidney 1763
publication of Discourses and related materials, pp. 37-40; see generally West, Preface, DCG, pp. xxxvxxxvi; Scott II, Ch. 14, “The reckoning,” pp. 317-47.
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The judge in Sidney’s trial was Sir George Jeffreys, the man who led the “campaign” called the Bloody
Assizes, “the most notorious saga in the history of the English judiciary” – the revenge trials in the
aftermath of the 1685 Monmouth Rebellion during which “over 1700 rebels were dealt with, about 300
receiving death sentences and 800 ordered for transportation,” not to mention whippings, disease during
confinement, e.g., smallpox, and the exhibition of “the putrefying remains of so many.” Jeffreys was
known for his ambition, arrogance, disdain, “grim brand of humour,” and cruelty towards those caught in
the legal process, as well as his drunkenness and crudeness. John Evelyn’s mild rebuke in the aftermath
of Sidney’s trial referred to Jeffreys’ drinking, dancing and “talking much beneath the gravity of judges” at
a wedding a day or two after he had “condemned Mr. Algernon Sidney on the single witness of that
monster of a man, Lord Howard of Escrick, and some sheets of paper taken in Mr. Sidney’s study.”
Jeffrey’s vulgarity speaks for itself. For example, in the aftermath of the Russell and Sidney trials, during
the libel trial of a Whig who had foolishly commented on the events that had transpired, Jeffreys’ dripping,
grody sarcasm was on full display in a courtroom speech he gave: “And here is Mr Sidney, sainted! What
an extraordinary man he was! Yes, surely, he was a very good man, because you may some of you
remember to have read the history of those times, and know what share Mr Sidney had in that black and
horrid villainy, that cursed treason and murder – the murder, I mean, of King Charles the First.” So much
for judicial objectivity. The Diary of John Evelyn, E.S. De Beer, ed. (London: Everyman Library, 2006), p.
682; Robert Milne-Tyte, Bloody Jeffreys: The Hanging Judge pp. 55, 67, 126, 137, 147.
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to note that Sidney became “the foremost English martyr and patriot figure in the political mythology of
both England and America, in the century and a half following his death on the scaffold in 1683.”637
A distorted Sidney mythology grew that served Whig political purposes and neglected substantial
evidence.638 “’The cause for which [the elder] Hampden perished in the field [early in the Civil War], and
Russell and Sidney on the scaffold,’ became a well-sounding rallying cry of a party.” Whig opposition to
absolutism and unfettered royal prerogative was symbolized by the railroading of Russell and Sidney. In
death Sidney became “aetherealised into a glorious myth, or degraded into an obstinate, if disinterested,
regicide.”639 Neither image is a valid characterization of Sidney as a politician or a political thinker.
English law required two witnesses in prosecutions for treason.640 One of the reasons for the
notoriety of Sidney’s execution was the fact that this evidentiary requirement was satisfied by a corrupt
court through proffer of pages from the unpublished, incomplete, unedited Discourses manuscript, which
was accepted as the second “witness.” The first and only “eye” (that is, human) witness was Lord Howard
of Escrick, “that monster of a man” who was testifying to save his own skin and was infamously
dishonest.641 Ironically Howard also was a man whose proverbial fat Sidney had previously pulled out of
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Scott I, p. 1. An intriguing albeit self-serving albeit not necessarily reliable account of Sidney’s role in
the Rye House Plot is the lengthy story told by Lord Forde Grey in 1685, who (suspiciously) survived
involvement in multiple conspiratorial activities to become Earl of Tankerville in 1695, a title conferred by
William III, who also made Grey a member of his Privy Council. See Forde Grey Tankerville, The Secret
History of the Rye House Plot: and of Monmouth’s Rebellion (London: Andrew Millar, 1754) [repr. Forgotten Books, 2012]. The Secret History was fashioned by Grey after the failed Monmouth Rebellion. He
made the “Confession” before the Earl of Sunderland, who of course was Sidney’s nephew. For important
details about Grey’s Secret History, see Appendix B. The Secret History included all sorts of interesting
statements, not only about Sidney but also about many others allegedly involved in conspiratorial activities.
Exactly what they were conspiring to accomplish is one of many intriguing questions that this contemporaneous account raises. In contrast to Grey’s allegations, at his trial Sidney maintained that he had not
engaged in any treasonable activities. “Cl. Of Cr. [Clerk of the Court]: Art thou guilty or not guilty? Sidney.
Not guilty.” “OO. The Trial of Colonel ALGERNON SIDNEY, at the King’s-Bench, for High Treason: 35
Charles II. A.D. 1683,” Cobbett’s Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason
and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors from the Earliest Period to the Present Time, Vol. IX [1682-1684]
(London: T. C. Hansard, 1811), pp. [columns] 817-1054, 830.
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Scott I, pp. 1-2; Scott II, p. 196; see Ch. Two.
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Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, p. 237.
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Ironically, the author of the Ninth Dialogue of Court Maxims specifically referenced the two-witness
rule. Court Maxims, p. 141.
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Milne, “The Results of the Rye House Plot and Their Influence upon the Revolution of 1688,” p. 97.
See, e.g., Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, p. 169 (“Lord Howard of Escrick was a plausible man
who pretended to great ideas, and descended to practices which would disgrace a thief, according to the
popular idea. He had no more sense of honour in any transaction of his life with man or woman than the
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the legal fire.642 Because of legal improprieties Sidney’s conviction was “repealed, reversed, made and
declared null and void.”643 But it would be foolish to think that anything but Sidney’s ideas, which were
known to be in opposition to absolute monarchy, retaliation for the political activities in which he had
already (or was considered to have) engaged, and the political threat that Sidney apparently represented,
were the root causes of his demise.644

lowest criminal. …A greater contrast to Algernon Sidney it would be impossible to imagine, and how he
was deceived by this imposter we cannot tell, nor could imagine, were it not that such things happen.
…Against the dictates of prudence he helped Lord Howard. He visited him in the Tower, he lent him
money, with no hope of its being returned.”)
642

Lord Howard of Escrick was the son of a baron, a parliamentary soldier during the Civil War, and an
MP. He also was a member of the Green Ribbon Club and an ally of Shaftesbury in his Popish Plot
efforts, including the trial of Howard’s Catholic relative, William Howard, 1st Viscount Stafford, for treason.
Lord Howard of Escrick had a disreputable reputation; nevertheless, Sidney helped get him out of the
Tower of London when he was arrested and sent there as a result of the false accusation that Howard
had written The True Englishman, a pamphlet that accused Charles II of arbitrary rule. “In the king's
bench he protested his innocence, and, with Algernon Sidney's assistance, persuaded the government to
drop the case in the absence of credible witnesses.” The irony of this scenario is apparent. If one
believes that where there is smoke, there is fire, Howard is highly suspect, potentially connected with
various nefarious undertakings and perhaps even entrapment, e.g., besides Sidney’s undoing (and
Russell and Essex), Howard had an unclear role in the Edward Fitz-Harris affair, “a Wonderful tale of a
Protestant Plot between two Irish Papists and a Protestant Lord [Howard]; one English Sheep in
conjunction with two Irish Wolves” in which Fitzharris, an Irishman, was found guilty of conspiring to
falsely “persuade the world” of a “feigned” plot by means of a “Mock Confession” alleging that Protestants
were conspiring to kill the King and the Duke of York, among other things. Fitz-Harris was executed for
high treason, but not before apparently befriending or at least becoming acquainted with Howard. Truth
Vindicated: or A Detection of the Aspersions and Scandals cast upon Sir Robert Clatton and Sir George
Treby, Justices; and Slingsby Bethell and Henry Cornish Esquires, Sheriffs, of the City of London,
Intituled, The Confession of Edward Fitz-Harris Esq. (London: Rich. Baldin, 1681), FAU/Weiner
Collection, pp. 5, 7, 9. Why Sidney misjudged Howard so badly remains a mystery. Perhaps it was
because of their shared aristocratic pedigree, although this seems insufficient; Howard must have been
beguiling. Charles himself declared, after meeting Lord Howard, that “no one would be such a fool as to
trust” him. During the rounding up of those accused of involvement in the Rye House Plot, Howard was
found hiding “in a cupboard behind a chimney.” While “Charles reportedly thought Howard ‘soe ill a man
that he would not hang the worst dog he had on his Evidence’ (committee minutes, House of Lords, 22
Nov 1689), in fact he believed the substance of Howard's charges following Monmouth's private
confession. The government used Howard to testify against Russell, Sidney, and Hampden.” “Howard,
William, third Baron Howard of Esrick (c. 1630-1694),” ODNB, www.oxforddnb.com/view/printable /13949
(10-5-14); Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, pp. 169-72; The True Englishman, 1681; Burnet,
History of My Own Time, Vol. II, pp. 293.
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Meadley, Sydney Memoirs, p. 399. Trial improprieties included refusing Sidney a copy of the
indictment; permitting improperly admitted hearsay evidence; lack of evidence for important factual
assertions; absence of proof of the writing of the alleged libel, which certainly was neither published nor
read to the jury. Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, p. 215. In sum, the Sidney case “exhibited
such a compound of wickedness and nonsense as Is hardly to be paralleled in the history of judicial
tyranny.” Id, p. 214.
644
But see Hume’s History of England, http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/793, Vol. 6, p. 478 (Sidney’s
“ingratitude and breach of faith, in applying for the king’s pardon, and immediately on his return entering
into cabals for rebellion, form a conduct much more criminal than the taking of French gold: Yet the

237

There is one further point that bears emphasis, particularly since it is not made in the histories
and biographies that cover Sidney’s execution, and that is the distinguished company that Sidney kept in
and out of his alleged criminal conduct – the company of fellow aristocratic public servants. Sir William
Lord Russell, characterized by Burnet as “universally beloved and trusted,” was also accused of being a
traitorous conspirator.645 Russell was the son of a Duke; he was a Baron and an MP. Related through
marriage to Shaftesbury, whose exclusion efforts he supported, Russell was arrested, tried, and executed
for his alleged involvement in the Rye House Plot.646 Arthur Capel, the Earl of Essex, had been the
English Ambassador to Denmark in 1669 and then a privy counselor and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in
1672. He served in various other government positions of importance. Like Russell he supported

former circumstance was always known, and always disregarded.”); cf. Blair Worden, “Republicanism and
the Restoration: 1660-1683,” Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776, Ch. 4, pp.
139-93, 153 (“Sidney had been wanting to assassinate Charles II for twenty years,” a rather rash and
notably undocumented statement by Prof. Worden.)
645

Burnet, History of my Own Time, Vol. II, p. 91.
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Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. XLIX: Robinson-Russell, Sidney Lee, ed. (London: Smith, Elder,
1897), p. 480-85. For an interesting perspective on Lord Russell, see the intriguing article by Melinda
Zook on Russell’s domestic chaplain, the prolific Whig propagandist Reverend Samuel Johnson, author of
Julian the Apostate, in which Johnson drew an inflammatory analogy between Julian, the fourth-century
apostate Roman Emperor, and Charles II’s “popish successor,” James, Duke of York . Indeed, in
November 1683, just before Sidney was executed, the very same Judge George Jeffreys convicted
Johnson of seditious libel for this work. One of the remarkable but unsurprising features of Zook’s very
thorough consideration of those men writing conspiring/plotting/planning, or supporting those in
opposition to James, Duke of York in the 1670s and ‘80s, including Samuel Johnson, Anthony Ashley
Cooper (the Earl of Shaftesbury), his confidant John Locke, Lord William Russell, Arthur Capel (the Earl
of Essex), John Hampden the younger, Sir William Jones, Thomas Hunt, Hugh Speke, Robert Ferguson,
William Atwood, and James Tyrrell, is the fact that Sidney is not even mentioned in connection with
Zook’s assessment of “early Whig ideology” and “ancient constitutionalism”! For instance Zook stated,
“The formation of early Whig ideology from the late 1670s through the 1690s was a collective effort in
which degrees of radicalism varied. Samuel Johnson along with James Tyrrell, William Atwood, Robert
Ferguson, Thomas Hunt, Peter Allix, and others propagated early Whig principles.” Again, Zook stated,
“For these men, it is very likely that Johnson’s principles as well as those of Thomas Hunt, Robert
Ferguson, (in his Whig days) James Tyrrell, William Atwood, and John Locke were not seen as located at
the radical end of Whig ideology, but as the basic tenets of Whig ideology.” No Sidney. Nevertheless,
there seem to be many Sidney ideas reflected in Samuel Johnson’s writing, most notably the emphasis
on law – Johnson “drew from Bracton, Fortescue, Coke, and other medieval texts” – and the ancient
constitution, the contract between a people and its ruler, the consent of the people to their form of
governance, anti-utopianism, and other republican convictions. Zook compared Johnson’s ideas
particularly to those of Locke, emphasizing their different modes of argument, with Johnson (like Sidney)
relying on historical precedent whereas Locke’s Second Treatise was ahistorical and Locke a “pristine”
natural law advocate. Although this is work for another day, whether it is a coincidence or Johnson and
Sidney knew each other, Johnson’s ideas certainly seem closer to Sidney’s than to Locke’s. See Melinda
Zook, “Early Whig Ideology: Ancient Constitutionalism, and the Reverend Samuel Johnson,” Journal of
British Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr. 1993), pp. 139-65, 141, 155, 163.
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Shaftesbury’s exclusion efforts. Essex favored the ascendency of the Duke of Monmouth in lieu of
James, Duke of York. After his arrest Essex was found dead in his cell in the Tower of London, and while
the official word was that he committed suicide, there were those who suspected he had been
murdered.647 John Hampden was the last man in this group to be charged; he escaped with a
misdemeanor conviction, perhaps because of the public outcry at Sidney’s execution. Hampden was the
grandson of the famous MP of the same name who had challenged the ship money tax. His father was a
prominent Whig politician from a wealthy, aristocratic family who became a privy counselor and chancellor
of the exchequer.648 Shifting from the Rye House Plot to other Sidney associates, in his work on A Just
and Modest Vindication, Sidney’s likely pamphlet collaborator was Sir William Jones, probably the most
highly regarded attorney in England.649 Penn was the man who supported Sidney in his unsuccessful
attempts to enter Parliament after he returned to England from France, the same aristocratic Penn who
was given a royal charter to found Pennsylvania. And then there are the very distinguished, politically
diverse family members with whom Sidney associated, including Halifax and Sunderland.
In short, one could certainly make the case that Sidney’s friends and family were leaders of their
country. As a later MP stated, one of “the most remarkable features” of the reign of Charles II was “that
the names of those who perished on the scaffold for high treason, were among those that were most dear
to the recollection of Englishmen.”650 Even if we assume that the allegations against those accused in the
Rye House Plot were true, and whether or not they amounted to treason, these men, including Sidney,
can be considered the most honorable in England, committed public servants engaged in dangerous
activity from which they had nothing to personally gain. Their motivation was to protect their country and
countrymen, just as the successful aristocratic leaders were in the English revolutions of 1689 or, for that
matter, 1776. Of course, none of this makes a failed revolution any less treasonous.651
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The Speeches of the Right Honourable Charles James Fox in the House of Commons (London:
Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1815) Vol. VI, p. 54 (Nov. 30, 1795).
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This point is made by Burnet’s editor, M. J. Routh, in connection with Lord Russell. “But be all this as it
may, what have bad princes, with their instruments, to answer for hereafter, who, by iniquitous acts of
pretended government, force unhappy subjects to resist them, for the sake of necessary defence, and
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From 1679 to 1685, during which time Sidney was executed, Charles II ruled without a
Parliament, fending off multiple sophisticated intrigues to either kill or dethrone him, or to successfully
control his unquestionable, albeit unbridled prerogative – indeed, his responsibility – to protect his
legitimate heir. “Charles had devised a workable solution. He had made the monarchy strong – stronger
than at any other time in the seventeenth century.” He had also “successfully built up a considerable
degree of goodwill towards the crown,” at least among members of the Anglican Church. Historians paint
this canvas variously. Spurr presented a largely positive picture of the 1670s, describing the “openness
to wit, irony and emotional experimentation,” a “burgeoning tolerance of religious diversity, commercialism
and “political trimming.” At the same time, he recognized that what “was characteristic of the 1670s could
not survive in the harsh political environment of the early 1680s,” which was when Sidney once again
became entangled in politics. Harris offered a different picture: “Restoration history is the story of human
tragedy. People were exploited, brutalized, persecuted, hounded to death by a regime that felt
desperately insecure after two decades of civil war and republican rule. The tragedy – the suffering –
reached its height during the years of the Tory Reaction,” in which the three kingdoms were “bitterly
divided places.” Tens of thousands of nonconformists were fined and imprisoned for their beliefs; many
lost jobs, and their lives and the lives of their families were ruined. “Whole communities were torn apart as
loved ones were lost. …People were stripped of their basic rights and privileges, as judicial and
magisterial benches were purged and juries were packed.”652 By the end of Charles II’s reign the opinion
of the Whigs at the time of the Oxford Parliament increasingly became the view of most moderates,
represented by Halifax, who embraced constitutional monarchy. This was the backdrop for James II’s
brief (four year) rule, and the invitation to William of Orange by many of the English nobility to invade

who, if they happen to fail, are treated as criminals, and put often to cruel deaths by those very tyrants
that provoked them; acting against them (and making it a justification) under the letter and colour of laws,
instituted only and avowedly for the protection and security of good government?” In short, “Is not this
murder in the sign of an all-judging God?” Burnet, History of My Own Time, Vol. II, p. 385 n.2.
652
Spurr, England in the 1670s, p. 300; Harris, Restoration, pp. 424-25; see also Milne, “The Results of
the Rye House Plot and Their Influence Upon the Revolution of 1688,” p. 102, citing Bodleian MS Aubrey
12, fo. 271 r.: “The straining of law to secure convictions also helped to undermine respect for the
monarchy. Adherence by the king to the law of the land was then regarded as the best safeguard against
a return to civil war, and conversely, as one writer expressed it when welcoming the promise of rule
by law contained in the king's declaration of April 1681: 'The prince who distroys the lawes of his
Country distroyes the best and firmest props and supports of his owne Royall throane.' “
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England and rule the country in lieu of the Stuarts.
For our purposes, what is important to recognize is that the Restoration Parliament stood by while
Charles II executed prominent Englishmen considered a threat to his dynasty. The emphatic, righteous
voice of Halifax, Sidney’s nephew, rings out in The Character of a Trimmer, a tract that was not published
until 1688; but it circulated shortly after Sidney’s execution.653 Halifax’s emphasis on law and many other
republican ideas embraced the views articulated by Sidney. This particular passage from The Character
of a Trimmer is understood to be an attack on the man who effectively executed Sidney – his corrupt
judge, Chief Justice Jeffreys: “ There would be no end of making a panegyric of laws; let it be enough to
add that without laws the world would become a wilderness and men little less than beasts. But with all
this the best things may come to be the worst if they are not in good hands.” Indeed, Halifax suggested
that Jeffreys’ corruption tarnished the reputation of Charles II. “The authority of a King, who is head of the
law, as well as the dignity of the public justice, is debased when the clear stream of the law is puddled
and disturbed by bunglers, or conveyed by unclean instruments to the people.”654
Not only did the corruption of a judge debase the value of law. Halifax went further, emphasizing
the danger of such government conduct – another tribute to the ideas of his uncle. “When such sacred
things as the laws are not only touched but guided by profane hands, men will fear that out of the tree of
the law, from whence we expect shade and shelter, such workmen will make cudgels to beat us with – or
rather, that they will turn the cannon upon our properties that were entrusted with them for their defence.
To see the laws mangled, disguised, made speak quite another language than their own;” said Halifax, “to
see them thrown from the dignity of protecting mankind to the disgraceful office of destroying them, and,
notwithstanding their innocence in themselves, to be made the worst instruments that the most refined
[malice and] villainy can make use of, will raise men’s anger above the power of laying it down again” –
set men on fire? – “and tempt them to follow the ill example given them of judging without hearing when
so provoked by their desire for revenge.”655Halifax’s highly critical comment about statesmen around the
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“Introduction,” Halifax Complete Works, p. 26, & “Editorial Introduction,” “The Character of a Trimmer,”
id, p. 48.
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Halifax, “The Character of a Trimmer,” p. 286.
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king “betraying him into such an unprincely mistake, and to such a willful diminution of himself” thereby
“retrench[ing] his own greatness so as to shrink into the head of a Party,” is, as Milne pointed out, very
reminiscent of the Sidney and Jones tract published four years earlier. A Just and Modest Vindication
stated that it seemed “as if the Ministers had a mind to make his Majesty the Head of a Faction and joyn
himself to one Party in the Kingdom, who has a just right of Governing all. …We have but too good cause
to believe that … the Ministers and Favourites do but little consider the Rise and Progress of the late
Troubles, and have little desire or care to preserve their country from a Relapse.”656 Once again, we have
an important Halifax-Sidney shared perspective.
The Parliament that instituted the Glorious Revolution also successfully conspired with the Prince
of Orange to intimidate James II into forfeiting his monarchy – an act of treason, had it been unsuccessful. In neither the acquiescence to the abuse of power in the trials of Sidney, Russell, and others, nor in
the intimidation that resulted in the ouster of James II, did Parliament (or what became the “Convention
Parliament”) pursue the sort of transparent form of governance, utilizing the rule of law, that was the
mainstay of Sidney’s political ideas and action. Sidney likely would have endorsed rebellion if he
considered it to be the least bad alternative to an English Orange monarchy.657 We simply do not
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[Sidney and Jones], A Just and Modest Vindication, p. 48; see Milne, “The Results of the Rye House
Plot,” p. 103; cf. [Edmund Bohun,] Reflections on a Pamphlet, Stiled A Just and Modest Vindication of the
Proceedings of the Two Last Parliaments: Or, a Defence of His Majesties Late Declaration (London: M.
Clark, 1683). As we will see, this is also reminiscent of the voices of the Americans who, until the bitter
end, viz., the signing of the Declaration of Independence, refused (or were psychologically unable) to hold
the king accountable for the consequences of his actions, blaming his ministers instead.
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“Some commentators would deny that James II had been abusing his prerogatives or that he intended
to introduce absolutism, while others would point to William’s continuing attachment to royal power, to the
limited nature of the revolution’s check on the prerogative, or to the role of the English and Welsh
themselves in establishing the new regime.” Thus, for example, in the early 1680s, William “opposed the
scheme of constitutional limitations on the monarchy which might have solved the exclusion crisis. In
1689 he fought hard to beat off parliamentary encroachments on royal power, both resisting the claim of
right and articles of grievance in Scotland and trying to water down the declaration of right in England.”
Claydon & Speck, William & Mary, pp. 91-92 94.
This perspective is echoed in the assessment of another historian: “According to Frankle, the main
reason why Whig plans to place further limitations on the powers of the Crown were thwarted was the
refusal of the Prince of Orange to go along with them.” Spurr, Reluctant Revolutionaries, p. 19, quoting
R. J. Frankle, “The Formulation of the Declaration of Rights,” Historical Journal 17 (1974), pp. 265-79.This
would have alienated Sidney. On the other hand, William’s “prioritization of the struggle against Louis in
Europe” – he was a “monomaniac” in this way – “meant that he was willing to accept changes in England
which earlier kings would not have entertained.” Indeed, “Lacking any real interest in England politics
beyond the need to maintain the country’s willingness to face France, the king gave up powers to
parliament which the monarchy had long resisted surrendering, and showed an absence of personal
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know.658 In the 1680 timeframe, the French Ambassador to England, Paul Barillon, opined that Sidney
“would not wish that England and the States General should make a league.” Charles-Édouard d’Avaux,
French Ambassador to the Netherlands, said “that Sidney told him, or he told Sidney, that the Prince of
Orange, as the opponent of liberty in Holland, would be the opponent of liberty in England.”659 This view
was confirmed by Barillon, who commented that, “M. de Sidney est un de ceux qui me larlent le plus
fortement et le plus ouvertement sur cette matière,” viz., “Mr. Sidney is one of those who speak to me
most strongly and openly upon this matter.”660

grudges or favouritism unprecedented in the Stuart dynasty.” Claydon & Speck, William & Mary, pp. 6768, 91-92, 94-95.
658

Perhaps we can gain insight from the evolution of Rev. Samuel Johnson’s perspective. Ardently
opposed to the succession of the Catholic James II, Johnson annoyingly demurred from the preferred
Whig interpretation of the accession of William and Mary, arguing that “the people of England had
dethroned James II in 1688 for his violation of the nation’s established laws and religion”; William and
Mary had not simply filled a void created by James’ departure. For these views, Johnson was ostracized;
he also became strange bedfellows with the country Tories. But unlike Ferguson, who had been Shaftesbury’s nonconformist chaplain and who was “converted to Jacobitism by 1690,” Johnson remained true to
his principles. At the same time, he “became steadily disillusioned with the new regime. Zook, “Early
Whig Ideology: Ancient Constitutionalism, and the Reverend Samuel Johnson,” pp. 142, 150-51.
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William’s regal, if not absolutist manner is evident in descriptions of his personality, e.g., “William’s
personal aloofness was often matched by arrogance about his position. Although the stadholder-king
was frequently politically flexible – especially in the face of representative assemblies – he also tended to
stand on his dignity.” In sum, William of Orange possessed “a multifaceted lack of sociability.” William’s
absolutist bent was reflected in his approach to the exercise of power, although William can be
distinguished from the Stuarts in his ability to compromise. “He had a keen sense of the prerogatives of
his offices, and of the rights of the Orange and Stuart families, and would often compromise these only
once bitter struggle had convinced him there was no alternative. Thus William’s early high-handedness in
the United Provinces was ended only by the overwhelming opposition it provoked, while in Britain the
king’s initial instinct seemed more absolutist than parliamentarian.” One of the men to whom William
conveyed these inclinations towards more absolutist government was Sidney’s nephew Halifax. “Indeed,
William’s conversations with the marquess of Halifax in 1689 reveal an intense irritation at the
Westminster parliament’s attempt to control him. He sank into a paranoid delusion that there was a
republican conspiracy against him, and admitted that he would have refused to confirm the revolution’s
limitations on his powers had it not been for ‘the condition of his affayres’.” On the other hand, William did
mellow with time. “Later in the 1690s, William’s gradual surrender to the English legislature was also
accompanied by tensions which threatened to erode the goodwill generated by his otherwise conciliatory
attitude to parliament. Only last minute changes of heart avoided ruptures over the place bill in 1694, and
the standing army in 1698.” Id, pp. 90-92.
660

Halifax, “The Character of a Trimmer,” Halifax Complete Works, p. 177 n.*. See Charles-Édouard
Levillain, Research Note, “French Diplomacy and the Run-up to the Glorious Revolution (1688): A Critical
Reading of Jean-Antoine d’Avaux’s Correspondence as Ambassador to the States General,” The Journal
of Modern History, Vol. 88, Noa.1 (March 2016), pp. 130-50, for an interesting discussion of William III’s
blindsiding of the French with respect to his “Grand Design,” viz., the invasion of England, including the
fact that “the Stadholder-less period of 1650–72 had facilitated French intervention in Dutch domestic
affairs. After 1672, the anti-French posture of both Grand Pensionary Fagel and Stadholder William III left
Louis’s diplomatic agents with less room for maneuver, except perhaps in Amsterdam, where the
Oranges had always faced considerable opposition”; that a “good ambassador was primarily expected to
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What we do know is that the opposition to William III came from two opposing quarters: the tories
(royalists), who became Jacobites, and those whigs (parliamentarians) who had spent their lives in
pursuit of the “good ol’ cause” and were unconvinced that replacing one monarch and dynasty with
another would advance this goal.661 “As early as 1689, the earl of Sunderland,” Sidney’s nephew, “had
warned William III that while it remained ‘very true that the tories were better friends to monarchy than the
whigs’, the new king ‘was to consider that he was not their monarch.”662 While the tories “remained
theoretically wedded to the principle of non-resistance to kings, elements within their ranks appeared
highly uncertain over precisely which monarch not to resist.”663 In contrast, the “Commonwealthmen,”
deemed “republicans” and for the most part parliamentarians and emerging whigs, viewed the Glorious
Revolution as an opportunity to seek guarantees for what was vital to them in governance. Accordingly,
they “had urged the Convention parliament to seize the change ‘to obtain, which we can never recover
again, if it is lost … the Delivery of the People from Slavery’.” This included the political principles that
“English government, sanctioned by tradition and civil prudence, rested on forms of popular consent, that
the fragile remnant of an ancient political ‘contract’ remained the source of sovereignty, even if it had
been all but buried beneath centuries of despotism.”664 England should not “owe its salvation” to a foreign

be a good spy, a reliable source of intelligence”; the role of the French ambassador to the Dutch Republic, Jean-Antoine d’Avaux, and his failure to be a good spy; the fact that William III’s activities were kept
closely guarded – secret – in the Dutch Republic, for “no one had forgotten the tragic end of the De Witt
brothers in 1672, lynched by an angry mob to avenge the French invasion of the Low Countries”; that one
of d’Avaux’s “main duties” was to keep the French Ambassador to England, Paul Barillon, who was
d’Avaux’s cousin, “abreast of the latest news coming from the Dutch Republic”; and that Louis XIV
believed that William of Orange intended to “stir up trouble in England, but only from a distance.”
661

A number of issues preoccupied the English during William III’s rule. One that also disturbed the
British Americans a century later was the necessity for a peacetime standing army. Notwithstanding
William’s determination to contain Louis XIV, which required having a large military force at the ready, the
Whig “new country” opposition “argued that a standing army would be an expensive threat to English
liberties. Claydon & Speck, William & Mary, p. 64.
662
Gabriel Glickman, “Political Conflict and the Memory of the Revolution in England 1689-c. 1750,” The
Final Crisis of the Stuart Monarchy: The Revolutions of 1688-91 in their British, Atlantic and European
Contexts, Tim Harris & Stephen Taylor, eds. (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: Boydell Press, 2015), pp. 243272, 249. For an interesting perspective on the Dutch prince’s military takeover of Britain, facilitated in
part by the Dutch fleet that “was four times the size of the Spanish Armada,” see Russell Shorto,
Amsterdam: A History of the World’s Most Liberal City (New York: Vintage Books, 2013), pp. 216-23.
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Id, p. 250.
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Id, p. 253.
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king. Indeed, William himself had apparently said, “I am not made for this people, nor they for me.”665
For the “left wing” opposition, Parliament had to “set the constitution on a new footing,” promulgate a
“wide-ranging declaration of rights,” and ensure that the king was “elected by popular will.” This was not
at all what William III had in mind; and he was remarkably successful in negotiating the shark-infested
waters. Meanwhile, the Convention Parliament was totally invested in compromise, e.g., the Declaration
of Rights had no enforcement provision; and the line between compromise and corruption turned out to
be diaphanous. 666 It is hard to imagine that Sidney would not have been acutely aware that the
“revolution could not be at once a conquest and an assertion of lost constitutional rights.”667
Years before Sidney had apologized to his father for straining at knats and swallowing camels – for
his “strange conscience” that did not allow him to do what seemed to come so easily to certain other
Englishmen, including MPs, which was to whitewash earlier allegiance to parliamentary rule. As Sidney
put it, “contempt might procure my safety; but I had rather be a vagabond all my life, than buy my being in
my own country at soe deare a rate.” While there is a fraudulent Sidney letter in which he ostensibly
castigated Parliament, Sidney certainly had his issues with some of the men in it although likely not with
the institution. 668 The same thing can be said of Adams, who had no issue with Britain’s bicameral
legislature; it was their oppressive actions that he indicted.
We can conclude our narrative with the recognition that the number of demanding activities in
which Sidney is considered to have played a primary role within a brief, several-year span stretches
credulity. Certain of these pursuits are indisputable. Most suspect is when Sidney wrote the Discourses
manuscript. Sidney was associating with people who opposed the monarchy as well as those that did
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Id, p. 258.
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Id, pp. 253-54 and contemporary pamphlets cited therein.
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Sidney was one among a number of republicans invoked by the disenchanted, such as John Toland, in
support of the proposition that “a Government of Laws” must be “enacted for the common Good of all the
People, not without their own Consent or Approbation.” But the times changed. William’s reign became
associated with the struggle against French hegemony in Europe and the protection of international
Protestantism; the latter pursuit of which would have been important to Sidney, and perhaps the former
would have made sense, too. Id, pp. 255-56, 264. Recently, Lionel K. J. Glassey surveyed the
historiographic characterization of the Revolution of 1688, including its most well-known characterization
as “glorious.” See Appendix B.
668

Sidney to. Leicester, Aug. 30, 1660, Blencowe, Sydney Papers, pp. 194-98. The fraudulent Sidney
letter is Letter VIII in the Sydney Papers, pp. 199-204.
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not. How far this opposition had gone in the evolution from abstract possibility to pragmatic discussions
to criminal activity is not clear; nor is the extent of Sidney’s role, leadership or otherwise, in whatever
collective activities might have been pursued.669 The utter lack of credibility of the evidence on which he
was convicted certainly does not prove anything; but neither does it disprove treasonable activity.

669

For an analysis that completely indicts Sidney, albeit without the citation of sources, see John Salmon,
“Algernon Sidney and the Rye House Plot,” History Today, Vol. 4, No. 10 (1954).
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CHAPTER TWO
Truth and Truth-Likeness

How violently rumours do blow the sails of popular judgments, and how few there be
that can discern between truth and truth-likeness, between shows and substance.
Sir Philip Sidney, Arcadia1

There are complexities at play in analyzing Sidney’s ideas that cannot be ignored.
A. Politics and Religion in Early Modern England
One of the Parliamentary grievances that led to the Civil War and continued thereafter was the
extent of the king’s prerogative, a centuries-old tradition providing the monarch with broad discretionary
authority in numerous arenas, enabling him not only to effectively tax people without their consent and
make policy decisions regarding foreign affairs and war, but also permitting the monarch to provide
extremely valuable titles, land, positions, and pensions to those he favored.2 During the Restoration the socalled royalist Cavalier Parliament, the label given to the Long Parliament that worked with the Crown for
eighteen of Charles II’s twenty-five year reign, was also known as the Pensioner Parliament precisely
because of the king’s control of the leadership of Parliament by means of the favors he doled out to those
who supported him.3
Perhaps even more ever-present than the issue of prerogative and its abuse was the matter of
religion, which often dominated the exercise of prerogative and political decision-making generally. As
has been made plain, “Fears of popery generated irrational delusions about the intentions of the Stuarts

1

Sir Philip Sidney, The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia, 1590, Book 3, Ch. 4 (University of Oregon
Renascence Editions, 2003), www.luminarium.org/renascence-editions/arcadia3.html (4-8-19).
2
In 1649 the official charge of treason by the House of Commons against Charles Stuart included the
following assertion: “All which wicked designs, wars, and evil practices of him (the said Charles Stuart)
have been and are carried on for the advancing and upholding of the personal interest of will and power
and pretended prerogative to himself and his family against the public interest, common right, liberty,
justice, and peace of the people of this nation, by and for whom he was entrusted as aforesaid. The Trial
of Charles I, A Documentary History, David Lagomarsino & Charles J. Wood, eds. (Hanover & London:
University Press of New England, 1989), p. 63.
3

See, e.g., reference to Sir William Temple’s avoidance of the office of Secretary of State, in 1677, in part
because “he disliked the practice of buying and selling Crown offices and found it distasteful to compete
with others for them.” Richard Faber, The Brave Courtier: Sir William Temple (London: Faber and Faber,
1983), p. 43.
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from the 1630s to the 1680s.”4 Once again, for every generalization there are exceptions. But the
following lay of the polito-religious land constituted the ever-present entangled context of Algernon
Sidney’s final years in England.
“It was a seventeenth-century commonplace that religion and politics were ultimately inseparable”
as evidenced in the fact, as Greaves understatedly noted, that “Restoration nonconformity was much
more complex than we have recognized, encompassing a range of political views as diverse as (though
not coextensive with) the religious tenets dissenters espoused.”5 The most visceral issue in the hearts
and minds of early modern Englishmen was the monarch’s Catholic or Protestant affiliation, which first
arose in the sixteenth-century when Henry VIII broke with the Papacy because of his determination to end
his marriage to his first wife, the Spanish Catholic Katherine of Aragon, who was unable to provide Henry
with a male heir. Henry institutionalized the “supremacy” of the monarch over ecclesiastical matters
through the 1533 Act in Restraint of Appeals, 24 Hen. VIII c.12, which delineated two separate legal
systems, temporal and spiritual, under the jurisdiction of the King.6 While this statute and others
associated with it were repealed during the Catholic rule of Mary Stuart, they were revived under
Elizabeth, along with the 1559 Act of Supremacy. In addition to specifying an Oath of Supremacy by all
officeholders (temporal and spiritual) that required the swearing of allegiance to the monarch, the Act of
Supremacy “united and annexed” all ecclesiastical powers “to the Imperiall Crowne.”7 This religious

4

W. A. Speck, Reluctant Revolutionaries: Englishmen and the Revolution of 1688-89 (Oxford University
Press, 1988), pp. 10-11; see also Richard L. Greaves, Secrets of the Kingdom: British Radicals from the
Popish Plot to the Revolution of 1688-1689 (Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 334. Jacqueline Rose
put the religious issue even most pointedly. “[T]he politics of Restoration supremacy” was “a distinct
phase in England’s long Reformation.” Jacqueline Rose, Godly Kingship in Restoration England: The
Politics of the Royal Supremacy, 1660-1688 (Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 15.
5
David Underdown, Pride’s Purge: Politics in the Puritan Revolution (Oxford University Press, 1971)(repr.
ACLS Humanities E-Book, 2008), p. 9.
6

The complexity of the concept of “royal supremacy” is the subject of Jacqueline Rose’s Godly Kingship.

7

Id, p. 46; 77 Eng. Rep. 1, 1 Co. Rep. 1 (1593). In this pre-Restoration period no one questioned the
assertion of monarchic supremacy over the Church of England; the only matter subject to question was
the nature of that supremacy – whether it was “jurisdictional,” i.e., legal, and/or spiritual, “sacerdotal.”
“Preventing supremacy from invading the sacerdotal sphere was the most important refutation of Catholic
criticisms. Elizabeth’s gender was relatively insignificant.” Effort was made to distinguish between
“advice about piety and religious affairs,” which was beyond the scope of the monarch, and the Church of
England’s “civil coercive authority” which was derived from the power and supremacy of the monarch.
Nevertheless, the jurisdictional/sacerdotal distinction became exceedingly challenging, e.g., “who
enforced uniformity and under what warrant: issues about the relative roles of crown, parliament, and
248

reality immediately defined who was “in” and who was “out,” at least among the nobility at Court and, not
infrequently, among those who remained physically in the country – i.e., whether Catholic or Protestant, if
you were out, you might well have had to seek refuge on the Continent. With rare exceptions, the religion
of the English monarch determined who else held positions of political power.
Religious affiliation became a dominant factor with Henry VIII; it remained just as true, if not more
so, during Algernon Sidney’s lifetime given the Catholic threat posed by the Stuarts. “To be a Catholic in
seventeenth-century England was to court opprobrium, social exclusion, and political suspicion. While in
practice Englishmen co-existed with their Catholic neighbours, they feared and reviled the vaguer
bogeyman of the papist. The spectre of popery haunted British kings….”8 The nobility of England had
always vied for positions of leadership that were controlled by the monarch; but with the late Tudors and
the Stuarts, having the correct religious affiliation was the sine qua non of political power. Given the
profound nationwide trauma experienced as a result of Mary Tudor’s Catholic rule, it was only through
more subtle means that the Stuarts could gain support for anything that in the least respect smacked of
Catholicism.9 In this timeframe it was the Anglican Church that was most closely associated with the
Stuarts, with a shared interest in dominating society, religiously, politically, and socially, by means of a
highly controlling (and controlled) state church. It was in this context that the powerful Archbishop Laud,
allied with Charles I in his efforts to strength both the Church and the Crown, was vilified by his opposing
parliamentarians.10 It is important to remember that the bishops of the established Church of England

convocation in governing English religion.” It is Rose’s thesis that there was both a political and an
ecclesiastical restoration, which “differed significantly.” Rose, Godly Kingship, pp. 8, 47, 50, 59, 61.
8

Rose, Godly Kingship, p. 229.

9

Notwithstanding the gossipy nature of the Personal Memoirs of Charles II by nineteenth-century Whig
author J. W. Clayton, the following description well illustrates the impact on others, even his ardent
supporters, of the association of Charles II with Catholicism: “That Charles was at heart a Catholic, even
at this early age, is fully evident, notwithstanding all professions to the contrary. The Duke of Ormond
says that, while at Fontarabia, in 1659, ‘to his great surprise and concern, he accidentally one morning
saw the King in the great Church, on his knees before the High Altar, with several priests and
ecclesiastics about him.” This was confirmed by two noblemen, one of whom “was of the opinion that the
King ought, in policy, to declare his religion, as the most hopeful method to recover his dominions.” But
the other nobleman “looked upon it as the most dangerous advice that could be given, such as would be
the ruin of the King’s cause; and it was finally agreed by the majority of the little Court there, that this
change should be kept as the greatest secret imaginable.” Clayton, Personal Memoirs of Charles II, Vol.
II, pp. 63-64; see Rose, Godly Kingship, p. 229.
10

From the 1620s, Charles I was associated with the Protestantism advocated by William Laud, the
Archbishop of Canterbury. “[T]he English church became a safe haven for those opposed to
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were automatically members of the House of Lords, and termed (to this day) the Lords Spiritual. The
commitment to episcopacy as “the best church government” was the most distinguishing feature of the
Church of England, which developed alongside the vitality of theories of divine right monarchy, “not least
because they shared the same enemies (papalism and Presbyterianism).” Nevertheless, because of
bishops’ assertions of independence, Presbyterian leaders and nonconformists were able to attack the
Church of England, arguing that it actually undermined royal supremacy.11
It goes without saying that the politico-religious English terrain became more complex as English
Protestantism splintered. As one scholar put it, religion was an “historic flashpoint between crown and
parliament.”12 The generalization is true that among the politically active, who were frequently the elite in
English society, royalist political inclinations that favored a strong monarchy tended to go hand-in-hand
with Anglicanism; conversely, support for a less controlling, less absolutist monarchy, derivatively providing to Parliament more political influence, was associated with dissenting Protestant affiliations, which
included a wide-ranging set of beliefs represented by an array of sects. This included the English Presbyterians, as well as Congregationalists, Diggers (also known as Levellers because of their belief in
economic equality or “leveling”), Quakers, Puritans (of whom Cromwell is the most famous Englishman),
Baptists and other minority “non-conformists.”13 While beyond the scope of this study, it is important to

predestinarian views and for those with relatively ceremonial tastes in worship.” For more details on
Laud, his policies and demise, see Appendix B.
11
For example, Archbishop Laud maintained that the state (and therefore by inference the king)
“supported rather than determined religious policy.” While James I had a “taste for platitudes,” and little
stomach for business, “Charles’s appetites were just the opposite: he spoke infrequently and governed
incessantly.” Charles I’s “unremitting” support of Laud (as well as the Earl of Strafford) became “one of
the great tragedies” of Charles’s life. He did not feel threatened by Catholics, but rather by “the hotter
sort of Protestants” seeking “unity of church and state,” who he strongly believed were a threat to the
crown as well as to the people. Rose, Godly Kingship, pp. 56, 60, 67; Kishlansky, A Monarchy
Transformed, p. 117.
12

During the Restoration the Church of England was far from one-dimensional. Religious pluralism
flourished, with the most significant division existing between those who believed that the Church of
England, bonded to the monarch, was supreme, versus those who believed that the established church
needed to be viewed as “one of several means of worship.” This split did not necessarily coincide with
conformity and dissent, particularly when Charles II’s indulgences to Protestant nonconformists and
Catholics created novel allegiances. Id, pp. 89, 163 et seq.; Greaves, Secrets of the Kingdom, p. 2.
13

Appreciating the distinctions within Protestantism is not easy. In addition to Lutheranism and
Anabaptism, other Protestant Reformation sects, known as Reformed religions, are identified by the
name of a reformer such as Calvin, a form of church government such as Presbyterian or Congregational,
and even a locality such as Waldensia. The established seventeenth-century English state church was
the Church of England, later known as Anglican, which was a form of Calvinism that incorporated various
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recognize that this balance changed a number of times over the period of the Civil War, Protectorate,
Interregnum and Restoration. Indeed, the “years between 1603 and 1642,” for example, and I would
suggest continuing throughout the Stuart dynasty, “witnessed explosive debates over religion.”14
Given the Stuarts’ comfort level with Catholicism, dissenting religious groups and political factions
representing them were seen by the monarchy as the greatest threat to both the monarch’s independence and to the Anglican Church’s dominance.15 Adding to this tension was the fact that the Stuarts

features of Catholicism, including a hierarchical church structure and ornate iconography and ceremony
within the church. Separated from the Church of England was a group of Reformed churches of diverse
organization and belief. The Presbyterians were the most moderate religious community among the
nonconformists, many of whom favored “comprehension within a reformed Church of England,” i.e.,
inclusiveness. Quakers were the most religiously radical sect but, as a result of their passivism, also the
least militant. They were nevertheless involved in anti-establishment publishing and other nonviolent
rebellious activities. The Congregationalists, or religious Independents, created a network of autonomous
churches in the late 1640s that operated on “quasi-voluntarist” principles, and a number of the 1660s
underground radicals were Congregationalists. Each congregation regulated its own internal organization,
having “ful and entire” not “independent” power, according to the Congregationalist 1643 manifesto,
Apologeticall Narration. Each congregation also maintained links with other congregations and sought
each other’s counsel, as well as the collective views of their fellow Congregationalists. But there was no
canon law, ecclesiastical hierarchy, or synods exercising doctrinal or judicial control. Congregationalists
strenuously opposed sectarianism, decried separatism and, as a result, expelled Quakers in the 1650s.
While there was a wide divergence of views within the movement, in general Congregationalists abhorred
intolerance, but rejected the Presbyterians’ concept of comprehension. The Baptists were another diverse
group that included General (Arminian) and Particular (Calvinistic) Baptists. Mention also should be
made of the Fifth Monarchists, not a religious group in its own right but made up of Congregationalists
and Baptists. Fifth Monarchists were radical millenarians who were particularly dangerous during the
Restoration. Rose, Godly Kingship, pp. 80-82; Greaves, Deliver Us From Evil, pp. 9-11; Historical
Dictionary of the Reformed Churches, 2nd Ed., Robert Benedetto & Donald K. McKim, eds. (Lanham, MD:
The Rowman & Littlefield Pub. Group, Inc., 2010), pp. xi, xlv-liii.
14

Rose, Godly Kingship, p. 61. This politico-religious phenomenon is cogently described by a nineteenthcentury author in the context of the rule of Charles I (albeit with the use of the misnomer “party” attached to
the Puritan MPs): “Charles I. inherited from his father very high notions of the royal prerogative, a strong
attachment to episcopacy, and a consequent antipathy to the dissenters from that system of Church
government, who, affecting greater sanctity, and a stricter religious discipline, than the members of the
Church of England, assumed the denomination of Puritans. They formed not merely a religious, but also a
political party, which manifested a decidedly republican spirit and a zealous attachment to civil liberty.”
While distinct, “Presbyterianism, the prevailing system of Church government in Scotland, closely
resembled that of the Puritans in England,” who “gained such ground during the reign of James I. as to form
a majority of the House of Commons in the first Parliaments convoked by his successor. Between such
contrary elements, it was absolutely impossible that harmony and unanimity could long subsist.” Clayton,
Personal Memoirs of Charles I, Vol I, p. 65.
15

There were several brief period of exception to this rule, in 1662 and 1672, when Charles II embarked
on a policy of granting indulgences to nonconformists, suspending the operation of penal laws against
both nonconformists and Catholics in an effort to similarly gain acceptance of Catholics in positions of
authority in government. This indulgences policy failed, and before and after it Charles was no more
tolerant of nonconformists than was the staunchest Church of Englander. (Years later, in the 1680s, there
was concern about Whig and dissenters’ demands for religious toleration precisely because of the risk of
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were reminded of their less-than-absolutist dynasty by the much more absolutist power of the Catholic
Bourbon kings and, particularly, Louis XIV, who ruled from 1643 to 1715, dominating the European
political arena from late in the rule of Charles I (who was married to Louis XIII’s sister) until after the end
of the Stuart dynasty.
The fact that the civil war is often dubbed the Puritan Revolution is the most conspicuous
indicator of the dominance of religious issues, and particularly, dissenting Protestantism, in a war that led
to the execution of the king.16 The English episcopate was outlawed, the head of the English Church, the
king, was executed, and the Church of England was “unestablished” and exiled. Cromwell was in many
ways what today we would term a born-again Christian, strident in his views, seeking to create an English
Puritan theocracy. “Oliver Cromwell knew that God had a special and surpassing purpose in the civil
wars….For ‘reasons best known to himself’, he had raised up Cromwell, a ‘weak instrument’, ‘not worthy
the name of a worm’.” Cromwell lived in obscurity for the first forty years of his life, a member of the
gentry who inherited a small estate near Huntingdon, a town roughly between London and Birmingham,
that he represented in the 1628 parliament. According to one historian, “He lost both face and influence
in a local dispute, sold up, and moved to nearby St. Ives, where he farmed and lived in the style of a
yeoman. At the time of his financial crisis Cromwell experienced a spiritual rebirth accompanied by
assurance of salvation.”17 While Cromwellian England may have been “the most tolerant and religiously
pluralistic” in English history, there were significant limits, e.g., there was no countenance of “popery,
idolatry and blasphemy.”18 In this regard, Algernon Sidney and his father, along with others in the family,

“letting the Catholics in at the back door.”) Tim Harris, Restoration: Charles II and his Kingdoms (London:
Penguin Books, 2006), pp. 65, 247, 423-25.
16

The term “the Puritan revolution” was invented by Samuel Rawson Gardiner a century ago. While both
the words “Puritan” and “revolution” may be anachronistic, as Wootton pointed out, “contemporaries did
employ religious terms … to justify supporting radical parliamentarianism rather than conservative
royalism,” which adds to the complexity of understanding the nature of differences among Englishmen –
were they religious, political, or both? Wootton, “Leveller Democracy and the Puritan Revolution,” p. 422.
17
Rose, Godly Kinship, p. 83; Blair Worden, God’s Instruments: Political Conduct in the England of Oliver
Cromwell (Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 13; Kishlansky, A Monarchy Transformed, p. 191.
18

Rose, Godly Kingship, pp. 80-81; Gordon J. Schochet, “From Persecution to ‘Toleration,’” J. R. Jones,
ed., Liberty Secured? Britain Before and After 1688 (Stanford, CN: 1992), Ch. 4, pp. 122-57. At the same
time, Cromwell asserted the right to freedom of conscience: “for these are matters of Conscience, and
Opinion; they are matters of Religion; what hath the Magistrate to do with these things? he is to look to
the outward man, but not to meddle with the inward.” Oliver Cromwell, His Highnesse the Lord
Protector's Speech to the Parliament in the Painted Chamber. The one on Munday the 4th of September;
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with their cosmopolitan, internationalist, and inclusive sense of Protestantism, were out of sync with the
political establishment.19
Many scholars have detailed the complex events of the eighteen years of the English Civil Wars
and the Interregnum (1642-60), and no effort will be made to do so here. Kishlansky’s description of the
millenarian environment of the Civil War period is one that brilliantly captures the mood of the times. “The
English Revolution was born of the axe, an unplanned child of necessity surrounded by angry predators.
It survived a decade of external hazards, internal dissension and its own inherent contradictions.”
Focusing on the impact of a people that killed their king, Kishlansky reminded us that, “The regicide made
England an outlaw nation.” On the other hand, “In England, the greater part of the nation accepted the
Commonwealth and then the Protectorate,” albeit “sullenly. …Most gentry withdrew from local
government, giving way to men lower in the social order and leaving justice and administration in the
hands of novices.” For the newly empowered, it didn’t matter. “Yet for enthusiastic supporters of the
Revolution these realizations were untroubling. Weight, not numbers, was the crucial measure. …The
Revolution was sustained by a passion for perfection and by a searing vision of the future. Both were
products of the intense millenarianism unleashed by the King’s execution.” Religiosity was the height of
the matter. “For many, dethroning the King and defrocking the bishops fulfilled ancient prophecies. The
Revolution would usher in a new Jerusalem; the nation would be governed by the saints, God’s own
minority through which he would uproot the corruption of the world.”20

the other on Tuesday the 12th of September. 1654. Taken by One who Stood very near him, and
Published to prevent mistakes (London: T. R. and E. M, 1654), p. 10.
19

As discussed in Ch. Four in connection with the element of moderation in Sidney’s republicanism, the
suggestion by Michael P. Winship in his article on Sidney’s ascribed Calvinist republicanism that Sidney
was ardently religious is simply not persuasive. Michael P. Winship, “Algernon Sidney’s Calvinist
Republicanism,” Journal of British Studies, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Oct. 2010), pp. 753-73. Sidney was, however,
an ardent supporter of religious toleration.
20

Kishlansky, A Monarchy Transformed, pp. 189-90. The shooting star called the Leveller movement,
which existed from 1646 to 1649, represented another radical, but much more religiously personal and
politically secular utopian view. In their first Agreement of the People, November, 1647, the Levellers
proposed a written constitution based on inalienable natural rights that included the following principles:
(i) almost universal suffrage (but not dependents – i.e., excluding women, children, and servants); (ii) a
representative, legislative assembly; (iii) rule of law, with no privileged estates, corporations or
monopolies; (iv) freedom of conscience, and therefore freedom of expression; (v) the illegality of
conscription; (vi) radical popular sovereignty, the power of the people, including the entitlement of the
people, e.g., juries, to determine the goodness of the law (and therefore to refuse to enforce bad laws);
and (vii) the right of revolution. Wootton, “Leveller Democracy and the Puritan Revolution,” pp. 412, 427.
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Beyond the safe-haven and intellectual world of Penshurst, Kishlansky’s description applies to the
English environment that Sidney experienced when he fought as a parliamentarian in the revolution,
retreated from London when Cromwell’s personal rule began, and then returned to participate in
republican governance in the 1650s before leaving on the diplomatic mission to Denmark in July 1659. In
short, this was the jumping off point for Sidney’s long continental odyssey and retreat. Importantly, Sidney
was neither part of, nor experienced the politico-religious scene of England from mid-1659 until 1677,
when he finally was permitted to return home because of his father’s impending death. Undoubtedly
Sidney was aware of what was going on. But many of the historical events of the Restoration took place in
Sidney’s absence. Furthermore, many of the people who were politically or religiously involved did not
have any first-hand awareness of him.21 Eighteen years is a long time, particularly when combined with
Sidney’s earlier years abroad and the volatility of the times.
Unlike Sidney, Charles II was invited back to England in 1660 at the age of thirty and remained king
for twenty-five years thereafter. Historian Jacqueline Rose pointed to the depiction of Charles II as the
“godly magistrate” on the frontispiece of the tract by the famous political and religious leader William
Prynne entitled, An Exact Chronological Vindication and Historical Demonstration of our British, Roman,
Saxon, Danish, Norman, English Kings Supreme Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction. In this drawing “the Church
quite literally rests on the royal sword, around which are entwined the words ‘Carol[us] D[ei] G[ratia] fidei et
ecclesiae defensor,’ meaning “Charles by the grace of God defender of the faith and church.” Above the
godly ruler is a banner that refers to Isaiah 49:23, “the proof-text for royal supremacy: kings shall be thy
nursing fathers, and their queens thy nursing mothers” – unsurprisingly, a Biblical reference on which

21

A modest effort to establish how many MPs might have known Sidney, and vice versa, when he
returned to Britain from abroad, establishes this point. Relying on Cobbett’s Parliamentary History, there
were virtually the same number of MPs in Commons in 1658 and in 1678 albeit slightly differently
distributed among towns and counties: by my count, 512 and 513, respectively. Some of the men closest
to Sidney in 1658, such as Sir Henry Vane, had been executed. There were only about thirty men who
seem to have been in Commons in both timeframes – and some may have been sons who had the same
name – along with about a dozen men with the same surname but a different first name, i.e., likely sons
or other relatives of 1658 MPs. See William Cobbett, The Parliamentary History of England from the
Earliest Period to the Year 1803, Vols. 3 & 4 (comprising the period from the Battle of Edge-Hill, in
October 1642, to the Meeting of the Parliament begun at Westminster, April the 25th, 1660, commonly
called the Convention Parliament, which was sitting at the return of Charles the Second, in the month of
May following and which voted his Restoration; and comprising the period from the restoration of Charles
the Second, in 1660, to the Revolution, in 1688) (London: T. C. Hansard, 1803 & 1808), at 1530-36 &
1079-85, respectively.
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Filmer relied.22
Beginning with Charles II’s reign and continuing with the rule of his brother James, millenarianism
became a significant political liability as the Anglicans regained control of government and implemented
the so-called Clarendon Code to stamp out Protestant nonconformism and ensure that those in public
office were members of the Church of England.23 Historian Mark Goldie reminded us that it was not the
king but Parliament that instituted this repressive law. “We first need to note the paradoxical circumstances of Restoration Dissent. The ‘great persecution’ was more the work of parliament that the crown.”24
According to Harris, “there is plenty of evidence of grass-roots Anglicanism, as people welcomed back
their old ministers,” and communities burned copies of the Solemn League and Covenant – the agreement
between the English parliamentarians and the Scottish during the civil war “for settling and preserving the
true Protestant religion” by protecting Scottish Presbyterianism and parallel nonconformism in England –
not to mention crushing popery and prelacy, viz., embracing Anglicanism.25 At the same time, religious
intolerance was the underbelly of radicalism. “Toleration for Protestant nonconformists was the most
crucial single issue; a policy that permanently granted such freedom would have substantially reduced the
radical threat to the government.”26
Charles II’s restoration foregrounds the continuing and pervasive fear of Catholicism. “[N]o issue
raised more concern in British politics in the period 1673-88 than James’ Catholicism.” Even though the
English Catholic population was tiny – only two percent of the population – “anti-Catholicism was firmly
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Jacqueline Rose, Godly Kingship, p. 1.

23

Harris, Restoration: Charles II and his Kingdoms, pp. 52-53.

24

“The Clarendon Code, enacted in the 1660s, was brutal: it not only enforced Anglican uniformity but
also criminalised all rival religious meetings.” As a result, “Quakers and Baptists were jailed in the
hundreds. The code culminated in the Conventicle Act of 1670, which Andrew Marvell memorably called
‘the quintessence of arbitrary malice’.” For example, “It unleashed informers and imposed crippling fines
and sequestrations.” Goldie noted, “Yet Charles II did not share the priorities of the Cavalier-Anglican
establishment and sought conciliation. His motives were to assist Catholics and to appease Puritans.”
The irony of the situation was patent. “The fact that oppression was the work of parliament and liberty the
gift of kings shadowed the debate over the Declaration. The deepest paradox was that some Puritans,
who had been Parliamentarians during the Civil War, now defended royal ecclesiastical supremacy.”
Mark Goldie, “Toleration and the Godly Prince in Restoration England,” Liberty, Authority, Formality, Ch.
3, pp. 45-65, 45-46.
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On the details of the Solemn League and Covenant, see Appendix B.
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Greaves, Secrets of the Kingdom, p. 332.
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embedded in the national consciousness as a result of the Marian burnings, the papacy’s futile attempt to
deprive Elizabeth I of her crown, the influx of seminary priests and Jesuits, the infamous Gunpowder Plot,
and the ‘popish conspiracy’ of the early 1940s.” The “unstoppable march of Catholicism on the Continent”
further fueled this fear.27 The alarm cannot be considered hyperbolic or irrational given the Stuarts’
religious proclivities and, particularly, the likelihood that the very Catholic James, Duke of York, would
become king when Charles died.28 “Separation of Catholic belief from political popery was rare.”29 Some
men may have been driven completely by religion or politics; most Englishmen were influenced by both,
whether in support of Stuart absolutism or in conspiracy against it.30 Undoubtedly, “the circumstances in
which an ungodly tyrant could be resisted, and by whom, drove Catholic and Calvinist political thought.”31
It is this politico-religious firestorm to which Algernon Sidney returned when he made his way back
to England in 1677. Two data points reflect this maelstrom of politico-religious activity: the 1677 publication
of Andrew Marvell’s An Account of the Growth of Popery, which averred that “unnamed perpetrators were
attempting ‘to introduce a French Slavery, and … Roman Idolatry,’ both of which were ‘crimes of the
Highest Nature’” and, in juxtaposition, the 1677 betrothal of Mary, the Duke of York’s daughter, to William of
Orange.32 But even earlier, as one Whig historian wrote, “if Sedition was the Pretence, Oppression was
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Greaves, Secrets of the Kingdom, p. 1.
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“The king’s own religion was suspected, as his brother’s was declared: and the whole conduct shewed
a design to govern by the French model.” Burnet, The History of My Own Time, Book III, ch. 1, p. 4.
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Rose, Godly Kingship, p. 184.
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Harris argued that the support of intolerance was politically, not religiously motivated because,
“Protestants did not believe in persecuting people for their religious opinions; that was a popish principle.
Nonconformist conventicles were hunted down because they were regarded as nests of sedition,”
although the reality was that this was simply false. How one can contend that Protestants were not
intolerant is a mystery, given more than a century of religious wars in England and the European
continent. Harris is quite right, however, that, “The trouble was, pursuing a policy of religious intolerance
out of a fear of political subversives ran the risk of making the potentially loyal disloyal and creating the
very problem that such a policy was designed to prevent.” Harris, Restoration: Charles II and his
Kingdoms, p. 55.
31

It was the political Presbyterians who restored Charles. As a result, many loyal royalists were irked
because “they were ignored in favor of Charles’s enemies.” This is one example of many in which political
and religious alignments were unpredictable. Even the terminology was confusing. One type of royalism
included allegiance to the Church of England, another to constitutional monarchy, a third to royal
absolutism. Rose, Godly Kingship, pp. 3, 7, 11, 15 n.17, 17, 24.
32
Greaves, Secrets of the Kingdom, pp. 3-4, citing Andrew Marvell, An Account of the Growth of Popery
(1677), p. 8. Mary’s solid Protestant marriage contrasts very conspicuously with her father James’s 1673
marriage to Mary of Modena, a Catholic from a family with close French ties. Greaves maintained that
Shaftesbury was dismissed as Lord Chancellor (November 1673) because of his opposition to James’
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always the Consequence.”33 A detailed description of the political circumstances that ultimately led to
Sidney’s arrest, in addition to Sidney’s own perspective through his correspondence and his trial record, is
contained in John Dalrymple’s Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland; from the dissolution of the 1st
Parliament of Charles II till the capture of the French and Spanish fleet at Vigo, “an invaluable source book
for students of late seventeenth century history,” published in 1771-73.34 Dalrymple “intend[ed] to give a
relation of the affairs of Great Britain and Ireland, from the time when Charles the Second, by ceasing to
govern by Parliaments, made the breach between him and the friends of liberty irreparable.” Much more
recently, Richard Ashcraft’s Revolutionary Politics & Locke’s Two Treatises of Government exhaustively
reviewed the events that led up to the arrest of Locke’s patron Anthony Ashley Cooper, the First Earl of
Shaftesbury, a precursor event to the exploits in which Sidney may have taken part. Richard Greaves’
Secrets of the Kingdom covers similar ground, and more. Melinda Zook’s account of Radical Whigs and
Conspiratorial Politics in Late Stuart England provided invaluable information about a number of men who
publicly opposed James (to be the II)’s assumption of the British crown.35 There are many other accounts.36
Disentangling the debate from the events is complex, often indeterminate, and inherently
problematic; there are gaps in the record, biased sources, and the inevitable influence of unspoken

second marriage. “The possible implications of this marriage for the succession became a matter of
increased concern as hopes faded that Charles would procure an annulment of his own marriage to
[Catholic] Catherine of Braganza and take a Protestant wife.” Id, pp. 2-3.
33

Greaves, Deliver Us From Evil, p. 56, quoting Whig historian James Ralph.
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In addition to public papers, Dalyrmple utilized considerable material that had not been accessible
previously, including the collection of papers contained in the cabinet of King William III’s private papers,
such as correspondence to the Prince of Orange, various private manuscript collections, and relevant
dispatches of Barillon and other French ambassadors from the archives of Depôt des Affaires Etrangeres
at Versailles, all of which threw new light on seventeenth-century English history. It was not until the
publication of Dalyrmple’s work that the 1670 Secret Treaty of Dover became public knowledge. The
Secret Treaty contained not only an agreement to launch an offensive war against the Dutch, but also
included Charles II’s commitment to Louis XIV to publicly declare himself a Catholic, another significant
instance of the secret truth versus the public truth-likeness. John Dalyrmple’s Memoirs of Great Britain
and Ireland; from the dissolution of the 1st Parliament of Charles II till the capture of the French and
Spanish fleet at Vigo, Volume 1 (Ulan Press: Lexington, KY: 2014), pp. xv-xxiv; E. K. Timings, “Dalyrmple
Corrected,” The English Historical Review, Vol. 70, No. 275 (Apr., 1955), pp. 267-68; C. H. Firth, “The
Development of the Study of Seventeenth-Century History,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,
Third Series, Vol. 7 (1913), p. 32; R. Hutton, “The Making of the Secret Treaty of Dover, 1668-1670,” The
Historical Journal, Vol. 29, Issue 2 (June 1986), pp. 297-318; Traill, Shaftesbury (the first earl), pp. 58-65.
35
Dalyrmple, Memoirs, Part I, Book I, p. 2; Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, passim; Greaves, Secrets of
the Kingdom, passim; Zook, Radical Whigs, passim.
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See Appendix B.
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intents and purposes. Ashcraft referred to the contingent nature of such analyses as the “determined
indeterminancy of political debate,” not only with respect to the outcome of political chess matches, but
also given the “moves and gambits” that constituted the “particular style and character of each new
confrontation.”37 With these caveats in mind, the following facts and circumstances seem clear.

Princes, therefore, have no greater enemy than a conspiracy, because if a conspiracy
is organized against them, it either kills them or disgraces them; if it succeeds,
they die, and if it is discovered and they kill the conspirators, people always believe
that the conspiracy was an invention of the prince to give vent to his avarice
and cruelty against the lives and property of those whom he has killed.
Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy38
B. Conspiracies

There are a plethora of conspiracies or cabals, real and imaginary, which form a penumbra
around Charles II’s restoration and the heir to his throne, James the Duke of York. This was far from a
new phenomenon; for a century England had been embroiled in conspiracies, real and imaginary, both
concocted fraudulent accusations and very real ones, e.g., the 1569 Rising of the North, an unsuccessful
attempt by Catholic noblemen in northern England to depose Elizabeth I and replace her with Mary
Queen of Scots, led by Thomas Percy, the 7th Earl of Northumberland, and Charles Neville, the 6th Earl of
Westmoreland, one Percy/Neville connection; and the 1605 Gunpowder Plot, a failed “Jesuit” plot to kill
James I and members of Parliament, led by Robert Catesby, Guy Hawkes, and Thomas Percy, a cousin
of Henry Percy, the 9th Earl of Northumberland, who had been his patron; as a result of the Gunpowder
Plot, the Earl was imprisoned in the Tower from 1605 to 1621.39 This Northumberland was Sidney’s
grandfather – his mother Dorothy’s father. The focus here will be on the conspiracy of which Sidney was
accused, along with some emphasis on those cabals associated with Shaftesbury. The sheer number of
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Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, p. 39.
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Machiavelli, Discorsi, BkIII, Ch6, 275.
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Greaves elaborated: “Colored by the memory of the Marian persecutions and played out against a
background of aggressive Catholicism on the Continent, including the growing repression of Huguenots in
France, the Popish Plot culminated a hatred and fear of Catholicism that extended from the Smithfield
burnings through the papal bull Regnans in excelsis, the Gunpowder Plot, and purported plotting in 1640
and 1641, and the tales of Titus Oates and Israel Tong.” There were then the politically astute, like
Shaftesbury, who “were quick to exploit fears of popish conspirators for their own ends.” But this does
not mean that the fear was not real. “Blatant attempts to manipulate anti-Catholic concerns do not detract
from the fact that antipapist sentiment was both widespread and a matter of deep conviction.” Greaves,
Secrets of the Kingdom, pp. 333.
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accusations of conspiracy is itself meaningful. As the Catch-22 adage goes, just because you are
paranoid doesn’t mean they aren’t after you. Real or imagined, the fear of conspiracy certainly goes a
long way in explaining the harshness – patently, the illegalities – associated with the way in which the
monarchy handled its perceived enemies. In chronological order, Restoration conspiracies will be very
briefly described.
In the 1660 to 1663 timeframe there were numerous radical cabals – “a steadily rising river of
allegations and rumors” – driven by a determination to enable nonconformism (variously expressed) to not
only exist in England but to thrive and to suppress Catholicism and hostility to the Stuart monarchy specifically
and sometimes monarchy, particularly absolute monarchy, in general. Less often, cabals were hatched
because of a determination to force the king to lower taxes. Allegations of plots and counterplots suggest that
motivation was sometimes more about power politics than religion. But the overriding reason for cabals
against the king was to obtain state toleration of religious nonconformism. Ironically, the flood of plots
produced the opposite result: greater religious and political repression. In Deliver Us from Evil historian
Richard Greaves documents twelve major plots to institute radical change and countless alleged sub-plots
and conspiracies in the 1660 to 1663 timeframe.40 For our purposes, the details of these plots are not
important.41 What is important is the fact that some of them took place and, with respect to those that
probably did not, there nevertheless was alarm and anxiety among royalists that cabals were taking place.42

40
Greaves drew the distinction between radicals and reformers although, as he noted, “[i]n practice the
distinction is often more difficult to make.” Radicals were “those who sought fundamental change by
striking at the very root of contemporary assumptions and institutions,” whereas reformers did not seek to
replace the status quo with something new but, rather, sought change from within the existing political
system. Greaves, Deliver Us from Evil, passim; see p. 86 for “rising river” description, pp. 4-8 for radicals
and reformers, and p. 227 for motivations.
41

The twelve major plots were: (1) Lambert’s rebellion of April 1660; (2) the White Plot of December
1660; (3) the Fifth Monarchist insurrection of January 1661, which included (4) Venner’s rebellion; and (5)
the Millinex Plot; (6) the Presbyterian Plot of October 1661; (7) the Yarrington Plot of November 1661; (8)
the Nonsuch House Plot of November/December 1661; (9) the Tong Plot Of October/November 1662;
(10) the Dublin Plot of Winter/Spring 1663; including the (11) Lascelles Plot; and (12) the Derwentdale
Plot of Fall, 1663, which expands to a host of conspiratorial machinations generally termed the Risings in
the North. Greaves, Deliver Us From Evil, passim.
42

Once again, scholars disagree on the extent and import of radical plots. On the one hand, while Harris
applauded the detailed work of Greaves in his trilogy of studies on the radical underground, Harris
concluded that it is difficult to interpret the evidence, and consequently declined to reach Greaves’
conclusion that radical dissidents represented a significant threat to the stability of the Stuart monarchy.
On the other hand, Harris believed that Alan Marshall has gone too far in the other direction in his
conclusion that there was “no coherent radical underground” but, rather, “desperadoes and adventurers
on the fringes of the criminal underworld” who posed little danger to the king. Harris also pointed to the
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The consequence was that Charles II was forced to take both defensive and offensive action to protect his
crown, including funding innumerable informants to facilitate nipping each plot in the bud, and dealing harshly
with alleged conspirators. Part of this nefarious activity consisted in the actual planning of insurrection and
regicide, as well as murder of the Catholic heir, James Duke of York. Related to the conspiratorial activity was
the radical press, which fomented rebellion.43 Perhaps of greatest importance, the environment
psychologically conditioned Charles and his advisers to suspect dangerous opposition, which began as soon
as Charles assumed power after a bloody civil war with his own harrowing escape, his father’s execution, and
years of personal exile. Although the radicals failed to achieve their goals, among other things they provided
a rationale for the Clarendon Code and other repressive measures, including Sidney’s execution.44
To understand the reaction of Charles II to Shaftesbury, and then to Russell, Essex, and Sidney,
it is helpful to recognize that in 1660 Charles was a thirty-year-old man who had spent the prior fourteen
years, his early adulthood, exiled from England (with one brief, ignominious return to reclaim the throne in
1650, at times running for his life.) The ten years before that were not fun either; Charles fought
alongside his father at the impressionable age of fourteen, and having lived through his father’s
execution, he resided in relatively meager circumstances when first exiled to France with his mother.45
When he (amazingly) returned victoriously to England, Charles faced numerous threats to his monarchy
and his person. Having survived this perilous time it should not be surprising that upon his secured

significant work by Gary S. De Krey on the London radical underground. Harris, “What’s New about the
Restoration?” pp. 195-96. Greaves’ Deliver Us From Evil, Enemies under His Feet: Radicals and
Nonconformists in Britain, 1664-1677 (Stanford University Press, 1990), and Secrets of the Kingdom:
British Radicals from the Popish Plot to the Revolution of 1688-89 (Stanford University Press, 1992) are
an important trilogy on dissident activity in England, Scotland, and Ireland, including the activities of Brits
on the Continent from 1660 to 1688, viz., “from revolution to revolution.” Greaves, Secrets of the
Kingdom, p. vii. Alan Marshall’s work is Intelligence and Espionage in the Reign of Charles II, 1660-1685
(Cambridge University Press, 1994). Gary S. De Krey’s ideas are included in a host of articles, as well as
London and the Restoration, 1659-1683 (Cambridge University Press, 2008) and Restoration and
Revolution in Britain: Political Culture in the Era of Charles II and the Glorious Revolution (London & New
York: Red Globe Press, 2007). Also written after Harris’ historiographic review is Zook’s important 2008
monograph on radical politics, Radical Whigs and Conspiratorial Politics in Late Stuart England.
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Greaves, Deliver Us From Evil, Ch. 7.
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See “A Character of King Charles II,” Halifax: Complete Works, J. P. Kenyon, ed. & intro. (Baltimore,
MD: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 247-67; Tim Harris, Restoration: Charles II and His Kingdoms 1660-1685
(London: Penguin Books, 2006).
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restoration Charles was a secretive ruler, a suspicious, defensive, and protective king who was not about
to imperil either his own royal status or that of his family. By the 1680s, Charles could be quite relaxed,
e.g., when he dismissed his personal guard after the Rye House plot because “no one was likely to kill
him to put James on the throne,” he indubitably was not a man willing to tolerate any sort of real threat.46
It is also clear that unintentionally, Charles’ 1681 dismissal of Parliament created a desperate
Opposition that no longer had a public forum that might be able to block repugnant exercises of the king’s
prerogative. In an action that Machiavelli would have considered foolhardy and perilous, Charles forced
his Opposition underground. While there had been political and religious radicals and dissidents in
England for many years and a flourishing pamphlet war over the power of the king, religion, and other
matters, the most prestigious and powerful leaders, even if they had availed themselves of the opportunity to write a pamphlet, focused their political activities in Commons or Lords. When Parliament was
dismissed this option ended. As Machiavelli emphasized in his Discorsi, a ruler need not be afraid of
open debate and opposition within a system that contains and controls inevitable and divisive political
differences; what they should worry about, and take immediately action to avoid, is the creation of a
hidden faction, cabal, or opposition movement that is functioning outside established government structures.47 Charles II effectuated the very problem Machiavelli urged rulers at all costs to avoid. Indeed, he
accomplished it in multiple respects. He seemed to recognize this fact in his suppression and jailing of
potential (and real) opponents. For example, in the case of nonconformists, “The government was far less
concerned with religious ideas than the capacity of conventicles to serve as nurseries of sedition.”48
One of the major plots of late-1661, soon after the monarchy was restored, was called the
“Nonsuch House” plot, so named because the alleged conspirators met at Nonsuch House, a
coffeehouse in Bow Street, Covent Garden (and hence the conspiracy is sometimes dubbed the Bow
Street Cabal). The Nonsuch House plot was an alleged conspiracy “to raise new Troubles, to the
Disturbance of the Peace of the Kingdom,” including a regicide plan. Among those arrested were
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Robert Milne-Tyte, Bloody Jeffreys: The Hanging Judge (London: Andre Deutsch, 1989), p. 65.
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“Princes, therefore, have no greater enemy than a conspiracy,” etc. Machiavelli, Discorsi, BkIII, Ch6,
275.
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Greaves, Deliver Us From Evil, p. 106.
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republicans who met at the Nonsuch House tavern, including the author James Harrington and his
protégé Henry Neville. Nonsuch House was owned by the infamous professional plotter and republican
John Wildman, who also happened to be a shrewd businessman. Wildman built up a substantial fortune,
largely through real estate speculation and ownership.49 Wildman was described by a fellow plotter as “a
man of cunning, very able to draw others into snares and keep out himself.”50 Nonsuch House had been
a known intellectual hang-out for years, a venue for those “in the left-wing republican party,” and the
meeting place of the Commonwealth Club, “evidently the predecessor” of Harrington’s Rota Club that first
met in 1659. The Commonwealth Club had over eighty members, including Henry Martin and John
Wildman. The plot also ostensibly included John Ireton, who in fact participated in later conspiracies to
overthrow the monarchy. The evidence against some of the accused was inadequate; Neville, for
instance, was not even arrested, whereas Harrington was.51
Harrington was a member of the gentry who attended Oxford for a few years and very briefly
entered the Middle Temple – an experience that must have been unpleasant as his writing reflects a
complete disdain for attorneys.52 Harrington traveled the continent and did not participate in the Civil
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Movement in the Seventeenth Century (London: Jonathan Cape, 1947), pp. 142, 180-81; Greaves,
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(Manchester, UK & New York: Manchester University Press, 2009), p. 58. Harrington should not be
confused with Sir James Harington (1607-1680), a distant cousin who was the Baronet of Ridlington, an
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War. When he returned to England in 1646 he became a gentleman of the groom when Charles I was
held captive, first at Holmby House where he had been brought by the Scots who had captured him.
Harrington remained with the King when he was sent to the Isle of Wight until shortly before Charles I’s
execution. Harrington was completely devoted to Charles.53 Nevertheless, “Even then he had been a
political idealist of a certain Republican fashion, and it had been part of the King's amusement in his
captivity to hold discourses with him and draw out his views.”54 After Charles’s execution in 1649
Harrington dedicated himself to writing The Commonwealth of Oceana, published in 1656. “After the
King's death, Harrington, cherishing very affectionate recollections of his Majesty personally, had lived for
some years among his books, writing verses, translating Virgil's Eclogues, and dreaming dreams.
Especially he had been prosecuting those speculations in the science of politics which had fascinated him
since his student days at Oxford.” Harrington read Histories; “studied and digested the political writings of
Aristotle, Plato, Machiavelli, Bacon, Hobbes, and others,” adding his own observations that he “collected
during his extensive travels in France, Germany, and Italy; he admired highly the constitution of the
Venetian Republic, and derived hints from it; and, altogether, the result was that he came forth from his
seclusion with a more perfect theory and ideal of a body-politic, as he believed, than had yet been
explained to the world.” It was in this context that Harrington derived his concept that, “Empire follows the
Balance of Property.” Harrington was convinced "’that no government is of so accidental or arbitrary an
institution as people are apt to imagine, there being in societies natural causes producing their necessary
effects, as well as in the earth or the air.’” Incorporating the approach of the scientific community, he
argued that Empire following the Balance of Property was one such natural cause. England’s “troubles
and confusions” were the result “not so much to faults in the governors or in the governed as to a change
in the balance of property, dating from the reign of Henry VII., which had gradually shifted the weight of
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affairs from the King and Lords to the Commons. But all could be put right by adopting a true model.”55
There is no reason to believe that Harrington was a political activist. Pocock, his modern editor,
said he was not.56 Historian Judith Shklar concurred, describing Harrington as a “provocative minor writer”
albeit “a 17th century figure of some considerable intrinsic interest.” He was “the only avowed Machiavellian of the time”; moreover, “the controversies in which he was engaged, particularly with Hobbes, are of
enduring importance as they touch upon the nature of both power and law. Beyond that is the question
how he came to appear to later writers in such a great variety of roles. Why has he served each
interpreter so differently? What is at stake here is the intrusion of ideology upon historical analysis.”57
Shklar considered Harrington to have had the misfortune of being “sandwiched between Hobbes and
Locke,” and therefore not appreciated until the twentieth century.58 Indeed, there is evidence to suggest
that Harrington was not even taken seriously in his own time.59
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Shklar continued to explain the three distinct senses in which ideology must be understood. “First, it is
the political convictions and preoccupations of later thinkers who read them into Harrington. Secondly,
there was ideology, not as a mere matter of political preferences, but in its historicist, all-explaining
form…. Lastly, there is ideology in the more neutral sense, as a term in sociological discourse. At the
level of abstraction at which social wholes are investigated, individuals and their ideas are treated as
functions, if not as direct effects, of these wholes. The unique and individual, the level of biography,
tends to be ignored, or even to be modified, in order to illuminate the logic of an entire situation.” Shklar,
“Ideology Hunting,” pp. 662-63. Note that Neville, a Harrington collaborator, was also a Machiavellian;
indeed, he described the Florentine as “divine.” Mahlberg, Henry Neville, p. 4.
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To the extent Harrington influenced American political thought, he was “an utter bore” – at worst, “a
grab-bag of republican platitudes” and, at best, “a prophet of written constitutions and an ingenious
inventor of electoral devices.” Shklar, “Ideology Hunting,’ p. 663.
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According to David Masson in his multi-volume work on John Milton, “[O]ne must specially remember
Harrington's Rota Club at the Turk's Head in New Palace Yard. That institution was now in its full nightly
glory, discussing all the questions that were discussed in Whitehall and many more.” The Rota Club
“had won by this time the crowning distinction of being a subject of daily jokes and witticisms.” Thus, for
example, “In a London squib of Nov. 12, 1659, laughing at Harrington and his Rota-men, the public were
informed that among the last ‘decrees and orders of the Committee of Safety of the Commonwealth of
Oceana’ had been these three:—1. ‘That the politic casuists of the Coffee Club in Bow Street [had the
Rota adjourned thither, or was this some other debating Club?] appoint some of their number to instruct
the Committee of Safety at Whitehall how they shall find an invention to escape Tyburn, if ever the law be
restored; 2. That Harrington's Aphorisms and other political slips be recommended to the English
Plantation in Jamaica, to try how they will agree with that apocryphal purchase; 3. That a Levite and an
Elder be sent to survey the Government of the Moon, and that Warriston Johnstone and Parson Peters
be the men, as a couple of learned Rabbis in Lunatics.’” The Harringtonians ignored this mockery; for
they “did not cease to put forth their own pamphlets with all seriousness. Valerius and Publicola, or the
True Form of a Popular Commonwealth extracted e puris naturalibus is the title of a dialogue of
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Coming to terms with the unique form of utopian republicanism that Harrington advocated in
Oceana is largely beyond the scope of this study; however, we will call upon Harrington’s utopian ideas, as
well as the republicanism of fellow seventeenth-century Englishmen, to understand where Sidney stood
among these thinkers. Pocock, for example, observed that the timing of the publication of Oceana reflected
the fact that its author was discontented with Cromwell’s Protectorate; it is not a treatise written during the
transition from monarchy to republic (or for that matter, later, from republic to monarchy). In Pocock’s view
although nothing links the three men, in Vane’s A Healing Question, Nedham’s The Excellency of a Free
State, and Harrington’s Oceana we have three early and contemporaneous programmatic statements of
English classical republicanism.60 Shklar noted, “No one has ever denied that Harrington was a Commonwealthman, and that being eclectic he shared some of the ideas of the Levellers and some of the
Independents.”61 But Independents did not embrace Harrington or his utopian ideas.62 As a nineteenth-

Harrington's, of Nov. 17, [1659,] expounding his principles afresh.” David Masson, The Life of John
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Pocock, “Introduction,” Oceana, p. ix. Harrington’s model was not “arbitrary monarchy, or a mixed
monarchy, or a mere democracy as vulgarly understood, or any other of the make-shift constitutions of
the past, but something worthy of being called a Free and Equal Commonwealth, and yet conserving
what was genuine and natural in rank or aristocracy. The basis must be a systematic classification of the
community in accordance with facts and needs, and the arrangements such as to give full liberty to all,
while distributing power among all in such ways and proportions as to keep the balance eternally even
and make factions and contests impossible.” There was nothing simple or even pragmatic about
Harrington’s model. “These arrangements, as he had schemed them out, were to be very numerous and
complicated, every kind of social assemblage or activity, from the most local and parochial to the most
general and national, having an exact machinery provided for it; but two all-pervading principles were to
be election by Ballot and rotation of Eligibility,” which were elaborately specified. The controlling nature of
Harrington’s concept of good government will be discussed in the next chapter. Here we note that
Harrington's ideal was “set forth in a thin folio volume, entitled The Commonwealth of Oceana, published
in 1656, and dedicated to Cromwell. The book was in the form of a political romance, with high-flown
dialogues, and a very fantastic nomenclature for his proposed dignities and institutions, throwing the
whole into the air of poetic or literary whimsy.” Perhaps unintentionally, nineteenth-century historian
David Masson drives home the very utopian nature of Harrington’s Commonwealth. “Though too fantastic
for direct effect, the book had been a good deal talked of, and had procured for the author not only a
considerable reputation, but also some following of disciples.” Masson, The Life of John Milton, Volume 5
(of 7), Book III, Ch. 1, §2, Part 13, “The Anarchy, Stage I.: or the Restored Rump: May 25, 1859 [sic]-Oct.
13, 1659,” at http://www.hotfreebooks.com/book/The-Life-of-John-Milton-Volume-5-of-7-1654-1660David-Masson--12.html (12-7-16).
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century scholar stated, Harrington was “to the right of the left and to the left of the right.”63 He was, however,
one of many men swept up in one of many conspiracies that jaundiced Charles II’s perspective. It is highly
problematic that Harrington was engaged in political much less conspiratorial activities. Nevertheless, he
was another man incarcerated for alleged involvement in a cabal. This incarceration forever adversely
affected Harrington’s health; indeed, it may have led to his mental breakdown and death.64
In 1663 Neville was arrested, this time in connection with the so-called Yorkshire or Northern Plot,
which was “widely believed to be real.” This cabal was said to be underway “to force the King to fulfill his
promises made at Breda,” namely, liberty of conscience to everyone except Catholics, and the removal of
certain taxes; but its “true intent” was supposedly “to destroy the government” and then “restore a Gospell
Magistracy and ministry.” This was an effort, to be led by Fairfax, “to renew ‘the old cause’” in league with
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T. W. Dwight, “James Harrington, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1 (March 1887), pp. 1-44. 6,
quoted by Shklar, “Ideology Hunting,” p. 679 n.77. (Dwight’s precise statement is that Harrington was,
“one of those good and noble men, found in every revolution, who at one and at the same time are on the
left of the party of the Right, and on the right of the party of the Left, without compromise of dignity or
sacrifice of principle.” While Dwight admired Harrington, he also began his article with the statement, “He
had no followers. He founded no school.” Id, p. 1. Notwithstanding these facts, Harrington and Sidney
do share certain important ideas, e.g., Aristotle’s assertion that “the true nature of government” is an
“empire of laws and not of men.” Id, p. 8.
In his biography of Cromwell-devotee John Milton, Masson provided the following depiction of the
utopian: “Of the varieties of political theorists glanced at by Ludlow the most famous at this time were the
Harringtonians or Rota-men.” Led by James Harrington, the group “set up their famous debating club,
called The Rota.” In 1649 they met every night at the Turk’s Head, where “their discourses about
Government and of ordering of a Common-wealth were the most ingenious and smart that ever were
heard, for the arguments in the Parliament House were but flat to those. This gang had a balloting box,
and balloted how things should be carried, by way of tentamens”, presumably, by example that, not
having been “used or known in England before upon this account, the room every evening was very full.”
Masson noted that besides Harrington and Neville, “who were the prime men of this club,” there were a
variety of merchants, military men, professions and others, including the infamous plotter Major John
Wildman. “The doctrine was very taking, and the more because as to human foresight there was no
possibility of the King's return.” In short, as risky as politics might have been in this timeframe, there was
no risk associated with simply theorizing about kingless government.
Even by Masson’s account, Harrington and his ideas were not popular with the parliamentary leadership.
“The greatest of the Parliament men hated this design of rotation and ballotting, as being against their
power. Eight or ten were for it." Nevertheless, in 1659, the Rota Club was amusing. It was “one of the
busiest and most attractive institutions in London, yielding more amusement of an intellectual kind than
any such meetings as those of the few physicists left in London to be the nucleus of the future Royal
Society.” But again, this intellectual amusement was entirely theoretical. “Harrington and the chief
Harringtonians looked with contempt” on the future Royal Society’s “physical philosophers.” For [w]hat
were their occupations over drugs, water-tubs, and the viscera of frogs, compared with great researches
into human nature and plans for the government of states?” Masson, The Life of John Milton, Volume 5
(of 7), id.
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political and religious exiles living in the United Provinces. The evidence was insufficient to keep Neville in
prison but he was forced to leave the country. He went to Italy for five years, returning in 1668.65
Fear of “popery and tyranny” was fomented in the early 1670s by the Treaty of Dover, Charles II’s
1672 Declaration of Indulgence, and “the growing public awareness of James’ conversion.”66 As
previously discussed, the Secret Treaty of Dover (1670) publicly was an alliance between England and
France, personally negotiated by Louis XIV, his sister-in-law Henrietta the Duchess of Orleans, and her
brother, Charles II of. England. Charles received substantial and desperately needed funds from France
in exchange for abandoning England’s alliance with Sweden and the Dutch republic of the United
Provinces, instead supporting a French war against the Dutch. Secret provisions included the
combustible commitment by Charles’ to publicly convert to Catholicism (which he did on his death bed)!67
The Declaration of Indulgence was a well-intended strategy by Charles to allow private worship by nonAnglicans, and hence tolerance of both Protestant nonconformists and, cleverly, Catholics. But the public
outcry, for both religious and political reasons, led to the Declaration’s cancellation and, instead, a 1673
Test Act requiring the exclusion of Catholics from powerful government positions. As a result, James
Duke of York and his political ally Thomas Clifford resigned their offices. It also led to the ascendancy of
the stridently Church of Englander Sir Thomas Osborne, the Earl of Danby, who was anti-Catholic, antiFrench, and hostile to nonconformists, while favoring a powerful monarchy and a weak Parliament.
The infamous Popish Plot is discussed in more detail shortly. For present purpose it simply
should be recognized that over the 1678-81 period the country was in the grips of this alleged plot, a
supposed cabal supervised by the Vatican, to be carried out by Jesuits, to kill the king. It was an
allegation that terrified the country. Once again, Neville was a suspected conspirator, perhaps because
of his many Catholic connections after his sojourn in Italy. A subplot of the Popish Plot was the allegation
that after killing a prominent Protestant judge, the plotters intended to kill the Earl of Shaftesbury, for

65

Mahlberg, Henry Neville, pp. 58-60.

66

Greaves, Secrets of the Kingdom, p. 2.

67

The secret, secret provisions remained secret until the 1770s, when Dalyrmple disclosed them. R.
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which Neville, once again, was under suspicion.68
1679 was the year of the Meal-Tub Plot story, false allegations by a Mr. Thomas Dangerfield, who
planted evidence in a meal-tub, a large barrel that held flour (meal). Dangerfield claimed that Shaftesbury, Essex, and Halifax were involved in a plot against James, Duke of York. When he was unsuccessful in proving these allegations Dangerfield’s story changed, and he claimed there actually was a Catholic
plot against the King. Dangerfield’s accusations continued to evolve, attacking James and Shaftesbury
as well as the Earl of Anglesey of a regicide conspiracy. There also were allegations that Anglesey was
in cahoots with the Catholic peers who were in the Tower, including Strafford.69
In 1682 Shaftesbury led a collapsed intrigue to install Monmouth on the throne. Shaftesbury’s
designs can be considered the first phase of the Rye House Plot; whether murdering the king at Rye
House was an entirely separate intrigue or part of Shaftesbury’s overall plan is unknown; there are
suggestions that Shaftesbury was connected to both. The plan was not executed, and Shaftesbury went
into hiding and then fled to Holland. The Rye House Plot then shifted gears to other leadership. We
know that the great intriguers or “plotters” in the Rye House cabal included Ferguson, who accompanied
Shaftesbury when he fled but returned after Shaftesbury died, as well as Wildman, who had been plotting
for years. We know that Russell, Essex, and Sidney attended some suspicious meetings; but we do not
know what part they played. One major subplot generally folded into the Rye House cabal was the 1683
effort to incite a Scottish invasion that would be coordinated with military action in England, all of which
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Earl of Anglesey (1615-1686),” unpublished 7-28-2005 dissertation, Florida State University, p. 143.
Annesley was another aristocratic political author and an attorney. Among other things, he wrote a
brochure published in 1683 under the name William Atwood, entitled “A letter of remarkes upon Jovian.”
Annesley was responding to George Hickes’ An answer to Julian the Apostate which, in turn, was a
response to Samuel Johnson’s Julian the Apostate, which attacked the Duke of York. Hickes had argued
that Christians under Julian had recognized the duty of passive obedience. Anglesey disagreed, arguing
that notwithstanding the king’s prerogative, Englishmen were entitled to challenge ministers or officers who
influenced the king to act “without, or contrary to the Authority of his Laws.” The English king did not have
absolute power; but even an emperor who “has Absolute Power over his Subjects Lives and Estates, has
to do what he pleases with particular Persons, he has not thereby right to enslave the whole People, by
altering the Constitution of the Government from a Civil into a Tyrannical Dominion.” A letter of remarkes
upon Jovian by “William Atwood” (London, 1683; repr. from the collections of the University of California
Libraries), passim. Not surprisingly given his legal training, Anglesey also criticized Hickes partial
quotations of Bracton, Fleta, and Fortescue, and the incorrect distinction drawn between so-called Imperial
Laws and Political Laws. On Annesley, see Appendix B.
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was allegedly designed to ensure that James did not succeed Charles, although whether this therefore
implied regicide is unclear. Indeed, whether fellow conspirators approached this project with the same
intents and purposes, such as the enthronement of Monmouth, is another one of the intriguing
components of this phase of the Rye House Plot which Sidney, among others, was accused of leading,
and for which he was executed.
Finally, it should be noted that with parliamentarians out of work, twenty-nine Whig clubs
functioned throughout London in which Opposition members drank, fraternized, and potentially conspired
to find a way to regain some political power, and probably, in some instances, at least hypothesized about
doing a great deal more than that. One of the major clubs of the period was the Green Ribbon Club,
which met at the King’s Head Tavern in Chancery Lane. Its members were lawyers, city politicians, and
MPs “alarmed by what they perceived to be a drift towards popery and arbitrary government under
Charles II and the prospect of Charles’s Roman Catholic brother James, duke of York, inheriting the
throne.” Apparently the club began holding meetings soon after the political fall of the Earl of Shaftesbury
in 1673. Various prominent lawyers and MPs were members, including Halifax and Whitelocke; but it
does not appear that either Shaftesbury or Sidney were.70
In sum, there was considerable confusion at the time and there remains considerable confusion in
the historiography over, on the one hand, the allegiances among members of the Opposition in the period
between the Oxford Parliament and the failed criminal action against Shaftesbury, “the dictator of
London,” and on the other hand, the sequence of events that led to Sidney’s arrest, trial, and execution.
In just one study of a peripherally involved MP, the Earl of Anglesey, we gain a picture of politicians
switching sides, not only from their allegiance in the Civil War vis-a-vis the Restoration, but also within the
quagmire of politics and accusations that became exceedingly difficult to outmaneuver once the Popish
Plot was broadcast to the public, along with the political intrigues to prevent the Duke of York from
succeeding Charles II.71 Legitimate avenues of contestation or even political circumvention were
eliminated with the king’s financial independence from Parliament and his solidifying political hold on
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London, which had been a haven for members of the Opposition. With Parliament’s dismissal and no
likelihood of its imminent summons, and with the new royalist sheriffs installed in London and the threat to
London’s corporate charter itself, the Opposition was in serious trouble.
English historian Iris Morley maintained that most of the opinions about what took place at this
juncture were not based on the available evidence, but “on how one views the Whig party.” Those who
believed that the Whigs were “an essentially aristocratic cabal, dominated by Russell and Sidney,” would
conclude that there was nothing to gain by illegal action, and that the Rye House Plot informers brought
Russell, Essex, and Sidney down with the “meaner sort” they accused by malevolent “embroidery” of their
story. On the other hand, in Morley’s view, if one viewed the Whigs as a lower middle-class organization,
at this juncture the situation would have appeared desperate.72 Meetings at Thanet House, Shaftesbury’s
home, before his demise included discussion of the need for a clearly defined plan that would govern if
the rank and file joined in an insurrection. These proposals have not survived, but there are independent
testimonies of their existence and content. It seems that the “leveling” elements of the party favored a
constitutional monarchy with Monmouth as king, a position that Shaftesbury is described as adopting.
“Sidney and his friends” are identified as proponents of a different plan, which Morley believed would
have been “of a more aristocratic composition,” because “[a]ll Sidney’s thinking had a somewhat remote
and patrician caste, and throughout his life, his circle was composed of high society and philosophers.”
Morley opined that there is “no reason to suppose” that Sidney “would equate justice, liberty or other
desirable principles with popular power.”73
Whether you consider Shaftesbury’s vantage point or the position of the aristocratic or other
Opposition leaders after Shaftesbury was gone, what we can say with confidence is that the situation was
desperate. That does not necessarily mean that desperate measures were taken; but it certainly makes it
understandable if they were. Whether one can reasonably go as far as Morley seemed comfortable doing
in assessing the evidence is problematic. At the very least Sidney did not have confidence in Shaftesbury,
Sidney was recognized as “the philosopher” – truly a gentleman and a scholar, and it is highly unlikely
that Sidney would have embraced either a position strongly advocated by Shaftesbury or express
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allegiance with him. Rather, as we shall see, Sidney would have readily accepted a form of government,
including constitutional monarchy, that had the approval and confidence of the electorate and, in that
sense, pace Morley, while highly aristocratic in lineage, relationships, and demeanor, Sidney’s
republicanism clearly embraced (although it was not limited to) popular sovereignty. This does not,
however, resolve the question of Sidney’s role in allegedly treasonous events after Shaftesbury died.
As a postscript, we should be aware of the fact that in 1684-85, by which time Charles II had died
and James, Duke of York, had become king, there was a major final conspiracy to change the line of
succession that manifested itself in Monmouth’s invasion of England. Monmouth’s effort failed very
quickly; he and many others were captured and executed.74 Overlaid on this volatile, potentially explosive
politico-religious context were the gestating Whig and Tory factions that favored, respectively, greater and
lesser political clout by Parliament, and lesser and greater (absolute) authority by the king. It was in this
context that some men, including Algernon Sidney, were known by contemporaries as “republicans.”
Post-postscript: it was the conspiracy of 1688 that finally succeeded.75
The reputation of those who shape the fate of nations become historical forces
in themselves. They are twisted and turned to fit the needs of those who follow,
until, it seems, there is no actual person left, only a complex mirror
in which successive interests see aspects of themselves.
Bernard Bailyn, To Begin the World Anew76

C. The Whigs
Political alliances are ubiquitous, and no more so than in early modern England. But “the rage of
party” is a post-Glorious Revolution phenomenon, developed somewhere between the 1694 passage of
the Triennial Act and the 1716 passage of its replacement, the Septennial Act, corresponding to the
establishment of regular parliamentary elections in Britain.77 When one talks about “Whig history,” it is a
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reference to the perspective that the 1689 revolution was indeed “glorious,” bringing to an end Stuart
absolutism and creating anew an English constitutional monarchy that became the British Empire.78 It is
Thomas Macaulay who is probably the most famous Whig historian who separated historical characters
as “good guys” or “bad guys” depending on where they stood vis-à-vis the concept of history as progress,
the 1689 Revolution as “Glorious,” and the finding that the forces of good overcame the forces of evil in
that revolution. Pursuant to this view, William of Orange was England’s deliverer.79
Why is this important in our study of Algernon Sidney’s republicanism? The answer is that
Sidney was a politician in addition to a thinker, and to understand his ideas we must understand his times
and place in them. Furthermore, if we want to juxtapose Sidney and Locke, appreciating the place of
Shaftesbury in seventeenth-century English politics is essential.
When Sidney returned to England he stepped into a very complex political world. Describing
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void. These attempts stretch from the crushing of the Levellers at Burford in 1649, to the Cromwellian
settlement of 1653, to the Restoration, to the Glorious Revolution, to the attempts by Whig historians to
present the Revolution as a chapter in the rise of parliamentary democracy, to contemporary attempts by
revisionist historians to present it as a neo-medieval war of religion or a ‘rebellion’ rather than a modern
revolution.” Holstun, Introduction, Pamphlet Wars: Prose in the English Revolution, p. 10.
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There are other perspectives on this period of English history, characterized by Shorto as “one of
history’s most stupendous examples of whitewashing,” that are distinct from the vantage point of Whig
historians. Russell Shorto, Amsterdam: A History of the World’s Most Liberal City (New York: Vintage
Books, 2013), p. 217. Marxist historians, led most subtly by Christopher Hill, viewed the Glorious
Revolution as a bourgeois revolution that focused on class and economics. Hill also looked at the ideas
that underlay the revolution. See Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution, 1603-1714 (London:
Routledge Classics, 1961). There are also the Neo-Whig or Revisionists, i.e., Pocock and friends, who
view the Glorious Revolution as the breakdown of the aristocratic order of the Tudors that led to the
reconstitution of another aristocratic order, the Whigs. See, e.g., Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688,
1776, J. G. A. Pocock, ed. (Princeton University Press, 1980). In contrast, another revisionist, W. A.
Speck, viewed the Glorious Revolution as a political revolution. “There was not much glory in 1688. But
there was a revolution.” W. A. Speck, Reluctant Revolutionaries: Englishmen and the Revolution of 168889 (Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 248. Speck also maintained that there was nothing unconstitutional
in James II’s efforts to establish an absolute monarchy and that his exertions, which were conducted
largely within the letter of the law, were not doomed to failure, as Whig historians have suggested.
Speck’s revisionism represented a moderate middle-ground relative to the Whig and Neo-Whig
perspective, in which there is an abrupt transition from divine-right kingship to the acceptance of another
ideological perspective, often Locke’s concept of contractual government. Speck considered Hill’s type of
Marxist perspective to also be relatively moderate and revisionist. With a slightly different view, John Miller
found the Glorious Revolution to have been pragmatic, a revolution that relied on common sense and the
realistically available alternatives, rather than a Lockean or ideological revolution. It was a rational, albeit
tortured, political choice. John Miller, The Glorious Revolution, 2nd ed. (London and New York: London,
1997). I tend to prescribe to Miller’s analysis. For a big picture perspective, see Lawrence Stone’s
scholarship, e.g., The Past and the Present Revisited (London & New York: Routledge, 1987); see also
Stone’s The Causes of the English Revolution, 1529-1642 (London & New York: Routledge, 2001).
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Cromwellian England In Pride’s Purge, Underdown is intent upon eliminating any assumptions we may
have had about the presence of party politics in late seventeenth-century England. As he flatly stated,
“Parties, as it is clear, were at best vague, ephemeral, and transitory, loose associations of individuals or
groups who might temporarily co-operate on some of the major issues of the day, but might equally well
be divided quite differently on others.”80 Gary DeKray’s perspective was more nuanced.81 It seems fair to
say that shifting groups of allied politicians existed in both the House of Commons and, when it was in
existence, Lords. Affiliations changed according to the subject matter, the times, and, particularly, the
ruler. Political affiliations were also significantly affected by personalities, favors and favorites, family
traditions, and personal loyalties.
Nevertheless, party “discourse,” in Pocockian terms, substantially preceded the institutionalization of parliamentary elections even though many (although, as will become evident, not Sidney)
equated party with faction, and faction with rebellion.82 As Bodin stated in the sixteenth century (and
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Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 2.
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De Krey’s view about the concept and the term “party” was somewhat different than Underdown’s.
According to De Krey, in the 1679-82 timeframe, “in London, the word ‘party’ was employed to
characterize both the civic opposition and civic loyalists well before the Whig and Tory labels were
attached. Organization, especially on the part of Anglican loyalists, was episodic; but the political contest
in which the opposition and loyalists were involved was one that encouraged organization. As episode
followed episode in a cascading torrent of political clashes, party organization became more continuous.”
De Krey explained the history behind the constitution of “parties.” “[T]he Whig and Tory parties in London
drew upon two generations of debate about how best to secure king-in-parliament and a Protestant church
establishment. Whig language tapped the histories of the civic opposition and the parliamentary Country
and incorporated discourse about conscience that flourished in London’s extensive Reformed Protestant
community. Tory thought drew upon historic Anglican rationales and apologies for monarchy and
episcopacy.” Thus, “As parties, the London Whigs and Tories were well rooted in the past from which they
evolved. The Tory party was a vehicle for all those who had triumphed in the confessional, coercive state
of the Restoration. The Whig party was a vehicle for many who were excluded from that confessional
state and for all who wished to replace it with a broader Protestant political order.” With this division in
mind, De Krey concluded that, “For the most part, however, the London opposition to Charles II was not a
‘republican community,’ as Scott has suggested: the Whigs were not exclusively the heirs of the ousted
sectarians and commonwealthmen of 1659-60. Instead, and ironically, they were mostly the very
Reformed Protestants who had, in their fear of the sects, contributed so much to the restoration of Charles
II.” Gary De Krey, London and the Restoration 1659-1683, (Cambridge: 2008), pp. 172-73.
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De Krey would go further: “Parties did not precede the crisis, nor were parties a result of the crisis.
Rather, in London, in parliament, and elsewhere, parties developed with the crisis – and to a varying extent
– as politicians and pamphleteers struggled to devise acceptable solutions to the precipitating issues.” De
Krey also observed that party development “reflected varying degrees of initiative from below and above.
That neither side ever achieved complete unity in its objectives is a quite understandable expression of how
fundamental the issues were. Yet the diffusion of approaches and the confusion of the times cannot
obscure the existence of a clear-cut division of the nation. Some political actors demanded a resettlement
of church and state on the basis of a Protestant succession and Protestant accommodation, while others
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Aristotle suggested in Politics many centuries earlier), parties were a form of faction and were “dangerous, and threaten the well-being, of all kinds of commonwealths.”83 This was a viewpoint that crossed the
political spectrum. Significant political differences separated Country from Court, the peace from the war
party, the nascent Whig from Tory (or, more pejoratively, the Phanatiques from the Malignants). To some
extent, the Country party became the Whigs, and the Court faction morphed into the Tories.84
By the late 1670s Restoration poet John Dryden called the rise of English Whiggery “’the good
old cause revived.’”85 This was not intended as a complimentary epithet. Dryden was a royalist who
tarred the new Whigs as supporters of the failed radical republican politics of their pernicious Interregnum

insisted that only hereditary succession and an exclusively episcopal establishment were acceptable.
Some few who trimmed between these positions were suspects on both sides.” Id, p. 172.
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Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Six Books. Of the Commonwealth, M. J. Tooley, abridged & tr. (Oxford:
Alden Press, 1955) [repr. Seven Treasures Publications, 2009], p. 176. Analogously, De Krey recognized
the contrary discursive traditions of reformed Protestants and Church of England loyalists in the 1679
timeframe, and the fact that “the future language of London whiggism could be detected in the opposition
electoral literature, with its combination of anti-Court, anti-French, and anti-episcopal language with a
defense of conscience and individual rights.” Tories, on the other hand, were steeped in a defense of the
Restoration status quo as the only protection against a return to 1641. De Kray, London and the
Restoration 1659-1683, p. 180.
84

For Scott’s analysis of the emergence of party politics, see, e.g., Scott, England’s Troubles, Ch. 21 on
“Anglo-Dutch Statebuilding,” section entitled, “Party,” pp. 490-93. In their original context, these terms were
actually “words of abuse.” The first Tories were religiously affiliated; they were Catholic bandits in Ireland.
The term Whig originated in Scotland from the label Whiggamores, a disparaging term for the Kirk Party,
the radical Presbyterian faction of the Scottish Covenanters who militarily opposed Charles I and William
Laud’s efforts to impose an Anglican liturgy on the Scotch. Speck, Reluctant Revolutionaries, p. 33. The
Whiggamores or Whigs were distinguished from the Scottish Presbyterian faction called the Engagers,
who made the Dec. 27, 1647 agreement or Engagement with Charles I as a consequence of his English
civil war defeat. That agreement consisted of the Engagers’ military support of the King in exchange for
Charles I’s assurance that Presbyterianism would be imposed as the official religion of England, initially for
three years. “His Majesty will likewise confirm by Act of Parliament in England, Presbyterial government,
the directory for worship, and Assembly of Divines at Westminster for three years.” The Engagement
between the King and the Scots, Dec. 26, 1647, Clarendon MSS 3685, 2686, from Great Civil War, iv.39,
www.constitution.org/eng/conpur076.htm (5-9-19). On the king’s imprisonment in Scotland, his “purchase”
back to the English for money due the Scots, and Charles’ subsequent Engagement agreement with the
Scots, see Robert Ashton, “Presbyterians and Engagers,” Counter-Revolution: The Second Civil War and
its Origins, 1646-8, Ch. IX, pp. 300-38; Laura A. M. Stewart, “English Funding of the Scottish Armies in
England and Ireland, 1640-1648,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Sept. 2009), pp. 573-93; Peter
Ackroyd, Rebellion: The History of England from James I to the Glorious Revolution (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 2014), Chs. 29 & 30, “A game to play,” and “To kill a king,” pp. 284-99.
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Two years after Sidney’s execution, when James, the Duke of York, became king in 1685, he “was
convinced that the Whigs aimed not just at limiting the Crown but at eliminating the monarchy altogether.
As he reminded loyalists, ‘remember Edward 2, Richard 2 and the King my father’. He even thought that
the duke of Monmouth had ‘got it into his head to drive things if he can to a republic hoping then to make
his self their general and stadholder as the Prince of Orange is in Holland’. James regarded their failure
to achieve their aims as providential.” Speck, Reluctant Revolutionaries, pp. 26, 124.
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predecessors. The “old polemical markers of confessional polarization,” namely “puritan” and “arminian,”
were “replaced by new ones signifying religious banditry in Scotland and Ireland respectively (‘whig’ and
‘tory’).”86 In Scott’s view, the issues had been and remained popery and arbitrary government. English
commitment to the Stuarts was now qualified – yes, to the Stuarts as long as they were not Catholic and,
in Scott’s view, as long as they protected the ruling elite.87
Scott’s position seems to be generally correct, but is perhaps too stark; while it is true that many
who fought for the “Old Cause” opposed both arbitrary power and popery, this does not mean that both
matters were always at issue, or that opposition to a Catholic king necessarily meant opposition to the
Stuarts, to monarchy or even to absolutism. It also does not mean that everyone who supported the
Stuarts were interested in protecting the ruling elite. In fact, in many ways, a religious explanation for
what may best be termed the emerging Whig party is most cogent.88 In the late 1670s and ‘80s the
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The labels “Puritan” and “Arminian” were inexact at the time and continue to be: historians’ definitions
of both terms also range broadly. For our purposes, it is sufficient to characterize Puritans as Protestants
rejecting of the elements of Church of England practice that smacked of Catholicism. Just to give one
example of many that illustrate the diversity of perspectives about Puritanism, some would exclude
Separatist groups from the label Puritan because they were not seeking to reform the Church of England
from within; others consider this definition to be too narrow. Arminianism is a similarly ubiquitously used
but variously defined term. Technically it refers to the views of the Dutch theologian Jacobus Arminius
(1560-1609), who embraced the doctrine of free will, thereby rejecting the strict Calvinist doctrine of
absolute or double predestination. Because this theological view was seen by many Protestants as a
Catholic belief, other views and practices regarded as Catholic were sometimes labeled Arminian. Thus,
the embracing of a much more ritualistic Church practice, adopted by William Laud, Charles I’s powerful
Archbishop of Canterbury, was often deemed “Arminianism.” Again, for our purposes, the point here is
that by the 1670s, the religiously oppositional labels of “Puritan” and “Arminian” were increasingly
replaced by the politically oppositional labels of “Whig” and “Tory.” On Puritanism and Arminianism
generally, see Ronald H. Fritze, “Puritanism,” and “Separatism”; J. Sears McGee, “Arminianism,” in
Historical Dictionary of Stuart England, pp. 436-38, 483-84, 22-24; Prak, The Dutch Republic in the
Seventeenth Century, pp. 29-31.
87
Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 165. Scott consistently sought to elide the religious issue of popery and
the political issue of arbitrary government, in the process refusing to recognize the succession
controversy as an exclusion crisis. Thus, he referred to “[t]he universal outcry against popery and
arbitrary government of late 1678,” which included loyalists and whigs (p. 213); “[w]hat was referred to as
‘whiggism’ was the rather older struggle against popery and arbitrary government” (p. 220); the “rage of
party” coincided with the “increasing security of protestantism and parliamentary monarchy at home,” as
well as “the effective confrontation of popery and arbitrary government abroad” (p. 491). A clearer
statement by Scott was his reference to James II’s uniting of “the threat to church and state from arbitrary
monarchy in league with counter-reformation” (p. 452). Cf. Lois Schwoerer, The Declaration of Rights,
1689 (whigs were “radical in the sense that they were on the left hand side of the essential issue of the
seventeenth century – whether King or parliament should exercise sovereignty”), p. 286.
88
Goldie maintained that it was during the exclusion crisis that the names Tory and Whig were assigned
to the cavalier and opposition parties. Harris agreed. It is my intention that the use of the expression
“emerging Whigs” defines more precisely the very early phases of whig opposition politics. See Goldie,
John Locke Selected Correspondence, p. 73; Tim Harris, “Party Turns? Or, Whigs and Tories Get Off
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emerging Whigs were often called Petitioners because they supported the petitioning campaign for the
Exclusion Bill, a grass-roots campaign led by the Earl of Shaftesbury to exclude the Duke of York from
the line of succession because he was Catholic. The petitioning campaign was not a challenge to the
Stuart dynasty or to monarchy generally. In contrast, nascent Tories were called Abhorrers because they
found the Exclusion Bill abhorrent. Actually, three Exclusions bills were introduced in Parliament without
success between 1679 and 1681. These bills were directed specifically at James Stuart, for if he were to
succeed, the exclusion legislation explicitly recognized that, “nothing is more manifest than that a total
change of religion within these kingdoms would ensue.”89 While acute political differences were obviously
present throughout the Restoration, at this juncture the emerging Whig political priority was the felt
necessity to prevent a Catholic king from assuming the throne of England; Whiggism did not extend to a
broader, unified political ideology. “[F]ear of Catholicism in high places, on the other hand, could be
traced to the charges brought by Pym against the [royalist] ‘malignant party’ at Court in the Grand
Remonstrance,” the list of grievances presented to and rejected by Charles I in 1641.90
The late 1670/early 1680 emerging Whigs have often been characterized as a single-issue party,
united in their objective of excluding Catholic James Stuart from the Crown. But revisionist Restoration
scholars reject the notion that the first Whigs were a monolithic party headed by Shaftesbury. Instead
they speak in terms of “a broad church, comprising different factions or interests,” of which the
Shaftesbury/Russell exclusion interest is considered one.91 Two other nascent Whig factions are
sometimes referred to as the “more radical” republican interest of Algernon Sidney/Arthur Capel, the Earl
of Essex, and the Monmouth interest favoring the accession of King Charles’ illegitimate son, supported

Scott Free,” Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Winter, 1993), pp.
581-90, 589.
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Exclusion Bill, as amended, An Act for securing of the Protestant Religion, by disabling James Duke of
York to inherit the imperial Crown of England and Ireland, and the Dominions and Territories thereunto
belonging. 'The fourth Parliament of Charles II: First session (2 of 5)- begins 4/11/1680', The History and
Proceedings of the House of Commons : volume 1: 1660-1680 (1742), pp. 403-435, https://www.britishhistory.ac.uk/commons-hist-proceedings/vol1/pp403-435 (4-9-19).
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Exclusion Bill of 1680; The Stuart Constitution, J. P. Kenyon, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1986),
pp. 387-89; Speck, Reluctant Revolutionaries, pp. 26, 33.
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Harris, Restoration, pp. 139-40; Speck, Reluctant Revolutionaries, p. 33; see also the much earlier
work by J. R. Jones, The First Whigs: The Politics of the Exclusion Crisis 1678-1683 (Westport, CN:
Greenwood Press, 1925; repr. 1961).
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by Sir Thomas Armstrong among others (a group that seems to have overlapped or perhaps merged with
the faction led by Shaftesbury, the leader of the emerging Whigs).92 Note, too, the trimming Halifax
interest of curtailing the power of the future King James because he was a Catholic but not dethroning the
rightful heir. Issues besides exclusion sometimes took precedence. For example, Essex resigned from
his position as Lord of the Treasury in protest of the way the king was proroguing and dismissing
Parliament – in short, in the struggle over political power, not religion.93 Historian Tim Harris described
the complex situation carefully. “Although Shaftesbury played an important role … he was not the leader
of the Whigs; indeed, he often found himself at odds with other leading figures in the Whig movement,
and did not always find it easy to persuade others to follow his initiatives. …Nor did all Whigs believe that
passing an Exclusion Bill was the only way to rescue the land from popery and arbitrary government.”
There were alternative solutions that “included limiting the powers of a popish successor, so that he could
not be a threat to the Protestant establishment; establishing a regency during the lifetime of a popish
successor; persuading the King to remarry, so he could father a legitimate heir; and trying to get Charles
to declare his eldest illegitimate son, the Duke of Monmouth, legitimate.” At the same time, Harris
cautioned that while these “revisionist perspectives are of undoubted importance,” they “should not
mislead us, however, into thinking that the Whigs lacked organization or that Exclusion was not an issue.
One of the main reasons why the Whigs represented such a challenge to the royal administration was
because … they appeared disturbingly well organized.94
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To take measure of these differences in another family, Sir Henry Capel (or Capell), ennobled as the
1st Baron of Tewkesbury in 1662, was a Whig leader who served as First Lord of the Admiralty between
1679 and 1680. The Earl of Essex was his brother. Their father was a royalist executed by Parliament
during the civil war. Burnet described Henry Capel as “a zealous supporter no less of the rights of the
people than of the just prerogatives of the Crown.” Capel was an exclusionist, seconding Lord Russell’s
motion for the bill to exclude James from the throne. His brother Essex either committed suicide or was
killed in prison awaiting trial for high treason for his role in the Ryle House conspiracies. Later Capel
strongly supported the Prince of Orange, for whom he became a privy councilor and then Lord Deputy of
Ireland. Henry Sidney, Diary of the Times of Charles the Second, pp. 268-69 n.1; “CAPEL, Hon. Sir Henry
(1638-96), of Kew, Surr.,” published in The History of Parliament: the House of Commons 1690-1715
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), D. Hayton, E. Cruickshanks & S. Handley, eds,
http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1690-1715/member/capel-hon-sir-henry-1638-96 (3-914); Harris, Restoration, p. 140.
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Note the influence of adjectives; Morley considered the Sidney-Essex interest to be of a “more
aristocratic composition.” Morley, A Thousand Lives, p. 140. On Halifax’s moderate views, see id, pp.
120-25.
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Harris, Restoration, pp. 140-41.
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Harris understandably was careful not to conflate the emerging Whigs exclusively into a
Shaftesbury’s exclusion faction. Nevertheless, it cannot be gainsaid that when you read the diaries,
memoires and correspondence of various members of the English aristocracy who were “in the know” in
the late 1670s and early 1680s, it is without exception Shaftesbury’s role in Parliament that is repeatedly
referenced, emphasized, and the unquestionable focus of attention to a much greater extent than the role
played by any other “emerging” Whig. For example, in a May 10, 1679 letter from the moderate George
Savile, 1st Marquess of Halifax, to Henry Savile, his younger brother, Halifax indicated that, “The Duke of
Monmouth was the popular favourite, and Shaftesbury boldly avowed his intention of placing him on the
throne.” Henry Sidney wrote in his diary in July 1679 that when he went to Hampton Court, the King “told
his mind very resolutely, and the business was done, much to the discontent of the Lord Chancellor and
several others, but most because they were themselves concerned, some because they had made cabals
and intrigues. Lord Shaftesbury the greatest hand in that….”95 In another diary entry, Henry Sidney
stated, “I went to Windsor, and told Lord Sunderland that I heard Lord Shaftesbury had spread abroad
that whoever gave the advice for the dissolution deserved to lose their heads.”96 Henry Sidney also
reported that the Lord Chancellor, Heneage Finch, later Earl of Nottingham, discussed the king’s
business, “which he thinks in an ill condition, and thinks Lord Shaftesbury the chief cause of it, who being
joined with the Duke of Monmouth will obstruct all till they are at the top of all affairs: that they certainly
did the King much harm the last sessions….” In a June 26, 1679 letter from the Duke of York to the
Prince of Orange, James stated, “I am afraid so long as Lord Shaftesbury and some others, who shall be
nameless, are at the head of affairs, I am not like to be called for home.” In another context, quoting from
a letter by Sir William Temple, an important English diplomat and friend of the Sidney/Percy family, one
scholar stated that, “According to Temple, …the three lords thought the King’s danger and their own
equally great, since if Charles had died there would be nothing to hinder the ambitious designs of the
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Cartrwright, Sacharissa, p. 209-210; Henry Sidney et al., Diary of the Times of Charles II, p. 25.
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In a letter to the Prince of Orange dated November 4, 1679, Henry Sidney explained various intrigues
going on in England: “The principal person concerned is one Mr. Willoughby, who saith that my Lord
Arendel and my Lord Powys have hired him to kill the King, which he refused; then they offered him £500
to kill my Lord Shaftesbury, and that he undertook: this is believed by a great many, but others will give
no credit to it, he being known to be as great a rogue as any in England.” Henry Sidney et al., Diary of the
Times of Charles II,, pp. 24-25, 180-81.
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Duke of Monmouth, and his supporter, Lord Shaftesbury, ‘who had threatened to have the heads of all
the King’s Ministers.’” In Temple’s view, the “designs” of Shaftesbury and Monmouth “had run the
kingdom into such incurable divisions and distractions, at a time that our union was so necessary to the
affairs of Christendom.” In discussing the continued public support of the Whigs in 1681 and 1682, Harris
referred only to public support of Monmouth and Shaftesbury. As to the latter, he stated, “When news
reached the Suffolk town of Woodbridge in late November 1681 of Shaftesbury’s release from the Tower
after his indictment for treason had been found ignoramus, local Whigs and Dissenters celebrated this
deliverance with bells and bonfires, and [Tory journalist] Nathaniel Thompson reported ‘that more money
was gathered towards Bonfires that time, than ever was known to be contributed by that Party to any
Loyal or Charitable use in all their lives.’” Again, in reflecting in his diary in June 1679 on “our design of
bringing over the Prince” of Orange,” Henry Sidney stated that he was advised by Lord Sunderland
(Dorothy Sidney Sunderland’s son) that, “I am to let the Prince know that the Lord Shaftesbury is not of
our party, but that he is a good tool to work with, and that there is nothing to be done in parliament without
him.”97 Two years later, the renowned English lawyer Sir William Jones removed himself from public life
after years as an MP and a public official, “owing, it was reported, to dislike of Shaftesbury.”98
In sum, it is difficult not to conclude that at least in the 1679 to 1682 timeframe, the emerging
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In the 1679 timeframe, Temple had been a member of “an inner group” of four advisers that also
included Lords Sunderland, Essex and Halifax, all related to Algernon Sidney. This group regularly met
“with the aim of enabling the King to conciliate Parliament and cut an adequate figure abroad.” But when
the other three lords, against Temple’s advice, decided to bring Monmouth and Shaftesbury into the group,
this purpose was lost. Additionally, Temple was the author of the design to revise the Privy Council,
reducing its size so that it could conduct business, which as a practical matter “had been conducted
privately or in smaller committees” after the Restoration. Temple’s own hopes for the effectiveness of the
new Privy Council were dashed, however, when the king insisted on bringing in Shaftesbury as Lord
President, “presumably in the hope of drawing his fangs.” Temple believed that this “ruined the Court’s
chances of making Parliament more amenable, because it gave the public impression that the King
supported Shaftesbury in his campaign against Popery and privately wished the Duke of Monmouth to
succeed him.” Thus, one of the main objectives of the new organization was “frustrated from the start.” (It
should also be noted, as well, that Charles “saw the Council as a tactical expedient,… and had little use for
it when he found that Parliament remained refractory.”) Henry Sidney et al., Diary of the Times of Charles
II, pp. 2, 19-20; the Duke of York to the Prince of Orange, Dalrymple, Memoirs, Vol. 1, p. 304; Cartwright,
Sacharissa, p. 220; Faber, The Brave Courtier, pp. 51-52.
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On the Tory report of Shaftesbury’s release from the Tower, see Tim Harris, “Party Turns? Or, Whigs
and Tories Get Off Scott Free,” Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4
(Winter, 1993), pp. 581-90, 587. It was Sir William Temple who complimented Jones. See also “Debates
in 1680: November 9th-11th,” in Grey's Debates of the House of Commons: volume 7 (1769), pp. 433-59.
URL: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=40463, (5-9-19).
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Whig faction was essentially a one-issue party under the leadership of the indefatigable Shaftesbury. At
the same time, there were those who certainly affiliated themselves with the faction that became the
Whigs – men who were more Whig than Tory –who also had other agendas. The threat to parliamentary
government caused by Charles II’s repeated proroguing and dissolution was one such issue, which was
the subject of A Just and Modest Vindication of the Proceedings of the Two Last Parliaments, published
in 1681 and likely authored by Algernon Sidney and Sir William Jones.99 But overall, during the
succession crisis, Shaftesbury and his exclusion issue dominated the emerging Whig agenda. Other
issues of importance, and other significant political players, floated in and out of the mix of
parliamentarians and others who were trying to rein in Charles II and, later, James II.
In view of his dominance, details about Sir Anthony Ashley, the Earl of Shaftesbury, his protégé
John Locke, and Locke’s friend and fellow Whig thinker, James Tyrrell, are in order.

I will let you know what, the good nature of some people of this place,
have invented to disparage your booke: a Freind told me the other day
that he had it from one who pretends to be a great Judge of bookes:
that you had taken all that was good in it; from divers modern French Authours.
James Tyrrell to John Locke, March 1690100

i.

Tyrrell

Perhaps the best way to describe James Tyrrell (1642-1718) is that he was an early intellectual
Whig and life-long admirer and friend of John Locke. Tyrrell nevertheless stayed out of the dangerous
goings on that caused Shaftesbury and Sidney, for example, to be arrested, and ultimately led to their
demise. Like Sidney and Locke, Tyrrell authored a rebuttal to Filmer’s Patriarcha and the patriarchal
theory of divine right monarchy Filmer advocated. Unlike Sidney, Tyrrell actually published his rebuttal,
entitled Patriarcha non Monarcha. The Patriarch Unmonarch’d and, unlike Locke, Tyrrell did not publish it
anonymously, belatedly or posthumously but rather in 1681 during the succession crisis. Attributing a
purpose to either Sidney or Locke’s rebuttal to Filmer involves conjecture, if not fancy; for Sidney did not
publish at all, and Locke published anonymously and posthumously. (One can say that he published
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Letter from James Tyrrell to John Locke, Oxford, March 18, 1690, in John Locke Selected
Correspondence, p. 146.
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because he directed the publishing in his will.) Indeed, in Sidney’s case, we have no basis at all for
concluding that he had any intention of publishing his rebuttal. Tyrrell’s Patriarcha non Monarcha,
however, is different. In the preface to the essay Tyrrell expressed concern about those “modern Churchmen” who “cry up” the notion of the divine and patriarchal right of absolute monarchy “as their Diana,”
thereby infecting the universities, and polluting the minds of “the Youth of this Nation,” who would be
misled “as long as they live.”101 Tyrrell was worried that these young men would then want to “alter that
Government, and give up those Priviledges which their Ancestors were so careful to preserve and deliver
down to Posterity.” Indeed, in his view, “the Poyson hath spread so far among the men of Letters, and in
the Country among divers of the Gentry and Clergie.” For this reason he felt obliged to God, King and
Country to write his rebuttal, and expose “the weakness of the Reasons, and the dangerous consequences” of Filmer’s “Principles,” especially since he had “perhaps more leisure, though less parts and
learning than a great many others.”102 In 1681 there was a whole new crop of men assuming positions in
government, including Parliament. These were post-Civil War men who did not experience first-hand the
felt necessity to kill fellow Englishmen. We have no reason to doubt Tyrrell’s explanation for his Filmer
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Similarly, at the beginning of Two Treatises, Locke explained why he considered it necessary to
address the “glib nonsense put together in well-sounding English” by “Sir Robert.” The reason was, in
sum, the intrusion of the clergy into political matters: “the Pulpit, of late Years, publickly owned his
[Filmer’s] Doctrine, and made it the Current Divinity of the Times…. In this last age a generation of men
has sprung up among us, who would flatter princes with an Opinion that they have a Divine Right to
absolute Power,” a belief that would “subvert the very Foundations of Human Society.” These men,
“taking on them to be Teachers, have so dangerously misled others,” and “there cannot be done a greater
Mischief to Prince and People, than the Propagating wrong Notions concerning Government.” Locke,
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people by “foist[ing]” the ideas of divine right monarchy and passive obedience upon them. Richard
Ashcraft and M. M. Goldsmith, “Locke, Revolution Principles, and the Formation of Whig Ideology,” The
Historical Journal, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Dec., 198), pp. 773-800, 776.
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Apparently, Tyrrell and Locke had discussed writing a rebuttal to a collection of minor works by Filmer
that had been published in 1679, before Patriarcha came out (1680). J. W. Gough, “James Tyrrell, Whig
Historian and Friend of John Locke,” Historical Journal 19, 3 (1976), pp. 581-610, 584. Tyrrell’s rebuttal
to Patriarcha is entitled, in full, Patriarcha non monarcha. The Patriarch unmonarch’d: Being Observations
on a late treatise and divers other miscellanies, published under the name of Sir Robert Filmer Baronet.
In which the falseness of those opinions that would make monarchy Jure Divino are laid open: and the
true Principles of Government and Property (especially in our Kingdom) asserted. By a Lover of Truth and
of his Country (London: Richard Janeway, 1681). See http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2168#Tyrrell_1453_7
(08-14-2014).
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rebuttal.
Tyrrell was the son of a baronet in the town of Shotover, near Oxford, and the grandson of a wellknown Irish Archbishop, James Ussher of Armagh, who was also the primate (chief bishop) of Ireland
under both James I and Charles I. Ussher was a learned, highly esteemed authority on Church matters;
among other things, he authored a text entitled, The Power Communicated by God to the Prince, and the
Obedience Required of the Subject. Tyrrell participated in public recognition of his grandfather’s work but,
as will become quite evident, did not agree with him. James attended Oxford where he met Locke, who
was ten years older and a senior student at Christ Church when Tyrrell began, at age 16, as a “gentleman
commoner” at Queens College in 1658. Unlike Locke, Tyrrell went on to study law at the Inner Temple,
and was called to the Bar in 1666. When his father gave the manor at Oakley to Tyrrell upon his
marriage in 1670, Tyrrell had no need to earn a living by practicing law; instead, he spent the next twenty
years as a country gentleman on his estate, serving locally as a JP and deputy lieutenant.103 Although
biographers do not mention it, perhaps one of the reasons that Locke, over many years, was very
impatient with and not particularly nice to Tyrrell, who obviously treasured their friendship, was because
of their economic disparity for, in contrast to Tyrrell, Locke had to work for a living. Nevertheless, Tyrrell
and Locke became good friends as young men, and remained friends for many years. They
corresponded warmly after leaving the university, and discussing personal matters of health and other
mundane issues. In 1668, one year after Locke had moved to Shaftesbury’s mansion, Exeter House, in
London, Tyrrell (as well as Shaftesbury) were regular attendees at an intellectual gathering that Locke
began to convene routinely there to discuss religious, philosophical and scientific questions.104 Tyrrell was
a first-born son, and therefore also inherited the family estate in Buckinghamshire, at which Locke stabled
his horse and stored books and other personal effects. Tyrrell authored a number of works, clearly
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New York: 2002), p. 27.
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The Lovelace Collection in the Bodleian Library has sixty-three letters from Tyrrell to Locke that were
written between 1677 and 1704, when Locke died. For the first ten years, the letters were addressed to
fond nicknames by which they knew each other. Later, the opening and closing of the letters became
very formal, e.g., “Dear Sir.” “Whatever Locke may have felt, Tyrrell always regretted the loss of the old
understanding between them.” Gough, “James Tyrrell, Whig Historian and Friend of John Locke,” p. 582.
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sharing Locke’s intellectual bent.105
During Shaftesbury’s exclusion battles Tyrrell and Locke were particularly close, and it was during
this period that Locke spent substantial time at Tyrrell’s home near Oxford working on his treatise On
Toleration with Tyrrell’s assistance, an essay that was either requested by Shaftesbury or stimulated by
him. Significant attention has been paid in the literature to the fact that Locke’s essay on toleration is less
authoritarian – more tolerant – than earlier tracts he had written on related matters.106 Shaftesbury’s
perspective on this subject seemed to be much more laissez-faire, and he likely influenced Locke in that
direction. Locke’s ideas about toleration will be discussed shortly. Whether it was his own evolving
ideas, Shaftesbury’s persuasiveness, or an assignment by Shaftesbury with a required ending, Locke
shifted from his earlier conviction that magistrates were entitled to make all sorts of religious impositions
for the good of society, to stressing necessary limits that exist on the magistrate’s right to become
involved in issues that are not of concern to him, such as opinions and actions that have nothing to do
with government and society, e.g., purely speculative religious ideas. As we will discuss in more detail
shortly, if any inferences can to be drawn from this interlude, with Locke apparently involved at most
tangentially in Shaftesbury’s exclusion controversy, it is that Locke immersed himself in a new study at
the comfortable country home of an old friend to remove himself from the public political fracas that the
exclusion conflict unquestionably constituted, and to thereby stay out of the succession controversy.
Over the years, Locke and Tyrrell were estranged many times, squabbling over all sorts of things
and offending each other, although Locke clearly seemed to be the worst offender and Tyrrell inevitably
was the supplicant who sought to continue their friendship. One could consider the two men as
intellectual rivals; the timing of their work suggests an intellectual sparring relationship involving mutual
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On Toleration was a response to the royalist Edward Stillingfleet’s 1680 essay, The Unreasonableness
of Separation: Or, An Impartial Account of the History, Nature, and Please of the Present Separation from
the Communion of the Church of England, a not so impartial endorsement of adherence to the Church of
England, and opposition to the toleration of dissent. Years earlier, in the 1680 timeframe, Tyrrell and
Locke had collaborated on a paper, unpublished, in response to two sermons by Stillingfleet, then Dean
of St. Paul’s, in which Tyrrell and Locke asserted the right to religious nonconformity. Tyrrell took the lead
in this effort. Gough, “James Tyrrell, Whig Historian and Friend of John Locke, p. 588; Rudolph,
Revolution by Degrees, p. 24.
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critique and rebuttal of each other’s work.107 On the other hand, Locke clearly viewed himself as superior
in intellectual prowess to Tyrrell, and it seems that Tyrrell agreed.108 Nevertheless, in their
correspondence Tyrrell pointed out public comments or criticisms of Locke’s anonymously published
work, most particularly a troublesome contradiction in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
This analytical challenge infuriated Locke, who seems to have had very thin skin.109 Tyrrell also upset
Locke by openly discussing his conjecture that Locke authored the anonymous Two Treatises of
Government, something Locke clearly did not want to disclose. Scholars disagree, but Locke’s Two
Treatises may have been written in response to Tyrrell’s Patriarcha non Monarcha as well as to rebut
Filmer.110
Tyrrell was neither a Shaftesbury man, nor involved in the political fights of the succession crisis.
He also was not a radical or a political activist; to the contrary, during this crisis, Tyrell “lived a sedate
existence at Oakley,” the family estate.111 He was not involved in the Rye House or other conspiratorial
plots against the Restoration monarchy.112 Years later, in the very different context of William and Mary’s
reign, Tyrrell published Bibliotheca Politica, a refutation of divine right monarchy, the Tory view of English
history and monarchic supremacy. In the Preface, Tyrrell made the following statement about his own
politics: “I am not what the world calls a Republican or Commonwealthsman, nor do I design or desire
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alterations in the government either of Church or States, since none can admire our excellent Constitution
more than myself: much less do I prefer an elective to an hereditary succession o the Crown.” Tyrell also
stated that he had no “aversion to absolute monarchy as such, could I be assured that princes would
always be as wise and good as they ought to be,” whatever that means.113 It will become clear how some
of these ideas agree and others are distinct from Sidney and others’ republicanism. We have no
indication whether Sidney knew Tyrrell; it seems unlikely.114 Tyrrell’s relevance to us is that like Sidney,
he wrote a lengthy rebuttal of Filmer’s Patriarcha.

Willmore: But why thus disguised and muzzled?
Belville (in masquing habits): Because whatever extravagances
we commit in these faces, our own may not be obliged to answer ‘em.
Aphra Behn, The Rover (staged 1677)115
[H]e had initiated that practice which was to be the
guiding maxim of his life – on determining to resist, organize.
Iris Morley, A Thousand Lives116

ii.

Shaftesbury

Anthony Ashley Cooper (1621-1683), who became the Earl of Shaftesbury when he was fifty-one,
was a baron’s son.117 Once again, the incestuousness of the English peerage is evident: Shaftesbury
was the brother-in-law of Sidney’s sister Dorothy, and related to Sidney in various other ways.118 There is
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Tyrrell was about twenty years younger than Sidney, and there is no political, family or other
connection (e.g., the Civil War) of which we are aware. Both Sidney and Tyrrell were friends with William
Penn; but there is no indication that through Penn they were acquaintances. Clearly they were not
friends, as there is no correspondence between them or other record extant suggesting any relationship.
Gough mentions Tyrrell’s acquaintanceship with Penn. Gough, “James Tyrrell, Whig Historian and Friend
of John Locke,” p. 593.
115

Aphra Behn, Oroonoko, The Rover and Other Works (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 174.

116

Iris Morley, A Thousand Lives, p. 31.

117

Both of Shaftesbury’s parents died when he was a child, leaving him an extremely wealthy peer of the
realm. As a teen Shaftesbury received some formal education at Oxford and Lincoln’s Inn. Married at
eighteen, he became an MP for Tewkesbury when he was nineteen. Morley, A Thousand Lives, pp. 2829.
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Family ties could not possibly be more entangled. Shaftesbury’s third wife, who he married in 1665,
was Margaret Spencer, the sister of Henry Spencer, the 1st Earl of Sunderland, who had married
Algernon Sidney’s sister Dorothy; thus, Shaftesbury was the brother-in-law of Sidney’s sister. The 1st Earl
of Sunderland died in 1643 fighting for the king during the Civil War, leaving Dorothy with three babies
(born 1640, 1641 and 1642). Shaftesbury’s wife Margaret Spencer was the aunt of these children,
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an element of notoriety associated with the Earl, largely a product of his combined visibility and
unpopularity; and Sidney disliked him as much or more than the rest of the aristocracy did. Shaftesbury’s
importance to our story is primarily in the political vacuum he left when he fled to the Netherlands in 1683.
He is also important because of his significant footprint in the history of the period, including all of the firsthand accounts that relate to Sidney, and because of his relationship to John Locke, who wrote a rebuttal
to Filmer’s Patriarcha and, of course, is known as the father of liberalism and perhaps the leading
philosopher of his time. In contrast to Sidney, Shaftesbury joined the army in 1642 on the king’s side; in
1644, he switched sides. The reasons are murky, but it seems most likely that the reversal was the result
of a belief in the inappropriate influence on the King of his Catholic advisers.119 “A judicious mingling of
interest and inclination” probably produced Shaftesbury’s final allegiance.”120
From a young age the Earl served in the House of Lords. He was a born politician – an MP (in the
Short, Long, Rump, Protectorate and Cavalier parliaments) before, during and after Cromwell’s
Protectorate. Little is known about his activity right after the war. He was probably disqualified from
serving in Parliament, having initially fought for the king. Instead, Shaftesbury focused on private and
local affairs, serving as Wilshire high sheriff. Gradually he became re-involved in parliamentary work.121
After Cromwell ejected the Rump the King created a Council of State and then Barebones Parliament.
Shaftesbury was one of only a few Peers appointed to Barebones, followed by selection to the Council.
He was among those who urged Cromwell to accept the Crown. Shaftesbury defeated Ludlow, the

including the 2nd Earl of Sunderland, who was also Sidney’s nephew (his sister’s son). Sunderland
became a royalist who played a leading role in Restoration politics. There are other Shaftesbury/Sidney
family links. Shaftesbury and Sidney were both uncles of George Savile (Halifax), as Halifax married
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Halifax, political arch enemies, were brothers-in-law. “Outline of Events,” Halifax: Complete Works, p.
41. Ashley’s stepmother also was the mother of Arthur Capell, the Earl of Essex; Shaftesbury and Essex
therefore were step-brothers. Furthermore, Essex was Sidney’s cousin, married to Henry Percy, the 9th
Earl of Northumberland’s daughter Elizabeth. William Douglas Christie, A Life of Anthony Ashley Cooper:
First Earl of Shaftesbury. 1621-1683, Two Volumes (London: Macmillan & Co., 1871), Vol. 1, p. 6.
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E.g., Shaftesbury served as a non-parliamentary member of the commission for the reform of the laws
under the leadership of the jurist, Matthew Hale. In 1653, Shaftesbury was officially pardoned of all prior
“delinquency,” and thereby able to serve in Parliament.
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regicide republican, in an MP race, but broke with Cromwell when the latter began to function more
autocratically and under increasing army influence. There were accusations during the later years of the
Protectorate that the Earl was a secret royalist 122 In the event, by 1660 he unconditionally supported the
Restoration and was one of the twelve MPs who went to The Hague to invite Charles to return.123
Shaftesbury was interested in international trade and colonization.124 He was a member of the
manorial squirarchy of Western England as well as a joint-owner of a Barbados sugar plantation.125 The
Earl’s avid interest in trade and capitalism was England’s interest, “not only because it guaranteed
national survival and prosperity, but because it contributed to the ‘improvement’ of the nation.”126 In 1663
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Shaftesbury was a very wealthy man throughout his life; however, as an orphaned child of nobility he
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During that time there were various corrupt activities that deprived Shaftesbury of considerable property,
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been Shaftesbury’s great-grandfather. Morley, A Thousand Lives, p. 32. This was before the decimation
of the West by James II, who exacted extraordinary retribution for the failed Monmouth rebellion –
revenge for the West’s embracing of Monmouth when he sailed into the bay of Dorset in 1685 to reclaim
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evident objection at Westminster, resulting in government-sanctioned judicial slaughter in the West. But
this was after Shaftesbury was gone. During the Bloody Assizes, 331 people were hanged in batches
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Shaftesbury became one of eight Lords Proprietor for the chartered Province of Carolina. During the
Restoration, when Sidney was exiled in France, he was one of the so-called CABAL Ministry formed after
Clarendon’s fall from the post of Lord Chancellor in 1667.127 Political power in England was divided by the
rivalry between the “reckless and conscienceless levity” of Buckingham, with whom Shaftesbury sided,
and the “unscrupulous audacity” of Arlington. Scholars conclude that Buckingham and Shaftesbury were
ignorant of “the conspiracy against the religion and liberties of England” that developed between 1667
and 1670, referring to the second level of secret agreements between the kings of England and France
that, beyond undermining the Triple Alliance (England, Holland and Sweden), provided impetus for
Charles to announce his conversion to Catholicism and defy parliamentary consultation in reaching these
vital agreements. It was in this timeframe, in 1672, that Shaftesbury was highly rewarded by the king:
named Lord Chancellor and further ennobled with an earldom.128
Shaftesbury was known to be immune from “monetary influence”; he was, after all, a very wealthy
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Troubles, pp. 170-72.
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peer of the realm.129 But this provides little consolation given his willingness to be otherwise “influenced,”
e.g., by the various honors bestowed on him as well as the gain of great political power. Undoubtedly,
the Earl profited from his collaboration with Charles II. Morley puts it this way: “Certainly, had [Shaftesbury] known…, he would never have approved the secret clauses of [the] treaty for the recognition of
Louis as heir to the Spanish throne and of the establishment of the Roman Catholic religion in England.
However, it is undeniable that either from an ambitious determination to stay in the King’s councils at any
cost, or from genuine conviction, he was one of those ministers who acquiesced in the King’s plan,
revealed … in 1669, for war against the [Dutch] Republic.”130 The Third Anglo-Dutch War ensued.
When the Stuart heir increasingly became publicly affiliated with Catholicism and Charles was
unwillingness to take the decisive action urged by Shaftesbury and others, namely, to divorce his barren
Catholic queen, marry a Protestant, and have a Protestant heir to avoid James’ succession, the Earl
became more and more concerned about Catholic influences. This included Louis XIV’s sway in matters
of English governance. This led to Shaftesbury’s fall from grace – first removal as Lord Chancellor
(1673), followed by expulsion from the Privy Council (1674). It also marks the beginning of the Earl’s role
as a powerful parliamentary opposition leader.131
In 1675, several years before Sidney’s return to England, the pamphlet A Letter from a Person of
Quality to his Friend in the Country was published anonymously, denouncing the Test Bill introduced by
the “very serviceable Yorkshireman” Thomas Osborne, the Earl of Danby, who replaced the CABAL of
which Shaftesbury had been a part.132 The pamphlet was written by Shaftesbury and/or Locke.133 The
Test Bill required officeholders to declare resistance to the king a crime and promise to abstain from any
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probably Shaftesbury’s”). Traill, Shaftesbury, the first earl, p. 77.
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attempt to alter Church or State government. Shaftesbury led parliamentary opposition to the proposed
legislation. In 1677, the year Sidney returned to England, the Earl and several other Peers unsuccessfully
introduced legislation in Lords that would have dissolved Parliament and required new elections because
of the extended parliamentary proroguing that had taken place for fifteen months over the prior two years
in violation of a thirteenth-century law requiring annual assemblies.134 These men were held in contempt
of Parliament and committed to the Tower. Four months later Charles ordered the release of everyone
but Shaftesbury, who he left in jail for another eight months until the Earl agreed to apologize.
Correspondence and memoirs of the several year period after this refer to the fact that Shaftesbury’s sole
motivation for his later actions was “revenge.”135 Presumably, this meant revenge for what he must have
considered unjust, indeed unlawful imprisonment.136 But one need not conclude that the Earl’s sole
motivation was personal to recognize the degree of enmity which no doubt existed by this time between
Shaftesbury and the King.
1678 was the year of the Popish Plot, a massive intrigue in which Shaftesbury clearly had a
starring role, although the extent of his initiation of this false charge that Titus Oates intended to commit
both regicide and create a Catholic England is unclear. By this time, Sidney was back in England. On the
question of the perspective and role in the Popish Plot of Shaftesbury as well as Locke, who was a
member of Shaftesbury’s retinue, Wootton maintained that, “We do not know whether Shaftesbury and
Locke believed Oates’s lies. What is clear is that Shaftesbury and his supporters were determined to
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of Shaftesbury (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), Ch. XX, “Imprisonment and Release (1677-78), pp. 42252.
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Another scholar asserts that Shaftesbury shifted from support of the king to opposition because he
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chancellor, for issuing writs outside of Parliament. Hayes-Steuck, “Emerging from the Shadows,” p. 107.
Historian Maurice Lee “argues that because Charles withdrew the Declaration of Indulgence and allowed
the house of commons to besmirch Shaftesbury, he turned his efforts to supporting a program of antiCatholic legislation, particularly the new Test Act.” Id, p. 108, citing Maurice Lee Jr., The Cabal (Ubana,
IL: University of Illinois Press, 1965).
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exploit Oates’s testimony in order to exclude James from succession to the throne.”137 In contrast, Traill
was convinced that Shaftesbury had to have known that Oates was lying.138 Although there is no
consensus, it seems clear that the Earl knowingly played a prominent role in the successful prosecution
of men falsely accused (by Oates) of this crime. We know Shaftesbury was rabidly hostile to the notion of
a Catholic king. In an unpublished account of the Earl by his faithful clerk and amanuensis, Benjamin
Wyche, who wrote to rebut Burnet’s malevolent commentary in his History of His Own Time, Wyche said
that when Shaftesbury was trying unsuccessfully to persuade more skeptical associates that an
insurrection should be mounted in 1682, one of his statements was that, “the Papists should never
Triumph over him, whatever they do over them, and that he would leave them to be hal’d away in
Triumph by Popish Cruelty to Goals and, Gibbets, and to dye by the Ax and halter.”139
The highly publicized Popish Plot made Shaftesbury into a public figure in London, a Protestant
hero, enhancing his power in Parliament as the leader of the increasingly well-organized Whig faction.
He also became an expert polemicist.140 Thus, even if the inner circle of Court officials did not believe the
Plot was true, they were unable to effectively resist the opposition’s tactical maneuvers. According to
Traill, “It is vain to argue, as Shaftesbury’s apologist has done, that his responsibility for these events is
no greater than that of any other peer who contributed by his votes and speeches to the same end.
Shaftesbury was the undoubted leader of the Opposition in the Lords, and its animating spirit indeed in
both Houses (‘a fairy fiend that haunted and deluded both,’ as he is described in one of the anonymous
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John Locke’s Political Writings, David Wootton, ed. & intro. (Indianapolis, IN and Cambridge: Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc., 2003), p. 20. Oates revealed “a Jesuit plot to murder Charles, burn London,
raise a Catholic army, procure a foreign invasion, massacre Protestants, restore Catholicism, and put
James on the. throne.” William B. Robison, “Popish Plots (1678),” Historical Dictionary of Stuart
England, 1603-1689, pp. 405-07.
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One reason for Traill’s conclusion was the credible testimony of Lord Campbell, the 9th Earl of Argyll,
who was involved in various cabals to keep James from becoming king, including both the Rye House
Plot and the later Monmouth Rebellion. In sum, Traill found it beyond doubt that Shaftesbury was “an
active participator” in representing the Popish Plot as a legitimate conspiracy. On Argyll and Shaftesbury,
see Appendix B.
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J. R. Milton, “Benjamin Martyn, the Shaftesbury Family, and the Reputation of the First Earl of
Shaftesbury,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Jun., 2008), pp. 315-35, 327.
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Note that the talented propagandist Robert Ferguson was Shaftesbury’s personal chaplain, part of the
Shaftesbury entourage that included John Locke as Shaftesbury’s personal physician, political confident,
and designated writer. See Melinda Zook, “Early Whig Ideology: Ancient Constitutionalism, and the
Reverend Samuel Johnson,” Journal of British Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr. 1993), pp. 139-65, 142.
291

pamphlets of the time).”141 Perhaps even more significant than Shaftesbury’s active participation in
fomenting public hysteria about the Plot is that he did nothing that a person in his position of influence, as
leader of the opposition, could have done to moderate the escalating public hysteria.142 On the basis of
Oates’ accusations, five Catholic Peers were sent to the Tower.143
During the next four years of the succession or exclusion crisis, Shaftesbury continued in his
Parliamentary leadership role, fighting repeatedly but unsuccessfully to prevent the avowed Catholic
Duke of York from becoming the next king.144 A massive public campaign was mounted under
Shaftesbury’s leadership, the result of which was the Monster Petition of 1680, estimated to include
almost 18,000 signatures. The Monster Petition “most humbly and earnestly pray[ed]” that the prorogued
Parliament might sit, both to try the Popish Plot defendants and “to redress all other our most important
grievances.”145 Lady Sunderland, Sidney’s sister, reported to their brother Henry that the petition “fell
flat.”146 There were differences within the parliamentary leadership and, indeed, across all sectors of
English, particularly London society, about the strategic value, as well as the propriety, of the Monster
Petition.147 Two of the men who signed the Monster Petition were Locke and Sidney.148
In contrast to the confrontational style of Shaftesbury’s faction, Halifax “preferred to win the king
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The five Catholic peers were Lords Powis, Stafford, Petre, Arundel and Bellasis. Id, pp. 130-31.
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In Patriarcha non Monarcha, Tyrrell seemed to be arguing that Charles II did not have the power to
deny the throne to his brother: “But as for the Right of bequeathing Crowns or Kingdoms by Testament,
as I will not deny but that some Kingdoms may have been so bequeathable by their Constitution, and
others become so by Custom; yet I cannot grant that this Right belonged to the Prince or Monarch by the
Law of God or Nature, but proceeds purely from a continued Custom of the Kingdom, or Civil Law thereof;
else why had not Henry VIII, or Edward VI, power to limit or bequeath the Crown to whom they pleased,
as well as William the Conquerour?”James Tyrrell, Patriarcha non monarcha,
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2168#Tyrrell_1453_72 (08-14-14).
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Diary of Henry Sidney, I, p. 252.
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The king’s proclamation against tumultuous petitioning “smeared it with the charge of illegality and
factiousness.” Gilbert Burnet believed that the Monster campaign “alienated many sober and wellmeaning men” who began to wonder whether its purpose was not just to reconvene Parliament, but “to
alter ye Government, or to help ye Duke of Monmouth into ye throne after ye King’s death.” Others charged
that its real purpose was to “muster a Party.” Knight, “London’s Monster Petition of 1680,” pp. 66-67.
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over by private argument, and advised ‘all his friends to concur in the same batter’.” Similarly, Penn
considered the Earl’s strategy to be “violent and irreconcileable.” Jones, recently resigned as attorney
general, refused to sign.149 The King took great offense at the Monster Petition, considering the action to
invade his prerogative. But the proclamation against tumultuous petitioning was only mildly enforced, as
Charles did not want to alienate Parliament in case he might need it as he sought to lobby the Dutch not
to ally with the French but, instead, to conclude an Anglo-Dutch alliance. Ironically, the man executing this
Stuart policy as ambassador at The Hague was Henry Sidney, Algernon’s younger brother.150
In this period, Shaftesbury also (briefly) became a member and President of the King’s Privy
Council, selected by Charles in an effort to coopt those in Parliament who opposed him, and to try to
tame the diverse parliamentary factions. Although records are particularly untrustworthy (vague, selfserving, second-hand) with regard to the cabals to rebel against the King in order to obtain a Protestant
successor, the Earl was in the middle of this activity. When his co-conspirators could not agree on how or
when to proceed, Shaftesbury took fright, and fled. He arrived in Amsterdam in December 1682; he was
dead less than two months later.151
Shaftesbury was maligned in his lifetime and thereafter. “No one can question either the number
of Shaftesbury’s adversaries or the formidable power of some of them.” Perhaps the most famous of his
critics is John Dryden, whose 1681 poem “Absalom and Achitophel” roasted Shaftesbury. Among other
things, Dryden accused him of “breaking the Triple Alliance, periling English safety, and paving the way
for French mastery.” The most biting comments against the Earl were directed at his character.152
Blackburne, for instance, stated: “Shaftesbury, who clothed his capacity in the garments which the
fashion of the day approved of, and many lesser spirits, were almost as discreditable in their opposition
as the Court in its authority. Shaftesbury played a splendid game, and he and Danby gave the Crown a
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Id, p. 45 n.33.
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Haley, The First Earl of Shaftesbury, pp. 728, 732.
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Because of the massive re-do of Ludlow’s 1680 Memoirs by the editor John Toland, we cannot be
certain of the document’s accuracy. See n. 171.
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mortal hurt” from which “it never recovered.”153 He was perhaps even more disliked by Sidney’s sister
Lady Sunderland than he was by Sidney. She believed that the Earl’s “abilities were as remarkable as
his utter want of principle…. His determined opposition to moderate counsels, and his persistency in
courting the popular vote, rendered him odious in her eyes. She looked upon his as a reckless and
dangerous man,” a man of great improbity, “and was never so much pleased as when her brother
Algernon quarreled with him.”154
Sidney quarreled with Shaftesbury during the succession crisis, and would not deal directly with
him. Again, Blackburne is unequivocal: “Sidney hated Shaftesbury.”155 Ashcraft mistakenly suggested
that Sidney and Shaftesbury reconciled, but Ashcraft is confused on a number of counts. As a result,
Ashcraft erroneously concluded that, “Since there is no one among the leaders of the Whig party who is
reputed to have had a greater personal dislike of Shaftesbury than Sidney, these statements ought to
give us pause.”156 Ashcraft even suggested that Sidney’s mother was unhappy because Sidney was “well
with Lord Shaftesbury,” who was a thorn in her side.157 Disentangling this muddle is irksome, but
sufficiently important to digress.
First, Ashcraft relied on a July, 1680 letter from Lady Sunderland, Sidney’s sister not his mother,
addressed to Halifax, Dorothy’s son-in-law and Sidney’s nephew.158 Ashcraft quoted the following
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Traill, Shaftesbury: the first earl, p. 66; Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, p. 147. One indicia of
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Shaftesbury to fund a redeeming account of his great-grandfather, particularly in view of the disparaging
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Ashcraft mistakenly thought that the correspondence was from Sidney’s mother. By this time (1680),
Sidney’s mother Dorothy had been dead for decades. Ashcraft referenced the same letter twice
(contained in two different compilations, one about the Countess of Sunderland, and another primarily
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statement from Dorothy Spencer (née Sidney): “I have told you how my Lord Shaftesbury and Mr.
Algernon have railed at one another. New messages pass between them, I believe by Mr. Hampden.”159
Ashcraft used this statement to support the idea that Shaftesbury and Sidney were reconciled.
Unfortunately, Ashcraft was cutting short Dorothy’s statement, which stated in full, “I have told you how
my Lord Shaftesbury and Mr. Algernon have railed at one another. New messages pass between them, I
believe by Mr. Hampden, but that I do not know. The first part he [Algernon Sidney] told me, why, I
cannot imagine. He [Sidney] says he does not go to him [Shaftesbury], because he tells lies of himself
and his friends, but he undertakes to know Shaftesbury’s mind. He says he professes to have no design
for the Duke of Monmouth.”160 What we have here, first, is Sidney explaining to his sister why he
remained in any contact whatsoever with the Earl, and the explanation he provided is that he did so as a
matter of prudence, of reconnoitering – gaining intelligence to determine what Shaftesbury was up to.
This is behavior more akin to how one treats an enemy than a friend. As Houston pointed out, by
confusing Sidney’s mother and sister, Ashcraft then mistook Sidney for the sister’s son, the Earl of
Sunderland. This may explain Ashcraft’s conclusion, since Sunderland did cooperate with Shaftesbury in
late 1680.161 Secondly, the relationship of Sidney and John Hampden, grandson of the famous opponent
to Charles I in the Ship Money case, is unclear from this statement. We do not even know if Hampden
was actually a messenger between Sidney and the Earl. Thirdly, Dorothy reported that Sidney told her he
has “no design” for Monmouth, the King’s illegitimate son – certainly not an indication of cooperation or
even acquaintanceship between the two, nor an indication that Sidney would have supported the Earl’s
backing of Monmouth as successor to Charles II. Considering the original statement as the basis for
finding a positive Sidney-Shaftesbury relationship is less than plausible. Indeed, consistent with a number
of other indicia, there was likely real animosity there. Certainly there is no indication that, “Sidney,
Monmouth, Shaftesbury, and Hampden were once again cooperating with one another,” which was

about Lady Russell, wife of William, Lord Russell, who was executed along with Algernon Sidney in
connection with the Rye House Plot).
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See Houston, Algernon Sidney, p. 52 n.142.
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Ashcraft’s conclusion.162
Ashcraft further suggested that in addition to John Wildman, the radical Leveller and so-called
“plotter,” “Sidney’s friends were drawn from a group of nonaristocratic Republicans in the city of London,
virtually all of whom were strong supporters of Shaftesbury.” This is the antithesis of Morley’s view of the
company Sidney kept. First-hand accounts reflect something in-between these extremes, but lean much
more towards Morley’s perspective than Ashcraft’s. Ashcraft maintained that, “It was thus possible,
despite personal animosities, to effect a significant level of cooperation between the two men through
commonly shared associates. Even the extent of the personality differences between them may have
been exaggerated by historians.” In his supporting footnote Ashcraft stated that Sidney’s “close friends”
included Wildman, Bethel, Lord Howard, and Hampton, “all of whom,” said Ashcraft, “worked closely with
Shaftesbury.” Yet again, the pages to which Ashcraft referred are from the collection of Dorothy
Spencer’s letters, and they do not support this claim.163 Details are footnoted; in sum, Ashcraft omitted
Dorothy’s reference to other friends of Sidney who were anything but radical.164 He mischaracterized
Bethel.165 He then bootstraps Bethel’s relationship to Sidney, which is not well understood, to unjustifiably
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First, as to the omissions by Ashcraft: Within the pages referenced, Dorothy Sidney opined that
William Penn (also referred to by Dorothy as “a Quaker,”) was a close friend of Algernon. We know that
they were friends, and we know that Penn was an aristocrat. Yet Ashcraft conveniently left Penn out in
characterizing the type of people with whom Sidney associated. Dorothy also referred to the younger son
of Sidney’s old friend, Sir John Temple, who was one of Sidney’s “most strenuous supporters” when
Sidney ran for Parliament; Ashcraft failed to mention him, too. Sir John is also the man who wrote to.
Sidney’s father, Leicester, when Leicester was angry with Sidney but without any financial support while
marooned on the Continent. For generations, the Temple family had been close to the Sidney family;
Algernon’s great uncle Philip died in the arms of the grandfather of Algernon’s friend John Temple, and
his older brother William, who was a prominent English diplomat. While not of the Sidney/Percy pedigree,
the Temples were aristocrats. Ashcraft also omitted Dorothy’s statement that Sidney “is suspected to be
in with the Duke of Buckingham,” the arch-rival of Shaftesbury and, again, an aristocrat. In connection
with his discussion of the political clubs in Restoration London, David Allen had some interesting things to
say about the distrustful and competitive relationship between the Duke of Buckingham and the Earl of
Shaftesbury. See David Allen, “Political Clubs in Restoration London,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 19,
No. 3 (Sept., 1976), pp. 561-80, 571-74. These omissions undermine Ashcraft’s thesis about Sidney’s
“close friends.”
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With regard to the names Ashcraft did identify (Wildman, Bethel, Howard and Hampden), Ashcraft was
correct that Dorothy recorded a friendship between Algernon and Slingsby Bethel. Sidney worked on
Bethel’s campaign for London sheriff. But they were two different men, with different priorities. Let us
consider who Slingsby Bethel was. Noted for his republican sympathies, Burnet described Bethel as “a
known republican in principle.” Burnet, History of My Own Time, Vol. II, pp. 241-43. But far from a
belligerent radical, Bethel was the son of an aristocrat, Sir Walter Bethel. Slingsby Bethel’s relatives were
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connect Sidney and Shaftesbury.166 Ashcraft inaccurately characterized Hampden.167 He linked Sidney to
Lord Howard of Escrick, a disreputable man who Dorothy does not even mention.168 Finally, Ashcraft
identified the radical Wildman, who we do know Sidney and the Earl knew; but beyond that, we know
nothing of relevance.169 Overall, Ashcraft’s finding that, “Sidney’s friends were drawn from a group of

divided by the war; his uncle Sir Henry Slingsby was a Cavalier and was executed for treason in 1658.
Bethel was instrumental in saving his uncle’s sequestered estate. In contrast to his uncle’s politics,
Bethel “was strongly opposed to the cause of the cavaliers, but did not approve of the conduct of the
Protector.” Bethel, Slingsby (1617-1697),” ODNB online, http://www.oxforddnb.com/templates/olddnb.
jsp?articleid=2303, (7-24-14). Bethel became a very successful London merchant; he also owned
substantial inherited property in Yorkshire. In his 1668 pamphlet, The World’s Mistake in Oliver Cromwell,
Bethel explained why Cromwell should not be lionized or idolized in Restoration England; for Cromwell
severely hurt the interests of England. Bethel’s emphasis was on the usurpation of Parliament’s
authority, major adverse impacts on trade, England’s prestige in Europe, Cromwell’s misguided Baltic
policies, and unjust, oppressive actions against those Cromwell disagreed with, including Sir Henry Vane.
See Appendix B for more details and references. While Sidney was not in England in 1668, he would
have concurred with virtually all of these Bethel views; but none of them is in any way a reflection of
radical republicanism. On Wildman, Howard and Hampden, see ns. 171, 170 & 169.
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Also, as far as we know, Shaftesbury was not involved in the effort to elect Bethel; indeed, It is
therefore foolish to draw any inferences about the relationship between Sidney and Shaftesbury, the
nature of Sidney’s friends, or even the type of republicanism to which Bethel and Sidney would have
gravitated, from Sidney’s support of Bethel’s election or from their relationship. We simply do not know
the relationship between Shaftesbury and Bethel, and certainly cannot use it as a bootstrap to connect
Shaftesbury and Sidney! Indeed, we have Sidney’s sister telling her nephew Halifax that Sidney thought
Shaftesbury was a liar. Bethel is not known to have had anything to do with any government
conspiracies, whether of Shaftesbury’s making or otherwise. Dorothy also stated, “Lady Russell, in a letter
to her husband, observes that Bethell has actually dined with Lord Dorset,” likely Richard Sackville, the 5th
Earl of Dorset, and that Bethel “professes not to have found courtiers such bugbears as he expected!” – a
moderating comment. Dorothy Sidney to Halifax, July 1680, Sacharissa, pp. 278, 282.
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Turning to Hampden, the only such reference by Dorothy Sidney Sunderland in the book on which
Ashcraft relied is the one previously described, which is not on the pages referenced – a statement of
Dorothy’s belief that Hampden was a go-between, although she “does not know.” In fact, we do not know
what the relationship was between Hampden and Sidney; and again, Hampden was an aristocrat, not one
of Ashcraft’s “nonaristocrats.” (Dorothy suggested a relationship between Shaftesbury and Hampden in
another letter to which Ashcraft did not refer.) Dorothy Sidney to Halifax, June 1680, Saccharissa, p. 264.
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Then there is Lord Howard of Escrick, the fourth “close friend” that Ashcraft identified. In the words of
Dorothy’s biographer, Howard was characterized as “one of the basest and most worthless of men,” a
man who turned king’s evidence in the Rye House Plot, accusing Sidney of treason. Sidney had
interceded to bail Howard out of an earlier legal scrap, although we do not know what prompted him to do
so; but there is no reason to conclude that they were friends. See Ch. One, ns. 641 & 642, on the
disreputable Howard. Why Ashcraft included Howard here is baffling; Dorothy did not mention Howard.
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Finally, there is John Wildman, a wild-eyed radical, clever businessman, brilliant rhetorician and a man
whose politics were all over the place, depending on one’s perspective as well as what accrued to
Wildman’s advantage. Substantial discussion follows about the activities of the slippery character John
Wildman. Ashcraft is almost certainly correct about Wildman and Sidney knowing each other. Dorothy
stated, for example, that, “Today, he [Algernon] was with Wildman,” an indication, by the way, that lots of
people, such as Dorothy, knew or knew of Wildman. But the nature of the Sidney-Wildman relationship is
unclear. We also have no idea what to infer about this association, certainly as far as particular nefarious
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nonaristocratic Republicans in the city of London, virtually all of whom were strong supporters of
Shaftesbury” is incorrect. His judgments about the relationship between Shaftesbury and Sidney,
including the latter’s opinion of the former and the people they counted as their friends, must be largely, if
not entirely, discounted.170
Considering the cumulative information impugning Shaftesbury’s character, is this simply a jumble
of bad Whig history – an aggregate distortion of the opinions of those who knew Shaftesbury and the
circumstances of the time? As we will consider shortly, engaging in Whiggish historiography reflects a
particular bias; but it does not mean that all of the content of Whiggish history is incorrect! It seems highly
unlikely that the broad and deep distrust and profound dislike of Shaftesbury is misplaced, given its
reflection in a surprising number of first-hand, contemporaneous accounts.171 The most benign conclusion

activities are concerned; and this is the only indication Ashcraft proffered of a man who was linked to both
Sidney and Shaftesbury since we know that Shaftesbury worked with Wildman.
170
Can we draw any inferences about these matters (Shaftesbury’s reputation, Sidney’s opinions about
Shaftesbury, and their likely common friends) from any connections they may have had through London’s
lively political clubs? Substantial scholarship has been done exploring the nature of clubs in the political
hothouse that was Restoration London. First, to answer this compound question simply, the answer is
no. Details about political clubs are scant; furthermore, there is no evidence indicating that Sidney
belonged to any political club. The most famous Whig/Opposition club was the Green Ribbon Club,
described by Zook in her book on radical Whigs as the “most notorious political club, active between 1678
and 1681, …which met at the King’s Head Tavern on the corner of Fleet Street and Chancery Lane.” The
Green Ribbon Club was a meeting place for the Whig faction. With about 150 members from a variety of
walks of life, it “provided Whigs of all social levels with a place to meet, converse, and conspire.” Zook,
Radical Whigs, p. 7. Included among its members were Barons Howard and Ford Grey, both implicated
and likely the critical informants in later conspiracies (Rye House and Monmouth). But this was one of a
host of political clubs, whether Whig/Opposition or Tory/Loyalist, that convened under “elastic
conditions… an assembly of good fellows, meeting under certain conditions,” most often in Westminster.
Allen, “Political Clubs in Restoration London,” p. 562. Besides the Green Ribbon Club, there were other
Whig clubs, including one at the Angel and Crown tavern in Threadneedle Street, the Salutation tavern in
Lombard Street, the Nag’s Head tavern in Cheapside, and the Green Dragon tavern in Snow Hill. There
were likely Whig (and Tory) clubs in other Westminster taverns and coffeehouses about which no trace is
left. According to historian David Allen, the Salutation housed a Whig club of Buckingham supporters,
whereas the Whig faction of Shaftesbury supporters met at the Nag’s Head. Shaftesbury also had a club
of Whig peers that excluded Buckingham. Neither Shaftesbury nor Buckingham or, for that matter,
Sidney, are included on the lists of members of the Green Ribbon Club. For several years, Wildman had
a republican club, located at the Nonsuch House tavern in Covent Garden, which he owned (but which no
longer existed by the time Sidney returned to England). There was also an Anglican-Cavalier club, and
various Catholic political clubs. Id, passim.
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Because of the massive re-do of Ludlow’s 1680 Memoirs by the editor John Toland, to be discussed
shortly, we know that Toland significantly changed what Ludlow wrote. Notwithstanding this general
ground for very cautionary reliance, the following pejorative Ludlow comments about Shaftesbury were in
passages Locke deleted from the original manuscript while it was being printed and before it was
published because of what they said about Shaftesbury. This would certainly support their authenticity.
I.e., aside from what this says about Locke, it makes the statements particularly reliable reflections of
Edmund Ludlow’s viewpoint: (i) Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper was “a known bitter enemy to the public and
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that seems reasonable is that Shaftesbury was a master politician, for better and for worse. On the one
hand, “ambition was at all times his master passion.” He was a talented orator with “a remarkable
readiness of argumentative and oratorical resource,” along with a “surpassing skill of Parliamentary
fence.”172 Notwithstanding the possibility of Whiggish prejudice, there is a remarkable consistency in the
comments about his deplorable character. It is his likely unscrupulousness that would have placed him at
absolute odds with a man like Sidney; not an idealist, his standard of conduct nevertheless was high.
Just taking the case of the Popish Plot, “What Shaftesbury did was to take the story as Oates told it, and
without believing it – nay, while well aware that its darkest accusations were and must be false – to turn it
to his political purposes.”173If this is true, it alone explains Sidney’s disdain.174

to all good men,” who Ludlow suggested unconscionably was readmitted into Parliament (1660) “on a
disputable election of eighteen years’ standing, against all reason and common justice.” Ludlow thought
that this was because Cooper had joined with those opposing the army; (ii) that army members placed on
Cromwell’s Council of State could not speak their mind because Shaftesbury was there and “assured to
Charles Stewart’s interest, … hot and confident … to pursue his mischievous design”; (iii) Cooper was
“also a great instrument in this horrid treachery,” which referred to the denial of huge arrears owed by the
English parliamentarians to the Irish Brigade that supported the Roundheads; and, in this same context,
(iv) Shaftesbury “professed to be very affectionate to the interest of the Commonwealth, which he did so
to the life that I was much pleased therewith, having always believed him to be otherwise inclined. But
notwithstanding his fair words, I was not so confident of him as to repose any great trust in him, he having
played fast and loose so often, declaring sometimes for the king, then for the Parliament, then for
Cromwell, afterwards against him, and now for the Commonwealth.” (v) Cooper was out in front, holding
“cabals” with like-minded leaders of the City of London at the time that Monk marched into the City,
beginning the transition from the Republic to the Restoration. The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow,
Lieutenant-General of the Horse in the Army of the Commonwealth of England, 1625-1672, Two Vols., C.
H. Firth, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894) [Andesite Press repr.], Vol. II, pp. 15, 85, 155, 205-06, 217.
On the suppressed passages of Ludlow’s Memoirs, see “Suppressed Passages of Ludlow’s Memoirs,
1653-1660. From the Locke Papers at the earl of Lovelace’s,” Memoirs, Letters, and Speeches of
Anthony Ashley Cooper, First Earl of Shaftesbury, Lord Chancellor, with other. Papers illustrating his Life,
from his Birth to the Restoration, William Douglas Christie, ed. (London: John. Murray, 1859), Ch. V, pp.
108-29, 126; Memoirs, Vol. I, Introduction, p. xiv.
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Traill, Shaftesbury (the first earl), pp. 24, 109. According to his clerk Benjamin Wyche, Shaftesbury
“had a wonderful faculty in speaking to a popular assembly, and could mix both the facetious and the
serious way of arguing very agreeably. He had a particular talent to make others trust in his judgment,
and depend on it; And he brought over so many to a submission to his opinion, that I never knew any
man equal to him in the art of governing parties, and of making himself the head of them.” J. R. Milton,
“Benjamin Martyn, the Shaftesbury Family, and the Reputation of the First Earl of Shaftesbury,” p. 325.
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According to Sidney’s sister, Lady Dorothy Sidney, in 1679, Shaftesbury accused Sidney of being a
“French pensioner,” which infuriated Sidney. The suggestion seems to be that this came not so much
from the fact that Sidney accepted money from the French government which he may well have done, as
from Sidney’s continuing efforts to convince the French that an English republic would be better for the
French than an English monarchy. Carswell suggested that Sidney may have lost his MP election
because of the hostility between the two men, as evidenced by the fact that one of Shaftesbury’s onetime lieutenants was the teller against Sidney’s election in Amersham, where Sidney lost. Letter from
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In summary, we often have a muddy picture of Shaftesbury, both as a man and with respect to his
ideas. We can confidently say that the Earl was alarmed and fearful that England would become a
Catholic country absent a Protestant heir. Whether his political convictions were as resolute is unclear
and, if anything, doubtful. Shaftesbury often spoke about the dangers of arbitrary government. But he
also repeatedly shifted, if not flipped sides of the political aisle. Overall the evidence suggests a talented
but slippery politician. In the arena of politics, Shaftesbury seems to have been a man of passion not
principle. He and Sidney did not see eye to eye.
To put it at its most offensive, are we to see Locke’s ‘liberal politics’ as simply
a fortuitous mode of upward social mobility or are we to see what was eventually
his undoubted social ascent as a ‘deserved’ consequence of his devotion to ‘liberal politics’?
Was it a purely arbitrary historical accident (or a natural, non-ideological, consequence
of his west country connections and background) that it was Shaftesbury’s service
that he entered or was this a mode of social ascent made independently inviting
by his initial and considerable ideological affiliations? This is a startlingly crude question,
involving the most profound issues of continuity and authenticity in Locke’s intellectual life.
John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke175

iii.

Locke

John Locke was not a friend of Algernon Sidney. We do not even know if Sidney knew him.
Although relative contemporaries, we have no evidence to suggest that they ever met. This is not
surprising. The two men did not travel in the same universe much less the same circles.176 Locke was the

Dorothy Sidney to Halifax, July 8 & 29, 1680 in Cartwright, Saccharissa, pp. 274, 281; Carswell, The
Porcupine, pp. 182-83.
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John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the ‘Two
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In “Petitioning and the Political Theorists: John Locke, Algernon Sidney and London’s Monster Petition
of 1680,” Past & Present, No. 138 (Feb. 1993), pp. 94-111, Mark Knight endeavored to link Locke and
Sidney by virtue of the fact that they both, along with about 18,000 other people, signed the so-called
Monster Petition, presented to the king on January 13, 1680. The Monster Petition sought the
reconvening of the prorogued Parliament to try the Popish Plot “offenders” and “redress all other our most
important grievances.” In my own view Knight’s analysis does not prove any connection between Sidney
and Locke; indeed, using but not endorsing Knight’s method, which was to argue that those who signed
the same petition page likely knew each other, the evidence suggests that Sidney and Locke did not. In
general, I find Knights’ analysis far too close to a guilt-by-association strategy to be convincing. Contrary
to Knights’ suggestion, it also does not establish any inclination or disinclination towards radicalism by
either Locke or Sidney. As Harris elucidated in his historiographic review of Restoration scholarship, all
sorts of people from different walks of life, social standing, and political outlooks signed the Monster
Petition. On the Monster Petition campaign and its impact, see Mark Knight, “London’s Monster Petition.”
On Harris’ historiographic review, see Harris, “What’s New about the Restoration?”
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son of a country lawyer; his grandfather was a clothier.177 Sidney was the son of a leading Peer and a
member of an aristocratic family of military men and political leaders. There also was a nine-year age
difference; while not of seeming significance, the age gap contributed to Locke’s not fighting in the Civil
War, e.g., the Battle of Marston Moor in which Sidney was seriously injured took place in 1644 when
Locke was twelve. Some very young men did participate in the war, e.g., Charles II. Others did not. More
importantly, for many years Locke was a Shaftesbury retainer, part of the Earl’s staff, a trusted secretary
and assistant but never a politician or statesman in his own right. While they knew each other, Sidney did
not like Shaftesbury; it is unlikely that Sidney would have interacted with Shaftesbury’s secretary.
One of the most surprising things about “Locke history” is its omission of the fact that when one
reads the vast literature on the political events of Sidney’s lifetime, unlike the many recognized political
leaders and other prominent men, Locke is virtually never mentioned.178 He is neither in the bystander
accounts of political happenings nor in the political histories of the times. He is not in the memoirs or
correspondence of Sidney family members significantly involved in politics, nor those of other leading
figures. Even in accounts of Shaftesbury’s life there is little mention of Locke, and certainly not as a
political ally or other distinguished public figure. The reason for this is straightforward: Locke was not in
the public eye; neither was he a recognized member of the English elite or otherwise notable at the time.
The gnarly thing about John Locke is separating the proverbial wheat from the perspicuous chaff,
and differentiating justifiable surmise from unsubstantiated hypothesis (as well as appreciating the way
Locke lived and worked, in contrast to our inflated, anachronistically created image of the man). This
challenge is not surprising for many reasons that will become apparent but, most obviously, because of
the prodigious literature on Locke with many outstanding scholarly debates. Locke preferred to remain a
private not a public figure, perhaps intentionally clothing his actions in a shroud of mystery if not obscurity.
Let us, at least, clarify what we know that might be important in understanding where Locke stood as a
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contemporary of Sidney.
Locke grew up in the country. His father fought briefly during the Civil War with the
parliamentarians; but Somerset County in southwestern England fell quickly to the royalists, and John
Locke Senior left the army. In 1644, at the age of twelve and in the midst of the war, Locke had the very
good fortune to be nominated by his father’s employer to attend London’s Westminster School, “the most
famous school in England,” a place he later characterized as “very severe” but, nonetheless, an avenue
to university. He then obtained a coveted place at Oxford, where the curriculum combined rigorous
humanist studies, e.g., grammar, rhetoric, ancient philosophy, logic, moral philosophy and languages,
particularly fluency in Latin.179 Years later Locke damned both the university curriculum’s content and
method.180 He graduated at twenty-three, but stayed at Oxford in a variety of positions as a tutor and
lecturer. He also continued his studies, primarily in “physic,” consistent with his interest in medicine.181 By
then, Oxford was “an extraordinarily thriving centre of scientific activity of many kinds,” particularly in
subjects related to medicine. For example, Robert Boyle, five years Locke’s senior, had a lab there.
Locke’s interests and exceedingly cautious personality dovetailed, one likely consequence of
which was that he remained at Oxford for fifteen years, from the age of twenty to thirty-five. It was not just
Oxford’s attractiveness as a center of research in medicine and related subjects which led Locke to tell
his father that he would “not willingly be drawn from hence”; he saw his agreeable pattern of life at
university as providing security – a degree of predictability and familiarity in a troubled and unsettled
world. He did not want to leave “whilst things are in these uncertain hurries, nor think to enter upon a
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Throughout his life Locke also kept all sorts of detailed statistical records, whether of routine
expenses, barometric pressure over time, and other miscellaneous factual information. According to
Goldie, Locke’s record-keeping “was meticulous to the point of obsessional.” Goldie, “Introduction,” John
Locke Selected Correspondence, p. xv. Two of Locke’s friends described him as “above all things,” a
man who “loved order”; he was an “exact keeper of accounts.” Woolhouse said, “This was surely a polite
way of saying that he was ‘anally retentive’, strong-willed, obsessively anxious for control; and given
these characteristics, it is noteworthy that his life did not take the shape he seems for a long time ideally
to have wanted – that of ‘a retired single life’ of residence in his Oxford college.” In part this is attributed
to a chronic cough and breathing difficulties, likely asthma and chronic bronchitis, exacerbated by the
notoriously polluted London air. Woolhouse, Locke: A Biography, pp. 3-4, 96.
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steady course of life whilst the whole nation is reeling.”182 We can see in Locke’s yearning for
predictability and familiarity, as well as in his hesitancy or disinclination to elect a discrete career path
among the various options that were specifically available to him – e.g., law, medicine, the clergy,
government service – the characteristic reticence that dominated his cautious personality and decisionmaking over the course of his life.183 In the protected arena of academia, e.g., in his intellectual group of
friends who met to discuss principles of morality and revealed religion, Locke was in his element. In that
enclave Locke was comfortable leading the group, which on one occasion he did by preparing some
“hasty and undigested thoughts” that became the core of his famous Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, an exploration into how the mind works and a discourse on empiricism. The friends with
whom Locke shared these experiences and ideas also were not men whose names arise in connection
with histories, diaries, and memoirs of the major political events of the day, or who were involved in any
significant way in contemporaneous political controversies. Tyrrell is the only familiar, albeit local politician
and theorist in the group; but it is clear from his biography that at least in these years Tyrrell preferred the
life of the country gentleman, avoiding the dangerous political world of the Restoration.184
Locke continued at Oxford for years, remaining professionally undecided, cloistered within the
academic ivory tower through the Cromwellian regime, the subsequent republic, and the restoration of
Charles II. Far from gregarious, he nevertheless had the capacity to be quite charming, both in person
and in his correspondence with various peers, male and female. Serendipitously, in 1666 when assisting
a doctor friend who had begun to take on patients, Locke met Shaftesbury. Both men took to each other
immediately, and Locke was invited to join the Earl’s London household. After briefly hesitating Locke
took the position, “falling into a great mans family.”185 This turned out to be the watershed of Locke’s life.
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Those friends were David Thomas, Nathaniel Hodges, Samuel Tilly, William Uvedale, Gabriel
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303

Initially, he was to have responsibility for the education of Shaftesbury’s son, and to be called upon for his
medical knowledge, although he was not the family physician (and, indeed, Locke never obtained a medical degree, although later he did lobby through Shaftesbury, albeit unsuccessfully, to obtain an honorary
Oxford medical degree.) A friend later remarked when Locke suggested that living at Exeter House had
held him back – “I might have made myself another manner of establishment” – that Locke had no need
to take that path, “being able to ‘live at his ease’ without doing so.186 “When he joined Shaftesbury it could
be said that he passed from the petite bourgeoisie to the haute bourgeoisie. He also followed his wealthy
patron into investments – the Africa Company, the Lustring Company and finally the Bank of England.
Locke invested in mortgages, lent money all his life to his friends for their convenience and at interest;
…[and engaged in] stock market profiteering in the shares of the Old and New East India Companies.”187
Locke undertook a miscellany of Shaftesbury assignments, e.g., finding a proper spouse for
Shaftesbury’s son; serving as the secretary of the eight Lords Proprietor of Carolina from 1669 to 1675
when Shaftesbury was the leading activist among the group; and increasingly, “whether merely stimulated
or actually requested by Ashley,” drafting various texts.188 In short, Locke’s responsibilities within the
Shaftesbury household, where he received room and board, ranged from the ridiculous to the sublime.
He kept minutely detailed lists of the expenses of Shaftesbury’s son, as he had done for himself and for
the students he had tutored at Oxford. He also functioned as the Earl’s advance man, obtaining lodgings
and other necessities for Shaftesbury and his Oxford entourage when the King moved Parliament there.
During the debate over the Test Act in 1675, Locke prepared the history of the debates, “published under
the direction of Lord Shaftesbury.”189 In short, some Locke assignments were clerical, others were not;
many certainly did not utilize Locke’s keen intellectual capabilities, nor do they suggest that the Earl
viewed Locke as a peer (in the substantive not the titled sense).
At the same time, as a trusted member of Shaftesbury’s inner circle, Locke could have been a
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courier and advance man for the Earl, particularly during the succession crisis. Additionally, in the early
1670s Shaftesbury appointed Locke Secretary to the Council of Trade and Plantations, which provided
him with a salary of five hundred pounds a year.190 Locke also wrote a variety of things for the Earl, as
Locke’s writing skill and thinking acumen must have rapidly become apparent, e.g., as an author of The
Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina (1669). Shaftesbury seems to have encouraged Locke’s political
self-education. It is possible that Locke wrote the infamous and, perhaps, explosive first pamphlet
produced in connection with the Popish Plot, A Letter from a Person of Quality to his Friend in the
Country (1675), which triggered public hysteria and crisis.191 This is one of those places where we do not
know precisely where Shaftesbury’s work ended and Locke’s began (or vice versa); scholars continue to
debate the matter. Regardless, Locke was a glorious writer. He either was of one mind with the Earl on
the political papers that he wrote for him, which some experts assert, or he was perfectly comfortable
penning Shaftesbury’s ideas whether or not he shared Shaftesbury’s perspective.192
Supremely talented as a thinker and writer, which the world later learned, during his lifetime, while
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working for the Earl, Locke was simply a Shaftesbury man. Woolhouse contended that Locke was not an
employee; this seems to be a distinction without a difference given the fact that Locke’s livelihood, not to
mention his food and lodgings, were provided by the Earl.193 Patronage was a feature of English high
society, just as it was honored in fifteenth-century Renaissance Italy, e.g., by the Florentine magnate
Lorenzo de Medici, who surrounded himself with talented men: artists, authors and others who, while
effusively embraced in humanist culture, were also financially dependent on, and therefore beholden to
their patron.194 The relationship of Shaftesbury to Locke, his intellectual retainer, is reminiscent of this
centuries-old tradition. As one historian observed, “In gratitude for the Duke’s patronage, Wildman called
Buckingham ‘the wisest statesman in England,’ and stood in relation to him much as John Locke did to
Shaftesbury, so that both Whig leaders came to learn, from their respective pet-intellectual, how to
express their tactical opposition to Charles II’s Government in the legal-historical vocabulary beloved of
contemporary political theory.”195 No doubt Locke scholars can provide many examples of the intellectual
power of Locke behind the Earl’s throne.
As a result of Laslett’s 1950s detective work, historians now are convinced that Locke’s Two
Treatises on Government was written in the 1679-81 timeframe not a decade later, after William and
Mary’s ascendency. Ashcraft passionately argued that Two Treatises was written after the failure of
Shaftesbury’s exclusion strategy, and that this should change our understanding of the text. “More than
“a ‘party’ book; that is, as a work of propaganda designed to promote the political objectives of
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Shaftesbury – a parallel role to Locke’s appointment as Secretary to the Board of Trade and Plantations.
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Shaftesbury and the Whigs,” which was Laslett and Cranston’s view, Ashcraft considered Two Treatises
to be a manifesto of Locke’s radical politics.196 This is a complex question, and the heart of Ashcraft’s
monumental study, Revolutionary Politics. For our purposes, effort will be made to correctly understand
what Locke’s Two Treatises was saying insofar as it relates to early modern republicanism. But if
Ashcraft was correct that the purpose of Two Treatises was to further the Earl’s political objectives, this
only tends to support the proposition that Locke was a Shaftesbury man and not more.
Whether at the Earl’s urging or his own inclinations, Locke stayed away from Shaftesbury’s
secretive political dealings in the aftermath of the failure to pass a bill excluding James Stuart as heir.
With the King defying Parliament through continual proroguings and dismissals, Shaftesbury and other
opposition leaders were hamstrung. Politically powerless, they were forced to either fail to meet what
they perceived to be their political responsibility to their country, or go underground politically, which a
number of highly regarded men apparently did, including Shaftesbury and later the prominent and highly
regarded aristocrats and politicians Russell, Essex, and likely Sidney. The consequences were secret
cabals, precisely the type of political activity of which Machiavelli, centuries before, had warned leaders to
beware. Men were desperately seeking ways to change a future political reality that appeared to be
increasingly inevitable, which was that England would have a Catholic dynasty that favored absolute
monarchy. Once again there is an incomplete and, at times, inconsistent record; nevertheless, there is
some record of the shady goings-on that ultimately led Shaftesbury and later Locke to flee.
That said, an objective consideration of Shaftesbury’s conspiratorial activities provides no
evidence to support the proposition that Locke was involved.197 He was not at political meetings with the
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The details of Locke’s whereabouts were carefully reviewed by Philip Morton in “Locke and the Rye
House Plot.” Morton established that Locke was a full-time member of Shaftesbury’s household from
1667 to 1675. He then went to France for four years and when he returned, did not continue with his
routine secretarial duties for Shaftesbury. Instead, Locke began to split his time between Shaftesbury’s
Exeter House in London, and his friend James Tyrrell’s country estate at Oakley. During this timeframe,
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Earl, or with Shaftesbury when he went into hiding. After the Earl fled, Locke spent several weeks quietly
at Oxford and at Tyrrell’s estate before returning to London. As for the subsequent conspiracy involving
Russell, Essex and Sidney, Locke also was not in town at the time of the one substantiated meeting.198
Transcript records of the various trials related to these events do not mention Locke as a participant in
any way.199 In fact, at that precise time he was busy worrying about the best nursing care that could be
provided to the infant of a Shaftesbury estate trustee – not exactly nefarious activity, political or
otherwise.200 How much Locke knew about what others were doing or had done, including but not limited
to Shaftesbury and later Russell, Essex and Sidney, and whether their activity or Locke’s putative
knowledge of it was treasonous, is another question. It also seems to be a dead end: the record simply is
not there. Whether out of conviction, scruples, prudence or timidity – and the last two explanations seems
most likely before he would have had any need to consider the first two – Locke was not personally
involved. To the extent that there is guilt by association, a view James II later embraced, Locke was
Shaftesbury’s long time underling and therefore it would not be surprising if the king or his men
considered Locke to be culpable. In that sense Locke’s flight in September 1683 and his secretive
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1674. He also personally invested, along with Shaftesbury, in the Royal African Company and in
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behavior in the Netherlands may well have been prudent.
In sum, Locke was not cut from the same cloth as either Shaftesbury or Sidney.201 He was not a
political actor.202 Locke was studying when Sidney fought in the Civil War. Sidney was a member of one
of the most prestigious noble families in England; Shaftesbury heir to one of the wealthiest. As a member
of the gentry, Locke came from a very different social milieu. He cultivated friendships with members of
the gentry to whom the Earl introduced him. He mingled with Oxford chums and their friends, old
acquaintances from home, and other professionals. For example, he had a lifelong (love-hate?) friendship
with Tyrrell, one of three authors, along with Sidney and Locke, who wrote treatises challenging Filmer’s
Patriarcha. But these were not men from the social milieu in which Sidney and Shaftesbury would have
spent much of their time. Moreover, Sidney was in exile during most of the years that Locke assisted the
Earl. It is true that circumstances and allegiances often blurred social lines, such as those prompted by
political crises and manifested in such things as the array of London political clubs; nevertheless, routine
social reality was another matter. Locke’s routine – making travel arrangements for his boss and
teaching the Earl’s children – was a very different reality than that of Shaftesbury or of a nobleman who
disdained the Earl, i.e., Sidney.
Surprisingly, scholars do not emphasize that Locke was never a politician. He was not a leader.
He did not seek public office in any capacity. In 1672 when he was selected to be the secretary to the
Board of Trade and Plantations that Shaftesbury controlled, Locke developed some knowledge of
coinage – the basis for his essay on the subject (which later proved to be completely in error).203 This is
probably as political a role as Locke ever assumed, and it was not political. Locke was serving as
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secretary to a professional board, albeit an important one, akin to a modern-day legislative or executive
staff committee, that had important responsibilities with respect to Britain’s colonial empire. But it had no
political voice. His work may have been important; but serving on the Board of Trade and Plantations
much less being its secretary required no public statements or appearances. If Locke was present during
the Earl’s innumerable political activities and intrigues, he was completely behind the scenes. This is
wholly consistent with what we can fairly deduce to be Locke’s personal preferences; it may have been
Shaftesbury’s as well.
While absolute certainly is impossible given the size of the universe in question, it certainly seems
to be the case that there are no allusions to Locke in the many memoirs and correspondence among and
about the political actors involved in the succession crisis or other major events of the Restoration. We
can say with certainty that even if someone mentioned him, he could not possibly have played a
significant role in these events or it would be evident from a variety of sources, including correspondence,
trial records and other primary sources. But Locke is not identified as a participant in any way in the
correspondence of key players in the quickly evolving circumstances and related cabals during Charles
II’s reign as recorded, for example, by Dalrymple’s Memoirs, R.W. Blencowe and Henry Sidney’s Diary of
the Times of Charles II, Bulstrode Whitelocke’s Memorials, Burnet’s History of His Own Time, Lady
Sunderland’s famous correspondence with leading political figures, Halifax’s correspondence, or the diary
of John Evelyn. If one considers just this last source, for example, the only reference to Locke in Evelyn’s
diary is when the “Earle of Shaftsbery” became President of the newly constituted Council of Trade and
Plantations in 1672, and “Mr. Lock,” described as “an excellent learned Gent: & student of Christ-Church,”
was sworn in as “Secretarie” of the Council.204
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Evelyn’s diary is interesting on many counts. Evelyn was a contemporary of Sidney, born in 1620 and
1623, respectively. The divergence of paths and views could hardly be more pronounced. Just to take a
few examples, while Evelyn was twenty-two when the Civil War broke out, he did not fight but took refuge,
traveling in Italy and residing largely in France until the war was over. Evelyn returned to England in
1652. Sidney, of course, was a soldier, wounded at Marston Moor. He remained in England throughout
the Civil War, and endeavored unsuccessfully to help steer the Commonwealth towards republicanism, as
good a definition as any of “the Good ‘Ol Cause.” Evelyn was committed to what one editor termed, “the
sanctity of monarchy.” Whether Evelyn thought absolute monarchy was required is not clear; but he
certainly had no problem with it. Sidney, of course, had an entirely different view. Reading Evelyn’s diary
can be frustrating because often Evelyn is not at all discursive. Nevertheless, it is an extraordinarily
useful record of a volatile eighty-year period in English history, 1620 to 1706 (albeit with 1620 to ’44
written in 1660, and 1649 to 1684 written between 1680 and ’84). John Evelyn, The Diary of John
Evelyn, E. S. De Beer, ed. (London: Everyman’s Library, 2006), pp. xxi-xxiii, 524. The world of the elite of
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The secondary literature also reflects Locke’s absence. For example, consider Maurice Ashley’s
1947 biography of John Wildman, the radical republican and Leveller. Wildman, like Sidney, was born in
1623. Although a major player in the Rye House Plot, Wildman was released from the Tower of London
(where he had been “able to carry on with equanimity the various business transactions in which he was
always engaged,”) one week before Sidney’s execution. Descriptions are provided of the later activity of
Wildman and other Englishmen in the Netherlands who were encouraging and assisting William to invade
England. There is no mention of Locke. Descriptions are given of various exiles, representing a range of
political views. Locke simply is not there. Minimally, one would expect Locke to be identified as one of
the talented propagandists who in November 1688 were writing papers in support of William of Orange’s
Declaration, to be published on or immediately before the Prince landed in England. After all, he was in
the Low Countries. Wildman, Burnet, and Robert Ferguson, for example, were men identified by the
Marquis d’Albeville, James II’s ambassador in Holland, as the three authors working for William of Orange
– “diverse conspirators” says Wildman’s biographer, who constituted a “freeman, Churchman, and
Presbyterian,” respectively. Locke is not there either.205
Shaftesbury, on the other hand, is discussed, sometimes in prolix fashion, in all of the diaries and
other compilations, as well as in innumerable letters between important political figures of the time.
Shaftesbury’s high political profile has already been discussed; one additional example, from Evelyn’s
Diary, is useful. Evelyn was a monarchist but also a political bystander who seemed to endorse the view
by “some” that Essex and Russell were “cunningly drawn in in by their Enemies” to the discovered
“Protestant-Plot,” viz., the Rye House Plot. After describing the plot’s discovery, Evelyn stated, “For my

the elite was very small. Algernon’s sister Dorothy, the widowed Countess of Sunderland, married Robert
Smythe, who was the grandson of Thomas Smythe, the Governor of the East India Company. Robert
Smythe was a friend of Evelyn. A Sidney Chronology, p. 297.
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Ashley, John Wildman, Ch. XVIII, and p. 247 for the quotation on Wildman’s business transactions in
the Tower, p. 274 on William’s propagandists. The important impact of William’s propaganda on the
outcome of the 1688-89 revolution, as well as the work of Dutch propagandists, is also discussed by
Jonathan Israel in The Dutch Republic, p. 850; Mark Goldie, “The Roots of True Whiggism, 1688-94,”
History of Political Thought, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June, 1980), pp. 195-236. Locke is not mentioned as a
participant in this vital propaganda effort. According to Jonathan Israel, the major piece of propaganda in
support of William’s invasion, William III’s November 1688 Declaration, was written “under William’s close
supervision, by his right-hand man in the States of Holland, the Pensionary. Gaspar Fagel, and then
translated into English by Gilbert Burnet.” Jonathan Israel, “Propaganda in the Making of the Glorious
Revolution,” S. Roach, ed. Across the Narrow Seas (London 1991), pp. 167-78,173.
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owne part I believe the crafty & ambitious Earle of Shaftsbery had brought them into some dislike of the
present carriage of matters at Court, not with any designe of destroying the Monarchy (which Shaftsbery
has in Confidence & for unanswerable reasons, told me, he would support, to his last breath, as having
seene & felt the miserie of being under [a] Mechanic Tyrannie &c) but perhaps of seting up some other,
whom he might govern, & frame to his owne Platonic fancie, without much reguard to the Religion
establish’d under the Hierarchie, for which he had no esteeme.” Evelyn then suggested that Shaftesbury
copped out in a somewhat cowardly fashion. “But when he perceiv’d those whom he had engag’d to rise,
faile of his expectations, & the day past, reproaching his Complices, that a second day for an Exploit of
this nature, was never successfull, he gave them the slip, got into Holland, where the fox died, three
moneths before these unhappy Lords & others were discovered or suspected.”206
Historians have debated the meaning of Locke’s works relative to contemporaneous English
politics. But his treatises were published anonymously and/or posthumously. As far as concurrent
political history records, Locke simply was not there. Ashcraft passionately wanted to make Locke into a
political leader after Shaftesbury died, suggesting in effect that Locke picked up the Shaftesbury mantle
and further radicalized it.207 Indeed, Ashcraft would place Locke and his ideas “to the left” of Sidney and
his republicanism. Ashcraft’s thesis is a complicated story beyond the scope of this study but, in sum, it is
not persuasive. Ashcraft’s inferences, including his creative interpretation of Locke correspondence, are

206

Evelyn said, “of the same tragical principles is Sidney &c:,” which is ambiguous because immediately
before this statement Evelyn was referring to “the rest of those who were fled, especialy Ferguson & his
gang,” who “doubtlesse some bloudy designe, set up a Commonwealth, & turne all things topsie turvy.”
On the other hand, just before this statement was Evelyn’s description of Shaftsbury’s role, and how,
“Every creature deplored Essex, & Russell, especialy the last, as being thought to be drawn in on
pretence onely of endeavoring to rescue the King from his present Counselors, & secure Religion, from
Popery, & the Nation from Arbitrary government.” Sidney could fall into either category. Evelyn’s Diary,
pp. 670-71.
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Ashcraft described Locke as a friend and political advisor to Shaftesbury, characterizations that elide
all sorts of distinctions, including friendship versus mutually admiring employer and employee, and
intellectual sparring partner versus an individual sufficiently experienced in politics to be relied upon for
sound advice. While these categories involve subjective determinations, it is very hard to believe that the
extremely politically astute and. experienced Shaftesbury would have relied on the political wisdom of the
politically inexperienced Locke. Ashcraft argued that there is a “myth of Locke’s political innocence.”
Here it is best to rely on the facts. See, e.g., Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, pp. 82-87.
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highly dubious.208 It is even less persuasive when one appreciates how Locke consistently stayed in the
political shadows all of his life, even opting neither to publicly acknowledge his brilliant work Two
Treatises on Government during his lifetime or publish it, nor publish An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding and A Letter Concerning Toleration, all three written earlier, until he returned to England
after the Glorious Revolution.209 In his literary, philosophical bent, Locke was consistently and extremely if
not pathologically reticent; unlike Shaftesbury and Sidney or, for that matter, the radical Wildman or the
Puritan Cromwell, Locke had neither the flare nor the will to function as a public figure. This was Locke’s
personality, through and through. He hated the study of rhetoric at Westminster and the requisite
disputations at Oxford; as a friend said, he “never loved the trade of disputing in public.”210
When he no longer had his front man, Locke did not step out in front. In 1683 he quietly left
England. Whether he had any role in any rebellious activities is highly dubious. He denied it and, while
scholars disagree, the evidence suggests he did not. The only “involvement” that seems even plausible
would have been knowledge or certainly suspicions about what others were doing. Perhaps Locke’s exile
was in fact necessary for his safety; we do not know. Recognizing that he was a very fearful man it is
certainly understandable, particularly given the notoriety of the man with whom he was so closely
associated. Once in the Netherlands perhaps Locke was in danger, perhaps not. We know that in his
correspondence with friends back in England Locke was worried about papers he had left behind;
perhaps this abundance of caution was necessary too. While in the Netherlands Locke moved around
discreetly and at times clandestinely; this could have been necessary for his safety, or it simply could
have been Locke being Locke. 211 One can make much of Locke’s low key or even sub rosa activities, as
Ashcraft cleverly did; but the obvious explanation makes the most sense, viz., that Locke acted at most
out of an abundance of caution (and at worst paranoia), unsurprising for a highly risk-adverse man. Most
importantly, the case has not been made that Locke assumed a leadership role in any of the political

208
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also Mark Goldie, “John Locke’s Circle and James II,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Sep., 1992),
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events that transpired between the death of Shaftsbury and the accession of William and Mary.
Locke was neither a political player in his own right nor the public face of a political figure, such
as the way an ambassador (e.g., Barillon) functioned on behalf of a king (Louis XIV). Locke also was not
a public supporter of the ouster of the Stuarts.212 Indeed, when you consider how Locke functioned while
working for Shaftesbury and thereafter, doing useful, sometimes brilliant but notably private or
anonymous work, it is manifest that Locke did not have a role in English political life that in any way
paralleled the career of either Shaftesbury or Sidney. At least during Shaftesbury’s lifetime, which would
have taken Locke to his fifties, it is indisputable that Locke was not politically active. He was a follower,
not a leader. It is implausible that a man who stayed in college into his mid-30s because he could not
decide what he wanted to do and was fearful of England’s instability, who then for the next eighteen years
lived quietly and perhaps vicariously through the life of his prominent patron, would in his 50s metamorphose into a leading political radical. When you combine this fact with Locke’s personality, which was
distinctly unsuitable for politics, we can appreciate that Locke functioned outside the scope of the political
events of his day.
Immediately after the Glorious Revolution Locke published the three works for which he is
famous: Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Two Treatises of Government, and the Letter
Concerning Toleration. During his lifetime he acknowledged authorship of the Essay and became known
as a philosopher – a metaphysicist; but he did not acknowledge the other two texts on government and
religious toleration until very shortly before his death.213 Unlike Shaftesbury and Sidney, Locke’s public
association with political ideas occurred post-mortem. He wrote gloriously and profoundly; politicians,
political theorists, philosophers, historians, and others have read and interpreted his ideas for centuries
and, undoubtedly, will continue to do so. But the political world knew nothing about his political ideas
during his lifetime. In contrast, Sidney was a much less precise writer, and anything but a metaphysician.
First and foremost he was a political activist from an exceptional English family, which Locke was not.
Sidney was known by his contemporaries because of who he was, the political ideas he advocated, and
the action he took. Like Locke, Sidney was also a thinker, an intellectual, and an author. It will become
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evident that Locke’s political ideas frequently coincided with Sidney’s, and that Locke and Sidney were
both early modern English republicans. In this regard, the historiographic determination to distinguish
Locke and his ideas from those of his contemporary republicans is incorrect. One could siphon off
Lockian thought as a sub-category of republicanism, which is how one could view liberalism. But to
segregate Locke from those with whom he shared fundamental political ideas is misleading, and has
profoundly muddled the historiography.214 While we can and should compare the political views of these
two men (Shaftesbury did not write a political treatise), the conduct of Locke’s life was radically different
from that of his adored mentor and employer and from the life Sidney led. From a theoretical vantage
point, this could be inconsequential. But as a practical matter it is a means by which to test the
authenticity of the ideas expressed, and to potentially lend credence and power to political ideas, a
consequence that is possible in the case of Sidney and not possible with Locke.
There are two postscripts. The first is ironic; the second adds a teensy bit of bravado to Locke’s
goody-two-shoes image. In 1693 Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education was published. In it,
Locke recommended the work of Algernon Sidney.215 Second, in 1698, in all likelihood through the
intercession of Shaftesbury’s grandson, Locke quietly, perhaps secretly, excised passages in Edmund
Ludlow’s manuscript edited by Toland and published as Ludlow’s Memoirs. The excised passages
contained “hostile references” to Locke’s adored Shaftesbury.216

It has been said that the historian is the avenger, and that standing as a judge between the parties
214
See Introduction, pp. 16 n. 29 for the tendency to segregate liberalism from republicanism & p. 30
n.60 for a solid sampling of the major works on Locke and liberalism. Political scientist Richard Flathman
makes the homologous, cognate point that, “Particular institutional forms – for example, representative or
direct democracy, the separation of powers or cabinet government – are often viewed as strongly
contributive to and even as necessary conditions of achieving liberal values and objectives. Such views
inform bastard expressions like ‘liberal democracy’ that conflate liberalism with a particular institutional
form, and they are at the heart of theories of liberalism.” This is incorrect, says Flathman. “[T]hese views
are hasty and otherwise ill considered. Theorists who proclaim a causally necessary or otherwise
invariant relationship between an institutional form and the flourishing of liberal projects exceed the
evidence on which they depend and introduce rigidity and overdetermination into liberal thinking and
practice.” Richard Flathman, “Liberalism and the Suspect Enterprise of Political Institutionalization: The
Case of the Rule of Law,” The Rule of Law: Nomos XXXVI, pp. 297-327, 299.
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and rivalries and causes of bygone generations he can lift up the fallen and beat down the proud….
It seems to be assumed that … there are ‘verdicts of history.’… It is astonishing to what extent the
historian has been Protestant, progressive, and whig, and the very model of the 19th century gentleman
,… and very quickly busies himself with dividing the world into the friends and enemies of progress.
Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History217

iv. Addendum: Whiggish History
With the Glorious Revolution, the whig faction became the Whig Party that supported the rule of
William and Mary.218 Later, under the strong leadership of Robert Walpole, Whiggism became the
dominant political force for two decades of Hanoverian rule.219 In his Introduction to Reluctant
Revolutionaries, historian W. A. Speck usefully summarized the impact of Whig History on both public
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At the time, as a practical matter, both the Stuart monarchy and the republican legacy of Sidney,
among others, was jettisoned. Scott maintained that, “In 1688 some sort of Anglo-Dutch political
federation was at last achieved by the forces of monarchy, not republicanism, as had been attempted in
1651, 1659, and 1665. This sealed the fate of republicanism as a political force in both countries. In this
fact lies the historical illegitimacy of the appropriation of the republican Sidney, a product of the first
revolution, for the propaganda purposes of the second.” I have difficulty with Scott here, as discussed at
length in Ch. Four, because it is not necessarily the case that the existence of a monarchy meant that
republicanism’s fate was sealed. It depends on how the monarchy was introduced, and the nature of the
monarchy. See Scott I, p. 167 n.5. Scott’s statement is too categorical. Nevertheless, Scott’s point is
extremely important, and is echoed by Richard Ashcraft, relying on a 1692 tract by John Hampden
entitled Some Short Considerations Concerning the State of the Nation: “It was incomprehensible to the
radicals that either James’ tyranny or the principles of the revolution could be so ‘publicly disputed’ and
covertly or overtly denounced by the very people who, in the wake of the revolution, had been brought
back into power.” Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, p. 600.
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Bishop Burnet, in his history treatise, commented on the sudden fall of James II: “A great king, with
strong armies and mighty fleets, a great treasure and powerful allies, fell all at once, and his whole
strength, like a spider’s web, was …irrecoverably broken at a touch.” Burnet, History of My Own Time,
Bishop Burnet’s History of His Own Time: From the Restoration. Of King Charles the Second to the
Treaty of Peace at Utrecht, in the Reign of Queen Anne (London: Bohn, 1857) Book IV, “Of the Reign of
King James the Second,” p. 398; Weston and Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns, p. 222. Martin Greig,
“Burnet, Gilbert (1643–1715),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (ODNB), first published 2004;
online edn, Sept 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/4061 (6-6-14). It is beyond the scope of this
study, but it should be noted that in the late 1680s and ‘90s, whigs were not homogenous. Some Whigs,
including a click of Locke friends, supported James II (“the king’s whigs”) because of his position on
toleration, at least until James flipped his position at the end of his reign. These men were not
necessarily welcomed back, at least initially, by whigs who had remained in opposition throughout the
difficult times of James II’s rule. E.g., “The only safe thing for a whig to do in 1689 was to dispel any
suggestion of having been a court whig in 1688.” Goldie, “John Locke’s Circle and James II,” pp. 577,
579. In a recent study of the substantial “repeal” movement in the late 1680s, referring to those who were
galvanizing support to repeal the Test Acts (which required various actions to confirm commitment to the
Church of England and which punished nonconformism), the case was effectively made that the repeal
movement’s legitimacy as a popular movement was deliberately swept under the rug by whig historians
and others. Scott Sowerby, “Forgetting the Repealers: religious Toleration and Historical Amnesia in
Later Stuart England,” Past and Present, No. 215 (May 2012), pp. 85-123.
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perceptions of the political events of seventeenth-century Stuart England and revisionists’ objections to it.
He pointed to the statement by the celebrated Whig historian George Macaulay Trevelyan that, “The
ultimate view of the Revolution of 1688 must be determined by our preference either for royal absolutism
or for parliamentary government. James II forced England to choose once for all between these two.”
Thus, for the Whig historian, the Glorious Revolution was “the final triumph of parliament over the Crown.”
It represented the confrontation of good and evil, the “last act” in a “cosmic drama.” Similarly, in his earlier
opus, History of England, Whig historian Thomas Babington Macaulay portrayed William of Orange as the
hero and James II as the villain, the Whig angels victorious over the Tory devils, and English history
presented as a story of progress, of advancement over reaction and regression.220 One of the problems
with this interpretation is that it depicted the Restoration Parliament as aggressively opposed to the
monarch which is incorrect, as evidenced by its frequent posture of seeking to gain consensus rather than
create conflict with the Crown.
Of course, there were debates; but many of these encounters, e.g., over Buckingham’s
impeachment, can be viewed as disagreements within the Court itself among rival courtiers, not a
confrontation between Parliament and Crown. “Parliament was an arena in which Court factions carried
on their jockeying for position.”221 We can see this jockeying fully in display in several important Sidney
family primary sources: Henry Sidney’s diary and both Henry and Dorothy Sidney’s correspondence.
These are first-hand accounts by Algernon’s younger brother and aunt that describe a variety of events at
Court and, particularly, the political disagreements and palpable competition among Stuart courtiers.
Another objection to the Whig interpretation of these events is that it virtually omits reference, and
certainly causation to the House of Lords. But as Speck pointed out, the great ministers of the Stuarts,
including Bacon, Buckingham and Cranfield under James I and Charles I, and Danby, Godolphin,
Nottingham, Rochester and Sunderland, during the reigns of Charles II and James II, were members of
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George Macaulay Trevelyan, The English Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 245,
cited by Speck in Reluctant Revolutionaries, pp. 1-2. In The Whig Interpretation of History, Butterfield
indicted the anachronistic nature of Whig history, looking at the past through the rose-colored glasses of
the present, e.g., “the whig historian looking back upon the catastrophe can see only the acquired
advantages and the happy readjustments. So in the result the whig historian will be tempted to forget the
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Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History, p. 89.
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Speck, Reluctant Revolutionaries, p. 6.
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Lords not Commons. (Surprisingly, Speck does not include Shaftesbury in this list. The Earl served in
both Commons and Lords; but his unsuccessful battle with the Crown over exclusion took place after he
became a member of the House of Lords.) In any event, Speck reminded us that the Peers of the realm
“also played a major part in the events of 1688.”222
While it had not swung, by the eighteenth century the pendulum had moved, and the Whigs were
challenged as too close to the monarchy. They had become members of the extended Court who were
as corrupted by the system of royal patronage as the Stuart courtiers had been the century before. Tories
such as Viscount Lord Bolingbroke and disaffected Whigs merged to form a Country party, again much
more akin to a political faction than a party in the modern sense of the term, supported by oppositional
literature that, among other things, pointed to the republicans of the civil war era and the ideas that they
articulated as what was best for Britain.223 It was in this context that the Algernon Sidney myth was
created, bootstrapping Sidney to the politicized version of history propounded first by the early whigs to
support their emergence as a powerful force that dethroned a monarch who had become illegitimate (e.g.,
the views of the early whig Reverend Samuel Johnson) to the more refined and convenient whig view that
England’s leadership filled the vacuum of kingship created by Charles II’s abandonment of the throne.224
I believe that it is this bootstrap to which Scott referred when he called out “the historical illegitimacy of
the appropriation of the republican Sidney, a product of the first revolution, for the propaganda purposes
of the second.”225 Scott is particularly disparaging of Whig history. In his view, “Genuine history is the
only thing standing between cultural self-knowledge and self-absorption. That is why all variants of the
‘whig’ history of origins are actually not history at all. They are on the contrary contributions to a set of
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In The Porcupine, Carswell touched upon this very briefly. Carswell, The Porcupine, p. 239. See also
Worden’s discussion of political divisions that reflected the soured view of parliamentary politics in
Worden, Introduction, A Voyce From the Watch Tower, pp. 46-52, 80.
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Scott I, p. 167 n.5. American historian Gordon Wood elided the 1688 revolution and the eighteenth
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the post-1688 political spectrum. See Wood, “Preface to the 1998 Edition,” The Creation of the American
Republic 1776-1787, p. viii.
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mythologies – whether left, right, national or international – of which the historian should be not the
guardian but the scourge. The prize is knowledge: that knowledge which comes from experience of the
world.”226 It was in eighteenth-century Whig revisionism a/k/a myth that Sidney, long gone, was
transformed into an advocate of the prevailing Whig view that a new, different and acceptable form of
monarchy was created in England when William of Orange, a Dutch prince married to the daughter of the
Stuart monarch, struck a deal with English Protestant leaders in and out of Parliament, which resulted in
the “invitation” to conquer England and become king in co-regency with his Stuart wife.
As will become clear, these are anything but the views that Sidney actually held. Indeed, there is
every reason to believe that Sidney would have had enormous difficulty supporting the accession of
English power by William of Orange, a member of a political dynasty of which Sidney had little regard
given its historical position as aspirant to royal absolutism in Europe, its merger with the Stuarts, and its
decisive role as the power behind the effective demise of the Dutch republic, which Sidney believed had
been a guiding bastion for international Protestantism, republicanism and freedom in Europe.227
Specifically tied into Sidney’s hostility towards the Orange dynasty was the lynching of De Witt, the Dutch
republican leader Sidney had greatly admired whose death he could reasonably lay at the doorstep of the
Orangists.228 Recall that D’Avaux, French Ambassador to the Netherlands from 1679 to 1684, wrote that,
“Sidney told him, or he told Sidney, that the Prince of Orange, as the opponent of liberty in Holland, would
be the opponent of liberty in England; and “M. de Sidney est un de ceux qui me parlent le plus fortement
et le plus ouvertement sur cette matière.”229 As Speck noted, “So far from displaying liberal constitutional
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De Witt was killed by an Orangist mob. Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 803.
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This perspective is echoed in Discourses when Sidney commented on a 1674 battle during the Third
Anglo-Dutch War, and how “the prince of Condé by his own valour,” with the help of the King of France’s
guard, had “broken the first line of the prince of Orange’s army” – commentary showing little admiration
for Orange leadership in the Low Countries about two years after the lynching of the republican DeWitt
leadership. D’Avaux, Negociations de Monsieur le Comte d’Avaux, en Holland, depuis 1679, jusq’ en
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attitudes, [William of Orange] had conspicuously protected such autocratic powers as he possessed in
the Dutch Republic.”230
Sidney believed in being a realist even if he “strained at knats and swallowed camels.”231 If the
only possible alternatives were the Protestant rule of William and Mary with a role for Parliament, or a
very Catholic absolutist rule by James II that would have foreshadowed a Catholic English dynasty
(because James was also married to a Catholic who had recently given birth to a son), it is not difficult to
conclude that Sidney would have chosen the former over the latter. But this assumes the existence of no
other viable political option; and this is where Sidney would have been very difficult – perhaps impossible
– to convince. Goldie, in his important article “The Roots of True Whiggism 1688-94,” focused on what we
might call the “rump” of republicans left by the time of the William and Mary revolution. Sidney historians
tend not to look at this period for the obvious reason that Sidney was executed in 1683. “On the face of it,
then, there was a decade in which English radicalism disappeared. This supposition is underlined by
historians of the Revolution who dismiss republicanism as inconsequential and beyond the imaginings of
contemporaries. But this is untrue.”232 Goldie established that there was “an articulate group of agitators,

1684, toml. i. p.8, in Meadley, Memoirs of Algernon Sidney, pp. 338-39; Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A
Review, p. 177 n.*; DCG, II.28.277.
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Speck, Reluctant Revolutionaries, p. 18; Zook, “Early Whig Ideology: Ancient Constitutionalism, and
the Reverend Samuel Johnson,” p. 161-62; see also Israel, The Dutch Republic, Ch. 32, “The
Stadholderate of William III, 1672-1702,” pp. 807-62.
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Sydney to the Earl of Leicester, Aug. 30, 1660, Blencowe, Sydney Papers, pp. 196-98.
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Goldie identified the Toland group, which he noted had already been studied seriously, but stated that
three men have been insufficiently considered who figured prominently in the late 1680s and 1690s: the
indomitable Major John Wildman, John Hampden in Parliament, and the publicist Samuel Johnson.
Wildman and Hampden were members of the 1689 Convention Parliament. Neville was mentioned; he
died in 1694. There was “a phalanx of militantly whiggish lords: Mordaunt, Delamare, Macclesfield,
Lovelace, Wharton and Bolton.” Lovelace was Wildman’s father-in-law and, according to Goldie, a Rye
House conspirator. While harder to discern, there also was an extensive radical underground, above all
in London. Bethel was identified; so was Captain Henry Wilkinson, a Shaftesburyite who was to command
the troops in Shaftesbury’s non-occurring coup, and the attorney Francis Charlton, also an exclusionist
MP, a Rye House plotter, as well as a Wildman colleague in the organization of London to rise with
Monmouth. Ludlow returned to England in November 1689. Of course, Locke also returned to England
in 1689. Constitutional theorist and pamphleteer William Atwood was still around, along with others,
including dissident clergymen the most notorious of whom was the infamous plotter and former
Shaftesbury chaplain Robert Ferguson, who worked with Wildman during William’s invasion, but the two
“fell out” shortly thereafter. Additionally, there was a collection of sympathetic, activist printers. On the
one hand, “There is no definitive evidence which can tell us just how close knit this large and assorted
group of commonwealthmen was,” per Goldie. On the other hand, he considered it “difficult to doubt that
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active in the [Glorious] Revolution, through whom the continuity of radical whiggism was preserved,” who
sought constitutional change.233
As may already be evident, I am loath to describe Sidney as either radical or whig; nevertheless,
had he survived, it is more likely than not that he would have been among the men Goldie documents,
although it is also possible that, as he did in efforts to end the civil war by agreement, allying with his
uncle Northumberland, Sidney could have joined with moderates, most particularly his nephew Halifax
with whom he shared so many ideas, particularly in the interest of political realism, and especially if he
thought that otherwise chaos would ensue.234 There remained those who sought to have a government
modeled on the Dutch Republic, with a stadholder, rather than simply removing James and crowning
William.235 Sidney was not paranoid about order, as Harrington and Locke were. But we also know that
Sidney believed that a republic could work in England if it was embraced by Parliament, and that one
monarchy was pretty much the same as another, particularly when comparing the Stuarts and the
Oranges.236 Perhaps the Catholic factor would have been critical for Sidney; it is impossible to say. But
there is little doubt that not only the assumption of power by William but also the degree of that power and

there was a club from 1689 onwards, for Wildman was an inveterate organizer.” Goldie, “The Roots of
True Whiggism 1688-94,” pp. 196-205. Id, p. 204.
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Goldie also stated: “Republicanism was repeatedly repudiated in the Convention [that met to work out
arrangements for the kingship of William and Mary] and in no sense was the commonwealth programme
popular, yet although the predominant mood of the Convention was conservative, many of the leading
speakers and active committee men were radicals.” This begs the question of whether Goldie’s “radicals”
were as radical, numerous and/or influential as he maintained. Moreover, those participants in this
process who would have agreed with Sidney’s ideas likely would have concluded that once they were
negotiating with the Prince of Orange, the degree of reform, never mind revolution, necessarily would be
limited. This does not mean that such reform was insignificant. Ensuring the assembly of Parliament was
an achievement. Id, pp. 197, 218.
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Analogously, Goldie discussed the fact that “in the circumstances of the Restoration the total abolition
of monarchy was a distant hope; the chaos of the last Interregnum years expunged faith in constitutional
novelty,” comparing the situation in 1688-89 to earlier in the Restoration when, as “a matter of strategy
and common sense,” the goal was limiting the prerogative rather than the transfer of power from king to
parliament. This was evidenced in Neville’s position in Plato Redivivus, 1681, to accept a Catholic
successor but carefully limit his power. Id, p. 206.
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Id, p. 197.
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As will become evident in Chapter Three, Sidney believed in mixed monarchy, including the
acceptability of a monarch as long as he was bound by the law, i.e., a constitutional monarch. It is here
that scholars tend to get sidetracked by other scholars who define republicanism as excluding monarchy.
See, e.g., Melinda Zook, “Early Whig Ideology: Ancient Constitutionalism, and the Reverend Samuel
Johnson,” pp. 161-62, in her analogous discussion of why the Rev. Samuel Johnson was not a
republican.
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his coopting of what became a conservative (and some would add corrupt) Whig-dominated Parliament,
would have gravely disappointed Sidney’s aspirations for England, whether or not his feelings rose to the
level of “outrage” at what Goldie’s radical whigs, those 1690s “shocktroops on the left,” considered to be
“a failed and inglorious revolution.”237
Notwithstanding the existence of remaining republican devotees, the reprisals that followed Rye
House and other cabals did devastate the opposition, both literally, in terms of loss of leadership, and
psychologically. There was precious little remnant left of the generation of honorable men who had
fought for the Good Ol’ Cause. In that sense, it most assuredly was a major political coup for the Stuarts
at the time. Ironically, the perceived victimization of at least some of the Rye House plotters, including
Sidney, actually may have constituted the death knell for compromise solutions that might have salvaged
the Stuart dynasty.
It is simply untrue, pace the centuries-old Sidney myth and as memorialized in Whig history, to
suggest that Algernon Sidney was part of the pantheon of intellectuals and political leaders who
deliberately paved the way for the rule of William and Mary.238 Interestingly, this is a point made by
Ashcraft about Locke. Ashcraft’s thesis was that Locke was a radical thinker and political actor, not an
apologist for the agreement reached by Parliament with William of Orange, nor a good housekeeping seal
on the resulting allocation of political power which gave enormous political clout to the Whigs.239 It was
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Where I disagree with Goldie, who relied on Behrens and Thompson, is in his assertion that there was
an irreconcilable difference among whigs, a “tension” that existed between those who characterized the
issues in terms of historical-legal language and those for whom the political debate “derived from reason
and nature.” Id, p. 209 & n.56, citing B. Behrens, “The Whig Theory of the Constitution in the Reign of
Charles II,” Cambridge Historical Journal, VII (1941) and M. P. Thompson, “A Note on ‘Reason’ and
‘History’ in Late Seventeenth Century Political Thought,” Political Theory IV (1976). While there might
well have been a tension among whigs, there is no reason why the issues Goldie specifies would
inherently or even probably create it, as evidenced by the ideas encompassed within Sidney’s
republicanism. These matters are discussed in some detail in Chapter Three. Finally, I believe that the
two “rival traditions of whiggism” that Goldie contended were born in 1690 had existed for many years;
indeed, there were probably more than two rival traditions. It is just that 1689-90 was one juncture at
which a choice had to made. See Goldie, “The Roots of True Whiggism 1688-94,” pp. 197, 220.
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We know that the Whig Party and, likely, Whig historians’ sensibilities later resulted in a distancing
from Sidney when it was discovered that he had accepted money from the French in support of his work
in opposition to Charles II. See, e.g., Scott I, pp. 4-5; Scott II, p. 349. For Sidney this was a non-issue; he
was very clear that he was willing to do whatever it would take to achieve his political ends. We also know
of no way in which his receipt of any money, if received, impacted any action he took. West, “Introduction”
to Discourses, p. xxxiv.
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Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, p. 579.
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Sidney, however, not Locke, who described how it was not only the executive, but also Parliament that
was susceptible to error.240 This was the logical outcome of Sidney’s recognition of both the fallibility and
the corruptibility of all men. Parliament was the “least subject to error, most exempted from passion, and
most free from corruption,” both because it was a collective body not one individual, and because its
natural appetites were curbed by the fact that any ill that Parliament imposed on the citizenry was
something to which they or their progeny also were likely to be subject. But Sidney was quite clear that by
no means was Parliament exempt from corruption. “All governments are subject to corruption and decay;
but with this difference, that absolute monarchy is by principle led unto, or rooted in it; whereas mixed or
popular governments are only in a possibility of falling into it.”241
While William III may have been less than absolute, he certainly retained the prerogatives of
monarchy that Sidney had vociferously opposed. Conversely, King William rejected the principles of
republicanism for which Sidney proudly stood. As Speck pointed out, the Declaration of Rights presented
to William and Mary was neither proffered as a condition prerequisite to their receiving the crown nor did it
require any formal assent. “It was merely read to them as a reminder of the limitations on their newly acquired powers.” While the Parliamentary committee that framed the Declaration of Rights drafted twentythree conditions, Commons separated the provisos requiring new legislation from those that “merely
affirmed old laws.” Indeed, “the main reason why Whig plans to place further limitations on the powers of
the Crown were thwarted was the refusal of the Prince of Orange to go along with them.”242 It would cer-
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“Tho the parliament consist of the most eminent men of the nation, yet when they intend good, they
may be mistaken.” Sidney also described the “parliament full of lewd young men,” to which we are
beholden to Hyde, Clifford and Danby, that had been chosen by an electorate that was reacting furiously
against the influence of the Puritans, presumably, Cromwell. “Some were fond of their seats in
parliament, and delighted to domineer over their neighbours by continuing in them: Others preferr’d the
cajoleries of the court before the honour of performing their duty to the country that employ’d them. Some
sought to relieve their ruined fortunes, … that from thence they might receive pensions: others were glad
of a temporary protection against their creditors.” He then reviewed the product of these lewd young
men, who “knew not what they did” when they annulled the Triennial Act, gave the king control over the
militia, and various other actions Sidney clearly thought were not in the interest of the English people.
DCG, III.46.574, III.45.571 & n.3.
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DCG, II.19.189, III.42.557. The problem is submitting to the will of one man, the king, “who is subject
to the same frailties, passions, and vices with the rest of mankind.” Id, II.9.131. Again, “I cannot be
confident that they are generally in an extraordinary manner preserved by the hand of God from the vices
and frailties to which the rest of mankind is subject.”
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Speck, Reluctant Revolutionaries, p. 19.
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tainly appear that had he lived, Sidney’s concerns would have remained about the wielding of potentially
unrestrained power by the king, and that Sidney would have been dissatisfied with, if he had not rejected
outright, the agreement that Parliament struck with the Duke of Orange. In short, reading about Sidney
from the vantage point of Whig history, as many historians have done, in which Sidney plays the part of
darling Whig martyr, can lead one to grievously misunderstand what Algernon Sidney was all about.243

With all that hospitality doth know;
Where comes no guest but is allowed to eat,
Without his fear, and of thy lord’s own meat;
Where the same beer and bread, and selfsame wine
This is his lordship’s shall be also mine.
Ben Jonson, “To Penshurst”244

E. Kindred and Other Spirits
Finally, it is important to consider Sidney’s immediate world in this closing phase of his life – a
handful of select family, friends and associates.
I have bin soe much a stranger to all things of our owne family
since I came hither, that I did not till within theis four days, know
that my brother Harry was in England. I hope he is as your lordship
wishes him, and that he will ever be a joy and comfort unto you.
Sidney to Leicester, Copenhagen, May 28, 1660245

i. Family
We know that, in addition to the loss of his father, by 1678 Sidney no longer had perhaps the
most important and sound source of counsel within his family, his maternal uncle, namesake, and role
model, Algernon Percy, the 10th Earl of Northumberland, who died in 1668. In many ways, over the rest
of his lifetime it was the mantle of Northumberland that perhaps weighed most heavily on Sidney – the
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Scott makes this point as well. See Scott II, pp. 106-07. It is interesting to consider the parallel circumstances of the Whig propagandist Reverend Samuel Johnson, who had been Lord William Russell’s
domestic chaplain. Johnson was jailed for years, as well as tortured, after conviction for seditious libel in
a 1683 trial in which Jeffries was the judge, and not released until William and Mary took the throne.
Johnson had been a William and Mary supporter; however, he became increasingly disillusioned with the
regime, as well as with Parliament, “especially after the ‘slight-of-hand’ performed by the Convention of
1689, when it declared that James had fled, abdicating the throne. Johnson considered the abdication/
vacancy formula a betrayal of the Revolution.” Melinda Zook, “Early Whig Ideology: Ancient Constitutionalism, and the Reverend Samuel Johnson,” Journal of British Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr. 1993), pp. 13965, 160.
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Ben Jonson, “To Penshurst,” Poetry Foundation, https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/50674/topenshurst (3-10-19).
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Sidney to Leicester, Copenhagen, May 28, 1660, Sydney Papers, p. 187.
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man and his discourse. Notwithstanding this loss, influential family connections remained extensive and
complex in a family as large as the Sidney/Percy clan. Leicester died immediately after Sidney’s return to
England in 1677. Sidney was estranged from his older brother Philip who, notwithstanding his close
association with Cromwell, had received a royal pardon at the time of the Restoration. As noted, the two
brothers were continuously engaged in legal battles. 246 It hard to know how much this wrangling is a
reflection on Sidney; from a relatively early age, Philip was inordinately jealous of the favoritism shown by
Leicester to Algernon.247 Philip also tried to deprive Algernon and Henry Sidney of their family bequest.
Leicester’s favoritism seems to have manifested itself when, immediately after his wife died, Philip irately
challenged a legal provision that reduced the amount of the annual personal allowance given to him by
his father. Philip could not have handled his disagreement with his father about the enforcement of that
proviso more badly. He struck Leicester, and it required the efforts of Philip’s mother and younger brother
Robert to break up the fight.248 The tendency of recent biographers to characterize Sidney as a man who
irritated everyone, based in part on his relationships in his family, seems ill founded. According to one
scholar, the “melancholy event [of Lady Lisle’s death, Philip’s wife,] did not improve the character of Lord
Lisle, whose haughty and ungovernable temper and bitter political dissensions with his father and brother
Algernon had estranged him from all of his family.”249 Philip withdrew from politics after Cromwell died,
becoming the next Earl of Leicester upon his father’s death. There was little love lost between Algernon
and Philip Sidney.
Robert Sidney, three years younger than Algernon, also died in 1668, and an unmarried sister,
Lady Diana, died in 1670, leaving only six out of the original fifteen children of Robert Sidney, the 2nd Earl
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"Despite his unquestioning service to both Oliver and Richard Cromwell, Philip, Viscount Lisle, was not
regarded as a political threat by Charles II. He was granted a pardon under the Great Seal on 30 October
1660.” Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 161. Ch. 5 of Scott II is about the series of legal disputes
within the family that particularly pit Algernon against his older brother and gave Sidney a great deal of
experience in the law.
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In a letter to his father when Algernon was at Penshurst after the execution of Charles II, Philip railed
against the unseemliness of the partiality shown by Leicester to his second son: Sydney Papers, Note D,
pp. 269-71.
248
At the time, Robert was briefly at home on leave from his military command in the Low Countries.
Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 158.
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Cartwright, Sacharissa, p. 128.
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of Leicester and his wife Dorothy Percy: Dorothy (Lady Sunderland), Philip, Algernon, the troublesome
Isabella (Lady Strangford), Lady Lucy Pelham, and Henry (later Earl of Romney).250 Lady Strangford, the
youngest, married a man in 1650 who became very corrupt, dissipating his fortune and hers, which
required Algernon’s legal intercession at much financial cost, time, and emotional insult while Algernon
was at Penshurst in the late 1670s and ‘80s. Ultimately the conduct of her husband resulted in complete
ignominy for Isabella without even kind words for Sidney’s efforts to help. her. Lucy was married to Sir
John Pelham, 3rd Baronet, who was a member of Parliament. Dorothy was the oldest and six years older
than Algernon. She married Henry Lord Spencer, the Earl of Sunderland, when Algernon was sixteen and
was widowed four years later when her twenty-two year old husband was killed at the first Battle of
Newbury at the beginning of the Civil War, fighting on behalf of the King. There is little documentation of
Algernon and Dorothy’s relationship, but it seems to have always been amicable.251 According to one
scholar, Algernon was “sincerely attached,” at least in his youth, to Dorothy, and she, in turn, “was always
fond of this brother, whose cultural tastes and contemplative nature agreed so well with hers.”252
Unlike the relationship with his older brother and sister, Sidney’s relationship with Henry, substantially younger, is less clear. According to one source, Henry “certainly bore no good-will to Algernon,” and
he had “a hearty hatred” towards Philip, his oldest brother. Henry was elevated to the peerage as the 1st
Earl of Romney, and became an MP in 1679. Indeed, Henry was one of the so-called Immortal Seven
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Id, pp. 122-24, 145-52, 192-93. According to one account, three of the original group of fifteen
siblings died in childbirth (Anne, Isabella, and Elizabeth); a sister Lucy died in infancy; a sister Mary died
in 1648, at age 19; another sister, Frances, died in 1651 at age 21; and a brother Robert died in 1668 at
42. This family tree seems to leave out two siblings, however, a Robert who also seems to have died in
childbirth in 1620, and another brother Henry who died the next year. Brennan, The Sidneys of
Penshurst, p. xi; Appendix A.
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The kind-hearted Algernon, perhaps foolishly, lost a great deal of money trying to take care of his
younger sister – “if he erred in those dealings with Lord and Lay Strangford which brought him such
infinite vexation, it was on the side of indulgence, caused, as he says himself, by that ‘affection to his
sister which was so hard to root out of his heart.’” Algernon also “was sincerely attached, at least in his
early days, to his sister Dorothy, whose assistance and counsel he sought on more than one occasion.”
Cartwright, Sacharissa, pp. 98-102, 141, 152-55. When Algernon was alienated from his family after their
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Dorothy was the one who was able to “soothe her brother Algernon’s wounded pride.” Id, p. 237. She
saw him frequently, and died only three months after his execution, likely “hastened” to her grave by the
shock and the loss. Cartwright, Sacharissa, pp. 63, 98-107, 235, 305; Brennan, The Sidneys of
Penshurst, p. 164.
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who invited William of Orange to invade England and overthrow James II, no doubt earning his earldom
through the role he played in this, the Glorious Revolution.253 Henry actually wrote the Invitation that
persuaded the Prince to carry out his plans to land in England in 1688 with a large Dutch army. There are
interesting parallels between Algernon and Henry, with the latter successfully negotiating his way through
politics in the very way that Algernon was unable to do. It may be that this was strictly the result of the
difference in the times in which their political efforts took place; maybe not. We don’t know.
Henry was born in 1641 and therefore was eighteen years younger than Algernon; as a result,
Henry did not participate in the civil war, and was a teen during the Protectorate. Henry and his nephew
Robert Spencer (Sutherland), the same age, were educated together, first in Paris and then at Penshurst.
They were “fast friends,” and “destined to be close allies in the tangled paths and crooked ways of
political life” throughout their public careers.254 When political circumstances became increasingly
uncertain in 1658, they were sent to the Continent, and traveled there until Charles II’s restoration was
secured. Indeed, Henry seems to have been in France during some of the time that Algernon was there.
Henry and Sutherland did not return to England until 1665, when both of their court careers began.
Because it was not until the Restoration that Henry was old enough to have positioned himself politically,
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Henry Sidney et al., The Times of Charles II, p. 115 note. The letter that William of Orange received
from seven English notables on July 10, 1688 [June 30th on the Julian calendar], informed the prince that
the English people would support him if he landed in England with an army. The men who signed the
letter were an important cross-section of English nobility. In addition to Henry Sidney, who wrote the
letter, the signatories were Thomas Osborn, known as Lord Danby, the first Earl of Leeds, a royalist who
had been a member of the Cabal Ministry with Shaftesbury, was extremely unpopular, imprisoned in the
Tower of London for over five years and eventually released by Chief Justice George Jeffreys, the very
judge who, euphemistically speaking, conducted the trial (but actually railroaded) Algernon Sidney – the
man who infamously sought to outlaw coffee houses; Richard Lumley, 1st Earl of Scarborough, who was
raised as a Catholic although he converted in adulthood, had accompanied James II, then the Duke of
York, en route to Scotland in 1679, and had played a major role in the suppression of the Monmouth
Rebellion, the effort by James II’s illegitimate son to overthrow the Catholic James II, including actually
arresting Monmouth; Charles Talbot, the 1st Duke of Shrewsbury, who also had been raised and
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became an opponent of the king when pressured to reconvert to Catholicism; William Cavendish, the 1st
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Russell, 1st Earl of Oxford, admiral of the fleet and First Lord of the Admiralty when Prince William
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Atlantic and European Contexts, Tim Harris & Stephen Taylor, eds. (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: The
Boydell Press, 2013); Steve Pincus, 1688: The First Modern Revolution (New Haven, CN: Yale University
Press, 2011); Tim Harris, Revolution: The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy, 1685-1720 (London:
Penguin, 2007); John Miller, The Glorious Revolution (Harlow, Essex, England: Routledge, 1997).
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this fortuitously enabled him to avoid the treacherously dangerous political rapids that his older brother
Algernon had no choice but to negotiate. Both Henry Sidney and Halifax’s younger brother Henry Savile
(affectionally called Harry) had gone on the grand tour together, along with Sutherland. Henry and Harry
became grooms of the bedchamber to James, Duke of York, and then Master of the Horse for (the future
King) James’ wife, Anne. Foolishly, however, Henry Sidney was “overly intimate” with Anne, which led to
his dismissal and, by 1667, his temporary refuge in the United Provinces. But Henry was very clever, and
took advantage of the situation to become a trusted friend of William of Orange. Clearly, from their
experience, the two Henrys and Sutherland were very cosmopolitan, spending time in France, too. All
three were prominent statesmen. To make matters even more incestuous, Henry Savile’s brother
George, who we know as Halifax, married Henry Sidney’s niece Dorothy, the daughter of Sacharissa
a/k/a Dorothy Sunderland!255 As a result of his family alliance with Halifax, Henry Sidney was brought
back into circles with the Duke of York and became acquainted with the Duke of Monmouth, King
Charles’ illegitimate son. Meanwhile, while the two Henrys and Sunderland were ambitiously building
impressive public careers, Algernon was going nowhere, "stranded abroad.”256
This period of Henry’s diplomatic ascendancy contrasts conspicuously with Algernon’s
contemporaneous ostracism from England and consequent meanderings, as well as any political mischief
in which he might have been engaged on the Continent. Later, Henry became the English envoy to The
Hague on behalf of Charles II, returning to England in 1681. “At The Hague, Henry Sidney had
succeeded in outwitting the French Ambassador, and had defeated Louis XIV’s project of a defensive
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This included his participation in a mission to Louis XIV, as envoy-extraordinary in Madrid, and then as
ambassador in Paris in 1672. Id, pp. 78-79, 170-80; Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, p. 162. Note
that one of Shaftesbury’s biographers commented that he had spent almost no time out of England – he
“never lived abroad, except for a few days in Holland in May 1660” – and this might explain a more
parochial perspective than that held by other members of the aristocracy, as well as Charles II. Haley,
The First Earl of Shaftesbury, p. 28.
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In 1665, “Henry Sidney, who was now twenty-five years of age and had the reputation of being the
handsomest man at Court, promptly fell in love with his royal mistress, and although according to the best
authorities the Duchess was ‘kind unto him and no more,’ the scandal reached the Duke’s ears, and the
too darling servant one day suddenly received his dismissal. He retired to Penshurst, and afterwards
served under Sir William Temple in Ireland, but it was many years before he was again allowed to show
his face at Court.” Cartwright, Sacharissa, pp. 176-77.
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alliance between France and the [Dutch] States.”257 Even though he had actively supported the exclusion
of the Duke of York, he was “kindly received by the King, with whom probably he was personally a
favourite.” Henry seems to have been in London in 1683 when Algernon was arrested and executed.258
Perhaps of equal importance in understanding the divergent personal outcomes for Algernon and
Henry is the distinction between their personalities, characters and possibly their values. Algernon was a
profoundly disappointed but highly principled man, driven by his political convictions, and certainly not a
man with a “caressing temper.” Henry was a ladies’ man, “le beau Sidney.”259 While Henry held many
important political positions and was a pivotal connection between William of Orange and “the disaffected
in England,” he does “not” seem to have been “rated high by cotempraries.”260 Nevertheless, Henry had
more political finesse than his older brother, as Henry was not endowed with Algernon’s confrontational
and not infrequently abrasive manner. To the contrary, Henry worked well with all sorts of people.
Indeed, according to one scholar, Henry Sidney and his nephew the Earl of Sutherland “were to prove
themselves two of the most deft and ruthless courtiers of their generation, charming in manner,
calculating in action, and pragmatically flexible in their political and religious adherences.” According to
contemporary historian Gilbert Burnet, “Henry Sidney was ‘the man in whose hands the conduct of the
whole design [of the Glorious Revolution] was chiefly deposited’. He had been envoy to Holland from
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see generally id, Brennan, The Sidneys of Penshurst, and Blencowe, lntroduction, Diary of the Times of
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“This sweet and caressing temper, combined with great personal attractions, produced their full effect;
and there are many proofs, in the present collection of papers, of the influence they gave him over the
hearts of women; of which influence he appears to have been withheld by no principle from taking every
advantage.” Henry Sidney et al., The Times of Charles II, p. xxvii; Cartwright, Sacharissa, pp. 78-79.
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Blencowe referenced several people who were critical of Henry’s ability. One of those people was
Algernon Sidney. But looking at the reference in context it Is not a criticism at all. Of course, this raises
questions about Blencowe’s other conclusions about Henry Sidney and others. Most helpful is when
Blencowe simply cited to a source. For example, with regard to Henry Sidney, he relied on Lord Dartmouth’s account: “When he was made Secretary of State, the Duke of Leeds told me he happened to go
into the King’s closet soon after he came out, and the King asked him if he had seen the new Secretary.
The Duke answered no, he met nobody but my Lord Romney [Henry Sidney], little thinking he could be
the man. The King told him he knew he would laugh at his being so, but he could not think of a proper
person at present, and knew he was the only Englishman he could put in and out again without
disobliging him. The Duke said he did not laugh before, but could not forbear when he heard he was to
be at the Secretary’s office like a footman at a play, to keep a place till his betters came.’” Henry Sidney
et al., The Times of Charles II, pp. xxiii, xxxv-xxxvii.
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1679 to 1685, during which time his brother Algernon Sidney had been executed for his alleged
implication in the Rye House Plot. Undeterred by this he coordinated the Orangist conspiracy of 1688.”
When threatened, such as when the Duke of York and not the Prince of Orange became king upon
Charles II’s death, Henry sensibly (and, apparently, fearfully) made himself scarce by travelling “nearly a
whole year in Italy” -- a trip reminiscent of the one his brother had taken many years before. But Henry
was luckier than Algernon. “As matters however ripened in England, and prepared the way for the Prince
of Orange, [Henry] Sidney moved nearer to the scene of action, and fixed himself in Holland. Henry later
returned to England with James II’s daughter, the new queen of England, Mary Stuart.”261
At the same time, there are several curious blotches on Henry’s image. First is his dalliance with
the wife of the Duke of York.262 There is also the story of his twenty-year liaison with a woman who he
then summarily dumped; she tried to sue him for recompense, but was unsuccessful. He is described by
Cartwright as “the most unprincipled of men. Even in that degenerate age his morals excited scandal
among his contemporaries.”263 This is quite an indictment in a court culture rife with scandal. “The love of
pleasure and greed for money were the absorbing passions which governed monarch and courtiers alike.
Titles and places alike were bought and sold. The King himself, his mistresses and chief ministers were in
the pay of Louis XIV, and Barillon showered French gold freely both on the leading members of the Court
party and of the Opposition.” In short, “Together with this wide-spread venality, there was a general
decay of morals. The standard of honour had sunk to a low pitch. To be a fine gentleman nowadays,
Lady Sunderland remarked, you need only gamble and tell lies; to be a fine lady you have only to run
away with your nieghbour’s husband. Vice and debauchery reigned supreme in high places.”264 While
Lord Leicester and Lady Sunderland may have “recoiled in horror at the scenes which took place nightly
in the palace where the Merry Monarch held his Court,” the fact is that Leicester’s youngest son Henry,
Lady Sunderland’s brother, was among the most notorious in this crowd. And then there is his apparent
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stealing of a significant portion of Algernon’s inheritance through a ruse perpetuated on his brother when
the latter was still living in France.265 The trick, if indeed we understand the facts here, also served to
alienate Leicester from Sidney at this late stage in both their lives, perhaps an even more grievous
consequence. In short, at best, the jury is out as to whether Henry was an honourable man.
The incestuousness of English politics and aristocracy has been insufficiently explored in the
literature of this period. Being from the same family did not mean that men had the same view, or were
similar men; Sidney and his siblings are a perfect case in point. But it did mean that the relationships
among relatives were much more complex than what might appear on the surface and also, that by virtue
of being family, the nobility were likely to have intimate connections often involving decades of personal
history with each other, as well as access to other important personages within overlapping, extended
family circles. Thus, for example, while the same age, Sidney was the uncle-in-law of Halifax (b.1633),
who married the daughter of Algernon’s sister – both mother and daughter named Dorothy. Sidney was
clearly close to his sister Dorothy, whose first marriage was to a formidable English nobleman, the 1st Earl
of Sunderland. Sidney therefore was also the uncle of Robert Spencer, the 2nd Earl of Sunderland (b.
1641). Both Halifax and Sunderland (the second earl) were important (and diametrically opposing)
members of Parliament in the period after the fall of Danby, as well as leading statesmen thereafter. The
juxtaposition of the politics and positions of these two men, both closely connected through family to
Algernon, is stunning. Halifax was a moderate who favored mixed monarchy but who sought to keep his
distance from Shaftesbury, who Halifax did not trust.266 In contrast, Sunderland was an ardent royalist
and principal supporter of Charles II in his efforts to hunt down and prosecute all of those involved in the
Rye House Plot. He also was the person before whom Lord Grey’s confession of complicity, in the form
of The Secret History of the Rye-House Plot And of Monmouth’s Rebellion, was signed, on October 16,
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1685.267 The royalist Sunderland played a leading political role during James II’s rule. He was on the
Privy Council and Secretary of State, serving in both roles several times.268 A man “unencumbered by
any strong religious convictions, … Sunderland was active in attempting to placate those most hostile to a
Catholic succession, notably Shaftesbury, and led a triumvirate of himself and the Earls of Halifax and
Essex in attempts to gain support for a scheme of limitations under which James as a Catholic king would
vow to uphold the Church of England and respect the authority of Parliament.”269 James II charged
Sunderland with overseeing the government’s infamous, deliberate and brutal repression after the failed
Monmouth Rebellion, which played out in the court of the infamous Judge Jeffreys, who had sent
Algernon to his death.
Halifax, in contrast, was known in Parliament as “the Trimmer” because of his compromising
ways; indeed, Halifax authored an essay entitled “The Trimmer,” which advocated mixed government. As
noted, Halifax joined with Sunderland and Essex to try to find some sort of compromise solution to the
issue of succession – viz., how to cope with the Catholicism of the Duke of York. There is a scholarly
debate about whether Halifax deserves the myth that developed around his 1680 oratory duel with
Shaftesbury at the time of the debate over the Exclusion Bill in the House of Lords; nevertheless, his
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political performance was impressively successful.270 With the fall of the extremely unpopular Lord Danby,
Halifax became a member of Charles II’s Privy Council in the 1679-80 timeframe, soon after Algernon
had returned to England. Halifax also was the older brother of Henry Savile, who served as ambassador
to the Court of Versailles during the reign of Charles II. This likely explains the comfortable, ongoing
correspondence between Sidney and Savile, a man who represented the English king who was
preventing Sidney from returning to his own country and, indeed, the king who was hunting him down. It
also explains Savile’s ready assistance in obtaining permission for Sidney to return to England when his
frail father became ill – a favor for which Algernon felt enormously indebted to Savile.271 While it is logical
that Halifax’s career would continue into the reign of William III, it is very surprising that Sunderland’s
career prospered, too. After duly but briefly living in exile, Sunderland was able to return to the good
graces of the new king. He was named Lord Chamberlain in 1697 and served, along with his Uncle Henry
Sidney, the Earl of Romney and Algernon’s younger brother, as one of the lord justices with the authority
to govern England when it was necessary for William to be in the Netherlands! While Sunderland’s
opponents successfully sought his resignation from these official roles, he remained politically active and
was influential in the negotiations that led to the 1701 Act of Settlement and the accession of the house of
Hanover (which occurred in 1714).272
To summarize, within the umbrella of the extended Sidney/Percy family there co-existed
numerous exceedingly prominent and highly successful political leaders with radically different politics –
in this specific example, a monarchist, a moderate compromiser and a committed republican. The
complexity of the relationships, and politics, among the most elite members of English society also could
be illustrated by other generations of the Sidney/Percy family. Over the many generations from the time of
Henry VIII to the eighteenth century, there was a remarkably synchronous political positioning of
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contemporaneous Sidney/Percy family members designed to simultaneously promote and safeguard the
family while also fulfilling its commitment to the nobleman’s role as protector of the realm. This “political
perspicuity” was a phenomenon that had happened repeatedly in the family’s past, but the illustration of
Algernon’s own generation suffices to establish the complexity of the family’s role in English high society
and political life, as well as their diverse views about politics.273 At the same time that Sidney gradually
became estranged from, and then actively opposed to the Stuart monarchy while remaining averse to the
assumption of the English crown by William of Orange because of his autocratic proclivities in the
Netherlands, Sidney’s younger brother Henry became an essential link between William of Orange, who
was married to Charles II’s daughter Mary, on the one hand, and those members of the English
aristocracy who believed that William should succeed Charles as the next king of England, on the other.
Meanwhile, Sidney’s nephew Sutherland remained committed to Charles II and his succession policy,
which was to place Charles’ Catholic brother James on the throne. In fact what happened is that James
did succeed Charles. As a result, Henry Sidney, Algernon’s youngest brother, stayed out of the country,
in Italy and the Netherlands, and Sutherland became Secretary of State for the Northern Department of
England and Lord President of the King’s Counsel. James lost the Glorious Revolution by running away;
in this process, Henry Sidney sailed back to England with William, the next king of England. Henry
subsequently became Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, representative of the English government in Ireland and
head of the Irish government, a prestigious position that his father and family forerunners had held years
earlier. Eventually Sutherland, a wily politician who at William’s accession was briefly imprisoned in the
Netherlands, returned safely to England and became a member of the House of Lords; subsequently, as
Lord Chamberlain, he was responsible for all Court matters, a position previously held by William Herbert,
3rd Earl of Pembroke, another Sidney cousin.
In short, there is no escaping the fact that, regardless of who ruled, there was a persistent,
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prominent position of statesmanship (or more than one) assumed by members of the Sidney/Percy clan.
As one scholar cogently stated in describing the perspective of Leicester and his sister, Mary Sidney
Herbert, Countess of Pembroke, “Both Robert and Mary were consummate employers of that proven
family strategy: preparing for all contingencies by distributing eggs among rival baskets.”274 Algernon
Sidney’s politics may have made him appear to be the family renegade; but his ambitions, commitment
to, and involvement in achieving good governance in England was no different than the commitment his
family had historically embraced for centuries. While not all family members may have wholeheartedly
embraced these values as sincerely and completely as did Algernon, some did. On the other hand, what
also can be said is that there were not such major differences between these men, who stood in different
political camps. All were highly educated humanists steeped in the ideas of the Melanchthonians and
International Protestantism. They were of the same religion, albeit with different levels of conviction. All
were highly ambitious. They were members of an extraordinary family with an exceptional pedigree. They
were all bright, some more than others. For the most part, they were all pragmatic, some more than
others. Sidney said he was the pragmatist and his theory was pragmatic; but his sense of nobility was
not, e.g., Machiavelli had warned, stay alive if you want to achieve your political goals. Not all the family
was necessarily politically committed; some just tried to read the political tea leaves. In this respect,
Algernon seems to have been the outlier – he was wholly driven by his political convictions. It is doubtful
the others were, at least to the same extent.

His writings were also edited and republished as part of a republican canon
in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries by John Toland
and his ‘history factor’ and by the commonwealthman and bookseller Thomas Hollis.
Gaby Mahlberg, Henry Neville and English republican culture in the seventeenth century275
[F]ar from converting country Whigs to republicanism,
Toland helped to adapt republicanism to country Whig ends.
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ii. Henry Neville
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Scott has argued that the man to whom Sidney entrusted his final statement handed to the sheriff
on the scaffold was Henry Neville (1620-1694). This seems like a ho-hum matter, except that this
assertion is then used to bootstrap Sidney to the republicanism of Neville, who was closely allied with,
indeed a protégé of, James Harrington (1611-1677). The purpose of this brief consideration of Neville is
simply to challenge this understanding.277
Neville and Sidney were second cousins, albeit through the first Viscount Strangford, Sidney’s
uncle (in law), who died in 1635, which means that Algernon probably did not know the Viscount well, if at
all. It was Strangford’s son Philip, married to Algernon’s youngest sister, who caused Sidney an
enormous amount of time and trouble in the 1650s with his unethical behavior and financial shenanigans.
Both Sidney and Neville were republicans, and so their possible close connection is worth considering as
context in which to view their ideas.
Neville was one of the few republicans who survived the Civil War, Interregnum and Restoration.
He was about Sidney’s age – born in 1619, and so actually four years older. Henry Neville’s family was
part of the “poorest” gentry among the Berkshire county elite – a county that was particularly wealthy
given its proximity to London. Neville’s great-great-grandfather was a prominent courtier during the reign
of Henry VIII; but he fell from grace and was executed in 1538. The family genealogy is confusing because everyone is named Henry: Henry’s great-grandfather, Henry Neville, was knighted during Edward
VI’s reign, at which time he was granted the estate in Berkshire. Like his father, Neville’s grandfather,
another Henry, was a county official, but also “spread[] his wings far beyond the county,” serving as
ambassador to the French court in 1596 under Queen Elizabeth. The grandfather also was suspected of
participating in Essex’s rebellion in 1601, and barely escaped with his life. Not surprisingly, he returned to
royal favor when James Stuart became king given James’ admiration for, and connection with Essex, who
had been seeking to supplant Elizabeth with James. Grandfather Henry was a member of James’ first
Parliament, in 1604, and was viewed as a moderate and a reconciler. Neville’s father, again a Henry,
married Thomas Smyth’s sister; Smyth’s son was Algernon Sidney’s second cousin. Father Henry also
was an MP in 1614 and 1621. Father Henry died before his sons reached their majority; Neville’s older
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brother and he were wards of the King, raised by the Earl of Pembroke’s secretary who married Neville’s
mother. Neville’s brother was a staunch royalist who fought for Charles I during the Civil War, resigned
from politics during the Interregnum, and became a county official as well as an MP during the
Restoration. In sum, Neville was related through marriage and somewhat remotely to Sidney.278
It is possible but highly improbable that Algernon and Henry were long time friends and
confidents. Because of his involvement in his sister and cousin’s legal problems, Sidney spent years
during Cromwell’s Protectorate both living at, and administering the Strangford estates, which is where
Neville’s mother was born and raised. Whether this created a positive relationship between Sidney and
Neville is unclear. There is no record establishing any such connection. Sidney’s relationship to Neville
did have profound generational roots – once again a factor insufficiently appreciated.279 Sidney’s greatgreat-grandfather, who had acquired the family estate of Penshurst, and Henry Nevile, the greatgrandfather of Neville, were political partners in the 1550s; their heirs were lifelong friends, as was the
next generation, who were the grandfathers of Sidney and Neville.280 Here again we find that a bedrock
family connection of this kind is one of those complexities that confound our understanding of the
significance of personal interactions which could range from shared political ideas and collaboration, to
opposing ideas combined with or rejecting of strong personal loyalty, and every affinity in between.
On the other hand, unlike Algernon, Henry Neville’s family was no longer one of the elite of the
aristocracy. Also, unlike Algernon, Henry Neville was on a grand tour of Europe for most of the Civil War,
either entirely or almost entirely avoiding the conflict. It seems likely that Neville was busy writing in this
timeframe. His bawdy work, The Parliament of Ladies, was published in two parts in the summer of
1647.281 In it, Neville “ma[de] free with the reputations of prominent women on the roundhead side.”
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Notwithstanding his republicanism, Neville “had little affection for the sectaries.”282 In 1650, he published
another work.283 In this same time-frame, Neville began a public career; his election, however, was
disputed, and both Sidney and Sir Henry Vane came to his aid. Subsequently, in 1651, Neville served on
Cromwell’s Council of State for one year, defeating the candidacy of Henry Marten, a regicide, radical and
notorious politician (who shared with fellow radical Thomas Chaloner a reputation for debauchery).
Marten, Chaloner, Neville, and Marchamont Nedham were friends and fellow members of a vocal, small
party in the Rump, the improvised rule of which began in 1649 and ended in 1953, to later return after
Cromwell died. Sidney was not a member of this radical contingent which welcomed the regicide, viewing
it as a prelude to fundamental social reform.284 Marten had supported the Levellers’ constitutional
demands; he was “the only MP to retain the trust and respect of John Lilburne.”285 Marten was also a
friend of the fellow regicide John Wildman.
Neville’s term on the Council of State was not renewed and, in 1653, with his fellow MPs, he was
ejected from Parliament. Neville did not support the Protectorate, and in retirement wrote several more
humorous political critiques. Of course, Marchamont Nedham is notorious for supporting every political
position in power, in part out of financial necessity and his ability to make a living by means of his adroit
pen. By this time, Neville was a friend of James Harrington; Hobbes “is said to have declared” that
Neville “had a finger in the writing of Oceana (1656).”286 In 1659, the Rump returned. Sidney and Neville
were both members. Neville opposed the substitution of “a Monmouth for a James,” i.e., maintaining the
monarchy but disallowing the succession of the Catholic James Stuart, Charles II’s brother, in favor of
Charles’ illegitimate son, Monmouth. In this timeframe, the republican Andrew Marvell listed Neville as
well as Vane and others but not Sidney, “as having for a motto ‘all power is in the people.’”287 Neville also
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seems to have been the man who presented “The Humble Petition” to Parliament in mid-1659, a proposal
that was entirely Harringtonian, dissolving and proposing an entirely different sort of government. Also
during the 1659 Richard Cromwell Parliament, a motion was made by a Cromwell supporter accusing
Neville of “atheism and blasphemy.” The purpose of the motion was to disqualify Neville from sitting as
an MP, as members of Parliament were required to be “persons fearing God and of good conversation.”
The matter was dropped after an animated four-hour debate.288
Neville’s political allegiances at that time were with the regicides, particularly Marten, Thomas
Chaloner and Thomas Scott, and not with Vane, for example, with whom Sidney sometimes worked
closely. By this time Neville was recognized as Harrington’s “lieutenant.” Ludlow’s Memoirs placed Sidney
and Neville in the same group in the Rump. But we now know from Worden’s work that the Memoirs were
significantly altered by John Toland, the editor. We also know that Sidney did not re-enter Parliament until
May 1659 and, except for one project on Ireland, was unable to accomplish much before leaving in early
July for the Baltic. Scott commented that, “Sidney took no visible part in this republican activity under
Richard,” referring to parliamentary activity from Sept. 1658 to the end of May 1659. On the Council of
State during this critical period Sidney was aligned with Vane and Whitelocke, not Haselrige and Neville,
which is very much buttressed by Sidney’s selection as a key Baltic negotiator given that “the Baltic was
Vane’s immediate foreign-policy priority.” 289
While Sidney was living the life of an exile, Neville may have been involved in some way in
several of the plots to overthrow the government.290 According to historian Caroline Robbins, after the
Restoration, when Neville returned to England after spending almost four years abroad, “he played no
further active role in politics.”291 But Neville was accused of being a conspirator in the late 1661 Nonsuch
House Plot along with his mentor James Harrington, the regicide Major John Wildman, and others. This
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was “a design to alter the government,” perhaps only intending to restore the Long Parliament, but also
allegedly involving a suspicious oath of secrecy, an attempt on General Monck’s life, and seizing
London’s city gates. The plan was purportedly being orchestrated by a committee of twenty-one rebels,
including Harrington and Wildman. Neville apparently was not a member of the committee; perhaps he
accompanied Harrington, which would not be surprising given their close relationship. Harrington but not
Neville was arrested, and lost his physical and mental health in jail.292
More suspiciously, Neville was identified as one of a small group of men who constituted the
London revolutionary council that supported regional plots against the monarchy, including the Tong
Cabal of late 1662 and the subsequent Risings in the North. A second list of such council members also
included Neville as well as other well-known parliamentarians but is generally considered to have been a
spurious piece of evidence intended to mislead the authorities. The rebels who were ultimately arrested
were primarily the ex-officers of Cromwell’s army who were planning insurrection in the north; but among
the “prominent radicals” arrested for their alleged involvement in, or knowledge of a London revolutionary
council was Henry Neville, although the government had “little more than hearsay evidence against
him.”293 Neville escaped incarceration, but was forced to leave the country and, in 1664, went to Italy for
four years. Sidney had been in Italy from 1660 to 1663, but was not there when Neville arrived, first to
the court of Ferdinand II of Tuscany, then to Pisa and Rome.294 In sum, if you believe that where there is
smoke, there is fire, then Neville was an incendiary.
Neville’s most well-known and popular work is The Isle of Pines, a “bogus travel narrative” that
was published in 1668, soon after Neville’s return to Restoration England but when Sidney was very far
away. Neville wrote popular satirical commentaries, viz., “low” literary works. He also published The
Works of Machiavelli in 1675 and his republican political tract, Plato Redivivus, was first published in
1681.295 In the second edition of the work Neville seriously examined and rejected Monmouth’s
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candidature, and again proposed a remodeled government with a very limited executive. Not surprisingly
he provoked substantial rebuttal, including Halifax’s “A Seasonable Address,” which advocated
constitutional monarchy.296 It is interesting to note that about a decade later, long after Sidney’s death,
Neville and Wildman were invited to meetings of The Dry Club, a group founded by Locke to discuss
religious liberty. “Whether either accepted and took part is not known, nor what prompted the invitation.
Locke and Neville had a mutual friend in James Tyrrell, but of this association, as with others, little can be
discovered…. The London circle in which he moved, save for Wildman, remains a mystery.”297
As noted, Jonathan Scott was convinced that Sidney’s last correspondence before his execution
likely was to Neville. This seems implausible given the lack of evidence of propinquity between Sidney
and Neville in the 1680s and little evidence of closeness before then. Algernon and Henry were among
those identified as “Commonwealthmen” who ran for parliamentary office in January 1679 following the
dissolution of the Long Parliament. Scott bases his hypothesis on the fact that Sidney’s communications
were personal and even familial; he suggests that the only person who was alive at this time who
qualified as Sidney’s “dear friend and kinsman” was Neville. As we know, Sidney had persistent ties with
a variety of other family and extended family members, irrespective of political differences.298
The lack of evidence of any existing, and then continuing closeness with Neville notwithstanding
their acquaintanceship undercuts Scott’s conclusion. Added to this is the fact that their frequent or even
accidental interaction seems unlikely, too. Sidney and Neville undoubtedly traveled in different social
circles. Neville was an Oxford man; Sidney was not. Sidney was still known as “Colonel” from his
heroism in the civil war when he was a younger man than Neville, who avoided most and perhaps all of
the War. Neville was part of a republican faction in Richard Cromwell’s Protectorate Parliament in which
Sidney took no part. Sidney was out of the country for many years; Neville was forced to leave in 1664,
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For example, Sidney maintained a close connection with his nephew Halifax, with whom, said Scott,
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about five years after Sidney had left, but they do not seem to have travelled in the same circles abroad,
met there, or lived anywhere proximate during their respective exiles.299 There also is no indication that
Sidney knew Harrington, which would seem likely if Neville and Sidney had been close. Robbins found
that, “During the period of the Rye House Plot, [the royalist extremist] Roger L’Estrange (1616-1704) and
his minions closely watched well-known republicans. Neville emerged unscathed and it seems probably
that he kept himself entirely aloof from the conspirators, “realizing the futility of republican aspirations,”
one accused of whom was Sidney.300 This is ironic albeit additional evidence undercutting a special
affiliation of fidelity or ideas between Sidney and Neville. Finally, there is no correspondence extant
between Sidney and Neville or between other Sidney family members that suggests any, much less a
close relationship between them. Neville may have translated Machiavelli into English, and he authored
his own republican political tracts, so that there is some commonality of ideas; but of course, as will be
made plain, there are notable differences, as well. Overall, it seems highly unlikely that the two men were
close, or that Sidney’s final words were entrusted to Neville. 301
Our Government is like our climate. There are winds which are sometimes loud and unquiet,
and yet with all the trouble they give us, we owe great part of our health unto them; they clear the air, which
else would be like a standing pool, and instead of refreshment would be a disease unto us.
Halifax, “The Character of a Trimmer”302
When the senate and people of Rome seemed to be most furiously incensed against each other, …
such as gave opportunities of correcting the defects that had been in the first constitution
of the government, without which they could never have attained to the greatness, glory,
and happiness they afterwards enjoy’d. Such as had seen that people meeting in tumult …
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might have thought they would have filled all with blood and slaughter; but no such thing
happened. … They who contended for their just rights, were satisfied with the recovery of them.
Sidney, Discourses303

iii. Halifax (again)
Emphasis has already been placed on the close family connection between Halifax and Sidney;
but the two men seemed to have shared much more. They were ten years apart; accordingly, Halifax did
not fight in the civil war. But both men had been educated among the French Huguenots, imbibing the
ideas of the monarchomachs and the advocacy of international Protestantism. They also both absorbed
a serious dose of the skepticism of the French Huguenots and certainly an irreverence, if not doubt as
well, that is reflected in their writing. Neither man had principles that had been “fixed by residence at
Oxford or Cambridge.”304 The temperaments of Halifax and Sidney were very different – the calm,
detached, seemingly objective Halifax as distinct from the sometimes hot headed, engrossed, and
opinionated Sidney; the suave diplomacy of Halifax in contra-distinction to Sidney’s confrontational style.
At the same time, Kenyon’s description of Halifax as “a humane, sensitive and tolerant man” applies to
Algernon independent of his fiestiness. He may have been a man who infrequently showed this side of
his character; but, nevertheless, Sidney was the man who authored a delicate poem, “Of Love,” in his
youth, who wrote with pathos to his mother before Marston Moor when he was stationed in Ireland during
the bloody reprisals for the Catholic uprising, that war was not for him. This is also the man who poured
his heart out to his father and was truly hurt when Leicester’s anger rained down on him in the years
immediately after his exile, the same man whose sensitivity impressed Sir John Temple, father of the
statesman William, who wrote to Leicester imploring him to be kinder to Sidney.305
Both Sidney and Halifax also were known for their exceptional intellect. Halifax was intellectually
“head and shoulders above most contemporary statesmen,” with his nearest rival being Shaftesbury,
whose insight did not match Halifax’s.306 We know of Sidney’s great intellectual breadth and depth from
his work and from the opinons of others. Withal, in addition to Sidney’s self-selection and, perhaps, for
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many years, his family’s designation as the heir apparent to the Sir Philip/Leicester cerebral, humanist
legacy, Sidney was identified later in life as “the philosopher.” Both Sidney and Halifax were extraordinarily articulate. They also were men who engaged in both the practice and the analysis of politics, a
dual function and capability that distinguished them from many men, whether the theorists (Locke,
Hobbes, Harrington, Filmer and others) or the practitioners (Cromwell, Algernon’s brother Philip,
Sunderland, and a thousand others).
Then there is the matter of affiliation. Sidney and Halifax were consistently independent; it was
an integral part of their personality and behavior. Both men are in obvious contrast, for example, to
another close relation, Sidney’s nephew and Halifax’s step-son Sunderland, who was a strident and
redoubtable royalist, an unbending, doctrinaire man. Unlike Sunderland, neither Halifax nor Sidney chose
to be defined by allegiance to a particular faction at any time over the many years (with a very significant
gap in the case of Sidney) in which they were involved in English politics. From Halifax’s perspective, “we
have played the fool with throwing Whig and Tory at one another, as boys do snowballs.”307 Sidney did
not discuss the matter; there is no indication that he cared what people thought of his committed
independence, although in an October 1679 letter to Halifax’s brother, Henry Savile, Sidney stated, “I and
my principles are out of fashion, my inclinations going one way, my friendship and alliance with those that
are like to give occasion for the greatest contests drawing another, I shall be equally disliked and
suspected by both parties.”308 One can consider this a lack of commitment, as some scholars do.309 But
that is extremely improbable; it is out of character. Much more likely is that Halifax and Sidney’s
commitment, which was vehement, was to their own ideas. They were not willing to be corralled by a
political faction or its leadership. As Halifax stated in The Character of a Trimmer, “our Trimmer [meaning
himself] is so fully satisfied of the truth of those principles by which he is directed in reference to the
public that he will neither be bawled, threatened, laughed nor drunk out of them; and instead of being
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converted by the arguments of his adversaries to their opinions, he is very much confirmed in his own by
them.”310 The most express statement to this affect about Sidney was made by historian Blair Worden,
who is of the opinion that, “Sidney valued his independence too highly to allow anyone to count on his
vote.”311 Similarly, Blackburne stated that in the late 1650s, Sidney had “re-entered public life perfectly
free and unfettered….[T]ied to no party, willing to accept all the good that was offered, not even reading
the restoration of Charles Stuart, much as he despised him personally – the star of Algernon Sidney must
have seemed once more in the ascendant, as he met Montague,” Admiral of the Baltic fleet, in the Sound,
“to mediate in the affairs of Northern Europe.312 Sidney’s independence was paralleled by Halifax, who
“was much annoyed at the courting which he underwent at the hands of the country party.”313 It was
expected that Halifax would support Shaftesbury’s exclusion effort, given the former’s known hostility to
the Catholic Duke of York; instead, Halifax parted company with Shaftesbury in 1679 (for which he
apparently received an earldom), and then, in 1680, in a dramatic confrontation with significant historical
consequences, Halifax faced Shaftesbury down in the House of Lords. (Notwithstanding Halifax’s
surprising support in the exclusion fight, James viewed Halifax “as the most dangerous enemy he
had.”314) Algernon had the example, for better and for worse, of his father; Leicester’s efforts to straddle
the fence with the monarchy and the parliamentarians as the civil war began proved to keep him from
being well received by either. Halifax seems to have simply struck out on his own.
In contrast to their political ideas, both men held religion as a private, spiritual matter; neither
sought to link their politics to their religious views or practices. Indeed, in The Character of a Trimmer,
Halifax lamented the fact that the “consideration of religion is so twisted with that of government that it is
never to be separated.”315 King James described Halifax as an atheist, a man who “had no bowels.”316
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Apparently, James’ impression of Halifax’s religious proclivities was not unique; this was Halifax’s
reputation. According to Burnet, when he raised the subject with Halifax, Halifax told him that, “He was a
Christian in submission; he believed as much as he could, and he hoped that God would not lay it to his
charge if he could not digest iron as an ostrich did.”317 As Kenyon, the editor of Halifax’s Complete Works,
remarked, Halifax’s thoughts on religion suggest anti-clericalism, not atheism.318 There is no question that
this is the case. For example, while Halifax maintained that the clergy should be “supported in their lawful
rights,” he also observed that there were members of the clergy who were of “too great eagerness to
extend the ecclesiastical jurisdiction,” as well as too ambitious. Furthermore, “Our Trimmer wisheth …
that those who are in possession of the pulpit would quote at least so often authority of the scriptures as
they do that of the state.”319 Nevertheless, he stated very plainly that religion “hath such a superiority
above all other things,” it has an “indispensable influence upon all mankind,” and that it is “as necessary
to our living happy in this world as it is to our being saved in the next.” Without religion, said Halifax,
“man is an abandoned creature, one of the worst beasts Nature hath produced, and fit only for the society
of wolves and bears.”320 These certainly are not the words of an atheist. Similarly, if you turn to his
“Advice to a Daughter,” Halifax began that essay with a discussion of Religion which, he contended “must
be the chief object” of his daughter’s thoughts because, “[i]n a strict sense, it is the only thing necessary.”
In his advice, Halifax focused on the important distinction between the reality and “the pretence” of
religion. He disliked the lore, the stories that “mak[e] the world a jest,” suggesting that God gave the Devil
the role of playing at “blindman’s buff,” which is “so far from being religion that it is not sense”; these
stories fed devotion out of ignorance.321 The fundamental problem with religion, in Halifax’s view, was
that the battles and, literally, the wars over religion had overshadowed its moral purpose: “We wrangle
now one with another about religion till the blood cometh, while the Ten Commandments have no more
authority with us than if they were so many obsolete laws, or proclamations out of date. He [The
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Trimmer] thinketh that a nation will hardly be mended by principles of religion where morality is made a
heresy.” Unsurprisingly, Halifax was decidedly wary of zealous devotion – when “[s]ome ladies are so
extreme stirring in church that one would swear the worm in their conscience made them so unquiet.” In
contrast, “Nothing is so kind and so inviting as true and unsophisticated religion.” It is “exalted reason,
refined and sifted from the grosser part of it.” It should be a choice, he told his daughter, and not only a
refuge. For Halifax, religion was “like a healing balm that extinguisheth the sharpness of the blood; so
this softeneth and dissolveth the anguish of the mind.”” 322
Burnet, who was often critical of Sidney (he “liked him even less” than Whitelock did), wrote that
Sidney “was a Christian at large, as he said himself, but he hated all sorts of Church men, and so he neve
joyn’d himself to any, but to ye Independents; he kept up very little of an outward profesion of Religion . . .
he seem’d in discourse with me to believe the truth of Christianity very firmly, yet he thought devotions
and the worship of God were but slight things, and that good Morality was all that was necessary.”323
According to Sidney’s nineteenth century biographer Gertrude Mary Ireland Blackburne, Sidney “was a
man of the nineteenth century; he was out of sympathy with almost every opinion held by those around
him. He could not bear indifference, yet, persecuting enthusiasm seemed to him, as to us, really ‘bad
taste.’ He was deeply religious, but, considering ‘religion to be a divine philosophy in the mind,’ he
disliked the Presbyterian tyranny as much as Milton do, and objected to the public prayer-meetings of the
Independents nearly as truly as he do to the principles of absolute monarchy.”324
What is striking about these descriptions is that not only do Sidney and Halifax sound similar in
their religious views, but this Sidney could not possibly be the man who authored much of the Court
Maxims, to be discussed shortly, nor would he have been particularly comfortable with radical
nonconformism even if he resolutely believed that everyone was entitled to observe the religion of their
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choice. Sidney lived with both Catholics and Quakers during his sojourns abroad, and was a long-time
friend of Benjamin Furly and worked closely with William Penn. During Sidney’s time in Rome his world
was the Cardinalate. He obviously felt comfortable enough to socialize with Catholics notwithstanding any
anti-popish feelings he may have had. It is difficult to assess anti-popish sentiments among post-civil war
Englishmen given the intertwined nature of politics and religion. In Sidney’s case, it is tempting to
speculate that he would have opposed the influence on Charles II of courtiers who favored a close
relationship between the French Catholic absolute monarchy and the Stuarts. No doubt there are many
other examples of his ecumenical attitude towards religious faith, which for Sidney was intensely
personal. We know that he closed his Apology with a prayer to God. Occasional statements of religious
conviction are sprinkled throughout his correspondence.325
It is when one considers their political ideas that the commonality between Halifax and Sidney is
most striking. Both men were, as Kenyon described the former, “so interested in the pursuit and exercise
of power, and so convinced that his were the only right answers to the public questions of the moment;”
and crucially, both men had similar answers.326 Sometimes Sidney was described by contemporaries as
a commonwealthman or a republican. At the same time, a fair reading of Sidney’s ideas, pursued in
depth in Chapter Four, suggests that he was not opposed to monarchy although he strenuously opposed
absolute monarchy. The fact is, however, that a man was characterized as a republican when opposed
to the Stuarts – the only monarchy there was to be had in England at the time. But this elides the political
distinctions about which Sidney wrote. Because of Stuart absolutist and papist convictions, Sidney
became opposed to the Stuart monarchy. In the case of Halifax, notwithstanding his royalist family
credentials, the impression that he gave to King James, for example, was that “I never could understand
his politics, and am sure they were never calculated for the meridian of a monarchy.”327 In fact, Halifax,
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the man known as “the Trimmer,” was a political moderate; as such, he would have no universally binding
answer to the best form of government. “The Character of a Trimmer,” which was circulated in
manuscript in December 1684, one year after Sidney’s execution, was a very direct and personal appeal
to Charles II in the nature of a mirror for princes treatise in the late medieval and Renaissance fashion,
presenting “practical rules, principles, and norms for the conduct of a prince.”328 The following ideas,
which Sidney endorsed, are the subject of Chapter Four. Here, for purposes of understanding the
remarkable alignment of Sidney and Halifax’s ideas, it is important to simply refer to the numerous ways
in which their ideas correspond: (1) a passion for liberty; (2) emphasis on the pursuit of truth; (3) a belief
in the necessity of consent by the governed, either directly or through representative government; (4)
opposition to absolute monarchy – the monarch should be subject to the law, a requirement necessary to
protect men’s liberty; (5) endorsement of the advantages of mixed monarchy in England, rather than an
absolute monarchy or, for that matter, an absolute republic; (6) reverence for, and the primacy of the law;
(7) the critical importance of justice, and the just administration of the law; (8) the recognition that
government cannot be perfect; men should strive for the most realistic and best alternative; (9) popular
sovereignty; (10) the conviction that successful magistracy – leadership – requires at least some virtue;
(11) patriotism; (12) the advocacy of religious toleration, “an argument for gentleness”; (13) a comfort
level with “tumult”; (14) the destructive nature of the policy of proroguing Parliament; (15) the advocacy of
moderation; (16) the importance of balance in national and international politics; and (17) a benign
application of Reason of State.329
In sum, there was an extraordinary wealth of shared political values between Halifax and Sidney.
There also existed an enormous sense of gratitude and obligation by Sidney towards Halifax’s younger
brother, Henry Savile, the English envoy in Paris, who was “so much afore-hand in obliging me, when I
most wanted a friend, that I cannot hope in a long time to pay my debt.”330 One of the ways that Sidney
chose to try to repay Savile in some small way was to send him, upon Sidney’s return to England in 1677,
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a weekly account of “what comes to my knowledge,” as far as the going’s on in London were concerned.
In April 1679, for example, Sidney wrote to Savile about Shaftesbury’s appointment as President of the
king’s new Privy Council. “A friend of yours and mine is, as far as I understand, the author of all this; and
if he and two more can well agree amongst themselves, I believe they will have the management of
almost all businesses, and may bring much honour to themselves, and good to our nation.” In a
subsequent letter (May 1679), Sidney explained that the three to whom he referred were Sunderland,
Essex and Halifax.331 After he was convicted, Sidney sent Halifax a paper to deliver to the king that set
forth the main points in his defense, and appealed to the king, asking him to review the whole matter.332
Halifax unsuccessfully appealed to King Charles. If I had to hazard a guess, it would be that in his last
statement, Sidney probably wrote to no one in particular but, rather, to make a final statement to the world
for posterity. As he said to the sheriffs who brought him to the scaffold and his executioner, “I have made
my peace with God, and have nothing to say to men, but here is a paper of what I have to say.”333 But if
Sidney was writing to anyone (recognizing that Essex was dead and that Sunderland is an unlikely
candidate because, though in contact with his uncle Algernon, of a very different political persuasion), it is
likely to have been Halifax or his brother Henry Savile and not, as Scott maintained, that Sidney’s last
correspondence was to Neville. The Saviles were among the very few men Sidney trusted; they were
men with whom we know he was in close contact at the end of his life. Halifax was a close family member, his views were very similar to Sidney’s, he had published, and Halifax was an important man in
England. Halifax’s brother had shown himself to be a true friend to Sidney at a time when he had few
friends, particularly of the English variety. Scott actually dwelt for several pages in his two-volume
intellectual biography on the commonalities between Sidney and Halifax; but he does little with the
relationship. Scott does make one important suggestion, which is that it was Halifax who obtained the
manuscript of Sidney’s Discourses and delivered it to a sympathetic publisher. Whether this transmittal
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was prearranged is unknown, but also would have been likely.334 These were the kinds of ties that bound
Sidney – family ties, generational ties, ties of loyalty, the ties of kindred spirits. These are not the sort of
ties that existed between Sidney and Neville, however one chooses to characterize that relationship.

Too often we hold fast to the clichés of our forebears. We subject all facts
to a prefabricated set of interpretations. We enjoy the comfort of opinion
without the discomfort of thought. Mythology distracts us everywhere.
For the great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie – - deliberate, contrived
and dishonest, but the myth – - persistent, persuasive, unrealistic.
John F. Kennedy335
The reputation of those who shape the fate of nations become historical forces in themselves.
They are twisted and turned to fit the needs of those who follow, until, it seems, there is no actual
person left, only a complex mirror in which successive interests see aspects of themselves.
Bernard Bailyn, To Begin the World Anew336

E. Matters of Authenticity
There are four independent matters of authenticity that relate to our consideration of Sidney’s
work. One question concerns the Discourses, and the possibility of editorial modifications to Sidney’s
original text. A second matter, probably the most important of the four, concerns the authorship of Court
Maxims. There is a third issue about financial corruption. The fourth concern involves the authorship of
an “anonymous” 1681 text, A Just and Modest Vindication of the Proceedings of the Last Two
Parliaments. The issue concerning A Just and Modest Vindication can be quickly dismissed, as can the
third matter, concerning corruption. The other two matters are more complicated.
They love to fish in troubled Waters,
and they find all disorders profitable unto themselves. They can
flatter the humor of a misguided Prince, and increase
their Fortunes by the excesses of a wastful Prodigal.
334
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A Just and Modest Vindication of the Proceedings of the Two Last Parliaments 337

i.

The Authorship of Vindication

A Just and Modest Vindication was a substantial political pamphlet that was published in 1681
after Charles II had dissolved Parliament twice in three months to sidestep the succession controversy.338
It was an eloquent statement by the Opposition of the weakening and undermining of Parliament that the
king’s actions engendered. Its author(s) contended, “The Wisdom of our Ancestors has provided, by
divers Statutes, both for the holding of Parliaments Annually, and that they should not be Prorogued or
Dissolved till all the Petitions, & Bills before them were answered and Redressed.”339 Its inclusion here as
an authenticity issue is because authorship of Vindication is attributed to a number of men, one of whom
is Sidney. The other likely suspects are Sir William Jones, the eminent jurist and parliamentarian, and
Robert Ferguson, the regicide and radical republican. Attribution is also given by Bishop Burnet to the
whig leader Baron John Somers, who Burnet believed rewrote Sidney’s draft, which was then edited by
Jones.340 Perhaps this is a case of interesting if not strange collaborative bedfellows, but what is
important for our purposes is not to resolve the different views of scholars as to who should be credited
with primary authorship of Vindication, but to recognize the scholarly consensus that, whether or not
Sidney was the chief author of this political tract, he was a substantial contributor to it. Rather than use
Vindication to “prove” what Sidney thought, it will be referenced in our analysis of Sidney’s republicanism,
along with other texts, as an important political disquisition during the succession crisis.
How easily men may be corrupted.
Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy341

ii. Financial Corruption
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Scandal ensued when Dalrymple’s Memoirs were published in 1771 and it was learned that the
infamously virtuous Algernon Sidney took money in 1679 and 1680 from Messr. Barillon, the French
ambassador to England. What was this money for? How could the self-described “incorruptible” Sidney
have done such a thing? And did he? Moreover, if he did take French money, and it was a bribe of some
sort, what does this suggest about the political views that Sidney avowed? Are his ideas suspect or
“inauthentic”? The same question can be asked about Sidney’s character. In general, the answer to
these questions is no – that is, that the money that may have been taken by Sidney could not possibly
have altered the very unattractive road which Sidney, and he alone, determined he must travel in the
early 1680s.
The evidence is as follows: Barillon’s memoirs and correspondence, which Dalrymple located in
the archives of the French Foreign Office, indicate that, in 1679 and 1680, “Messr. Algernon Sydney”
took two annual payments of 500 guineas, or about 543 livres sterling from the French, which others
subsequently understood to be payments in furtherance of designs against the English government, or
perhaps for exchanging information of some kind with Barillon.342 Just to get a handle on the order of
magnitude of these payments, and rounding off numbers very roughly for the sake of simplicity, five
hundred guineas was about £25, which in twenty-first century terms is something like £3,000, or on the
order of $5,000.343 In other words, the annual amount that Sidney received would be equivalent, in
today’s dollars, to about $5,000. This is not a paltry amount; but for a man of Sidney’s stature, even
recognizing his depressed economic circumstances, it was far from a windfall. One reference point is that
Algernon’s brother Philip received an annual stipend from Leicester in the 1650s of £800 when he was
married, dropping to £600 when he was not.344 In present dollars, that would be about $96,000 and
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$72,000, respectively. Another point of reference is that in the 1650 timeframe, when Leicester favored
Sidney and disfavored Philip, Algernon’s allowance was £2,000, or $240,000 present day value.345 Later
on, Algernon became much more financially strapped. Still, in his will, Leicester left Sidney a cash legacy
of £5,000, which Algernon, in the 1678 timeframe, expected would be about half of his inheritance. In
present value, that would total about $1.2 million. Sidney described this inheritance in a November 29,
1677 letter to Benjamin Furly. “[M]y father hath left me a considerable summe of money.” Sidney was
writing to Furly in order to gain his advice, as a very successful and experienced businessman, on what to
do with his new found wealth, so that “it may be safe, and in the mean time yeald me a reasonable
increase.” Sidney’s stated intention was “to send it over seas as it comes in,” so that it would be available
to him to “purchase a convenient habitation in Gascony, not farre from Bourdeaux, where I may in quiet
finish thoes dayes that God hath appointed for me.”346 Sidney had expected that half of his inheritance
would be sufficient for him to buy a respectable property. We also know that when Sidney and his
younger brother Henry won their lawsuit against their older brother Philip over their inheritance in January
1680, both men were about £2,000 a year richer – as previously indicated, about $240,000 in present
value, and no doubt a significant sum in the seventeenth century.347 In short, returning to Barillon’s
payments to Sidney, two payments of 500 guineas, about £25, while more than pocket change, is not a
large amount of money for a nobleman, even one of the poorer sort. In contrast, for example, the
100,000 crowns promised by Louis XIV to Ralph Montagu for ruining Lord Danby was equivalent to about
£25,000, or $3 million present day value. Dalrymple estimated that Montagu received about half that
amount, which was a windfall.348
The French Ambassador listed Algernon among seven other Englishmen in 1679, and among
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twenty in 1680 to whom the Ambassador liberally spread French good will in amounts ranging from 150 to
one thousand guineas. Of course, this does not account for various huge payoffs to Englishmen, most
notably Charles II.349 Nevertheless, in considering Sidney’s “incorruptibility,” we cannot gain solace from
such comparisons. Dalrymple quoted from the Barillon letter, albeit in translation, to the effect that some
of the payments to Englishmen were used, at King Charles’ behest, to bribe Dissenters who were
members of the Opposition, so “that they should keep their party generally quiet, and that they might not
oppose his Majesties affairs in parliament.”350 There is no statement by Barillon as to why he gave
Sidney money.
What this accounting suggests is that Barillon was buttering not just both, but perhaps more
accurately, all sides of his English bread. Barillon sought to provide the best intelligence possible to Louis
XIV; secondarily, he was charged with implementing the French king’s policies, which were different at
various times, but generally sought outwardly, with Charles II, to advance Stuart interests while furtively
creating problems at home for the English king – distractions and financial burdens –such that England
would not ally with the Dutch or the Spanish against the continental interests of the French.351 Evidence
of this exists quite explicitly, but from over a decade earlier, in the memoirs of Louis XIV, who described
things he was doing in England to weaken Charles II’s position:
Mais tandis que cette aventure [referring to the retreat of de Ruyter and Van Tromp in the
Netherlands] sembloit nous ôter le moyen de nous joinder pour les attaquer ouvertement, je
cherchois de ma part des moyens secrets pour les affoiblir: d’une part, je ménageois les
rests de la faction de Cromwell, pour exciter par leur crédit, quelque nouveau trouble dans
Londres; et d’autre côté, j’entretenois des intelligences avec les Catholiques Irlandais,
lesquels, etant toujours fort mécontens de leur condition, sembloient aussi toujours prêts à
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faire un effort pour la render plus supportable.352
This is the same memoire excerpt in which Louis XIV recorded discussions he had with Messr. Sidney
about providing 100,000 crowns to him so that he could instigate an uprising, and in which the king
agreed to provide twenty crowns to start, until it was evident that the money could be used with
success.353 There is no reason to think that Louis XIV’s penchant for weakening Charles II by stirring up
trouble in England changed in the interval between this entry in his memoirs and subsequent events.
Adding to this possibility is the fact that the English – Lord Arlington, specifically, with Charles’
concurrence – apparently urged the French King in August of 1670, “in consequence of his pecuniary
difficulties,” to provide Sidney with a pension to keep him about of England! This goes to the English
king’s fear of Sidney’s capabilities: “’Le roi me dit encore,’ said [French ambassador to England] Colbert
[de Croissy], in a letter of the 4th of August, ‘qu’il ne se soucioìt pas que le dit Sidney demeuroit en Paris
ou Languedoc, ou en tel autre lieu qu’il lui plairoit, pourvu qu’il ne revient pas en Angleterre, ou dit-il ses
pernicieux sentimens, soutenu d’autant d’esprit et de courage qu’il en a, pourroient beaucoup nuire.”354
We do not know because no record exists recounting Sidney’s motivation for accepting money
from Barillon, but we can consider what it may possibly have been, assuming Barillon’s records are true,
and we have no reason to doubt them. Sidney was not wealthy. Presumably, offers of compensation that
did not require any action on Sidney’s part that he might find distasteful or offensively compromising
probably were welcome. Also, if Sidney was endeavoring to promote rebellion, he would have
appreciated funds to facilitate this work.355 More persuasively, in exchange for these payments, Sidney
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The Whig Party and, likely, Whig historians’ sensibilities later resulted in a distancing from Sidney
when it was discovered that he had accepted money from the French in support of his efforts in
opposition to Charles II. Scott I, pp. 4-5; Scott II, p. 349. We can debate precisely how incendiary those
efforts were. But for Sidney, accepting money from the French was a non-issue; he was very clear that
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did not seem to have to do anything but share his perspective with Barillon, who was interested in having
access to information from all English political vantage points.
From a September 30, 1680 letter from Barillon to Louis XIV, for example, we have a detailed
description of at least one Opposition point of view, and “Mr. Sidney” was “one of those who talks” with
Barillon “with the most force and the most openness on this matter.” The opinions expressed to Barillon
certainly sound like the Sidney that we know. “There are some who have applied themselves for some
time to make me understand that it is an old error to believe that it is against the interest of France to
suffer England to become a republic; they endeavour to prove by good reasons and the example of the
past, that the reunion of England, under a protestant King authorized as the Prince of Orange would be, is
much less conformable to the true interest of France than a republic, which would be more occupied with
trade than any other thing, and would believe, as Cromwell did, that it should gain rather at the expence
of Spain than of France.” Barillon’s additional words were “et qui croiroit, comme a fait Cromwell, pouvoir
plutôt profiter sur l'Espagne que sur la France.” In short, “that a republican England would be able to best
profit by challenging Spain, rather than France.” Furthermore, “the interest of England as a republic, and
that of Holland governed as it is, could not easily agree; whereas the Prince of Orange can reunite in his
person the power of the States General and of England together.” Barillon’s conclusions were particularly
Sidney-like. “In fine, they establish for a fundamental principle that the house of Stuart and that of Orange
are inseparably united; that their common interest engages them to augment their power in England and
in Holland, and that it is [in] the interest of France to maintain the liberties and privileges of both nations,
and to endeavour rather at the ruin of those who would oppress them.”356
The Sidney of this description was lobbying Barillon not to support a close relationship between
the Stuart and Orange dynasties, which he argued was not in France’s strategic interest. Sidney and/or
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Barillon’s letter goes on to state, “They even believe that the Catholic religion might be established in
England, if people were not afraid that a Catholic Prince would be in a condition to change the
government and laws; and they observe by the example of Holland, how much the condition of the
Catholics in Holland is better than in England.” Dalrymple, Memoirs, Vol. 1, pp. 77-78; original copy in
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357

other Opposition leaders were also suggesting that an English republic would focus on trade, as the Dutch
republic did and, consequently, that it would compete with Spain, presumably because of its colonial
empire, and not with France. In sum, Sidney & Co. persuasively explained to Barillon why an English
republic would be better for France than a monarchy.
Finally, there is an intriguing possibility that does not appear to be picked up at all by any of the
recent historians who have considered the matter of Sidney’s receipt of money from the French. In Book
VIII of “Green’s Larger History of the English People,” which is volume one of the 1883 The World’s
Cyclopedia of History, nineteenth-century Whig author John Richard Green provided the following
information about political events in England in the 1678 timeframe. “From the moment when the
pressure of the commons and of Danby had forced Charles into a position of seeming antagonism to
France, Louis had resolved to bring about the dissolution of the parliament, the fall of the minister
[Danby], and the disbanding of the army which Danby still looked on as a weapon against him.” In
contrast, “The aims of the country party were the same as those of the French king, and even before the
peace of Nimegwen,” which ended war between France, and the Dutch Republic (and Spain), “Barillon,
had succeeded in opening a correspondence on these points with its leaders,” i.e., “with Shaftesbury,
Halifax, and Lord Russell.” Per Whig historian Green, “A closer connection was negotiated in 1678
through the mediation of Algernon Sidney; and money was intrusted to Russell and other prominent
members of the country party by Barillon to be used in the bribery which, disgraceful as it was, was now
almost necessary to counteract the bribery of Danby.”357
Several points are worth noting here. First, if the information is correct, it may explain what the
money Sidney received from Barillon was either for, or what it related to, in terms of the political
complexities of the relationship between Louis XIV and various constituencies in England. Also, the
information suggests that in 1678, Sidney - who some allege to be, by this time, the author of that
diatribe, Court Maxims, and a republican radical – was busy working with Barillon on behalf of prominent,
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respectable English leaders– his nephew Halifax, Russell (related, through marriage, to his sister, Lady
Sunderland), and perhaps even Shaftesbury, although it is unclear with whom he might have been in
contact directly.358
On the basis of the information we have, did Sidney compromise his own ideals in accepting
money from the French, particularly since Sidney seems to have represented himself to be an ethical rod,
which is the inference that we draw from Sidney’s statement of his incorruptibility? The answer seems to
me to be no or, at least, certainly not necessarily. There is an appearance question – the appearance of
impropriety – although it does not seem that Sidney typically paid much attention to appearances. But
just because Sidney was true to his values, and in that sense incorruptible, does not mean that he was
not a man who would have been glad to receive “free” money. Sidney was supporting himself, and
possibly others. In addition to his personal staff, while living in France, for example, Sidney may have
had a companion and a child, although we have no record of a marriage or of a legitimate heir, and barely
hear of any references to this personal aspect of Sidney’s life.359 Isn’t the real question, however,
whether from the proffer and acceptance of funds, albeit relatively modest, there is any indication that
Sidney took political action, expressed a political idea, or otherwise allowed this money to influence him?
The answer is resoundingly no. If anything, one would think that if Sidney prioritized his own well-being,
and had a means of doing so, he would not have agreed to become involved in any way with efforts that
were, or certainly could have been seen as conspiratorial, and that were unquestionably dangerous.360
Sidney had witnessed the demise of many Englishmen ahead of himself, his ally Vane the most obvious,
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for far lesser action. In Vane’s case, no treasonable acts whatsoever was taken against the Crown.
More recently, Shaftesbury had been imprisoned for his “exclusion” leadership and, fleeing England, he
died shortly thereafter. If Sidney had any inclination to prioritize his own well-being, or had received
outside funds such that he was “fat and happy” and therefore unwilling to jeopardize his satisfactory state,
his own fate would have been very different.
In sum, while we do not know, we can acknowledge that it is likely that Sidney did receive the
specified payments from Barillon. At the same time, it is sensible to conclude that such actions would not
have, and did not in fact impact the authenticity of Sidney’s political convictions or their expression in
Discourses.
Toland’s was the only edition of the Discourses that claimed to be based on the original manuscript.
West, “Introduction” Sidney’s Discourses Concerning Government361

iii.

The Editing of Sidney’s Discourses

Sidney did not publish Discourses. Whether he ever had any intention of doing so, we do not
know. Aside from his essay on Vane, and the likely collaborative effort with Sir William Jones on A Just
and Modest Vindication of the Proceedings of the Two Last Parliaments (1681), there is apparently only
one interesting allusion to publication by Sidney, recorded by Scott in his intellectual biography. In 1665,
when Sidney was in Rotterdam with Furly, a Charles II’s spy in Flanders named Aphra Behn reported
that, “’Sidney is at present writing a Treatise in defence of a Republique, and agst Monarchy, and
designes it soone or late for ye presse.’”362 Scott interpreted this treatise to be Court Maxims. Aside from
the fact that we do not know if Behn’s report was true, as will be evident shortly it is more likely that this
text would have been portions of Discourses. In any event, the latter treatise was no more than a sheaf
of loose manuscript leafs in 1683 when the king’s men grabbed pages of it when they arrested Sidney.
When Discourses was published posthumously in 1698, the publisher was John Toland; Toland’s
edition is the basis for West’s modern translation of Discourses.363 The original manuscript that Sidney
wrote is lost; we therefore do not know precisely what he wrote. What we do know is that when Toland
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published Ludlow’s Memoirs, he radically altered its content; indeed, Scott described it as “a posthumous
fabrication.”364 Worden said, “There is not a single sentence in the Memoirs – indeed, it is relatively
unusual to find a sequence of more than four or five words – in which Ludlow’s text is accurately
reproduced…. It is often impossible to guess – let alone to decide – whether Toland was drawing on
Ludlow’s manuscript or resorting to pure invention.”365 While both Scott and Worden have concluded that
the published edition of Discourses is likely very similar to the draft he wrote, there certainly is reason to
express uncertainty, which we cannot resolve, about the treatise’s authenticity.
In particular, Scott’s discussion focused on the tone of Discourses, explaining how it is “like the
tone of his letters to his father,” and justifying when it is different – “[t]he change in tone” -- between that
treatise and Court Maxims.366 As discussed in much greater detail in “A Second Look at the Question of
Who Authored Court Maxims,” the weight of the evidence suggests that Sidney did not write a great deal,
if not all of Court Maxims. Certainly, Sidney’s authorship has not been established. In any event, to
assume that Toland did not modify any substantive content of Discourses when we know that he entirely
changed Toland’s text is problematic. In the case of Ludlow’s Memoirs, Worden is convinced that the
autobiography at the core of the Memoirs, while “radically … attenuated,” and “ruthlessly … rewritten,” is
“in essence unmistakably Ludlow’s own. The voice from the watch tower has been emasculated, muted
and refined; but it survives.”367 In contrast, Worden considered Discourses to be unmistakably Sidney’s
own. His reasons were that the table of contents read at Sidney’s trial, “with one probably trivial
exception,” was “encouragingly consistent with the chapter headings of the Discourses.” In addition,
while the title may have been Toland’s, he did not appear to have removed long and repetitive passages
from Discourses, as he did with Ludlow’s Memoirs.368 Overall, in Worden’s view, “it seems unlikely that
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Sidney’s manuscript was profoundly changed.”369 At the same time, Worden said that, “The manuscript
of Sidney’s Discourses, too, seems likely to have undergone revision. The passages read from it at
Sidney’s trial in 1683 are hard to reconcile with the 1698 publication, the preface of which neatly
sidesteps the question whether the manuscript has been faithfully reproduced.” In addition, Worden noted
that, “Even so, if Sidney’s text was pruned before publication, it is surprising that it was not pruned more
extensively.”370 There are definitely references in Discourses that could not have been provided by
Sidney, such as citation to Bartolomeo de la Casas’ work that was not published until 1698. Moreover,
Worden noted, while “Sidney’s prose style is likely to have required less revision than Ludlow’s,”
comparing the first sentences of Discourses and Ludlow’s Memoirs “leads us to suspect that the
manuscripts of the two authors have been amended by the same hand.”371
One of the ways in which Worden suggested Sidney’s treatise may have been amended was the
exclusion of religious enthusiasm, which Worden observed is present in both Court Maxims and Ludlow’s
Memoirs. This argument rests largely on Worden’s conviction that Court Maxims is entirely Sidney’s
work, a conviction that, as discussed shortly, is dubious at best. As Worden himself noted, “both the tone
and content” of Discourses “are consistent with the evidence of Sidney’s private letters and reflections.”
But, “However strong his religious convictions may have been, it is unlikely that Sidney was ever an
‘enthusiast’ of the kind that Ludlow was.”372 Finally, Worden’s findings about Sidney’s works must be
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tempered and informed by Worden’s own strongly held views, which can be described as euphemistically
ill-disposed towards Algernon Sidney: “The mythologizing of Sidney involved, as we shall see, the
transformation into a plaster saint of a reckless and incompetent insurrectionary.”373
Scott, Sidney’s intellectual biographer, concluded that Discourses and Court Maxims are properly
attributed to Sidney, “tampered with, if at all, only superficially.”374 He similarly linked Vindication, which
he noted that Burnet called “the best writ paper in all that time.”375 Indeed, Scott maintained that Sidney
was the primary author of Vindication based on both Burnet’s contemporaneous History (and Burnet was
no friend of Sidney) and the text itself, which Scott described as having “countless coincidences of both
style and content between it and Sidney’s writing elsewhere.”376 West, Discourses’ most recent editor,
similarly concluded that, “We may conclude that the 1698 edition [of Discourses] is fairly close to what
Sidney actually wrote.”377
In view of these circumstances, it seems to me that we have to acknowledge that we cannot
authenticate Sidney’s Discourses. On the other hand, we can authenticate the fundamental ideas in
Discourses, recognizing that Toland may well have played with the text. Recognizing that over time his
ideas could have changed, the optimal way to evaluate Sidney’s republicanism is to assess the
consistency of what Sidney advocated, e.g., to consider his statements in correspondence and other
statements, as well as his actions as a politician and the influences to which we know he was subject.
Additionally, we will endeavor to accomplish this secondarily by connecting Sidney’s statements in
Discourses with the various contexts detailed in Chapter Two. General statements about tone are subject
to manipulation although, admittedly, as I have indicated in discussing Court Maxims, we cannot help but
take note of them and be influenced by them. Certainly, Scott cannot be faulted for doing so. It would
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Worden added, “But we shall see too that the story is more complicated than that. For if the myth
gave Sidney an undeserved stature, the collapse of the myth has confined him to an unmerited oblivion.”
I do not read this statement as a qualification in any way of Worden’s description of Sidney as “a reckless
and incompetent insurrectionary.” Id, p. 3.
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Scott I, p. 169.
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Scott II, p. 185.

376
Id, p. 188. On Burnet’s dislike of Sidney, see, e.g., Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, pp. 151,
170-71.
377

West, “Editor’s Note” to DCG, p. XLIII.
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have been helpful, however, had Scott provided examples of the particular elements of Discourses that
he thinks are “pure” Sidney, and why. Scott is actually much more interested in establishing his view that
both Discourses and Court Maxims are Sidney’s, notwithstanding their differences. This does not
address the legitimate question of Toland’s monkeying with Discourses.
Fourth Court Maxim: Monarchy is not secure unless the nobility
be surpressed, effeminate, and corrupted.
Fifth Dialogue, Court Maxims378
The publishers did not merely cut and reorder
the manuscript. They completely rewrote it.
Blair Worden, “Introduction,” Edmund Ludlow, A Voyce From The Watch Tower 379

iv.

The Authorship of Court Maxims

The fourth issue of authenticity is the most troublesome. The issue here is whether Court
Maxims is Sidney’s work. Court Maxims is a treatise that juxtaposed the views of Philalethes, “a moral,
honest Courtier and lover of state truth,” viz., presumably, raison d’état, with the ideas of Eunomius, “the
Commonwealthman.” It was written in the “dignified literary form” of the classical ancient dialogue,
although much of its content is anything but dignified. Fifteen chapters or dialogues set forth fourteen
maxims consistent with absolute monarchy, which are then debated by the courtier and the
commonwealthman. Philalethes requests Eunomius to recount the ancient “virtue and piety” unknown to
him as a courtier, and Euonomius explains how the English people are discontented with their king, who
has cheated them during the Restoration with the help of corrupt courtiers and bishops. Rebutting the
argument that God established monarchy from the first family onward, Euonomius explains that rule by
one man is not a necessity; republics are prosperous, and parliamentary monarchies have also thrived.380
The matter of the authorship of Court Maxims is nettlesome because in many ways it is the least
susceptible to resolution, certainly without a Sherlock Holmesian investigation of primary sources and
other factual details, which remains to be accomplished. Consideration of the matter also requires the
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Court Maxims, Hans W. Blom, Eco Haitsma Mulier and Ronald Janse, eds. (Cambridge University
Press, 1996), p. 66.
379
A. B. Worden, “Introduction,” Edmund Ludlow, A Voyce From The Watch Tower, Part Five: 1660-1662
(London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, University College London, 1978), p. 4.
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Court Maxims, pp. xvii & 1 (emphasis. Added). On reason of state, see Ch. Four.
364

analysis of considerable minutiae. As indicated in my article, “A Second Look at the Question of Who
Authored Court Maxims,” contrary to the view of some scholars that the issue is not important because of
the commonalities between the ideas in Court Maxims and Discourses, the issue is extremely important
because of the profound differences in these texts. There also are myriad subsidiary questions that this
matter raises. 381 Most obviously, if Sidney did not author Court Maxims, who did? Ultimately, for the
purposes of understanding Sidney’s republicanism, this question need not be completely resolved;
nevertheless, we can at least reach some tentative conclusions and appreciate the lay of this Gordian
land. In sum, Sidney may have written the initial part of the Court Maxims manuscript; however, we have
no direct evidence to support this finding, and we cannot resolve the question of whether this relatively
small portion of the manuscript was written by him and, even if it was, how much it may have been
materially changed after Sidney wrote it. But a review of the tricky intricacies associated with the
manuscript establishes the reasons for deep skepticism that Sidney authored the (relatively lengthy)
remainder of the text, at least in the form in which it has been left for posterity.382 With this perspective in
mind, as has been done with other republicans’ texts, in discussing Sidney’s republicanism, Court
Maxims is utilized from time to time as an independent source; it is neither excluded from consideration
nor attributed to Sidney.383 It is simply referenced. Citations indicate whether the text cited comes from
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Unsurprisingly, there are significantly contrarieties of opinion among scholars about Court Maxims.
See Worden, “Preface,” Edmund Ludlow, A Voyce from the Watchtower; Michael P. Winship, “Algernon
Sidney’s Calvinist Republicanism,” Journal of British Studies, Vol. 49, No. 4 (October 2010), pp. 753-73.
Carswell’s article is an interesting analysis, with some strongly held views expressed that Court Maxims is
Sidney’s work. But once again, as Carswell did in The Porcupine, his study of Sidney, for the most part
his findings are not substantiated by citations to sources, making them very difficult to assess. See J. P.
Carswell, “Algernon Sidney’s ‘Court Maxims’: the Biographical Importance of a Transcript,” Historical
Research, Vol. 62, No. 147 (Feb. 1989), pp. 98-103. The modern editors of Court Maxims argued that it
was “intended … to unite English republicans, and possibly their Dutch counterparts as well, into an effort
to re-establish the Commonwealth in England.” At the same time, they maintained that pace Worden, “it
would be inappropriate to look at it as just a ‘work of propaganda.’” Rather, it was a “remarkably uncompromising text” that contained, as Scott averred, “a more complete exposure of the assumptions behind,
and the tensions within, Sidney’s thought as a whole.” The editors also asserted that Court Maxims was
less of a “direct response to the actual circumstances of the 1680s” than was Sidney’s Discourses, an
odd conclusion given that, the latter was a reply to Sir Robert Filmer’s pre-civil war absolute monarchy
argument in Patriarcha. Maxims, p. xi, citing Blair Worden, “The commonwealth kidney of Algernon
Sidney,” Journal of British Studies, 24 (1985), pp. 1-40, 10; Scott I, pp. 7, 79. One of the problems with all
of these characterizations is that they fail to address the absolute inconsistencies contained within Court
Maxims’ text.
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Note that in Chapter 4 of Toward Democracy, which examined “the ideas of 1688 and their consequences,” a bit of an odd place to situate Sidney given the fact that he died in 1683, Kloppenberg stated
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Court Maxims’ first three Dialogues or later in the published text.

that Court Maxims remained “largely unknown during his lifetime and did not surface until the late
nineteenth century. Much about it remains dubious.” Here is another instance where heroic effort is
made by a distinguished scholar to meld the ideas in Discourses with those in Court Maxims. I do not
know why Kloppenberg says “largely”; we know of no references to Court Maxims during his lifetime. It
also surfaced in the twentieth, not the nineteenth century. Additionally, Kloppenberg, perhaps unwittingly,
added to the ample evidence discrediting the attribution of Court Maxims to Sidney when he pointed out
that, “The learned, Sidney observed, might invoke Littleton, Coke, and the common law,” legal authorities
of which Sidney was very knowledgeable, “but he counseled reading only ancient philosophers and the
Bible.” As we will see, for many reasons it makes absolutely no sense that Sidney would have made this
statement. Kloppenberg, Toward Democracy, Ch. 4, “Coup d’etat, pp. 137-88, 139, 143, 144 & n. 15, at
732. See “A Second Look.”
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CHAPTER THREE
Sidney’s Republicanism, Part One
Much of the history of ideas consists in rendering clear what is
at first obscure. In cases such as this, however … it is necessary first
to render what seems simple, complex; what seems transparent, opaque.
David Wootton, “Leveller Democracy and the Puritan Revolution” 1
Sixteenth-century English political history reveals that republicanism was ubiquitous.
Andrew Hadfield, Shakespeare and Republicanism 2

Philip Sidney was the epitome of what a monarch might seek in her courtiers: a dashingly handsome
young gentleman, a brilliant scholar, linguistically gifted, well-traveled and urbane, articulate, brazen with a
risqué sense of humor, a dancer and a poet, a courageous soldier, a talented swordsman in both war and
convivial jousts. It is true that Philip was overshadowed by his Uncle Robert Dudley’s gargantuan successes:
foremost, the personal love of the Queen apparently bestowed on no other man and the privileges that flowed
from it; but also the abysmal failures – Dudley’s secret marriage after Elizabeth turned him down, earning the
Queen’s notorious wrath and unwillingness to forgive, which other courtiers were only too willing to exploit.
Philip’s potential knew no bounds and so, not surprisingly, he was groomed by his relatives for great things.3
No doubt the legend of Philip Sidney exists in significant part because this talented young man was cut down
before his prime, dying in battle. Perhaps the legend grew, as legends are wont to do. But there is more to
the story than Philip’s youth and potential.
First, an observer might have said that Philip was fighting someone else’s battle – he was a soldier
engaging with the enemy on behalf of the persecuted Protestant Dutch who sought independence from the
intolerant Catholic Spanish. This was a cause for which the majority of Englishmen cheered, with no love lost
between the English and the Spanish or, for that matter, between most Englishmen and any Catholic country.
Still, Philip had no obvious stake in the game. Even so, as we can now appreciate from the Sidney family
perspective, a threat to the cause of international Protestantism was personal.

1

David Wootton, “Leveller Democracy and the Puritan Revolution,” The Cambridge History of Political
Thought 1450-1700, J. H. Burns, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 412-42, 419.
2

Andrew Hadfield, Shakespeare and Republicanism (Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 19.

3
“Henceforth we may regard our hero as a courtier high in favour with the queen, esteemed for his solid parts
by the foremost statesmen of the realm, in correspondence with the leaders of the Reformed party on the
Continent, and surely marked out for some employment of importance.” Clarence Henry Warren, Sir Philip
Sidney: A Study in Conflict (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1887), p. 42.
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Second, whether consciously or not, Philip was fighting not only for Protestantism but also for
religious freedom, a purpose that was uncommon when intolerance governed the sentiments of both
Catholics and Protestants. Nevertheless, the legend of Sir Philip may well have been strengthened in later
years by this aspect of his heroic death.
Third, the Dutch also sought political independence from an emperor – national self-determination, a
goal that surely the 1st Earl of Northumberland would have well understood and which, it will become clear,
was of vital importance to Algernon Sidney. But perhaps we short-change everyone else within the family
and beyond if we do not recognize that even if political self-determination was novel, it resonated among
particular groups within English society, even in the sixteenth century.4
Finally, part of the Sidney lore was the story that was well known about the circumstances of Sir
Philip’s mortal wound. Right after he was shot Philip became very thirsty from “excess of bleeding.” He
asked for water, which was brought to him. When he was about to drink it, he saw a soldier who also had
been injured – “who had eaten his last at the same feast” -- eying Philip’s water bottle. He offered his water to
the poor man, a commoner, to whom he said, “Thy necessity is yet greater than mine.”5 How poignant! How
impressive! Philip’s virtue knew no bounds. Beyond the appreciation of his kindness, most noteworthy is that
Sir Philip’s unselfishness was indiscriminate. The thirsty man was not a nobleman; he was every man.
[T]he establishment of a free Commonwealth, in which law and liberty
should be reconciled, -- this was the great ruling passion of Sidney’s life.
Robert C. Winthrop, Algernon Sidney; A Lecture Delivered Before the
Boston Mercantile Library Association, Dec. 21, 1853 6

A. The Nature of a Republic
According to the ancient Roman republican Marcus Tullius Cicero, “every rational approach to
instruction on any subject ought to begin with a definition, to ensure that people know what the topic under

4
“People in the clothing districts, an anonymous writer noted in 1648, ‘being poor and populous are naturally
mutinous and bold, … so that the clothiers through the whole kingdom were rebels by their trade.” David
Underdown, Pride's Purge: Politics in the Puritan Revolution ( Oxford University Press. 1971) [ACLS
Humanities E-Book repr., 2008], p. 11.
5

Warren, Sir Philip Sidney, p. 171.

6

Robert C. Winthrop, Algernon Sidney: A Lecture, Delivered Before the Boston Mercantile Library
Association, December 21, 1853 (Boston: S. K. Whipple & Co., 1854), p. 15.
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discussion is.”7 Notwithstanding Cicero’s wisdom about defining one’s terms, many theorists do not define
the term “republic,” and other very intelligent people over innumerable generations, including John Adams,
have complained about the difficulty of doing so: “of all the words, in all languages, perhaps there has been
none so much abused in this way as the words republic, commonwealth, and popular state.“8 It is Cicero who
used res publica in a dialogue on De re publica about three hundred years after Plato. Cicero’s work is often
translated as On the State or Treatise on the Commonwealth. In Book One of Republic, Cicero, defined a res
publica as “the property of the public. But the public is not every kind of human gathering, congregating in
any manner, but a numerous gathering brought together by legal consent and community of interest. The
primary reason for its coming together is not so much weakness as a sort of innate desire on the part of
human beings to form communities.”9 Since then, authors have used the word in a number of different ways.10
Frequently its meaning is equivalent to what we now call a state or a nation. Neville equated the

7

Cicero, On Obligation, P. G. Walsh, tr. & intro. (Oxford University Press, 2008), Book I, ¶7, p. 5.

8

Adams goes on to say, “Others, again, more rationally, define a republic to signify only a government, in which
all men, rich and poor, magistrates and subjects, officers and people, masters and servants, the first citizens and
the last, are equally subject to the laws. This indeed appears to be the true, and only true definition of a
republic.” John Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, Against
the Attack of M. Turgot in his Letter to Dr. Price, dated the twenty-second day of March, 1778, in Three Volumes,
3rd ed. (Philadelphia: Budd and Bartram, 1797) [repr., Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 2015], Vol. III, p.
159.
9
Cicero’s Republic, Cicero The Republic and The Laws, Niall Rudd, tr. (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 19
[orig. ref. R. 1. 39]. On the availability in the seventeenth-century of certain parts of Cicero’s work, see
Appendix B.
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One can immediately see the confusion upon learning that Jean Bodin’s sixteenth-century influential book on
political theory, De la république, is all about how absolute monarchy is the best system of government – “the
best type of res publica.” Wootton, “Introduction: The Republican Tradition: From Commonwealth to Common
Sense,” Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776, David Wootton, ed. (Stanford University
Press, 1994), p. 5 et seq. Francis Barham, a nineteenth-century British translator of Cicero, wrote, “It is
necessary to state that Cicero used the word Republic or Commonwealth in a general sense, just as we use
the word constitution or state. In his idea, a true republic, or common-wealth properly so called, should include
the specific forms of royalty, aristocracy, and democracy; but it is not to be confounded with either of these
specific forms in particular. Unhappily, the scientific precision with which Cicero employs these political terms
has been neglected by many modern authors; and thus the most important and essential distinctions of
government have been perplexed by a careless and conflicting nomenclature.” “Preface, A Review of the Life
and Politics of Cicero,” The Political Works of Marcus Tullius Cicero: Comprising his Treatise on the
Commonwealth; and his Treatise on the Laws, transl., with diss. & notes in two vols., by Francis Barham, Esq.
(London: Edmund Spettigue, 1841-42), Vol. 1, The Online Library of Liberty,
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/cicero-treatise-on-the-commonwealth--5?q=The+Political+Works+of+Marcus
+Tullius+Cicero+Vol.+1# (1-14-19).

369

commonwealth with “the body politic.”11 Sidney observed that, “all the regular kingdoms in the world are
commonwealths,” and we know that the Latin word “republic” was generally translated into English as
commonwealth.12 John Adams had this to say: “Our countrymen will never run delirious after a word or a
name. The name republic is given to things, in their nature as different and contradictory as light and
darkness, truth and falsehood, virtue and vice, happiness and misery.” For example, “There are free
republics, and republics as tyrannical as an oriental despotism.” Adams defined a free republic as “the best of
governments, and the greatest blessing which mortals can aspire to.” In contrast, republics that “are not free,
by the help of a multitude of rigorous checks, in very small states, and for short spaces of time, have
preserved some reverence for the laws, and been tolerable; but there have been oligarchies carried to such
extremes of tyranny, that the despotism of Turkey, as far as the happiness of the nation at large is concerned,
would perhaps be preferable.”13
Some authors have used the term republic to refer to particular types of states, often those that are not
governed by a monarch.14 Legal scholar M. N. S. Sellers defined a republic as a state that serves the common
good.15 To theorist Quentin Skinner, “A free state … must constitutionally speaking be what Livy and Sallust
and Cicero had all described and celebrated as a res publica.”16 One also finds authors, Machiavelli perhaps
the most conspicuous, that used the term in the same text in more than one way.17
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Henry Neville, “Plato Redivivus: or, A Dialogue Concerning Government,” Two English Republican Tracts,
Caroline Robbins, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1969), p.82.
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DCG, I.10.30.
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John Adams, A Defence, Vol. I, p. 87.

14
Quentin Skinner, as well as Paul Rahe and those scholars who adopt the concepts of republicanism
endorsed by these two preeminent scholars or have become revisionists of their work, view a republic as
wholly inconsistent with monarchy. For further analysis, see Appendix B.
15
M. N. S. Sellers, Republican Legal Theory, p. 64. Pocock defined the Aristotelian polis as a republic.
Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p.3. As David Wootton explained or, perhaps, further confounded, while
“republic” could be used to mean Aristotle’s word “polity,” both words were ambiguous because “for Aristotle
all states were polities, but some were more properly polities than others.” “Introduction, The Republican
Tradition: From Commonwealth to Common Sense,” David Wootton, ed., Republicanism, Liberty and
Commercial Society, 1649-1776 (Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 5.
16

Quentin Skinner, “The republican ideal of political liberty,” Machiavelli and Republicanism, Gisela Bock,
Quentin Skinner & Maurizio Viroli, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 302.
17
Machiavelli did not define “republic” and, in the Discorsi, the word has two distinct meanings. One definition
was used to distinguish a territory that was ruled by a prince from one that was not. “I wish to examine … those
cities that had their beginnings far removed from any kind of external servitude and were immediately
governed by their own will either as republics or as principalities, that have had different laws and institutions
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How important is this conundrum? The answer is not very. In ancient Rome, res publica meant
public or the People’s business or interest, to be distinguished from res privata, private interest.18 Res publica
was the term used by the ancient Romans for their “state, its public business, all public property, and the
purposes these served.”19 The concept was formulated in the context of Caesar’s establishment of his
principate and the subjugation of the Roman senate and people. Self-consciously, republican theory
emerged with the succession of Caesar’s nephew, Augustus. Cicero and Livy developed the first and most
comprehensive republican ideology that praised the ancient institutions of Rome and analyzed why these
institutions had failed.
Our focus is on republican theory, not on the res publica. This is neither a form of government, nor a
place or “state.” Republicanism is a political approach, a set of principles to which political theorists and
practitioners were (and are) committed as the means of achieving their desired ends, viz., the best political
circumstances in which a community can thrive. To arrive at these principles, one must explore the ends that
are desired, and how best to achieve them. To do this, to understand early modern Anglo-American
republicanism, we need not dwell or even be concerned about buttoning down what a “republic” is, particularly
since we are absolutely sure that it has meant different things to different people in different times – even at
the same time. It is a question that would be nice to answer definitively and finally; but that would be
inconsistent with the term’s variegated historical usage and, in any event, is a luxury that is immaterial to our
understanding of the nature of early modern republicanism.20

just as they have had different beginnings.” Niccolò Machiavelli, The Discourses on Livy, Julia Conaway
Bondanella and Peter Bondanella, tr., intro. & notes (Oxford World’s Classics Ed., 2008),(“Discorsi”), BI, Ch2,
22 (emphasis added). On the other hand, in the same chapter, entitled, “How Many Kinds of Republics There
Are, and What Kind the Roman Republic Was,” Machiavelli utilized the word “republic” to describe categories
of republics that included principalities. For further analysis, see Appendix B.
18
“The Romans set the res publica, literally ‘the People’s matter’ hence the republic, in opposition to res
privata.” Paul Cartledge, “Greek Political Thought: The Historical Context,” The Cambridge History of Greek
and Roman Political Thought, Christopher Rowe & Malcolm Schofield, eds. (Cambridge University Press,
2005), pp. 11-22, 12. For a more detailed discussion of Greek use of the terms republic and constitution, see
Appendix B.
19
M. N. S. Sellers, “The Origins of Republican Legal Theory,” Republican Legal Theory: The History,
Constitution and Purposes of Law in a Free State (Hampshire, UK & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003),
Ch. 2. It is interesting to note the ownership taken of republican theory by Sellers, from the legal vantage
point.
20
Ashcraft went further, rejecting categories such as “Republican” and “Whig.” Richard Ashcraft,
Revolutionary Politics and John Locke’s “Two Treatises of Government,” (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987) p.
393. This seems to me to be an impractical position for a post-hoc analyst, including the historian. In the next
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It is a deliberate anachronism to refer to the ideas of the seventeenth-century Englishman Algernon
Sidney as “republicanism” given the fact that the “ism” term was not parlayed until the late-seventeenth
century and, with much greater frequency, in the eighteenth century.21 Nevertheless, the identification of a
person’s political convictions as decidedly “republican” was certainly very much around in the seventeenth
century and earlier. Sidney was considered to be a republican, but what did that mean? In the vernacular of
early modern England, the label seems to have been used readily, without any worry about its precise
meaning as a political doctrine but, rather, as an indication that its advocate did not support the Stuarts.
Sometimes it was used as a synonym with anti-monarchism. Indeed, these two very different meanings are
blurred. The belief that a republican opposed monarchy is also the view that recent scholars, including
Skinner and Pocock, adopted.22 But this is not the case. For example, while most if not all of the Rye House
Plot conspirators were considered to be republicans, even radical republicans, many also sought to replace
the Catholic Duke of York as heir with the Duke of Monmouth, Charles II’s illegitimate son. This was simply
substituting one monarch for another; it was not challenging the institution of monarchy. It would have
changed the Stuart line of succession and also have avoided a Catholic heir; but it would not have eliminated
monarchy. What seems most probable in reading the primary sources on the Rye House conspiracy is that
some of the more sophisticated men accused of treason were inclined to a much more powerful Parliament
as a means of moderating and balancing an overreaching king; nevertheless, even this goal included

sentence, for example, Ashcraft referred to a particular radical as someone who “was not a Republican,”
proving the point. Id, p. 394. See also other references to “Republican(ism)” in the Index to Revolutionary
Politics.
21

As Richard Greaves aptly stated, “The judicious use of anachronistic terms is not only justifiable but
essential if the historian is not to be a mere chronicler.” Richard L. Greaves, Deliver Us from Evil: the Radical
Underground in Britain, 1660-1663, (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 5. For the early
uses of the word republicanism, see "republicanism, n." OED Online, Oxford University Press, September
2014, http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/view/Entry/163161?redirectedFrom =REPUBLICANISM& (921-14).
22

John Florio’s early seventeenth-century dictionary, for example, translated “respublica” to mean “a
Common-wealth, free state, the weale-publike.” Cicero, as a Roman republican, implied in De officiis that
Rome had only been a true Res publica (that is, a commonwealth) “while under its traditional constitution.”
This implication, per Quentin Skinner, was the (incorrect) “impetus for the term’s eventual contraction to
exclusively mean elected governments,” and therefore to exclude monarchy. Winship contended that Pocock
was much more focused on his conviction that it would have been impossible to have republicanism – “a
republican type of civil consciousness” – in England before the Civil War than he was on what the English
Puritans actually said about “commonwealth themes.” Michael P. Winship, “Godly Republicanism and the
Origins of the Massachusetts Polity,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 63, No. 3 (July
2006) pp. 427-62, 429-30 & n.3.
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kingship. Another way to encapsulate this concept of kingship was that it consciously rejected the French
model of (absolute) monarchism in favor of the Dutch (aristocratic republican) Stadholder-monarch model.23
As we shall see, none of this is inconsistent with Sidney’s articulation of the nature of republicanism.

The historian will want to know what the statute meant to the generation
which enacted it, apart from the ways in which subsequent judges have adapted
their interpretations of it to fresh circumstances. For the lawyer, on the other hand,
these successive interpretations reveal the true meaning of the law.
J. W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History 24

B. Sidney’s Methodology
Scholarly opinion about Sidney has been exceptionally varied. On the one hand we have historian
Peter Laslett’s opinion that “Sidney’s vast work” is “unreadable,” because unlike Locke, “its author lacked
philosophical curiosity.”25 At the other extreme, Scott found Sidney to be “one of England’s most influential,
and most neglected, political writers,” an author with an “extraordinary capacity for the crystallisation of general
political values,” who created “a powerful and relativistic system of political thought,” and “a dynamic revolution
ideology which was to make its mark on three cultures in the century of revolutions that followed.”26 In truth,
like the meaning of res publica, negative and positive superlatives are beside the point. Sidney did, indeed,
write a lengthy republican political treatise that at times is both repetitive and mind numbing with its extensive
interpretations and frequent supporting string citations to events and associated Biblical characters, ancient,
medieval and modern tyrants, heroes, philosophers and historians, as well as to prominent Sidney
contemporaries. In fairness, unlike his critics, Sidney had no opportunity to edit his manuscript before
Discourses was published; indeed, we have no reason to believe that Sidney had any intention of publishing it.
Moreover, Sidney was participating in a scholarly tradition in which authors’ erudition demanded an
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Cf. Winship, “Godly Republicanism,” pp. 430 & 457 n.53 ; K H. D. Haley, William of Orange and the English
Opposition 1672-74 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 27 (In the early 1670s, English government leaders,
merchants, MPs, and Dissenters “were tending to become anti-French in opposition to the Catholicism, the
strong protectionism, and the absolutism of Louis XIV and the most powerful state in Europe”).
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J. G. A. Pocock, “England’s Cato: The Virtues and Fortune of Algernon Sidney,” The Historical Journal Vol.
37, No. 4 (1994), pp. 915-35, p. 915, citing Peter Laslett, ed., Patriarcha and other political works of Sir Robert
Filmer (Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 39.
26

Jonathan Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677 (Cambridge University Press.
2004)(“Scott I,”) pp. 6, 10.
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appreciation of a vast array of historical and philosophical works. The fact that we are not educated to
understand and appreciate these innumerable references does not mean that Sidney’s peers were unable to
do so. Furthermore, Sidney’s stated purpose was to examine and refute Filmer’s ideas in Patriarcha;
accordingly, Sidney structured the sequence of his argument to follow Filmer’s text, point by point.27 One can
hardly blame Sidney for a repetitive train of thought when the train is not his. In sum, we need not throw the
baby out with the bathwater. The first order of business is to understand what Sidney had to say and why.

What a piece of work is man! How noble in reason, how infinite in faculty, in form and
moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in apprehension
how like a god – the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals!
Shakespeare, Hamlet, ca. 1600 28

i. Realism
If the issue is originality, historian Markku Peltonen is correct that the ideas of the English early
modern republicans were not new.29 To the contrary, as will be evident through-out this study, Sidney’s ideas
and those of his fellow republicans were developed out of rich political, historical, theoretical, and familial
traditions that were longstanding in both England and the European continent. What is noteworthy and, at
least in its English application, unique, was the particular selection of concepts among the many ideas in
these traditions; what was new was the opportunity in seventeenth-century England to endeavor to implement
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The first sentence of the first section of the first chapter of Discourses Concerning Government stated,
“Having lately seen a book entitled Patriarcha, written by Sir Robert Filmer, concerning the universal and
undistinguished right of all kings, I thought a time of leisure might be well employed in examining his doctrine,
and the questions arising from it.” Algernon Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government, Thomas G. West,
ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1996) (“Discourses” or “DCG,”), Ch. I, §1, p. 5 (format-ted hereafter as “I.1.5”).
As discussed in my (unpublished) article, “A Second Look at the Question of Who Authored Court Maxims,”
these words could belong to Toland; nevertheless, the thought and the organizational structure of Discourses
is founded on Filmer’s book. See Sir Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings. Johann P. Sommerville,
ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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William Shakespeare, “The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark,” The Oxford Shakespeare: The
Complete Works, Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor, gen. eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), Act. II, Scene II,
pp. 655-90, 666.
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political discourse only appeared in England after the collapse of the traditional frames of reference. Before
this there was simply ‘no room for republican notions’: the dominant modes of discourse stressing eternal
unity, harmony and hierarchy effectively inhibited the emergence of republican modes of thinking.” Peltonen
referred here to the work of Zagorin, Rawson, Worden and Wootton. Markku Peltonen, Classical Humanism
and Republicanism in English Political Thought, 1570-1640 (Cambridge University Press, 2004)[orig. pub.
1995], p. 1.
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those ideas. Sidney’s admired confederate Sir Henry Vane the Younger recognized this and clearly
expressed his appreciation for the opportunity that presented itself to Parliament in February 1659, after
Cromwell had died and his son was ineffectually trying to rule England. “We sit here intrusted with preserving
the rights of the people. …If the people think they are not competent judges of what is good for them, let us
say so plainly, and let that be the debate.”30 Like Vane, Sidney was not just a theorist; he was a political
activist. So was John Adams. It is the unique interplay of political ideas, on the one hand, and historical
contingency and opportunity, on the other, that made early modern Anglo-American republicanism explosive
in its time.
Sidney’s universe was the real world, the world of “common sense” and what it teaches us, viz., that
governments are set up for the good of the society, that “it can never be good for great nations, having men
amongst them of virtue, experience, wisdom and goodness, to be governed by children, fools, or vicious and
wicked persons,” etcetera, etcetera.31 When Sidney was isolated on the Continent, living “only to [him]self, …
in no ways usefull unto God’s people, my country, and the world,” he was deeply dissatisfied.32 He yearned
for more. In an undated letter to a friend, written when Sidney was in his 40s or 50s and living abroad, Sidney
explained what drove his political activism throughout a life of bitter disappointments. “I found farre less
satisfaction in my second retirement than the first, and, by the advice of friends, am once more comme upon
the stage. I do not knowe what success God will give unto our undertakings, but I am certaine I can have no
peace in my owne spirite, if I doe not endeavour by all meanes possible to advance the interests of God’s
people.” Reflecting on his own temperament, Sidney continued, “Others may judge from whence this temper
doth proceed, better than I can; if it be from God, he will make it prosper, if from the heat and violence of my
owne disposition, I and my designes shall perish.” Sidney knew he was embarking on a potentially
dangerous endeavor; but he felt compelled. Some historians label this as “reckless,” the action of an
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[Parliamentary] Diary of Thomas Burton, Esq., Member in the Parliaments of Oliver and Richard Cromwell,
From 1656 to 1659, Four Vols., John Towill Rutt, ed. & notes, (London: Henry Colburn, 1828), Vol. III, pp.
337-38; see Margaret A. Judson, The Political Thought of Sir Henry Vane the Younger (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), p. 53.
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DCG, II.3.91, II.4.94.

32

Sidney to unidentified friend; undated but estimated to be “certainly later than 1664,” but probably before
1677. Sydney Papers: Consisting of a Journal of the Earl of Leicester, and Original Letters of Algernon
Sidney, (Breinigsville, PA: Nabu Public Domain Reprints, 2010), pp. 258-60.
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“incompetent insurrectionary.”33 Others view Sidney as the heir of his courageous Great-Uncle Philip.34
Regardless, it was heartfelt. “I desire you and all our friends to seeke God for me, praying him to defend me
from outward enemyes, but more especially from thoes that are within me; and that he would give me such a
steady knowledge of truth, as I may be constantly directed in seeking that which is truly good.35
Long before, Cicero said essentially the same thing.36 In De officiis, or On Obligations, an essay
written to advise his son on the obligations of civic life, the redoubtable ancient Roman republican thinker
articulated his personal philosophy. Just as Sidney focused on the “steady knowledge of truth,” Cicero
explained to his son that, “Especially unique to man is the search and scrutiny into truth. … We reckon that
the acquisition of knowledge of hidden or remarkable features is necessary for the happy life. … Associated
with this eagerness for the vision of the truth is a kind of aspiration for leadership.” Accordingly, Sidney said,
“My work is to seek after truth.”37 Cicero broke this pursuit down into its constituent parts. “All that is
honourable emerges from one or other of four sources. It is found in the perception and intelligent awareness
of what is true.” Sidney prayed that God would give him a steady knowledge of truth in order to seek “that
which is truly good,” so that he could advance the interests of God’s people. According to Cicero, seeking the
good is what it meant to exercise wisdom and prudence. As for Cicero’s additional sources of honor, they too
will sound strikingly familiar to one versed in Sidney’s Discourses. For Cicero, the foundation of honor is
completely pragmatic, designed to provide and maintain “the essentials for living out our lives.” It was made
up, first, of our obligation to “safeguard[] the community by assigning to each individual his due,” including
“keeping faith with compacts made.” Safe-guarding the community was at the heart of Sidney’s aspirations.
As for keeping faith with compacts made, Sidney had a great deal to say about this as well. To accomplish
this goal, said Cicero, required “not merely mental application but some physical action as well,” applied “to
ensure that the community and its cohesion are preserved.” Sidney’s political purpose also was to promote,
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Recall Sir Philip’s ascribed deathbed statement that, “Thy necessity was greater than mine.” Clarence
Henry Warren, Sir Philip Sidney: A Study in Conflict (New York: Harper & Bros., 1887), p. 171.
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Cicero, On Obligations, P. G. Walsh, tr. (Oxford University Press, 2008), Book I, §§12-13, p. 7; DCG,
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protect and preserve the community, which might require “physical action.”38
Sidney understood the importance of both civil responsibility and military capability as a means of
enabling leaders to be civically responsible. Cicero concurred on both counts, advising his son, for example,
“wars should be undertaken for the one purpose of living peaceably without suffering injustice.” Ever the
pragmatist, Cicero added, “My opinion, for what it is worth, is that we should always aim at a peace which
does not contain the seeds of future treachery.”39 Another source of honor identified by Cicero was “the
greatness and strength of a lofty and unconquered spirit,” which required that “men of courage and greatness
of spirit should also be good and guileless, friends of the truth and total strangers to deceit; for when we
praise justice, such qualities lie at the heart of it.”40 In his anonymous letter to a friend Sidney recognized his
own inability to have a peaceful spirit unless he pursued the political goals in which he believed. At the same
time, for Sidney the pursuit of justice was fundamental. Finally, Cicero explained to his son that honor
requires “order and due measure” so that “all words and deeds reflect an underlying moderation and selfcontrol.” For it is “the mark of a brave and resolute spirit not to get rattled in difficult circumstances, and when
plunged into commotion not to be knocked off one’s balance, as the saying goes. Rather we must maintain
presence of mind, keep our counsel, and not depart from the path of reason. …This is how a person of great
and lofty spirit operates.”41 Surely this is precisely the thought to which Sidney alluded when he asked his
friend to pray for him, and seek God’s help in achieving his hope of not only protecting his people from
outward enemies. Even more difficult, perhaps, was the goal of protecting the people from enemies within –
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Cicero, On Obligations, Book I, §15, pp 7-8. For a helpful discussion of Cicero’s stated values in On
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from the weaknesses Sidney recognized, for example those in his own nature that could foil his purpose and
prevent him from attaining a “steady knowledge of truth” in accordance with the well-being of his people. This
sort of moderation through emotional and psychological balance, of which this is one illustration, is another
touchstone of Sidney’s republican political theory.
Overall, it is apparent that Sidney’s stated goals were not original. Indeed, the correspondence in
values is stunning when one compares Sidney and Cicero’s understanding of man’s purpose, their chivalric
concept of honor, and their shared political commitment to the personal well-being of one’s people and
country. Both men, millennia apart, had almost indistinguishable, lofty aspirations that they believed were
man’s responsibility to actively, politically pursue. Thus it was to age-old, Ciceronian values and practices that
Sidney aspired.
Neither man fared well. But they shared a political agenda – the implementation of republicanism.
About one-third of the way into the lengthy Discourses Sidney provided a straight-forward explanation of his
approach to analyzing government: “[F]or our inquiry is not after that which is perfect, well-knowing that no
such thing is found among men; but we seek that human constitution which is attended with the least, or the
most pardonable inconveniences.”42
In short, in addition to Sidney’s political enthusiasm – sometimes fairly described as hot-blooded zeal
towards what in layman’s terms is simply good governance – one of the characteristics of Sidney’s political
approach, like his personal style, was blunt realism. Sidney was categorical in his determination to understand
life as it really was – to tell the truth. “My work is to seek after truth.”43 Sidney’s nephew Lord Halifax said the
same thing about truth, albeit at much greater length, in a passage famous for its elegance, e.g., Truth
“showeth her greatness in this, that her enemies, even when they are successful, are ashamed to own it.”44
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While authorities are invaluable, even they are subject to the test of blunt realism. As Sidney brazenly noted in
one particular instance, “’Tis not my work to justify these opinions of Plato and his scholar Aristotle: They were
men, and tho wise and learned, subject to error.”45 Aristotle agreed! “Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas.
Plato is dear to me, but dearer still is truth.”46 Sidney can be considered a distant protégé of Cicero and
Machiavelli, both of whom similarly viewed themselves as no-nonsense realists in their approach to republican
governance.47 Cicero’s perspective was an express challenge to the ancient Greek notion that the wisest men
should remain aloof from the problems of the real world while continuing to philosophize about them, including
the nature of government.48 It “is not enough to possess moral excellence as a kind of skill, unless you put it
into practice.” Particularly in the case of understanding the nature of good governance, “moral excellence is
entirely a matter of practice.” What is necessary, said Cicero, was “the achievement (in reality, not just in
words) of those things which our friends in their shady nooks make such a noise about,” those things “laid
down by philosophers.”49

Character of a Trimmer,” Halifax Complete Works, J. P. Kenyon, edit. & intro. (Middlesex, UK: Penguin
Books, 1969), pp. 101-02. For the full passage see Appendix B.
45

DCG, II.1.86.

46

It is disputed whether Aristotle said these precise words or if it is a paraphrase of his statement in The
Nicomachean Ethics that, “We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss thoroughly what is
meant by it, although such an inquiry is made an uphill one by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by
friends of our own [obviously including Plato]. Yet it would perhaps be thought to be better, indeed to be our
duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth even to destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are
philosophers or lovers of wisdom; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to honour truth above our friends."
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The word “utopia” comes from ancient Greece and means “no place.”50 For Sidney, as with Cicero,
analyzing governance was neither an exercise in abstraction nor the exploration and elucidation of an ideal
world; it had everything to do with political realities, including the imperfect nature of man.51 “But such is the
condition of mankind,” Sidney contended, “that nothing can be so perfectly framed as not to give some
testimony of human imbecility, and frequently to stand in need of reparations and amendments.”52 Cicero
similarly wrote, because “our lusts are set over our thoughts like cruel mistresses, ordering and compelling us
to do outlandish things,” a ruler must be prudent “in all facets”; he must see ahead, which requires that “this
citizen must make sure that he is always forearmed against the things that upset the stability of the state
(Nonius 2.389).”53
Simple perfection is “only in God, not in the things he has created,” said Sidney. Men are imperfect.
Because “nothing can or ought to be permanent but that which is perfect,” utopian political goals were
inapposite. In Sidney’s words, “For if the perfection were absolute, there could be no difference between an
angel and a worm, and nothing could be subject to change or death, for that is imperfection.” Moreover,
“those who would admit of no change render errors perpetual, and deprive … mankind of the benefits of
wisdom, industry, experience, and the right use of reason.”54 Perhaps Sidney had James Harrington (16111677) in mind. In contrast, Sidney was on Cicero’s wave-length. The ancient Roman jurist wisely stated that
while it is “a fine thing to excel in … discovery and knowledge,” it is a mistake to “devote too much energy and
effort on matters which are not merely arcane and taxing, but also unnecessary.”55 Men are not perfect, and

50

Eric Nelson, “Utopia through Italian Eyes: Thomas More and the Critics of Civic Humanism,” Renaissance
Quarterly, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Winter 2006), pp. 1029-57, 1039.
51

Compare, e.g., Plato’s idea of the republic, in which the wisest man is “a ruler in the city of which we are the
founders, and which exists in idea only; for I do not believe that there is such an one anywhere on earth? In
heaven, I replied.” Plato’s Republic, Book IX, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.10.ix.html (3-10-14).
52

DCG, III.25.461. On classical realism, see Joseph M. Parent, “Elder Abuse: How the Moderns Mistreat
Classical Realism,” International Studies Review 13 (2011), pp. 193-213.
53
Cicero, The Republic, Cicero The Republic and The Laws, Book Six, p. 85. References to Nonius are to
the later writers from whom fragments of the original text are preserved, since we do not have a complete
edition of Cicero’s manuscript. See id, Note on the Text, p. xxxii.
54

DCG, III.25.461-63.

55

. “Philo’s insistence on the impossibility of certain knowledge, a position modified by accepting the doctrine
of probability, became Cicero’s consistent viewpoint.” Cicero, On Obligations, “Introduction,” pp. xxxii & Book
I, ¶¶18-19, p. 8.
380

that which they create is not perfect either. “Many things are unknown to the wisest,” said Sidney, who is
“sometimes led into error.” Even the best men cannot “wholly divest themselves of passions and affections.”
This is true of even the extraordinary Plato and Aristotle.56
Here is one of the many instances in which Sidney and Halifax’s views correspond.57 In “The
Character of a Trimmer” Halifax stated: “When all is done, those who look for perfection in this world may look
as long as the Jews have done for their Messiah … [T]ill we have another race of mankind, in all constitutions
that are bounded there will ever be some matter of strife and contention.”58 Sidney and Halifax, the
pragmatists, are immediately distinguishable from some of their fellow English republicans and other early
modernists who thought and wrote in conspicuously utopian terms.59 They did not. Not that Sidney and
Halifax did not have high aspirations and reflect upon them. But it is important to distinguish between such
passions and ideals, and utopianism.
One can then juxtapose the ideas of Harrington and Sidney to readily illustrate this essential
difference in conviction about the possibilities and purposes of political theory. Harrington, the darling of Prof.
Pocock who considered him to be the proper epicenter of early modern republicanism, wholly embraced a
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utopian paradigm. As one scholar stated, he was a dreamer.60 This is not surprising. Harrington was not
involved in English politics. Even Pocock recognized that Harrington “seems to have played no part in county
or national politics, before or during the First Civil War.”61 For Harrington, the very nature of English society
had to change, along with the form of governance. But once the English people took his advice and got it
right, he believed that nothing would ever have to change in order for a proper republic to exist!62 Henry
Neville, who admired and worked with Harrington, shared this utopian perspective notwithstanding the fact
that to some extent he was involved in politics. Per Neville, once Harringtonian changes were made “in the
beginning or first institution of a state,” a commonwealth could be “immortal.”63
Pocock edited Oceana, and had this to say about Harrington’s utopianism: “Because The
Commonwealth of Oceana employs the devices of fiction to portray the arrangements of an ideal state, it
exhibits characteristics which we call utopian.”64 Per Pocock, Harrington considered his portrayal of “Oceana”
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‘analytical experiments’ with no regard to the consequences. The comparison was apt, since Harrington’s
scheme was certainly known to Sieyès, whose constitutional draft showed traces of Oceana.” Furthermore,
Oceana was a “rural gentry-paradise,” a “pseudo-realistic utopia” that was a combination of prophecy,
historical speculation and exhortation. Gentry was the life-blood of the commonwealth; “only gentlemen, like
Moses, Solon, or Cromwell had ever established a commonwealth.” Indeed, in Shklar’s view there was every
reason “to doubt Harrington’s devotion to democracy.” Judith N. Shklar, Political Thought & Political Thinkers,
Stanley Hoffman, ed. (The University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 209, 223. Note that Jefferson’s ideas
dovetail. See, e.g., Annette Gordon-Reed and Peter S. Onuf, “Most Blessed of the Patriarchs”: Thomas
Jefferson and the Empire of the Imagination, (New York & London: Liveright Pub., 2016), pp. 11, 29, 52-53,
85-86.
61

Harrington was a gentleman of Charles I’s bedchamber after the king became a captive of Cromwell.
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to be a “model” that would, presumably, facilitate the avoidance of the phenomenon whereby “’state empirics’
and ‘ministers of state’ very often acted without understanding the springs of their own actions.”65 Yet Pocock
perplexingly denied that the design of this political model was utopian.66
Pace Pocock’s description, Harrington sought the “perfection of government” by means of the
institution of a very particularized political system he thought best that, once entrenched, would never
change.67 It “requires no proof,” said Harrington, “that the perfection of government lieth upon such a
libration in the frame of it, that no man or men, in or under it, can have the interest or, having the interest, can
have the power to disturb it with sedition.”68 As a practical matter this meant that Harrington’s republicanism
included features to obviate change. For instance it provided virtually no opportunity for spontaneous citizen
participation in government. Oceana prescribed petitioning; but the process was remarkably controlled and
the opportunity was afforded “the whole tribe,” or local community, not the individual.69 In contrast, Sidney
appreciated the inevitability of change; the tricky and important thing was that change be “done by those who
have a right of doing it.”70 As we will see, for Sidney this meant lawful change. Harrington was overwhelmingly
threatened by this prospect whereas Sidney embraced it: “nothing will be found more orderly than the
changes of government, or of the persons and races of those that govern’d, which have been made by many
nations.”71
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declaring that they had no part in “Platonic,” “Utopian,” “Atlantic” and “Oceanic” dreaming, and of course have
been doing so ever since.” Pocock, “Introduction,” Harrington, Oceana, p. xvi.
65

Id, p. xvii.

66

To do Prof. Pocock’s erudite explanation justice, consider his argument in full. See Appendix B.

67

English professor Rachel Trubowitz analyzed “the emergence of a new, non-patriarchal mode of male
domination among the radical sectarians, particularly utopian writers such as Bacon, Harrington and
Winstanley, and Milton in Paradise Lost.” Holstun, Introduction, Pamphlet Wars, p. 9.
68

Harrington, Oceana, pp. 30-31.

69
On the degree to which petitioning was restricted to “the tedious repetition of ritual,” compare Jonathan
Scott, “The rapture of motion: James Harrington’s republicanism,” Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain,
Nicholas Phillipson & Quentin Skinner, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 139-63, 151, with
Edward Vallance, “Harrington, Petitioning, and the Construction of Public Opinion,” Perspectives on English
Revolutionary Republican-ism, Dirk Weimann and Gaby Mahlberg, eds. (Oxon, UK & New York: Routledge,
2016), Ch. 7, pp. 119-31, 123-31.
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DCG, II.13.150.
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Id, II.16.168.
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The most famous specific Harringtonian requirement of government is the maintenance of control and
the imposition of a very particularized redistribution of wealth and property.72 Indeed, control is Harrington’s
overarching theme. “Freedom is to be attained by systematizing the exercise of intelligence among citizens
associated in a commonwealth, republic or polis; a community as large as England is to have the form of a
city state. The elaborate ‘orders’ of Oceana are designed to involve all citizens in the process of political
decision and to distribute the exercise of intelligence among them.”73 Thirty “orders” are therefore required to
specify the conduct of government from the most general and profound components of Harrington’s republic
to the most particularized and trivial. Indeed, it is surprising that there is not more scholarly emphasis on the
excruciating level of control reflected in these meticulously detailed orders.74 In one of innumerable
examples, in the context of his fourteenth order that required that “the ballot of Venice” be used in Oceana,
Harrington specified on what day and hour of each week (varying in summer and winter) the great bell should
be rung convening his parliament (“senate”), and for how long the bell should be rung; precisely who should
attend the senate magistrates who gather when the bell rings; the dimensions of the senate house – “a room
consisting of a square and a half. In the middle of the lower end is the door; at the upper end hangeth a rich
[canopy of] state, overshadowing the greater part of a large throne, or half pace of two stages, the first
ascended by two steps from the floor and the second, about the middle rising two steps higher”; who sits
where on the stage and precisely where everyone else sits, e.g., “every bench being divided by numeral

72
Harrington’s “equal agrarian” was “a perpetual law establishing and preserving the balance of dominion, by
such a distribution that no one man or number of men within the compass of the few or aristocracy can come
to overpower the whole people by their possessions in lands.” Harrington, Oceana, p. 33. Shklar pointed out
that Harrington had no understanding of economic development or economic life generally. By property
Harrington did not mean rents, sales, or profits from land. His interest was in property per se, because its
ownership signified control over the access to food, a universal human necessity. It also meant power,
including the power to maintain soldiers needed to defend that property (and, presumably, to access more.)
Shklar, Political Thought & Political Thinkers, pp. 214-15; see also Zelda S. Fink, The Classical Republicans:
An Essay in the Recovery of a Pattern of Thought in Sventeenth Century England (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1945), pp. 63-64; Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman (Harvard
University Press, 1959); pp. 30-32; Kathleen Toth, "Interpretation in Political Theory: The Case of Harrington,"
The Review of Politics, Vol. 37, No. 3 (July 1975), pp. 317-39.
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Pocock, “Introduction,” Harrington, Oceana, p.xxi.
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Davis recognized that, with respect to the ideas in Harrington’s Oceana, “men without choice are neither
citizens nor capable of virtue, as their society is incapable of corruption. But, it is a dead society.” Davis,
“Pocock’s Harrington,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Sept. 1981), p. 696.
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characters into the thirty-seven parts or places,” etcetera, etcetera.75 The disparity is palpable between this
sort of consuming (more accurately, obsessive) preoccupation with detail and what Harrington’s fellow
republicans considered worth their attention.
I have no idea in the real world how, as Pocock described Harrington’s intention, one could
systematize or “distribute the exercise of intelligence” or, for that matter, how one could construct anything in
the real world that is “immune from the contingencies of history.” When you combine these features, which
sounds repressive and even reactionary, with the fact that Harrington had none of the roll-up-your-sleeves,
get-your-hand’s-dirty mentality that is always necessary when engaging in political campaigns, negotiations,
and deal-making in England and everywhere else, it is easy to understand the light years between the political
perspectives of Harrington and Sidney and the dubious placement of both men’s ideas under the political
umbrella of republicanism.76 We can look at it another way. If, as we shall see, republican liberty necessarily
includes the right to choose and modify one’s own government, e.g., “the constitution of every government is
referred to those who are concerned in it, and no other has anything to do with it,” an imposed and fixed form
of government, such as Harrington proposed, is wholly inconsistent with this concept of republicanism.77 In
sum, Harrington was an armchair theorist, self-contained, hyper-controlling, full of promise if one agreed with
him but threatening if one did not, and patently removed from the difficult realities and profound imperfections
of early modern English political life.78
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Harrington, Oceana, pp. 118-19.
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Scott said the same thing more poetically: “Upon the altar of peace [Harrington] sacrificed the moral and the
participatory bases of the classical republican tradition. Oceana is a dead landscape: a political Frankenstein’s
monster raised from the anatomists’ slab.” Scott, "The rapture of motion,” p. 162.
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DCG, I.16.49. Worden euphemistically commented: “At such moments Harrington is not obviously
recognizable as a friend to modern conceptions of liberty, or at least to modern conceptions of negative
liberty. He is not interested, or is barely interested, in rights. Political life is not, for him, a conflict between
the power of the state and the liberty of the individual. There is no ‘state’ in Harrington’s thinking, only a
‘commonwealth’ whose ‘liberty’ becomes inseparable from the ‘liberty’ of its citizens. Commonwealth and
citizen grow strong and free together. Collectively the citizens create something better than themselves.
…[I]n Oceana it is the commonwealth, not the individual, that is born again, ‘for as man is sinful, but yet the
world is perfect, so may the citizen be sinful and yet the commonwealth be perfect’.” Worden, “Harrington
and ‘The Commonwealth of Oceana,’ 1656,” Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, p.105. It is
difficult to appreciate how “civic virtue” is “at the heart of Harrington’s thought,” as Pocock emphasized, if
there is no political life and the citizen is sinful. See id, p. 106 & n.58, referencing a number of Pocock works
on Harrington.
78
In his Introduction to Locke’s Two Treatises on Government, Laslett reflected on the theorists of natural
philosophy of whom Locke was familiar – Grotius, Pufendorf and Hooker, among others – who presented a
“single, synthetic system, a view of the world which proceeded from an account of reality to an account of
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Setting aside Harringtonianism, Sidney’s republicanism was exceedingly pragmatic and anything but
armchair. While extremely well educated in the theory of politics (as Gilbert Burnet said, he was the most
learned man on the state of Greek and Roman commonwealths of any man that Burnet ever knew), Sidney’s
writing was rhetorical. It was designed to challenge and persuade – himself; perhaps others – that it was
practical and wise to implement the political ideas and values he advocated, which included the notion that the
political system would always require correction because of the changing, imperfect, perpetually contingent
condition of man. Sidney worked from the here and now of his immediate and often capricious political world to
define a better system of governance, defined by the principles he embraced.79 Whether one considers this
goal to be less lofty, more pedestrian, or simply more realistic than the utopianism of Harrington, it is a vital
feature of Sidney’s republicanism.
Ultimately and once again, one need not resolve the question of whether Harrington’s “idealized,”
“fictionalized” “occasione” is a utopia in a More, Bacon or Campanella sense in order to be confident that, by
Pocock’s own account and in contrast to Sidney, Harrington was not trying to deal with the realities on the
ground but, rather, “to construct new forms immune from the contingencies of history.” Perhaps more
precisely, what Harrington sought to construct in 1656, a clue to which we gain from the Horace quotation on

knowledge, and so to an ethic and to politics.” These accounts varied in completeness, and “in the extent to
which they relied on Christian revelation to fill out the great chain of being,” as well as their use of historical
examples and “concrete political situations.” Nevertheless, they all relied on natural law to create their
“closed system.” For these thinkers, “philosophy was civil philosophy.” Laslett contrasted “Machiavelli and
the writers of political advice,” who to him represented “a counter-tradition to natural law.” I disagree.
Nevertheless, Laslett interestingly linked the natural law theorist and the scholar-philosopher, who he
distinguished from the pragmatist, with Locke a representative of the former and Shaftesbury a representative
of the latter: “Here the relationship between Shaftesbury the statesman and Locke the thinker comes very
close to the surface, and it is recalled by a sentence in Locke’s Essay [on Human Understanding]. He is
discussing the medieval scholarly doctors and he says: ‘Notwithstanding these learned disputants, these all
knowing doctors, it was to the unscholastic statesmen that the governments of the world owed their peace,
defence, and liberties.’” Although not the same as utopianism, Locke seemed to recognize that his sort of
thinking anticipated “a system that ideally would be complete and entirely consistent.” Whether or not he
achieved this, Locke’s approach to political analysis was not the same as the pragmatic, compromising, and
sometimes inconsistent approach that confronted the politician. Sidney was a republican thinker, as was
Halifax, who endeavored to cross this divide. Peter Laslett, “Introduction” John Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two
Treatises on Government, Peter Laslett, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 87-88.
79

At least this was Burnet’s view in his original memoirs, “which constituted the basis of Burnet’s published
History.” The memoirs were modified in large part in Burnet’s History in order to be more eloquent and less
jejune. Burnet, Original Memoirs, A Supplement from Unpublished Mss. To Burnet’s History of My Own Time,
H. C. Foxcroft, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1802), pp. viii, xiv, 198.
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Oceana’s title page, is a world that eliminated the pitfalls of money!80 If that is not utopian, it is hard to
imagine what is.
We need a man, can speake of the intents,
the councells, actions, orders, and events
of state, and censure them: we need his pen
can write the things, the causes, and the men.
Robert Johnson, “Of Histories,” 1607 81
I make no claim to any great competence as a legal historian, but
in discussing early modern English political thought one needs to employ
some knowledge that is probably unexciting to legal historians, but remains
too much beyond the province of the historian of political thought.
Glenn Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution 82

ii. Use of history
Sidney pervasively, ubiquitously relied on historical illustration as evidentiary proof of the political
postulates he advocated. The use of “real” historical examples is one way in which Sidney (like Cicero,
Machiavelli and many other political thinkers) made the case that his ideas were grounded in the real, not the
ideal world. Sidney’s explanatory method has its roots in not only the ideas of earlier republicans, but also in
Lipsius and the neo-Tacitian Essex Circle with which his family was so intimately connected. Henry Savile,
who translated Tacitus into English in the late sixteenth century, credited Tacitus with “setting us downe a
theorem of history … that an historiographer is to give knowledge of counsailes and causes … so shall we see
the reasons and causes of things, not only the bare eventes, which are most commonly govened by fortune.”83
As Savile’s contemporary Robert Johnson stated in his essay, “Of Histories,” history “teacheth more than
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“Tantalus a labris sitiens fugientia captat/Flumina: quid rides? Mutate monime, de te/Fabula narrator,”
translated as, “Tantalus is also said to have a violent Thirst, and would fain have drank of the Waters in which
he stood Chin deep; but they still flew from his Lips – Why do you laugh? Change but the Name, the story
suits you.” This is an excerpt from the first Satire in Book I of Horace’s Satires, the punch line of which is,
“And can you be surprized that no Body shows that Regard for you which you never merited, seeing you
prefer your Money to every Thing?” The Works of Horace Translated into English Prose, As near the Original
as the different Idioms of the Latin and English Languages will Allow…., Vol. II, The Fourth Edition (London:
D. Browne, R. Manby, J. Whiston & B. White, 1753), pp. 12-15.
81
Robert Johnson, “Of Histories,” Essayes, or, Rather imperfect Offers (London, 1607), sigs. D1v-D4, cited in
Alan Bradford, “Stuart Absolutism and the ‘Utility’ of Tacitus,” Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 2
(Spring, 1983), pp. 127-55, 133.
82

Glenn Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, p. 2.
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The Ende of Nero and Beginning of Galba. Fower Bookes of the Histories of Cornelius Tacitus. The Life of
Agricola, Sir Henry Savile, tr. (Oxford, 1591), p. 3, in Bradford, “Stuart Absolutism and the ‘Utility’ of Tacitus,”
pp. 133, 153 n. 23.
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twentie men living, successively can learn by practise.”84
In the first instance, an idea must be sound; and to be sound, it must be rational. As the title of
Section 3 of Chapter I of Sidney’s Discourses stated, “Implicit Faith belongs to Fools, and Truth is
comprehended by examining Principles.” Sidney elaborated. “An implicit faith, says he, is given to the
meanest artificer. I wonder by whom! Who will wear a shoe that hurts him, because the shoe-maker tells him
‘tis well made? or who will live in a house that yields no defence against the extremities of weather, because
the mason or carpenter assures him ‘tis a very good house?” Only Fools would do so. In contrast, said
Sidney, “Such as have reason, understanding, or common sense, will, and ought to make use of it in those
things that concern themselves and their posterity, and suspect the words of such as are interested in
deceiving or persuading them not to see with their own eyes, that they may be more easily deceived.”
Accordingly, we must “search into matters of state, as to examine the original principles of government in
general, and of our own in particular. We cannot distinguish truth from falsehood, right from wrong, or know
what obedience we owe to the magistrate, or what we may justly expect from him, unless we know what he is,
why he is, and by whom he is made to be what he is.”85
Just in case reason might lead one to challenge one of Sidney’s political ideas, the reader is endlessly
referred to instances in history that, in Sidney’s opinion, proved his point. He often explained how “Ancient
monarchies afford us frequent examples of this kind,” in all sorts of circumstances, along with illustrations “in
our age.”86 If you peruse the lengthy Discourses, it is exceedingly difficult to find a page in which historical
examples are not utilized. Sometimes Sidney elaborated in great detail upon the specifics of an historical
event or person; at other times he used string cites, referring to many persons or events, assuming that the
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Robert Johnson, “Of Histories,” quoted in Elbert N. S. Thompson, The Seventeenth Century English Essay
(New York: Haskell House Publishers Limited, 1967), p. 38.
85

DCG, I.3.12-13. The term “magistrate” was used by Cicero, and referred to the leading civil and military
official(s) of the state. “So the particular function of the magistrate is to be aware that as the personification of
the state he must maintain its dignity and glory, preserve its laws, dispense its justice, and remember that
these tasks have been entrusted to his good faith.” Cicero, On Obligations, Book I, ¶124, p. 42; Key to
Technical Terms, Cicero: Selected Works, Michael Grant, tr. & intro. (London: Penguin Books, 1971), App. C,
p. 259.
86

In this instance Sidney was criticizing Filmer for imputing to the Schoolmen and the Puritans ideas known to
all reformed and unreformed Christian churches, the Grecians, Italians, Spaniards, Gauls, Germans, and
Britains, “and all other generous nations ever lived, before the name of Christ was known in the world,”
etcetera. DCG, II.21.197.
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reader knew what he was talking about and that it was therefore unnecessary for him to elaborate further.87
The fact is that we do not know if Sidney ever intended to have any readers beyond himself. In any event, at
the beginning of the treatise Sidney “took no prisoners,” disparagingly attacking Filmer for his blatant
disregard of history. “The error of not observing this may perhaps deserve to be pardoned in a man that had
read no books, as proceeding from ignorance; if such as are grossly ignorant can be excused, when they take
upon them to write of such matters as require the highest knowledge: But in Sir Robert ‘tis prevarication and
fraud.”88
Three things are readily apparent from Sidney’s reliance on historical example to prove his contentions.
First, those less erudite than Sidney would have to utilize an encyclopedia (or today, the internet) to closely
follow his argument. Second, this method is highly effective as a rhetorical device – a means of persuasion.
Indeed, one could call it auspicious – conductive to success – as evidenced by its common usage by the
ancients. Third, while many of Sidney’s peers shared his penchant for historical example, although probably
not to the extent that he did, at least one contemporaneous author, John Locke, did not use Sidney’s traditional approach.89 Locke preferred to argue in more abstract terms about the nature of good governance.90
In his work on the ancient constitution Pocock severely criticized the reliance on historical examples by
various legal scholars (such as Sir Edward Coke) because of what Pocock and those scholars who have
followed in his footsteps perceived to be a distorted and therefore inappropriate use of history.91 According to
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For examples of detailed accounts, see Appendix B.
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DCG, I.2.9.
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Peter Laslett, one of Locke’s modern editors, believed that Locke’s Two Treatises on Government is unique
because arguments from history, and particularly arguments about the ancient constitution that Filmer raised,
“mattered a very great deal” to Locke’s contemporaries whereas for Locke, “apparently, they mattered not at
all.” He did not include such arguments in his Two Treatises; instead, he referred his reader elsewhere. See
Appendix B.
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See John Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in
the Seventeenth Century, A Reissue with a Retrospect (Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 237.
91
“[I]t has been said that they,” lawyers, “misled ‘real’ historians into accepting their history, and did this even
though the history they wrote was history that real historians knew was ‘bad’ history; that they ‘played havoc
with history,’ perhaps unconsciously, yet did not heed the lessons of historians; that they lacked training in
correct history, even though what they wrote, forensic history, was the history they were trained to write.”
John Phillip Reid, “The Jurisprudence of Liberty: The Ancient Constitution in the Legal Historiography of the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” The Roots of Liberty: Magna Carta, Ancient Constitution, and the
Anglo-American Tradition of Rule of Law, Ellis Sandoz, ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1993), pp. 195-96
(footnotes omitted).
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this view, the proper approach is to look “with a historian’s open mind,” and historians therefore would have
“found conflicting authorities and they would have had to deal with precedents hostile to their argument.”92
While this criticism is not directed at Sidney, who was not a legal scholar, it would apply to his utilization of
historical examples just as it does to legal scholars at whom the criticism was directed.
In his early work The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, Pocock’s focus was on the history of
early modern English historiography – a subject that was “not only the history of the rise and perfection of a
particular manner of thought – tremendous subject though this is,” but also “the history of all the ways in
which men have felt committed to their past and bound to find out what it was and how they are related to it,
and all the attempts they have made to deal seriously with the problems in which this inquiry involves them.”93
Seventeenth-century Englishmen utilized the law as a means of learning about their past. Indeed, Pocock
saw “the study of the law” as a “mode” of studying the past.94 But this looks at the matter backwards. Rather,
the past was a means of understanding the law.95
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John Phillip Reid, The Ancient Constitution and the Origins of Anglo-American Liberty (DeKalb, ILL: 2005),
p. 65.
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Pocock recognized that in seventeenth-century England, “the attempt” was made “to understand
themselves by understanding their past and their relation to it.” The effort to do so focused on what Pocock
called “two most important schools of thought,” viz., “the common lawyers with their belief that the constitution
was immemorial, and the few dissentients who sought to upset this theory by pointing out that it had once
been informed with the principles of feudal tenure.” John Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal
Law (New York: Norton, 1957), pp. xiii, 251.
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Id, p. xiii.
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For a detailed discussion of Pocock’s unusual love-hate relationship with the law and its practitioners, see
Appendix B. Without dissecting Pocock’s statements, suffice it to say that there is little here with which I can
agree, e.g., that jurisprudence denies that man is naturally political, that law is social but that “the purely
political” is not, that law fixes on commerce not politics, or that it is concerned predominantly with things and
not people and personal relationships. These fundamental dichotomies are not valid. It is true that law is
often a tool of the citizenry, and to the extent that a citizen seeks to enforce his rights, or to make claims
regarding his things, he turns to the law. But as discussed throughout this study, the Law is so much more!
Pocock is correct that, as legal historian Arthur R. Hogue noted, “the history of the common law is matter-offact and rests ultimately on the relationships of people who have taken their differences before a court for
settlement.” In that sense, in medieval and early modern England and America, common law “was the body of
rules enforced by royal judges” – not a strictly commercial perspective, sometimes but not always political, but
invariably grounded in reality, real controversies, and pragmatic solutions. Hogue showed how the “growth of
early common law is inseparable from the events of English political history.” While it was (and is) not perfect
– nothing is – what was (and is) extraordinary about the common law to which Pocock seemed indifferent,
was (and is) its ability to both embrace absolute justice and equity and to provide stability and some sort of
permanence through “[f]aith in the eternal reasonableness of law,” viz., that the “law is written reason, ratio
scripta,” while also embracing the objective of establishing an adaptable system of law. “Any encounter with
the common law may reveal this tension, this polarity, between the permanent and the expedient.” Arthur R.
Hogue, The Origins of the Common Law (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1986)[orig. pub. 1966], pp. 3-4, 9-12,
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Pocock’s perceived “great dangers to the clarity of historical thought” would not exist if one appreciated
that utilization of common law is a legal means of accessing how people in the past handled situations that
were parallel or in some way meaningful to the present resolution of particular conflicts – a task that was the
responsibility of particular lawyers in particular cases, viz., what is often called the case at bar.96 Usually, there
was precedent of relevance, albeit not precisely on point. The outcome often effectively modified the
precedent, reshaping the history – the evolution – of that particular point of law. This is not the same thing as
writing history; indeed, it had nothing to do with writing history. Yes, there was “the essential medieval idea of
law as a thing ancient, immanent and unmade.”97 This principle applied in the practice of law, and still does
today. Logic and experience tell us that from the time men gathered together into societies they created laws,
whether unwritten and customary or written down, that governed the way that people in a community
interacted with each other and how they related to outsiders. These laws evolved over time.98 We see this in
the most ancient of societies, e.g., Hammurabi’s Code. Pocock viewed English customary law as idealized,
which sometimes was true; but it was still there. Pocock also found it unsatisfying that by virtue of the fact that
it was unwritten, “it could be argued with some plausibility that it could never become obsolete.”99 This may or
may not be true. Again, it seems that the purpose for which the inquiry into law from time immemorial was
made has been misunderstood. Lawyers were simply trying to figure out how to resolve contemporary
problems; if resolution was not evident on the face of the law – written or unwritten – lawyers turned to legal
history to do so. In a sense this was what Pocock described as “the attempt to understand themselves by
understanding their past and their relation to it”; but the purpose was much more precise: it was a problemsolving method.100 To the extent that ancient law could be useful in accomplishing that goal, effort was made to

33, 190. For an analysis of how legal history has been influenced by four distinct methodologies of
intellectual history and the best use of such methodologies, see the article by Harvard law professor William
W. Fisher III, “Texts and Contexts. The Application to American Legal History of the Methodologies of
Intellectual History,” Stanford Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 5 (May 1997), pp. 1065-110.
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Pocock, The Ancient Constitution, p. 17.
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Id, p. 16.
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The evolution of the law was intrinsic to its nature. Even within one exact period of time, the circumstances of every case were different and might create very different outcomes and interpretations of
applicable law.
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Id, p. 15.
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Id, p. xiii. “Our Common Law system consists in the applying to new combinations of circumstances those
rules of law which we derive from legal principles and judicial precedents; and for the sake of attaining
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understand ancient law. When “wrong” interpretations were proffered, those who disagreed with the
interpretation said so. This explains the objections by Tyrrell and Sidney to Filmer’s interpretation of history,
which Pocock flagged.101 Sometimes this pursuit proved fruitless. But it was always worth trying, and this was
the role of legal advocates and judges – to make and resolve arguments on the applicability of customary law
to the case at hand.
Pocock also argued that subsequently, “At last,” this “mode” was “succeeded by another in which that
importance,” when “law was supremely important in determining men’s thought about the past,” was replaced
by another method or “mode.”102 While this may be true in terms of historiography, it definitely is not true with
respect to law. Precedent is still the method utilized to resolve legal disputes in legal systems grounded in
English common law, of which the American system of law is one.103
Note, too, that in The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law and other works, Pocock created
separate categories of analysis, segregating one from the other, e.g., “the existence and extent of a
‘language’ of precedent, common law and ancient custom, in which a significant part of English political
argument was … carried on,” versus “other languages,” including “humanist and republican, civilian and
commercial.”104 The determination to categorize, to create paradigmatic classifications, one for the law and
others for separate “languages,” including republicanism, oversimplifies the complex integration and
overlapping of these concepts as they were utilized by those seeking answers to real problems they
confronted, particularly lawyers not historians who, as already emphasized, were looking for the best way to

uniformity, consistency, and certainty, we must apply those rules, where they are not plainly unreasonable and
inconvenient, to all cases which arise.” Judge Baron Parke, Mirehouse v. Rennell, 1 C1 & F., 527, 546, Hogue,
Origins of the Common Law, p. 245.
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Pocock, The Ancient Constitution, pp. 347-48.
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Id, pp. xiii, 251.
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“Case law refers to the creation and refinement of law in the course of judicial decisions. The foregoing
has highlighted the increased importance of legislation in its various guises in today’s society but, even
allowing for this and the fact that case law can be overturned by legislation, the UK is still a common law
system and the importance and effectiveness of judicial creativity and common law principles and practices
cannot be discounted.” In this system, “The doctrine of binding precedent, or stare decisis, lies at the heart of
the English legal system.” Gary Slapper & David Kelly, The English Legal System Ninth Edition (London &
New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009), pp. 3, 102.
104

Pocock, The Ancient Constitution, p. xi. “It is the diversity of languages, reflecting the diversity of
problems, with which the historian of political discourse remains concerned.” J. G. A. Pocock, Political
Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 138.
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resolve real disputes. This was something that in later years Pocock acknowledged.105
In short, whether or not one agrees with Pocock’s assertion that these seventeenth-century men
utilized the law as a means of learning about their past, he mistakenly believed that this was a passing
phenomenon. That with Locke and Descartes, thinkers “overcame” this approach to history with “techniques
of political argument” relying on abstract political concepts, particularly natural law.106 Here we have another
misunderstanding. First of all, we cannot make the black-and-white distinction that Pocock drew; matters are
essential grey. For while Coke’s “artificial reason” relied upon “accumulations and refinements of
experience,” the nature of that experience often included “philosophical reflexion.” In De Laudibus, for
example, Fortescue wrote about how “freedom was instilled into human nature by God.”107 Coke ‘s
understanding of the ancient constitution relied on and conformed with Fortescue’s ideas. Both judicial
scholars – legal philosophers! – “appeal[ed] to all the sources of law with the understanding that the ancient
laws of England accord with eternal and natural law no less than with immemorial precedent, as befits all
human laws but is uniquely achieved in England.” Selden piggy-backed on this thesis.108 Pace Pocock, “the
wisdom of generations” was not the former (artificial reason and experience), at the expense of the latter
(philosophical reflections).109 Lawyers were (and are) not arm-chair philosophers; but they were (and are)
active, engaged, enterprising, efficacious practicing philosophers who sought (or seek) ways to solve specific
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“There have been criticisms which suggest that the two chapters on ‘The Common-Law Mind’ present it in
over-simplified terms, and as isolated from the operations of other languages to a greater degree that the
evidence justifies; it seems possible that some of these criticisms are justified.” Pocock, The Ancient
Constitution, p. xii.
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Pocock, The Ancient Constitution, pp. 16-18, 236. This is where some historians get entirely off track. For
example, in his article, “Reason and History in Early Whig Thought: The Case of Algernon Sidney,” James
Conniff asserted that arguments from history are irrelevant if one is basing one’s political theory on reason;
Locke chose the latter approach, whereas Sidney chose both. But Conniff misapprehended Sidney’s use of
history. Sidney’s analyses required, as a starting point, an understanding of human nature and the necessity
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legal problems, assiduously pursuing analytical approaches that work in the particular legal contexts at hand.
Again, whether philosophical reflection was (or is) part of that process had to do with the nature of the legal
controversy, i.e., the specific context and circumstances in which common law was (or is) invoked. Nuts and
bolts determine the applicability or usefulness of philosophical reflection.110
Pocock identified another ostensible transition away from “the age in which law was supremely
important in determining men’s thought about the past … succeeded by another in which that importance has
been lost.”111 In Pocock’s view, “in a number of European nations,” there was a kind of political thought,
“which cannot satisfactorily be termed ‘constitutionalism’ since it involved a more intensive use of historical
and antiquarian thinking than the use of that term normally applies.” (How is the term “normally applie[d]”?112)
This political thought was “an attempt to settle fundamental political questions, notably those involving law,
right and sovereignty, by appeal not directly to abstract political concepts, but to the existing ‘municipal’ laws
of the country concerned and to the concept of custom, prescription and authority that underlay them, as well
as to the reverence which they enjoyed by reason of their antiquity.”113 Was Pocock circling around to an
acceptance of European interpretations not only of positive “municipal” laws, but also to reliance on custom,
which he had rejected in the context of early modern England? Pocock seemed to be searching for the right
paradigm by which to address the use of history in law, an interesting exercise but simply not the way that
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lawyers think.
To sum up, as law professor John Phillip Reid explained in The Ancient Constitution and the Origins of
Anglo-American History, in the case of Coke and other English common law jurists and practitioners, history
was invaluable as a technique of persuasion, not for purposes of establishing what had happened in the past
but, rather, to support a contemporaneous goal. The ancient constitution “must not be thought mainly a model
of liberty that existed in the golden age of antiquity when a warrior people cherished freedom and knew how to
preserve it. The forensic value of the ancient constitution was not in its past perfection but in its present
timelessness.”114 In the case of both Sidney (and John Adams) and the jurists Pocock severely criticized,
historical examples were invoked to analogize historical events and figures to present circumstances that were
the subject of their advocacy. “Usually the purpose was to get across a practical lesson.”115 However
“ahistorical” this approach may seem to an historian, it was (and still is) the bread-and-butter of the advocate –
attorney or otherwise. Indeed, it is a formalized method in the law, viz., argument based on precedent.116 As
medieval historian J. C. Holt explained in the context of Magna Carta, “The intimate relation between law and
history was of a special kind. It was concerned with precedent. It involved selection and encouraged error, but
it was something different from the simple anachronism of superimposing the present on the past…. It was
more deliberate, more precise….”117 This is Sidney’s chosen methodology, too. Reid dubbed the strategic
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This principle, from both their awareness of legal practice and simply from wisdom, is the underlying
motivation of Sidney and others who relied on historical example to prove the contemporary argument that
they were making.
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utilization of historical example “forensic history.”118 The lawyer, and Sidney – along with Cicero, Machiavelli,
and many other political theorists, some trained in the law and some not – “take from the past what they needed
or found useful” that would be effective in the advocacy in which they were engaged. “It is an essential feature
of the common-law system that its principles are derived from decisions in actual cases.”119 This does not mean
that forensic historians manipulated data or changed historical facts. Indeed, purposefully misleading one’s
audience was (and is) an unacceptable use of history, forensic or otherwise. Notwithstanding the ever-present
disdain for lawyers, that is not what effective advocacy was (or is) all about. In fact, because such misuse can
be exposed, resulting in the complete loss of an advocate’s credibility and therefore his case, it is incompetent
advocacy.120
The role of the attorney and political theorists like Sidney who were writing to advocate a cause and a
political platform was to persuade – in the case of Sidney, perhaps only to persuade himself. This is a
different explicit agenda than that of the historian. But how different is it, really? However idealized our view
may be about the historian’s analysis of the past, she also seeks to persuade her audience of the perspective
she is advocating by her selection of information from an unlimited mine of history, of historical facts and
contexts. After all, even in the immediate aftermath of an event people have very different understandings of
what occurred. While it is not the job of champions of a legal cause to present countervailing arguments or
evidence, of which there may be greater expectations in historical advocacy, a good lawyer almost always
addresses such matters. The reason she does so is because it is the best way to preempt them. Moreover, it
is not only lawyers but historians who can opt to avoid countervailing arguments or evidence, viz., present
facts that might suggest a different interpretation of events and therefore outcome. But again, this can
backfire.
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Not to be postmodern, but events are subject to multiple understandings and interpretations, whether
one is an historian or a lawyer. What is important to recognize, however, is that the approach of both
disciplines (and others) to history are well designed and appropriate for the purposes they serve. The
historian crafts his understanding of history from “evidence,” as does the lawyer; perhaps the historian, whose
agenda is not explicitly advocacy or adversarial, considers herself to be more “objective.” It is doubtful that
she is. There is no reason to think that the human beings who become historians think “with a historian’s open
mind” any more than attorneys do. In law, quite expressly, to the extent that historical examples are useful
ammunition in the advocate’s arsenal, they are fair game. If an advocate distorts her evidence – historical or
otherwise – it is the role of the adversarial process to challenge the accuracy, and therefore the credibility of
the opposing advocate’s argument. This is considered the most effective, albeit not full-proof way to establish
the truth or, at least, a more credible perspective. It is an explicit part of the legal process. Historians rely on
the public sphere – countervailing essays and reviews – to accomplish the same thing. While the adversarial
process may be held in disdain by some in the academic community who are not interested in the present use
of the past, and while history may be more likely to be presented as objective “truth,” any meaningful
description of historical events is its own form of advocacy; it also is very much a part of the legitimate give
and take of academic analysis.121 This is the nature of both the Anglo-American legal system and of
academia generally, and it would have been very familiar to Sidney from his own extensive legal wranglings
as well as his engagement in political discourse. After all, Sidney’s Discourses was a rebuttal of the creative
use of history by Robert Filmer.
Reid wistfully wondered whether “we have gone too far down a road of professional separation. Is it
possible that historians and lawyers can no longer understand one another because they are asking different
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questions based on different assumptions?”122 Perhaps we have more in common than Reid feared.
But lest his fraud in this should be detected, he cites no precise passage
of any author, alleges few examples, and those mistaken; never tells us
what the law was, when made, or where to be found; whereas I hope to
prove, that he has upon the whole matter abominably prevaricated,
and advanced things that he knows to be either impertinent or false.
Algernon Sidney, Discourses123

iii. Rebutting Filmer
In Discourses Concerning Government Sidney’s purpose and method was designed explicitly to rebut
Filmer’s ideas in Patriarcha, of the Natural Rights of Kings; consequently, a few words about Filmer and his text
are in order.124 Until recently, historians had sought, with markedly limited success, to explain why three
contemporary seventeenth-century thinkers would find it necessary to write substantial tracts to rebut
Patriarcha.125 The picture is significantly unraveled by Cesare Cuttica in Sir Robert Filmer (1588-1653) and the
Patriotic Monarch.126 Much of Cuttica’s monograph is focused on the confrontation between the “patriots” and
the royalists, some of the latter of whom were patriarchalists in the 1620s.127 The advent of Charles I’s
“Personal Rule” from 1629 to 1640 after he had dissolved Parliament for the last time did not alter the wave of
patriotism and consequent political divisiveness that continued into and beyond the Civil War. It is within this
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Protestant Cause “both at home and abroad,” the “fundamental role of a freely elected parliamentary
assembly,” emphasized a “(republican) abhorrence of corruption,” and repudiated the king’s absolute
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context that Cuttica placed Filmer and his well-known political text, Patriarcha.128
Robert Filmer was a wealthy landowner, a member of the gentry in in the county of Kent in southern
England, with an estate located in the vicinity of the Sidney ancestral home of Penshurst. “Since the
fourteenth century the Filmers had been one of the most influential Kentish families,” with a well-recognized
intellectual bent and a substantial library. Filmer went to Cambridge although he did not graduate, and then
to Lincoln’s Inn. He was “one of a circle of high churchmen” at Cambridge.129 Eight years later Filmer
became a member of the bar, although he did not practice law. He did serve on the local magistrates’ bench,
a decidedly lawyerly function, as did both laymen and attorneys. Leicester was chairman of the bench on
which Filmer sat!130 In 1619, several years before Algernon was born, Filmer was knighted. Scholarly
inclinations led him to write commentaries and treatises on a variety of subjects, including works by Plato and
Aristotle, but also on usury, witchcraft, in praise of women (particularly, wives) and absolute monarchy.131 For
James I, the foundation of absolute monarchy as a divinely ordained and sanctioned institution was not only
Scripture, but also the “Law of Nature,” which designated the king as “a natural Father to all his Lieges at his
Coronation.”132 James embraced the metaphor of pater patriae as a means of understanding the nature of
kingship: “The king towards his people is rightly compared to a father of children.” It is this latter point, the
patriarchal nature of kingship, which constituted the guts of Filmer’s argument, although Filmer veered off into
an elaborate, far-fetched “proof” that in the Garden of Eden God gave to Adam the role of king of the world,
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and for millennia Adam had passed on this sovereignty to monarchs.
In the 1640s and ‘50s Filmer became close friends with Peter Heylyn, a prolific royalist author who
was a major figure in the Laudian settlement, and with whom Filmer shared political values.133 Heylyn wrote
aggressively about the king not being one of three estates (with Commons and Lords); for “What else can
follow hereupon but that the king must be co-ordinate with his two houses of parliament, and if co-ordinate,
then to be over-ruled by their joint concurrence, bound to conform to their acts,” a ridiculous, dangerous and
“brainless foll[y]”!134 Later both men were also associated with the highly influential Sir John Spelman, royalist
author and scholar who also strongly advocated the position that supreme power was placed unequivocally in
the king, including the sole power to make laws. Spelman defined the two houses of Parliament as
subordinate. In short, the king was subject to no one on earth but himself.135 From Patriarcha we know that
Filmer had earlier advocated this view. Sidney, on the other hand, in Discourses, ignored Spelman (although
he cited his scholarly father, Henry), and castigated Heylyn and of course Filmer, frequently pairing them
together, e.g., “And as Aristotle following the wise men of those times, shews us how far reason, improved by
meditation, can advance in the knowledge and love of that which is truly good; so we may in Filmer, guided by
Heylyn, see an example of corrupted Christians, extinguishing the light of religion by their vices, and
degenerating into beasts, whilst they endeavour to support the personal interest of some men … as if
governments had not been instituted for the common good of nations.”136
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Filmer did not fight in the Civil War. While we might have expected him to have been an active and
ardent political and military supporter of the royal cause, surprisingly, he was much more circumspect.
Filmer, like Leicester, was a man who “seemed to prefer neutrality.”137 Because of his royalist pedigree,
however, he was threatened with the loss of his estate and placed in confinement and then jail by the
parliamentarians, who completely controlled Kent.138 But this was long after Filmer had written Patriarcha,
which was ready for publication by 1632.
Cuttica believed that Filmer was motivated to write Patriarcha in order to defend the unpopular
policies of James I and Charles I, who “failed to provide their subjects with a popular and successful account
of monarchy and its values.” This occurred contemporaneously with the Stuarts’ implementation of decidedly
unpopular policies, such as the Forced Loan strategy of 1626-27 utilized by Charles I to build up his treasury
without reliance on Parliament, not to mention Stuart manifest sympathy with Catholicism and the absolutist
French monarchy.139
Filmer’s ideas were not unique. In early seventeenth-century England patriarchal political theory was
common, and often arose in connection with the hostility between Protestants and Catholics, particularly in the

infected our Universities, that are the Seminaries where the Youth of this Nation do commonly receive
Principles both in Religion and Politicks, which if they have not a mind large enough to overcome the
prejudices of Education, will mislead them as long as they live, and so make them desire at least to alter that
Government, and give up those Priviledges which their Ancestors were so careful to preserve and deliver
down to Posterity.” In short, Tyrrell was worried about the impact of Filmer on young men still very much
formulating their ideas. Consequently, he thought himself “obliged (having perhaps more leisure, though less
parts and learning [none] than a great many others) to do God, my King, and Country this service, as to lay
open the weakness of the Reasons, and the dangerous consequences of this Author’s Principles.” On
Filmer’s Patriarcha, Locke wrote, “there was never so much glib Nonsence put together in well sounding
English.” Preface, “First Treatise,” Two Treatises, p. 138.
137
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years following the 1605 Gunpowder Plot in which a group of Catholics, ostensibly with Jesuit support,
conspired to blow up the House of Lords while James I was in attendance.140 Divine right theory was based on
the grant of power to the King by God, and emphatically demanded a duty of obedience by the people to their
absolute monarch.141 There also was the “constitutional royalism” of Sir Edward Hyde in the 1640s, along with
Anglican clergyman Henry Ferne and members of the royalist Great Tew Circle, including Dudley Digges, Sir
John Spelman and others, who “share[d] a wish to defend and reconcile two key principles: that sovereign
kings were not accountable to their subjects, and that kings were obliged to respect the rule of law.”142 Some
of these men sought to reconcile absolutism with the legal character of that authority so that a monarch could
be constrained by law, but only in the sense of self-constraint (which, however important it may have been
viewed at the time, in legal parlance is equivalent to no constraint). As one bishop opined, “[Y]et all of them
being absolute Kings and free Monarchs, are excepted from any account of their actions to any inferiour
jurisdiction.”143 Even Cromwell’s chaplain, John Owen, considered the “ideal scenario” in government to be “a
magistrate-ordered godliness.”144
In contrast, Filmer believed in patriarchal-based absolutism. In the Bible God had designated Adam,
in his time, to be the king of the world in the manner that fathers were the patriarchs of their families. As the
patriarchal monarch Adam had complete, divinely sanctioned political authority, just as fathers had parallel
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authority within the family.145 But absolute monarchy was not primarily derived from the patriarchal nature of
seventeenth-century family life.146 Rather, Filmer maintained that the Adamite model of kingship did not die
out but had been continuously passed on over innumerable generations (and, indeed, communities and
civilizations) to the absolute kingly rule of seventeenth-century countries, justifying the superiority of secular
rulers to the power claimed by the Pope.147 Modern temporal polities “were the outcome of Cain’s murder”
and his consequent banishment, “legitimated by the original fatherly power embodied in Adam.”148 Adam’s
descendants inherited his political status as apparently had all subsequent monarchs including the Stuarts.
These men were all legitimate, if not hereditary descendants of Adam’s patriarchal kingship designated by
God to rule their societies.149 One of the (many) fundamental problems that Sidney had with Filmer’s analysis
was the assumption that justice would best be served by determining the form of the very first government.
Sidney found this ridiculous: “As governments were instituted for the obtaining of justice, and (as our author
says) the preservation of liberty, we are not to seek what government was first, but what best provides for the
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with the theory of the divine right of kings.” Cuttica, Filmer, p. 5. In Patriarcha Filmer stated, for example,
“The greatest liberty in the world … is for people to live under a monarch. … All other shows or pretexts of
liberty are but several degrees of slavery. … [N]ot only Adam but the succeeding patriarchs had, by right of
fatherhood, royal authority over their children. … And this subjection of children is the only fountain of all regal
authority, by the ordination of God himself.” Filmer, Patriarcha, pp. 4, 7.
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There are important “fatherly” components here pace Cuttica, who went out of his way to indict scholars
“as ideologically different as Gordon Schochet, Glenn Burgess and Carole Paterman” for their identity of
paternal or patriarchal power and political power. Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer, p. 150. This approach may be
an oversimplification, but it assuredly is not wrong. First, the Adamite model would not work without the
inheritance of the authority vested in Adam from father to son, generation after generation. Second, as Filmer
recognized, “the natural duties of a father” when compared to those of a monarch, are “all one, without any
difference at all but only in the latitude or extent of them.” Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 12. In short, the Schochet et
al. analogy is very helpful. But the analogy is just that – an analogy; it is not a justification. To justify his
theory, Filmer relied on the role God granted to Adam. As a separate matter, Cuttica oversimplified when he
emphasized the so-called secular nature of Filmer’s argument: “It is, however, important to underline that,
whilst Laud’s preoccupations were ecclesiastical, Filmer’s were exclusively secular.” Cuttica, Sir Robert
Filmer, pp. 159-60 n.84. Any reliance Filmer placed on Adam and, according to Cuttica, he placed total
reliance, is per force not exclusively secular.
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Commonly bound within the King James Bible and the Book of Common Prayer were elaborate
genealogical tables “documenting” the line of descent from Adam to Jesus by way of Noah, Abraham and Lot,
e.g., a 1612 Booke of Common Prayer … with The Genealogies Recorded in the Sacred Scriptures … With
the Line of our Sauiour Iesus Christ obserued from Adam to the blessed Virgin Mary, and The Holy Bible, and
a 1633 Edinburgh book, The Book of Common Prayer bound with Genealogies, Apocrypha and other
pamphlets. See Gaby Mahlberg, “Republicanism as Anti-patriarchalism in Henry Neville’s The Isle of Pines
(1668),” Liberty, Authority, Formality, Ch. 7, pp. 131-52, 142 n.53.
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Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer, pp. 94, 109.

149

See, e.g., Filmer, Patriarcha, pp. 6-7, 10-12.
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obtaining of justice, and preservation of liberty.”150
Because of the absolute authority granted to Filmer’s patriarchal monarch, including the English ones,
it was immoral and illegal for junior members of “the family,” that is, other members of the kingdom, to
challenge any decision made by the monarch.151 Furthermore, “those sitting in the Commons, who ‘say it is a
slavish and a dangerous condition to be subject to the will of any one man who is not subject to the laws’,
were obnoxious fomenters of rebellion.”152
An important addition to the theory of patriarchal divine right that Cuttica brought to the fore is
Filmer’s embracing the arbitrariness of kingly power – a necessary attribute of its absolute nature. The king
was “the only non-equal in the State,” and it was inconceivable that a government could exist “without an
arbitrary power”; indeed, “’[i]t is not power except it be arbitrary.’”153 In this respect Filmer was much more
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DCG, III.25.460.
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“For Filmer only the Adamite solution could guarantee to ‘every man to live in peace, that so he may tend
[to] the preservation of his life, which whilst he is in actual war [as in the state of nature] he cannot do’.”
Cuttica, Filmer, p. 127, citing Filmer’s Observations Concerning the Originall of Government, Upon Mr Hobs
Leviathan, Mr Milton against Salmasius, H. Grotius e Jure Belli,” Filmer, Patriarcha, pp. 184-234, 188.
Burgess’ take on this argument was that at least in the 1620 to 1640 timeframe, absolutists such as James I
did not believe that the monarch’s power was absolute since he was subject to divine law; this meant that the
king could not be an arbitrary monarch. Nevertheless, even Burgess recognized that, “in the end, because
there were no mechanisms to enforce this limitation (or any other), kings were sole law-givers, true sovereigns;
and, in consequence, ‘absolutist theory provided no safeguard against [tyranny]’.” Burgess, Absolute
Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, p. 27, citing J. P. Sommerville’s Politics and Ideology in England, 16041640 (London, 1986), pp. 34, 36, 38. The difficulty with Burgess’ argument is that it is dependent on
seventeenth-century acceptance of a dichotomy between what made sense in theory, and what actually
occurred in practice. This is implausible, even though it would be well to be “unaided but also undeceived,”
such that “many of the dichotomous interpretative alternatives that we have hitherto faced can be
transcended.” Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, p. 2.
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Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer, p. 118. Tyrrell could not have disagreed more with Filmer’s ideas about
patriarchalism.”[S]ince, as I have already shown, that a Father hath no higher Right or Authority from God
over the person of his Child, but as it tends to his good and preservation, or as it conduces to the great end of
Nature, the common Good and preservation of Mankinde: So when the Father transgresses this Authority,
his Right ceases; and when that ceases, the Sons Right to preserve himself (and in that, to pursue that great
end) begins to take place.” Accordingly, “out of a Civil state, if a Father will endeavour evidently, without any
just cause, to take away his Sons Life, I think the Son may in this case, if he cannot otherwise escape nor
avoid it, and that his Father will not be pacified neither with his submission nor entreaty, defend himself
against his Father, not with a design to kill him, but purely to preserve his own Life; and if in this case the
Father happen to be kill’d, I think his Blood is upon his own head.” James Tyrrell, Patriarcha non monarcha.
The Patriarch unmonarch’d: Being Observations on a late treatise and divers other miscellanies, published
under the name of Sir Robert Filmer Baronet. In which the falseness of those opinions that would make
monarchy Jure Divino are laid open: and the true Principles of Government and Property (especially in our
Kingdom) asserted. By a Lover of Truth and of his Country (London: Richard Janeway, 1681).
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles /2168, at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/ 2168# _1453_45 (08/14/2014). Likewise
Locke and Sidney, among others.
153

Interestingly, of Filmer’s opponents, Sidney was one of the few men who agreed with him that ultimately,
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extreme in his views than James I, who conceded that while “kings had first governed arbitrarily, … [b]ecause
of their coronation oath, sovereigns had to abide by the laws of the country.” Filmer argued that “the king was
“’lex loquens – a speaking law.’”154 He was beholden to no one and nothing.
Until recently scholars did not realize that Filmer tried unsuccessfully to publish Patriarcha; his
request for a license, which was required to publish, was turned down.155 At the time (1632), Sidney was only
nine years old. Later, during Cromwell’s Protectorate, after Filmer had been imprisoned and released and was
living quietly on his Kent estate, Algernon served on the committee that recommended that Lords and the
monarchy be abolished, which occurred in March 1649. In this timeframe, Algernon spent considerable time
at Penshurst, where two of the royal children, Princess Elizabeth and the Duke of Gloucester, were placed
under the protection of Leicester and his wife from June 1649 until August 1650, after the execution of their
father.
Penshurst is located a stone’s throw – about twenty miles, within the same county – from Filmer’s
family estate at East Sutton in Kent, southeast of London. By this time Filmer was in his sixties whereas
Sidney was a young man. We do not know whether Filmer interacted directly with Leicester in this timeframe,
although this seems probable. In addition to their both serving on the local magistrates bench, Filmer’s

all power was arbitrary. Halifax also agreed: “There is then no other fundamental but that every supreme
power must be arbitrary.” “Political Thoughts and Reflections,” Halifax Complete Works, p. 198. The issue for
Sidney was who was entitled to decide where that arbitrary power lay. On Cuttica’s analysis of Filmer and
arbitrary power, see Sir Robert Filmer, p. 74 & n.208, and p. 99 & n.68, relying on Filmer’s statements in
works other than Patriarcha, viz., The Free-holders Grand Inquest Touching Our Sovereraigne Lord the king
and His Parliament, and Observations Concerning The Originall of Government, Upon Mr Hobs Leviathan, Mr
Milton against Salmasius, H. Grotius De Jure Belli, both in Sommerville, ed., Filmer. This political tract was
published anonymously in 1648. Months later Filmer published The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy.
Or a Succinct Examination of the Fundamentals of Monarchy, both in this and other Kingdoms, as well as
about the Right of Power in Kings, as of the Original/or Natural/ Liberty of the People. This tract also was
published anonymously.
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Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer, p. 111. Mahlberg pointed out that it was debatable “[h]ow far the coronation
oath also obliged the King to consent to laws,” juxtaposing the views of moderate parliamentarians, who might
contend that the King had a legislative veto (sometimes called “the negative”, e.g., Neville in Plato Redivivus),
with radical parliamentarians who “interpreted the coronation oath as a binding contract between ruler and
ruled, obliging the king to consent to the laws the two houses had made, rendering the king subordinate to
them.” Gaby Mahlberg, “Republicanism as Anti-patriarchalism in Henry Neville’s The Isle of Pines (1668),”
Liberty, Authority, Formality, pp. 131-52, 143; Neville, Plato Redivivus, p. 30 & p. 74 (quoting Filmer,
Patriarcha, p. 40).
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See Cuttica, Filmer, ch. 5, “The issue of Patriarcha’s non-publication”; cf. Laslett, “Sir Robert Filmer,” p.
532. For a more detailed discussion of Patriarcha’s initial non-publication, see Appendix B.
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eldest daughter was “a great friend” of Sidney’s sister Dorothy.156 One of Filmer’s sons also “carried out
some important errands for the Earl in 1640.”157 Filmer and Leicester were socially positioned in different
stations in life as members of the high aristocracy and gentry, respectively, and held decidedly different
political views; nevertheless, it would have been somewhat surprising if they were not only social but also
intellectual acquaintances given their close geographic proximity, shared intellectual prowess, recognized
erudition, unusually bibliophilic nature and formidable libraries.158 We know that there was an accomplished
intellectual tradition in Kent in which the county gentlemen participated, exchanging and circulating papers
and met to discuss them. Patriarcha may well have circulated among this group by 1628.159 “The manner of
composition of this work and its circulation in manuscript form for many years before it was printed were alike
typical of the literary activity of these Kentish gentlemen, and particularly of Filmer.”160 Laslett pointed out that
the circulation of Patriarcha that Filmer would have expected was the passage of copies of the manuscript
“from friend to friend.” In fact, Worden recognized that, “It is not inconceivable that [Algernon] Sidney would
have written the [Discourses] treatise as a reply to one of the manuscript versions of Filmer’s tract that were in
circulation earlier, in which case we would perhaps view the two works as a debate within the learned milieu
of Kentish gentlemen to which both the Filmers and the Sidneys belonged.”161 Carswell suggested that
Sidney studied Patriarcha in the 1638 to 1640 timeframe when he was living at Penshurst while his parents
were in Paris. “Algernon’s minute knowledge of the Patriarcha, and his alleged ability to compose a
voluminous reply to it within a fairly short time of its later appearance in print; and his reference (in 1683) to
having worked on such a reply for many years past. All point to his having seen the text long before its
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Filmer was seven years older than Leicester (born in 1588 and 1595, respectively).
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Carswell, The Porcupine, p. 17.
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See Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer, “The 1630s: Filmer Amongst the Kentish Literati,” pp. 26-28.
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Mahlberg relied here on Jonathan Scott’s Algernon Sidney and the restoration Crisis, 1677-1683
(Cambridge University Press, 2002)(“Scott II”), pp. 7, 208, and Richard Tuck, “Communications: A New Date
for Filmer’s ‘Patriarcha,” Historical Journal 29 (1986), pp. 183-86. See Mahlberg, “Republicanism as Antipatriarchalism in Henry Neville’s The Isle of Pines (1668),” p. 141 & n.47. In concluding that Henry Neville’s
anti-patriarchal parody, The Isle of Pines, was likely a response to Patriarcha and other Filmer publications,
Mahlberg also maintained that the Patriarcha manuscript was definitely circulating by the 1640s. Id; see also
Mahlberg, Henry Neville and English republican culture in the seventeenth century, Ch. 3, “Republicanism as
anti-patriarchalism,” pp. 83-138.
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Laslett, “Sir Robert Filmer,” p. 529.
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Id, p. 532; Worden, “Commonwealth Kidney,” p. 15.
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publication in 1679. What is more, some of his quotations from Filmer vary considerably from that printed
text.”162 This latter point suggests that perhaps Sidney was working from a manuscript of Patriarcha in
circulation; he also may have had The Free-holders Grand Inquest in hand, which contained closely-related
political arguments.
Filmer died in 1653, seven years before the Restoration. Whatever we might conclude as to Filmer’s
reasons for writing Patriarcha, they are not apposite to the context, many years later, in which the text was
printed and enjoyed a certain notoriety.163 Scholars believe that all three of Patriarcha’s major intellectual
challengers – Sidney, Tyrrell and Locke – wrote their Filmer refutations in the same general timeframe; but
there is vigorous scholarly debate over the precise timing of Sidney and Locke’s works. Tyrrell published
Patriarcha non Monarcha in 1681, one year after Patriarcha was published.164 Worden and Wootton contend
that Sidney did not begin work on Discourses until August 1681 at the earliest, although during his trial and in
the paper Sidney handed to the sheriff as he climbed the scaffold, Sidney vociferously claimed otherwise.165
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Carswell, The Porcupine, p. 19.

163

Worden, “Commonwealth Kidney,” p. 23.
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Henry Neville’s The Isle of Pines, first published in 1668, may have been a much earlier Patriarcha
rebuttal, written by a man who, like Sidney, was in exile during the Restoration. As discussed in the context of
various Sidney ideas, there are themes in common in The Isle of Pines and Sidney’s Discourses. The Isle of
Pines, however, was published during Neville’s lifetime, whereas Sidney’s work was not published during his.
Soon after its initial publication, The Isle of Pines was translated into Dutch, French, Italian, German and
Danish. Copies also were sent to New England. Neville & Ford, The Isle of Pines: An Essay in Bibliography,
p. 136; Mahlberg, “Republicanism as Anti-patriarchalism in Henry Neville’s The Isle of Pines (1668),” Liberty,
Authority, Formality, pp. 134-36.
165
With his life on the line one could easily maintain that Sidney was inherently incredible in testifying on his
own behalf at his trial that his treatise was not related to any contemporaneous conspiratorial activities.
Nevertheless, he was under oath. During his trial, he stated, “My lord, if these papers are right, it mentioned
200 and odd sheets, and these shew neither beginning nor ending; and will you, my lord, indict a man for
treason for scraps of paper found in his house, relating to an ancient paper, intending as innocently as any
thing in the world, and piece and patch this to my lord Howard’s discourse, to make this a contrivance to kill the
king?” In the Apology that Sidney delivered to the Sheriff as he mounted the scaffold, he repeatedly stated
that the yellowed manuscript pages were written many years earlier, “that the ink and paper did evidently shew
they were very old, and it was impossible they should have any dependence upon businesse pretended to be
now in agitation; such as had bin written many, perhaps twenty or thirty years agoe, could not relate unto the
pretended consultations within ten months.” Accordingly, in an assessment of Sidney’s trial prepared for
William III long after Sidney had been executed, Sir John Hawles, Knight, Solicitor General, stated, “But
admitting Colonel Sidney wrote that book and published it; yet if it were not done with a design to stir the
subjects up into a rebellion, but was writ and published only disputandi gratis, as the import of the books shews
plainly it was, it was no more treason, than the discourse between Blague [a conspirator found not guilty] and
Mate Lee about taking the Tower was.” The Solicitor General continued, “And suppose it was wrote with that
design, yet it not appearing when it was writ, how could a jury upon their oaths, say it was done with a design
to raise rebellion against king Charles the Second, when for aught appeared, it was writ before he was king or
thought of? It might, for aught appeared, be writ in king Charles the First’s time, or Cromwell’s time, and

407

We can all agree that it had to have been written as is – that is, in its draft form (although possibly redrafted,
edited or a collection of drafts) – as an ongoing process that ended on June 26, 1683, the day Sidney was
arrested.166 Because of the existence of references in the early part of the Discourses to later events, Worden
concluded that it could not have been written before August 1681 and that the latter part was written in the
1682-83 timeframe. Scott relied on Worden’s “definitive discussion of the dating of the Discourses,” noting
that it was probably begun in 1681 shortly after the completion of A Just and Modest Vindication, and was still
being written when Sidney was arrested in May 1683.167 This is not the only plausible conclusion.
Unfortunately, we do not have the original manuscript, or any other copy in Sidney’s handwriting. This means
that there is no way to tell whether, like the rest of us, Sidney could have later added “carrots” providing
additional information substantially after drafting portions of Chapter One, even if there are reasons to
conclude, as Worden did, that significant portions of Chapter Two were written subsequently. The date of
publication is not helpful because it was published posthumously, in 1698. Locke’s Two Treatises were
published anonymously in 1689, and then publicly attributed to Locke shortly before his death in 1704.168
Scholars date the composition of Two Treatises to sometime between 1681 and 1683.169 In the Tyrrell,

designed against either of them, or any foreign prince, and therefore could not be treason against king Charles
the Second.” We do know from its content that some portions were written much later; but that does not mean
that it was not started much earlier, and not directed at Charles II. See Worden, “Commonwealth Kidney,” pp.
14-15; Other Crimes and Misdemeanors from the Earliest Period to the Year 1783, with Notes and Other
Illustrations, Vol. 9 (London: T. C. Hansard, 1811)[Lexington, KY: Ulan Reprints, 2014], Col. 368; “The Apology
of A. Sydney in the Day of his Death,” Algernon Sidney, Discourses concerning government by Algernon
Sydney with his letters trial apology and some memoirs of his life, Thomas Hollis, ed. (London: A. Millar, 1763;
ECCO reproduction, 2010), supplemental materials at pp. 169-98, 179; Appendix XXI, “Remarks on Algernon
Sidney’s Trial, By Sir John Hawles, Knight, Solicitor General to King William III, Meadley, Memoirs of Algernon
Sydney, p. 360. For an abbreviated version of Sidney’s Apology, see Appendix XXVII of Meadley, Memoirs of
Algernon Sydney, p. 392.
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West, “Foreword,” DCG, p. xxxiv.
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Scott II, p. 201.
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Locke left instructions in a late codicil to his will, “written only a week or two before he died,” effectively
acknowledging his authorship of Two Treatises in his gift of the book to the Bodleian Library. Laslett,
“Introduction,” John Locke: Two Treatises of Government, p. 4.
169

Wootton maintained that the Second Treatise was written in the second half of 1681, and the First Treatise
was written by March 1681. David Wootton, “Introduction,” John Locke, Political Writings (Indianapolis &
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003), p, 63. Laslett, Ashcraft and Marshall agreed on this timing
with respect to the First Treatise, but disagreed with regard to the Second Treatise, with Laslett maintaining
that Locke wrote most of the Second Treatise in 1679-80, during the succession crisis, but then revised and
added to it as late as 1683 when he went into exile. Ashcraft maintained that the writing of the Second
Treatise took place in the 1681-83 period, and Marshall concluded that it was written in the 1682-83 period.
Id, pp. 50-54. Why is this important? One of the issues in contention is which author may have benefited
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Sidney, and Locke tracts we have something much more than responsive pamphlets to Patriarcha, of which
there were numerous on all sides of these issues.170 This triple-barreled, heavy-duty response to a book was
exceptional. What was the perceived threat?171
Patriarcha was finally published in 1680, although written in the late 1620s-early ’30s.172 But Filmer
was not a new author to his community, published or otherwise. His substantial pamphlet The Freeholders
Grand Inquest foreshadowed arguments in Patriarcha, circulated widely in the Kent intellectual community
and beyond in the 1640s, was published anonymously in 1648, and began with the epigraph, “Anyone who
believes that it is servitude to live under a prince is badly mistaken: there is no more welcome liberty than to
be under a righteous king.”173 A copy of Freeholders Grand Inquest is in the Sidney Library, as is a 1648
edition of Filmer’s pamphlet rejecting mixed monarchy, The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy.174
Scholars assume Patriarcha was eventually published by members of the emerging Tory party as they fought
Shaftesbury and his exclusion campaign.175 “One reason for Filmer’s popularity was that the straw men that

from the other author(s)’ writing. The other issue is the correct understanding of the historical context within
which Locke’s words should be understood.
170

On the proliferation of political pamphlets after the 1679 lapse of the Licensing Act that had censored such
publications, see Cuttica, “Publishing in the Exclusion Crisis (1679-81): Patriarcha between fatherhood and
fatherland,” Sir Robert Filmer, Ch. 7, pp. 187-201 and accompanying notes; see also Holstun, Pamphlet
Wars.
171

In Plato Redivivus, also published in 1681, Neville ho-humly dismissed patriarchal theory: “Really, I did not
think it worth the taking notice of: for though it be not easy to prove a negative, yet I believe if we could trace
all foundations of polities that now are, or ever came to our knowledge since the world began; we shall find
none of them to have descended from paternal power.” Neville, Plato Redivivus, p. 12.
172

On Patriarcha’s 1630s date, see Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer, pp. 2, 38; Preface, Sir Robert Filmer, p. viii.
Mahlberg, on the other hand, maintained that one of the fundamental purposes of Neville’s republicanism was
not what it was arguing for, but what it was arguing against: patriarchalism. Mahlberg, Henry Neville and
English republican culture in the seventeenth century, p. 83.
173

As he had done in Patriarcha, in The Free-Holders Grand Inquest Filmer rejected parliamentary
constitutionalism and its basis in the ancient constitution, arguing that “the supreme power is always
arbitrary,” that “the legislative power is proper to the king” – “the king hath all laws within the cabinet of his
breast” – and that the king has no superior other than God. The nature of the arguments in Free-Holders is
legalistic and historical. Other Filmer works were published in the same timeframe. In The Ancient
Constitution, Pocock emphasized the significance of the late 1640s context of Free-Holders’ publication, viz.,
the growing awareness of the dangerously uncontrollable power of the army. The Free-Holders Grand
Inquest, Sommerville, ed., Filmer, pp. xxvi-xxxviii, xxx, 69-130, 69, 80, 100, 107, 114; Cuttica, Sir Robert
Filmer, pp. 74, 99, 117, 169, 180 n.70, 235; Pocock, The Ancient Constitution, pp. 151-57.
174

The Library of the SIdneys of Penshurst Place Circa 1665, pp. 56, 166, 298.

175
Between 1679 and 1681 James’ opponents twice won majorities in Parliament after Charles had
unsuccessfully sought to avoid this outcome by proroguing and dismissing Parliament. Indeed, Charles had
earlier found it necessary to create a kitchen cabinet of sorts, the so-called CABAL Ministry that was headed
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Filmer had constructed in the 1630s in order to hack at them with his sickle had become men of flesh and
blood in the meantime, men armed with guns: it was hard not to read him as someone commenting upon,
rather than foreseeing, the arguments of the Civil War.”176 This may be true but again, it does not explain the
tremendous and seemingly redundant oppositional effort by three formidable writers to rebut Patriarcha in
great detail. There was an ongoing battle among English pamphleteers over succession issues.177 Why was
this sort of brief, punchy journalistic response insufficient to quash the potential impact of Patriarcha?
Patriarcha was an exceedingly threatening text to not only republicans, but to non-absolutist royalists
among the politically astute in England. Filmer’s work fused both a traditional and innovative approach to
absolute monarchy; indeed, he “proved to be too ‘extreme’” within the mainstream of royalist thought. Cuttica
persuasively argued that Filmer’s almost exclusive reliance on the Adamite patriarchal justification of and
explanation for absolute monarchy fed into, and was strongly reinforced, by the patriarchal nature of
seventeenth-century English society. Culturally, Filmer’s patriarchal explanation of absolute monarchy was an
inherently seductive and therefore powerfully threatening argument (or a successful one, depending on one’s
vantage point).178 Historian Alan Craig Houston argued that the publication of Filmer’s work coincided with the
realization that Charles II and James II had “absolutist pretensions.”179 But as Cuttica pointed out, Stuart
absolutist pretensions were well appreciated long before the 1680 publication of Patriarcha. Filmer’s ideas

by his nemesis, Shaftesbury, as a means of trying, without success, to rein in the defiant opposition to James’
anticipated rule. See Ch. Two. In addition to not knowing with any certainty why Patriarcha was published
when it was, we also do not know who decided to publish it. “Few scholars have paid attention to this issue.”
Cuttica, Filmer, p. 244 n.55.
176

David Wootton, “Introduction,” John Locke, Political Writings (Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett
Publishing Company, 2003), p. 13.
177

The Marvin and Sybil Weiner Spirit of America Collection at Florida Atlantic University includes a very
useful and substantial collection of the succession pamphlets.
178
Burgess provided a useful definition of absolutism in early Stuart England, namely, kings who “were not
merely – on the negative side – irresistible, they also had certain positive powers. In particular, they alone
could give laws to their people (and thus alter existing law). In this their sovereignty resided. In addition,
many would argue that an absolute sovereign was one that could tax his, her or its subjects at will. In short,”
said Burgess, “an absolute sovereign (in our sense) must be more than irresistible: he, or she, must be conceived of as unlimited by positive or human law, and fully superior to it.” The consequence was that an “absolute sovereign could not only change laws, he could act without need to obey the law (though it was usually
recognized that any right to act contrary to law was only to be employed when, in the sovereign’s judgement,
it was necessary for the public good).” Per Burgess, “The key test of absolutism, then, is whether or not a
ruler is conceived to be legally limited, meaning limited by civil laws.” Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the
Stuart Constitution, p. 29; Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer, p. 240, citing Houston, Algernon Sidney, pp. 94-96.
179

Id, p. 96.
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had been circulating (whether or not they were “thriving”) since the initial issuance of his manuscript in the late
1620s-’30s, and were consciously evoked in 1680 to strengthen what we might characterize as the “right
wing” royalist position on absolute monarchy. Filmer’s principles also were influential in controversies over a
variety of issues in 1679-80, including succession, but also hereditary rights, national identity, political
representations of kingship, and fatherhood.180
More intriguing is the argument that the absence of a typically divisive religious posture in Patriarcha
made it strategically useful propaganda. “[W]hat might have made Filmer’s works appealing to a certain
audience at this historical juncture was both the absence from them of any theory of Church affairs and the
fact that Filmer was no Hobbes”; this was true whether one saw Hobbes as popish, an atheist, or “even as
republican” – an eclectic set of epithets!181 The pariah status of Hobbes is clear from the text of The Triumph
of Our Monarchy, published in 1685 and written by the prominent Tory pamphleteer John Northleigh
(1656/57-1705). In The Triumph Norleigh asserted that, “’all the Venom and Pyson of Mr Hobs’, that is, his
dangerous doctrines of the ‘Origination of Society out of Fear, his definition of Right to Conflict in Power, his
Community in Nature, his Equality in persons … The Pest and Plague of the People’ were highly ‘priz’d with
our Republicans.’” In Norleigh’s view, “The antidote to this Hobbesian disease could only be found in a polity
where ‘[p]aternal Power’ had been ‘patriarchal, and Absolute’ in the family, but had subsequently become
subordinate to ‘a Supream Sovereignty Paramount’ that had been established by ‘Civil constitutions’.”182
Here we have Filmer’s argument in précis. On the other hand, given the fact that Filmer’s patriarchalism is
founded on a literal reading of Genesis, one could certainly contend that his theory rested on a profoundly
religious foundation. Indeed, it is this foundation that Neville mocked in The Isle of Pines.183 Moreover,
“Filmer’s doctrines did not inspire thoughts of toleration towards dissenting minds.”184
If we find these explanations for the publication of Patriarcha in 1680 at least satisfactory albeit not
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Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer, p. 240.
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Id.
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John Northleigh, The Triumph of Our Monarchy (1685), cited in Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer, pp. 200-01.
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“Neville’s satire … reads almost like a fictional adaptation” of Patriarcha. Harold Weber, “Charles II,
George Pines, and Mr. Dorimant: The Politics of Sexual Power in Restoration England,” Criticism, Vol. 32
(1990), pp. 193-219; see generally Mahlberg, “Republicanism as Anti-patriarchalism in Henry Neville’s The
Isle of Pines (1668),” Liberty, Authority, Formality, pp. 131-52.
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full-proof, this goes some of the way towards understanding the multiple responses to it. But “responses” is a
euphemism. While Tyrrell published his work quite openly, Sidney showed absolutely no indication of trying to
publish Discourses, such as submitting it to a publisher or discussing doing so, at least as far as Sidney’s
surviving correspondence or any other record by any other family member or others indicates.185 While it is
possible Sidney would have sought to do so, his work was simply sheaves from an unbound manuscript
hauled out from his personal belongings in June 1683 when he was arrested, and then used as evidence
against him at his trial for high treason. It was unfinished; and there was no bound manuscript much less a
published text. We know that Sidney had not returned to England until 1677 and at that time, his motivation
for doing so was highly personal – the impending death of his father. From 1677 to 1683 Sidney was
entangled in family litigation.186 He had no interest in working with Shaftesbury, for whom he had no fondness
and perhaps no respect. Indeed, in his Apology Sidney stated, “besides the knowne dislikes which he had
unto me, and I unto him and his ways, I did not see his face in allmost a yeare before he went out of England,
and had no communication with him afterwards.”187 Shaftesbury left England in 1682. It is therefore difficult to
connect Sidney’s lengthy efforts, the over 500-page erudite, if unedited prose which by virtue of its length
must have taken a substantial period of time to write, to the politics of the moment, such as the 1680s’
succession battle. In this regard Scott’s argument seems inapposite.188 Similarly, as we have previously
detailed, Worden and other historians’ convictions that Sidney did not start writing Discourses until August
1681 at the earliest seems implausible given its hefty length, the variety of references to Sidney writing a
political piece for years, Sidney’s other contemporaneous preoccupations and, notably, the yellowed
manuscript pages which, as Sidney pointed out at his own trial and elsewhere, were clear indications of its
agedness.189
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As noted previously, we do have the suggestion by Aphra Behn of an intent by Sidney to publish a political
work in the future, but there is no substantiation of its accuracy or to which text Behn might have been
referring.
186

See “Family politics 1677-83,” Scott II, Ch. 5, pp. 85-103.
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Sidney’s Apology, Appendix, Hollis, ed., Discourses, p. 181.
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See Scott II, p. 95.
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Worden, “Commonwealth Kidney,“, p. 15. In view of the references in Discourses to events between 1681
and 1683, Houston concluded that Sidney’s reference during his trial to some of the papers being twenty
years old was either a mistaken reference to Court Maxims “or it is a patent lie.” Houston, Algernon Sidney, p.
63 n.188. But on the face of Sidney’s testimony he is not referring to Court Maxims, which he never
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In short, we cannot say that Sidney’s work was intended either as a public refutation of Filmer or as
an effort to enter the succession fray. There is some possibility, although the suggestion is elusive, that
Sidney may have had access to the Filmer manuscript before the text was published, particularly because of
his family’s acquaintance with the Filmers. From the 1665 catalogue there is no indication that Patriarcha was
in the Sidney Library in its manuscript form; but it could not have been in the catalogue as a published treatise
since the publication date (1680) postdated the catalogue date! Stated another way, the Sidney Library
catalogue is not relevant to the question of whether the Sidneys or their Library had a printed edition of
Patriarcha. Filmer’s two earlier published works were in the 1665 Sidney Library catalogue. It is probable that
Sidney had read all three texts. Certainly, Filmer’s ideas would have been very familiar to him. If Leicester
also had the Patriarcha manuscript, which we do not know, Sidney could have been working on his
Discourses for many years, and the work may not have been triggered by Patriarcha’s publication or the
events of the early 1680s at all. What seems most plausible is that publication of Patriarcha in 1680 caused
Sidney to haul out old sheaves of work on political theory that he had written over many years of study, which
he then incorporated into a treatise directed at Patriarcha, with which he was already familiar. Regardless,
we certainly have no basis for concluding that in the early 1680s Sidney intended to share his views on Filmer
and related matters with the public, and thereby enter the political arena by means of this text; indeed, the
evidence suggests that he did not.
On the other hand, while Sidney does not seem to have been particularly confidential about his opus,
Locke was extremely secretive about his Two Treatises of Government. According to Laslett, an editor of Two
Treatises, “There can be little doubt that Locke was summoned back from France early in 1679 to help his
master” develop “a general, theoretical argument to justify a change in the constitution.”190 We know that it

acknowledged as existing much less his work, nor is there any reason to think that anyone had any
knowledge of that text in 1683, not to mention that most of it almost certainly was not written by Sidney. See
Deborah Charnoff, “A Second Look at the Question of Who Authored Court Maxims” (unpublished; 8-20-18).
Furthermore, we have every reason to believe that Discourses was edited after Sidney was executed and
prior to its publication; we just do not know what those edits were; they certainly could have included
references to events and dates. See Ch. Two. If Sidney’s testimony was a patent lie, it was one that Sidney
repeated unequivocally, and the reference to yellowed pages would have been very foolhardy. While we do
not have the original manuscript, those pages were in the hands of the judges and prosecutor of his case, and
they would have known immediately if some of the pages were or were not yellowed from age. If they were
they not, Sidney’s observation would have been challenged. It wasn’t. In sum, Houston’s conclusions seem
unfounded.
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Peter Laslett, “Locke the man and Locke the writer,” Introduction, Two Treatises, Part II, p. 31.
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was in this very timeframe, 1681, that Shaftesbury was arrested for high treason, subsequently released, and
within a year, after various secret meetings, he made the decision to flee the country, only to die shortly
thereafter. Thus, by 1683 Locke had lost Shaftesbury which, as a practical matter, was both a curse and a
blessing. Shaftesbury had been Locke’s protector, and that protection was gone. At the same time,
Shaftesbury had become Locke’s increasingly dangerous mentor, and that affiliation may have become ever
more perilous for Locke. Not surprisingly, immediately after the revelation of the Rye House Plot in 1683,
Locke clandestinely fled England too, as had his by-then deceased mentor. Thereafter Locke corresponded
covertly with friends in England when he was in the Low Countries because of what apparently was
nervousness about the public disclosure of Two Treatises.191 Given Locke’s propensity for secrecy to the
point of obsession, it would have been shocking if he had released Two Treatises in this timeframe, much
less claimed authorship of the text in the highly volatile and progressively more dangerous years of Charles’
rule. The same argument applies, perhaps with even greater force, during James II’s reign. By this time the
Stuarts’ earlier opponents were being hunted down, even on the Continent, and if the king could manage it,
they were executed. Whether James viewed Locke as a threat is much less clear than Ashcraft confidently
asserted; but it is possible.192 In short, whether or not Two Treatises was written for the purpose of being
published, Locke’s ideas in it were not articulated in the public sphere until 1698, for Locke only
acknowledged his authorship posthumously, long after Two Treatises’ contemporaneous political relevance.
In sum, Tyrrell clearly wrote and published Patriarcha non Monarcha in the context of the succession
crisis as a text designed to persuade his fellow parliamentarians and other politically attuned countrymen to
reject Filmer’s views, and instead endorse Tyrrell’s own moderate political perspective which, as we shall see,
was an advocacy of constitutional monarchy. Whether Sidney or Locke’s works rebutting Filmer can be
politically linked to the context of the succession crisis is manifestly less clear.193 Tyrrell and Locke were
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See Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, Ch. 9, “Exile and Rebellion,” pp. 406-66.
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Id, pp. 485-87, 497-520.
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With regard to Locke, this perspective stands in contradistinction to the position advocated by Ashcraft
particularly, who was endorsed by John Dunn among others, that Locke was an aggressive and leading
political opposition figure, prominently assisting Shaftesbury during his exclusion battle, and continuing after
Shaftesbury’s death in other highly subversive activity as a leading Stuart opponent intent upon preventing
James from becoming the King of England and then, when that failed, knocking James off the throne. See
John Dunn, Review, “Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government by Richard Ashcraft,
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friends, and Locke read Patriarcha non Monarcha. We do not know if Sidney knew Tyrrell, knew of his work,
or had read it. There is no reason to believe Sidney and Locke ever met; we know that Locke never read
Discourses, although he knew of it and recommended it to others. Sidney would have had no opportunity to
read Two Treatises. Much more will be said about the content of all three texts. What we can say is that
Tyrrell and Locke’s views, but not necessarily (indeed, probably not) Sidney’s, were generated on paper in the
early 1680s, and it is likely that some of the views expressed therein were influenced by the succession crisis.
It is not sensible to say much more. Moreover, to understand these ideas, we need not say more.

Having lately seen a book entitled Patriarcha, written by Sir Robert Filmer, concerning
the universal and undistinguished right of all kings, I thought a time of leisure might be
well employed in examining his doctrine and the questions arising from it; which seem
so far to concern all mankind, that, besides the influence upon our future life,
they may be said to comprehend all that in this world deserves to be cared for.
Sidney, first sentence, Discourses Concerning Government 194

C.

Republicanism’s Recognized, Albeit Contested Fundamentals
Sidney’s Discourses is a 578-page tomb, unedited, repetitive, brilliant but frequently sardonic and at

other times wearisomely dry. It is not an easy read, which cannot but have helped make it a less popular one.
When you do read Sidney’s treatise there are two immediate, overwhelming impressions. One we have
already flagged: the remarkable breadth of Sidney’s knowledge of and reliance on history and classical texts,
his mental accessibility to the vast subject matter of these books, and his facile use of it. The other striking
impression is the Sidney drum beat, evident on virtually every page, foregrounding law as the essential
means by which men can protect their liberty. Surprisingly, the importance of law to the early modern English
republicanism of Sidney and others has been ignored. The many facets of law that inform Sidney’s

Vol. 60, No. 2, The Journal of Modern History (Jun. 1988), pp. 366-68. Other scholars dispute this
interpretation of Locke’s role in revolutionary politics.
In my view, there are far too many indications of what can only be described as exceptional, perhaps even
pathological timidity, and an indisputable reluctance to take public political stands or to become a
parliamentary figure, for Locke to have been an outspoken critic of the Stuarts. Adding to this picture of
Locke’s personality and decisions is his secondary, if not subservient role vis-à-vis Shaftesbury and the Earl’s
circle. For these reasons, Ashcraft’s convictions about Locke as a subversive are implausible. See Ch. Two.
On this scholarly debate, see, e.g., Mark Knights, “John Locke and Post-Revolutionary Politics: Electoral
Reform and the Franchise,” Past and Present, No. 213 (Nov. 2011), pp. 41-86, 41-42 & associated footnotes.
On the interesting question of why Locke’s friends in England were so comfortable supporting James II in the
period immediately preceding William of Orange’s invasion, and why Locke may not have been, see Mark
Goldie, “John Locke’s Circle and James II,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Sep. 1992), pp. 557-86.
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republicanism are not identified much less systematically analyzed in the scholarship; they certainly are not
understood to be integrated, critical elements of republicanism, which they undoubtedly are. Because of the
pivotal nature of this component of Anglo-American early modern republicanism, law will be addressed on its
own, as will the more subtle but essential elements of moderation, toleration and balance that pervade
Sidney’s theory. First, however, it is important to identify the components of republicanism that are bandied
about in the literature, and their expression in Sidney’s work vis-à-vis that of his contemporaries. Having
thoroughly considered Sidney’s roots, we also will reflect on ways in which England’s historical legacy, the
Sidney/Percy family legacy, and Sidney’s personal experiences, inform his ideas.
O accursed reason, how many eyes thou hast to see thy evils,
And how dim, nay blind, thou art in preventing them.
Philip Sidney, The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia195
Ah Sir! Corrupt occasion still preferreth
The wisdom, that for selfe-advantage erreth.
Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, Mustapha196

i. The Nature of Man & The Society in Which He Lives
Cicero propounded the Stoic doctrine of natural law: “all species of living creatures are endowed by
nature with the capacity to protect their lives and their persons. …[M]an is endowed with reason, which
enables him to visualize consequences, and to detect the causes of things.”197 Sidney and his
contemporaries endorsed the concept that man, by nature, was a rational creature. “But as reason is our
nature, that can never be natural to us that is not rational.” For “man being a rational creature, nothing can be
universally natural to him, that is not rational.” Indeed, man’s rationality allows man to be “good.”198 Thus,
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Sir Philip Sidney, The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia, Maurice Evans, ed., intro. & notes (London:
Penguin Books, 1987)[orig. pub. 1593] Ch. 35.
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“Mustapha,” The Works in Verse and Prose Complete of the Right Honourable Fulke Greville, Lord Brook,
Vol. III (Lanashire, UK: St. George’s, 1870), p. 299.
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Cicero, On Obligations, Book I, §11, p. 6 & P. G. Walsh, “Introduction,” p. xiv.
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It is difficult not to lose confidence in political scientist Craig Alan Houston’s analysis of Sidney when the
first page of Chapter One of his book began with the proposition that Sidney believed “that the world is
governed more by force and fraud than by reason and persuasion.” Houston also said that Sidney’s
“commitment to republicanism was intermittent and inconsistent.” Later on in the text Houston stated that,
“Surprisingly, Cicero … played only a minor role in Sidney’s arguments.” Houston, Algernon Sidney and the
Republican Heritage in England and America, pp.15 & 153 n.29. These characterizations are remarkably
flawed. While Sidney was a realist and recognized that men were often engaged in “force and fraud,” neither
of the first two assertions is a fair characterization of Sidney’s character, political beliefs, or political
commitment. With regard to Cicero, as this dissertation makes plain, Sidney’s republicanism was informed by
Cicero’s ideas, not to mention the fact that Cicero was a family heritage – De officiis was the earliest book of
416

Aristotle, “following the wise men of those times, shews us how far reason, improved by meditation, can
advance in the knowledge and love of that which is truly good.” The principle that man is a rational creature is
an uncontroversial aspect of early modern English republicanism.199 Moreover, said Cicero, because of the
“bond of fellowship which in its widest sense exists between all members of the entire human race” and an
even closer link among those of the same nation, while civil law might not forbid certain acts, they may be
“forbidden by nature’s law.”200
One of the consequences of man’s ability to reason, and to be good, is the appreciation of equality.
For reason “gives paria paribus,” equal things to equals, “equal power to those who have equal abilities and
merit.”201 This, too, was a Ciceronian mantra: “there is no essential difference within mankind.”202 Said
Sidney, “A civil society is composed of equals.”203 Sidney explained his sense of equality in his treatise. “I
hope to be excused if I do so [differ from Filmer] in this also, and affirm, that nothing but the plain and certain
dictates of reason can be generally applicable to all men as the law of their nature; and they who, according
to the best of their understanding, provide for the good of themselves and their posterity, do all equally
observe it. He that inquires more exactly into the matter may find, that reason enjoins every man not to
arrogate to himself more than he allows to others. …He who would be exempted from this common rule, must

which we are aware that Robert Sidney, the 1st Earl of Leicester, owned, and may have been Philip Sidney’s
first book, too! Indeed, it was a family story how Sir Philip had written to a young friend that the first two books
he should have in his library in order to understand himself were the Holy Scriptures and Cicero’s De officiis.
See Ch. One. To suggest that Cicero was unimportant in Sidney’s thinking is patently incorrect. To the
contrary, Sidney lived and breathed Cicero. On Robert and Philip Sidney’s copies of De officiis, see
“Introduction,” The Library of the Sidneys of Penshurst Place, p. 18 & catalogue at p. 114. On the parallel with
John Adams, see Ch. Five.
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DCG, II.4.94, II.20.191, II.10.134. Locke, for example, in discussing “what State all Men are naturally in,”
asserted, “The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And Reason, which is
that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to
harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.” Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, Ch. II,
“The State of Nature,” §6, p. 271.
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Cicero, On Obligations, Book III, §69, p. 107.
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DCG, II.4.94. Locke actually identified equality of man before he raised the subject of Reason. For Locke,
the State of Nature is a “State also of Equality.” Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, Ch. II, “The State
of Nature,” §6, p. 269.
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Cicero, “The Laws,” Cicero, The Republic and The Laws, Book One, ¶30, p. 107.
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shew for what reason he should be raised above his brethren.204 Accordingly, because God provided men
“with understanding to provide for themselves, and by the invention of arts and sciences, to be beneficial to
each other; he shewed, that they ought to make use of that understanding in forming governments according
to their own convenience.”205 Sidney repeated this conviction in various renditions, e.g., “There is therefore
no natural propensity to anyone, but they chuse that which in their judgment seems best for them.” Similarly,
he maintained that God has given “to all men in some degree a capability of judging what is good for
themselves” – all men.206
Man’s ability to reason is challenged, however, by his corrupt desires, e.g., “that inconsiderate
impulse, by which brutish and ignorant men may be swayed when they know no better.” There are no
exceptions to this bisected character of man. “[M]en are all made of the same paste.” For “such is the
condition of mankind, that nothing can be so perfectly framed as not to give some testimony of human
imbecility, and frequently to stand in need of reparations and amendments.”207 Again, “Every man has
passions; few know how to moderate, and no one can wholly extinguish them.”208 In the Christian tradition
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DCG, II.20.192-193. Sir Henry Vane similarly stated that “men in their creation and births are made of one
blood, all the nations of them, Acts 17:26, and so are equal, and cannot therefore be distinguished and fixed
in such different conditions and capabilities of rulers and subjects.” Henry Vane, The Retired Man’s
Meditations, cited in Judson, The Political Thought of Sir Henry Vane, p. 17. Because of the equality of man,
in his Commonwealth newspaper Mercurius Politicus, Nedham advocated preferment on the basis of merit,
and open access to public office. See Worden, “Marchamont Nedham and English Republicanism,”
Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, p. 71. Recall that the mercurial Nedham was a friend of
Milton and the editor of the pro-Cromwellian Mercurius Poltiicus who then swung 180 degrees and supported
the Parliament in his Mercurius Britannicus (1643-46) and then again the King in his Mercurius Pragmaticus
(1646-50). Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, p. 30.
205
DCG, II.8.122. One can distinguish Vane, for example, on this matter, as his emphasis was on the
necessity of an elite group of men receiving God’s grace rather than special education to maintain the public
welfare. Judson, The Political Thought of Sir Henry Vane, p. 56. In The Retired Man’s Meditations, p. 75,
Vane stated that faith in Christ gave man “a raisedness of discerning and enlargedness of his natural mind.”
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Cicero said the same thing more diplomatically: “The similarity between human beings is evident in their
vices as well as their virtues.” Cicero, The Laws, Cicero, The Republic and The Laws, Book One, ¶31, p.
107; DCG, III.1.326, III.25.461.
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Id, II.24.234. Sidney’s great uncle Sir Philip began his “Second Eclogues” of The Old Arcadia with a
“skirmish betwixt Reason and Passion.” See Sir Philip Sidney, The Major Works, including Astrophil and
Stella, Katherine Duncan-Jones, ed. (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 71-72. In this
interlude, seven reasonable shepherds square off against seven “appasionate” shepherds, and they sing:
Reason. Can Reason then a tyrant counted be?
Passion. If Reason will that Passions be not free.
R.
But Reason will that Reason govern most.
P.
And Passion will that Passion rule the roast. …
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and quite conventionally, Sidney recognized that man’s “corrupted nature” was a product of sin. “[I]t could not
be imputed to God, since man by sin is fallen from the law of his creation.” Quoting from Genesis, Psalms and
Matthew, Sidney asserted, “The wickedness of man (even in the first ages) was great in the world: All the
imaginations of his heart are evil, and that continually. All men are liars: There is none that doth good, no not
one. Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false testimonies, &c.”209
The passions “are various in their nature, so they are governed by various objects; and men usually follow
that which is predominant in them, whether it proceed from anger or desire, and whether it terminate in
ambition, covetousness, lust, or any other more or less blamable appetite.” Elsewhere Sidney stated, “Man is
of an aspiring nature, and apt to put too high a value upon himself.”210
The corrupted nature of man is a fundamental aspect of Sidney’s difficulty with absolute monarchy.
Not only is it true that, “Men are naturally propense to corruption, ” but there is a wealth of decadence to which
men are susceptible.211 “Power, honors, riches, and the pleasure that attend them, are the baits by which men

R.
We are too strong; but Reason seeks not blood.
P.
Who be too weak do feign they be too good. ...
R. P.
Then let us both to heav’nly rules give place,
Which Passions kill, and Reason do deface.
209
DCG, II.8.122, II.8.123, citing Genesis 6:5, Psalms 116:11 and 14:3. and Matthew 15:19. Machiavelli
similarly stated, “it is necessary for anyone who organizes a republic and establishes laws in it to take for
granted that all men are evil and that they will always act according to the wickedness of their nature
whenever they have the opportunity.” Machiavelli, Discorsi, BkI, Ch3, 28.
210
DCG, II.24.234, II.19.187. In his Two Treatises, Locke did not emphasize man’s corrupt nature. The
closest that he came to this recognition is the following statement: “To this strange Doctrine, viz. That in the
state of Nature, every one has the executive Power of the Law of Nature, I doubt not but it will be objected,
That it is unreasonable for Men to be Judges in their own Cases, that Self-love will make Men partial to
themselves and their Friends. And on the other side, that Ill Nature, Passion and Revenge will carry them too
far in punishing others.” The consequence, said Locke, was that “hence nothing but Confusion and Disorder
will follow, and that therefore God hath certainly appointed Government to restrain the partiality and violence of
Men. I easily grant, that Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the Inconveniences of the State of Nature,
which must certainly be Great.” Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, Ch. II, “Of the State of Nature,” §13,
pp. 275-76.

Another contemporary, Sir William Temple, who favored “popular” or constitutional monarchy, articulated a
realistic view of man’s nature in his analysis of government. For example, in his essay Of Popular Discontents
he wrote, “No civil or politick Constitutions, can be perfect or secure, whilst they are composed of Men, that are
for the most part Passionate, Interested, Unjust or Unthinking, but generally and naturally Restless, and
Unquiet.” Faber, The Brave Courtier, p. 89 (quoting Temple).
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DCG, III.6.350. As Machiavelli said, “It should also be noted … how easily men may be corrupted and
how they may transform themselves and give themselves a completely different nature, no matter how good
and well educated they may be.” Machiavelli, Discorsi, BkI, Ch42, 113. Discussing Machiavelli, Sidney noted
his view that where “the body of the people … is not corrupted, tumults and disorders do not hurt; and where
it is corrupted, good laws do not good.” In Sidney’s view, this has been “confirmed by reason and
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are drawn to prefer a personal interest before the publick good.”212 Of concern to Sidney and many
seventeenth-century Englishmen was official corruption: the purchase of votes, the silence bought by the
awarding of offices – i.e., the phenomenon of the placeman, the man appointed to or “placed” in a lucrative
government position – and the growing threat to the legitimacy of their own system of government that
increasingly was threatened by the exercise of the king’s prerogative. “The number of those who covet [power,
honors, riches, and the pleasures that attend them] is so great, that he who abounds in them will be able to
gain so many to his service as shall be sufficient to subdue the rest.”213 This was “the particular sin” of greatest
concern to Sir Henry Vane.214 Sidney referred to France, and the fact that it would not have been possible for
Louis XIV “to keep the nation under servitude” if he did not have a large revenue to either subjugate his people
or buy them off – “to gain so many to his particularly service.” He also suggested that we consider the
“madness” of those who have given the English king so much money, “unsuitable to the modest behavior
expected from our kings.”215
In short, providing the king with the means to circumvent political decision-making was destructive of
the people’s liberty. At the same time, English monarchs legitimately felt that the Crown was woefully

experience,” and therefore Sidney “think[s] no wise man has ever contracted him,” viz., Machiavelli. DCG,
II.11.135. Compare Court Maxims, Third Dialogue, p. 24 (“By this you may see whether the name of policy be
fitly given to that wicked malicious craft, exercised with perfidy and cruelty, accompanied with all manner of
lust and vice, directly and irreconcileably contrary to virtue and piety, honesty or humanity, which is taught by
Machiavelli and others.”). Neville similarly stated, “Those, who have not so great a sense of honour and
integrity, will be presently corrupted by their own interest.” Neville, Plato Redivivus, p. 102. Neville sought to
eviscerate the power, although not eliminate the office, of the monarch. See Blair Worden, “Republicanism
and the Restoration: 1660-1683,” Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, Ch. 4, pp. 139-93, 15152. Sir William Temple, considered by King Charles II to be republican and “popular” in his notions, went the
other way. While he recognized that “all Government is a restraint upon Liberty,” and that “government must
stand on the widest possible basis of consent,” he had a very paternalistic concept of authority, and believed
in “a humane ideal of monarchy” in which the prince should govern, but should not “govern a people against
their nature, their inclinations and their laws”; for “the true interest of the kingdom is the plainest thing in the
world: it is what every body in England find and feels, and knows to be right.” Faber, The Brave Courtier, pp.
84-86.
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Id. Neville also seemed to make the obverse observation: that it is “infallibly true” that where “the policy is
corrupted,” meaning the failure to observe the rules on which the state is founded, “there must necessarily be
also a corruption and depravation of manners; and an utter abolition of all faith, justice, honour, and morality.”
Neville, Plato Redivivus, p. 26.
214
Vane worried about “that great idol of self interest, which was “no other than the spirit of man, lusting after
the doing of his own will and procuring his own glory more than God’s.” Henry Vane, The Retired Man’s
Meditations, Preface to the Reader, cited in Judson, The Political Thought of Henry Vane, p. 19.
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underfunded, especially if they sought to compete with the French kings, who were so much wealthier.
Sidney’s barb was well honed: giving the Stuarts significant revenue “will render parliaments unnecessary to
them,” referring, of course, to the constant royal proroguing and dismissal of Parliament with which English
political leaders had been grappling for years.216 Marvell’s An Account of the Growth of Popery and Arbitrary
Government (1677) “pointed a finger of accusation at Charles II and said ‘enough’: it left no doubt in the
reader’s mind that Charles had governed in a constitutionally unEnglish way.”217 Halifax also focused on the
debilitating impact of prorogation.218
Once again, on the issue of corruption Sidney reminded us: “[T]here is a vast distance between what
men ought to be, and what they are. Every man ought to be just, true, and charitable; and if they were so,
laws would be of no use; but it were a madness to abolish them upon a supposition that they are so.”219
Referring to Vane but in a statement equally applicable to Sidney, Judson observed, “[H]e saw man
constantly involved in a struggle with sin. Unlike some of the left-wing idealists of the time, he never denied
that man had sinned and that even the best (including himself) would continue to do so.”220 Furthermore,
monarchs were just as human as other men, and equally, if not more vulnerable to corruption. “I cannot be
confident that they are generally in an extraordinary manner preserved by the hand of God from the vices and
frailties to which the rest of mankind is subject.” Indeed, Sidney continued, “they are more than any other
men in the world exposed to temptations and snares, they are more than any in danger of being corrupted,
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DCG, III.6.350-51. While Plato’s work was “hypothetical” and “a prescription for justice in a Utopian state,”
Cicero’s parallel efforts in Republic and Laws, portions of the former and the latter of which was known by
Sidney’s time, “was rooted in the historical existence of the Roman constitution” and, like Sidney’s work, was
a much more pragmatic analysis than Plato’s, as well as more reliant on the work of the historian Polybius,
who avidly admired the Roman republic. At the same time, Cicero was more idealistic than Sidney, e.g., “the
reason commands, and the appetite obeys.” Cicero, On Obligations, Walsh, Introduction, p. xiii & Book I,
¶101, p. 35.
217

Nigel Smith, Andrew Marvell The Chameleon (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2010), pp. 1-

2.
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“That which helped to confirm many well-meaning men in their misapprehensions of the King was the long
and unusual intermission of Parliaments, so that every year that passed without one made up a new
argument to increase their suspicion, and made them presume that the Papists had a principal hand in
keeping them off. This raised such heats in men’s minds, to think that men who were obnoxious to the laws,
instead of being punished should have credit enough to secure themselves, even at the price of destroying
the fundamental constitution.” “The Character of a Trimmer,” Halifax Complete Works, p. 78.
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DCG, III.1.325.
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Judson, The Political Thought of Sir Henry Vane, p. 18.
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and made instruments of corrupting others.” 221
Recognition of man’s weak character must be the starting point in the quest for good governance:
“such as have been more wise in the constitution of their governments, have always had regard to the frailty
of human nature, and the corruption reigning in the hearts of men.”222 We know that Sidney came by these
ideas honesty, through his family’s intellectual heritage. Sir Philip was a member of the literary group the
Essex Circle, which was part of the Tudor humanist phenomenon. Many other members of the Circle were
also Sidney family members. The Tudor humanists recognized that the world was full of ambitious, corrupt
men. One can see, for example, in the words of the Tudor humanist Sir William Cornwallis a view of man’s
nature that is exactly the same as the one that Sidney articulated, viz., “All states were to some degree under
the sway ‘of Power, Selfe-Love, Ambition, Corruption, Revenge, and Feare.’” While men must strive after
virtue and promote it, in such a world “virtue and ‘honesty’ had a precarious place,” and it was “far from
apparent that virtue was most readily to be found at court.”223
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DCG, III.1.325, II.19.189. Sidney dwelt on this point in a later section of Discourses. “Every manner of life
furnishes something, that in some measure may foment these [passions]; but a crown comprehends all that
can be grateful to the most violent and vicious.” He then reviewed the various aways in which man’s passions
can be corrupted. “He who is covetous, has vast revenues, besides what he may get by fraud and rapine, to
satisfy his appetite. If he be given sensuality, the variety of pleasures, and the facility of accomplishing
whatever he desire, tends farther to inflame that passion.” As to those who are ambitious, they “are incited by
the greatness of their power to attempt great matters; and the most sottish or lazy may discharge themselves
of cares, and hope that others will be easily hired to take the burden of business upon them whilst they lie at
ease.” Those who are naturally proud or cruel “are more violently tempted to usurp dominion; and the wicked
advices of flatterers, always concurring with their passions, incite them to exercise the power they have gotten
with the utmost rigor, to satiate their own rage, and to secure themselves against the effects of the publick
hatred, which they know they have deserved.” DCG, II.24.234.
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Id, III.40.544. Marchamont Nedham alluded to the same thing. “When the Senators of Rome, in their
publike Decrees and Orations, began to comply with and court the People, calling them Lords of the world;
how easie a matter was it then for Gracchus to perswade them to un-Lord the Senate? In like manner, when
Athens was quitted of Kings, the Power was no sooner declared to be in the People, but immediately they
took it, and made sure of it in their own hands, by the advice of Solon, that excellent Lawgiver: for, as Cicero
saith, There is a natural desire of Power and Sovereignty in every man, so that if any have once an
opportunity to seize, they seldom neglect it; and if they are told it is their due, they venture life and all to attain
it. Marchamont Nedham, Excellencie of a Free State: Or, The Right Constitution of a Commonwealth [1656],
Blair Worden, ed. & intro. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2011), The Thomas Hollis Library, David Womersley,
gen. ed., p. 8, https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2449#Nedham_11600_167 (1/29/19).
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We also know that Algernon’s grandfather, the 1st Earl of Leicester, was a friend of Lipsius, who was
particularly influential in the development of the Tudor humanists’ political ideas. Not surprisingly the works of
many of the authors on whom the Tudor humanists heavily relied were very well represented in the Sidney
Library, e.g., numerous texts by Sir Francis Bacon and by Nathaniel Bacon, not to mention many books by
Tacitus. See Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, pp. 52-57; Arthur J. Slavin, “Profitable
Studies: Humanists and Government in Early Tudor England,” Viator, Vol. 1 (1971), pp. 307-26; Quentin
Skinner, “Sir Thomas More’s Utopia and the Language of Renaissance Humanism,” Anthony Pagden, ed.,
The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1987), Ch. 6, pp.
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Men are individuals; but Sidney emphasized that men are also social animals. He shared this
perspective with other republican thinkers for whom the community was as important a subject in their political
discourse as the individual. Vane, for example, explained during his trial for high treason that it is “the act of a
community, or an associated people” by which government is constituted.224 Nedham’s The Excellencie of a
Free State was all about why “Government by the People … by consent of the People,” is “above any other
Form of Government.”225 In Book One, Chapter VII of his Two Treatises, entitled “Of Political or Civil Society,”
Locke stated, “GOD having made man such a creature, that in his own judgment, it was not good for him to
be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination to drive him into society,
as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it.” This dual nature of man as
individual and as a member of his community is at the heart of Locke’s second treatise.226 Locke described
the naturally free condition of individual men: “Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect

123-57; David Womersley, “Sir Henry Savile’s Translation of Tacitus and the Political Interpretation of
Elizabethan Texts,” Review of English Studies, Vol. 42, No. 167 (Aug. 1991), pp. 313-42; Alexandra Gajda,
“The State of Christendom: history, political thought and the Essex circle,” Historical Research, Vol. 81, Issue
213, pp. 423-46 (Aug. 2008); Bradley J. Irish, “The Literary Afterlife of the Essex Circle: Fulke Greville,
Tacitus, and BL Additional MS 18638,” Modern Philology, Vol. 112, No. 1 (Aug. 2014), pp. 271-85. On the
contents of the Sidney Library, see the multiple entries for Sir Francis Bacon, Nathaniel Bacon and Tacitus in
The Library of the Sidneys of Penshurst Place Circa 1665. On Tacitus and the Essex Circle, see Ch. One.
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“Trial of Sir Henry Vane,” [June 2 & 6, 1662,] 14 Charles II. 1662, T. B. Howell, A Complete Collection of
State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and other Crimes and Misdemeanors in Twenty-One Volumes
(London: Hansard, 1816), Vol. VI, pp. 119-202, 161. Elsewhere Vane stated, “God doth allow and confer by
the very law of nature, upon the community or body of the people (that are related to, and concerned in the
right of government, placed over them) the liberty by their common vote or suffrage duly given, to be assenters
or dissenters thereunto, and to affirm and make stable or disallow and render ineffectual, what shall apparently
be found by them to be for the good or hurt of that society whose welfare are next under the justice of God’s
commands and His glory, in the supreme law, and the very end of all subordinate governing power. “ Judson,
The Political Thought of Henry Vane, pp. 59.
225

Nedham explained why “every particular man” agreed to “Government by the People”; again, “why one man
is content to submit to the Government of another.” Nedham, Excellencie of a Free State, pp. 34, 36.
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As one scholar stated in describing Locke’s understanding of social man, “at least one classical liberal
recognized fully the extent to which human beings are social beings, but did not believe that that fact dictated
any particular political conclusions.” As a result, “Locke's disagreement with contemporary critics would be
not so much about the facts as about their import. He recognized the social character of human life and the
extent to which individuals develop beliefs, ideas and interests in a social context. The question is what that
recognition ought to mean for politics.” Accordingly, “premise of Locke's political argument – that men are
born free – is not a sociological claim, but a moral one … is central to appreciating what could properly be
meant by Lockean "individualism." Ruth W. Grant, “Locke’s Political Anthropology and Lockean
Individualism,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Feb.1988), pp.42-63, 43. For another interpretation of
Locke’s understanding of man as both individualistic and communal in nature, see Julian H. Ranklin, “Locke
on the Dissolution of Society,” Politics, Ideology and the Law in Early Modern Europe, Ch. 11, pp. 175-84.
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freedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with any
other man, or number of men in the world.” Political society originated out of this state of freedom. Man “hath
by nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and
attempts of other men,” but the right to create a community. To do so man quits his natural state, “resigning”
his freedom “into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to
the law established by it.” The individual resigns natural rights that are inconsistent with the community’s wellbeing while reserving those individual rights that the community need not eliminate in order to exist as a
political, social society.227 Thus, “ the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent,
and the same to all parties.”228 The author of the Court Maxims Second Dialogue similarly recognized, “By the
principles of nature and reason man cannot live well unless joined in society with others.”229 In contrast,
Harrington actually circumvented the individual. Oceana revealed Harrington’s “incapacity, or rather his
unwillingness, to think [of] the individual as disconnected from the whole of society and of mankind.”230
But from Sidney’s perspective and those of his republican bent, protection of the natural rights of the
individual went hand-in-hand with the best interests of the community. Initially, Sidney’s concept of social man
sounds like Hobbes’ view that men in the state of nature established civil society because of the protection it
afforded.231 But unlike Hobbes, Sidney believed that social man was a creation of God, who created men as
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Locke explained in §131 of the Second Treatise that men who enter into society give up only those natural
rights necessary to preserve the common good. Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, Bk2, ch11, §131.
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Id, Bk2, ch1, §3.
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Court Maxims, Second Dialogue, p. 9. Halifax addressed this duality only indirectly; his focus was very
much on the community. For example, he quipped “That a people may let a King fall, yet still remain a
People; but if a King let his People slip from him, he is no longer King.” “Maxims of State,” Halifax Complete
Works, pp. 147-49, 149.
230

See Luc Borot, “Religion in Harrington’s Political System: The Central Concepts and Methods of
Harrington’s Religious Solutions,” Perspectives on English Revolutionary Republicanism, pp. 149-64, 151
(discussion of Harrington’s “sylleptical way of thinking in Oceana, in which the “commonwealth’s task … is to
subsume the interests of the individual and of the ruler or rulers under that of mankind.” Harrington “cannot
define the individual members of the commonwealth and of mankind separately from the wholes that they
make up.” Accordingly, the “relationship between the individual, his faculties, and the polity” is described as
“a kind of fusion.”).
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As will become very clear in our consideration of Sidney’s views about natural law, his concept of natural
man’s sociability was much more benign than Hobbes’ infamous description of the savagery of the state of
nature, in which man’s life, per Hobbes’ famous adage, was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury; Now First Collected and
Edited by Sir William Molesworth, Bart. (London: Bohn, 1839-1945), 11 Vols., “Ch. XIII.: Of the Natural
Condition of Mankind As Concerning Their Felicity, and Misery,”
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rational beings. Accordingly, it was obvious that men would band together to form societies for their individual
and mutual protection and self-interest. “[I]nasmuch as God having from the beginning ordained that men
should not live like wolves in woods, every man by himself, but together in civil societies, left to every one a
liberty of joining with that society which best pleas’d him, and to every society to create such magistrates, and
frame such laws as should seem most conducing to their own good, according to the measure of light and
reason they might have.”232
Furthermore, the nature of man is such that the purpose of the “whole body of a nation,” said Sidney,
can only be obedience to action that “is consistent with the common good.” As he repeated elsewhere in
Discourses, an entire society cannot be wrong in identifying what is in its own best interest. “One, or a few,
may commit follies, but mankind does not universally commit, and perpetually persist in any.” That is why
government is set up “for the good of the society.” Men “cannot therefore, by a general and permanent
authority, enact that which is utterly absurd and impossible; or if they do, they destroy their own nature, and
can no longer deserve the name of reasonable creatures.” No such men exist, said Sidney, and he left it to
the “disciples of Filmer” to prove otherwise. Sidney elaborated on this point in connection with a discussion
about the protection that law affords to the people, whose interest the law is designed to protect. “The
question will not then be what pleases the king, but what is good for the people.” To answer this question,
Sidney noted, “’Tis ordinarily said in France, il faut que chacun soit servi a sa mode; Every man’s business
must be done according to his own mind: and if this be true in particular persons, ‘tis more plainly so in whole
nations.” In assessing what is safe for a people, “Many eyes see more than one: the collected wisdom of a
people much surpasses that of a single person; and tho he should truly seek that which is best, ‘tis not
probably he would so easily find it, as the body of a nation, or the principal men chosen to represent the

http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php %3Ftitle=585&layout=htm
l#chapter_89842| (2-11-14). The idea, suggested by political scientist Lee Ward, that Sidney was attempting
to “mediate between the positions of Hobbes and Machiavelli” is unsatisfactory. Sidney referred to Hobbes a
few times in Discourses. But there was very little engagement. As he said in one instance, “Mr. Hobbes I
think was the first, who very ingeniously contrived a compendious way of justifying the most abominable
perjuries, and all the mischiefs ensuing thereupon, by pretending, that as the king’s oath is made to the
people, the people may absolve him from the obligation.” As he later flatly stated, this would “overthrow all
societies” that rely on “oaths and most solemn contracts.” DCG, III.17.409, 412; see Ward, The Politics of
Liberty in England and Revolutionary America, p. 174.
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DCG, III.10.373.
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whole.”233
The concept of the common good is an age-old principle. “Already in the age of Plato and Aristotle
reflective persons understood the common good of the people to be the only legitimate basis of justice,
government and law.”234 The Ciceronian phrase salus populi est lex suprema, the welfare or safety of the
people is the supreme law, was debated and applied by many scholars.235 In Discorsi, Machiavelli recognized
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DCG, III.10.373, III.36.519, I.17.54, II.3.91, III.16.403. In Two Treatises Locke did not discuss the corrupt
nature of man. He did begin the “Second Treatise” with a denial of Hobbesianism, viz., that there must be
another reason for Government besides the assertion that it avoids “Force and Violence, and that Men live
together by no other Rules but that of Beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a Foundation for
perpetual Disorder and Mischief, Tumult, Sedition and Rebellion.” Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises,
Ch. I, §1, pp. 267-68. But like Sidney, Locke emphasized that God made man to be a social animal, and that
community is what life is all about. As he put it, “God having made Man such a Creature, that, in his own
Judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong Obligations of Necessity, Convenience,
and Inclination to drive him into Society, as well as fitted him with Understanding and Language to continue
and enjoy it.” Id, Ch. VII, “Of Political or Civil Society,” §77, p. 318; cf. Laslett, Introduction, Two Treatises, id,
p. 82 n.† (“The trouble was that Locke based right and wrong on God’s commands and punishments, but also
adopted a hedonistic ethic as well, an ethic of the Hobbesian sort. ….[H]e was perpetually complicating
everything with his anthropological relativism, noting the variety of ethical values among the world’s peoples
and hinting that virtue and vice were simply customary.” This sounds very much like French Enlightenment
thinking, e.g., Denis Diderot’s Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville; cf. John Dunn, The Political Thought
of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the ‘Two Treatises of Government,’ (Cambridge
University Press, 1982), pp. 23-24 (In Locke’s Essays on the Law of Nature the “single feature” of the
condition of man is the existence of God; as a result, life is not Hobbesian: “the law of nature, rationally
understood ethical truth, is not reducible to the practice of self-preservation or to an individualist hedonism”).
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M. N. S. Sellers, Republican Legal Theory: The History, Constitution and Purposes of Law in a Free State
(London & New York: 2003), p. 1. Cicero, for example, stated: “At all events, those who are to take over
administration of the state must observe the two precepts which Plato lays down: first, they must protect the
interests of the citizens in such a way that all they do should be directed towards that end without thought of
personal advantage. Second, the whole body-politic should be their concern, so that they do not protect one
section at the expense of the rest. … As for the argument advanced by some that they will take nothing for
their own profit from a parent or a brother, but that the rest of the citizen-body is a different matter, that is
quite absurd. Such men are claiming that there is no law or compact which they share for the common
welfare with their fellow-citizens. Such an attitude is destructive of all fellowship in the body-politic.” Cicero,
On Obligations, pp. 30, ¶85 and 93, ¶28. This view was commonplace in seventeenth-century England.
Jonathan Scott, “What Were Commonwealth Principles?,” The Historical Journal Vol. 47, Issue 03 (Sept.
2004), pp. 591-613, 591-93; see Algernon Sidney and Sir William Jones, A Just and Most Vindication (1681)
(repr. State tracts of the reign of Charles II (1689), Vol. IV, App. 15, pp. clxviii-xlxix.
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Cicero, Laws, Cicero The Republic and The Laws, Book Three, ¶8, p. 152. See, e.g., DCG, II.7.117, in
which Sidney maintained that no form of government was “set in nature,” and that “no crown is granted” that
was not given “in submission” to the principle of salus populi est lex suprema, viz., that the common good, or
the welfare of the people, always comes first. This was far from a new idea in England. Henry Parker’s 1642,
pre-Civil War “Observations Upon Some of His Majesties Late Answers and Expresses” had argued in favor
of Parliamentary sovereignty in opposition to James I’s Answer to the Nineteen Propositions, maintaining that
salus populi established “transcendent αχμη,” that is, that the high point or the essence of politics was the wellbeing of the people, “to preserve the Commonalty.” The royal prerogative was subservient to this “Paramount
Law.” Tuck pointed out that this phraseology was challenged by Selden, who maintained that the expression
was salus populi suprema lex esto, not lex est, that is, “in all the laws you make, have a special eye to the
good of the people,” not that one can “forsake the known law, when it may be for the most advantage of the
people.” To some extent this is classic legal rhetoric, as one person’s forsaking might be another person’s
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that the common good was the basis of government.236 The concept of the common good had particular
poignancy in the context of the Interregnum and the Restoration. Sidney admired Sir Henry Vane, for example,
who attested very eloquently to the principle of the common good in the midst of the post-Civil War political
struggles. Vane was a Puritan, viewed by some historians as a zealot, one of a number of men who, like
Sidney, walked out of the Rump when Cromwell initiated the process that culminated in the execution of the
King.237 He also was a leader of the Independents as civil war wound down. Parliament was grappling with its
ability to institute reforms without the kind of revolution that in fact had occurred when Parliament was “purged”
and the King executed. Vane’s statement about the public welfare is contained in the pamphlet A Healing
Question, which in its effort to “heal” constituted a powerful criticism of Cromwell and his Protectorate.238 In it
Vane reminded the English people of the nature of the “good Old Cause,” an expression that became
synonymous with the principles of liberty for which so many, including Sidney, fought the Civil War. “It lies in
this. They are to have and enjoy the freedome … to set up meet [i.e., suitable] persons in the place of Supreme
Judicature and Authority amongst them; whereby they may have the use and benefit of the choicest light and
wisedome of the Nation that they are capable to call forth, for the Rule and Government under which they will
live.” As a result, “through the orderly exercise of such measure of wisedome and counsel as the Lord in this
way shall please to give until them, to shape and forme all subordinate actings and administrations of Rule and
Government, so as shall best answer the publique welfare and safety of the whole.” In short, the Good Old
Cause was all about the common good, “the right and freedome contained in the nature and goodnesse of the
cause, wherein the Honest men have been engaged.239 Vane’s “healing question” was the matter of what could

compliance with “a special eye to the good of the people.” But in both interpretations, the common good was
the recognized priority. See “Henry Parker, ‘Observations Upon Some of His Majesties Late Answers an
Expresses’, 1642, pp. 38 & 250, n.12.
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“[I]t is not the private good but the common good that makes cities great. And without any doubt, this
common good is pursued only in a republic. …The opposite occurs when there is a prince,” at least “in most
cases.” Machiavelli, Discorsi, Bk II, Ch2, 157.
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See Underdown, Pride’s Purge, pp. 17, 59, 196. Judson pointed out that, “Unlike his contemporary
theorists Hobbes, Harrington, the Levellers, and others, Vane spent much of his adult life actually participating
at a high level in the councils of government.” Judson, The Political Thought of Sir Henry Vane the Younger,
pp. 3-4. This was part of the connection between Vane and Sidney.
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Sir Henry Vane, A Healing Question Propounded (London, 1656), p. 4.
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Id, pp. 4 & Postscript (emphasis added). For a further discussion of Vane’s invocation of the Good Ol’
Cause, see Appendix B.
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be done now to restore harmony and order to Britain. The answer was the pursuit of the common good and
welfare, which Vane identified with freedom of conscience, civil justice, and certainly not military dictatorship, or
self-interest and private gain.240 Years later Charles II executed Vane, not because he was a regicide but “by
virtue of [his] civil and military actions during the Commonwealth,” and from his self-exile in the Netherlands
Sidney anguished over Vane’s fate.241 Two decades later Sidney invoked the Good Old Cause in his Apology
and in the Last Paper that he handed to the sheriff as he mounted the scaffold.242
One of the offshoots of this understanding of social man, and the issue of what constitutes the good
of society, is a skeptical (some would say cynical) approach to governance known as “interest theory.” In
interest theory distinctions are made between public and private interest and the place of government in
controlling each. In England in the 1670s: ‘This Masquerading Age,’ Spurr focused particularly on the
concept of interest. Referring to The Present Interest of England Stated, a 1671 pamphlet published by the
republican London merchant and later sheriff Slingsby Bethel, Spurr maintained that “interest was the goal of
polemicists, be they republican or royalist, country landowner, nonconformist or overseas merchant. And
there lies the rub. For the country’s ‘true’ interest was open to debate and to change. No single recipe for
national improvement could command common assent.”243 In 1638, when the Sidneys were in Paris, Duc Du
Rohan, who became a friend of Leicester, published Of the Interests of Princes and States. It was translated
into English in the 1640s and greatly popularized the political strategy that “interest alone is forever sure.”
Leicester utilized the concept of interest in correspondence with the English Court when he was serving as a
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See J. H. Adamson & H. F. Folland, Sir Henry Vane: His Life and Times 1613-1662 (Boston: Gambit,
1973), pp. 336-43.
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For the demise of Vane, see id, Chs. 18-23, pp. 398-476.
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Apology, Algernon Sidney, Discourses concerning government by Algernon Sydney with his letters trial
apology and some memoirs of his life, printed after Discourses at pp. 195-96; “Last Paper,” Memoirs of A.
Sydney, id, printed before Discourses at p. 40.
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John Spurr, England in the 1670s: ‘This Masquerading Age’ (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p. 4. Note Scott’s
analysis of Bethel’s pamphlet, including its re-publication in 1680 in an expanded version entitled The Interest
of Princes and States. Bethel’s work adopted the interest theory analysis of the Dutchman Pieter de la Court,
a protégé of De Witt whose 1662 Het Interest Van Holland, published in England years later as The True
Interest and Political Maxims of the Republic of Holland, focused particularly on the country’s interest in trade
as the means of ensuring the prosperity of its inhabitants. Scott tied Bethel not only to de la Court, whose
ideas were reflected in Penn’s 1679 work, but also to Locke, Halifax, and ostensibly to Sidney via the
attribution to him of Court Maxims. See Scott I, Ch. 13, “The Dutch Connection,” pp. 207-21. (One has to
wonder, incidentally, whether the title Court Maxims was a play on de la Court’s Maxims.)
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diplomat in Paris.244 Du Rohan’s work was followed, in the 1660s, by Pieter de la Court’s The True Interest
and Political Maxims of the Republic of Holland, which focused on both the phenomenal trade and economic
success of Holland and the relationship of Holland’s commercial success to the republican freedom that
existed there, a subject to which Sidney referred in Discourses.245 Both of these interest theorists were part
of the Huguenot movement with which the Sidney family was so closely associated.
Interest theory has its own ancient history. Although some argue that Machiavelli was the source of the
concept of “interest,” in fact, as Prof. Viroli has explained, Machiavelli’s ideas were rooted in earlier Italian
thinkers.246 But we can go back much further to appreciate the context of interest theory. The ancient Stoics
formulated the ideas of the interest theorists after the decline of the ancient city-states; not surprisingly, their
emphasis was on achieving freedom through interior peacefulness rather than through political achievement
that, as a practical matter, was not attainable. Neo-stoicism was “a self-discipline the purpose of which was
to achieve a serenity or ‘constancy,’ impervious to the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. The favourite
Stoic images of the wise man were those of an oak tree standing firm against the buffeting of the winds, and a
rock resisting the waves. …Like yin and yang, the two doctrines were complementary opposites, with reason
of state teaching the activities suitable for a ruler, and Stoicism the passivity or resignation suitable for his
subjects.”247 The English example that Renaissance historian Peter Burke provided of literature reflecting
these Stoic values was Sir Philip Sidney’s Arcadia (1590), “in which Pamela is portrayed as constant in
adversity, ‘like a rock amidst the sea, beaten both with the winds and with the waves, yet itself immovable.’”248
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245

Spurr, England in the 1670s: ‘This Masquerading Age,’ pp. 118.
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Of course, there were numerous Machiavelli texts in the Sidley Library catalogue. See The Library of the
Sidneys of Penshurst Place Circa 1665, pp. 142, 237. For detailed consideration of the concept of reason of
state, Maurizio Viroli’s work on this subject, Machiavelli’s influence, and the related work of other
Renaissance humanists, see Appendix B.
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Peter Burke, “Tacitism, skepticism, and reason of state,” The Cambridge History of Political Thought 14501700, J. H. Burns & Mark Goldie, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2006), Ch. 16, pp. 479-98, 491-92.
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Id, pp. 493. Henry Savile, who was Elizabeth I’s Greek tutor, included a note in his 1591 annotated
translation of Tacitus’s History on the phrase arcana imperii, the mysteries of state: “the secrete trueths of
apparences in affaires of estate, for the masse of the people is guided and governed more by ceremonies and
shewes then matters in substance.” Savile had been a client of the Earl of Essex. Montrose, The Subject of
Elizabeth, p. 229, citing Henry Savile, tr., The ende of Nero and beginning of Galba (Oxford, 1591) (passage
in Savile’s separately paginated Annotations, 6). There are numerous editions of Tacitus’ work (not to mention
commentaries on it) in the Sidney Library catalogue, including an Opera dated 1585 that was heavily
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The skepticism of the ancient Stoics and later the neo-Stoic thinkers that spawned interest theory was
also associated in medieval and early modern Europe with the concept raison d’état, ragione degli stati, or
“reason of state.”249 Early modern writers recognized that the ancient Roman historian Tacitus was a master
of reason-of-state analysis. In the late sixteenth and much of the seventeenth century, Tacitus was revived
and embraced; commentaries on Tacitus became a parallel genre to reason-of-state literature in England and
France. Reason of state was variously defined, which Burke observed may have been the secret to its
success. In general, it might mean that rulers were above the law, or it might mean that a ruler sometimes
had to take action not covered by law. Usually writers analyzed reason of state in terms of a “good” and a
“bad” version of its application – “good” decisions were made by a leader influenced by a desire to meet the
needs of his people in contrast to “bad” decisions motivated strictly by self-interest. Of course in most cases
the balancing of factors required by a leader encompassed both of these considerations.250 Reason-of-state
authors were unable to avoid the fact that their pragmatism smacked of Machiavelli’s approach to politics,
which made people uncomfortable even if they agreed with the perceptive Florentine political thinker.251 The
concept that it was better to be feared than loved, for example, was not a rejection by Machiavelli of the value
to a sovereign of the devotion of his people; it was simply the pragmatic recognition that a feared leader could

annotated by Sidney’s grandfather, Robert Sidney. The Library of the Sidneys of Penshurst Place Circa
1665, pp. 85, 231, 333-34.
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Burke, “Tacitism, skepticism, and reason of state,” pp. 479-80.
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Id, pp. 480-81, 484-85; see also Geoff Baldwin, “Reason Of State and English Parliaments, 1610-42,”
History of Political Thought Vol. 25, No. 4 (2004), pp. 620-41, 623-25; Markku Peltonen, Classical humanism
and republicanism in English political thought 1570-1640 (Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 156-58.
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In the sixteenth century during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, a tract entitled Maxims of State was written.
It is sometimes attributed to Sir Walter Raleigh (1552?-1618). The author maintained that to preserve a State
two things were required: “Mysteries, or Sophisms, which are divided into those “general to all States,” and
those “Particular, for every several State,” and then secondly, “Rules, or Actions,” which were also either
general or particular. Maxims of state defined “Mysteries, or Sophisms of State” as “certain secret practises,
either for the avoyding of danger, or averting such effects as tend not to the preservation of the present State,
as it is set or founded.” The tract’s fourteenth axiom or rule for preserving the state was, “To take heed, least
their Sophisms, or secret practices for the continuance and maintenance of that State, be not discovered;
least by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves, but wisely used, and with great secrecie. (Here
we also have another text to which Court Maxims could be sardonically referring.) Maxims of state written by
Sir Walter Raleigh; whereunto is added his Instructions to his sonne, and The son’s advice to his aged father
(London: W. Bentley, 1650), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A57483.0001.001/1:5.4.1?rgn =div3;view
=fulltext (1-29-19). Note that the date of re-publication is during the Restoration. See Louis Montrose, The
Subject of Elizabeth: Authority, Gender and Representation (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago
Press, 2006), p. 229.

430

run a country and accomplish many of his goals, whereas a loved ruler who was not feared could more
readily become a toppled leader – precisely what happened to Machiavelli’s mentor Piero Soderini. In short,
the feared had a much greater shot at success than the loved, and those who failed could accomplish
nothing.252 Reason-of-state literature often discussed not only the concept of “interest,” but also “prudence.”
The virtue of prudence, which is “the mastery of the will by the intellect,” was fundamental to moral philosophy
from the time of Aristotle.253
Not surprisingly given his intellectual family grounding in these ideas over generations, including the
ideas of his great-uncle Sir Philip, and as reflected in the Sidney Library and the political ideas of the times,
interest theory is reflected in Algernon Sidney’s work. In his usual fashion, Sidney began with a recognition of
the personal implications of the concept of interest. “All men follow that which seems advantageous to themselves.”254 This had positive and negative consequences. We had the ability to understand what motivates
people, what is important to them, which is why we could rely on men collectively when they tell us what they
view to be “the common good.” But self-interest also explained why men were so easily corrupted. These
ideas certainly were not unique to Sidney; they were reflected in the ideas of fellow early modern republicans,
particularly in a communal context.255 Halifax put it this way: while he could “not deny but that interest will not
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Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. XVII, pp. 57-59.
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For a more detailed discussion of the concept of prudence, see Appendix B.
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In discussing consent, for example, Sidney stated that nothing obliges men to consent to enter into a
society “but the consideration of their own good; that good, or the opinion of it, must have been the rule,
motive and end of all that they did ordain.” DCG, II.28.274, II.5.99, and discussion infra.
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Nedham, for example, resonantly castigated those who justified bad acts by invoking reason of state. “A
fourth error in Policy, and which is indeed Epidemical, hath been the Regulation of affaires by Reason of
State, not by the strict Rule of Honest.” Nedham did not “condemn the equitable Results of prudence and right
Reason; for upon determinations of this nature depends the safety of all states, and princes.” Nedham,
Excellencie of a Free-State, p. 105. Rather, it was selfish interests that were rejected: “that reason of state
that flowes from a corrupt principle to an indirect end; that reason of state, which is the states man's reason,
or rather his will and lust, when he admits Ambition to be a reason, Perferment, Power, Profit, Revenge, and
Opportunity, to be reason, sufficient to put him upon any designe of Action that may tend to the present
advantage.” Id, pp. 105- 06. While reason of state can be used for legitimate purposes – “the Care and
compass of the ship, the life of a State” – it is also used to rationalize all sorts of “strange Pocus.” It can be
the rationalization of everything: “say and unsay, do and undo, baulk the Common Road, make High-wayes to
become By-wayes, and the furthest about, to become the nearest Cut. If a difficult Knot come to be untied,
which neither the Divine by Scripture, nor Lawyer by Case or precedent can untie, then Reason of State, or a
hundred wayes more, which Idiots know not, dissolves it. This is that great Empress which the Italians call
Raggione distato. It can rant as a Souldier, complement as a Monsieur, trick it as a Juggler, strut it as a
States man, and is as changeable as the Moon, in the variety of her appearances.” Id, pp. 106. For further
details on Nedham’s use of history to elaborate on “wicked Reason of State,” see Appendix B.
431

lie is a right maxim,” the problem was that a nation’s interest was not properly understood until “for the most
part it is too late for them to pursue.”256 In the 1670s flood of English Restoration pamphlets, “interest” was
used to describe “the political calculations of rulers and nations in their dealings with other nations.”257
Like reason-of-state analysis, the weakness of interest theory in analyzing a nation’s best interest was
the amoral tone of the analysis, implying that self-interest trumped other factors in a political calculation.
Some writers sought to turn this around, suggesting that real interest required a moral component. 258 The
political cachet of interest lingo may have been utilized or coopted, but the ideas smacked of those who
sought to revitalize civil virtue. As the author(s) of A Just and True Vindication stated: “But if they mean by
these lovers of Commonwealth Principles, men passionately devoted to the Publick good, and to the common
service of their Country, who believe that Kings were instituted for the good of the People, and Government
ordained for the sake of those that are to be governed, and therefore complain or grieve when it is used to
contrary ends, every Wise and Honest man will be proud to be ranked in that number. And if Commonwealth
signifies the Common Good, in which sense it hath in all Ages been used by all good Authors, and which
Bodin puts upon it, when he speaks of the Government of France which he calls a Republick, no good man
will be asham’d of it.”259 As Sidney said in Discourses, “The follies with which our author endeavours to
corrupt and trouble the world, seem to proceed from his fundamental mistakes of the ends for which
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“A Rough Draft of a New Model at Sea,” Halifax: Complete Works, p. 158.
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On a sampling of the relevant pamphlet literature, see Appendix B. Self-interest was negatively associated
with Machiavelli, which was a bad rap. Machiavelli’s thesis was that it was all very well and good for a ruler to
pursue virtuous matters; but if he did not take into account his own political viability or existence, and in that
sense his “self-interest,” he would not be able to accomplish anything for his country (or, in Machiavelli’s case,
his city-state). See Ch. One discussion of Machiavelli’s ideas. In 1679, the Quaker William Penn wrote a
pamphlet entitled, “ONE Project for the Good of England That is, Our Civil Union is Our Civil Safety Humbly
Dedicated to the Great Council, the Parliament of ENGLAND,” which stated, “Civil Interest is the Foundation
and End of Civil Government. … William Penn, The Political Writings of William Penn, Andrew M. Murphy,
intro. & annota. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2002), p. 122.
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As Penn stated in his 1679 pamphlet, “The Word INTEREST has a good and bad Acceptation; when it is
taken in an ill Sense, it signifies a Pursuit of Advantage without Regard to Truth or Justice; which I mean not:
The good Signification of the Word, and which I mean, is a Legal Endeavour to keep Rights, or augment
honest Profits, whether it be in a private Person or a Society.” Penn also said that by government, he means
“a Just and Equal Constitution, where Might is not Right, but Laws rule, and not the Wills or Power of Men; for
that were plain Tyranny.” This is Sidney and Adams language. Id.
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In the course of this discussion, the author(s) referred to The Mirror of Justice, Bracton, Fleta, Fortescue, Sir
Thomas Smith, Sir Francis Drake, Coke, King James I, Charles I “and others.” A Just and Modest Vindication,
pp. 43-44.
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governments are constituted.” Contrary to Filmer’s perspective that government is instituted for the benefit of
the ruler, “common sense teaches, and all good men acknowledge, that governments are not set up for the
advantage, profit, pleasure or glory of one or a few men, but for the good of the society. For this reason,” said
Sidney, “Plato and Aristotle find no more certain way of distinguishing between a lawful king and a tyrant, than
that the first seeks to procure the common good, and the other his own pleasure or profit.”260 Halifax shared
this conviction. “When all is said, there is a natural Reason of State, an undefinable thing grounded upon the
common good of mankind, which is immortal, and in all changes and revolutions still preserveth its original
right of saving a nation, when the letter of the law perhaps would destroy it; and by whatsoever means it
moveth, it carrieth a power with it that admitteth of no opposition, being supported by Nature.” Thus, said
Halifax, “a wise Prince, instead of controverting the right of this Reason of State, will by all means endeavour
it may be of his side, and then he will be secure.”261
On the other hand, because of the self-serving nature of interest theory, Sidney and his fellow
republicans also shared with some of the Civil War absolute monarchists a wariness of arguments grounded
in interest, whether Biblical in origin or otherwise. Sidney impugned Filmer because he would “overthrow
liberty and truth” by “modestly” advising the people “not to meddle with mysteries of state, or arcana imperii,”
i.e., mysteries of government. Sidney likened such an approach to “the foundation of the papal power,” which
“can stand no longer than those that compose the Roman church can be persuaded to submit their
consciences to the word of the priests.” To the contrary, he said, “Such as have reason, understanding, or
common sense, will, and ought to make use of it in those things that concern themselves and their posterity,
and suspect the words of such as are interested in deceiving or persuading them not to see with their own
eyes, that they may be more easily deceived.”262 Describing the ideas of the royalist pamphleteer Jaspar
Mayne, historian Glenn Burgess observed, “The capacity to describe good as evil and evil as good produced
the feeling that ‘there had been no such things in Nature, as Right or Wrong, Justice or Injustice, but only as
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DCG, II.3.91.
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“The Character of a Trimmer,” Halifax Complete Works, p. 60. Pincus maintained that, “Milton’s notion of
active citizenship was antagonistic to the new emphasis on interests,” an emphasis typical of a commercial
society. “Milton’s republic was a place where ‘reason only swayes.’” This does not follow. An emphasis on
interest certainly need not be irrational; neither need it be the promotion of a commercial society. See Pincus,
“Neither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism,” p. 725.
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DCG I.3.12-13.
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Holy men would please to call them,’” and such statements could be defended in the name “of publique utility
and necessity of State.”263 For the monarchists, the seductive element of rhetoric – that very cultivation to
which Cicero was so dedicated as a vital element of good republican, participatory governance – enabled
“Rapines, and Oppressions” to be characterized by the “softer names of Just levyes and supplyes,” and
“Murthers” and “Bloodsheds” to be “smooth’d and glazed into the milder appearances.”264 Hobbes
concurred.265 This also brings to mind the tension between the importance Sidney placed on the law, on the
one hand, and the dangerous rhetorical talents of a corrupt lawyer or, particularly, a corrupt judge, on the
other, which could undermine the very purpose of law to protect good governance. The law “which intends to
obviate offences, or to punish such as cannot be obviated, has directed, that those men should be chosen
who are most knowing in it,” and it “imposes an oath upon them, not to be diverted from the due course of
justice by fear or favour, hopes or reward, particularly by the command from the king; and appoints the
severest punishments for them if they prove false to God and their country.”266 Ironically, such was the
denouement of Algernon Sidney.
As Holt emphasized and Pocock would no doubt concur, “Language matters.”267 The study of history
has been enormously enriched by the linguistic turn, and the attention paid among historians to discourse.268
But sometimes we may make too much of language. There is always more than one way to say the same
thing. Language also can be jargon; there are popular ideas and popular words that each generation
embraces, today and in the past, to which discourse an author seeks to have taken seriously must refer. The
popular use of language does not necessarily explain the views of its invoker. The language of interest may
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Jaspar Mayne, A Late Printed Sermon against False Prophets, Vindicated by Letter from the Causeless
Aspersions of Mr.Francis Cheynell (London, 1647), pp. 7-8, cited in Burgess, “Royalism and Liberty of
Conscience,” p. 23.
264
265

Burgess, “Royalism and Liberty of Conscience,” p. 23.
Id, p. 24, citing Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Richard Tuck, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 257.
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This is essential particularly because “no law can be so perfect … so as to leave nothing to the discretion
of the judges.” DCG III.26.465, 468-69 (emphasis in original). See also DCG II.28.276-77 on the corruption of
officeholders, including judges.
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Holt, “The Ancient Constitution in Medieval England,” Sandoz, The Roots of Liberty, Ch. 1, p. 35.
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For a compelling analysis of the linguistic turn, with an emphasis on its psychological roots, on the
continuing work of historians, see Gabrielle M. Spiegel, “The Task of the Historian,” The American Historical
Review, Vol. 114, No. 1 (Feb. 2009), pp. 1-15.
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be such a lingo. Nevertheless, it is another (modest) feature of Sidney’s Discourses.
I contend that the liberty which we contend for is granted by God to every man in his own person.
…They carried their liberty in their own breasts, and had hands and swords to defend it.
Sidney, Discourses 269

ii. Liberty
Sidney’s Discourses’ analysis begins with the statement that he was writing a Filmer rebuttal. He
then immediately turned to the concept of liberty, viz., that Filmer was “endeavouring to overthrow the
principle of liberty in which God created us, and which includes the chief advantages of the life we enjoy, as
well as the greatest helps towards the felicity,” that intense happiness “that is the end of our hopes in the
other.”270 Five-hundred and seventy (printed) pages later, the last line of Discourses is also about liberty:
“And if we examine our history we shall find, that every good and generous prince has sought to establish our
liberties, as much as the most base and wicked to infringe them.”271 Liberty, and man’s associated liberties,
is what Sidney’s republicanism was all about.272
Indeed, if there is only one issue on which scholars of republicanism agree, it is that the attainment of
liberty – whatever that might be – lies at the heart of republicans’ quest; accordingly, liberty is the
unchallenged starting place of an analysis of republicanism.273 Sidney stated that Filmer “absurdly” credited
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Locke also said that in Filmer’s view, “no Man is Born Free.” Locke, “First Treatise,” Two Treatises, I, ¶2,
p. 176.
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DCG, 1.2.8, III.46.578.
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Similarly, the author of Court Maxims’ First Dialogue stated, “The people of England, deceived by the fraud
of the courtiers and the priests, grew to that height of madness as to seek servitude rather than liberty.” Court
Maxims, p. 4. Machiavelli famously said, “Among the most necessary things established by those who have
founded a republic in a prudent fashion is a safeguard for liberty, and according to whether it is wellestablished or not, that free way of life is more or less enduring.” Machivelli, Discorsi, BI, Ch5, 31. In short,
“Liberty is for Machiavelli the highest and most precious political value.” Viroli, Machiavelli, p. 76. Nedham
termed liberty “the most precious Jewel under the Sun.” Indeed, he said, “If a People once conceive they
ought to be free, this conception is immediately put in practice; and they free themselves. Their first care is to
see, that their Laws, their Rights, their Deputies, their Officers, and all their Dependents, be settled in a state
of freedom. This becomes like the Apple of the eye; the least grain, atom, or touch, will grieve it: it is an
espoused virgin; they are extreme jealous over it.” Nedham’s treatise was devoted to the subject of the best
way to preserve liberty. Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, pp. 8, 10.
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“According to the majority view, the idea of liberty is the central value in the republican political tradition.”
Samantha Besson and José Luis Martí, “Law and Republicanism, Mapping the issues,” Legal Republicanism:
National and International Perspectives, Samantha Besson & José Luis Martí, eds. (Oxford University Press,
2009), pp. 1-36, 13. In their monograph Besson and Martí identified “at least four main elements at the core
of republican political thought” – a strategy for analyzing republicanism that is flawed. The elements identified
are “a particular and rich conception of liberty,” “a particular and ambitious conception of basic and political
435

the School divines – the Catholic scholastic Schoolmen – with the idea of liberty. This was preposterous
because liberty is “universal,” and love of liberty is “written in the heart of every man.” Man is “naturally free.”
While “the Schoolmen were corrupt, they were neither stupid nor unlearned: They could not but see that
which all men saw, nor lay more approved foundations, than, that man is naturally free; that he cannot justly
be deprived of that liberty without cause, and that he doth not resign it, or any part of it, unless it be in
consideration of a greater good, which he proposes to himself.” Sidney embraced the ancient principle,
reflected in the familiar claim to “life, liberty and property” (later modified in America to “life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness”), that was the subject of substantial medieval scholastic thought, with a variety of root
sources debated by scholars, but often with the premise, adopted in the seventeenth century by Grotius, that
“every individual has a property right in his own person.”274 This property right amounted to one’s freedom, or
liberty. It is a natural right given to man by God.275 Accordingly, deprivation of that right is not only the taking

equality,” a “strong and deliberative ideal of democracy, much more participatory than what liberal democratic
theory can accommodate,” and “an idea of civic virtue.” I would suggest that “a particular and ambitious
conception of basic and political equality” is a factor that is an off-shoot of the necessity for public participation
in politics. Consent is not mentioned; perhaps this is what Besson and Martí mean by “a strong and
deliberative ideal of democracy”? No mention is made of the extremely important facet of mainstream
republicanism that declines to specify a required form of governance – a necessary conclusion if one truly
embraces the notion of consent. The emphasis on democracy is confusing, as democracy is a form of
government that republicans often did not embrace (unless one is talking about a democratic republic?)
Additionally, the list omits the very important foundation of republican theory, which is a clear appreciation of
the nature of man. Needless to say, no mention is made of the multiple facets of law, the multi-tiered
approach to law that includes God-made natural law, man-made law (both the social contract and the rule of
law, the latter of which is emphasized in Legal Republicanism), legal process and procedure (which comes up
in the text but is not identified as a facet, per se, of republicanism), and there is no mention of balance and
moderation as integral parts of republican theory. See Besson & Martí, Legal Republicanism, pp. 13-26.
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The distinction is also made between permissive and immutable natural law. See Brian Tierney, The Idea
of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law 1150-1625 (Grand Rapids, MI &
Cambridge, UK: William B. Erdmans Publishing, 1997), p. 8, and passim. Behind the identification of liberty
as a natural right is the complex debate among scholars as to whether natural rights are objective or
subjective (or, in Tierney’s case, whether this duality is inapposite). The distinction between objective and
subjective rights relates to one’s conviction about the most compelling account of the origin of natural rights
theories. Objective right is “independent of the notion of law as the rule of actions. Right is an objective thing
(res, chose) and it has nothing to do with the possibility of actions,” a concept originating in Aristotle, classical
Roman law, and Aquinas. In contrast, subjective right is “une qualité du sujet, une de ses facultés, plus
précisément une franchise, une liberté, une possibilité d’agir,” and is “dependent on the notion of law.”
Annabel Brett, Liberty, Right and Nature: The Language of Individual Rights in Later Scholastic Thought
(Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 4 & n.14, quoting Michel Villey, the modern scholar whose account of
the origin of natural rights theories Tierney termed “the most widely accepted account.” See also J. H. Burns,
“The individual and society,” J. H. Burns, ed., The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c. 350c.1450 (Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 588-606.
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According to the sixteenth-century Spanish Dominican theological Francisco de Vitoria, a member of the
famous Catholic humanist school at Salamanca, “’liberty cannot rightfully be traded for all the gold in the
world: it can be traded for life, which is more precious than any gold.’ Only in extremis could men enslave
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of one’s property, but constitutes a violation of God’s natural law.276 The creeping expansion of the king’s
prerogative, for example, threatened the natural right of liberty, as evidenced by the frequent parliamentary
debates on the exercise of prerogative laced with the language of liberty. Most Englishmen, including
republicans, had not considered the prerogative an inappropriate exercise of power, and certainly not per se
unlawful, until it seemed to be used with increasing frequency by the Stuarts, and in ways that further intruded
on citizens’ lives. In the famous Ship Money case, for example, the king was adversely impacting English
subjects’ freedom by unilaterally taxing them. In A Just and Modest Vindication, written to protest the king’s
repeated prerogations of Parliament, the authors (probably Sidney and Sir William Jones) complained that,
“every pretence of Prerogative is strained to the utmost Height” such that “Parliaments are used with
contempt and indignity.”277 For Sidney, liberty was an antidote to man’s vulnerability to corruption. “Liberty

themselves; they were not masters of their own destiny, and it was not up to them to fix the exchange-value of
their liberty. That was given by the law of God, and it was fixed at more than anything except life itself.”
According to Vitoria, liberty is not property, and it cannot be exchanged as if it is, in contradistinction to the
Gersonian concept that liberty could be traded like any other property. Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories:
Their Origin and Development (Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 27-29, 49. Endorsing Grotius, Sidney
considered liberty to be a property right. But in general, in this time period, this question is particularly
confusing because of the differences in the way theorists defined property. For further discussion of the
meaning of property, including by John Locke, see Appendix B.
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The subtitle of Section 2 of Chapter One of Discourses is, “The common notions of Liberty are not from
School Divines, but from Nature.” DCG, I.2.8. Tierney’s conclusion about the origins of natural rights reflects
the complexity of the subject: “Perhaps it would be more satisfying if the idea of natural rights had entered
Western political thought with a clatter of drums and trumpets in some resounding pronouncement like the
American Declaration of Independence or the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. In fact,
though, this central concept of Western political theory first grew into existence almost imperceptibly in the
obscure glosses of the medieval jurists.” In short, “One might say that, in the works of the early Decretists, a
distinctive mutation of thought and language occurred which gave rise to a whole new species of idea, the
species of natural rights theories.” And “once the idea that all persons possess rights had grown into existence,
it displayed a remarkable vitality and adaptability.” Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on
Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law 1150-1625 (Atlanta, GA: Emory Univ. Studies in Law & Religion
No. 5, 1997), pp. 344-45.
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A Just and Modest Vindication, p. 48. In analyzing political ideas in seventeenth-century England, Weston
and Greenberg created a polarity between a “community-centered view of government” and “a political theory
of order or an ordered theory of kingship.” At the center of this distinction, these scholars suggested, is, “Who
makes law?” with a king who is the lawmaker entitled to exercise power in all sorts of ways, including
dispensing with statutes. This approach conflated several different issues. A community-centered view of
government, namely, a parliamentary system, relies on consent, as Weston and Greenberg suggested, but
only in the selection of representatives; furthermore, Weston and Greenberg are correct to distinguish
between legislative authority shared by three equal estates (king, lords and commons) and authority and law
made by the king alone, albeit in parliament. They were incorrect, however, to suggest that an ordered theory
of kingship necessarily intertwines royal prerogative with lawmaking, whereas a community-centered view of
government does not. Prerogative can be exercised in either form of governance, monarchy or representative
government. Any substantial or undefined exercise of prerogative suggests that a king is not subject to the
law, which would mean that there is no rule of law. For in a constitutional monarchy, a king can be subject to
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produceth Virtue, Order and Stability: Slavery is accompanied with Vice, Weakness and Misery.” Indeed,
Sidney looked at the matter both ways: liberty promoted virtue; but by the same token, virtue promoted
liberty. “But if this virtue and the glorious effects of it did begin with liberty, it did also expire with the same.”
The triumph of small republics over powerful monarchies proved his point; it was “necessarily … the
production of virtue and good order.” Sidney relied on Machiavelli, as well, who recognized that a corrupted
people – of course the issue is, how corrupt? – cannot “set up a good government.”278 As Vane stated in A
Healing Question, “if there be never so many fair branches of liberty planted on the root of a private and
selfish interest, they will not long prosper, but must within a little time wither and degenerate into the nature of
that whereunto they are planted.”279 Nevertheless, the point is that for Sidney, virtue and liberty reinforced
each other.
At the same time that man is naturally free, and that it is man’s God-given nature to love his liberty,
that love is “temper’d by Reason,” which is also natural to man. Sidney categorically rejected Filmer’s
assertions that “the desire for liberty was the first cause of the fall of man,” and that man’s unlimited love of
freedom was a self-destructive impulse that necessarily led to licentiousness and other forms of corrupt
behavior.280 Cleverly, Sidney relied upon the religious foundations that undergirded Filmer’s argument to
rebut his adversary’s conviction that liberty was dangerous and must be suppressed in order to protect man

the law and still can exercise prerogative within legally defined parameters. See Weston & Greenberg,
Subjects and Sovereigns, pp. 3-5.
278

DCG, II.11.134, II.12.146, II.11.135.
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Sir Henry Vane, A Healing Question, p. 4. If we look at Machiavelli’s view on interest in the chapter of
Discorsi to which Sidney referred, it is clear that Machiavelli’s concern was with circumstances in which there
was a pervasive absence of virtue in a society, the consequence of which was that the laws could be and
were flaunted – a subject vital to Sidney’s republicanism. In Chs. 17 and 18 of Book One of Discorsi
Machiavelli articulated his view that, “a corrupt city living under a prince can never regain its liberty.”
Discussing Rome after Caesar, and then Milan after the death of the autocrat Filippo Visconti, Machiavelli
explained the difficulty of restoring freedom to people who neither recognize nor seek it because they are
“long accustomed to bad habits.” In such an “extremely corrupt” city, “neither laws nor institutions will be
found in it sufficient to check universal corruption.” This happens, in part, because laws that are established
when men are not corrupt “are no longer suitable later, once men have become evil.” Machiavelli recognized
that in such circumstances it may be “necessary to lead it [such a corrupt city] more towards a monarchical
than towards a popular government, so that those insolent men who cannot be improved [by the laws] would
be held in check by an authority which is almost kingly.” In short, Machiavelli favored popular sovereignty; but
like Sidney, he recognized that in some circumstances, what might be best for the people might require
something else. Moreover, as Sidney emphasized and fundamental to his republicanism, the people might
want something else. Machiavelli, Discorsi, BkI, Ch17, 65-71.
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DCG I.2.8-9, from Filmer, Patriarcha, Ch. 1, pp. 53-54; DCG, II.20.191-92.
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from himself. Tempered, yes; suppressed, no. The views of Sidney’s nephew Halifax were entirely
consonant with Sidney’s perspective. “Our Trimmer owneth a passion for liberty, yet so restrained, that it doth
not in the least impair or taint his allegiance. He thinketh it hard for a soul that doth not love liberty ever to
raise itself to another world; he taketh it to be the foundation of all virtue, and the only seasoning that giveth a
relish to life.” Waxing poetic, Halifax continued. “[T]o men made of a better sort of clay all that the world can
give without liberty hath no taste. …Liberty is the mistress of mankind, she hath powerful charms which do so
dazzle us that we find beauties in her which perhaps are not there, as we do in other mistresses; yet if she
was not a beauty, the world would not run mad for her.” The English constitution must be recognized, said
Halifax, for its protection of man’s liberty. “Our Trimmer admireth our blessed constitution, in which dominion
and liberty are so well reconciled. …Our laws make a true distinction between vassalage and obedience;
between a devouring prerogative, and a licentious, ungovernable freedom.281
But what was this natural liberty revered by Sidney and Halifax? “Taking man in his first condition,”
liberty is derived from one’s spirit, “ab eo libertas a quo spiritus,” which means that he who gives life, gives
liberty, otherwise often stated as the liberty of a people is the gift of God and nature.282 Since the “creature
having nothing, and being nothing but what the creator makes him, must owe all to him, and nothing to
anyone from whom he has received nothing,” the result is that, “Man therefore must be naturally free, unless
he be created by another power than we have yet heard of.”283 This raises the question as to which of the
scholarly renditions – negative, positive, neo-Roman, or some other understanding of liberty – Sidney had in
mind. “Negative liberty” consists in the absence of obstacles or constraints; conversely, if a person is
constrained, he is not free. In contrast, positive liberty requires “the possibility of acting – or the fact of acting
– in such a way as to take control of one’s life and realize one’s fundamental purposes.” Positive liberty is
often discussed in terms of self-realization. In “Two Concepts of Liberty,” Isaiah Berlin brought these

281

“The Character of a Trimmer,” Halifax: Complete Works, pp. 62-63.

282

This is the title of Section 33 of Chapter Three of Discourses, as well as the motto on Thomas Jefferson’s
coat of arms. DCG, III.33.510; http://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/coat-arms (2-8-14)
(part of the Robert H. Smith International Center for Jefferson Studies, “a multidisciplinary research center
that oversees the work of several departments at Monticello and supports the ongoing international study of
Thomas Jefferson and his world.” http://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/robert-h-smithinternational-center-jefferson-studies (2-8-14).)
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concepts into the intellectual arena.284 The neo-roman concept of liberty was first articulated by Quentin
Skinner and later modified by political theorist Philip Pettit. Skinner spoke of neo-roman liberty in terms of
non-dependence and non-interference. Pettit used the language of domination. “The republican conception of
freedom was certainly negative, I maintained, but it did not represent liberty as noninterference in the manner
that Hobbes inaugurated and that came to prominence among nineteenth-century liberal writers. It was,
rather, a conception of liberty in which the antonym is not interference as such but rather dominatio or
domination,” which means “subjection to an arbitrary power of interference on the part of another – a dominus
or master – even another who chooses not actually to exercise that power.”285 Pettit and Skinner concurred
on the meaning of domination or dependency, two terms Pettit equated (or, more precisely, considered
convergent).286 As Skinner stated in Liberty Before Liberalism, “Your rulers may choose not to exercise these
powers, or may exercise them only with the tenderest regard for your individual liberties. So you may in
practice continue to enjoy the full range of your civil rights. The very fact, however, that your rulers possess
such arbitrary powers means that the continued enjoyment of your civil liberty remains at all times dependent
on their goodwill.”287
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For a (partial) list of the scholarly analyses on the nature of liberty, see Appendix B. On Skinner’s ideas,
see also Introduction.
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On Pettit’s ideas about liberty, see Philip Pettit, “Law and Liberty,” Legal Republicanism, Ch. 1, pp. 39-59;
Pettit, “Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On a Difference with Quentin Skinner,” Political Theory, Vol. 30
No. 3 (June 2002), pp. 339-56, 340; Pettit, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of
Agency (Oxford University Press, 2001); Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government
(Oxford University Press, 1997).
286

Pettit explained: “Where Skinner speaks of dependency on the good will of another, I speak of being
dominated. Being dominated involves occupying a position where another can interfere on an arbitrary basis
in your life: specifically, where another can interfere with greater or lesser ease on a more or less arbitrary
basis across a smaller or larger range of choices. I see no relevant difference between what we say here,
and I shall assume that, though we use different words, we have roughly the same thing in mind. For the
record, I think that someone has an arbitrary power of interference in the affairs of another so far as they have
a power of interference that is not forced to track the avowed or readily avowable interests of the other: they
can interfere according to their own arbitrium or decision.” Pettit, “Keeping Republican Freedom Simple,” pp.
341-42. In this discussion, Pettit seems to be eliding the distinction between non-domination and noninterference. This may be more politic than anything. Pettit does not include non-interference in the way that
Skinner uses it in his concept of liberty because, in Pettit’s view, such an inclusion is not the best way to
create a free society.
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Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, p. 18. Skinner and Pettit did not invent this concept of liberty. For
example, in the anonymous pamphlet A Defence of the Majority in the House of Commons, on the Question
relating to General Warrants. In Answer to the Defence of the Minority (London: J. Wilkie, 1764), FAU/Weiner
Collection, p, 19, the author stated, “Liberty demands that there should not be left a Possibility of Danger.”
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Skinner and Pettit also agreed that men living in a state of dependency or domination are not free; and
when men are not free, a state is not free. Pettit put it the other way around: “one is free only in a free
state.”288 The difference between their views of liberty is that Skinner added the concept of non-interference to
the concept of non-dependency. He and Pettit’s ideas represent two different versions of liberty, whether or
not we call them both “neo-roman.”289
The question of how best to protect liberty was debated among English republicans during the critical
period of 1658-59 when the Protectorate and then the post-Protectorate regimes collapsed and the Stuarts
were invited back to England. Renaissance literature scholar Martin Dzelzainis, an expert on Milton, Marvell,
and other republican authors of the period, challenged the concept of neo-roman liberty in the context of this
dramatic seventeenth-century controversy.290 Dzelzainis did not distinguish between Skinner and Pocock’s
concepts of liberty, lumping them together as neo-roman. He explained that a heated written exchange took
place among republicans before the republic’s implosion in the winter of 1659-60 that juxtaposed Harrington
and Nedham (no mention is made of Neville), who for purposes of this analysis, I dub the Harringtonians,
against Vane, Stubbe (a Vane protégé) and Milton. In one of his lesser-known publications, Pour enclouer le
canon, published in May 1659, Harrington rejected a bicameral legislature, arguing that there should be no
House of Lords, senate for life, optimacy, or any sort of appointed council; for in such a circumstance,
oligarchy would inevitably ensue and the people would not really be free. Nedham argued that the people are
not free where there is an “absolute Monarchy … an unlimited, uncontrolable, unaccountable station of Power
and Authority in the hands of a particular person … yet really, and effectually, the thing in itself hath been
discovered under the artificial covers of every Form, in the various Revolutions of Government.” Like
Harrington, one of the examples Nedham provided was ancient Rome, when Tarquin was expelled, yet “the
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Here one can contrast the analysis of Philip Pettit , who distinguished his own similar ideas from Skinner’s
thesis, emphasizing that “the interference suffered in living under a coercive but fair rule of law must count as
a secondary offence against freedom. Such a rule of law will not compromise freedom, in the manner of a
dominating agency, but it will condition freedom…. it will reduce the range or ease with which people enjoy
undominated choice.” Pettit, “Keeping Republican Freedom Simple,” p. 342. Skinnerian republicanism has
been analyzed in various contexts. See Appendix B. Note that the French revolutionaries were particularly
focused on the matter of control.
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Martin Dzelzainis, “Harrington and the Oligarchs: Milton, Vane, and Stubbe,” Perspectives on English
Revolutionary Republicanism, Dirk Wiemann & Gaby Mahlberg, eds. (Ashgate: Surrey, UK & Burlington, VT,
2014), Ch. 1, pp. 15-33.
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Power and Interest of Kingship was still retained in the Senate. …[A]s soon as the Senate was in the saddle,
they forgat what was charged by themselves upon Tarquin, and ran into the same Errour, by establishing an
Arbitrary, Hereditary, unaccountable Power in themselves, and their Posterity, not admitting the people
(whose interest and liberty they had pleaded[)], into any share in Consultation, or Government, as they ought
to have done.”291 Harrington was not opposed to a different sort of bicameralism: his paradigm had two
houses; but their functions were entirely separate and highly controlled, with the upper house, embodying “the
wisdom of the commonwealth,” proposing legislation to resolve matters of concern to the country, and the
lower house debating and voting on such matters. If the elite did not hold too much power, they were “the
very life and soul” of popular government. The upper house did not vote; its members debated. The people,
which the house of commons concretized, guarded liberty – the “interest of the commonwealth –by voting.”292
This is the context of Harrington’s well-known cake metaphor: two girls divide a cake by having one cut it and
the other select a piece. Harrington’s goal was to create a commonwealth that was “perfectly equal.”293
According to Dzelzainis, Harrington’s issue in the 1659 timeframe was that he recognized that if Lords
was reinstituted, the people might be free, but they would not – note the carefully formulated language – be
“free indeed.”294 Neo-roman liberty might guarantee freedom from the authority of an arbitrary monarch, i.e.,
freedom from domination; but it did not ensure that people were entirely free from arbitrary government.295
Dzelzainis pointed to the statements of other republicans who made the same distinction, specifically, a
contemporaneous Nedham statement that in Venice, “the People are free from the Dominion of their Prince or
Duke, but little better than Vassals under the Power of their Senate,” as well as the statement by English
Colonel Robert Gibbons that, “Libertas is written over the door of some senate-houses, where yet the people
live under the greatest servitude.”296 Dzelzainis could have selected an even more persuasive statement from
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Harrington, Oceana, pp. 15, 21-25, 237. Harrington’s paradigm included other controlling features,
including the equal agrarian principle for which he is famous, and mandatory rotation in office. For further
discussion about control, see Appendix B.
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Nedham, who in Excellencie of a Free State specifically said, “It is also to be observed, when kings were
driven out of Rome, though they were declared and called a Free-state, yet it was a long time ere they could
be free indeed.” To the contrary, Brutus was cheating them “with a meer shadow and pretence of liberty.” On
the other hand, they would have been “free indeed” if they had placed “an orderly succession of supreme
Authority in the Hands of the People.”297 Dzelzainis related this dichotomy – “being free” versus “being free
indeed” – to a fundamental problem with the concept of neo-roman liberty. If liberty was defined as the
absence of arbitrary power, essentially Pettit’s definition, this did not guarantee real freedom. A lawfully
empowered upper house, for instance, could deny the people their freedom, as Harrington and Nedham
emphasized. The absence of arbitrary power was a necessary but not a sufficient condition to being “free
indeed.” It did not protect against non-arbitrary impositions on freedom.
This takes us back to Pettit, for whom there is a fundamental problem with including the concept of
non-interference as a necessary component of liberty. Here the twenty-first century theorist Pettit meets the
heart of the 1659 controversy that is the subject of Dzelzainis’s analysis. “[I]f the fact of restricting choice is
enough to make something into the antonym of freedom, then freedom should be thought to require not just
nondomination and noninterference but also nonlimitation.” In other words, “Any theory that goes beyond
identifying freedom with nondomination will have to identity it with nonlimitation of any kind; it cannot find a
stable resting point in the identification of freedom with a joint idea of nondomination and noninterference.”298
Admittedly, if men are interfered with by a non-arbitrary power, they are not completely free – “free
indeed” – in the Dzelzainis sense. This would be true, for example, if a lawfully instituted senate, through
lawful means, inhibited the actions of the people or, for that matter, in some way constrained the people’s
representatives, e.g., MPs. This was Skinner’s primary concern with Pettit’s concept of freedom and, as
already stated, the focus of the Harringtonians. Skinner was troubled that defining liberty as strictly nondomination would result, in his view paradoxically, in the outcome that having to obey a non-arbitrary law
makes you free. Pettit does not find this paradoxical; neither do I. Besson and Martí maintained that this
outcome is a reflection of “the necessity to define liberty in a richer and more demanding way than the
traditional negative liberty, to borrow Berlin’s famous opposition, but without conflating it with its positive
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characterization.” Positive liberty required the intrusion of government into individual lives, even if
“paternalistic,” or “perfectionist”; because to achieve “self-realization” would “require avoiding all the internal
causes that prevent, distort, or simply affect our free choice – things like weakness of will, adaptive
preferences, cognitive dissonances, and so on.”299 In the Dzelzainis context, this also raised the specter of
the Senate unlawfully doing the same thing, viz., the fear of the Harrington contingency: the danger that a
senate, Lords, or duly appointed council would usurp power lawfully residing elsewhere in government.300
Harrington provided the example of the Roman republic, which evolved from an elected to a hereditary body,
foreclosing freedom and becoming “an instrument of servitude for the people.”301 Harringtonians apparently
believed that by giving power to the people, one could avoid this risk.
The position that Sidney held, as did Pettit, and consistent with the view of the non-Harringtonians that
Dzelzainis analyzed, is that regardless of the form of government, including a pure or other sort of democracy,
there always exists the possibility of corruption, whether sanctionable within the law or not, including
corruption that thwarts freedom. One such form of corruption is ultra vires action, measures taken beyond the
authorized, legitimate assignment of legal power. Again, the corruption of the political system is contingent; it
is also a risk that Sidney recognized could never be completely eliminated. One can create a form of
government in which the people are entrusted with the exercise of power; but this political option, like every
other, will not eliminate the risk of corruption, including the exercise of unauthorized power. This is a more
skeptical position that the Harringtonian idealized view, which contemplated the ability to both avoid conflict,
verbal or otherwise, and guarantee liberty. From Sidney’s perspective, there simply is no full-proof way for a
system of governance to avoid the risk of ultra vires acts or other forms of corruption that can infringe upon
liberty.302
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Besson and Martí, “Law and Republicanism: Mapping the Issues,” pp. 13-14. Besson and Martí are,
respectively, Swiss and Spanish law professors who edited a relatively recent text, Legal Republicanism, to
which lawyers, political scientists, political theorists, and philosophers contributed. Historians were not
included. This makes evident one limitation of this collection of essays, namely, it’s generally ahistoric bent.
See Appendix B.
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Thus, for example, Sidney said that, “Ill men may possibly creep into any government,” courtiers are
particularly susceptible to corruption, and “absolute monarchies are more subject to this venality and
corruption than the regular and popular governments.” For the “highest places are always slippery: Men’s
eyes dazzle when they are carried up to them; and all falls from them are mortal.” But this is the human

444

In the context of the seventeenth-century republican controversy, Dizelzainis rejected the Pettit
concept of neo-roman liberty, concurring with the Harringtonians, who utilized a Skinnerian definition of
liberty. Liberty was non-domination but it was more; it also subsumed freedom from interference, including
non-arbitrary impositions on freedom. Non-interference was intended to close the loophole with regard to
non-arbitrary impositions. For the Harringtonians, the absence of arbitrary power (non-domination) was
insufficient; they also sought to prevent non-arbitrary impositions on freedom. If one was truly free from the
interference of others, one was “free indeed.” Dzelzainis endorsed this Harringtonian concept of being “really
free,” which he equated with a commonwealth founded on “the free consent and actual confirmation of the
whole people.”303
We now have the Harringtonians and their modern advocate, Dzelzainis, endorsing a Skinnerian
definition of liberty and rejecting Pettit’s perspective. Aside from the idealism (Sidney would have said lack of
realism) that this position reflects, it is wholly inconsistent with the concept of rule of law, discussed in detail
below, but what for present purposes should be understood as another independent feature of republicanism
to which all of the English republicans subscribed, including the Harringtonians and non-Harringtonians. As
Pettit made plain, the rule of law necessarily restricted freedom and appropriately so. Creating law and then
imposing it on civil society was, by definition, an inhibition or curtailment of some expressions of freedom. For
Pettit, liberty did not mean unqualified or absolute freedom. While “law does restrict choice,” it was “not
inherently opposed – not opposed in the manner and measure of domination – to freedom.”304 We are no
longer in the state of nature; liberty is a distinctly civil condition. It is the maximum amount of freedom
consistent with living in civil society. It is not complete freedom! Accordingly, it was not only possible, but it
was necessary to “condition” freedom.

condition, “every man bearing in his breast affections, passions, and vices that are repugnant to this end,”
viz., the attainment of the good in ourself and achieving a just society. Accordingly, “Tis in vain to seek a
government in all points free from a possibility of civil wars, tumults, and seditions; that is a blessing denied to
this life, and reserved to compleat the felicity of the next.” DCG, II.25.252-57, II.3.91; II.1.82-83; II.24.217;
see also id, II.19.184. Nevertheless, Sidney (following Machiavelli) considered tumult – express political
disagreement – as often a healthy aspect of political society, e.g., in a commonwealth, tumults that “arise
between the nobles and commons frequently produce good laws for the maintenance of liberty.” DCG,
II.24.249.
303
It is unclear, for example, in Dzelzainis’ analysis, whether freedom is possible in representative
government. Dzelzainis, “Harrington and the Oligarchs,” pp. 30-31.
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Here was the essence of the debate. For Pettit, and the Milton (non-Harringtonian) faction of
republicans who participated in the 1659 exchange, conditioning freedom did not compromise or undermine
freedom; for Dzelzainis (and the Harringtonians), it did.305 Pettit did not address the obvious rationale for his
concept of liberty, namely, that in the absence of the rule of law, there is no protection afforded freedom; but
with the rule of law, freedom is not absolute.306 From the pragmatic, realistic viewpoint of Pettit and the nonHarringtonians, the latter choice was far better than the former. It was part of the argument of republicans who
favored conditioned freedom. As Milton sensibly observed in October 1659, in A Letter to a friend, concerning the ruptures of the Commonwealth, “whether the civill government be an annuall democracy or a
perpetuall Aristocracy” is “too nice a consideracion for the extremities wherein wee are,” which he described
as “Being now in Anarchy without a counselling & governing power & the Army I suppose finding themselves
insufficient to discharge at once both military & civill offices.”307 From the vantage point of many post-Civil
War republicans, it was the avoidance of anarchy that was essential, which requires the rule of law and the
conditioning of freedom.308
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As Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter famously said, “"I do take law very seriously, deeply seriously."
He explained. "[F]ragile as reason is and limited as law is as the expression of the institutionalized medium of
reason, that's all we have standing between us and the tyranny of mere will and the cruelty of unbridled,
undisciplined feeling." “Felix Frankfurter,” Time, Sept. 7, 1962, Vol. 80, Issue 10, pp. 29-30.
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John Milton, “A Letter to a friend, concerning the ruptures of the Commonwealth,” Complete Prose Works
of John Milton, 8 vols., Wolfe et al., eds. (New Haven, CT & London, 1954-83), vol. 7, pp. 329, 331, cited in
Dzelzainis, “Harrington and the Oligarchs,” pp. 25-26.
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“The central objective for republicans since Cicero has been to revive the liberty, the principles, and the
virtues of the Roman republic, while avoiding the vices and constitutional flaws that led eventually to the
tyranny of the emperors and to the tragedy of civil war.” Sellers, Republican Legal Theory, p. 3. This does not
mean, by the way, that following the rule of law always results in a just result. As law professor Frederick
Schauer explained, “It is not law’s purpose, of course, to be unfair for the sake of being unfair. But there is an
important group of values – predictability of result, uniformity of treatment (treating like cases alike), and fear of
granting unfettered discretion to individual decision-makers even if they happen to be wearing black robes –
that the legal system, especially, thinks it valuable to preserve. These values often go by the name of the Rule
of Law, and many of the virtues of the Rule of Law are ones that are accomplished by taking rules seriously as
rules.” The consequence is that “law remains irreducibly formal, and thus at times seemingly unfair in
particular cases. …[J]udges are being formalistic when they believe that they are operating in the core of a
legal rule when in reality they are at the fringe.” But Schauer reminded us that, “law is more than simply doing
the right thing in each individual case. …[W]hat makes law what it is – usually for better but sometimes for
worse – is that it takes larger institutional and systemic values as important, even if occasionally at the
expense of justice or wise policy or efficiency in the individual case.” Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a
Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press, 2009),
pp. 30, 35.
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This analysis also relates to Locke’s famous statement that, “though this be a State of Liberty, yet it
is not a State of License.” In a State of Liberty man had “an uncontroleable Liberty to dispose of his Person
or Possessions,” Locke observed. At the same time, man was neither free “to destroy himself, or so much as
any Creature in his Possession, but where some nobler use, than its bare Preservation calls for it,” nor was
he entitled “to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.”309 This was the so-called Lockeian
doctrine of natural political virtue, viewed as a specific law of nature distinct from the law of nature
generally.310 “This doctrine lays it down that all individuals … will have some tendency to allow for the
existence, the desires, actions, and needs of other men. …The doctrine of natural political virtue goes some
way to justify in ethical terms Locke’s rather perfunctory defence of majority rule in mechanical terms,” viz.,
that a majority will “act with some responsibility towards those in the minority.” Laslett called this an “outwardfacing” virtue,” a power that men have and direct towards the well being of others.311 Locke’s idiosyncratic
concept of natural political virtue was not shared by Sidney, who regarded man as more self-absorbed.312
Nevertheless, notwithstanding Locke’s use of the expression “uncontroleable Liberty,” Locke embraced the
conditioned liberty of the non-Harringtonians.313
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Locke, “Of the State of Nature,” “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, Ch. 2, §6, pp. 270-71. Similarly, in his
Essay concerning Human Understanding, Locke stated, “No government allows absolute liberty.” Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, IV, iii, 18.
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Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, §§6-7, pp. 270-71; see Peter Laslett’s “Introduction,” id, p. 98.
Per Laslett, Locke maintained that man in society “never completely transcends the state of nature: the
contrast is never complete.” Id, p. 100. It is difficult to reconcile this view with several of Locke’s statements
in the “Second Treatise,”e.g., “Those who are united into one Body, and have a common establish’d Law and
Judicature to appeal to, with Authority to decide Controversies between them, and punish Offenders, are in
Civil Society one with another: but those who have no such common Appeal, I mean on Earth, are still in the
state of Nature.” “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, §87, lines 23-30. Perhaps what Laslett meant here is
that men do not become something entirely different when they leave the state of nature? In short, while men
in civil society are no longer living in the state of nature, they are still governed by the laws of nature. This is
a subject of Ch. Four.
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Laslett, “Introduction,” Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 110-11.
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Adams also was preoccupied with the potential tyranny of the majority. It “is the majority only who will
remain secure out of the reach of tyranny. …[T]he minority, on the contrary, will be constantly within the reach
of tyranny, and under the arbitrary disposition of the commanding power of the majority.” Adams, Defence,
Vol. III, p. 356; cf. Francis Thorpe, “The Political Ideas of John Adams,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History
and Biography, Vol. 44, No. 1 (1920), pp. 1-46, 10.
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Pettit noted that Skinner had “such an explanation to offer in the case of Machiavelli: that Machiavelli sees
the restrictions of the law as preventing people from indulging their appetites and avoiding public service and
from thereby undermining the freedom of the state in which their own freedom is included.” In Pettit’s view, “it
would be better to be able to make do without such a special account, and in any case it is not clear how far
that explanation will work with English writers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: with writers, as he
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In addition to the practical conclusion that there is no way to absolutely protect freedom, and the
necessity for rule of law to condition liberty, Pettit’s analysis focused on a third palpable distinction between
interference and dominance. While both domination and interference do restrict choice, they do so in very
different ways, often with conspicuously disparate consequences. If one is dominated – subject to the arbitrary will of another – one is often subject to aggression, coercion, intimidation or manipulation; domination
also may induce self-abasement and self-censorship. It not only victimizes people by virtue of the uncertainty
it creates in their situation in life; it also tends “to introduce a characteristic asymmetry of status. …[I]t deprives a person of the ability to command attention and respect and so of his or her standing among persons.”314 Whatever resentments one may have as a consequence of “interference,” it does not create these
onerous personal and social consequences. This is particularly true when the interference is non-discriminatory, which generally is the goal of purposeful restrictions on freedom enacted through the rule of law.
Sidney’s republican freedom, as we shall see, was constructed within a multi-layered system of law
and, accordingly, rejected domination but not interference. This is not only true for Sidney. Many of the
seventeenth-century republicans expressly embraced a Pettit concept of liberty as non-domination. In
contrast, those such as Harrington who strove to enlarge the concept of liberty to include non-interference
held to a theory that lacked internal coherence. One cannot have absolute liberty and the rule of law; they are
mutually inconsistent.315 In any event, this was the fault line between the groups of republicans who, in 1659,
desperately sought a political solution that would promote their political values. Depending on how one
defined liberty, as well as one’s level of idealism/realism/skepticism, different conclusions followed. If you
rejected the idea that liberty could exist subject to limitations absent one’s personal consent, and if you further
believed not only that personal consent was required but that the people as a whole could prevent the risk of
intrusions on liberty, then a Lords or Senate or counsel of any sort was threatening and unacceptable. On the

[Skinner] himself says, for whom the language of rights plays as important a role as the Machiavellian
language of service.” Pettit, “Keeping Republican Freedom Simple,” p. 346; Skinner, Liberty Before
Liberalism, pp. 19-21.
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Scott considered Harrington’s Oceana to be “a deliberate subversion of classical republicanism,” and to
have abolished the foundation of classical republicanism, viz., liberty. While I could not agree more, because
Scott did not focus on the substructure of law that undergirded both classical republicanism and early modern
English republicanism, he did not recognize the ways in which Harrington subverted this fundamental aspect
of republicanism as well. See Scott, “The rapture of motion,” pp. 146, 152.
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other hand, if you believed that rule of law properly could limit freedom, and that representatives could speak
for the people, you were unlikely to be wary of a bicameral legislature and, indeed, may well have considered
it an important constraint on the whims of a single, popular legislature such as Commons. The broad range of
republican views about the nature of liberty are in part a reflection of how one answers these questions,
including how best to protect it. Some republicans sought to impose a distinct type of democracy (Harrington,
Neville); others relied on some form of aristocratic institution to avoid the perceived problem that the
uneducated masses might not know what was actually in their best interest and therefore might not protect
their own liberty (Vane); still others required bicameralism to address the concern that any institution without a
counter-balancing one would be much more vulnerable to corruption (Sidney, Halifax, Locke – and a century
later, Adams).316
In turning to Sidney’s extensive discussion of liberty, I propose a shift from the term “non-domination,”
which is Pettit jargon, and “non-dependence,” Skinner jargon, to the term, self-determination. Hopefully, this
will somewhat avoid the historiographic baggage that weighs down the other terms. Self-determination also is
a more informative way to think about liberty. It encompasses not only the concept of non-domination, but
also the value of self-reliance and, more broadly, the ability of each individual to control his own life to the
maximum extent possible, to make decisions – foolish or otherwise – that an individual believes are in his own
best interest, and to act on them.317 At the same time, self-determination does not preclude and, indeed,
relies on the rule of law to maximize the self-determination possible in civil society. This was Sidney’s view,
aligning him with Dzelzainis’ 1659 non-Harringtonians in the debate in which English republicans in Commons
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Tyrrell was not prepared to defend “a Popular Government, where the mixt Multitude, without any
Representatives, consult of Affairs, or make Laws.” Tyrrell, Patriarcha non Monarcha, Ch. III.
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As discussed in much more detail in Ch. Four in the context of Sidney’s reliance on the concepts of balance
and moderation, historian Ethan Shagan probed the adverse consequences of the early modern commitment
to moderation. Among other things, Shagan argued that if liberty was not by nature uninhibited, then its
“defence” actually amounts to its restraint. “Once we have noticed that liberty acquired meaning through its
moderation, however, defence of liberty can be resituated as an attempt to restrain or bridle liberty in its own
particular context.” Shagan, The Rule of Moderation, p. 255. Shagan is not wrong; but, nevertheless, he is
hoisted by his own petard. Sidney and other republicans who believed that liberty was self-determination were
obviously concerned about protecting that civil right. Because liberty was necessarily exercised within civil
society by a vast number of self-determining individuals, it was considered necessary to adopt laws that
avoided potentially dangerous exercises of unrestrained liberty by one or more individuals at the expense of
the liberty of others. This is what the concept of license was all about – the reckless exercise of liberty. But to
suggest that protecting liberty meant in some adverse way “bridling” it misses the point that the consequence
of a failure to exercise some restraint on individuals’ exercise of their liberties would likely lead to its loss and
the associated loss, at least for some, of their right of self-determination.
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grappled with the best way to protect liberty.318
Self-determination is not a term generally used by scholars who discuss liberty. There are two
exceptions, both of which are inapposite. Jurist M. N. S. Sellers discussed self-determination as a right that
implicitly recognized “the republican principle of popular sovereignty.” But Sellers used self-determination in
strictly the collective sense, e.g., “the right of ‘all peoples’ to ‘self-determination’ and ‘freely’ to ‘determine their
political status.’”319 Self-determination can be collective; but it is also individual. In contrast, Goldsmith’s use
of the term “self-determination” significantly muddies the waters because of his concept of republican liberty.
In his article on liberty, virtue, and the rule of law immediately after the Glorious Revolution, Goldsmith
referred to “rational self-determination” in a footnote discussion of different conceptions of liberty.320 He
distinguished between “civil, ‘rule of law’ liberty,” which he viewed as a form of Berlin’s “negative” liberty
contemplating a “sphere of non-interference in which the subject is free to act,” versus what he termed
“republican” liberty in which “a free person shares in taking political decisions” but in a much narrower way
than Berlin’s “positive” liberty, which “ranges far beyond republican liberty … to identifying freedom with
rational self-determination.” In contrast, it is my contention that “rule of law” is a distinct element of
republicanism, and certainly not in opposition to either self-determination or “republican liberty”321
Individual self-determination usefully describes the republican concept of liberty. Like many of his fellow
republicans, Sidney repeatedly and explicitly endorsed the well-worn metaphor of liberty as freedom from
slavery, which closely relates to Pettit’s concept of domination. If someone else makes your decisions, you
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In a funny albeit confused description, one nineteenth-century author wrote, “it may be urged that he
[Sidney] was not an out-and-out Republican. What he wanted was a free form of government – not a oneman-despotism.” Sidney, Memoirs of the Sidney Family, p. 185.
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Sellers is quoting from a modern document, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. Sellers, Republican Legal Theory, p. 122.
320

M. M. Goldsmith, “Liberty, Virtue, and the Rule of Law, 1689-1770,” Republicanism, Liberty, and
Commercial Society, pp. 197-232, & p. 445, n. 1.
321
Goldsmith focused on Hobbesian “prætermitted” – not legislated on – liberty, which he considered a “civil,
‘rule of law’ liberty,” intended by Hobbes to counter a republican, participatory concept of liberty. Hobbes
“rejected the basic liberal belief that there should be a sphere of individual liberty protected from state
interference. Such a protected sphere of liberty was inconsistent with having a state.” Goldsmith correctly
pointed out that one can have “a more generous conception of civil liberty than Hobbes had,” in which “’the
end of law was not to ‘abolish or restrain’ but rather to ‘preserve and enlarge Freedom,’” quoting Locke. I
would simply add that, as will be evident, Goldsmith also could have quoted Algernon Sidney on this point,
which he effectively did by discussing Sidney immediately after this Locke quotation. Id, pp. 199-204.
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clearly are not free: “He is a slave who serves the best and gentlest man in the world, as well as he who
serves the worst; and he does serve him if he must obey his commands, and depends upon his will.” Since
liberty is “only an exemption from the dominion of another, the question ought not to be, how a nation can
come to be free, but how a man comes to have a dominion over it; for till the right of dominion be proved and
justified, liberty subsists as arising from the nature and being of a man.”322 The dichotomy of free man versus
slave pervaded Sidney’s discourse, often associated with Tacitus and the concept of interest: 323 “[I]t was
said, that the people, who whilst they fought for their own interests, had been invincible, being enslaved, were
grown sordid, idle, base, running after stage-plays and shows; so as the whole strength of the Roman armies
consisted of strangers. When their spirits were depressed by servitude, they had neither courage to defend
themselves, nor will to fight for their wicked masters; and least of all to increase their power, which was
destructive to themselves: The same thing is found in all places.”324
In addition to platitudes about domination as slavery, Sidney’s liberty was also highly personal. This
is the man whose perspective was informed by the Percy conviction that freedom meant self-determination; it
was one of his family’s formative principles. After all, it was Sidney’s Northumberland ancestors who
politically challenged the first king of the Lancastrian branch of the Plantagenet dynasty in the early fifteenth
century on the basis of their own right of political self-determination. It was also the Northumberland Percys
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DCG, III.21.441, III.33.510. Neville made a similar point when he stated, “any violent constraining of
mankind to a subjection, is not to be called a government; nor does salve either the politic or moral ends,
which those eminent legislators amongst the ancients proposed to themselves, when they set rules to
preserve the quiet and peace, as well as the plenty, prosperity and greatness of the people.” Neville, Plato
Redivivus, p. 35.
323

It pervaded Locke’s analysis, as well. See, e.g., Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, Ch. IV, “Of
Slavery,” pp. 283-85. In Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, Milton was more long-winded, but made the same
point: “And surely that shall boast, as we doe, to be a free Nation, and not have in themselves the power to
remove, or to abolish any governour supreme, or subordinate, with the government itself upon urgent causes,
may please thir fancy with a ridiculous and painted freedom, fit to coz’n babies; but are indeed under tyranny
and servitude; as wanting that power, which is the root and sourse of all liberty, to dispose and oeconomize in
the Land which God hath giv’n them, as Maisters of Family in thir own house and free inheritance. Without
which natural and essential power of a free Nation, though bearing high thir heads, then can in due esteem be
thought no better than slaves and vassals born.” John Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, William
Talbot Allison, ed. (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911) (repr. of 1st ed., with variants from the 2nd ed.), p. 51,
http://oll.liberty fund.org/titles/ 271 (11/12/2014). Machiavelli said that in trying to persuade the Etruscans to
join them and take up arms against the Romans, the Samites said, “peace with servitude was harder to bear
than war with liberty.’” This is a quotation from Livy. Machiavelli, Discorsi, BkIII, Ch.44, 353, 414 (Explanatory
Notes).
324

DCG, II.21.197.
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who sought to protect the religious self-determination of Catholics in the north of England. Sidney considered
the matter broadly, exploring various self-interests that men embrace when they are able to do so.
One’s self-interest includes an enthusiasm about “the increase of commerce,” so that “the people
being pleased with their present condition, may be filled with love to their country,” which then encouraged
them “to fight boldly for the publick cause, which is their own.”325 In Discourses Sidney referred in passing a
number of times to the subject of trade. He clearly took it for granted that trade was desirous.326 His mission
to the Baltic, after all, had been to ensure that the northern trade routes remained open to England. On the
other hand, addiction to money, e.g., the disreputable behavior that many courtiers exhibited, was indicative
of men who “have no other care, than to get money for their supply by begging, stealing, bribing, and other
infamous practices.” This was corruption, pure and simple; such unscrupulously obtained riches were “the
base product of their own corruption.”327 Yet Sidney devoted no discussion in his 578-page treatise to the
issue that so troubled and preoccupied Harrington and Neville, the distribution (and redistribution) of property.
Sidney appreciated that different people esteemed different things. Commerce, trade, and financial success
were only one aspect of self-interest, and they were not concomitant with avarice.328 Sidney was a modern
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Id, I.2.8, II.23.209.
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Sidney debated whether a commonwealth should be constituted for war or for trade. He concluded that if
it was constituted for war, it could “make use of trade as assisting to that end”; for “experience teach[es] us
that those only can be safe who are strong.” DCG, II.22.204-05. Here is another instance in which
Harrington’s views were diametrically opposed to Sidney’s; on this matter, Milton’s ideas were, too. In Pincus’
words, “Nigel Smith may be guilty of some understatement when he declares that ‘Milton does not
fully integrate trade into his system of virtue .’ … He absolutely condemned the commercialization of
society and ultimately blamed it for the downfall of the Commonwealth…. James Harrington, for all his
ideological inventiveness, for all his insistence on the material underpinnings of political power, was
no more friendly to commercial society. …Harrington bitterly condemned commercial culture, the culture of
‘selling,’ the ‘Jewish humour,’ as subversive to commonwealths. …Earlier, Harrington warns that Jews were a
people that would ‘suck the nourishment which would sustain a natural and useful member.’” Pincus, “Neither
Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism, pp. 715 & n.37, 717 & n.56. Pocock’s aversion to
commercialism may be why he found Harrington to be so compelling – the “real” republican.
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DCG, II.25.254-55.
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In contrast to its brief treatment in Discourses, and once again with overbearing rhetoric that seems unSidney like, there is a lengthy discussion in the Sixth Dialogue of Court Maxims between the courtier and the
commonwealthman on the issue of trade. The courtier maintained that the people must be controlled and,
indeed, oppressed: “The people at best is but an ass fit for burdens, and they use them as they deserve who
make them bear the heaviest. The unruly beast must be flattered a little at first, till saddled and bridled, and
then you may make them carry what you please.” This was done by having the court “and principally the
new-made nobility,” who “delight in vanity and sensuality” spend money profusely. “In order to effect this work
of impoverishing and bringing the people low we find it to be the king’s interest to destroy trade.” The courtier
noted, “The Hollanders in all business of war or peace with any nation do principally consider trade.” In
contrast, in England the king did not consider the interests of its merchants. Moreover, “For the same end
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man of London (and environs), a thriving commercial center of Europe. He recognized that all good things in
life could be corrupted (and corrupting) including, incontrovertibly, the use of wealth. For example he
castigated Louis XIV, whose “abundance of riches” were “torn out of the bowels of his subjects,” rendering
them the poorest, most miserable nation in the world even though the country was wealthy.329 As Sidney
explained metaphorically, “The head cannot desire to draw all the nourishment of the body to itself, nor more
than a due proportion.”330 The susceptibility of trade, commerce and the wealthy merchant community to
various forms of corruption did not detract from the value and desirability of economic improvement.331
Sidney did not believe that trade alone could protect a country from invasion; for that reason, he advocated
that military defense was a necessity since “experience teach[es] us that those only can be safe who are
strong.”332 But he was unequivocal that, “that government is evidently the best, which not relying upon what it
does at first enjoy, seeks to increase the number, strength, and riches of the people. …This comprehends all
things conducing to the administration of justice, the preservation of domestick peace, and the increase of
commerce.”333
“All men follow that which seems advantageous to themselves.”334 Again, “naturally and properly a
man is the judge of his own concernments. No one can be deprived of this privilege, unless by his own

custom and excise is raised to get a great deal of money to the king and his servants, and advance the main
design of ruining trade.” The Sixth Dialogue continues for pages in this vein. Court Maxims, Sixth Dialogue,
pp. 73-77.
329

DCG, III.6.352.

330

Id, III.39.540.
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Pace Pocock, in the years immediately preceding the creation of the Commonwealth in 1649, “the
strategic importance of trade was gaining unprecedented levels of attention.” Thomas Leng, “Commercial
Conflict and Regulation in the Discourse of Trade in Seventeenth-Century England,” The Historical Journal,
Vol. 48, No. 4 (Dec. 2005), pp. 933-54, p. 935. See Appendix B.
332

DCG, II.22.205. This was a very Machiavellian notion.

333
Id, II.23.209. Because he based his view strictly on Court Maxims, indeed, in this case, the Sixth Dialogue
of Court Maxims, Pincus had the mistaken view that, “Sidney's attitude toward trade is admittedly
equivocal - he does heap praise on martial valor.” Pincus, “Neither Machiavellian Moment nor
Possessive Individualism,” p. 720 n.72. Of course, praise of martial valor in no way suggests a particular
attitude towards trade, and Sidney was not equivocal about trade. At the same time, Pincus correctly
pointed out that Pocock’s understanding of Sidney on commerce is not correct: “Yet Pocock's
categorical dismissal of Sidney's interest in commerce as merely a nostalgic longing for ‘a postElizabethan deployment of naval intervention in Europe’ appears to have gone too far. It cannot make
sense of Sidney's praise for Dutch state thinking or of his deep and abiding friendliness toward
Nieuwpoort and other Dutch commercial advocates.” See Pocock, ‘England's Cato,’ 920.” Id.
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DCG, II.28.274.
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consent, and for the good of that society into which he enters.”335 Men have different priorities in life,
particularly in different societies and governments; these differences were not of particular importance to
Sidney. In fact, from his perspective it was none of his business what other people strove to do, including
amassing wealth, as long as they did not infringe on the entitlements of others (which is the rub, of course,
and enormously controversial). “We are not concerned to examine, whether the political and oeconomical
powers be entirely the same, or in what they differ.” Limitations on people’s liberty must be based on their
consent; this could include inhibitions on the freedom to acquire wealth and property.336 As Sidney repeatedly
recognized, all such manifestations of self-interest were a reflection of “the natural, universal liberty of
mankind.”337
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DCG, III.41.547. Along with Maurizio Viroli I depart significantly from views expressed particularly by
Quentin Skinner and Martin Van Gelderen that the republican tradition had “ambiguous implications” with
respect to commerce. Sidney, Halifax, and other early modern Englishmen, as well as the republicans Cicero
and Machiavelli before them, disdained corruption, including financial corruption. But this did not constitute any
sort of advocacy of a limitation on, or qualification about commerce. Contrary to Skinner and Van Gelderen’s
suggestion, the acquisition of wealth was not “a base and even an unpatriotic pursuit.” Quentin Skinner,
“Introduction,” Republicanism, a Shared European Heritage, Vol. I: “Republicanism and Constitutionalism in
Early Modern Europe,” Quentin Skinner and Martin von Gelderen, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.
6. Note also the slight-of-hand by which Skinner entirely changed Machiavelli’s wariness about private political
spheres, controlled by those with excessive wealth, into the danger of “excessive devotion to the pursuit of
private wealth.” With this seemingly modest adjectival move, Skinner created an entirely different meaning: the
“dislike of ‘luxurious habits’ as a threat to political liberty.” The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. 1,
The Renaissance (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 162-63. The question was not the acquisition of
wealth; it was how one used that wealth, once it was acquired. As Viroli stated, “In no classical republican work
can we find a criticism of commercial society; indeed praise of commerce, trades, banks, and the
entrepreneurial spirit abounds.” Maurizio Viroli, Republicanism (New York: Hill and Wang, 2002), p. 32; cf.
Rachel Hammersley, “English republicanism in Revolutionary France: The Case of the Cordelier Club,” The
Journal of British Studies, 43:4 (Oct. 2004), pp. 464-81, 481 (distinction drawn between the anti-commercial
bent of classical republicanism, and a new so-called “modern republicanism” that “distinguishes itself by being
solicitous to and supportive of commerce.)”
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DCG, III.44.564, II.4.97.
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Id, II.4.97. One of many instances in the First Dialogue of Court Maxims, pp. 4-5, that sounds strikingly unSidney like, both because of its content and because of its crabbed English, is a discussion in which the
commonwealthman rejected man’s desire for wealth, suggesting it led to servitude, not liberty. On the other
hand, Sidney did castigate greed. The passage states, “The people of England, deceived by the fraud of the
courtiers and the priests, grew to that height of madness as to seek servitude rather than liberty, and to
restore that king who, with the loss of so much treasure and blood, had been ejected. But this mistake could
last no longer than until they found the weight of the yoke with which they were oppressed and the difficulty of
throwing it from their necks.” Indeed, “their madness is not the least who, rejecting all righteous rules, do by
the most wicked ways seek vain honours, hurtful offices, and riches, which they throw away upon their vices
and lusts; nothing remaining unto them but a raging and unsatiable desire of rising higher and getting more,
which is given unto them as a punishment of their follies and crimes.” In short, “We desire places,
commands, honours, and riches: none of all these things are wanting unto us. And yet we are all as unhappy
as if we wanted all these things.”
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Liberty emphatically embraced the idea that men were entitled to their own interests. We may think
of the seventeenth century as a time of minimal personal choice; but in fact, as historian Linda Levy Peck
documented in Consuming Splendor, cultural life and personal options were surprisingly diverse in early
modern England.338 “Consuming Splendor tells a different story: of new ways to shop; of royal sponsorship of
luxury trades and manufactures; of new aspirations, shaped by print and travel, which found expression in
buying, building, furnishing, and collecting; of the reinvention of identities through new artifacts; of the
transformation of meaning as objects moved across cultures and into new contexts; and of the way in which
early science underpinned luxury consumption.”339 Liberty was the right to exercise personal choice; it was
self-determination. Sidney stated, “He is a free man who lives as best pleases himself,” albeit in accordance
with laws to which he has consented (two other subjects we will consider shortly).340 Locke said the same
thing: “Freedom then is not what Sir R. F. tells us. A Liberty for every one to do what he lists, to live as he
pleases, and not to be tyed by any Laws: But Freedom of Men under Government, is, to have a standing Rule
to live by, common to every one of that Society, and made by the Legislative Power erected in it; A Liberty to
follow my own Will in all things, where the Rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant,
uncertain, unknown, Will of another Man. … The Natural Liberty of Man is to be free from any Superior Power
on Earth. …The Liberty of Man, in Society, is to be under no other Legislative Power, but that established, by
consent, in the Common-wealth.”341
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England’s last sumptuary laws were repealed in 1604. Three years later James I “enthusiastically
endorsed” the domestic silk industry. The English civil war “underwrote the expansion of luxury consumption
for some, especially for those in London.” Moreover, there were Commonwealth and Protectorate policies that
indirectly helped promote luxury consumption, including a relatively free press and free travel. Luxury
consumption was directly related to writings on political economy and on politics. Linda Levy Peck,
Consuming Splendor (Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 1, 255, 355.
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We know that the well-to-do benefited directly from this “consuming splendor.” But so too did others.
“Luxury commodities circulated throughout society from the merchant who imported them, to the retailer who
sold them, the purchaser who bought them, the client who presented them to his patron, and the poor who
wore them as second-hand goods.” Id, p. 2. For a wonderful taste of the parallel commercial environment of
the republican merchant city-state of Renaissance Florence, see Tim Parks, Medici Money: Banking,
Metaphysics, and Art in Fifteenth-Century Florence (New York: W. Norton & Co., Inc. 2005).
340

DCG, III.21.440.
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Reid goes so far as to say that, “The reign of Charles I was the proving time for the concept of consent.
Although it risks oversimplifying a very complicated political situation, the constitutional controversy that led to
the English Civil War could be explained in one word: consent.” In 1642, for example, Edmund Ludlow, who
later became a regicide, said that the question in dispute between the King’s party and his own was “whether
the people should be governed by laws made by themselves, and live under a government derived from their
own consent.” Reid, The Concept of Representation, pp. 14-15 & 151 n.13. On Locke, see the “Second
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In analyzing the relationship of consent to the concept of liberty, scholars of early modern republicanism have tended to focus upon consent in terms of its pooled, communal impact and the related concept
of popular sovereignty.342 Like Seller’s treatment of self-determination, this is a collective consequence of
consent. But a vital individual consequence of consent is the affording of personal choice and, in whatever
arenas liberty may be expressed, personal self-determination. As with most concepts that Sidney embraced,
both the individual and communal aspects of the concept are significant.343 We can see that in Locke’s
statement, too: the liberty to follow my own will, and the liberty of man in society.
In sum, self-determination was the liberty to which Sidney subscribed. Self-determination may be a
more meaningful way to articulate Pettit’s view of liberty as “non-dependence.”344 Sidney used the word
“independency.” “For as liberty solely consists in an independency upon the will of another, and by the name
of slave we understand a man, who can neither dispose of his person nor goods, but enjoys all at the will of
his master; there is no such thing in nature as a slave, if those men or nations are not slaves, who have no
other title to what they enjoy, than the grace of the prince, which he may revoke whensoever he pleaseth.”345

Treatise,” Two Treatises, Ch. IV, “Of Slavery,” §22, pp. 283-84 (citation omitted). (Locke’s references to
Filmer were updated by Laslett with attribution, in brackets, to the modern edition of Filmer’s work contained
in Patriarcha, and other Political Writings of Sir Robert Filmer, edited from the Original Sources, by Peter
Laslett (Oxford: Blackwell’s Political Texts, 1949).)
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See, e.g., Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, p. 108: “Locke argued, ‘all government, whether monarchical or
other, is only from the consent of the people.’” See also Weston & Greenberg, “The shift in political thought,”
Subjects and Sovereigns, Ch. 1, pp. 1-7. Tyrrell is wry about the subject: “let us see if his [Filmer’s] Objections against Bellarmine and Suarez, and all those who place Supream Power in the People, be such terrible
things, that the poor Jesuits are absolutely run down in this Dispute.” Tyrrell, Patriarcha non monarcha, p. 48.
343
I would agree with the thesis of Clement Fatovic that, “a survey of English political thought from the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reveals that liberal and republican conceptions of liberty alike exhibited
both individualistic and collective features shaped by an ideological confrontation and conceptual contrast
with the evils represented by Roman Catholicism.” Clement Fatovic, “The Anti-Catholic Roots of Liberal and
Republican Conceptions of Freedom in English Political Thought,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 66, No.
1 (Jan., 2005), pp. 37-58, 38. Fatovic primarily considered the ideas of Locke, Milton, Neville, Richard Price,
John Trenchard and William Blackstone, although he also mentions Sidney and others.
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Philip Pettit, “Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On a Difference with Quentin Skinner,” Political
Theory Vol. 30, No. 3 (Jun. 2002), pp. 339-56; Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government
(Oxford University Press, 1997); Pettit, “The Instability of Freedom as Non-Interference: The Case of Isaiah
Berlin,” Ethics 121 (2011), pp. 693-716; see also Maria Dimova-Cookson, “Republicanism, philosophy of
freedom and the history of ideas: An interview with Philip Pettit,” Contemporary Political Theory (2010) Vol. 9,
pp. 477-89.
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DCG, I.5.17. Sidney repeated this standard much later in Discourses: “But as liberty consists only in being
subject to no man’s will, and nothing denotes a slave but a dependence upon the will of another; if there be
no other law in a kingdom than the will of a prince, there is no such thing as liberty.” DCG, III.16.402.
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In referring to “men or nations,” Sidney combined the personal and collective implications of selfdetermination. Liberty is essential to personal happiness – a “chief advantage” of the life we enjoy; but it is
also critically important to the success of a country.346 Sidney again turned to the ancient Romans. “I dare
affirm that all that was ever desirable or worthy of praise and imitation in Rome, did proceed from its liberty,
grow up and perish with it.” In the two hundred and sixty years in which the kings of Rome, beginning with
Tarquin, exercised their dominion, the size of the Roman kingdom “hardly extended so far as from London to
Hownslow” – as the crow flies, about two miles. But once the Roman people “recovered their liberty,” they
created a vast empire, subduing other warlike nations (Italy), defeating formidable armies (the Gauls, the
Cimbri, and other German tribes), overthrew their nemesis (Carthage), and conquered peoples (the Cisalpine
and Transalpine Gauls, and all of the nations of Spain). Just as individual liberty was self-determination,
political liberty was collective self-determination. Sidney had a great deal of respect for the synergetic wisdom
of the people. “Many eyes see more than one: the collected wisdom of a people much surpasses that of a
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Various renditions of this concept of liberty are articulated by Sidney’s fellow English republicans. There
are many examples; a few will suffice. The anonymous author of the 1649 pamphlet, The Original & End of
Civil War, contended that popular will, the people’s “free choice,” is the essence of political liberty. [Eutactus
Philodemius,] The Original & End of Civil Power (London, 1649), discussed by Shagan in The Rule of
Moderation at p. 257. Locke stated, “Freedom of Men under Government, is, … not to be subject to the
inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man.” Locke, “The Second Treatise,” Two Treatises,
Ch. IV, “Of Slavery,” p. 284. The peripatetic Marchamont Nedham, with his distinction between being free and
being “free indeed,” was, like Sidney, emphatically focused on consent. Recall that he termed Liberty “the
most precious Jewel under the Sun ... of more worth than your Estates, or your Lives.” Nedham, The
Excellencie of a Free-State, pp. 9-10. In ancient Rome, said Nedham, before the election of Tribunes and the
convening of Assemblies of the People, “whilst all was in the hands of the Senate, the Nation was accounted
Free, because not subjected to the will of any single person: But afterwards they were Free indeed, when no
Laws could be imposed upon them, without a consent first had in the Peoples Assemblies.” Id, p. 14. For
Vane, while freedom necessitated choice, it was the freedom and integrity of man’s inner life that was
supremely valuable. See J. H. Adamson and H. F. Folland, Sir Harry Vane: His Life and Times 1613-1662
(Boston: Gambit, 1973), pp. 43-52, 479-80. John Milton also emphasized internal freedom, that men are
“slaves within doors.” Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates Proving That It Is Lawful and Hath been
held so Through All Ages for Any who have the Power to call to Account a Tyrant or Wicked King (1650)
(EEBO Editions, Proquest Reprint, 2010) , p. 3. In contrast, Neville scholar Gaby Mahlberg considered
Neville’s liberty to be a combination of both positive and negative liberty – the right to directly participate in
government as well as freedom from interference in the state of nature. Here Neville was very much
distancing himself from Harrington. Mahlberg, Henry Neville and English republican culture in the
seventeenth century, p. 180.
In contradistinction to his fellow republicans, it is unclear how Harrington viewed liberty. In Oceana he
discussed both civil liberty and liberty of conscience. At the same time, “be assured,” he warned, “that the
nation where you cannot establish an equal agrarian is incapable of liberty.” Harrington, Oceana, p. 230. I
whole-heartedly agree with Scott that Harrington’s utopian republic removed individual choice and, in so
doing, Harrington effectively abolished political liberty, “the foundation of the classical republican tradition.” Its
replacement was a material foundation, “the balance of property.” See Scott, “The rapture of motion,” p. 152.
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single person; and tho he should truly seek that which is best, ‘tis not probable he would so easily find it, as
the body of a nation, or the principal men chosen to represent the whole.”347 Halifax also wrote lyrically about
the wisdom and the power of the people: there is “a soul in that great body of the people.” Indeed, in the
fashion of Hobbes, Halifax warned about that great Leviathan, the people, which, when “roused it moveth like
an angry creature, and will neither be convinced nor resisted.” Ordinarily, the people were very patient; they
put up with a lot. But they would not put up with everything. “The people can never agree to show their
united powers till they are extremely tempted and provoked to it so that to apply cupping-glasses to a great
beast naturally disposed to sleep, and to force the tame thing whether it will or not to be valiant, must be
learned out of some other book than Machiavelli, who would never have prescribed such a preposterous
method”!348
Liberty encompassed the opportunity and the right to participate in decision-making. Men were
entitled to be governed by a political system of their choice: “for the choice of that society, and the liberty of
framing it according to our own wills, for our own good, is all we seek.” Nedham’s sweep in Excellencie of a
Free-State was even broader: “[P]eople never had any real Liberty, till they were possess’d of the power of
calling and dissolving the Supreme Assemblies, changing Governments, enacting and repealing Laws,
together with a power of chusing and deputing whom they pleased to do this work, as often as they should
judge expedient, for their own well-being, and the good of the Publike.”349 It naturally followed that because
men often disagreed about what was best for themselves, liberty required compromise or what one might
term, exercises in moderation; for as Sidney recognized, “[s]uch as enter into Society, must in some degree
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Skinner argued that republican freedom emphasizes “communal forms of ‘free government,’ whereas liberal
freedom emphasizes natural rights. Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics: Vol. 2: Renaissance Virtues
(Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 16. It is apparent from this study that I do not embrace this dichotomy.
Republican thinkers, including liberals, valued both individual and communal freedom, as well as natural rights
and a form of government that protected the freedom of the individual and the community. See, e.g., DCG,
II.12.144-145, III.16.402.
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Halifax, The Character of a Trimmer, p. 100.
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Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 10; cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, C. B. Macpherson, ed.
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 264 (“Liberty in the proper sense” was “freedom from chains and
prison…. [T]he Liberty of a Subject, lyeth … only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the
Soveraign hath paetermitted: such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another;
to choose their own aboad, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they
themselves think fit; & the like.”)
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diminish their Liberty.”350 More on this diminishment shortly.
Sidney’s concept of liberty as non-domination – what is most easily understood as self-determination
– was echoed in the work of his fellow early modern English republicans including, very conspicuously, Locke.
Ashcraft stated in Revolutionary Politics that, “Locke argues that individuals in the state of nature are ‘all
equal and independent’ and no one has more ‘power and jurisdiction’ than any other, there being no
‘subordination or subjection’ among them.” In Locke’s view, men were free if they “’be more or less, are their
own, and at their own dispose’ and not under the ‘dominion’ of anyone else.” 351 In the “Second Treatise”
Locke stated, “Every Man is born with … A Right of Freedom to his Person, which no other Man has a Power
over.”352 Again, Lockean liberty was the freedom from “the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of
another Man.”353 Locke’s articulation of liberty was about as close to Sidney’s view as one could envision:
man was naturally free; it was man’s God-given nature to love his liberty; that love was “temper’d by Reason,”
which was also natural to man.354 Furthermore, for Locke, “Liberty is to be free from the restraint and
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DCG, I.10.30-31.
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Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, p. 579-80.
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Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises of Government, §190, p. 393. Locke continued, “I will not dispute
now whether Princes are exempt from the Laws of their Countrey; but this I am sure, they owe subjection to
the Laws of God and Nature. No Body, no Power, can exempt them from the Obligations of that Eternal Law.”
Id, §195, pp. 395-96. Vane contended that the natural freedom God gave man is a responsibility: “[I]f we can
bear our own liberties,” it was necessary to accept this responsibility. “[T]hough this free state was
shipwrecked, yet you have got a liberty left to say it is now again in your possession; else I am mistaken. If it
be so, I hope you will not part with it, but upon grounds of wisdom and fidelity.” The alternative was a “return to
Egypt, weary of our journey to Canaan.” [Parliamentary] Diary of Thomas Burton, Vol. III, p. 177; Judson, The
Political Thought of Sir Henry Vane, pp. 32-33, 50-55.
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Ashcraft stated, “We can say, therefore, as Locke does, that only an individual’s consent can place him
under a political authority, but it is also true that, for Locke, an individual retains his status as a freeman so
long as he does not make himself dependent ‘upon the will of any other man,’ whatever the specific social
relations that arise in the course of time. …When Locke raises the issue of what determines whether an
individual is a ‘free,’ ‘equal,’ ‘independent’ person under the law, natural or civil, he gives the same reply. It is
his ‘reason and ability to govern himself’ that he is presumed to have that supplies the standard. This means
that his understanding is able ‘to direct his will’ and his status as ‘a freeman’ under ‘the law of England,’
resides in the fact that he has ‘the liberty to dispose of his actions and possessions according to his own will.’
Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, pp. 580-81, citing “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, §22, p. 284. It is
doubtful that, as Fatovic maintained, Locke’s concept of liberty was virtually entirely the result of his ideas
about, and fears of Catholicism. Fatovic, “The Anti-Catholic Roots of Liberal and Republican Conceptions of
Freedom in English Political Thought, p. 48. E.g., “Locke was clearly thinking of Catholicism when he
animadverted that ‘Religion which should most distinguish us from Beasts, and ought most peculiarly to
elevate us, as rational Creatures, above Brutes, is that wherein Men often appear most irrational, and more
senseless than Beasts themselves.’” Id, p. 49.
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Cf. Houston, Algernon Sidney, p. 113 (“Sidney’s conception of freedom was much more individualistic than
that of Locke.”)
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violence of others which cannot be, where there is no law” – a subject of forthcoming substantial analysis.355
Nor is there any man whose thoughts and affections do perfectly
consent with themselves in matter and order, any two hours in all his life.
Richard Baxter, The Cure of Church-divisions: or, Directions for weak Christians, 1670 356
[A]s is admirably observed by Mr Hobbs … [man’s] will is caus’d, and being caus’d is necessitated.
James Harrington, “Antient and Modern Prudence”357

iii.

Consent

Sidney recognized that man could not “continue in the perpetual and entire fruition of the liberty that
God hath given him” once he entered into society. Indeed, it was “reason” that led men to realize that, “No one
man or family is able to provide that which is requisite for their convenience or security, whilst everyone has an
equal right to everything, and none acknowledges a superior to determine the controversies, that upon such
occasions must continually arise, and will probably be so many and great, that mankind cannot bear them.”
Accordingly, as this section of the Discourses is entitled, “Such as enter into Society, must in some degree
diminish their Liberty,” an articulation of the well-known concept embraced by a vast range of philosophers,
from Plato to Hobbes, that to be social, man must enter into a social contract, forfeiting some of his individual
freedom. This is the only way in which man can be social and live peaceably. Otherwise, “[t]he liberty of one is
thwarted by that of another; and whilst they are all equal, none will yield to any.” 358 As one pamphleteer
succinctly put it during the November 1680 debate on the exclusion of Catholic James II from the line of
succession, “Monarchy was ‘far from being de Jure Divino’, … ’but ariseth by consent’; and the reason why
people entered civil society was to secure ‘the publick good’.”359
Ironically, in The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, James I also relied on social contract theory but, in
his case, viewed the consent that was essential to it as irrevocable. James’ theory was grounded on the
foundational experience of the Biblical Jews when they sought a king, which James described as “a paterne
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Richard Baxter, The Cure of Church-divisions: or, Directions for weak Christians (London, 1670). On
Baxter, see Appendix B.
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James Harrington, “Antient and Modern Prudence,” The Oceana and Other Works: With an Account of His
Life, John Toland, ed. ([London], 1700), Ch. 7, p. 241.
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W. G., The Case of Succession to the Crown (1679), pp. 7-8, cited by Harris in Restoration, p. 155 & n.72.
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to all Christian and well founded Monarchies,” since the Jewish kingdom was “founded by God himselfe.”
Once the Jews had done so, and God agreed to permit them to have a king, this was, in James’ words, a
contract between the Jews and God. Citing 1 Samuel 8, James found that, as God forewarned the Jews,
having sought and obtained a kingdom, the Jews could not reject their king. 360 “As he would say, ‘I forewarn
you of, although you shall grudge and murmur, yet it shall not be lawful to you to cast it off, in respect it is not
only the ordinance of God, but also yourselves have chosen him unto you, thereby renouncing forever all
privileges, by your willing consent out of your hands, whereby in any time hereafter ye would claim, and call
back unto yourselves again that power, which God shall not permit you to do.’” The Jews were stuck. “And
for further taking away of all excuse, and retraction of this their contract, after their consent to underlie this
yoke with all the burdens that he hath declared unto them, he craves their answer, and consent to his
proposition.” This principle is equally applicable, said James, to his monarchy. There was no “excuse and
retraction of this their contract, after their consent to underlie this yoke.”361 In short, for James I the English
people’s consent to their contract with their king was irrevocable.
The legal nature of a social contract will be discussed shortly. The question here is, how does one go
about entering into such an agreement? According to Sidney, the only way to do so is “by a general consent.
This is the ground of just governments.”362 Sidney granted the right of consent to a social contract to all
freemen. What are freemen? Sidney certainly seemed to intend that “freemen” literally meant “free men,” viz.,
those men who legitimately can exercise liberty, which meant those “with no dependence upon each other.”363
Sidney was not referring here to land ownership, or another traditional specific indicia of social status. The
critical inquiry cut across society, and required an analysis of the individual status of men: were they able to
make political decisions without being subject to the pressure, insistence, or coercive backlash of another? It
is only such freeman “who think it for their convenience to join together, and to establish such laws and rules
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For a more detailed discussion of 1 Samuel 8, see Appendix B and Charnoff, “A Second Look at Who
Authored Court Maxims.”
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James I, The True Law of Free Monarchies, p. 62.
DCG, I.10.30-31.
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DCG, II.4.97, II.5.97-99. Having proven “the natural, universal liberty of mankind,” Sidney said that he
would leave it to Filmer “to fight against Suarez or Bellarmine; or to turn one of them against the other,” for he
felt no need “to trouble” himself “with Bellarmine or Suarez.” On Suárez and Bellarmine, see Appendix B.
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as they oblige themselves to observe.”364 Freemen were “all the people” who were civis, but that did not
include servus, a radically different status. For “no man, whilst he is a servant, can be a member of a
common-wealth; for he that is not in his own power, cannot have a part in the government of others.” This
was true whether this multitude was “great or small”, ten men or ten million. “[E]very man must therein be his
own judge, since if he mistake, the hurt is only to himself.” Men can agree to place one man above another;
but in the making of that decision, “no man could have any prerogative above others,” unless that very
circumstance is “granted by the consent of the whole.”365
Locke and Sidney’s views on consent were the same. As Locke stated quite clearly from the very
beginning of his Two Treatises. Indeed, in the second sentence of “The Preface” to the “First Treatise” he
stated that he hoped this work, was “sufficient to establish the Throne of our Great Restorer, Our present King
William, to make good his Title, in the consent of the people, which being the only one of all lawful
Governments, he has more fully and clearly than ay Prince in Christendom.”366 Locke discussed “the consent
of the Society” to the law, something that is “absolutely necessary” and achieved by means of legislators that
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As this section of Discourses is entitled, “Freemen join together and frame greater or lesser Societies, and
give such Forms to them as best please themselves.” DCG, II.5.97-108.
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Id, II.5.103, II.5.100. Vane’s analysis of consent was complicated because he variously used the terms the
“people,” and “the good people.” Judson did not see these terms as conflicting, maintaining that Vane’s
reference, for example, to “free debate and common consent” enabled men to consider “how that which is the
ordinance and institution of God, may become also the ordinance and statute of man.” Vane, The Retired
Man’s Meditations, p. 395, quoted by Judson in The Political Thought of Sir Henry Vane the Younger, p. 24. In
contrast, Rowe was convinced that Vane “did not advocate the right of the rank-and-file godly to govern
themselves.” Rowe, Sir Henry Vane the Younger, p. 254. Sidney disagreed with Vane’s defense, in 1653, of a
prohibitively high property qualification to vote. Mayers maintained that the “good party,” which she seemed to
view as the same thing as the “good people,” was a religious affiliation, a “distinct entity … distinguished by
godliness and by sincere and constant commitment to this cause, demonstrated by specific actions such as
public prayer, Active service, or financial aid.” Many people were excluded by this definition: “Not only
Royalists and neutrals, but worldly and irreligious members of the Rump, such as the ‘classical republicans’
Marten and Challoner. …Former Parliamentarians disaffected by 1649, especially the Presbyterians … were
similarly excluded.” Ruth E. Mayers, “Real and Practicable, Not Imaginary and Notional: Sir Henry Vane, ‘A
Healing Question,’ and the Problems of the Protectorate, Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British
Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 37-72, 41. Sidney’s views on this matter are unclear, although it
seems highly unlikely that he would have agreed with any such privileged status. Without trying to solve the
matter of whose consent Vane would have required, and whether his views remained consistent over time on
the matter of consent, it is clear that some form of consent was a necessity for Vane. In A Needful Corrective,
for example, he stated that the best form of government rested on “the common vote of the whole body”; this is
a “common right and freedom,” to which “free citizens … are equally entitled” by means of “their own free and
common consent.” Vane, A Needful Corrective, pp. 3-4.
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Locke, “The Preface,” Two Treatises, p. 157 (emphasis added).
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“the publick has chosen and appointed.”367 In the “Second Treatise” he said that “he would attempts to get
another Man into his Absolute Power, does thereby put himself into a State of War with him. … For I have
reason to conclude, that he who would get me into his Power without my consent, would use me as he
pleased, when he had got me there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it.”368 Nedham also
emphasized consent, applauding “that famous Law-giver” Solon for the wisdom to “place both the exercise &
interest of Supremacy in the hands of the people, so that nothing of a publick interest could be imposed, but
what passed currant by vertue of their consent and Authority.”369 In this regard, Nedham was not only wary of
“kingly tyranny,” but concerned about the encroaching power of the nobility, a matter that did not particularly
trouble Sidney (unless one equates this, whereas it overlaps but is not the same, with his concern about the
corrupted power, not to mention the potential for innocent error, of Parliament).370 Consent was an incessant
theme in Nedham’s The Excellencie of a Free State.371
Sidney rejected the language of Hobbes that man’s original liberty “is of no use to us,” and that man
“cannot endure the solitude, barbarity, weakness, want, misery and dangers that accompany it whilst we live
alone.” He also rejected the view that man cannot enter into a society without resigning his liberty. Rather,
“the choice of that society,” as well as the very act, “the liberty of framing it according to our own wills, for our
own good,” is not only what man seeks, but is “all we seek.”372 While governments are in formation, Sidney
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Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, [unnumbered] p. 11.
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“Tho the parliament consist of the most eminent men of the nation, yet when they intend good, they may
be mistaken.” DCG, III.46.574; see also id, III.45.572.
371
E.g., “Then the issue of such a Constitution must needs be this, that no Load shall be laid upon any, but
what is common to all, and that always by common consent; not to serve the Lusts of any, but onely to supply
the Necessities of their Country.” Nedham wrote, “in this Form no Determinations being carried, but by consent
of the People; therefore they must needs remain secure out of the reach of Tyranny, and free from the Arbitrary
Disposition of any commanding Power.” Again, “[T]he only way to prevent Arbitrariness, is, That no Laws or
Dominations whatsoever should be made, but by the Peoples Consent and Election: therefore it must of
necessity be granted, that the People are the best Keepers of their own Liberties.” Nedham, The Excellencie of
a Free State, pp. 25, 36, 38 [unnumbered].
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DCG, I.10.31. Sidney’s liberal concept of who was entitled to voice his consent and what consent meant
was similar to the democratic views of the 1640s Levellers, as reflected in the statement by an MP and officer
who, in 1647, articulated the fundamental tenet of the Levellers “that every man that is to live under a
government ought first by his own consent to put himself under that government.” Puritanism and Liberty:
Being the Army Debates (1647-9) from the Clarke Manuscripts with Supplementary Documents, A.S.P. Woodhouse, ed. (London: Dent; repr. 1950, 1965, 1986), p. 53, cited in Wootton, “Leveller Democracy and the
Puritan Revolution,” p. 429. This concurrence does not equate, however, with endorsement of social
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believed that “we ourselves,” each member of the society, “are [the] judges [of] how far ’tis good for us
to recede from our natural liberty.”373 Liberty is not resigned in order to enter into society, as Hobbes
maintained; it is partially resigned, to the extent that we choose, as a consequence of entering into
society that is good for us.374 Indeed, one cannot enter into society if one already has resigned one’s

revolution or utopian thinking, or with republicanism’s interest in radical “levelling”; nor is it necessarily the
case, as Wootton suggested, that revolutions that seek validation in history or historical precedent are “merely
restoration” and not revolution. It is this suggestion that led Wootton to conclude that, “republicanism was
largely irrelevant to the preoccupations of the Levellers.” Perhaps the more important cause for Leveller
disinterest in republicanism was the latter’s non-utopian, pragmatic approach to problem solving which, as
Wootton pointed out, men like Wildman who had originally been Levellers later reassessed and embraced.
(Wootton also argued that it was religion, not politics, that was “the primary factor” that made the English Civil
War possible and led to the deposition (actually, the execution) of the king.) Id, pp. 421-25.
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The anonymous author of the 1690 pamphlet, Political aphorisms, significantly plagiarizing from Locke’s
Two Treatises, similarly stated that it is “left unto every nation and country to choose what form of government
they like best, and think most fit for the natures and conditions of the people.” Political aphorisms, pp. 1-2.
Ashcraft and Goldsmith pointed out that this language is very close to the language used by Robert Ferguson
in the Declaration that he wrote for Monmouth’s Rebellion, as well as to Ferguson’s Brief Justification of the
Prince of Orange’s descent into England, 1689. Political aphorisms also stated that, “there is nothing more
rational, than that creatures of the same species and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of
Nature, and the use of the same faculties should also be equal one amongst another,” unless God, “by any
manifest declaration of his Will had set one above another.” Id, p. 2; Ashcraft and Goldsmith, “Locke,
Revolution Principles, and the Formation of Whig Ideology, p. 777.
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Per Wootton, Tyrrell believed that “political society replaces natural rights by governmentally determined
ones,” whereas Locke argued that political society “merely protects a broad range of natural property rights,”
and that those rights continue in political society, acting as “a continuing check on the powers of government.”
Wootton, “Introduction,” John Locke, Political Writings, p. 86. I agree with Wootton’s characterization of
Locke’s concept of natural rights in property. Sidney also would have agreed with Locke’s view that the
natural layer of the law and additional legal strata remain once there is a social contract, e.g., the rule of law.
Wootton’s statement about Tyrrell is probably too broad. Admittedly, Tyrrell is a bit confusing on this subject.
He stated, “I have already granted, that where a Commonwealth is established, and men are come out of the
state of Nature, and constitute one Politick Body, all the Members of it are obliged in Conscience to maintain
this Government according to its first Institution,” which is likely the statement on which Wootton relied.
Tyrrell, Patriarcha non Monarcha, p. 54. At the same time, he repeatedly asserted that there is a “natural
freedom of Mankind,” and a natural right to life. In one of the longest sentences of the era, Tyrrell explained
his view. “Suppose a Son cannot otherwise preserve his own Life, or that of his Mother, or Brothers from the
rage of his mad or drunken Father; but by holding him, or binding him, if need be; I suppose no reasonable
Man will deny the lawfullness of this action; and yet this Power over his Fathers Person is not Authoritative, or
Civil, but Moral, and which the Son does exercise not as Superior to his Father, but as a Rational Creature
obliged by the Laws of Nature, to preserve his own being, and to endeavour the good preservation of his
Parents and Relations, not against Paternal Authority (which is always Rational, and for the good of the
Family) but Brutish, Irrational force: Which God gives every Man a right to judge of; so likewise if a Prince
prove either a Madman, or a stark Fool, the power which their Subjects exercise in the ordering him, or
confining him, and appointing Regents, or Protectors to Govern for him, and in his Name, is not Authoritative,
or Civil, since the Prince himself who is the Fountain of all Authority, gave them no such power, and therefore
must be Natural, or Moral or residing in them as reasonable Creatures.” Id, p. 123. In short, Tyrrell seemed
to be saying that while property rights become governed by civil law in political society, civil law does not
override all natural rights. Nedham, on the other hand, seemed to go further.
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liberty.375
It is important to note here that Filmer, against whom Sidney’s Discourses is directed, disagreed
profoundly with Sidney and many of his fellow republicans (but not Harrington) on this point.376 Indeed, Filmer
disagreed with his fellow absolute monarchist Hobbes on the point, as well. Hobbes argued that men were
originally free, but that that condition was intolerable, and so they gave up the condition and its associated
freedom. In contrast, Filmer asserted that, “men’s original freedom was a mere impossibility.” Politics was
“all-embracing” and “never absent. The moment in which man was born represented the moment in which
politics had originated.”377 For Filmer, there was no pre-political man. This was certainly not the view of
Hobbes or Sidney, albeit on different bases, and drawing very different conclusions from their shared understanding. For Hobbes the state of nature was dangerous; Sidney agreed, but was much less extreme. For
Sidney, the emphasis was pragmatic. While “man is naturally free, ... Reason leads them to this: No one man
or family is able to provide that which is requisite for their convenience or security, whilst every-one has an
equal right to everything.”378 For Hobbes, exit from the state of nature was a one-way affair; for Sidney it was
not, or at least the choice to change the form of government that was first chosen certainly was not.379
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Wootton argued that Locke’s purpose in writing the “First Treatise” was to establish that laws of inheritance
were artificial and therefore there was no need for James II to succeed Charles II. Locke also sought “to
undermine Filmer’s claim that one should always obey the King.” In the “First Treatise,” however, Locke
avoided a commitment “to any substantial theory of natural freedom and equality.” This does not occur until
the “Second Treatise.” In contrast to Locke, “as they waited for the Oxford Parliament to meet” in March
1681, Wootton suggested that “the Whigs foresaw … that individuals might one day have to choose, as they
had had to in 1642, whether they would obey the King or Commons. If Locke foresaw a “Second Treatise” as
he began work on the “First,” it would presumably have been one that established the claims of the
representatives of the people. To do this he would have had to analyse the role of consent in government
and say something about the nature of man’s natural freedom.” Wootton, “Introduction,” John Locke, Political
Writings, p. 76. In sum, Wootton was suggesting that in 1681 Locke was not yet prepared to go as far in his
analysis of natural rights as other Whigs were, and as Sidney always recognized would be necessary, to
support the right of the people to convene their representatives in Parliament. What is also clear from these
deliberations is the recognition that if man is to have liberty, the question of choice immediately arises, not
only for Sidney, but for his fellow political theorists.
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Another way in which Harrington was idiosyncratic in his republican views was that he was indifferent to
the concept of consent; it was not part of his analysis. See, e.g., Houston, Algernon Sidney, p. 140.
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Filmer effectively attacked Hobbes’ vision of the hostile state of nature. Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer, p. 126
& n.226; see Filmer, “Observations Concerning The Originall of Government, Upon Mr Hobs Leviathan, Mr
Milton against Salmasius, H. Grotius De Jure Belli,” Sommerville, ed., Filmer Patriarcha and Other Political
Writings, pp. 184-234, 187-97.
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Id, III.25.464 (“Our laws were not sent from heaven but made by our ancestors according to the light they
had, and their present occasions. We inherit the same right from them.”)
465

It was Sidney’s further conviction that “the difference between the best government and the worst”
could be defined in terms of “a right or wrong exercise of that power,” that is, the power of framing a
government. This power required the exercise of individuals’ liberty. For “[i]f men are naturally free, such as
have wisdom and understanding will always frame good government.” On the other hand, men “born under the
necessity of perpetual slavery” had no use for wisdom, for they “must forever depend on the will of their lords,
how cruel, mad, proud or wicked soever they be.”380 Again, the effectiveness of the social contract depended
upon the actual liberty of those who entered into it. “[V]iolence or fraud can create no right [to governance]; and
the same consent gives the form to them all, how much soever they differ from each other.”381
Edmund Ludlow, the Puritan revolutionary, regicide and republican, said the same thing to Cromwell in
1656 when Cromwell asked him, in exasperation, “What can you desire more than you have?” The answer
that Ludlow gave was all about consent: “That which we fought for, … that the nation might be governed by its
own consent.”382 Unsurprisingly, Halifax discussed this too, seeming to make a pitch for constitutional
monarchy. “[N]o government is perfect except a kind of omnipotence reside in it. …Now this cannot be
obtained by force alone upon the people, let it be never so great, there must be their consent too, or else a
nation moveth only by being driven, a sluggish and constrained motion, void of that life and vigour which is
necessary to produce great things; whereas the virtual consent of the whole being included in their
representatives, and the King giving sanction to the united sense of the people, every act done by such an
authority seemeth to be an effect of their choice as well as a part of their duty.”383
The principle of legitimate consent was a necessary condition to the creation of good governance
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when people entered into a social contract. This was true regardless of the form of government selected.384
As the radical Whig lawyer Thomas Hunt wrote in 1680, “Every form of Government … is of our Creation and
not Gods, and must comply with the safety of the people in all that it can.” Parliaments derived this power,
said Hunt, “’from the same Original the King derives his,’ namely ‘from the Consent of the People in the first
Constitution of the Government.” The author of A Dialogue at Oxford “encapsulated the typical Whig view”
when he stated that, “’only Government in general is of Divine Right.’” Once you get past the existence of
government, “‘the particular Forms and Limitations of it’ were ‘from humane Compact’, or contract (the author
used both terms), which established that ‘the common Good of Humane Societies’ was ‘the First and Last
End of All Government’.”385 About thirty years earlier Milton had said the same thing.386 Sidney was very clear
about this, too: “These rights, in several nations and ages, have been variously executed, in the
establishment of monarchies, aristocracies, democracies or mixed governments, according to the variety of
circumstances”– another element of Sidney’s republicanism. 387
In fine, for Sidney, in order to exercise one’s consent a man had to be free, which meant that he had
to be free from dependence upon anyone and able to determine for himself what was in his own best interest,
viz., able to exercise self-determination. This was the necessary condition for each participating man and the
necessary condition of a legitimate government. But consent was not finished once men entered into a social
contract. Indeed, it was just beginning.
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[T]here is no such thing as a legislative power placed in kings
by the laws of God and nature, but that nations have it in themselves.
Sidney, Discourses388

iv.

Participatory Government: A Manifestation of Collective Consent

Another aspect of governance that is well-recognized as an element of republicanism is the
opportunity to participate in governance. Participation is really a subset of consent; if there is a continuing
entitlement to consent, then there has to be a mechanism for doing so. One also can make one’s consent
contingent on one’s opportunity to participate. Conversely, just as one could elect absolute monarchy, one
could elect a form of government in which very few (or even one!) member of the society participated, in
which case there would be neither continuing consent (except to that form of governance selected) nor
participation in government. This particular choice is a theoretical possibility that was beyond remote for
Sidney; consequently, it did not distract him from the realistic outcomes when people were given the
opportunity to participate in government. Man’s nature was such that the desire for self-determination that
informed individual, personal liberty was paralleled by a desire to exercise political self-determination in the
form of collective, social liberty. Notwithstanding Locke and liberalism’s association with individual liberty, and
notwithstanding Locke’s own tendency to be obscure – seemingly deliberately so – Locke shared this
communal view of man and his commitment to a collective social and political liberty.389 For Sidney, liberty
encompassed the opportunity, indeed the right, to participate in government.390 Public participation was also
tied to the French concept of “il faut que chacun soit servi a sa mode,” viz., [e]very man’s business must be
done according to his own mind,” along with the two-heads-are-better-than-one principle, which add further
impetus to the idea that participatory government simply worked better. 391
It is important to recognize, however, that early modern English republicans were rarely democrats.
“As to popular government in the strict sense (that is pure democracy, where the people in themselves, and
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by themselves, perform all that belongs to government),” noted Sidney, “I know of no such thing.” Pure
democracy, even if it was desirable, was utopian. It is also the case that Sidney, like most republicans and
other early modern theorists, considered democracy to be dangerous. Sidney was circumspect: “[I]f it
[democracy] be in the world, [I] have nothing to say for it. In asserting the liberty, generally, as I suppose,
granted by God to all mankind, I neither deny, that so many as think fit to enter into a society, may give so
much of their power as they please to one or more men, for a time or perpetually, to them and their heirs,
according to such rules as they prescribe; nor approve the disorders that must arise if they keep it entirely in
their own hands.”392
That the “rabble is just as tyrannical as one man” was also a cautionary statement by Cicero of which
Sidney was acutely aware.393 As one historian pointed out in the context of Filmer’s views, “The opinion that
the common people were dangerous and their intervention in politics calamitous was widespread throughout
the 1640s too.”394 That may well be; but notwithstanding his concerns about democracy, this was not Sidney’s
view. The fact that universal education was not yet a reality lent credence to the concern many republicans
shared with royalists, who argued that monarchy was necessary in part because of the ignorance of the
people, the basis for the adage that private men should not meddle in public affairs.395 Most people in early
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Cicero wrote very pejoratively about democracy: “Actually there is no state to which I should be quicker to
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modern Europe were entirely preoccupied with life’s exigent demands. Driven particularly by commerce and
religion, gradually a somewhat educated “middling sort” grew, the existence of which varied tremendously in
time according to the nature of different societies’ economies and religious inclinations. Sidney maintained
that due to “the defects of age, person, or sex,” there were those who were “neither fit to judge of other men’s
affairs, nor of their own; and are so far from being capable of the highest concernments relating to the safety
of whole nations, that the most trivial cannot reasonably be referred to them.”396 On the other hand, Sidney
recognized that, “of all governments, democracy, in which every man’s liberty is least restrained, because
every man hath an equal part, would certainly prove to be the most just, rational and natural,” challenging
Filmer’s contention that it would necessarily be “a perpetual spring of disorder, confusion and vice.”397 At the
same time, Sidney thought that democracies were most vulnerable to instability. Overall, for Sidney the best
choice was not between pure forms of government, such as democracy or monarchy, but rather to “mix”
forms and thereby combine the advantages and avoid the disadvantages of each.398
Returning to the topic of political participation, some historians have argued that republican affirmation of political participation, whether direct or indirect through representatives, which Sidney specifically
endorsed, was disingenuous; that early modern republicans were in actuality advocates of oligarchy.399 This
is too facile; the question is more complex. Sidney genuinely advocated political participation. Indeed, the
concept of “framing one’s own government,” which is the right to which all men hold equally, required
participation by some large set of persons. “Every nation acting freely, has an equal right to frame their own
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government, and to employ such officers as they please.” For Sidney, the essence of government was
participation. “If it do therefore appear (as is testified by the laws and histories of all our northern nations) that
the power of every people is either wholly, or to such a degree as is necessary for creating kings, granted to
their several gemotes, diets, cortes, assemblies of estates, parliaments, and the like, all the kings that they
have anywhere, or at any time chosen, do reign by the same authority, and have the same right, as if every
individual man of those nations had assented to their election.” This shows, said Sidney, “that all kings are
not set up by violence, deceit, faction of a few powerful men, or the mutinies of armies; but from the consent
of such multitudes, as joining together, frame civil societies.400 Again, “But if he enter into the society, he is
obliged by the laws of it; and if one of those laws be, that all things should be determined by the plurality of
voices, his assent is afterwards comprehended in all the resolutions of the plurality.”401
Participatory government was essential; and representative government was participatory government:
“there is no difference as to right, between that which is done by them all in their own persons, or by some
deputed by all, and acting according to the powers received from all.”402 Placing power in the people, e.g., “if
the commons are as free as the nobles,” or the fact that power may be placed “in the hands of representatives
chosen by themselves,” were two ways of governing that were “differing rather in form than essentially, the one
tending to democracy, the other to aristocracy.” Indeed, “All men that have any degree of common sense,
plainly see, that the liberty of those who act in their own persons, and of those who send delegates, is perfectly
the same, and the exercise is, and can only be changed by their consent.”403 Both approaches “equally assert
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the rights of the people to put the government into such a form as best pleases themselves.”404 That so many
different types of constitutions and governments had existed over time proved that man had perpetually
exercised his right of consent and often come out differently.
One element of Sidney’s confidence in political participation was his comfort level with tumult – a view
shared by Machiavelli, among others, on whom Sidney expressly relied. “Machiavelli discoursing of these
matters, finds virtue to be so essentially necessary to the establishment and preservation of liberty, that he
thinks it impossible for a corrupted people to set up a good government, or for a tyranny to be introduced if
they be virtuous; and makes this conclusion, That where the matter (that is, the body of the people) is not
corrupted, tumults and disorders do not hurt; and where it is corrupted, good laws do not good. Which being
confirmed by reason and experience, I think no wise man has ever contradicted him.”405 The title to Ch. 2,
Section 26 of Discourses is, “Civil Tumults and Wars are not the greatest Evils that befall Nations.”406 The
outward, legitimate expression of political differences was a sign of a healthy political society. It was when
these differences were forced underground and became conspiratorial that the political system was at risk –
ironically, a good description of the events that transpired that led to Sidney’s execution.407 For example,
Sidney would have considered the Monster Petition of 1680 to be an outward, legitimate expression of political differences. The fact that Charles II found it malapropos and threatening would have seemed to Sidney to
be very shortsighted. Ultimately, although not in his lifetime, Sidney proved to be right. Charles was offended
by the Petition’s encroachment on his prerogative, and so he issued a proclamation against “tumultuous
petitioning.” This was not a new Stuart strategy. Fear of the “rabble,” “fanatics,” and the reoccurrence of
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events of the 1640s manifested itself at the beginning of the Restoration in the 1661 Act against “tumultuous
petitioning.” The 1680s outcome of this intimidation would have been predictable to Sidney: it would drive the
campaign underground, potentially lead to profound political change, and foster the collection of petition
signatures “in such a private manner” so as to effectively protect petition promoters from prosecution.408
Affirming that political participation was a right, Sidney nevertheless recognized that many who in
theory were entitled to participate in political decision-making quite sensibly and properly either delegated that
authority or otherwise opted not to personally exercise it. “[T]here is no man who would not rather chuse to be
governed by such as are just, industrious, valiant and wise. …So there are none who do not according to the
measure of understanding they have, endeavor to set up those who seem to be qualified.” Capability was the
quality that should cause one to be selected to govern. Sidney analogized the matter to military leadership:
“There may be a hundred thousand men in an army, who are all equally free; but they only are naturally most
fit to be commanders or leaders, who most excel in the virtues required for the right performance of those
offices; and that, not because ‘tis good for them to be raised above their brethren, but because ‘tis good for
their brethren to be guided by them, as ‘tis ever good to be governed by the wisest and the best.” Repeatedly
Sidney emphasized capability: “But if governments arise from the consent of men, and are instituted by men
according to their own inclinations, they did therein seek their own good. …That is not accomplished simply
by setting one, a few, or more men in the administration of powers, but by placing the authority in those who
may rightly perform their office. This is not every man’s work.” Nevertheless, this was a matter of choice.
Sidney simply contended that it was in every man’s self-interest to utilize this criterion: “men so qualified can
better than others accomplish the ends for which societies are constituted.”409
Just as every man was not suited to govern, neither was every man suited to decide who should
govern, e.g., those “who very often through the defects of age, person, or sex, are neither fit to judge of other
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men’s affairs, nor of their own.”410 Indeed, men often recognized their own lesser qualifications to do so. “It
cannot be believed that rational creatures would advance one or a few of their equals above themselves,
unless in consideration of their own good.”411 This seems to have been a caveat to Sidney’s frequent
assertion that, “The law that aims at the publick good makes no distinction of persons.” In England, “the
people have been headed by the parliament, or the nobility and gentry that composed it; and when the kings
failed at their duties, by their own authority called it. The multitude therefore is not ever headless, but doth
either find or create heads unto itself, as occasion doth require.” In A Just and Modest Vindication, in which
the author(s) – likely Sidney and Sir William Jones – was railing against Charles II’s repeated prorogations
and dismissals of Parliament, the observation was made that, “English Spirits resent no Affronts so highly as
those which are done to their Representatives.” Indeed, the author(s) warned, it is the Court that surely paid
the price by “find[ing] the Effects of that Resentment in the next Election.”412 Sidney was very explicit that the
power of government – sovereignty – rested in the people. Again, in A Just and Modest Vindication, the
author(s) stated, “A Parliament does ever participate of the present temper of the People.”413 In England,
Sidney said, “[t]he legislative power therefore that is exercised by the parliament … must be essentially and
radically in the people, from whom their delegates and representatives have all that they have. …And if I am
free in my private capacity to regulate my particular affairs according to my own discretion, and to allot to
each servant his proper work, why have not I with my associates the freemen of England the like liberty of
directing and limiting the powers of the servants we employ in our publick affairs?”414 Parliaments should
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DCG, II.18.179, II.32.315, III.44.564 (emphasis added). This is a republican mantra. Machiavelli, for
example, examined the republics established by the Spartans and the Venetians, on the one hand, and the
Romans, on the other. He concluded that on balance, guardianship of liberty is best placed in the people
because they have “only the desire not to be dominated, and, as a consequence, a stronger will to live in
liberty,” whereas in Sparta and Venice, where the nobility were assigned this role, they had “a strong desire to
dominate,” and therefore were not as effective guardians of liberty. Machiavelli, Discorsi, B1, Ch5, 31. In A
Just and Modest Vindication, the author(s) expressed concern about the king’s criticism of Parliament for
presenting “Addresses in the nature of Remonstrances rather than Answers.” The responsive assertion is
that the role of the representative is substantive and, for Englishmen, fundamental. “Under what unhappy
circumstances do we find our selves, when our Representatives can never behave themselves with that
caution, but they will be misinterpreted at Court.” If the Commons had not explained its position to the King,
the MPs “had then been accused as men acting peremptorily & without reason; if they modestly express the
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neither be “directed what they were to meedle with,” nor should they be “threatened if they do any other
thing.” This principle was so fundamental that “the loss of Liberty of Freedom of debate in Parliament, will
soon and certainly be followed by a general loss of Liberty.” Moreover, making Parliament ineffectual would
deny to the king something essential – the impartial view of the people’s representatives of “that which tends
to the good of those they represent.”415
Historians argue that the republican language of liberty in the Italian Renaissance tradition was “the
freedom to participate” but was not freedom in the “juristic” sense, which involved “the possession of rights”
and “freedom from authority.”416 Pocock introduced this thesis, finding liberty as participation versus liberty as
the possession of rights to be an essential analytical dichotomy. “To lower the level of citizen participation in
a republic could end by reconstituting it as a legal monarchy, in which every man’s libertas, even his
bourgeoisie, was protected by law which an absolute sovereign administered.” Thus, said Pocock, “In the last
moments of his life King Charles I was heard to proclaim from the scaffold that the people’s liberty under law
had nothing to do with their having a voice in the government.” In short, the “juristic presentation of liberty
was therefore negative; it distinguished between libertas and imperium, freedom and authority, individuality
and sovereignty, private and public.” Pocock contrasted this “juristic” liberty with the “republican vocabulary”
of dictators, rhetoricians and humanists, who “articulated the positive conception of liberty: it contended that
homo, the animale politicum, was so constituted that his nature was completed only in a vita activa practiced
in a vivere civile, and that libertas consisted in freedom from restraints upon the practice of such a life.
Consequently, the city must have libertas in the sense of imperium, and the citizen must be participant in the
imperium in order to rule and be ruled.” Per Pocock, “it was not central to this assertion that the citizen should
claim rights as against the imperium in which he was himself participant; and for this reason Thomas Hobbes
in the next century declared that the libertas emblazoned on the towers of Lucca did not prevent that city

reasons of their Resolutions, they are then said to Remonstrate.” Sarcastically commenting, the authors
remarked, “what the Ministers would have this word Remonstrance signifie, what Crime it is they mean
thereby, to charge the Commons with, is unknown to an English Reader. Perhaps they who are better Critics
and more Frenchmen, know some pernicious thing which it imports.” Defending Commons, they asserted
that the particular parliamentary votes were anything but “the Transcendent monstrous Crimes, which can
never be forgiven by the Ministers.” A Just and Modest Vindication, pp. 14-16.
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exercising absolute sovereignty over the lives of its citizens.” In Pocock’s view, “Hobbes argued juridically: he
held that there were rights, that rights constituted sovereignty, that rights could not thereafter be pleaded
against sovereignty.” In contrast, “Harrington retorted that Hobbes had mistaken the issue.” Rather, “the
vocabulary of the law is almost wholly lacking from Harrington’s discourse. He argued as a humanist: he held
that there was in the human animal something planted there by God, which required fulfillment in the practice
of active self-rule, and to this something … he was also prepared to give the altogether crucial name “virtue.”
One need not agree with this definition of virtue to find, in précis, that central to Pocock’s argument was that
“‘virtue’ cannot be satisfactorily reduced to the status of right or assimilated to the vocabulary of
jurisprudence.”417
Pocock’s statement encompassed a number of ideas to which we will return, including Harrington’s
views, virtue, and the vocabulary of jurisprudence. What is important to appreciate at this juncture is that the
Pocock dichotomy between juridical and civic humanist liberty did not exist in the ideas of Sidney or most of the
other early modern republicans.418 Indeed, it also did not exist in Machiavelli, a representative of the Renaissance republican tradition.419 Machiavelli defined liberty as a “free way of life.”420 For Sidney, following in Cicero
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bias. Furthermore, Pocock opined, “but of course it is true, that the lawyers and not the republicans were the
first social historians,” and that during the “republic” – Roman or Renaissance? – that jurisprudence and
rhetoric “tended to become enemies.” The opposition of lawyers and republicans makes no sense and, as
has been made plain, jurisprudence and rhetoric were never enemies! J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce,
and History (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 40-44.
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Van Gelderen concluded that, in the tradition of the great jurist Grotius, Dutch liberty was decidedly juristic.
“Surely for the thinkers of the Dutch Revolt, as in scholastic theory, the defence of liberty was essentially
based on a constitutional framework of fundamental laws and a balanced system of institutions. But as is the
case with Sidney, Van Gelderen found that the political thought of the Dutch Revolt also emphasized the
importance of rights and contained powerful notions of popular sovereignty.” Id. He concluded that, “the use
of the language of jurisprudence during the Dutch Revolt was by no means incompatible with the articulation
of republican ideas.” Id. It is my contention that the language of jurisprudence is not only not incompatible
with republican ideas, it is an integral part of, and informs the concept of republicanism. On Grotius and law,
see Ch. Four.
419
Machiavelli endorsed the concept of liberty as self-determination, freedom from domination. This is not the
same thing as the negative or positive liberty to which Pocock refers in Virtue, Commerce and History. As
previously discussed, on the concepts of negative and positive liberty, neoroman liberty, independence from
the dominance of others versus freedom from the possibility of the dominance of others, scholars continue to
disagree.
420

It was not hatred against “a citizen” that prompted English leaders to go underground; but what they did
dovetails precisely with the scenario Machiavelli described. There is an entire literature on Machiavelli; but in
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and Machiavelli’s footsteps, there was a sense of civic responsibility associated with liberty. It was a right and
an opportunity which, if taken, became a civic duty to frame government according to one’s will.421 This required
the continuing freedom to participate; and to do this, one must have the right, the legal right, to self-determination, to be free from dependence on the will of another, the right not to be subject, unreasonably and unlawfully,
to the authority of another. It was legal rights that guaranteed the freedom to participate. While he equivocated
on the subject, Machiavelli reasoned that the guardianship of liberty “must be given to those who have less of
an appetite to usurp” such power. Accordingly, it was best placed in the people, who have “less hope of
usurping it,” and “only the desire not to be dominated.” They therefore have “a stronger will to live in liberty.”
The nobility, on the other hand, have “a strong desire to dominate”; therefore, they were more dangerous
guardians of liberty.422 Perhaps Sidney would have disagreed about the role that the nobility could play in the
protection of liberty. But both men endorsed popular sovereignty as the best means of safeguarding liberty.
It was neither the title nor the rank of dictator that enslaved Rome but rather the authority
taken from its citizens by the length of his dominion. …[T]he dictatorship, as long as
it was bestowed in accord with public laws and not by private authority, always benefited the city.
Machiavelli, Discorsi 423

v. No Required Form of Governance
Sidney was repeatedly unequivocal that God and nature had not prescribed a particular form of
government. “[T]here is no form appointed by God or nature.” Section 6 of Chapter One of Discourses is

the present context, see particularly Marcia L. Colish, “The Idea of Liberty in Machiavelli,” Journal of the
History of Ideas, Vol. 32, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1971), pp. 323-50. See also Appendix B.
421

In On Obligation Cicero told his son, “the life of those who have devoted themselves to politics and to the
conduct of important affairs brings more profit to humanity, and is more conducive to fame and distinction.”
Cicero, On Obligations, Book I, §70, p. 25; see also id., Book I, §§72-79, 85-92.
422

Machiavelli, Discorsi, B1, Ch5, 31-33, entitled “Whether the Guardianship of Liberty May Be More Securely
Lodged in the People or in the Upper Classes; and Who Has More Reason to Create an Uprising, He Who
Wishes to Acquire or He Who Wishes to Maintain,” at p.31.
423

Machiavelli also believed that dissension and tumult were not necessarily a problem in a republic. “Nor
can one in any way reasonably call a republic disorganized where so many examples of exceptional ability
occur, for good examples arise from good training, good training from good laws, and good laws from those
disturbances that many people thoughtlessly condemn.” But, in fact, tumults did not necessarily cause a
problem. Where “the material is not corrupt, disturbances and other disorders can do no harm, and where the
material is corrupt, carefully enacted laws do not good, unless they are initiated by a man who, with enormous
power, causes them to be observed in such a way that the material becomes good the people was good,
these troubles, instead of harming, rather benefited the republic. And from this we may draw the conclusion
that, where the mass of the people is sound, disturbances and tumults do not serious harm.” “any exile or
violence disadvantageous to the common good, but to laws and ordinances beneficial to public freedom.”
Machiavelli, Discorsi, B1, Ch. 4, 30; B1, Ch17, 66-67; see Colish, “The Idea of Liberty in Machiavelli,” p.340.
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entitled, in part, “God leaves to Man the choice of Forms in Government.” Again, “no privilege is peculiarly
annexted to any form of government.” 424 This thought was wittily reiterated: “If men are not obliged to live in
caves and hollow trees, to eat acorns, and to go naked, why should they be forever obliged to continue under the
same form of government that their ancestors happened to set up in the time of their ignorance?”425 Accordingly,
“Every nation acting freely, has an equal right to frame their own government, and to employ such officers as
they please.”426
Furthermore, if a nation did not get it right, the people could change their form of government, and
maintain it as long as they were happy with it. As Halifax stated, “A Constitution cannot make itself;
somebody made it, not at once but at several times. It is alterable, and by that draweth nearer perfection; and
without suiting itself to differing times and circumstances it could not live. Its life prolonged by changing
seasonably the several parts of it at several times.”427
“[A]ll nations give what form they please to their government.” But having created one form of
government, the citizenry was not forever bound by that decision. “These nations may at the first set up
popular or mixed governments, and without the guilt of sedition introduce them afterwards, if that which was
first established prove unprofitable or hurtful to them.”428 Sidney strongly disagreed with Filmer’s distinction
between eligere and instituere, to elect and to institute which, Sidney said, “signifies nothing: tho, if the power
of instituting were only left to nations, it would be sufficient; for he is in vain elected who is not instituted; and
he that is instituted is certainly elected; for his institution is an election.”429 This view is reiterated: “We say in
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DCG, II.21.196, I.6.20, I.20.70.

425

DCG, III.7.358. Note that Locke, too, “was keen to insist that the fact that things had been done in a
certain way in the past did not imply that they ought to be done that way in the future. There was no need for
the river to continue to run between its old banks.” Wootton, “Introduction,” John Locke, Political Writings,
p.87.
426

DCG, III.12.385. With regard to various forms of government, “[t]here is therefore no natural propensity to
anyone, but they chuse that which in their judgment seems best for them.” Id, II.8.122; cf. id, III.31.505 (there
was an “almost infinite variety of constitutions,” made by those who “would have it so.”).
427

“Political Thoughts and Reflections: Of Fundamentals,” Halifax Complete Works, p. 195; see also DCG,
II.17.175 (“whilst the foundation and principle of a government remains good, the superstructures may be
changed according to occasions, without any prejudice to it.”).
428
DCG, III.21.445, II.21.196. The dicey question, of course, is who gets to make that decision, and how do
you go about this peaceably, or is that even pertinent?
429

Id, III.12.385, II.6.109.
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general, he that institutes, may also abrogate [cajus est instituere, ejus est abrogare], most especially when
the institution is not only by, but for himself.”430 In other words, there is neither one choice, nor a necessarily
permanent choice. First, men chose to enter into a political society by means of a social contract, leaving
behind the absolute freedom they had as uninhibited “natural” men, and came together to form a particular
type of government. But one does not forgo the opportunity to change that form, by choice, if the community
so desires. Reflecting on this emphasis on choice, one could argue that Sidney’s republicanism theoretically
endorsed the choice of absolute monarchy.431 But this is a theoretical distinction without a practical difference.
Sidney was convinced that free men would never make such a choice; that did not mean that they did not
have the right to do so. Meanwhile, we are aware of Sidney’s preferences. Where he was exceptionally nonideological was that, unlike some of his fellow republicans, Sidney did not take his own personal preference –
his choice – and make it a necessity.432 As he often said, “the choice of that society, and the liberty of framing
it according to our own wills, for our own good, is all we seek.”433 For this reason, Sidney acknowledged to his
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There are scholars who categorize Sidney as a political writer who was neither systematic in his thinking
nor pragmatic because his theory lacked implementation details; he is also characterized by some as not
particularly constructive. Laslett, “Introduction,” Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 39 (“Sidney’s vast work is unreadable”);
Fink, The Classical Republicans, p. 164 (“His avowed purpose of answering Filmer point by point precluded
any attempt to set forth an elaborate plan for the reform of the state; the consequence is that though what he
did not want is clear enough, we cannot on all points be certain as to what he did want.”); Robbins, The
Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman, p. 42 (“Some of his ideas are worth comment, though he is never
constructive as Neville is.”) These views either fail to understand or misconstrue Sidney’s perspective.
Sidney felt no need to detail the form of governance; it did not matter to him. All sorts of different government
structures had worked in various places in various times. Other than the conviction (but not requirement) that
if a community wanted to succeed it should not hand over absolute power to a monarch, Sidney’s theory was
that such choices were entirely up to those who belonged and consented to a system of government. “If the
multitude therefore do institute, the multitude may abrogate.” DCG, I.6.21.
431

Wootton ingeniously argued that because of Locke’s narrow definition of a voluntary action, “absolute
governments cannot be legitimate because they provide for no impartial arbitrator in disputes between the
subject and the ruler, and so leave subject and ruler in a state of nature with regard to each other (Locke
2.§13).” Wootton, “Introduction,” John Locke, Political Writings, p. 84.
432

Milton, Harrington, and Neville, for example, ruled out monarchy altogether. See, e.g., Worden,
“Republicanism and the Restoration,” Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, p. 161 (“Milton quoted
the statement of Sulpicius Severus that ‘the name of kings has ever been hateful to free peoples”); id, p. 149
(for Harrington and Neville, in all government, stability is only possible “when the balance of the constitution
corresponds to the balance of the land,” and in England, where land is democratically held, a secure
monarchy is not possible); Worden, “Harrington and ‘The Commonwealth of Oceana,’ 1656,” id, p. 90 (“there
is no monarch in Harrington’s model”).
433

DCG, I.6.21. Vane agreed completely with Sidney on this point, as did Halifax. For Vane, it was essential
that the people make it their “first business to settle [their] own constitution.” [Parliamentary] Diary of Thomas
Burton, IV, p. 180; see Judson, The Political Thought of Sir Henry Vane the Younger, p. 54. Good
governance also had to be based on right principles. “The form the executive should take (whether one or
many) was unimportant, but its subordination to the supreme judicature was essential in government
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father that since Parliament invited the Stuarts back, theirs was a legitimate monarchy.
How Pocock and Skinner among others could possibly interpret Sidney or categorically define early
modern republicanism as requiring a particular form of governance is therefore a mystery.434 In particular,
monarchy was considered anathema. Nor were they alone in reaching this conclusion. Winship, for example,
began his article about Sidney with the comment that Sidney’s classical republicanism had “a strongly antimonarchical bias.”435 The distinction that is not made is between absolute monarchy, against which there
definitely is a strong bias, and constitutional monarchy, against which there is not. Indeed, confidence was
expressed throughout Discourses that if the ends of government were achieved, the form of government was
not the issue. In contrast, there are a number of scholars, with Skinner in the lead, who jumped off the ship at
this juncture, viz., who argued that the particular form of government was not only significant, it was essential
to the nature of early modern republicanism.
If there is no required form of governance, a clear element of Sidney’s republicanism, the extensive
scholarship on the importance of the form of government in a republic is inapplicable to Sidney’s theory as
well as to those Anglo-American republicans who share Sidney’s concept of liberty. Indeed, there has been
enormous misplaced anxiety on this subject among scholars, including particularly the conclusion that any

constructed on right principles of governing,” for the executive had to be kept “within its due bounds.” Id, p.
31, citing Vane’s A Needful Corrective, p. 5. While he touched on it only briefly, in “The Character of a
Trimmer,” Halifax also expressly stated that either actual consent or virtual consent through the people’s
representatives is a necessary component of healthy governance, devoid of “a sluggish and constrained
motion,” without the “life and vigour which is necessary to produce great things.” “The Character of a
Trimmer,” Halifax Complete Works, pp. 64-65.
434

Pocock suggested that Sidney’s republicanism “might be little more than a clear perception that kings were
not necessary and might be hostile to virtue, and that this could, and very probably should, do without them.
At the end of Scott's two volumes one knows a great deal about Sidney; one sees that he was a
monarchomach and an exponent of resistance theory; but one is not persuaded that he spent much time
considering how a kingless form of government might be given institutional shape.” First of all, Pocock’s
finding that a kingless form of government is of importance to Sidney – that “kings as a class were a bad lot” –
is not the case. Pocock clearly viewed Sidney as a lightweight, stating that his republicanism “was a temper
of the mind,” and that he had an “insufferable temper.” Pocock contrasted this loose-cannon description of
Sidney with his appreciation of Harrington. Sidney’s mind was “very different from the mind of James
Harrington, convinced that monarchy had become historically impossible in England and that something else,
necessarily higher, would have to take its place.” Overall, this understanding of Sidney and his republicanism
is inadequate. See Pocock, “England’s Cato: The Virtues and Fortunes of Algernon Sidney,” The Historical
Journal, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Dec. 1994), pp. 915-35, 918.
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Michael P. Winship, “Algernon Sidney’s Calvinist Republicanism,” Journal of British Studies, Vol. 49, No. 4
(Oct. 2010), pp. 753-73, 753.
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form of monarchy is inconsistent with republicanism.436 Once again we have an idea that comes directly from
Grotius who, in The Law of War and Peace, stated, “for you can frame no Form of Government in your Mind,
which will be without Inconveniences and Dangers . . . but as there are several Ways of Living, some better
than others, and every one may chuse what he pleases of all those Sorts; so a People may chuse what Form
of Government they please.”437 Sidney echoed Grotius, to whom he frequently referred: God “having given to
all men in some degree a capacity of judging what is good for themselves, he hath granted to all likewise a
liberty of inventing such forms as please them best, without favouring one more than another.”438 For both
Grotius and Sidney, the decision about the form of government under which a people lived was the choice of
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I demure from the view of Skinner, Pocock, and, more recently, Scott that early modern English
republicanism, which Scott termed classical republicanism, included an unqualified rejection of monarchy.
See, e.g., England’s Troubles, p. 302. It is the case, of course, that It is not possible to reconcile the antimonarchism of later sections of Court Maxims, on which Scott overwhelmingly relied, with the repeated
assertions in Discourses that a people had a right to choose the form of governance to which it was bound.
This readily leads to another conclusion than an anti-monarchic Sidney, viz., that at least the portions of Court
Maxims that articulate this view were not written by Sidney. See Charnoff, “A Second Look at the Question of
Who Authored Court Maxims.” The unqualified rejection of monarchy also is inconsistent with the view
expressed in A Just and Modest Vindication, likely authored by Sidney and Jones, that there were legitimate
monarchies. See, e.g., A Just and Modest Vindication, p. 44. It would not be surprising if Sidney had doubts
whether monarchy could work in early modern Europe; it had been consistently corrupted in his lifetime and
earlier. See Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 305 (“There is nothing in the writings of Milton, Sidney, Nedham,
Hall and others to suggest that they thought restoration of limited monarchy desirable.”) I do agree with Scott
that monarchy had to be consistent with freedom. I do not agree, however, that this ruled out monarchy
altogether. Scott endeavored, in my view unsuccessfully, to rationalize Milton and Sidney’s Aristotelian
recognition of lawful monarchy because, “in practice,” which is what Sidney and Milton cared about (on this
latter point, I heartily concur), the “circumstances for natural monarchy” did not apply. Again, a categorical
rejection of any form of government, including monarchy, is wholly inconsistent with Sidney’s republicanism,
including his concepts of liberty and consent. Accordingly, I do not agree with Scott’s conclusion, which flows
ineluctably from the rejection of every form of monarchy, that the importance to Sidney’s theory, as well as
Milton’s for that matter, of “the Polybian doctrine of the mixed constitution … has been considerably
exaggerated.” Id, pp. 301-03.
437

Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, vol. I (Book I) [1625], Richard Tuck, ed., from the Edition by
Jean Barbeyrac (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), Bk I, Ch. III, p. 95, http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/grotiusthe-rights-of-war-and-peace-2005-ed-vol-1-book-i ( (2-2-19). Note Tuck’s criticism of Pocock for drawing a
hard and fast line between humanists and jurists. See Pocock’s (unconvincing) rebuttal in “Afterword,” MM,
pp. 560-61. Tyrrell also substantially relied on Grotius, considering him to be “an Author of greater learning,
and better reputation, than either” Hobbes or Milton. Tyrrell “neither like[d] the foundation nor the building
which Mr. Hobs hath set up,” and “less shall I take upon me to vindicate Milton, since that were at once to
defend downright Murder and Rebellion.” Tyrrell, Patriarcha non Monarcha, Ch. 4, p. 79.
438

DCG, I.6.20; see also id, I.2.12 (“it must be acknowledged that the whole fabrick of tyranny will be much
weakened, if we prove, that nations have a right to make their own laws, constitute their own magistrates; and
that such as are so constituted owe an account of their actions to those by whom, and for whom they are
appointed.”) Cicero also emphasized choice and diversity: “Why are national codes dissimilar? Is it not
because each community enacts what seems to suit its own conditions?” Cicero, The Republic, Cicero, The
Republic and The Laws, Book Three, ¶19, p. 65.
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that people.439 It is an unsurprising view for Sidney to have; after all, this open-minded perspective about
types of government was a strong Sidney/Percy family tradition.
Here an important digression is in order to consider the nature of the different forms of government,
including the meaning of the “mixed governments” to which Sidney referred and, at least generally, the
historical legacies with which Sidney engaged when addressing this subject.

Therefore, the good of man must be the end [i.e. objective] of the science of politics.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics bk. 1, 1094b 6–7 440

a. The Different Forms of Governance
Sidney took for granted, as did all his contemporaries, Aristotle’s categorization in Politics of three
“simple species” of government: monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, or the governance of a people by
one, a few or all.441 (Notice that a republic was not a form.) Sidney referenced one of those rare times that
Filmer was not only correct that Aristotle “is hardly brought to give a general opinion in favour of Monarchy”; in
fact, Aristotle “never” found that monarchy was the best form of government. Instead, like Sidney, Aristotle
approved or disapproved of the form of government “according to circumstances.”442 Sidney repeatedly
emphasized that none of the “simple species” of government worked well.443 How does one define a wellworking government? “If the publick safety be provided, liberty and propriety secured, justice administered,
virtue encouraged, vice suppressed, and the true interest of the nation advanced, the ends of government are
accomplished.”444
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On Grotius, see Richard Tuck, “Grotius and Selden,” The Cambridge History of Political Thought 14501700, J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie, eds. ( Cambridge University Press, 2006), Ch. 17, pp. 499-529.
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“Aristotle 384-322 bc,” Oxford Essential Quotations (1 ed), Susan Ratcliffe, ed. (Oxford University Press,
online ed. 2014), http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780191735240.001.0001/q-oro00000434 (9-5-14).
441

See, e.g., DCG, II.16.169; II.1.81.
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DCG, II.10.132 (discussing in this instance, the differences between monarchy and popular government).

443

See, e.g., Section 16 of Chapter Two of Discourses, entitled, “The best Governments of the World have
been composed of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy.” DCG, II.16.166-70; see also DCG, II.21.195202, entitled, “Mixed and Popular Governments preserve Peace, and manage Wars better than Absolute
Monarchies,” in which Sidney memorably, lyrically, and realistically stated: “I may leave our knight [Filmer],
like Don Quixote, fighting against the phantasms of his own brain, and saying what he pleases against such
governments as never were, unless in such a place as San Marino near Sinigaglia in Italy, where a hundred
clowns govern a barbarous rock that no man invades, and relates nothing to our question.”
444

DCG, III.21.444.
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In one of the most interesting aspects of Sidney’s ideas, Sidney maintained that, “The difference
therefore between good and ill government is not, that those of one sort have an arbitrary power which the
other have not, for they all have it; but that those which are well constituted place this power so as it may be
beneficial to the people, and set such rules as are hardly to be transgressed; whilst those of the other sort fail
in one or both these points.”445 Sidney was simply saying that the people decided what government they
wanted to live by; there were no master instructions on government, and whatever “sort” the people embrace
was, by virtue of that embracing, government was legitimized.446 Once again, Halifax was the man who said
precisely the same thing in Political, Moral and Miscellaneous Thoughts and Reflections, which were not
published until 1750 although written in the 1694 timeframe. “To say a power is supreme, and not arbitrary, is
not sense. It is acknowledged supreme, and therefore, &c.” Accordingly, “If the Common Law is supreme,
then those are so who judge what is the Common Law; and if none but the Parliament can judge so, there is
an end to the controversy; there is no fundamental, for the Parliament may judge as they please – that is, they
have the authority.” In short, said Halifax, “There is, then, no other fundamental but that every supreme power
must be arbitrary.”447
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Id, III.45.570.
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Houston seemed to misunderstand this point. Why would he say that Sidney’s recognition of the
inherently arbitrary nature of each country’s law means that his ideas were “directed against the ancient
constitution”? Houston, Algernon Sidney, p. 129.
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The editor of this late nineteenth-century collection of Halifax works footnoted Sidney’s Discourses with
approval and Locke’s “Second Treatise,” suggesting that Locke was less accurate than Sidney and Halifax
because Locke, “with his not infrequent looseness of expression, uses power where he means right,” referring
to Locke’s assertion that, “nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy
his own life, or take away the life or property of another.” Halifax, “Political, Moral and Miscellaneous
Thoughts and Reflections,” The Life and Letters of Sir George Savile, Bart., First Marquis of Halifax &c: With
a New Edition of His Works, Now for the First Time Collected and Revised – Primary Source Edition, Vol. II,
Helen Charlotte Foxcroft, ed. (London, New York & Bombay: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1898; Nabu Public
Domain Repr.), pp. 489-528, 497 & n.3. Locke did not state that every government exercises arbitrary power.
Whether he effectively meant the same thing that Sidney did is unclear, when he said, “Absolute Arbitrary
Power, or Governing without settled standing Laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of Society and
Government, which Men would not quit the freedom of the state of Nature for, and tie themselves up under,
were it not to preserve their Lives, Liberties and Fortunes; and by stated Rules of Right and Property to
secure their Peace and Quiet.” For, he continued, “It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a
power to do so, to give to any one, or more, an absolute Arbitrary Power over their Persons and Estates, and
put a force into the Magistrates hand to execute his unlimited Will arbitrarily upon them. This were to put
themselves into a worse condition than the state of Nature, wherein they had a Liberty to defend their Right
against the Injuries of others.” Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, §137, p. 359. For Sidney, the point
is that the selection of “standing Laws” by the people in fact is arbitrary although not arbitrarily imposed and,
in that respect, Locke’s ideas may be consistent.
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In the Aristotelian tradition, each form of “good” governance was capable of becoming a “bad” form:
monarchy could evolve into tyranny, aristocracy could turn into oligarchy, and democracy could deteriorate
into anarchy. In the last instance, Aristotle’s terminology was actually that polity would become democracy.
(Notice again that none of the forms of governance was a republic.) Neville described aristocracy, which he
also termed “optimacy,” as “a commonwealth, where the better sort (that is, the eminent and rich,) have the
chief administration of the government: I say the chief; because there are very few ancient optimacies, but the
people had some share.”448 In his republican text Plato Redivivus Neville elaborated on “corruptions” of the
three forms of government, noting that, “I have no light out of antiquity to convince me, that there were in old
times any other monarchies, but such as were absolutely despotical.” But, said Neville, “I must confess,
Aristotle, when he reckons up the corruptions of these three governments, calls tyranny the corruption of the
monarchy: by which if he means a change of government, (as it is in the corruptions of the other two;) then it
must follow, that the philosopher knew of some other monarchy at the first, which afterwards degenerated into
tyranny.”449
Tyranny is another one of those concepts used so commonly in seventeenth-century political thought
that few felt necessary to define. To Neville tyranny was the exercise of arbitrary power, which he considered its
commonly understood meaning, although he noted that tyranny “signifies the ill exercise of power” in modern
languages.450 Presumably, the ill exercise of power subsumed its arbitrary exercise but was a broader concept.
The author(s) of the Ninth Dialogue of Court Maxims discussed tyranny at some length and seemed to be
utilizing what Neville described as its modern usage. Quoting Aristotle’s Politics, the author(s) stated, “the
difference between a tyrant and a lawful king” – and note the recognition of the fact that a king could be lawful –
is that a tyrant “seeks his own profit,” whereas “a king that of those who are governed by him.”451 This suggests
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On the other hand, in democracy, said Neville, there are three fundamental orders with “the senate
proposing, the people resolving, and the magistrates executing.” Neville was actually describing a mixed
government, not a democracy, which he nevertheless concluded is a “much more powerful” government than
aristocracy. Sidney also favored mixed government. Neville, Plato Redivivus, pp. 17-18.
449

Neville, Plato Redivivus, p. 15.

450

Id, p. 89.

451

Tyrrell was more precise. He criticized Filmer for misunderstanding Aristotle on the nature of tyranny.
“Hence it appears plainly, that Aristotle, when he says that a Tyranny is for the benefit of the Governour
alone, he does not mean that the Subjects can have no benefit at all by it, since it is the Tyrants interest they
should live and get Children, or else he would quickly want Subjects.” In other words, it is always good for the
ruler, even a tyrant, to promote the interests of his people – a pitch to which Tyrrell clung, as Halifax tended to
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not only arbitrary actions, but also other “ill exercise[s] of power.” Indeed, Socrates in Plato’s Republic echoed
this view: “a king is not created, that he may carefully provide for himself, but for the happiness of those that
create him.” Accordingly, “tyranny refers all to its own profit; a kingdom seeks that of the subjects.”452 In
Discourses Sidney stated that government is “unreasonable, and abhorred by the laws of God and man,” if it is
“not instituted for the good of those that live under it.” Machiavelli similarly maintained that the community’s
concern for the common good was its moral foundation, and the corollary to liberty.453 Indeed, “so soon as the
supreme lord begins to prefer his own interest or profit, before the good of his subjects,” a government has
“degenerate[d] into a most unjust and detestable tyranny.”454 Sidney perspicuously explained, “as they who are

do. “Thus the Children of Israel, under the Tyranny of Pharaoh, had Meat, Drink, and Cloaths, and were not
so low kept but they got Children apace; and yet we find God thought them opprest, and heard their cry.”
Returning to Aristotle, Tyrrell stated, “But Aristotle clears the point, when he distinguishes an absolute
Masterly power over a Slave, from that of a Father of a Family; the Master in the former considering onely his
own profit, and the preservation of the Slave but by accident; and so an ill-natured brutish Master takes care
of the life of his Slave that works in the Mines or Sugar-works in the Indies, not out of any love to the person
of the Slave, but because he cannot subsist without him. So a Grasier or Butcher takes care of his Cattel that
they thrive and do well (as they call it) yet every body knows that they take this care onely for their Carcasses,
which yield them so much ready money at the Market.” Tyrrell, Patriarcha non Monarcha, Ch. III, p. 75.
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Halifax did not focus significantly on the concept of tyranny; but he nevertheless addressed the same
issues. “There is a wantonness in great power that men are generally too apt to be corrupted with, and for
that reason a wise Prince, to prevent the temptations arising from common frailty, would choose to govern by
rules for his own sake, as well as for his people’s.” Princes should not consider laws “as things imposed on
them,” said Halifax, like “fetters of iron.” Rather, laws “are chains of gold,” viz., they protect the king from
himself. “That a People may let a King fall, yet still remain a People; but if a King let his People slip from him,
he is no longer King.” “Maxims of State,” Halifax Complete Works, p. 147. For the Trimmer, “the King and
kingdom ought to be one creature, not to be separated in their political capacity; and when either of them
undertake to act apart,” it is gruesome – “like the crawling of worms after they are cut in pieces.” Halifax
explicitly identified the “comparative beauty” of England’s government to that of France - the government of
Louis XIV and “his tyranny.” “Let us look upon the most glittering outside of unbounded authority, and upon a
nearer inquiry we shall find nothing but poor and miserable deformity within.” “The Character of a Trimmer,”
Halifax Complete Works, pp. 57, 63. Sidney said the same thing about France: “The beauty of it is false and
painted.” DCG, II.23.216. Let us imagine a Prince living in his kingdom,” remarked Halifax, “as if he was in a
great galley, his subjects tugging at the oar, laden with chains and reduced to real rags, that they may gain
him imaginary laurels.” “The Character of a Trimmer,” Halifax Complete Works, pp. 63-64. Said Sidney,
consider “the misery to which” the French king “has reduced his people,” such that “the whole body of that
state is full of boils, and wounds, and putrid sores.” DCG, II.21.198, II.23.216. “Let us represent” that Prince,
envisioned Halifax, “grazing among his flatterers and receiving their false worship, like a child never
contradicted, and therefore always cozened, or like a lady complimented only to be abused; condemned
never to hear truth, and consequently never to do justice; wallowing in the soft bed of wanton unbridled
greatness, not less odious to the instruments themselves than to the objects of his tyranny.” “The Character of
a Trimmer,” Halifax Complete Works, p. 64. On “Arbitrary Power,” Halifax also said that it was “like most other
things that are very hard, they are very apt to break.” “Maxims of State,” id, p. 147.
453

Colish, “The Idea of Liberty in Machiavelli,” p. 350.
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DCG, I.16.52.
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skilled in the Oriental tongues assure me, there is no name for a tyrant in any of them, or any other way of
expressing the thing than by circumlocution, and adding proud, insolent, lustful, cruel, violent, or the like epithets,
to the word lord, or king.” In contrast, “in Greece, from whence the word comes, it signified no more than one
who governed according to his own will, distinguished from kings that governed by law.” This meaning “was not
taken in an ill sense, till those who had been advanced for their justice, wisdom and valour, or their descendants,
were found to depart from the ends of their institution, and to turn that power to the oppression of the people.
…[B]y these means it grew odious.”455
In contrast to Discourses’ secular discussion of tyranny, in which Sidney avowed that “tyranny is the
death of a state,” the Court Maxims Ninth Dialogue author(s) vitriolically exploded about the religious significance
of tyranny.456 Since it was “the centre where all corrupt and filthy interests do meet,” tyranny “must needs be
hateful to God.” Consequently, “Whosoever therefore governs wickedly is hateful to God and man.” For the
author(s) of the Ninth Dialogue of Court Maxims, tyranny was a sin against God and man, a religiously imbued
perspective of the ill exercise of political power. Going even further, the author(s) became incendiary. “This evil
is not incurable, since it may be cured by the destruction of its authors.” Ending with a Biblical flourish, he/they
declared, “The glory of a tyrant is like that of the fruits which are said to grow near unto the lake where Sodom
stood. They are beautiful to the eye, but are nothing save rottenness, poison, and noisome vapour, fit for
nothing but to be thrown into the filthy lake from whence they sprung, which resembles tophet” – Hell – “prepared
of old for kings.”457
There is a profound legacy, both ancient and medieval, associated with each of the forms of
governance, and one of which Sidney was well aware, as evidenced by references that abound in
Discourses. Absolute monarchy seemed to be the same thing as the original concept of monarchy; for if
monarchy was not absolute it was, by definition, a “mixed” form of governance. Thus, both Plato and Aristotle
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Sidney noted that, “The practice of most nations, and (I may truly say) of all that deserve imitation, has
been as directly contrary to the absolute power of one man as their constitutions: or if the original of many
governments lie hid in the impenetrable darkness of antiquity, their progress may serve to shew the intention
of the founders.” DCG, III.7.353-54; II.30.289.
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DCG, III.40.545; Court Maxims, Ninth Dialogue, pp. 149-51.
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Court Maxims, Ninth Dialogue, pp. 149-51. In Patriarcha non Monarcha, Tyrrell stated, “a Guard of
Strangers, or a constant standing Army, was ever held the Body of Tyranny.” Patriarcha non Monarcha
(1681), Ch. III, p. 73.
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criticized the right of the monarch to place himself above the law – a fundamental characteristic of what later
came to be known as absolute monarchy. As Sidney explained, “neither Plato nor Aristotle acknowledge
either reason or justice in the power of a monarchy,” the exception being if the monarch “has more of the
virtues conducing to the good of the civil society than all those who compose it” and, moreover, that he
“employ them for the publick advantage, and not to his own pleasure and profit” – an exception that was not
impossible, but relatively unlikely. Machiavelli said the same thing.458 As Neville noted, Plato considered
monarchy to be the best government, “but with this restriction, where philosophers reigned.”459 This was an
ideal. In the real world, instead of placing reason and justice strictly in the hands of the monarchy, “a law is
set as a rule to him, and the best men, that is such as are most like to himself, made to be his assistants,
because, say they, Les est mens sine affect, & quasi Deus,” viz., “law is mind without passion and is, as it
were God,” a statement taken from Aristotle’s Politics.460 Plato and Aristotle therefore concluded that, “to
prefer the absolute power of a man, as in those governments which they call barbarorum regna,” kingdoms of
barbarians, “before the regular government of kings justly exercising a power instituted by law, and directed to
the publick good, is to chuse rather to be subject to the lust of a beast than to be governed by a god.” Here
we have a specific example where Sidney carefully distinguished between absolute and non-absolute
monarchy.461 Sidney elaborated on numerous societies – e.g., the Spartans, the Persians, the Germans –
that “observed the same rules.”462
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“The reason Machiavelli usually gives for the view that liberty cannot exist in a monarchy is that the rule of
one man tends to be despotic and tyrannical,” and “would lead to an absolute government.” But this does not
mean that people can never be free in a monarchy. Machiavelli “clearly distinguishes between monarchy and
absolutism and includes monarchies, along with republics, among those states capable of internal freedom.”
Colish, “The Idea of Liberty in Machiavelli,” p. 336-37.
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As Neville remarked: “the whole possession of the country, and the whole power lies in the hands and
breast of one man; he can make laws, break and repeal them when he pleases, or dispense with them in the
meantime when he thinks fit; interpose in all judicatories, in behalf of his favourites; take away any particular
man’s personal estate, and his life too, without the formality of a criminal process, or trial; send a dagger, or a
halter to his chief ministers, and command them to make themselves away; and in fine, do all that his will, or
his interest, suggests to him.” Neville, Plato Redivivus, pp. 16-17.
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DCG, II.30.288, citing Plato’s Laws, Book 9, 875a, and Aristotle’s Politics, Book 3, 1287a.
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Tyrrell did the same thing. Patriarcha non Monarcha (1681), Ch. III.
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Later, Sidney commented that Aristotle seemed to think that the first monarchs were righteous enough to
rule on their own; “but that they or their children falling into corruption and pride, grew odious; and that nations
did on that account either abolish their authority, or create senate and other magistrates, who having part of
the power might keep them in order.” DCG, II.30.288-291.
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It was not only Plato and Aristotle who raised objections to monarchy in which the power and the
opinions of the king defined the nature of law and of how the people would be governed. Not that it did not
have its supporters, but absolute monarchy was a concept that was criticized throughout the Middle Ages in
texts well-represented in the Sidney Library. In fact, Filmer’s unqualified endorsement of absolute,
patriarchally-derived monarchy was unprecedented.463 Even those who had accepted a theoretically absolutely
powerful king had clever qualifications. This included Jean Bodin, writing at the time of the St. Bartholomew’s
Day massacre in sixteenth-century France and an author to whom Sidney referred; Josephus and Philo in the
first century; Isaac Abravanel in the late fifteenth century; and Maimonides in the twelfth century, all of whom
are referenced in Discourses. Sidney argued that as a matter of good sense and wise kingship, a monarch
would both consult with the society’s leading men, however defined, before making important decisions, and
was limited in his behavior by rules of natural law, as well as religion.464 While this was not enforceable against
a monarch, it was very much expected – a matter of respect, prudence, and wisdom. Indeed, this expectation
was viewed as the definition of capable kingship. “Ulpian a corrupt lawyer undertakes to say, that the prince is
not obliged by the laws; yet Theodosius confessed, that it was the glory of a good emperor to acknowledge
himself bound by them.”465 This statement parroted a similar recognition of the preeminence of law in the
Vindiciae contra Tyrannos, with which Sidney would have been extremely familiar. Known as a right of
resistance tract, “the Vindiciae was self-evidently about monarchy: it could be described as a defence of mixed
monarchy.”466
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Sidney consistently explained how Filmer had erroneously relied on the authorities to which he alluded,
including Plato and Aristotle. Indeed, said Sidney, “our author’s intention,” was “only to cavil, or to cheat such
as are not versed in the writings of the ancients.” See, e.g., id, II.1.77-87 (quotation on page 86).
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DCG, II.9.124. “Bodin, himself a lawyer by training, shared the almost universally held belief that kings are
required by God to fulfill the divine commandment to maintain justice in their kingdoms and to observe the
principles of natural law, that is, the principles of reason and conscience.” Harold J. Berman, Law and
Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA &
London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 236.
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DCG, III.21.446. On the doubtful suggestion that Sidney was either referring to or quoting from Ulpian,
see Appendix B.
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George Garnett, “Law in the ‘Vindiciae, contra tyrannos’: A Vindication,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 49,
No. 3 (Sept. 2006), pp. 877-91, 887. Furthermore, we know that Sidney’s grandfather, the 1st Earl of
Leicester, left his descendants two large commonplace books that frequently cited Livy and Tacitus, “the
classical historians who ‘idolized the Roman republic;’ and modern European works that promoted antiabsolutist and republican ideas, especially Machiavelli’s Il principe and the monarchomach George
Buchanan’s De iure regni.” Fred W. Schurink, “Manuscript Commonplace Books, Literature, and Reading in
Early Modern England,” Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol. 73, No. 3 (2010), pp. 453-69, 459. In 1584 the
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Three important subsidiary propositions follow directly from the view that there was no required form
of governance. First, absolute monarchy was wholly inconsistent with liberty (and, inversely, forms of
monarchy that were not absolute were not inconsistent with liberty).467 As Gertrude Mary Ireland Blackburne,
Sidney’s early biographer, stated, Sidney “had no objection to kingship, properly limited.”468 Second, and an
issue of discussion among political theorists for centuries, was that there was a right of resistance to the
government of an absolute monarch that was inherently tyrannical. Third, the extensive scholarship on the
importance of the form of government in a republic is inapposite in the context of Sidney’s republicanism as
well as those Anglo-American republicans who shared Sidney’s concept of liberty.
Not that I loved Caesar less, but that I loved Rome more.
Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Julius Caesar, 1599 469
Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
Lord Acton, 1887 470
They only trampled on people they didn’t see.
Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution 471

1. Absolute monarchy and liberty
In absolute monarchies, people are not free when they are subject to the wanton will of the monarch;
furthermore, changing the form of governance of an absolute monarchy is highly problematic in a society in
which the citizenry has neither the means nor the entitlement to participate, much less redress grievances.

Scottish Parliament ordered that all copies of Buchanan’s De jure regni be provided to government authorities
in order to purge them of offensive material. De Lisle, After Elizabeth, p. 51. The 1st Earl’s notes included
“statements such as ‘Tyrantes and Vserpers may be removed:’” Not that his views were constrained by
republicanism; in his commonplace books there were also extracts from works “defending absolutism and
obedience to the monarch, particularly Bodin’s De republica libri sex and Lipsius’ Politicorum, sive civilis
doctrinae libri sex,” all influences on early modernists, as discussed in Ch. One, and authors well represented
in the Sidney Library. See Schurink, “Manuscript Commonplace Books,” p. 459.
467

For a detailed discussion of the concept of seventeenth-century absolutism, see James Daly, “The Idea of
Absolute Monarchy in Seventeenth-Century England,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 21, No. 2 (June, 1978), pp.
227-50.
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Gertrude Mary Ireland Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.,
1885), p. 60.
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“The Tragedy of Julius Caesar,” The Oxford Shakespeare, Act III, Scene II, pp. 599-626, 599, 614.
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Lord Acton (John Emerich Edward Dalberg) to Archbishop Mandell Creighton, April 5, 1887, Lectures on
Modern History by the late right honorable Emerich Edward First Baron Acton, John Neville Figgis, ed.
(London: MacMillan 1906), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2254#Acton_PowerCorrupts1524_24 (11-13-14).
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Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution, François Furet and Françoise Mélonio, eds.,
Alan S. Kahan, tr. (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), Book II, Ch. XI, p.172.
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“But there is more than ordinary extravagance in his [Filmer’s] assertion, that the greatest liberty in the world
is for a people to live under a monarch, when his book is to prove, that this monarch hath his right from God
and nature, is endowed with an unlimited power of doing what he pleaseth, and can be restrained by no law.
If it be liberty to live under such a government, I desire to know what is slavery.”472
Absolute monarchy necessarily meant that the ruler has unconditional discretion – unfettered
prerogative. As Sidney stated in Discourses, rational men do not put such “fetters” upon themselves.473
Moreover, if God intended for man to be governed by a divine monarch, why didn’t he say so? “’Tis hard to
imagine, that God who hath left all things to our choice, that are not evil in themselves, should tie us up in this;
and utterly incredible that he should impose upon us a necessity of following his will, without declaring it to us.
…[H]e might have declared in a word, that the eldest man of the eldest lien should be king; and that his will
ought to be their law. …We see nothing in Scripture, of precept or example, that is not utterly abhorrent to this
chimera.”474 Likewise, Tyrrell: “I see no divine Charter in Scripture of any such absolute despotick power
granted to Adam or any other Father.”475 In addition to the principle of consent, Sidney relied on Plato and
Aristotle, and also cited the Bible and particularly the example of Moses to support his conviction that God
taught men by example, through Scriptures, that bounds must be set on those placed in positions of authority.
“Moses seems to have had as great abilities as any man that ever lived in the world; but he alone was not able
to bear the weight of the government, and therefore God appointed seventy chosen men to be his assistants,”
the Sanhedrin. “This was a perpetual law in Israel.”476
Not only does absolute monarchy prevent the exercise of choice and consent by the citizenry, but it is
the form of government most susceptible to corruption. While “all governments are subject to corruption and
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DCG, 1.5.17. Tyrrell said something similar. “I suppose this asserting of such an unlimited Power in all
Monarchs, and such an entire Subjection as this Author exacts from Subjects, can produce nothing but a
Slavish Dread, without that Reverence, Esteem, and Affection for their Princes Person and Government which
is so necessary for the quiet of Princes, and which they will have, whilst they believe he thinks him-self obliged
in Conscience and Honour to protect their Lives and Fortunes from Slavery and Oppression, according to just
and known Laws.” “THE PREFACE To The Reader,” Tyrrell, Patriarcha non monarcha, p. 6.
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DCG, I.12.35.
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Id, I.6.23.
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Tyrrell, Patriarcha non monarcha, p. 13.
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Id. Sidney argued that a condition of kingship granted by God was that kingship be limited. As a result,
the “practice of most nations, and (I may truly say) of all that deserve imitation, has been as directly contrary
to the absolute power of one man as their constitutions.” DCG, II.30.289.
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decay,” absolute monarchy is “by principle led unto, or rooted in it.” Indeed, opined Sidney, in comparing
absolute monarchy and popular government, the former “can be said to be natural in no other sense, than
that our depraved nature is most inclined to that which is worst.”477
On this subject, there is uniform concurrence among republicans. Halifax indicted absolute monarchy
in The Character of a Trimmer. “[N]o monarchy can be perfect and absolute, without exception; … to screw
out precedents of unlimited power is a plain diminution to a prince that nature hath made great.” In Halifax’s
inevitable way, he sought to turn the matter around so that a prince – the English king – would see that it was
in his own self-interest not to seek absolute power. “There is a wantonness in great power that men are
generally too apt to be corrupted with, and for that reason a wise Prince, to prevent the temptation arising
from common frailty, would choose to govern by rules for his own sake, as well as for his people’s.” Halifax
cautioned, “[E]ven at the time when the rule was quod prinipi placuit lex esto [what pleases the Prince is law]
the armies and pretorian bands which the instruments of that unruly power were frequently the means made
use of to destroy them who had it.” In sum, “There will ever be this difference between God and his
vicegerents, that God is still above the instruments he useth.” Halifax, the “Trimmer,” “cannot commit such a
sin against the glorious thing called liberty, nor let his soul stoop so much below itself, as to be content
without repining to have his reason wholly subdued, or the privilege of acting like a sensible creature torn from
him by the imperious dictates of unlimited authority, in what hand soever it happens to be placed.”478
Cleverly, Tyrrell made the point that before signing on to Filmer’s platform of absolutism, one must
keep in mind that what’s good for the goose is good for the gander: “You may also consider whether most of
the Arguments this Author makes use of for absolute Obedience to Usurpers, as representing the lawful
Prince and Father of the People, might not serve for the establishing of Oliver and the Rump-Parliament, as
well as a lawful Soveraign; since I am sure Milton makes use of the same places of Scripture for this purpose,
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Id, II.19.189.
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Halifax, “The Character of a Trimmer,” pp.55-58, 99. Similarly, Vane maintained that the executive had to
be kept “within its bounds”; that “all offices had their rise from the people, and that all should be accountable
to them. If this be monstrous, then it is monstrous to be safe and rational, and to bear your own good.”
[Parliamentary] Diary of Thomas Burton, Vol. III, p. 76. Accordingly, when Richard Cromwell assumed office,
Vane argued that “the ‘dedicated’ group in Parliament must establish proper foundations. They must see to it
that the new executive, Richard, was their own creature, subordinate to them.” Judson, The Political Thought
of Sir Henry Vane the Younger, pp. 54-55.
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which this Author and Salmasius do for another.”479
Locke unequivocally opposed absolute monarchy. In his “Second Treatise” he argued that men give
up the powers that they have in a state of nature in order “the better to preserve himself his Liberty and
Property,” and this is only possible when the commonwealth was “bound to govern by establish’d standing
Laws, …by indifferent and upright Judges. …And all this is to be directed to no other end, but the Peace,
Safety, and publick good of the People.480
The commonplace book of a Sidney family member likely Algernon’s grandfather Robert Sidney, the
1st Earl of Leicester, cited to Livy and Tacitus, who revered the Roman republic, but also included quotations
from works that were not republican but were anti-absolutist such as those by Machiavelli (il principe) and
Buchanan (De iure regni). It included “statements such as ‘Tyrantes and Vserpers may be removed.’” At the
same time, “there are extracts from works defending absolutism and obedience to the monarch, particularly
Bodin’s De republica libri sex and Lipsius’ Politicorum, sive civilis doctrinae libri sex.”481 One also sees the
heavy influence of medieval texts that Sidney relied upon in Discourses. The 1st Earl identified pervasive
difficulties with the institution of monarchy, even though he also seemed to take for granted the fact that in
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Tyrrell, Patriarcha non Monarcha, pp. 5-6. In a 1675 speech in Parliament Shaftesbury also distinguished
between the “true” and “perverted” form of Divine authority, and the error of unlimited Divine Right monarchy.
“In a word, if this doctrine be true, our Magna Charta is of no use; our laws are but rules among ourselves
during the King’s pleasure.” For “Monarchy, if of Divine Right, cannot be bounded or limited by human laws;
nay, what is more, cannot bind itself; and all our claims of right by the law or constitution of the Government,
all the jurisdiction and privilege of this House, all the rights and privileges of the House of Commons, all the
properties and liberties of the people, are to give way not only to the interest but the will and pleasure of the
Crown; and the best and worthiest of men holding this principle must vote to deliver up all we have, not only
when reason of State and the separate interest of the Crown require it, but when the will and pleasure of the
King is known to have it so; for that must be, to a man of that principle, the only rule and measure of right and
justice.” Traill, Shaftesbury, p. 111.
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Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, §131, p. 353. One scholar argued, “Locke held that human
beings are by nature rational and equally free. On the basis of that rationality and equal freedom he argued
against political absolutism and in defense of a constitutional state. Much more than his distinctive
institutional views about popular sovereignty, legislative supremacy, or the separation of powers, it was these
foundational beliefs that distinguished Locke from contemporary constitutionalists.” Reference is made to a
number of republican and other thinkers, including Sidney. My contention is quite the opposite: that in these
“foundational beliefs” Locke is indistinguishable from most of his fellow republicans. Joshua Cohen,
“Structure, Choice, and Legitimacy: Locke’s Theory of the State,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 4
(Autumn 1986), pp. 301-324, 301.
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Schurink, “Manuscript Commonplace Books,” p. 459. Once again, the work of these authors was well
represented in the Sidney Library. On the 2nd Earl of Leicester’s commonplace books, see Germaine
Warkentin, “Humanism and Hard Time: the Second Earl of Leicester (1595-1677) and his Commonplace
Books, 1630-1660,” Challenging Humanism: Essays in Honor of Dominic Baker-Smith, Arthur Kinney and
Tom Hoensela, eds. (Dover, DEL: University of Delaware, 2005), pp. 229-53.
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England, with its history and traditions, monarchy was necessary.482 But there are topical headings on
rebellions, factions, grievances, and treason. The 1st Earl “plainly sees nothing sacred about the authority or
even the person of a monarch.”483
The commonplace books of the 2nd Earl reflect Leicester’s scholarly inclinations and, while they
continued the preoccupations of his father, also reflected their author’s “meditative perusal of learned
writings,” including canonical Latin texts, antique historians, biographers, anecdotalists and, most unusually, a
heavy emphasis on contemporary authors, including Sir Edward Coke, William Prynne (Puritan opponent of
Laud and Laudianism, as well as lawyer and prolific author), and particularly French jurist Pierre Ayrault, who
wrote “vast historical commentary on issues in the civil law.” In Leicester “we discover an interesting paradox:
the political culture of anti-absolutism is inflected through the operations of an obsessively orderly, precedentconscious mind.”484 We also see a man preoccupied with the role of law in society. Leicester copied down
innumerable sources in an effort to determine what had actually happened in the past, or what might happen
in the future, consistently viewing antique and modern history from a moral vantage point – a perspective that
his son Algernon entirely adopted.485 In sum, as we have seen, there is conspicuous continuity in the
family’s skepticism about the ability of an all-powerful monarch to protect the interests of the people.
Sidney’s perspective was also informed by the views of the French Huguenot monarchomachs, who
endorsed mixed but not absolute monarchy. Recall that Sidney was educated at Saumur, the famous
Huguenot academy near Paris, when his father served as ambassador to France. Sidney stated in a letter to
a friend, written while in exile in Italy, that “no man shall be a more faithful servant to [the king] than I, if he
make the good and prosperity of his people his glory; none more his enemy, if he doth the contrary.”486 He
said the same thing in Discourses, viz., regardless of the type of government – “one, a few, or many” or one
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Robert Shephard, “The Political Commonplace Books of Sir Robert Sidney,” Sidney Journal, Vol. 21, No. 1
(2003) pp. 1-30, 22-26.
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Id, p. 25.
“Introduction,” The Library of the Sidneys of Penshurst Place circa 1665, p. 26.
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Johann Carison’s Chronicle was one of Leicester’s favorite works and one he often cited, and it was edited
and, indeed, “rewritten … to make it his own,” by Melanchthon. This is an important albeit indirect indicator of
the influence of Melanchthon on Sidney’s thinking, including the necessity of “structuring … human
knowledge in its ethical setting.” Warkentin, “Humanism in Hard Times,” pp. 239, 241-42, 245.
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Sidney to unknown recipient, probably the second half of 1662, Sydney Papers, p. 204.
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body composed of all three – the same obedience is due to the “magistratical power” insofar as rule benefits
the people. But “if they depart from it, no one of them has a better title than the other to our obedience.”487
Sidney repeatedly reaffirmed his willingness to serve the king in the context of the Restoration, e.g., “I
acknowledge that I owe all duty and service unto the king, as to my lawfull soveraigne; and would live as
quietly under his government, as any man within his dominions.488 Again, “Since the Parliament hath
acknowledged a king, I knowe, and acknowledge, I owe him the duty and service that belongs unto a subject,
and will pay it.”489 Sidney clearly believed in the right of a people to select the form of government best suited
to it, including their “right of regulating the power of kings, as well as that of consuls or dictators.”490
Incontrovertibly, monarchy was not ruled out. “I do not by this conclude that all monarchs are vicious men,
but that whoever will set up an absolute power,” in which he has “no other law than his own will, … must do it
by these means,” viz., “there is no villainy that men of profligate lives, lost reputation, and desperate fortunes
will not undertake,” referring to those dependent on the absolute monarch, who carry out his “vicious”
wishes.491 But Sidney could not endorse kingly rule if it was not qualified; in short, a constitutional monarchy.
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DCG, III.12.386.
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Sidney to Leicester, July 28, 1660, Sydney Papers, p. 189.
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Sidney to Leicester, May 28, 1660, id, p. 186.
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Earlier in the Discourses Sidney similarly stated, “’Tis hard to comprehend how one man can come to be
master of many, equal to himself in right, unless it be by consent or by force. If by consent, we are at an end
of our controversies: Governments, and the magistrates that execute them, are created by man. They who
give a being to them, cannot but have a right of regulating, limiting and directing them as best pleaseth
themselves.” DCG, I.11.32, III.221.445. In Plato Redivivus, Neville said almost the same thing. “Which of the
governments now extant, or that have been formerly, was first, is not possible now to be known: but I think
this must be taken for granted, that whatsoever the frame or constitution was first, it was made by the
persuasion and mediation of some wise and virtuous person, and consented to by the whole number. And
then, that it was instituted for the good and preservation of the governed; and not for the exaltation and
greatness of the person or persons appointed to govern.” He elaborated: “The reason why I beg this
concession is, that it seems very improbable, not to say impossible, that a vast number of people should ever
be brought to consent to put themselves under the power of others, but for the ends above-said, and so lose
their liberty without advantaging themselves in any thing. And it is full as impossible that any person (or
persons so inconsiderable in number as magistrates and rulers are) should by force get an empire to themselves. Neville, Plato Redivivus, p. 85. These views was far from original; Cicero stood behind them: “Nevertheless, in monarchies the rest of the populace plays too small a part in the community’s legislation and
debate; in aristocracies the masses can have hardly any share in liberty, since they are deprived of any
participation in discussion and decisionmaking; and when the government is carried on entirely by the people
(however moderate and orderly) their equality is itself unequal, since it acknowledges no degree of merit.
…That is why, in my view, a fourth kind of government is to be judged the best; that is, a carefully proportioned mixture of the first three described above.” Cicero, The Republic and The Laws, The Republic, Book One,
¶¶43-45, pp. 20-21.
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Similarly, in the 1681 pamphlet A Just and Modest Vindication, the author(s), most likely Sidney and Jones,
stated: “Parliaments were ordain’d to prevent such mischiefs as they design’d. …To unite the King unto his
People, and the Hearts of the People unto the King: To keep the Regal Authority within the bounds of Law,
and persuade his Majesty to direct it to the publick good which the Law intends.”492 Such a monarchy was
termed, “the legal Monarchy.”493 Without the right to regulate the power of the king, an absolute monarchy
was created; and perforce, tyranny.494 “The authority, right and power of these must be regulated by the
judgment, right and power of those who appoint them.”495
Sidney was clear that untrammeled power in a monarch, which was the consequence of the inability to
regulate the power of a king, constituted absolute monarchy; and absolute monarchy deprived the citizenry of
its freedom. This principle is well illustrated by “an infinite number of the most detestable villains that the world
has ever produced, ” e.g., Agathocles, Dionysius, Phalaris, Phaereus, Pisistratus, Nabis, and Machanidas.496
On a separate note, this is a juncture at which the authenticity of Court Maxims is particularly important
because in portions of that text the author explicitly stated that monarchy in toto is inconsistent with a
republican form of governance.497 This view is irreconcilable with Sidney’s many express statements to the
contrary in Discourses. It is inconsistent with A Just and Modest Vindication. It is also inconsistent with
Sidney’s indirect statements, such as the production of Julius Caesar in which he mocked Cromwell to the
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A Just and Modest Vindication, p. 45.
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Id. Cf. the seemingly self-contradictory statement by historian Tim Harris in Rebellion: Britain’s First Stuart
Kings, 1567-1642 (Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 494, that, “Most would agree that the English were not
looking to orchestrate a revolution, that they were not conspiring long in advance fundamentally to restructure
the political set-up in England: they believed not only in monarchy but in divine-right monarchy, and even that
the king’s authority was absolute, albeit at the same time limited by law.” See also id, Ch. 1, pp. 11-41, “How
to Reigne Well.”
494
Grotius is more opaque than Sidney on this issue. He suggested that any form of government is
permissible as long as it conforms to the Will of those who conferred sovereignty, which seems to suggest
that he could be comfortable with absolute monarchy. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Vol. I, Bk I, Ch.
III, §§ VIII, XVII, pp. 115, 130, www.oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1425 (10-28-14). But as Tuck explained, there
were other considerations at work in Grotius, including the fact that he viewed the form of governance as
superficial and other factors as more important, such as that sovereignty need not be perpetual, and also that
it could be divided. Tuck, “Grotius and Selden,” The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, Ch.
17, pp. 499-529, 520.
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See Charnoff, “A Second Look at the Question of Who Authored Court Maxims.”
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great embarrassment of his older brother, who was an ardent Cromwell crony.498 Consistently Sidney rejected
the absolute rule of one; he did not, however, reject monarchy.
Indisputably, unequivocal rejection of absolute monarchy is one element of early modern English
republicanism.
It is lawful, and hath been held so through all ages, for any, who have the power,
to call to account a tyrant, or wicked king; and after due conviction, to depose,
and put him to death; if the ordinary magistrate have neglected, or denied to do it.
John Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates 499
Why should it not therefore be as lawful for a People that are at their own Disposal, to deliver up themselves to
any one or more Persons, and transfer the Right of governing them
upon him or them, without reserving any Share of that Right to themselves?
Hugo Grotius, On the Right of War and Peace 500

2. The right of resistance
Absolute monarchy was slavery; God made men to be free; therefore men were entitled to fight for
their freedom. “For every man has a right of resisting some way or other that which ought not to be done to
him.” Sidney affirmed this point repeatedly throughout Discourses. For example, in discussing “all those who
by force or fraud usurped” the Roman Republic, e.g., Marius, Sulla, Catiline, Juiius and Octavius Caesar,
Sidney described some of the Roman emperors’ misdeeds, and then declared: “Such as commit them, are
not to be looked upon as fathers; but as the most mortal enemies of their respective countries. ...No
obedience can be due to him or them.” Analyzing the fundamentally flawed nature of hereditary monarchy,
Sidney asserted, “That which is originally unjust may be justly overthrown.”501
The right of resistance was fundamental to seventeenth-century English republicanism. Milton, for
example, wrote a treatise to justify the execution of Charles I. Ludlow’s A Voyce from the Watchtower is
similarly dedicated to this purpose. Milton’s task in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates was to prove that, “it
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See Cartwright, Sacharessa, pp. 140-42. Scott thought that the story of this play’s performance at
Penshurst was a myth; as previously discussed, there is reason to believe it took place. See Ch. One.
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Editions, Proquest Reprint, 2010), p. 1.
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is lawful, and hath been held so through all ages, for any who have the power, to call to account a tyrant, or
wicked king; and after due conviction, to depose, and put him to death; if the ordinary magistrate have
neglected, or denied to do it.”502 According to one scholar, Locke agreed that there was a right of resistance;
but his was a much more reluctant and collective right. “Although ‘private Men’ have rights to self-defense and
reparations against unjust governments and societies, their mere possession of these rights ‘will not easily
ingage them in a Contest, wherein they are sure to perish’ against clearly superior numbers and forces. …
Whereas individuals and peoples alike possess rights to resist illegitimacy, the right to revolution strictly
conceived – to alter or to abolish and reconstitute government – is effectively a societal right, for Locke, not
an individual right.” On the other hand, government need not respect this right, for “commonwealths do not
and need not permit their own dominions to be ‘dismembered.’”503 The author of the First Dialogue of Court
Maxims stated that if men “find that, instead of all these advantages, they receive as many prejudices; and
that having a king, they want all those things for which they desired him; nothing is more reasonable than that
they should repent of their choice and endeavour to unmake what they have made.”504 One can here
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Milton utilized quotations from “true ministers of the protestant doctrine,” among others, to support his
thesis in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates. Vane seemed to be alluding to the same thing in A Healing
Question, albeit in a much more obscure fashion. Vane said that the issue that “the whole body of honest
men” are interested in is, “what which makes all sound and safe at the root, and gives the right ballance
necessary to be held up between soveraignity and subjection.” The answer was “the use of the sword” to
promote and uphold public safety and welfare, “in preference and if need be in opposition unto any of the
parts.” Who gets to use the sword is not clear. A Healing Question, p. 15.
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Peter C. Myers, “Locke on the Social Compact: An Overview,” The American Founding and the Social
Compact, Ronald J. Pestritto and Thomas G. West, eds. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003), pp. 1-35, 23
& n.32, citing Locke’s “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, §§II.208, 176, 114-17; see also Franklin, “Locke on
the Dissolution of Society,” Politics, Ideology and the law in Early Modern Europe, pp. 175-84. Cf. Richard
Flathman, “Liberalism and the Suspect Enterprise of Political Institutionalization: The Case of the Rule of
Law,” The Rule of Law: Nomos XXXVI, Ian Shapiro, ed. (New York & London: New York University Press,
1994), pp. 297-327, 320 (If we want to protect liberal values, which Locke presumably did, we must “join the
company of theorists who, while respecting the rule of law as a sometimes valuable institutional idea and
device, nevertheless takes a less than celebratory stance toward it. It is especially easy to agree with the
view of H. L. A. Hart and of proponents of civil disobedience that the fact that a rule is a law is anything but a
conclusive reason for obeying it. …[T]he presence of citizens ready and willing to disobey law, however good
its credentials by rule of law standards, is a necessary condition of realizing the liberal ideals.”)
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Court Maxims, First Dialogue, p. 7. There are many more examples throughout Court Maxims of
statements expressly or implicitly recognizing the right of resistance:
–

Second Dialogue: “if it appears that another government does more conduce to their good than that of
kings, they may choose some other form of government from which they may expect more happiness.” Id,
p. 11.

–

Fourth Dialogue: “in the above-mentioned case of Israel’s kings, I shall show that the elders and people
when they pleased exercised their due power above that of kings (1 Samuel 14).” Id, p. 63.
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distinguish Tyrrell, for it was not until after the invasion of William and Mary that he was willing to endorse the
right of resistance.505 Harrington is even further afield. For Harrington, there was no right of resistance in a
free republic; “‘perfect liberty’ proscribed it.”506
The right to resist had roots that were much deeper than early modern English republicanism. Forms
of government other than absolute monarchy also could be resisted; but there was likely to be a means of
redress within a system that included a safety valve to avoid the necessity to forcibly resist. This was absent
in an absolute monarchy. In discussing Filmer’s analysis of the tacit consent of the people to their governor,
Sidney observed, “evident marks of dissent are often given: Some declare their hatred; others murmur more
privately; many oppose the governour or government, and succeed according to their strength, virtue or
fortune. Many would resist, but cannot.” In short, oppression was not consent. “[T]hose who are under such

–

The author of the Seventh Dialogue stated, “kings are not to be obeyed when they command anything
contrary to the command of God, that is, contrary to justice, piety, charity, or truth, which God
commands.” Id, p. 85.

–

Eighth Dialogue: “I take it to be a clear, universal truth that in injuste vim inferenti vis justa opponenda
est,” or “against force that is unjustly imposed just force has to be opposed.” Id, p. 101 and n. 254.

–

Ninth Dialogue: “It is essentially necessary to all true magistracy that it intend the good of the people.
Those magistrates that perform their duty and office in seeking and procuring this, may justly be called
fathers and shepherds. But maintaining an interest contrary to that of the people that entrusted them,
they become enemies of that people and ought no longer to be looked upon as fathers or shepherds,
which are titles of love and sweetness, but thieves, wolves, tyrants, the worst of all enemies.” Id, p. 149.

–

Most dramatically, in the Twelfth Dialogue: “In fine, the king seeking the ruin of the English trade and
people, and the ruin of the Holland commonwealth, these two nations may see their joint interest against
him and Orange, and unite in counsels and action; joining their hands, hearts, and heads to extirpate the
two detested families of Stuart and Orange, who, like serpents, as soon as they recover a little vigour,
tear out the bowel of them that cherished them. The opposition between us and them, their concernment
and ours, is universal and irreconcilable. Their safety is our destruction, our safety is their destruction.”
Id, p. 176.
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In Patriarcha non Monarcha, Tyrrell stated, “and though some men either by their own fault, and the
carelesness, or prodigality of their Ancestors, may perhaps be now under such Circumstances by reason of
their poverty, as that civil Government may appear inconvient for them, and the Property now establsht
contrary to their interests, as having perhaps little share either in lands, or goods, he is not therefore at liberty
to resist the Government, and to change the course of this property already establisht; and this is by the laws
of nature, without any Divine revelation: since no man can disturb the general Peace of humane society for
his own private advantage or security, without transgressing the natural laws of God.” Tyrrell, Patriarcha non
Monarcha, Ch. 4, p. 80; see Julia Rudolph, Revolution by Degrees: James Tyrrell and Whig Political Thought
in the Late Seventeenth Century (Hamp-shire, UK & New York: 2002), p. 62.
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Vallance, “Harrington, Petitioning, and the Construction of Public Opinion,” Ch. 7, Perspectives on English
Revolutionary Republicanism, Ch. 7, p. 125 n.27; Jonathan Scott, “James Harrington’s prescription for healing
and settling,” Michael J. Braddick & David L. Smith, eds., The Experience of Revolution in Stuart Britain and
Ireland (Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 190-210, 206.
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governments do no more assent to them, tho they may be silent, than a man approves of being robbed,
when, without saying a word, he delivers his purse to a thief that he knows to be too strong for him.”507
A major source of Sidney’s resistance theory was the work of the French Huguenot theorists,
particularly Mornay, Hotman and Languet who, like Sidney, were political practitioners and theorists; they
were also intimates of the Sidney/Percy family. Mornay and Languet were close friends of Sir Philip Sidney,
and Hotman had been a good friend of Philip’s brother and Sidney’s grandfather, the 1st Earl of Leicester.
Scholars have debated whether the monarchomachs rejected monarchy, as well as their views on precisely
who had the right to resist a tyrannical monarch. The author(s) of the anonymous monarchomach tract
Vindicaie maintained that the people vested inferior magistrates individually with the authority to contract with
a king, and the people therefore had the right to resist the monarch through their inferior magistrates if the
king overturned the law and the Church of God. After all, the Vindicaie argued, monarchs were “servants to
the public.”508 (Note, however, as scholars have emphasized, that the authors of the Vindicaie were not
endorsing a wholesale right of resistance by the populace; rather, they “placed safeguards” on this right in
order to avoid anarchy.509) “Medieval resistance theory is sophisticated when defining tyrant, and bold when
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See [Philippe de Plessis Mornay], Vindiciae, contra tyrannos: or, concerning the legitimate power of a
prince over the people, and of the people over a prince, George Garnett, ed. & trans. (Cambridge University
Press, 1994). Languet and his student Philip Sidney are also known as Melanchthonians or Philippists
because of their study and affirmation of the work of the sixteenth-century tolerant Protestant Philip
Melanchthon, who was extremely influential in the thinking of continental and English Protestants.
“Melanchthon exemplifies the practice and to some extent the content of that overused term ‘Christian
humanism,’” meaning a “rational devotion to classical texts and their dissemination,” and a philosophy or
ethos that stresses human agency in Christian life. Accordingly, Melanchtonian advocacy also embraced a
“moderate, but active international Protestantism.” Carol Kaske, Review, “Robert Stillman. Philip Sidney and
the Poetics of Renaissance Cosmopolitanism,” Sidney Journal 27:1 (2009), pp. 62-70, 63; see Andrew
Strycharski, “Pedagogical Affect in the Early Sidney-Languet Correspondence,” Sidney Journal 28.1 (2010),
pp. 25-51, 28; Kees Meerhoff, “Melanchthon, Latomus, Ramus: Teachers of Careful Reading,” Challenging
Humanism: Essays in Honor of Dominic Baker-Smith, Ton Hoenselaars & Arthur F. Kinney, eds. (Newark:
University of Delaware Press, 2005), pp. 90-107. Discussed in the context of Philip Sidney, Kaske’s article is
suggestive of John Locke’s religious predilections: how “one could be militantly anti-Catholic yet be tolerant of
every other form of religious observance, and even of some individual Catholics.” Melanchthon respected
Catholics, other than the Roman Catholic hierarchy “and their Valois agents.” Languet and Mornay “regularly
cultivated friendships with distinguished Catholics.” Kaske, “Robert Stillman,” pp. 63-64. Sidney and his
father were far more tolerant, including of both individual Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. See Ch. One
on Sidney’s religious non-discrimination, Ch. Two on Locke’s views on Catholics, and Ch. Four on toleration.
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Garnett, “Law in the ‘Vindiciae, contra tyrannos’: A Vindication,” p. 888. On the theory of the right to resist,
see Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. II (Cambridge University Press,
1978), Chs. 7, 8 & 9, “The duty to resist,” “The context of the Huguenot revolution,” and “The right to resist,”
pp. 189-348.
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declaring the general right to resist it; but it usually stops short of specifying the persons who could act
against an erstwhile legitimate ruler.”510 In general, during the Middle Ages if anyone was identified as a
legitimate resister it was the Holy Roman Emperor and/or the Pope; but by the sixteenth century, the doctrine
of national sovereignty precluded the notion of a king having external human superiors. The Vindiciae did not
directly answer the question of who had the power to resist a tyrant. The suggestion was that “effective
Optimates,” the Officers of the Crown and Peers, individually had this responsibility; in France, the EstatesGeneral was responsible for lawfully installing a new ruler.511 The radicalism of the Vindiciae stemmed from
this analysis, for the Optimates’ individual responsibility to remove the king raised the spectre of singlehanded
regicide.512 Overall, what is absolutely clear is that these resistance theorists totally rejected absolute
monarchy while comfortably embracing mixed monarchy. As for who had the right to resist, Languet and
Mornay were cautious; they did not throw open the doors to a broad-based right of resistance. At the same
time, emphasis was placed on the responsibility vested by the people in their lower magistrates, both
collectively and individually, to overthrow a tyrannical king.513
In juxtaposition to the medieval right-to-resistance theorists and the sixteenth-century monarchomach
Huguenots, the English seventeenth-century defenders of absolute monarchy also analyzed the issue of the
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Ralph E. Giesey, “The Monarchomach Triumvirs: Hotman, Beza and Mornay,” Bibliothèque d’Humanisme
et Renaissance, T. 32, No. 1 (1970), p. 41-56, 45. As indicated in our Introduction, well before the
monarchomachs, the twelfth-century English Dominican John of Salisbury toyed with the idea of dethroning a
corrupt and therefore delegitimized authority, viz., the pope. Note, too, that in addition to the French monarchomachs, the sixteenth-century Scot George Buchanan is often included in the monarchomach group, and
Sidney quoted or referred to Buchanan a number of times in Discourses. Not surprisingly, there were
Scotsmen who vigorously opposed Buchanan, including the jurists Adam Blackwood and William Barclay, and
the “amateur,” Ninian Winzet, all of whom challenged the monarchomach assertion that the people had a right
to challenge the authority of the king. Barclay, in his De regno published in 1600, referred to Bodin, Hotman,
and Bellarmine among others. See historian J. H. Burns, “George Buchanan and the anti-monarchomachs,”
Political discourse in early modern Britain, Nicholas Phillipson & Quentin Skinner, eds. (Cambridge University
Press, 2011), Ch. 1, pp. 3-22. On Barclay’s De regno references, see id, p. 18 n.53. Blackwood and Barclay
are in the Sidney Library. Burns emphasized that in Two Treatises Locke specifically challenged some of the
ambiguities in Barclay’s work; he does not mention that Sidney acknowledged and then dismissed them.
511

Giesey, “The Monarchomach Triumvirs: Hotman, Beza and Mornay,” p. 47 n.13.
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For the most part the monarchomachs were tackling the challenging question of what to do when a
legitimate monarch became a tyrant. For them the decision was easy when you either had a monarch who
obtained power illegitimately, or when a king sought to force people to act inconsistently with their religious
beliefs. In these circumstances it was clear that people had a right to resist. The much more complicated
issue, and the core of resistance theory including the issue of interest for Sidney, was the entitlement to resist
on purely secular, i.e., political, grounds. Id, p. 45 & n.8.
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right of resistance, of course rejecting it, often in the context of religion. In general, the majority view among
these theorists, such as Jaspar Mayne and others, was that religion entitled men to freedom of conscience –
control over one’s “inner” world – but not the right to resist political authority – control over one’s “outer,”
political world. In Ochlo-machia: Or, The People’s War, Examined According to the Principles of Scripture &
Reason, published in 1647 at the most acute period in the last desperate efforts, post-Civil War, to reach
some sort of resolution with the King, Mayne argued, “The subject could never forcibly resist the prince; but
equally, he could never be made to believe anything by the prince, and was entitled in religious matters to
resort to passive obedience.” As to the king, he held “’a Jus or power … unquestionable by the Subject, to
doe if he pleased things unlawfull.’” What bound the king was the coronation oath, to which he was legally
bound by the oath that he had given to God. But neither civil nor religious law could control men’s minds. As
Mayne avowed, it “would be unreasonable to make Warre upon mens persons for the reception of a Doctrine
which cannot convince their minds.” Many of these royalists rejected the idea that political authorities could
force religious beliefs on people, viz., a recognition of man’s entitlement to liberty of conscience, almost (but
not entirely) regardless of the error of one’s beliefs; adoption of this view, in turn, could lead to a “grudging”
toleration of religious diversity. Consistency required this outcome in order to preserve the dichotomy
between inner and outer sanctums, and intimidating efforts to affect the former intruded upon “the sacred
prerogatives of God.” At the same time, Mayne rejected Grotius’ view that a Christian kingdom was entitled to
go to war against “a nation of atheists” in order to “banish them out of the World.”514 One has the impression
of a full circle here, with the most extreme views on the right and left converging; for both the democratic
Levellers and the absolute monarchists “readily” adopted a theory of liberty of conscience that was “rooted in
a strong sense of God’s sovereignty over the human soul.”515
Republican theorists, on the other hand, like the monarchomachs, were interested in going beyond
the issue of religious liberty to address the matter of political freedom. While Sidney was well aware of the
matter of religious liberty, his focus was on the political, even in the context of the French Huguenots’s right to
rebel. “[I]t is not by their own consent they are deprived of all honors and offices in the [French]
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Jaspar Mayne, Ochlo-machia: Or, The People’s War, Examined According to the Principles of Scripture &
Reason (Oxford, 1647), quoted in Burgess, “Royalism and Liberty of Conscience in the English Revolution,”
Morrow and Scott, eds., Liberty, Authority, Formality, p. 20.
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commonwealth, even of those, which by a corrupt custom that had gained the force of a law, they had dearly
bought; prohibited to exercise any trade; exposed to the utmost effects of fraud and violence, if they refused
to adore their master’s idols.” The consequence was mass flight. “They will tell him, that ‘tis not willingly they
leave their lands and estates to seek a shelter in the most remote parts of the world; but because they are
under a force which they are not able to resist; and because one part of the nation, which is enriched with the
spoils of the other, have foolishly contributed to lay a yoke upon them which they cannot break.”516
In addition to resisting authority that encroached on one’s religious conscience, republicans also
believed that men neither deserved nor were required to subject themselves to a tyrannical government. In
contrast to Mayne, Sidney cited Grotius for the proposition that when power is shared between the king and
the senate or the people, “just force can be used against a king who encroaches upon the part which is not
his own”; for “when power is given the right of protecting that power is given.517 Nevertheless, many of these
thinkers were fearful of opening Pandora’s Box. If there was a right of resistance, who decided when that
right was properly exercised and when it was not? Who decided who was entitled to exercise that right, and
who was not? Would it be inviting anarchy to recognize such a right? What about the right to rebel against
something less than absolute monarchy; can another form of government be tyrannical? These ideas were
explored by the early modern republicans.518
Unsurprisingly given the deep-seated family connection, Sidney relied on the resistance theory of the
monarchomachs. He discussed Hotman’s ideas, for example, describing the Frenchman as a lawyer “famous
for his learning, judgment and integrity.” Having “diligently examin’d the ancient laws and histories of that
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Locke described how a magistrate who attempted to take away a person’s freedom and thereby enslave
him “puts himself into a state of war” with that person, who then is entitled to “destroy a man who makes war
upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion;
because such men are not under the ties of the common-law of reason, have no other rule, but that of force
and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey.” Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, Ch. III, “Of
the State of War,” §§16-21, pp. 278-82. In contrast, Harrington sought to create a utopian society in which
men were not entitled to resist. This led to the controversial issue of standing armies – whether they were
harmful to government or advantageous. Harrington “proposed by authority of the senate to you, my lords the
people of Oceana: …That the lord Archon have a standing army of twelve thousand men, defrayed upon a
monthly tax, during the term of three years, for the protection of this commonwealth against dissenting
parties; to be governed, directed, and commanded by and with the advice of the council of war, according to
the orders of this commonwealth.” Harrington, Oceana, “The Corollary,” p. 251 (emphasis added). Halifax
went the other way, as did Sidney, opposing standing armies.
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kingdom,” Hotman “distinctly proves that the French nation never had any kings but of their own chusing; that
their kings had no power except what was conferr’d upon them; and that they had been removed, when they
excessively abused, or rendered themselves unworthy of that trust.”519 It is important to recognize that much
of the theory of the monarchomachs, e.g., in the Vindiciae, is grounded on centuries of Roman law.520 When
the Roman Empire collapsed after Rome was sacked in 410 AD, as jurisprudence scholar Paolo Grossi
euphemistically put it, political power was “incomplete.” Laws were therefore necessary to control society.
Nevertheless, “The totalizing and all-encompassing mentality that is the distinguishing feature of the princes
of modernity is absent.”521 The medieval period was the golden age in the study of law and jurisprudence.
During that time, Germanic customary law was introduced into the West, Catholic canon law matured, Roman
law reestablished itself, and the tradition of Engish common law was born.522 We will address Sidney’s direct
reliance on multiple layers of law; but here there is an added secondary reliance on law in Sidney and other
republicans’ extensive discussion of the right of resistance.
Sidney entitled a section of Discourses, “The general revolt of a Nation cannot be called a Rebellion”;
this is a theme that pervades his treatise.523 Sidney placed his confidence in the judgment of the people, who
would not join in a revolt other than in exceptionally adverse circumstances. Accordingly, the efficacy of a
regime was dependent on its acceptance by the people. This meant that, “Rebellion is not always evil.” For
rebellion suggested illegitimacy and Sidney (intentionally or unintentionally) was challenging the
monarchomachs’ acknowledgement that the people do not have the power to act against a legitimate king.524
Sidney circumvented the issue by arguing that a tyrant loses his legitimacy. Analyzing the meaning of the
word “rebellion,” he asserted, “The word is taken from the Latin rebellare, which signifies no more than to
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Giesey, “The Monarchomach Triumvirs: Hotman, Beza and Mornay,” p. 45.
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renew a war.” But the “whole body of the people” cannot renew war against itself; by definition, this makes no
sense. Thus, if the people believed that the king was a tyrant, they had no obligation to remain loyal to him.
For the people were not “subject to the commands of the magistrate” whose authority originated in them;
rather, “he is by and for the people, and the people is neither by nor for him.” This was not rebellion. Indeed,
“there can be no such thing in the world as the rebellion of a nation against its own magistrates,” for the
“whole body of the people … cannot be said to revolt or rebel against them to whom they owe no more than
seems good to themselves, and who are nothing of or by themselves, more than other men.” People were
entitled to take action “vindicating their own laws and liberties against a prince who violates them.”525 As
Sidney metaphorically explained, “A flock cannot subsist under a shepherd that seeks its ruin, nor a people
under an unfaithful magistrate. ....[H]e that sets himself to destroy his flock, is a wolf. His authority is
incompatible with their subsistence.”526
Accordingly, “if it be natural for the multitude to chuse their governors, or to govern, or to participate of
the government as best pleases themselves … what can be thought of that damnable conclusion, which has
been made by fools or knaves, that the multitude may not, if need be, correct or depose their own
magistrates? Surely the unnaturalness and injustice of such a position cannot be sufficiently expressed.”527 A
contrary view would make it “impossible to check the fury of a corrupt and perfidious magistrate: The worst of
men would be raised to a height that was never deserved by the best.”528 Filmer and others who shared his
views, said Sidney, condemned all seditions, tumults and wars, even those that might have been undertaken
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DCG, III.36.519-23.
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Id, II.24.224.
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Id, III.33.510. Once again, Sidney (like Machiavelli) turned to Livy to illustrate the merits of his thesis. “The
Privernates had been more than once subdued by the Romans, and had as often rebelled. Their city was at
last taken by Plautius the consul, after their leader Vitruvius and great numbers of their senate and people
had been kill’d.” Having been defeated, the Privernates, “reduced to a low condition, … sent ambassadors to
Rome to desire peace.” There, “a senator asked them what punishment they deserved,” to which one
ambassador replied, “The same which they deserve who think themselves worthy of liberty. The consul then
demanded, what kind of peace would be expected from them, if the punishment should be remitted: The
ambassador answer’d, If the terms you give be good, the peace will be observed by us faithfully and
perpetually; if bad it will soon be broken. And tho some were offended with the ferocity of the answer; yet the
best part of the senate approved it as worthy of a man and a freeman; and confessing that no man or nation
would continue under an uneasy condition longer than they were compell’d by force, said They only were fit to
be made Romans, who thought nothing valuable but liberty. Upon which they were all made citizens of
Rome, and obtained whatsoever they had desired. DCG, III.36.520.
528

Id, II.32.309-310.
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against Caligula and Nero, who respectively “wish’d the people had but one neck, that he might cut it off at a
blow” and set Rome to fire. Per Sidney, Filmer maintained, “They must either be suffer’d to continue in the
free exercise of their rage, that is, to do all the mischief they design; or must be restrain’d by a legal, judicial
or extra-judicial way; and they who disallow the extra-judicial, do as little like the judicial.” The idea of bringing
such a magistrate before a tribunal was unacceptable for, as Filmer stated, “They will … depose their kings.”
Sidney’s riposte: “Why should they not be deposed, if they become enemies to their people”?529
Not surprisingly, Sidney relied on the historical example of the Low Countries to prove his point. In
what could be viewed as a veiled threat to Charles II, Sidney proclaimed, “If the king of Spain desired to keep
his subjects, he should have governed them with more justice and mercy; when contrary unto all laws both
human and divine, he seeks to destroy those he ought to have preserved, he can blame none but himself, if
they deliver themselves from his tyranny.”530 Filmer argued that the Protestants of the Low Countries “ought
to have suffered” and not resisted the King of Spain, who lost the Low Countries: “they ought not to have
been judges in their own case.” Sidney disagreed. “[B]y resisting they laid the foundation of many churches,
that have produced multitudes of men, eminent in gifts and graces; and established a most glorious and
happy commonwealth, that hath been since its first beginning, the strongest pillar of the Protestant cause,
now in the world, and a place of refuge unto those who in all parts of Europe have been oppressed for the
name of Christ.”531 If the term “sedition” implies evil, “it ought not to be applied to those who seek nothing but
that which is just.”532
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DCG, II.24.226.
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Id, II.32.315. Indeed, Sidney goes into an erudite exposition of various tyrannies, including the Spanish
Catholic oppression of the Dutch Protestants, and their right to resist their oppressors. “When pride had
changed Nebuchadnezzar into a beast, what should persuade the Assyrians not to drive him out amongst
beasts, until God had restored unto him the heart of a man? When Tarquin had turned the legal monarchy of
Rome into a most abominable tyranny, why should they not abolish it?” Turning to much closer to his own
time, Sidney continued, “And when the Protestants of the Low-Countries were so grievously oppressed by
the power of Spain, under the proud, cruel and savage conduct of the duke of Alva, why should they not make
use of all the means that God had put into their hands for their deliverance?” Sidney’s “bottom line”: “Let any
man who sees the present state of the provinces that then united themselves, judge whether it is better for
them to be as they are, or in the condition unto which his fury would have reduced them, unless they had, to
please him, renounced God and their religion.” Id, II.24.227, II.32.315.
531

As to being judges in their own case, “it is plain, they ought to be the only judges, because it is their own,
and only concerns themselves.” DCG, II.32.316.
532
Id, II.24.227. Halifax echoed Sidney’s emphasis on the critical importance of justice: “Our Government is in
a just proportion, no tympany, no unnatural swelling either of power or liberty; and whereas in all overgrown
monarchies reason, learning and enquiry are banished and hanged in effigy for mutineers, here they are
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Beyond the entitlement of a nation to rise up, for Sidney the right to rebel was an individual right. “But
if kings, like those of Israel, will neither judge nor be judged, and there be no power orderly to redress private
or publick injuries, every man has recourse to force, as if he liv’d in a wood where there is no law; and that
force is always mortal to those who provoke it.”533 Locke was less clear, but seems to have effectively said
the same thing.534 The echo of Philip Sidney’s egalitarianism is evident. The thirsty man was not a nobleman;
he was every man. Sidney was unequivocal; the right to rebel was both a collective and an individual right.
Citing the example of Saul and David, Sidney explained that while Saul was chosen by lot by the people, and
placed on the throne “by the general consent of the whole nation,” when he became a tyrannical despot,
“disobeying the word of the prophet, slaying the priests, sparing the Amalekites, and oppressing the
innocent,” Saul “overthrew his own right.” Saul’s entitlement to rule was nullified by his own despotism.
Again, a tyrant loses his legitimacy. “This did not only give a right to the whole people of opposing him, but to
every particular man.” Accordingly, the champion of everyman, David, “did not only fly from his fury, but
resisted it.” Indeed, said Sidney, “every man might kill a tyrant; and no names are recorded in history with
more honour, than of those who did it.”535

In Elizabeth’s reign therefore apologists defined
the “commonwealth” in a new way, as the “mixed monarchy.”
Anne McLaren, “Reading Sir Thomas Smith’s De Republica Anglorum as Protestant Apologetic”536

b. The Nature of “Mixed” Government

encouraged and cherished as the surest friends to a government established upon the foundation of law and
justice.” “The Character of a Trimmer” Halifax: Complete Works, p. 63.
533

DCG, II.30.297 (emphasis added).

534

In his Second Treatise Locke explained how one of the two powers that a man has in the state of nature is
the power to protect himself by punishing those who commit crimes against the law of nature. As he famously
stated, “When a King has Dethron’d himself, and put himself in a state of War with his People, what shall hinder
them from prosecuting him who is no King?” As for “Who shall be Judge”?, Locke said, “The People.” The
power that each individual gave up when he entered into the society did not revert to the individual unless the
society dissolved. It need not do so. The People of the Community could resist a tyrannical King. Alternatively, the Government was “forfeited,” and individuals returned to the rights that they had before the entered
into the social contract. Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, Ch. IX, §§ 128-130 & Ch. XIX, §§239-243.
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DCG, II.24.221, III.1.330.
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Anne McLaren, “Reading Sir Thomas Smith’s De Republica Anglorum as Protestant Apologetic,” The
Historical Journal, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Dec. 1999), pp. 911-99, 913.
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While Sidney did not mandate a particular form of governance and, indeed, such non-mandating was
an essential component of his republicanism, this does not mean that he did not personally prefer a particular
form of government. Sidney subscribed to a so-called “mixed” form of government, a government that
contains elements of all three simple species.537 For this reason, mixed government often was also termed
mixed monarchy.538 The “variety of forms between mere democracy and absolute monarchy is almost
infinite,” Sidney observed. Accordingly, a people’s choice was virtually unlimited; if a democracy was
unsuitable, “this no way obliges men to run into the other extreme.”539
Mixed government was often characterized as the essential balancing feature necessary to create a
“good” ruling structure (and as it will become clear, Sidney recognized other important ways in which balance
supported and protected good governance).540 Because power corrupts, as was well appreciated by theorists
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Tyrrell’s take on monarchy is a little more confusing, but appears to be quite consistent with Sidney’s view.
On the one hand, at the beginning of Patriarcha non Monarcha, Tyrrell wrote, “I desire to be thought no other
than what I really am, a zealous assertor and defender of the Government establisht by Law; being so far
from a Commonwealthsman, that for my own part I reverence Monarchy above all other forms of Government.” But then Tyrrell stated that he “should be as willing to have it unmixt (it being that by which God
Almighty governs the Universe) could humane nature be long trusted with it, and could we be as certain that
his Vicegerents on Earth would as easily imitate those divine Attributes of wisdom and goodness, as they are
prone to lay claim to his absolute Power.” But this is anything but an endorsement of absolute monarchy,
particularly having defined the necessary government as one “establisht by Law.” In finding that, “the Government of this Nation, as now establisht, I conceive the best in its kind, as most equal and beneficial both to the
Prince and People,” Tyrrell was advocating mixed monarchy because of the vital role given to Parliament.
Indeed, he expressly did so later in the text: “I hope I may be able to shew that this Doctrine of a limited
Monarchy is not but of Yesterday, as our Author [Filmer] will have it: But that all the learned men in the laws
and constitutions of these Northern Kingdoms, have held it to be no such damnable Doctrine, but that the
contrary would introduce all Tyranny, and Arbitrary Government among them.” Put more poetically, “Thus
some men think Musk, and Ambergreece mixt whith other Ingredients makes an agreeable Perfume, which if
held to their noses in the Cod, or whole Lump, they are so far from thinking a good smell, that they loath it.”
Tyrrell, Patriarcha non monarcha, pp. 6-7, 89.
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While mixed monarchy generally referred to the combining of elements of monarchy, aristocracy and
democracy, Harrington and Nedham dropped the first element and “sought to harmonize the claims of the few
with those of the many.” Worden, “Marchamont Nedham and English Republicanism,” p. 68; cf. John Adams,
“Letter VI. “The right Constitution of a Commonwealth, examined,” A Defence of the Constitutions of
Government of the United States of America, Against the Attack of M. Turgot, Vol. III (Philadelphia, 1797), p.
212 (Nedham was a writer who “felt the necessity of leaving the monarchical and aristocratical orders out of
their schemes of government”).
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DCG, II.16.166.
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As Sandoz averred, the balancing impact of mixed government had ancient roots. “This constitution of
double majesty, of a political people represented in parliament and of a kingship bounded by law … is the
heart of England’s ancient constitution. Its emphasis lies in securing through the consensus of the realm laws
protecting the immemorial liberty of free men, … assuring a balance between parliament and king.” Thus,
Sandoz pointed out, “Fortescue’s account, whatever the differences, is patently indebted to the mixed regime
favored in a range of forms by Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero, and, in a most interesting way, by Thomas Aquinas,
who associates it with the Mosaic commonwealth of ancient Israel. “ Thus, the age-old emphasis on balance
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from ancient times and continuing, one should seek to avoid a monopoly of power; and dividing up the
authority vested in the state, realm, or other jurisdictional entity is the most conspicuous way to achieve
that.541 “But unless the light of reason had been extinguished in him, he might have seen that tho no law
could be made without a supreme power, that supremacy may be in a body consisting of many men, and
several orders of men.” Not that this was the only model. “It it be true, which perhaps may be doubted, that
there have been in the world simple monarchies, aristocracies or democracies legally established, ‘tis certain
that the most part of the governments of the world (and I think all that are or have been good) were mixed.”542
He reiterated, “But the wisest, best, and far the greatest part of mankind, rejecting these simple species, did
form governments mixed or composed of the three.”543 In fact in Sidney’s view, “there never was a good
government in the world, that did not consist of the three simple species of monarchy, aristocracy and
democracy.” Accordingly, the selection of one particular form of government was a mistake.544
In contrast to an absolute monarchy, a mixed monarchy (as well as popular government) was much
less vulnerable to corruption and venality.545 Presumably Sidney would have concluded the same thing to be

in mixed government “foreshadows the mixed and balanced constitution of kings, lords, and commons that
appears full-blown so unexpectedly with Charles I’s Answer to the XIX Propositions of Both Houses of
Parliament in June 1642.” While one can and should dispute Sandoz’ characterization – the “unexpected”
appearance of mixed monarchy – “It remains a cardinal component of constitutional development and theory
from De Laudibus to John Adams’s Defence of the Constitutions and Publis’s Federalist No. 51, not to claim
more.” Sandoz, “Editor’s Introduction,” The Roots of Liberty, pp. 11-12.
541
As we have noted, there is more than one way to “mix.” As we know from Montesquieu’s use of the
concept, “balance of power” does not necessarily equate to mixed government; that is, balance of power is
often intended to refer to a division among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.
But this was not the ancient, medieval, or early modern meaning of the term, which focused instead on Plato
and Aristotle’s forms of governance, viz., monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.
542
DCG, III.21.444. “Pocock has shown that the ‘domesticated’ republicanism of the Restoration was
essentially a doctrine of mixed monarchy which sought to transfer constitutional power from the crown to
parliament.” There are several thoughts packed into this statement, but focusing on just one, the embracing of
mixed monarchy was not a domesticated republicanism; it was republicanism. Even more precisely, while
republicans shared the conviction that the choice of form of government was up to each society to select,
most republicans believed that mixed monarchy likely best promoted and protected republican values,
including participatory governance, balanced government and a stable society. See Mark Goldie, "The Roots
of True Whiggism 1688-1694," History of Political Thought, Vol. I, Issue 2 (1980). Pp. 195-236, 206.
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DCG, I.10.31.
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Id, II.16.166. Recall that scholars disagree as to whether the Monarchomach manifesto, Vindiciae, contra
tyrannos, was a defense of mixed monarchy. See Ch. One.
545
Popular government was a synonym for democracy. Sidney provided many examples. For instance,
citing Tacitus’s Germania, Sidney discusses the Saxon mickelgemote, which was an assembly of all of the
people to discuss matters of importance. Id, II.5.103. Many authors have focused on the accuracy of this
view of Saxon government, but for our purposes it doesn’t matter whether the illustration is accurate; the point
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true, perhaps to a lesser degree, with respect to the other “pure” forms of governance. But in view of Filmer’s
obsession with the merits of absolute monarchy, it was this form of governance that was Sidney’s target. As
he graphically noted, “Whether bawds, whores, thieves, buffoons, parasites, and such vile wretches as are
naturally mercenary, have not more power at Whitehall, Versailles, the Vatican, and the Escurial, than in
Venice, Amsterdam, and Switzerland: Whether H-de, Arl-ng-t-n, D-nby, their Graces of Cleveland and
Portsmouth, S-nd-rl-nd, Jenkins or Chiffinch, could probably have attained such power as they have had
amongst us if it had been disposed by the suffrages of the parliament and people.”546 In fact, one of the
sections of Discourses was subtitled, “Courts are more subject to Venality and Corruption than Popular
Governments.”547 Furthermore, Sidney believed, and subtitled another section, “Mixed and Popular
Governments preserve Peace, and manage Wars, better than Absolute Monarchies.”548 This seemed to be a
matter of ownership for Sidney – a psychological commitment to the state as much as anything – that people
felt when they were involved. “[I]n a popular or mixed government every man is concerned: Every one has a
part according to his quality or merit; all changes are prejudicial to all. ...This makes men generous and
industrious; and fills their hearts with love to their country: This, and the desire of that praise which is the
reward of virtue, raised the Romans above the rest of mankind; and wheresoever the same ways are taken
they will in a great measure have the same effects.”549
Halifax reflected his general republican inclinations when he summarily replicated Sidney’s reasoning
favoring mixed monarchy.550 “That Power and Liberty are like heat and moisture; where they are well mixed,

is that one form of government, recognized by Sidney and since the time of Plato, has been popular or
democratic government.
546

Here Sidney is referencing absolute monarchies versus republics, and men who were prominent and
supportive of monarchy, and arguably absolute monarchy, during the reigns of Charles I and Charles II.
DCG, II.25.258.
547

DCG, II.25.251. This is one of those sections in which Sidney referenced an extraordinary number of
historical examples, including Cornelii, Junii, Fabii, Valerii, Quintii, Curii, Fabricci, Vinius, Laco, Sajanus,
Macro, Narcissus, Pallas, Icetus, Tigellinus, Agrippina, Messalina, Lollia, Poppaea, Rome, Carthage, Athens
and Sparta.
548

Id, II.21.195. This was also a major theme of Machiavelli; Book II of Discorsi is all about how republics can,
and why it is essential that they do, manage wars effectively.
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DCG, II.21.199.
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Since men are natural inclined to self-interest and therefore corruption, said Halifax, “if he whose will and
interest it is to corrupt them, be furnished with the means, he will never fail to do it. Power, honors, riches,
and the pleasures that attend them, are the baits by which men are drawn to prefer a personal interest before
the publick good.” This was decidedly not the purpose of the social contract. “[C]ommon sense teaches, and
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everything prospers; where they are single, they are destructive.”551 In provided a ringing endorsement of
mixed monarchy, Halifax began with his usual panache. “The dispute, which is a great beauty, a Monarchy or
a Commonwealth, hath lasted long between their contending lovers, and they have behaved themselves too
like lovers.” Focusing on his own country Halifax observed, “We in England, by a happy use of the controversy,
conclude them both in the wrong, and reject them from being our pattern, taking the words in the utmost
extent, which is Monarchy, a thing that leaveth men no liberty, and a Commonwealth, such a one as alloweth
them no quiet.” Halifax’s punch line: “We think that a wise mean between these barbarous extremes is that
which self-preservation ought to dictate to our wishes. …We take from one the too great power of doing hurt,
and yet leave enough to govern and protect us; we take from the other the confusion of parity, the animosities
and the license, and yet reserve a due care of such a liberty as may consist with men’s allegiance.”552
In contrast, one of the reasons Marchamont Nedham can be viewed as an atypical rather than a
mainstream republican is in his endorsement of unicameralism, and the consequent determination not to have
a mixed government that constituted a balanced constitution but, rather, place control of decision-making in
the people or their representatives. As Worden, Nedham’s editor, stated, “He impels us to deduce that
England will be truly free and have a true republic only when it has acquired some equivalent to Rome’s
‘necessary’ tribunes and its popular assemblies.”553 In the context of mixed government, Harrington was
atypical in a different way. Harrington’s determination to avoid any political conflict was more than idealistic; it
was wholly unrealistic. In order to accomplish this goal Oceana advocated a very specific form of
bicameralism as well as innumerable unchanging requirements about governance that were designed, to
control society, rather than enable liberty.

all good men acknowledge, that governments are not set up for the advantage, profit, pleasure or glory of one
or a few men, but for the good of the society.” If some “might fall under the temptation” to be corrupt, “those
who continued in their integrity, would easily be able to chastise them for deserting the publick cause.”
Accordingly, kings must be deterred from seducing the nobility such that they are willing to betray their
country by forsaking their duty. The best way to do so was through mixed monarchy:” “Maxims of State,”
Halifax: Complete Works, p. 147.
551

Id.
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“The Character of a Trimmer,” Halifax: Complete Works, p. 54. Halifax reiterated his endorsement of
mixed monarchy in his essay “A Rough Draft of a New Model at Sea.” Id, pp. 155-59. For a discussion of the
use of the concept of mixed monarchy in sixteenth-century England, see McLaren, “Thomas Smith’s De
Republica Anglorum as Protestant Apologetic.”
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Blair Worden, “Introduction,” Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free-State, p. xxxiv.
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Sidney and his fellow English early modern republicans followed formidable footsteps. The analysis of
mixed government originated with the ancient Greeks, particularly Polybius, a Greek philosopher living in the
Roman Empire during the years that the Romans overtook the ancient Greeks. Polybius “was a pioneer,
accomplishing for Rome what Aristotle and his students had done for Athens and the Greek city-states” by
compiling Roman constitutional history, the development of which he saw as “an incremental process of
natural evolution.”554 Seeking to “turn history into a science based on clear rational principles backed up by
observation,” Polybius maintained that the Roman constitution was stable because of the fact that none of its
constitutional elements – the monarchic consul, the aristocratic Senate, and the democratic element of the
people manifested through various popular assemblies – were able to function without the consent of the
other elements. To Polybius it was “impossible to find a better form of constitution than this.”555 Polybius also
introduced “the influential metaphor of ‘checks and balances’”; interestingly, he utilized the psychological
factor of fear as the motivator that allows checks and balances to work.556
Sidney relied on many sources to support his claim. For example, he reported that God (the one)
instituted the government of the Hebrews, but the Jews also had an elite assembly called the great Sanhedrin
(the few), as well as popular assemblies of the people (the all). “Sparta had two kings [two ones?], a senate of
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Polybius’ theory of constitutional types and change resembled ideas of Plato and Aristotle, but also differed
from his predecessors “in construing good government as one based on the consent of the governed.” David E.
Hahm, “Kings and constitutions: Hellenistic theories,” The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political
Thought, Christopher Rowe & Malcolm Schofield, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 455-476, 465,
473. Polybius was from Megapolis, Arcadia, in western Greece, but he arrived in Rome in 167 BCE and
worked as a tutor to the sons of a prominent Roman politician. Arthur Herman, The Cave and the Light (New
York: Random House, 2013), p. 112.
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Herman, The Cave and the Light, citing Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, Ian Scott-Kilvert, tr.
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 317. Cicero agreed. “For I distinguished, first, three acceptable
forms of government along with their three objectionable counterparts. I then showed that no one of these
simple forms was ideal, but that each of them was surpassed by a moderate blend of the three acceptable
types.” Cicero, “The Republic,” Cicero, The Republic and The Laws, Book Two, ¶65-66, pp. 56-57.
556

Hahm, “Kings and constitutions,” p. 470; Herman, The Cave and the Light, p. 114. Machiavelli also relied
on Polybius’ concept of mixed government, and the Discorsi reflected his study of the psychology of man.
Many non-republicans also embraced the concept of mixed government. The Spanish Jesuit scholar
Francisco Suarez, for example, “first declared that the three traditional forms of government could be mingled
together to forge one type of political power. Following Aristotle, he then reiterated that although monarchy
was normally reputed to be the best kind of polity, the ‘determination’ to establish who was in charge of
governing was ‘necessarily … made by human decision.’” Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer, pp. 97 & 102, relying on
Francisco Suarez, “Laws and God the Lawgiver,” Extracts on Politics and Government, G. A. Moore, ed. &
trans. (Maryland, 1910), Bk iii, Ch. Iv, p. 109. Recall, as well, that the Monarchomach resistance theorists
also endorsed mixed and rejected absolute monarchy. Giesey, “The Monarchomach Triumvirs: Hotman,
Beza and Mornay,” pp. 51-54.
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twenty eight chosen men [the few], and the like assemblies [the all].” The Hellenic Dorian cited in
Peloponnesus had “a chief magistrate, a senate, and occasional assemblies. [the one, the few, the all].”
Etcetera, etcetera, with numerous additional examples -- a raft of peoples and civilizations across time that had
relied upon mixed forms of government. Filmer seemed to appreciate “the resemblance of regality” in the
Roman consuls and Athenian archons; so Sidney focused on ancient Rome and Athens, explaining that “those
governments were composed of the three simple species: for if the monarchical part was in them, it cannot be
denied that the aristocratical was in the senate or areopagi, and the democratical in the people.”557
Traditional notions of government by the one, the few, and the many were seen to be incorporated
into the English system of government by means of the role of the monarch, the House of Lords, and the
House of Commons. Indeed, one of the battles of the 1670s was over the question of whether the English
government was mixed and, if so, what it meant if there was irreconcilability among the separate and
contending powers in government. John Humfrey, a seventeenth-century English religious and political
dissenter, maintained that the government of England was a mixed government, and that “the supreme
legislative power in this nation lies in the King and his two houses jointly.” The necessity for these elements
of government to work collaboratively was so essential, however, that Humfrey radically suggested that an
irreconcilable division of opinion among the King, Lords, and Commons returned power “to the people,” who
were then free to reconstitute government.558 Taking political ideas, such as mixed monarchy, to their logical
conclusion – or what some would call their logical extreme – and potentially placing the country in a state of
chaos, without any government, at least for some period of time, was one of the things that was very
threatening to the English Parliament and even to Cromwell; but, of course, whether one wanted to push an
idea to its extreme depended on the outcome that one sought.559 Sidney’s analysis was not abstract in this
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DCG, II.16.166-169.
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John Humfrey, The Authority of the Magistrate about Religion Discussed, 1672, p. 17; see generally
Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, pp.2 9, 43-51.
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Not surprisingly, Filmer was one of those unqualified critics of republicanism who found mixed monarchy to
be anathema to the well-being of English society. One can find Filmer’s view simply from the title of his
pamphlet, The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy. Or, A Succinct Examination of the Fundamentals of
Monarchy, both in this and other Kingdoms, as well about the Right of Power in Kings, as of the Originall or
Naturall Liberty of the People (1648), https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=XOVbAAAAQAAJ &printsec=
frontcover&source=gbs_atb_ hover&pg=GBS.PP1 (8-1-18). In this work Filmer defined monarchy as “the
government of one alone.” Id, p. 3. “As he was to vividly explain in The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed
Monarchy (1648), this brigade [referring to Parsons, Buchanan, Bellarmine and Calvin] supporting the ‘new
512

way; nor was Halifax’s approach. It was Sidney’s thesis that the people were free to change their government
if they believed it was not functioning in their best interest. He unequivocally subscribed to the value and
necessity of mixed government. But he did not seem to advocate the kind of radicalism that was expressed
by some of England’s more extreme dissidents.

Since men almost always follow the paths trod by others, and proceed in their affairs
by imitation, … a wise man should always enter those paths chosen by great men, …
so that if one’s own virtue does not match theirs, at least it will have the smell of it.
Machiavelli, The Prince 560

vi.

Virtue

One could easily be entirely sidetracked by an examination of the nature of virtue. As Aristotle stated,
“without virtue, he [man] is the most unholy and the most savage of the animals, and the worst with regard to
sex and food”!561 Focusing on the politics of republicanism, this subject has been frequently explored in
analyses of Machiavelli’s ideas. In view of the Florentine’s preeminence as an early modern republican, it is
worth a brief review of Machiavelli’s understanding of virtue; we will then turn to Sidney’s use of the
concept.562
One of the most analyzed aspects of human nature set forth in Machiavelli’s work is the capacity to
be a man of virtù. Skinner has observed that virtù is not translatable as virtue, nor can it be reduced to any
one word in the English language; indeed, it is difficult to give virtù its due in a sentence or two. Harvey
Mansfield, who wrote an entire book on the subject, interestingly suggested that the difficulty Machiavelli’s
translators have had with finding an English word for virtù is a reflection of our squeamishness – a reluctance
to face the question of evil.563 Virtù, a Latin word, originated from the ancient Greek word, ver, which means

doctrine of the limitation and mixture of monarchy’ had ‘crucified’ kings ‘between two thieves, the pope and
the people.’” Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer, p. 67.
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Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. VI, p. 20.
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Aristotle, Politics, Book I, Chapter 2, ¶15, p. 5.
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In The Sacred Fire of Liberty: Republicanism, Liberalism and the Law (New York University Press, 1998),
the jurist M. N. S. Sellers summarily reviewed the ideas of a host of republican and liberal thinkers. He stated
that Harrington, Sidney, Rousseau, and John Adams relied on Machiavelli. Sellers also summarily reviewed
the ideas of many other thinkers, including Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu and Blackstone, whose ideas often
built on, and sometimes distinguished themselves from the republicanism of their predecessors.
563

Harvey Mansfield, Machiavelli’s Virtue (Chicago, IL & London: Chicago University Press, 1998), p.7; cf.
Judith Shklar, “Montesquieu and the new republicanism,” Machiavelli and Republicanism, Gisela Bock,
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masculinity; accordingly, its meaning is often mistakenly limited to common attributes of virility, from the same
root, which is not what virtù means. In the Oxford World Classics’ edition of the Discorsi, for example, the
editors (the Bondanellas) translate virtù, in one instance, as “exceptional ability,” a quality that Machiavelli
mused had “always existed and still exists in those [provinces] where such ability is still sought after and justly
praised.”564 In translating Machiavelli, his editors noted, “Likewise, in selecting a vocabulary to express key
concepts, we aimed for consistency. …[V]irtù has been rendered as ‘exceptional skill’, ‘ability’, ‘talent’,
‘valour’, ‘excellence’, or ‘ingenuity’, and occasionally as ‘strength’, or ‘power.’”565
What is missing from these scholars’ characterization of virtù is the way in which a man’s very nature,
his character, integrity and judgment, is wrapped up in “exceptional ability.” In that sense, a better translation
of virtù might be wondrous character, judgment and ability, or the qualities of a man of profound integrity,
judgment and talent. Perhaps this is the same special quality that is described by one scholar as “a
conditioning of the soul.”566 Surely this is what Cicero meant when he wrote On Obligations, De Officiis, to
educate his son. Cicero’s title in Greek was Peri tou kathēkontos, which can be translated as “Concerning the
appropriate.” Appropriate meant ethical behavior, or “appropriate behaviour directed towards virtue.”567 It was
not enough to be dutiful. Neither was it enough to be exceptionally able. One must be honourable, and then

Quentin Skinner & Maurizio Viroli, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 268 (“Virtue is the love of
equality”).
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Machiavelli, Discorsi, BII, Preface, 150.
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Id, Translator’s Note, p. xxiv.
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See W. R. Newell, “How Original is Machiavelli? A Consideration of Skinner’s Interpretation of Virtue and
Fortune,” Political Theory, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Nov. 1987), pp. 612-634, 628. One of the scholars who has
grappled with the issue of virtue, its ancient roots, and the trajectory of virtue in republicanism is Prof. Eric
Nelson. In The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought (Harvard University Press, 2004), for example, Nelson
argued that it was the Greek, not the Roman republican tradition that emerged in sixteenth to eighteenth
century England and America. Although I do not share his view, Nelson’s analysis is trenchant in a number of
respects, including his observation that Skinner effectively took on Pocock’s analysis of the existence of a
composite “classical” republicanism that combined ancient Greek and Roman accounts of political life and
political ideas. Part of Nelson’s analysis rests on his understanding of the civic humanist tradition introduced
by Hans Baron in his 1955 work, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance, and particularly Baron’s thesis
that Italian Renaissance republicanism was based on an interpretation of Roman history in which Roman virtue
died with the collapse of the Roman empire, at which time Ciceronian virtue and civic mindedness was
replaced by “fawning subservience.” What is important to Nelson is that these ideas are deeply antagonistic to
Greek ethics and the ancient Greek concept of republicanism, a perceptive albeit perhaps overdrawn
argument. Nevertheless, there is no question that in Anglo-American early modern political literature, repeated
emphasis is placed on the divide between the times of freedom and virtue represented by the Roman republic,
in contrast to the times of tyranny and corruption characteristic of imperial Rome.
567

P. G. Walsh, “Introduction,” Cicero On Obligations, p.xvii.
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apply (or use) that honor to the practicable. To be honorable one must know and undertake “the highest aim
among goods”; then one must apply this “moral guidance which can shape our daily lives in all their aspects.”
Cicero intended to educate his son on how to accomplish this. Indeed, virtually the entire text of De Officiis is
about the utilization of one’s virtue in the service of one’s state.568 Virtue is comprised of a panoply of qualities
because different qualities are called upon in different circumstances. Newell’s reference to “a conditioning of
the soul” focused on one aspect of Cicero’s concept of virtue, which is “magnanimity or greatness of soul.”569
The qualities that make a man virtuous, or the component virtues that a virtuous man possessed were
completely intertwined: “all philosophers agree, as I have often argued, that the man who possesses one
virtue possesses them all.”570 There is no question that, following Cicero, republicans value virtue. At the
same time, what is possibly most interesting as well as most overlooked about mainstream republican theory
is its pragmatic effort to design a state that is as minimally dependent on virtue as possible.
While there always will be men with virtuous qualities, such men are not common. Indeed, the much
more likely scenario is that men of great capability become powerful and then power corrupts them. This was
Machiavelli’s concern, and it was similarly a preoccupation of Cicero. As Cicero stated in Book 3 of De Officiis,
anyone who thinks that a man who lusts to become “king of the Roman people and lord of all the world” is
possessed of an ambition that is honorable – an obvious vilification of Julius Caesar – “is a lunatic,” as this
“justifies the extinction of laws and liberty, and regards the squalid and accursed subjugation of them as
magnificent.” Machiavelli’s understanding of virtue was wholly consistent.571

568
As noted in this study’s Introduction, Cicero was very explicit about the relationship between honor and the
obligations he was teaching to his son. “All that is honourable emerges from one or other of four sources. It
is found in the perception and intelligent awareness of what is true; or in safeguarding the community by
assigning to each individual his due, and by keeping faith with compacts made; or in the greatness and
strength of a lofty and unconquered spirit; or in the order and due measure by which all words and deeds
reflect an underlying moderation and self-control.” Cicero, On Obligations, Book I, ¶15, pp. 7-8.
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P. G. Walsh, “Introduction,” Cicero On Obligations, p. xvii.
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Cicero On Obligations, Book 2, §35, p. 66.
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Id, Book 3, §83, p. 112. Machiavelli similarly observed, “None the less, in the end almost all men, deceived
by a false good and a false glory, allow themselves, either willingly or through ignorance, to pass into the
ranks of those who deserve more blame than praise, and having the capacity to create, to their everlasting
honour, either a republic or a kingdom, they turn to tyranny, failing to realize how much fame, how much
glory, how much honour, security, tranquility, and peace of mind they are losing through this choice, and how
much infamy, disgrace, blame, danger, and anxiety they incur.” Thus, when Machiavelli praised the Romans
as men who acquired their empire more by “exceptional ability” – virtù – than fortune, a conclusion contrary to
Livy’s view, he was talking about the extraordinary skill, integrity and good judgment of the Roman people
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In contrast to this traditional understanding of virtue to which both Cicero and Machiavelli clearly
subscribed, Skinner was convinced that Machiavelli radically changed the definition of virtù from its commonly
understood meaning. According to Skinner, in both The Prince and the Discorsi virtù is described as a
combination of a set of personal qualities, including “the four ‘cardinal’ virtues of wisdom, justice, courage and
temperance,” but which also included the “princely” virtues of honesty, magnanimity and liberality.572 Skinner
appeared to recognize that Machiavelli ‘s views reflected the traditional notions of virtue that constituted not
only the understanding of the time, but the preoccupation of the Italian civic humanists with the virtues
required by man generally, and political man specifically. For the civic humanists, the debate was the age-old
one of the viva activa versus the viva contemplativa: should the well-educated man become involved in
politics, or should he recede from such vapidity and utilize his time for a “higher” purpose?573 Cicero believed
that men must be éngagé, to mix civilization lingos. The “pursuit of tranquility” by “austere and serious men”
was admirable; but the better life was “the life of those who have devoted themselves to politics and to the
conduct of important affairs.”574 The Renaissance civic humanists agreed.575 While Machiavelli continued to
think in terms of virtue, said Skinner, he ultimately was entirely rejecting of it. Skinner’s conviction was that
Machiavelli knew that he was creating “an unbridgeable gulf between himself and the whole tradition of
humanist political thought,” which he did with “his most sagely ironic style.” Out of this omnishambles,
Skinner found that while the most important quality of a political leader was virtù, Machiavelli changed its very
meaning to include “the willingness to do whatever may be necessary for the attainment of civic glory and
greatness, whether the actions involved happen to be intrinsically good or evil in character” while, at the same
time, continuing to include within the definition of virtù the possession of the highest qualities of care, political

(which in this specific instance also required prudence), not simply ability. Machiavelli, Discorsi, Bk I, Ch10,
47 & Bk II, Ch1, 152-54.
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Skinner, “Preface,” Machiavelli, A Short History, pp. 40-41.
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On Petrarch, see Appendix B.
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Cicero On Obligations, Book I, §70, p. 25.

575
“By ordering the laws and ensuring justice, political men lead their fellows to live a life of virtue which is in
turn the pathway to true happiness.” Maurizio Viroli, “Machiavelli and the republican idea of politics,”
Machiavelli and Republicanism, Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner & Maurizio Viroli, eds. (Cambridge University
Press, 1993), p. 163; cf. Marisa Linton, The Politics of Virtue in Enlightenment France (London: Palgrave,
2001), Ch. 1, “Concepts of Virtue Before 1745.” In Politics, Aristotle also presented “a powerful defense of
the dignity of politics and the political life.” “Introduction,” Aristotle’s Politics, 2nd ed., Carnes Lord, ed. &
tr.(Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), p. viii.
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prudence, courage, military leadership, and the ability to disarm the envious – in short, some of the attributes
characteristic of the traditional man of virtù. Overall, said Skinner, the “revolution Machiavelli engineered …
was based in effect on redefining the pivotal concept of virtù.” In the Skinnerian republic, this redefined virtù of
leaders served “in itself to stave off corruption and collapse.”576
I would like to suggest that we sidestep Skinner’s unusual definition of virtue and return to the
language of Cicero and Machiavelli, on which the early modern republicans relied. In my own view it is clear
that not only was the ancient and traditional sense of virtù precisely the one that Machiavelli utilized (pace
Skinner’s crabbed interpretation to the contrary) but, so too do the English republicans. What Machiavelli
made clear is the matter on which Cicero’s De Officiis dwelt, which is that virtù was just one character trait of
man, subject to the diverse and often inconsistent pulls from man’s complex nature, not to mention the
contingencies he faced. The difference between Cicero and Machiavelli is that while the former recognized
the practical and the contingent, he urged his son to always act according to virtù, whereas Machiavelli said
that no matter how virtuous a man, to be a successful leader of a country a ruler realistically could not always
give first priority to virtue. The political direction in which Machiavelli urged leaders to take their country,
whether “a republic or a kingdom,” was almost always sui generis, and thus a matter of circumspection and
difficult choices – the art of real politik. A man usually had the freedom to choose to be good or bad; indeed,
this was the crux of virtually every one of the myriad anecdotal tales that Machiavelli – and Sidney – told.577
In short, the exercise of virtue was an option and, if possible, the best option.578 In different circumstances

576

“[T]he core of his positive advice to new rulers,” said Skinner, was to ignore the well-recognized attributes
of virtù and be guided, above all, by “the dictates of necessity,” which frequently would require a leader to act
“treacherously, ruthlessly or inhumanely.” Skinner, Machiavelli, a Short History, pp. 44, 68.
577
“Machiavelli would argue that America owes her greatness not only to her habitual adherence to the
principles of freedom and justice, but also to her occasional deviation from them. He would not hesitate to
suggest a mischievous interpretation of the Louisiana Purchase and of the fate of the Red Indians. He would
conclude that facts like these are an additional proof for his contention that there cannot be a great and
glorious society without the equivalent of the murder of Remus by his brother Romulus.” Leo Strauss,
Thoughts on Machiavelli (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1978)[orig. pub. 1958], p. 14.
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This is one of the few times where Machiavelli, and Sidney to a lesser extent, conspicuously depart from
the republicanism of Cicero, who is more idealistic, e.g., when he stated that, “the reason commands, and the
appetite obeys,” and that, “The Stoics define the highest good as ‘being in conformity with nature’, and what I
think this means is that we must always align ourselves with virtue.” Cicero, On Obligations, Book I, §101, p.
35, & Book 3, §13, p 89. We need to keep in mind, however, that Cicero’s On Obligations is written as an
advice book to his son. As such, it is to be expected that it brooks no compromise to lofty ideals and
ambitions. Compare Cicero’s approach in another major work: “The Republic is a work on the state and its
fundamental principles. …In conscious emulation of Plato, Cicero intends to offer a conception of the ideal
state. …The problem with Plato, Cicero feels, is that he attempts to demonstrate the validity of his basic
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one might be right in both the virtuous and practical sense, and in another circumstances the opposite course
of action might be best for one’s people even if not virtuous. There is no one right answer to these questions.
The answer is always contingent; it depends on the choices realistically available at the time, and the acute
appreciation of the outcomes of their exercise.579 It is the ability to read the moment that, for Machiavelli and,
I would submit, for realist theorists including Sidney, is the essential quality of a good leader.580
Machiavelli’s overriding purpose in his discussion of corruption and choices in political life was to
show how it made no sense not to be honest with oneself and practical about one’s options, both personally
and politically.581 He also explored the choices most likely to be available in a far-ranging panoply of
scenarios – historical, contemporary, and hypothetical, but never ideal. If one combined wisdom, consisting
of an understanding of the values to which one should aspire such as freedom of choice, with an appreciation
of the nature of a good republic and a good man (or, if one is fortunate, a man of virtù!), with the
understanding of realistic options and optimal choices that one can glean from the study of history, one
should be able to arrive at the best choice available in any given circumstance.582 This avoids the ultimate

political axioms by creating a paper ideal, unfortunately a highly impractical one in terms of actual human
conduct. In other words,” explained political scientist Neal Wood, “Plato’s ideal is far too utopian to be of much
service for guidance in the realities of politics.” Neal Wood, Cicero’s Social & Political Thought (Berkeley &
Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 65-66.
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In determining which type of republic is the better safeguard for liberty, “it is necessary to examine which of
these republics made the best choice.” Machiavelli, Discorsi, Bk I, Ch6, 37 & Bk I, Ch5, 31.
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Viroli, How to Read Machiavelli, p. 22. There is also always the question of how unvirtuous a good leader
can be and still be a good leader, a subject of continuous debate in the United States.
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Prof. Lamont made an astute comment about Hobbes, reminiscent of Machiavelli: “What we cannot forgive
in Hobbes is his candour. Hobbes is the candid friend of strong government.” William Lamont, “Authority and
Liberty: Hobbes and the Sects,” Liberty, Authority, Formality, pp. 29-44, 30. Although perhaps a little more
circumspect, Halifax was candid, too: “No King can be so little inclined to dissemble but he must needs learn
it from his subjects, who every day give him such lessons of it. Dissimulation is like most other qualities, it
hath two sides; it is necessary, and yet it is dangerous too.” Thus, said Halifax, “To have none at all layeth a
man open to contempt, to have too much exposeth him to suspicion, which is only the less dishonourable
inconvenience.” In short, “If a man doth not take very great precautions, he is never so much showed as
when he endeavoureth to hide himself. One man cannot take more pains to hide himself than another will do
to see into him, especially in the case of kings.” “A Character of King Charles II,” Halifax: Complete Works,
pp. 245-67, 251.
582

Once again, Machiavelli and Cicero diverge. Machiavelli famously stated, “it is much safer to be feared
than to be loved.” (Contrary to common understanding, while the question the realist Machiavelli posed was
“whether it was “better to be loved than to be feared, or the contrary,” the answer, he said, was that “one
would like to be both.” But as that was difficult to accomplish, it was “safer to be feared.”). Machiavelli, The
Prince, Ch. XVII, pp. 57-58. In contrast, Cicero stated, “Of all these possibilities, none is more calculated to
secure and to retain influence than winning affection, and none is more repugnant than being feared.” Cicero,
On Obligations, Book 2, ¶23, p. 61. Sidney was a realist; but he still had a very strong sense of Ciceronian
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pitfall, self-delusion, which leads to failure. Through this successful engagement in the art of real politik,
legitimate governance can flourish, to the tremendous advantage of the citizenry. 583
Sidney and the early modern English republicans were less interested in defining virtue than in
applying it. As Scott stated grandly, “For the republican writers of the English revolution, the value of their
(frequently glorious) words hinged entirely upon the practical realization of the ‘solid things in them.’”584
Among the qualities Sidney deemed virtuous were knowledge of God, wisdom, justice, valor, integrity, skill,
industry, and experience. 585 Of greater interest was determining how to achieve “the end of just and civil
government” which was “the good of the governed.” For those who had “understanding and courage, which
may be taken for learning, or the effect of it, will never endure the government of one or a few that do not

obligation and the capacity of man to rise to the occasion – or, at least, of some men to do so. See, e.g.,
DCG, II.1.79 (“Such as were wise and valiant procured [a publick advantage], by setting up regular
governments, and placing the best men in the administration.”) Note that Machiavelli’s sense of history came
right from Livy, “whose major work, Ab urbe condita (From the Foundation of the City), may well be said to
constitute the single most important historical work in Western civilization. Originally containing 142 books, of
which only 35 are extant, Livy’s masterful historical narrative espoused a view of history as a source of
models of behaviour that the Italian Renaissance embraced. As Livy put it, history was full of ‘fine things to
take as models, base things, rotten through and through, to avoid.’” Bondanella & Bondanella, Introduction,
Discorsi, p. xiii.
583
Does a republic require citizenry and leaders of virtù, as Skinner stated? No, for Machiavelli cited examples of good governance that do not have either. How did Machiavelli define political success? That, too,
would depend on the circumstances. If a mixed government, with an uncorrupted citizenry, could be led by
wise and uncorrupted leaders who exercise virtù – that is, who have extraordinary skill, integrity, and good
judgment – surely one would have the ideal republic. Can a country flourish without this? Obviously so, since
good emperors can lead nations. Would a citizenry and leadership of men of great virtù be helpful?
Machiavelli undoubtedly would say yes, as long as the definition of virtù included prudence and good
judgment. Did Machiavelli redefine virtù as Skinner suggested? Clearly not. “Where the ultimate decision
concerning the safety of one’s country is to be taken, no consideration of what is just or unjust, merciful or
cruel, praiseworthy or shameful, should be permitted.” Machiavelli, Discorsi, Bk III, Ch41, 350.
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Scott, Commonwealth Principles, pp. 174-75.
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DCG, I.17.47, I.17.49, II.1.80-85. In the Third Dialogue of Court Maxims, Eumonius stated, “Man is by
nature a rational creature.” Irrationality is contrary to man’s nature; in contrast, “virtue is the dictate of
reason.” Men “rightly esteem and love those as good and wise men who are endowed with virtue and …
conform themselves to the rules of reason and nature.” The social corollary of this principle is that justice is
the virtue that should direct “all our actions in the world and the rule of commerce.” Court Maxims, Third
Dialogue, p. 33. Furthermore, all men are “equal … in freedom.” Nevertheless, not everyone is equal in
every way; there are natural inequalities. For example, “He that excels in fidelity, valour, experience, and all
military virtues has a juster pretence to the command of an army than one who has none of these qualities.”
Id, pp. 34-35. The author(s) noted that, “following the example of his master Plato,” Aristotle concluded that,
“he or they that are wisest ought naturally to govern.” Id., p. 36. Similarly, Sidney stated in Discourses that
Aristotle maintained that while “all are equally free, all are not equally endowed with those virtues that render
liberty safe, prosperous, and happy.” DCG, II.1.8.
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excel them in virtue.”586 Sidney’s confirmation of Aristotle’s view that “virtue alone … ought to give the
preeminence” is an unequivocal commitment to classical virtue. In the context of Sidney’s championing of
liberty, virtue produced liberty and vice versa.
Halifax said liberty was the foundation of all virtue.587 Sidney sometimes reflected on how virtue was
what one looked for in a leader: “[A]ll wise men have held, that order required that the wisest, best, and most
valiant men, should be placed in the offices where wisdom, virtue, and valour are requisite.” He referred to
Alexander the Great as a man “endow’d with all the virtues that nature improved by discipline do ever attain,
so that he is believed to be the man meant by Aristotle, who on account of the excellency of his virtues was
by nature framed for a king.”588 Conversely, in “well-govern’d states,” a “value is put on virtue, and no one
honoured unless for such qualities as are beneficial to the publick.” In such states, men were brought up to
believe in virtue – “from the tenderest years” taught that “nothing in this world deserves to be sought after, but
such honors as are acquired by virtuous actions.”589 Etcetera, etcetera.590
We see in Sidney and his compatriots a recognition of the enormous value to mankind and the
common welfare of virtue in the very traditional sense, and to “stability,” a term Sidney often used. 591 As
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Sidney stated, “Aristotle, following the wise men of those times, shews us how far reason, improved by
meditation, can advance in the knowledge and love of that which is truly good.” Id, II.10.134. Sidney
continued to the effect that Aristotle does not “dispraise” a popular government “unless” – and Sidney’s
“unless” is all about the absence of virtue – “the multitude be composed of such as are barbarous, stupid,
lewd, vicious, and incapable of the happiness for which governments are instituted.” DCG, II.10.133.
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“The Character of a Trimmer,” Halifax: Complete Works,, p. 62.
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DCG, II.11.135, II.11.139.
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Id, II.25.253.
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There is really no disagreement among the English republicans about the nature of virtue. The issue would
be a non-issue but for Skinner’s creative interpretation of Machiavelli’s concept of virtue and, perhaps, the neoStraussian take on Machiavelli. In Plato Redivivus, Neville does not use the word “virtue” in this particular
context but his meaning is plain. He stated, “government was at first instituted for the interest and
preservation of mankind,” but that “the corruption of better governments … necessarily cause a depravation of
manners” – i.e., the loss of liberty causes a loss of virtue. For “nothing is more certain than that politic defects
breed moral ones as our nation is a pregnant example,” and “debauchery of manners might blind the
understandings of a great many; destroy the fortunes of others, and make them indigent; infuse into very many
a neglect and carelessness of the public good.” Plato Redivivus, pp. 86-87. Per Vane, “if there be never so
many fair branches of liberty planted on the root of a private and selfish interest, they will not long prosper, but
must within a little time wither and degenerate into the nature of that whereunto the are planted.… The
goodness of any cause is not merely to be judged by the events, whether visibly prosperous or unprosperous,
but by the righteousness of its principles.” Henry Vane, A Healing Question, pp. 305-06, and Ancient
Foundations, p. 121, in Judson, The Political Thought of Sir Henry Vane, pp. 77 & ns. 155 & 156.
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Halifax talked about virtue in the context of “Nature,” from which “[a]ll laws flow.” He explained, “By this
Nature is not meant that which fools and libertines would misquote to justify their excesses; it is innocent and
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Sidney experienced and Franco Venturi observed, “Great Britain had allowed herself [in the mid-seventeenth
century] to be governed by men who ‘n’avaient point de vertu,’ quoting from Montesquieu’s Esprits des lois.592
In Sidney’s starker terms: “if vice and corruption prevail, liberty cannot subsist; but if virtue have the
advantage, arbitrary power cannot be established.”593 Sidney then quickly turned to the means and
mechanisms of instituting virtue, and that was the law: “They therefore who place kings within the power of
the law, and the law to be a guide to kings, equally provide for the good of king and people.”594 The
connection between virtue and law is emphasized by Sidney in another way. “If virtue may in any respect be
said to outlive the person, it can only be when good men frame such laws and constitutions as by favouring it
preserve themselves.”595 For law was “written reason,” embodying virtue; it allowed society to institutionalize

uncorrupted Nature, that which disposeth men to choose virtue without its being prescribed, and which is so far
from inspiring ill thoughts into us, that we take pains to suppress the good ones it infuseth.” “The Character of a
Trimmer,” Halifax: Complete Works, p. 51.
592

Franco Venturi, Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 47, citing
Charles-Louis de Secondat de Montesquieu, Esprit des lois, Book III, chapter III, Oeuvres completes, Vol. I,
André Masson, ed. (Paris, 1950).
593

DCG, II.30.302.
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Id, II.30.302-03. We see the same transition made from virtue to law by republican Slingsby Bethel. In
The World’s Mistake in Oliver Cromwell, Bethel referred with approval to the Venetians, who when the Duke
died who was their leader, “made it unlawfull, even so much as to mourn for their Duke at his death;
Intimating thereby, that their Felicity and Safety depends not upon the uncertain Thred of any one Man’s life;
but upon the Vertue of their good Laws, and Orders, well executed, and that they can never want virtuous
Persons to succeed.” Slingsby Bethel, The World’s Mistake in Oliver Cromwell, Or, a Short Political
Discourse Shewing that Cromwell’s Mal-Administration, During his Four Years and Nine Moneths Pretended
Protectorship, Layed the Foundation of our Present Condition in the Decay of Trade (1668) (EEBO repr.,
undated), p. 1. Locke also turned to the law as the means of preserving and protecting political society. But
he rarely talked in terms of virtue or associated ideas. For Locke it was a given that people did the wrong
thing. Thus, he defined tyranny as “the exercise of Power beyond Right,” and proceeded to discuss what
citizens could do about a tyrannical magistrate. Locke, Second Treatise, Ch. XVIII, §199, p. 398 et seq. This
is not to say that he was operating on a different basis than his fellow republicans. For example, he referred
to “the Golden Age (before vain Ambition, and amor sceleratus habendi, evil Concupiscence, had corrupted
Mens minds into a Mistake of true Power and Honour),” which “had more Virtue, and consequently better
Governours, as well as less vicious Subjects, and there was then no stretching Prerogative on the one side to
oppress the People; nor consequently on the other any Dispute about Priviledge, to lessen or restrain the
Power of the Magistrate, and so no contest betwixt Rulers and People about Governours or Government.”
Once this Golden Age passed, however, men found ways to “restrain the Exorbitances, and prevent the
Abuses of that Power which they having intrusted in another’s hands only for their own good, they found was
made use of to hurt them.” Id, Ch. VIII, §111, pp. 342-43.
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and thereby perpetuate virtue, enhancing the nation’s stability and government’s longevity.596 In sum, there is
no question that republicans valued virtue. As previously stated with respect to the design of the state,
mainstream republican theory, of which Sidney is a helpful example, was realistic and pragmatic in its effort to
design a state that was not dependent on any particular virtuous man or men’s exercise of it.
Finally, a comment is opportune about the attitude of seventeenth-century Englishmen towards
commerce, trade and the accumulation of wealth, and whether these activities were considered to be
unvirtuous. Those scholars who suggest that “real republicans” found commerce, trade and wealth anathema
are simply wrong.597 A 1998 study by Steve Pincus made this case; the author’s many cogent arguments will
not be repeated here.598 There are several specifics, however, on which I part company with Pincus. First,
he placed a great deal of emphasis on his conviction that, “the nature of English politics and society changed
dramatically” in the 1640 to 1660 timeframe such that republicans came to appreciate something that they
had not appreciated before, which was the value of the commercialization of English society and of ensuring
the establishment of government institutions that were consistent with that goal. Much of Pincus’ argument
about commerce and republicans is based on the contrasting views of Milton and Harrington, on the one
hand, and the later republicanism of many other Englishmen, including Sidney. The former two republicans
were not in a position to appreciate this change, said Pincus, whereas later theorists were. As a result, the
wealth that was valued by Milton and Harrington was land, which Pincus terms an “agrarian society” but which
might more precisely be termed an “agrarian perception of society.” In contrast, maintained Pincus, “the
massive expansion of English trade, domestic and foreign” in early modern England after the 1660s “created
for the first time a truly self-conscious commercial society.”599
In creating this divide Pincus challenged a variety of definitions related to republicanism by a series of
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scholars, including Pocock, Skinner and Pettit.600 Setting those distinctions aside for present purposes, the
problem with Pincus’ argument is that, in fact, the English were exceedingly aware of the economic value of
commercialization well before the growth of trade in post-Civil War England. One could simply point to the
Netherlands, and the obvious attribution of the success of the Dutch Republic to not only its Protestantism, to
which the English entirely related, but also to its economic well-being, which was the result of its extraordinary
trading empire. The Netherlands was a tiny country with virtually no natural resources or other assets to
parlay. Yet Dutch commerce led to the republic’s seventeenth-century Golden Age. Appreciation of this
phenomenon predated the productive writing years of Harrington and Milton; after all, the Dutch East India
Company was founded in 1602, just to take one data point. Harrington’s Oceana was published in 1656;
Milton’s The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates in 1649.601
It would not have escaped the attention of early seventeenth (and, for that matter, sixteenth) century
scholars that the Florentine city-state’s success, not to mention that of ancient Rome, was driven substantially
by international trade. This included an English appreciation for the strategic importance of banking, another
related point that Pincus identified as a later and pivotal seventeenth-century “insight.”602 In the classical
world, the ancient Spartans, who lived in an oligarchy, spurned trade. Rome did not. Cicero, the personification of ancient Roman republicanism, grew up in a society that we would instantly recognize as highly
commercial: “There were shopping malls and bars and a lively cultural scene with theater and sport. Poetry
and literature thrived and new books were much talked about. Leading actors were household names. The
affluent led a busy social round of dinner parties and gossip, and they owned country homes to which they
could retreat from the pressures of urban living.”603 This was not a world that Cicero rejected; to the contrary,

600

See, e.g., id, pp. 706-07.

601

When Pincus suggested that from the middle of the seventeenth century, attitudes towards economy and
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he embraced it.604
This description of Cicero’s ancient Rome as a successful commercial center could equally have
been a description of Machiavelli’s Renaissance Florence – the environment of another exemplar of early
modern republicanism.605 Banking was a city industry -- consider the Medici!606 “As I said above,” he said,
“all countries and provinces living in liberty have gained enormous advantages from it. …Wealth will be seen
to increase more rapidly there, both that which derives from agriculture and that from crafts and trade,
because each man more willingly increases those things and seeks to acquire those goods that he believes,
once acquired, he can enjoy.”607 Surely this is Machiavelli’s description of commercial success as a
manifestation of liberty as well as a form of self-interest.
Finally and most conspicuously, we know that early modern England was a bastion of successful and
prosperous trade, with London as a major center of international commerce that was patently evident to
visitors, such as the Swiss man who in the late 1590s wrote, “Most of the inhabitants are employed in
commerce; they buy, sell, and trade in all the corners of the globe. …There are also many wealthy merchants
and money changers (banquiers) in this city … so that inexpressibly great treasures and vast amounts of
money may be seen here.”608 One of the charges against Charles I at his trial for treason in 1649 was that he
had prosecuted a wicked design by engaging in a cruel war that, among other things, decayed English
trade.609 Pincus correctly identified Slingsby Bethel, a man who certainly had republican sympathies, as a
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man who favored commerce.610 Interestingly, Pincus omitted mention of the fact that Bethel was a highly
successful entrepreneur, which no doubt informed his perspective in his pamphlet criticizing Cromwell for,
among other things, destroying England’s status in Europe as a leader in “Trade, Wealth, and Honour.”
England fought a series of wars against the Dutch beginning in the mid-1600s in significant part because of
already flourishing but competing trade interests.611
In short, I could not agree more with Pincus that early modern republicans, although not Harrington
and Milton, well appreciated commerce and most embraced it. At the same time, Pincus’ thesis is implausible
that one can virtually isolate this factor, and distinguish and explain the differences between Harrington and
Milton, on the one hand, and later republicans, including Sidney, on the other, on the basis of the later
development of trade and commerce in England.612 Pincus concluded that this change betokened a
watershed between the earlier “classical republicanism” of Harrington and Milton and the ideas of republicans
of the 1650s and later, who he characterized as liberals.613 The fact is that Englishmen and visitors to
England throughout this period (and earlier) appreciated the value of its growth in trade. At the same time,
while many English republicans appreciated the economic prosperity that was the product of England’s
flourishing national and international trading interests, other significant distinctions unrelated to trade are
apparent among these men, e.g., Milton’s profound Puritanism and Harrington’s highly idiosyncratic and
controlling principles of “the balance” and “an equal agrarian.”
Returning to the matter of virtue, for republicans the issue was not commerce, trade, wealth or, for

little world apart, has not any thing to doe with other Princes, but only so far as the necessity of commerce do
oblige her, which was then her true interest. For thereby she gained great riches, which together with her
situation, have made her of very great account.” Du Rohan, Of the Interests of Princes and States, pp. 53-54.
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that matter, capitalism; it was corruption, which could manifest itself in the corrupt use of wealth. It is also true
that associated with spectacular economic growth was “the case against luxury, a sinful excess attacked in
the official homilies of the Church for centuries and as great a threat to the fabric of the nation as the pollution
of the metropolis. It was fed by expensive imports, … and it brought with it the corruption and decadence that
demolished commonwealths and buttressed absolutism.”614 It was against all forms of corruption that
republicans, including Sidney, battled.
Section 37 of Chapter 3 of Discourses, for example, is all about how, “The English Government was not
ill constituted, the defects more lately observed proceeding from the change of manners, and the corruption of
the times.”615 Sidney was focused primarily on the lack of loyalty to the monarch by the nobility, not decadence.
But luxury also was corrupting. In a rare misquote to Lucan when he was actually citing Juvenal, Sidney
observed, “Saevior armis Luxuria incubuit, victumque; ulciscitur orbem,” meaning “Luxury, more savage than
arms, has oppressed (Rome), and avenges a conquered world.” Sidney tended to take for granted the value of
trade, often focusing more on the concomitant importance of military defense. But the value of trade certainly
was well appreciated, e.g., “that government is evidently the best, which, not relying upon what it does at first
enjoy, seeks to increase the number, strength, and riches of the people. …This comprehends all things
conducing to the administration of justice, the preservation of domestick peace, and the increase of
commerce.”616 Indeed, law was the answer to corruption. The king could not be the judge in his own case,
which would make him “above the laws,” for example; for that would cause “all the passions and vices that have
most power upon men” to “concur to corrupt it,” viz., “the king’s judgment.”617 Accordingly, in the case of
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England’s material well-being, reliance on Harrington as representative of early modern English republicanism
would lead one completely astray; for Harrington was the exception to the generally positive comments among
English republicans about industry and trade, and the better quality of life that it generated.618
Sidney and many of his fellow English republicans followed in the footsteps of Renaissance
republicanism and its continuation of classical concepts of virtue (or virtù).619 In the case of Sidney we have a
man whose roots were deeply imbedded in the knightly virtue of the Elizabethan era and particularly his
famous great-uncle, Sir Philip, who had become an English mythical figure, a gentleman of the Court as well
as a product of cosmopolitan intellectual and political culture, a man of military prowess, champion of international Protestantism’s fight against persecution in England and abroad, and a defender of the oppressed.620
Sir Philip was mythologized to be the man of virtù. Algernon’s interest also repeatedly expressed itself in
terms of the common good of the English people, which is why he did not disdain commerce. “If [a city] do
not grow, it must pine and perish.”621 While scholars, e.g., “the leading historian of seventeenth-century
English republicanism,” Blair Worden, maintained that “[t]here is precious little evidence of republicanism
even during the civil wars,” the fact is that there was a multi-generation tradition in the Sidney/Percy family,
and perhaps among others, that included advocacy of many of the elements of republicanism, e.g., liberty,
consent, participatory government, the right to rebel, the value of virtue and public service, and favoritism

keep their magistrates within the limits of the law, and oblige them to perform the ends of their institution.
…They who know the law is well defended, seldom attempt to subvert it. Id, III.40.544.
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towards a mixed monarchy.622 The family rejected absolute monarchy but, like Sidney and Halifax, did not
reject constitutional monarchy. Thus, Algernon was continuing, not beginning his family’s republican values.
Unlike Hobbes, Sidney had a positive view of man, who he esteemed as a rational creature.
Irrationality was contrary to man’s nature; and the pursuit of virtue was the likely activity of good men. For
virtue was “the dictate of reason, or the remains of divine light, by which men are made beneficent and
beneficial to each other.” Religion also served this purpose. “Religion proceeds from the same spring, and
tends to the same end: and the good of mankind so entirely depends upon these two, that no people ever
enjoyed anything worth desiring that was not the product of them.” Leadership required skill and virtue, and
there was “no reason to prefer any one; unless he were distinguished from others by the virtues that were
beneficial to all.”623 Halifax similarly believed that virtue was a necessary quality of leadership: “Our Trimmer
cannot conceive that the power of any Prince can be lasting, but where ‘tis built upon the foundation of his
own unborrowed virtue.”624 Among Sidney’s virtuous qualities were knowledge of God, wisdom (sometimes
identified separately), justice, valor, strength, good discipline, and industry.625
Sidney tried to live by these words. At the Restoration he explained to his father, “[B]ut God that gives
me inward peace in my outward troubles, doth knowe, that I doe in my hart choose an innocent, quiet retirement, before any place unto which I could hope to raise myself by thoes actions which they condemne. …I had
rather be a vagabond all my life, than buy my being in my own country at soe deare a rate.”626 In another letter
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Sidney stated, “The truth is, I could hope to noe good in a businesse that I should begin with a lye.”
Nevertheless, ”[i]f things are carried in a legall and moderate way, I had rather be in employment, than without
any. If I am trusted, I shall performe my duty with as much fidelity and care, as any that I have ever undertaken in my life.”627 As he said to a friend, “I must live by just means, or serve to just ends, or not at all.”628
Like Cicero and Machiavelli, Sidney extolled virtue. But is virtue enough to sustain good
governance? Clearly not. Sidney cited innumerable instances in which virtuous men were overpowered by
the unvirtuous. Indeed, this seems to be one of the main purposes for which Sidney invoked historical
illustrations. We need not repeat the errors of the past if we understand them; and there are an unlimited
number of historical examples in which vice and evil triumph over virtue. This is why Sidney and his fellow
republicans turned to, and relied upon multiple layers of law – the foundation on which their political theory
was based and, for that reason, perhaps the most essential component of their republicanism.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Sidney’s Republicanism – Part Two

Ista Lex est ab omnibus quaerenda, a multis ignorata, a paucis cognita.
This law is inquired into by all, unknown to many, understood by few.
Coke on Littleton, cited by John Adams in his
student notes on “Ld Cokes Sayings,” ca. 17581

A. The Law: the Sine Qua Non of Republican Theory
There is a complete, multi-layered substructure of law that undergirds Anglo-American
republicanism of which Sidney’s ideas are representative. I use the word “undergird” deliberately.
Republicans, including Sidney, figuratively “secure or fasten from the underside, as by a rope or chain
passed underneath,” their commitment to certain political values and goals by means of a
comprehensive, cohesive legal framework that informs their theory.2 Continuously interspersed within
Sidney’s arguments in Discourses, as well as those of other early modern republicans, are statements
that directly invoke these multiple legal strata, the sinews of which constitute the fundamental structure
that underlies and supports the theory of republicanism. It is important to both understand what those
distinct legal strata are, as well as to appreciate their use by Sidney and others. Law professor John
Phillip Reid began his monograph on The Ancient Constitution and the Origins of Anglo-American Liberty
with the following cautionary statement: “It has long been a matter of professional as well as academic
discussion that there is an unbridgeable dichotomy separating the writing and discipline of history from
the cannons of the common-law methodology. When legal and constitutional points are being argued,
history and law are not comfortable as joint participants.”3 It is interesting to juxtapose this statement with
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one made in 1897 by Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: “The rational study of law is still to a
large extent the study of history.”4 Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that one of the people who was able
to bridge this gap was Algernon Sidney, a man who was neither a lawyer nor an historian. It is incumbent
on us to do justice to his approach.
There are four layers of legal substructure on which Sidney’s republicanism relied. The first layer
was the law of nature. The universe is created by God, and is governed by His natural law. Part of the
natural order God fashioned was the creation of man.5 This led to the second legal component of
Sidney’s theory: that men found it beneficial to live together socially and, to do so, they found it necessary
to enter into a social contract. A social contract was a legal agreement that bound people living together
in society, and constituted a foundational legal framework and commitment to which the people
consented; it was the people’s first step in governing their conduct for their collective benefit – or, for that
matter, for whatever benefit they collaboratively contracted.6 Rule of law was the third legal stratum,
another substructure of law on which Sidney’s republicanism profoundly relied. It can be characterized as
the formative element, the substantive means by which the social contract was implemented. Legal
process and procedure constituted the fourth and final fundamental layer of law. While process and
procedure could be separated, together they implemented the rule of law, and promoted and protected its
efficacy. These four distinct legal strata were essential to early modern republicanism and are reflected in
Sidney’s work.7 We will consider each legal component of Sidney’s system of law in the context of both
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“Ancient Constitution in the Age of Coke and Selden,” The Roots of Liberty, pp. 115-84, 129 n.16.
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his ideas and those of other members of the Anglo-American republican tradition. From this analysis it
will become patently clear that each element of this multi-tiered aggregation of law reinforced the others.
They were a means by which to implement God’s natural law, honing in on the specific fabric of law that
undergirded and effectuated the political system of a society.8 This multi-tiered legal substructure was an
indispensable and, to date, a misunderstood and therefore both unsatisfactorily analyzed and invariably
insufficiently emphasized dimension of early modern republicanism.
Several additional preliminaries are important. First, notwithstanding the pervasive, inexorable
reliance by Sidney and other republicans on a substructure of law, it should not be inferred that the law was
flawless. Sidney readily acknowledged, “I confess that no law can be so perfect, to provide exactly for every
case.” The law was neither full proof nor a guarantee of any particular outcome. “Our law may possibly have
given away too much from the people, and provided only insufficient defences of our liberties against the
encroachments of bad princes; but none who are not in judgment and honesty like to our author [Filmer],
can propose for a remedy to the evils that proceed from the error of giving too much, the resignation of all
the rest to them.”9 As the essay title of a later seventeenth-century theorist stated, “Discourse On What Is
Permitted By The Laws … Is Not Always Just And Moral.”10 Like everything else, law was not immune from
error, nor was it invulnerable to corruption. Judges could be bribed, to take an obvious example. Sidney
recognized that in England, “tho the intention of our laws be just and good, they are so numerous, and the
volumes of our statutes with the interpretations and adjudged cases so vast, that hardly anything is so clear
and fixed, but men of wit and learning may find what will serve for a pretence to justify almost any judgment
they have a mind to give.” That is why there was legal process and procedure – the fourth legal tier. Legal
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Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner, eds. (Cambridge University Press. 2011), Ch. 1, pp. 3-22, 18.
9

DCG, III.26.465 (italicized phrase from Filmer’s Patriarcha, Ch. 27, p. 107), III.27.475.

10
This is an essay by Samuel von Pufendorf, a seventeenth-century jurist and natural law theorist whose
work Sidney may not have known. See Appendix B, Ch. 4, n.44. In it, Pufendorf stated, “Yet no matter
how the laws were introduced and no matter what the intellectual capacities of those who played the major
part in their establishment, it is a certainty that in various times and various places there were laws that
were unjust.” Samuel von Pufendorf, “Discourse on What is Permitting by the Laws … Is Not Always Just
And Moral,” The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature, Andrew Tooke, tr., Ian Hunter and
David Saunders, ed., With Two Discourses and a Commentary by Jean Barbeyrac [1707], David Saunders,
tr. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2003) [orig.pub. Latin 1673, English 1691], E-Book pdf, p. 201.
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process and procedure did not guarantee the law’s effectiveness, but it did significantly improved its
probability.11
For Sidney and those who shared his perspective, law was the best way to protect the liberty that
they so loved, and the participatory government that they championed.12 Certainly, if not more, law was
the optimal way to protect the freedom or opportunity to choose the sort of government that was best for
one’s community. For Machiavelli, too, the protection and exercise of political liberty required a system of
law. Accordingly, he said, when a new society was established the first step was the selection of a site
that could be physically protected; the next was the organization of the law.13
We also must keep in mind that there are many definitions of law, none of which has been
universally adopted. The nature of man-made law will be discussed in detail in connection with Sidney’s
third legal tier, the rule of law; but several points are worth mentioning at the outset. Theorists and others
tend to assume that we all know a law when we see it. Most people conceive of law as a governing rule;
and that which is governed depends on the nature of a specific law – e.g., civil or criminal, but also
natural, contractual, or religious.14 Sidney utilized the term “law” on almost every page of Discourses, but
it is not until quite late in the text that he provided a definition. As we have noted, Sidney referred to Plato
and Aristotle and stated, lex est mens sine affect, & quasi Deus, “law is mind without passion and is, as it
were, God,” a quotation from Aristotle’s Politics.15 This definition suggested something much “bigger” than

11
As Sidney observed, ironically as it turned out, “the law intends that men should be made judges for
their integrity and knowledge in the law, and that it ought not to be imagined that the king will break his
trust by chusing such as are not so.” DCG, III.26.466-67.
12

The author(s) of A Just and Modest Vindication stated, “The preservation of every Government
depends upon an exact adherence unto its Principles, & the essential principle of the English Monarchy,
being that well proportioned distribution of Powers, whereby the Law doth at once provide for the
greatness of the King, and the safety of the People.” In these circumstances, the king enjoyed “the
Power which the Law doth give him” while “the People are duly protected in their Rights and Liberties.” A
Just and Modest Vindication, pp. 29-30.
13
As Machiavelli explained, ancient Rome was a good republic because it “brought forth laws and
institutions for the benefit of civil liberty.” Machiavelli, Discorsi, B1, Ch1, 20 & BI, Ch4, 30.
14

One complaint of Hugo Grotius, the famous seventeenth-century Dutch jurist, was that authors had
“mingled and confounded natural law, divine law, law of nations, civil law, and canon law.” William
Rattigan, “Hugo Grotius,” Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, Ne Series, Vol. 6, No.1
(1905), pp. 68-81, 77.
15

DCG, II.30.288 & n.4.
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a collection of particular rules – a matter to which we will return.16 It is very clear, however, that for early
modern republicans, the multiple layers of the law necessarily begin with natural law.

And while the dread of judgement past remains
Fresh in thir mindes, fearing the Deitie,
With some regard to what is just and right
Shall lead thir lives and multiplie apace,
Labouring the soile, and reaping plenteous crop,
Corn wine and oyle; and from the herd or flock,
Oft sacrificing Bullock, Lamb, or Kid,
With large Wine-offerings pour'd, and sacred Feast,
Shal spend thir dayes in joy unblam'd, and dwell
Long time in peace by Families and Tribes
Under paternal rule; till one shall rise
Of proud ambitious heart, who not content
With fair equalitie, fraternal state,
Will arrogate Dominion undeserv'd
Over his brethren, and quite dispossess
Concord and law of Nature from the Earth,
Hunting (and Men not Beasts shall be his game)
With Warr and hostile snare such as refuse
Subjection to his Empire tyrannous:
Milton, Paradise Lost 17

i.

Natural Law

The fact that natural law is God’s law does not make it any less a species of law. But unlike manmade law, which is both idiosyncratic and varies from nation to nation, natural law is universal.18 It is the

16

See Bernard Murphy, “The Lawyer and the Layman: Two Perspectives on the Rule of Law,” The
Review of Politics, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Winter, 2006), pp. 101-31. There are two Latin words related to law, ius
and lex. “The leading historical linguists of the twentieth century agree about the origins of ius: Benveniste
derives ius from the Indo-European “yous,” which means ‘a state of regularity or normality, as required by
the religious rules.’” Dumezil added that “the ‘yaus’ refer[red] to what is normal as well as to what is
optimal.” There was “less agreement about the origin of lex. Most modern scholars derive[d] it, as did
Thomas Aquinas, from ligare (to bind), though it … [was] also linked to words for what is laid down and
what is read out or stipulated. What these etymologies suggested was that ius refer[red] more widely to
the normative order as a whole, while lex refer[red] to a particular kind of norm, whether described as
binding, or laid down, or read out.” Id, pp. 109-10.
17

John Milton, Paradise Lost (1667, rev. 1674), Book 12, lines 14-32, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~milton/
reading_ room/pl/book_12/index.shtml (8-6-14).
18

There is no intention here to become distracted by the legitimate and complicated distinctions between
a nation, a country and a society – a subject of considerable scholarly work, and with significantly
different definitions according to the historical context. See, e.g., Aristotle’s Politics, in which “nations” are
“communities organized on a tribal basis and lacking major urban centers – though often occupying more
territory than an average polis.” In ancient Greece, the “complete community” arose from the coming
together of several villages, and it was called a city. It was the city that Aristotle considered to exist “by
nature,” because the first communities’ end was a city, for “the city is their end, and nature is an end:
what each thing is … when its coming into being is complete is, we assert, the nature of that thing.” For
Aristotle the city came “into being for the sake of living, it exists for the sake of living well. ...From these
things it is evident, then, that the city belongs among the things that exist by nature, and that man is by
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law that governs nature, and nature is common to all living things. As Milton stated in The Tenure of
Kings and Magistrates, “all men naturally were borne free, being the image and resemblance of God
himselfe.”19 Locke similarly declared, “all Men are naturally in … a State of perfect Freedom.”20 What do
scholars intend when they refer to natural law? A brief note of caution is in order here. One should be
mindful of political theorist and medievalist Cary Nederman’s warning that, in considering the importance
of natural law to political thought, the intended meaning of language, such as “natural law” talk, may vary
in different historical contexts (indeed, one could add, even within the same historical context), and that
we must therefore be mindful of “profoundly different conceptions of political life and the foundations of
legitimate power” that one finds in the medieval versus the modern era notwithstanding use of the same
or similar language. At the same time Nederman recognized how ideas sometimes outstrip terminology
or, to put it the other way, “language may occasionally ‘lag behind’ thought.” Overall, this simply means
that language is not transparent; we need to take into account its context and application to make
assumptions about its meaning. Here we have another historiographic divide, namely, between those
scholars who privilege language over ideas and those who do the reverse.21
Notwithstanding the highly theologically-infused conceptions of politics and governance to which

nature a political animal.” Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, Chapter 2, §§7-8, pp. 3-4 & n.10. No doubt there
also are anachronistic uses of the terms nation, country and society in early modern European contexts
that were still essentially feudal and decentralized, such as the Holy Roman Empire. See, e.g., Peter
Zagorin, Rebels & Rulers 1500-1660: Vol. I: Society, States & Early Modern Revolution, Agrarian & Urban
Rebellions (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 180-81. For our purposes, namely, to recognize the
existence of law applicable to a particular geographic, social and political group, these words will be used
interchangeably.
19

Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, Proving That It Is Lawful and Hath been held so Through
All Ages for Any who have the Power to call to Account a Tyrant or Wicked King (1650)(EEBO Editions,
Proquest Reprint, 2010), p. 38.
20

Locke, The Second Treatise, Ch. 2, “Of the State of Nature,” §4, p. 269.

21

In his study Nederman was exploring the two “incommensurable historiographic visions” of history as
progress and continuity – the “continuity thesis” – and the presence of an insurmountable divide between
the medieval and modern periods – the “rupture thesis.” Nederman challenged Brian Tierney’s
contention that there was a direct line of natural rights doctrine from the twelfth to the seventeenth
centuries. He acknowledged that Tierney legitimately challenged “the conceit of many scholars” such as
Leo Strauss, C. B. Macpherson, and others who said that “rights talk” is a new (seventeenth-century)
thing. At the same time, in Nederman’s view the concept of natural rights in the medieval period did not
necessarily have political significance. Cary Nederman, Lineages of European Political Thought,
Explorations along the Medieval/Modern Divide from John of Salisbury to Hegel (The Catholic University
Press: Washington DC, 2009), pp. xix-xxi, 29-60; cf. Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, passim.
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Nederman is referring, with the translation and circulation of Aristotle’s Politics after about 1250, theorists
embraced “the fundamentally natural ends and purposes of human society,” along with the view that
“political philosophy itself constituted a distinct discipline, with its own unique vocabulary, independent of
theological considerations, and worthy in its own right for the sake of human happiness.”22 Even before
the rediscovery of Aristotle’s work on political philosophy, Justinian’s Digest, the great codification of
Roman law, was rediscovered in the late eleventh and early twelfth century, triggering a legal
renaissance, including the creation and thriving of a law school in Bologna that attracted students (clerics
studying law) from throughout Europe.23 The first passage of the Digest stated, “Private law is made up of
three parts,” the first of which was natural law, ius naturale. The other two parts were the law of nations,
ius gentium, which was natural law as applicable to all nations, and ius proprium, law peculiar to a
particular society, also known as ius civile, civil law. Natural law was defined as “what nature has taught
all animals: for this law is not peculiar to mankind but common to all animals of earth, sea and air.”24 (The
source of this view may have been Peripatetic (Aristotelian thought) or Neoplatonic scholars; but not the
Stoics, who believed that ius naturale applied only to rational beings.25)

22

Nederman, Lineages of Political Thought, p. 7. For every assertion on the subject of natural law, there
is a qualification. Thus, Jon Miller pointed out that Hugo Grotius, the seventeenth-century thinker often
characterized as the father of natural law, did “not think that law, politics and ethics are entirely distinct
domains. If one reads Grotius with the expectation that he will keep them apart, one will likely be
befuddled by the way he ignores distinctions which are important to us. It may help to know that he does
this because he is interested in picking out the fundamental principles which lie at the basis of all
normativity, not just a portion thereof.” Thus, says Miller, Grotius “cannot talk just about ethics, say,
because his views on ethics are informed by his views on politics and the law.” Jon Miller, "Hugo
Grotius", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/ entries/grotius/ (6-11-14).
23

The study of civil law was professionalized in England in the mid-fifteenth century. In the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, after the invention of printing, professional lawyers amassed substantial private
law book collections; medieval lawyers did not do so. Although it is several centuries later, one of the
reasons that the Sidney Library at Penshurst was extraordinary was the size and breadth of its legal
collection. See The Library of the Sidneys of Penshurst Place circa 1665, Germaine Warkentin, Joseph
L. Black & William R. Bowen, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), passim; For more details
on the development of law libraries in England, see Appendix B; see also Stanley Chodorow, Law
Libraries and the Formation of the Legal Profession in the Late Middle Ages (Austin, TX: Jamail Center of
Legal Research, University of Texas, 2007), passim; Arthur Hogue, Origins of the Common Law
(Indianapolis, IN: The Liberty Fund, 1986)[orig. pub. 1966], pp. 245-46.
24

In contrast, like Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez of the Spanish Renaissance School of
Salamanca, Grotius considered natural law, which originated in God, to be a law of reason, which
therefore applied only to creatures capable of being rational. Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, p. 327.
25

Kenneth Pennington, “The History of Rights in Western Thought,” 47 Emory Law Journal (Winter 1998),
pp. 237-52, 243; Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, p. 45; David Johnston, “The jurists,” The
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In the twelfth century (c. 1140) Gratian produced the Decretum, a textbook on canon law, which
became part of the Bologna law school curriculum. The division between Roman (civil) and Church
(canon) law quickly merged. Gratian “confronted” the term ius or jus (the root for justice) in the Decretum,
grappling with its equivocal meanings, which ranged from law to legal system to rights, and from an
objective law to a subjective right. He began the treatise by dividing law into “natural law” and “usages
(i.e. custom).” The canonist Rufinus (c. 1160) maintained that, “natural ius is a certain force instilled in
every human creature by nature to do good and avoid the opposite.”26 This definition became commonplace. For Huguccio, the greatest canonist of the twelfth century, “ius naturale in its primary sense was
always an attribute of individual persons, ‘a force of the soul’ associated with human rationality.”27
In the four centuries that preceded the Protestant Reformation there were a number of natural law
theories. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)’s theory is most well-known. Aquinas defined ius as “what is

Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, Christopher Rowe & Malcolm Schofield, ed.
(Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 616-634, 620-21. In his panegyric to Brian Tierney, Charles Reid
explained how Tierney effectively advanced a view about natural rights that saw their development on a
continuum from ancient times, and not something that sprouted out of the ground in the medieval or early
modern period. “Natural rights historians and scholars have expressed numerous opinions concerning the
origins of the Western rights tradition. In the Anglo-American world, scholars have commonly viewed the
seventeenth century as a radical departure from an older tradition that had emphasized the existence of
an objectively just order in which individual rights were impossible. On the Continent, by contrast,
scholars have tended to view the fourteenth century as decisive for the formation of individual rights: it
was then that William of Ockham, the brilliant English logician, succeeded in dissolving the thirteenthcentury synthesis of Thomas Aquinas in an acid bath of nominalistic analysis, reducing Thomas’s
conception of ordered justice to the competing interests and claims of individuals.” Per Charles Reid,
both schools of thought tended “to view the creation of natural-rights theories as an aberrant development, either harmful to society, or, at best, of dubious benefit.” Tierney challenged “this scholarly consensus,” with a “central contention … that theories of natural rights did not emerge as an aberrational feature
of Western political and legal thought at some late date, but rather comprised an integral part of Western
intellectual life from the birth of universities and the revival of legal studies in the twelfth century.” Charles
J. Reid, Jr., “The Medieval Origins of the Western Natural Rights Tradition: The Achievement of Brian
Tierney,” 83 Cornell Law Review 437 (1998), pp. 437–40; see also Charles J. Reid, Jr., “The Canonistic
Contribution to the Western Rights Tradition: An Historical Inquiry,” 33 Boston College Law Review
(1991), pp. 37-92; cf. Harold J. Berman, “The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale,”
The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 103, No. 7 (May 1994), pp. 1651-1738. On the distinction between natural
law and natural rights, see Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, passim; cf. Annabel S. Brett, Liberty,
Right, and Nature: Individual Rights in Later Scholastic Thought (Cambridge University Press,1997);
Harold Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA &
London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1983) (“Law and Revolution I”), pp. 120-64.
26
Pennington, “The History of Rights in Western Thought,” p. 243; Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights,
pp. 58-62.
27

Pennington, “The History of Rights in Western Thought,” p. 243.
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just,” as well as “the just thing itself.”28 For Aquinas, natural law was something that existed in external
nature. Sometimes he used the word ius and sometimes lex in discussing natural law and natural right,
both of which included an “underlying sense of rightness or fairness.” Natural law consisted of man’s first
judgment, which is the starting point of practical reasoning and other uncontestable general convictions
that were directed towards our “complete good,” to which we are naturally inclined. This constituted “the
peculiarly human participation in the eternal law, in providence,” by mankind.29 Thus, divine reason was
the ultimate source of law, and advancing the common good its ultimate purpose. The fifteenth-century
jurist Sir John Fortesque adopted Aquinas’ reliance on divine reason as the source of law.30 In contrast, a
century before Fortesque, William of Ockham (1288-1347) and other members of the “voluntarist” school
of natural law challenged Aquinas, arguing that “at the divine and human levels,” will predominated over
reason and was the foundation for precepts of natural law.31 Given these two major schools of natural
law, one resting on divine reason and the other asserting that it is divine and human will not reason that
was the ultimate source of law, what are the consequent precepts of natural law?
Once again we can turn back in time for guidance to Cicero, ancient Roman republican, legal
advocate, and political theorist. Cicero “helped popularize the crucial theory of natural law,” a commitment
to a universal code of ethics, applicable to all men, that was inherent in nature, transcended time and
culture, and was discernable by man. Thus, the view that natural law existed and constituted the “glue
that connected gods to humans in the one great organism of the universe” was a decidedly pre-Christian

28

Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, pp. 23-26.

29

Similarly, the medieval religious jurist Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) believed that human reason
provided “access to the precepts of natural law that guides all valid political institutions and powers.” Cary
J. Nederman, “Empire and the Historiography of European Political Thought: Marsiglio of Padua, Nicholas
of Cusa, and the Medieval/Modern Divide,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Jan. 2005), pp.
1-15, 10; Ralph McInerny and John O'Callaghan, "Saint Thomas Aquinas", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Summer 2014 ed.), Edward N. Zalta, ed., http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/sum2014/entries/aquinas/ (6-11-14).
30

Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western
Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003)(“Law
and Revolution II”), p. 232.
31

Harold J. Berman, “Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale,” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 103, No. 7 (May,
1994), pp. 1651-1738, 1654.
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concept.32 As Cicero stated in The Laws, “For law is a force of nature, the intelligence and reason of a
wise man, and the criterion of justice and injustice.” 33 Even in a world in which most men did not
participate in politics, man participated in the natural order of life, the laws of nature.34 That natural legal
order was innate, part of nature, “stamped in invisible characters upon our very frame. …Hence this
whole universe must be thought of as a single community shared by gods and men.”35 The recognition of

32

Carl J. Richards, Greeks and Romans Bearing Gifts, How the Ancients Inspired the Founding Fathers
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, Inc., 2009), p. 10.
33
Cicero, “The Laws,” Cicero, The Republic and The Laws, Niall Rudd, tr. (Oxford University Press,
2008), Bk One, ¶19, p. 103.
34

In “’Bringing Philosophy down from the Heavens’: Natural Right in the Roman Law,” The Review of
Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter, 1989), pp. 70-85, Michael Zuckert analyzed the way in which jurists have
endeavored to integrate the philosophical concept of natural law with Roman law, including Justinian’s
Institutes and the Digest. Fundamentally, the question that the jurists faced was how to create a coherent
doctrine of jus naturale. Zuckert believed that it was essential to set aside both the earlier Stoic and the
later Thomist natural law doctrines in order to appreciate, without anachronism, what the post-Institutes
and post-Digest jurists were trying to do, which was to include both objective rights – “’the right or just
thing itself,’ that is, the correct assignment or relation of things to persons,” or “being ‘in the right’” – and
subjective rights or claims – “having a right” within the scope of jus naturale, and to then integrate these
concepts with civil law. Id, pp. 74, 78-79. “The Roman jurists attempt[ed] to carry forward the effort
which, according to Cicero, was initiated by Socrates, of ‘bringing philosophy down from the heavens,’
and making it useful to men in the cities. They attempt[ed] to use philosophy – and to tame it.” Id, p. 79,
citing Cicero, Tusculan Disputations. As we shall see, Grotius did the same thing. Grotius “ did not look
upon civil society as an artificial creation; it was, rather, an extension or an improvement made
in order to render natural society more serviceable to men's needs. Civil society was built upon
the universal human society that existed in nature.”
In parallel with the way that Sidney and other early modern republicans approached the multi-faceted
aspects of law, Zuckert described Roman jurists’ positing a hierarchy of law, beginning with the most
“universalistic,” in the form of jus naturale, and then continuing to jus gentium, which “’recedes from’ the
jus naturale in that it applies only to all the human peoples and not to all animal beings as such,” and then
receded again to the jus civile, which is “yet more restricted, for it is the jus belonging only to some particular people or other.” Id, p. 76. The interesting question that Zuckert’s analysis raised is, when, and in
what ways, is it lawful in civil society to restrict a natural right, the most conspicuous being freedom, and
when is that restriction unlawful? The obvious example is slavery, which was lawful under Roman law
although not lawful in the state of nature, viz., in the state of nature everyone is free. This certainly was an
issue with which the early modern English grappled. What natural law required in non-natural circumstances, i.e., not in the state of nature, could be viewed as self-evident – as one scholar stated, “a body of
immortal rules superior to positive law.” A. G. Chloros, “What is Natural Law?” The Modern Law Review,
Vol. 21, No. 6 (Nov., 1958), pp. 609-22, 609. It was Blackstone, in the eighteenth century, who similarly
wrote, “This law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior
in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe in all countries and at all times: no human laws
are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force and all their
authority, mediately or immediately, from the original.’” Id, p. 610, quoting Blackstone’s Commentaries on
the Laws of England I, pp. 40-41. Clearly, this was not how Romans applied natural law to civil society,
and for Grotius and the early modern English republicans, the matter was more complicated.
35
Carl J. Richard, Greeks and Romans Bearing Gifts, p. 10, citing Cicero’s Res publica; cf. John Locke,
who in Chapter X of Book IV of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding stated, “We are capable of
knowing certainly that there is a God. Though God has given us no innate ideas of himself; though he has
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natural law reflected an optimistic view of man – that we are beings that seek out what is morally right,
and we recognize it when we see it. Cicero was not original; but he was pithy: “I supply only the words,
and I don’t lack those!” It was his words that were read for two thousand years by educated Europeans
(and in the eighteenth century by the American colonists).36
Hugo Grotius, the brilliant seventeenth-century Dutch scholar known as the “miracle of Holland,”
and “one of the greatest jurists of all time” who was famous for his political theory, jurisprudence, and
diplomatic role in Europe, elaborated on these points in his famous text, On the Law of War and Peace,
published in 1625.37 Like Cicero, the study of Grotius is a scholarly industry. And like Cicero but in
contradistinction to Hobbes, Grotius argued that in the state of nature man was governed by principles of
morality. Grotius was categorical that man was not motivated solely by self-interest.38 The context of
Grotius’ work was a thoroughly imbued Christian world engulfed in the brutal Thirty Years War, a
mercilessly deadly conflict.39 As Grotius stated, “I had many and weighty reasons for undertaking to write

stamped no original characters on our minds, wherein we may read his being; yet having furnished us
with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not left himself without witness: since we have
sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry ourselves about
us.” “Of Our Knowledge Of The Existence Of A God,” John Locke, “An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding,” The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes (London: C. & J. Rivington, 1824 12th ed.),
Vol. 2 Online Library of Liberty (Indianapolis, IN: Online Library of Liberty, 2011), E-Book (PDF format),
Vol. 2, Ch. X, p. 107.
36
Richards, Greeks and Romans Bearing Gifts, p. 11; Cicero, “The Laws,” Cicero, The Republic and The
Laws, Bk One, ¶23, p. 105.
37

See Charles Reid’s panegyric to the work of Brian Tierney, “The Achievement of Brian Tierney,” p. 460.

38

Benjamin Straumann, “’Ancient Caesarian Lawyers’ in a State of Nature: Roman Tradition and Natural
Rights in Hugo Grotius’s De iure praedae,” Political Theory, Vol. 34, No. 3 (June 2006), pp. 328-50, 337-38;
see also Straumann, Roman Law in the State of Nature: The Classical Foundation of Hugo Grotius’ Natural
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015); Straumann, Crisis and Constitutionalism: Roman Political
Thought from the Fall of the Republic to the Age of Revolution (Oxford & New York: Oxford University
Press, 2018).
39

The Thirty Years War was triggered by the rebellion of the Protestant states of Bohemia (today, the
Czech Republic) against their Catholic king, Ferdinand II, who became the Habsburg Holy Roman
Emperor the following year. The Bohemians offered Frederick V, Elector Palatine, the kingship of their
country; he was crowned on Nov. 4, 1619. Frederick was the son-in-law of James I – an obvious
connection between the English and what was about to become the bloody Thirty Years’ War. In 1620,
Frederick was over-thrown by the combined forces of Spain and the Holy Roman Empire, forcing
Frederick and his family into exile in Holland. Overall, “Protestantism in Europe seemed very much on the
retreat.” James’ determination to stay neutral, and his consequent unwillingness to come to the aid of his
daughter and son-in-law, was a political decision that alienated the English, playing out “within a burgeoning public sphere.” Harris, Rebellion, pp. 187-91. In retrospect, however, we can easily conclude that this
was a brilliant decision.
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upon this subject. Throughout the Christian world, I observed a lack of restraint in relation to war, such as
even barbarous races should be ashamed of.”40
Grotius began by explicitly challenging the concept of Interest advocated by the ancient Roman
skeptic Carneades, viz, that, “for reasons of expediency, men imposed upon themselves laws, which vary
according to customs, and among the same peoples often undergo changes as times change.”
Carneades then argued that, “there is no law of nature, because all creatures, men as well as animals,
are impelled by nature towards ends advantageous to themselves; that, consequently, there is no justice;
or, if such there be, it is supreme folly, since one does violence to his own interests if he consults the
advantage of others.”41 To the contrary, maintained Grotius, “Man is, to be sure, an animal, but an animal
of a superior kind.” This included his choice to live in a community, “an impelling desire for society, that is
the social life – not of any and every sort, but peaceful, and organised according to the measure of his
intelligence, with those who are of his own kind.” Grotius continued, “this social trend the Stoics called
‘sociableness.’ …This maintenance of the social order, which we have roughly sketched, and which is
consonant with human intelligence, is the source of law properly so called.”42 Natural law conformed to
man’s rational nature and sociableness; those things that are “clearly at variance with [the direction of

40
Hugo Grotius On the Law of War and Peace, Stephen C. Neff, ed. & annot. (Cambridge University
Press: 2012)(“LWP”), Prologue, p. 8. On Grotius, see Ch. One. There are many editions of LWP. Unless
otherwise noted, references here are to the annotated Neff edition.
41
Id, p. 2. Tierney pointed out that while Grotius began On The Law of War and Peace with reference to
the ancient Greek skeptic Carneades, he then quickly brushed aside Carneades’ doubts about Stoicism
and never returned to the subject or to any preoccupation with seventeenth-century skepticism, either. In
contrast, Richard Tuck maintained that “the central animating principle of Grotius’ work” was the moral
relativism and skepticism of contemporaries like Pierre Charron and Montaigne. In that sense, Carneades
was a stand-in for the early modern skeptics. Michael Zuckert also believed that rebutting Carneades
was essential for Grotius. Yet it seems self-evident that if Grotius considered Carneades’ skepticism or
the ideas of later skeptics to be something “he must refute,” much more effort would have been put into
doing so. See Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, Ch. Thirteen, “Grotius. From Medieval to Modern,” pp.
316-42; Michael P. Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism (Princeton University Press,
1994), p. 128; Richard Tuck, “The ‘Modern’ Theory of Natural Law,” A. Pagden, ed., The Languages of
Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 99-119. For a review of
the scholarly debate, see Thomas Mautner, “Grotius and the Skeptics,” Journal of the History of Ideas
(2005), pp. 577-601, whose “bottom line” is that “Grotius bypassed skepticism. It was not on his agenda,
nor did it have to be.” Id, p. 601; see also Martin van Gelderen, “Aristotelians, Monarchomachs and
Republicans: Sovereignty and respublica mixta in Dutch and German Political Thought, 1580-1650,”
Republicanism, a Shared European Heritage, Vol. I, pp. 195-217, 199-204.
42

Prologue, LWP, pp. 2-3; see Sir William Rattigan, K.C., “The Great Jurists of the World. IV. Hugo Grotius,” in Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, New Series, Vol. VI (1905), Sir John
MacDonell and Edward Manson, eds. (London: John Murray, 1906), pp. 68-81, 77 (emphasis added).
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well-tempered] judgment … [were] understood to be contrary also to the law of nature, that is, to the
nature of man” and were “necessarily repugnant to man’s reasonable, social, tranquil nature,” and
therefore “cannot belong to the law of nature.”43 As Grotius stated in another context, Man is, “by Nature”
a “mild Creature,” possessing a “natural Gentleness.”44
Like Sidney (and unlike Hobbes), Grotius believed that men were naturally sociable and had
always been so. Civil society developed out of the state of nature, and sociableness was part of human
nature and the natural order.45 Sidney expressed the same thought poetically: “God hath not only
declared in Scripture, but written on the heart of every man, that as it is better to be clothed, than to go
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LWP, Prologue, p. 3. Like Grotius, the sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suarez, a leading
figure of the School of Salamanca and a well-known scholastic Aristotelian, believed that man was
invested with the ability to reason as a result of the natural order that God had created. Natural reason
revealed to man what is good and bad. Nevertheless “God, as the Author and Governor of that nature,
commands that certain actions should be performed or avoided, in accordance with the dictates of
reason.” Suarez also emphasized that divine will “was not the sole reason for obligation,” and postulated
the identity of natural law in man and God. “Natural law was truly and properly divine law of which God
was the author.” Edwards, “The Law of Nature in the Thought of Hugo Grotius,” pp. 791-97. Suarez
distinguished between institutions founded in the natural law and those founded in positive law, thereby
rejecting “the Aristotelian statement that some men are by nature slaves; all forms of servitude must exist
only on the basis of mere human law.” To the contrary, Suarez maintained that, “By nature all men are
free; …the right of liberty is intrinsic in human nature.” According to one scholar, Suarez had “an
astounding knowledge of both the canon law and the Roman civil law and, in addition, of the ‘national’
laws of the Iberian peninsula, France and the Italian states, papal and secular.” Heinrich Rommen,
“Francis Suarez,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Oct. 1948), pp. 437-61.
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Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. & intro., Richard Tuck, from Jean Barbeyrac ed.
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005) E-Book pdf, Vol. 1 [Bk I], Ch. 1, §XII, p. 68. According to Tuck, who
viewed Grotius as adopting a non-Aristotelian moral, humanistic natural law theory, the early eighteenthcentury jurist Jean Barbeyrac modified Grotius’ language. “Barbeyrac consistently sought to emphasize
the wider character of Grotian sociability and to bring him in line with the seventeenth-century political
theorist Samuel von Pufendorf (whose main aim was to attack the account of man’s narrow and selfinterested natural life found in Hobbes). But anyone who read the first edition (as Hobbes himself.
probably did), or who could see through the confusion artfully introduced by Grotius (as Rousseau seems
to have done), would be aware that Grotius’s theory of the law of nature was more like Hobbes’s than
Pufendorf and Barbeyrac were ever prepared to acknowledge.” When Rousseau stated that the principles
of Grotius and Hobbes were “‘exactly the same,’ he may well have been surprisingly close to the mark.”
For instance, Barbeyrac sought to emphasize sociability in Grotius’ work by inserting the words “and
social” after the word “rational” in the Grotius passage that described ius natural as a dictate of right
reason, id, pp. 19 & 166, n.33. On Pufendorf, with whom we have no basis for assuming Sidney was
familiar, see Appendix B.
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“Though [Grotius] held that states came into existence by the express or implied consent of
men, this did not constitute a crucial departure that negated his basic belief in the naturalness of
sociability. He did not look upon civil society as an artificial creation; it was, rather, an extension
or an improvement made in order to render natural society more serviceable to men's needs.
Civil society was built upon the universal human society that existed in nature; its purpose was
to enable men to fulfill natural aims.” Charles Edwards, “The Law of Nature in the Thought of Hugo
Grotius,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Nov. 1970), pp. 784-807, 790.
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naked; to live in a house, than to lie in the fields; to be defended by the united force of a multitude, than to
place the hopes of his security solely in his own strength; and to prefer the benefits of society, before a
savage and barbarous solitude.” The purpose of law was to maintain the social order of civil society in
consonance with the nature of man. For God “also taught [men] to frame such societies, and to establish
such laws as were necessary to preserve them.”46
Precisely how to define Grotius’ concept of natural law has been a subject of scholarly debate
among political theorists, jurists and historians. Perhaps most interesting from a Sidney/Adams
perspective is the notion that Grotius had an approach to law, morality, and politics in which “the theorist
unmindful of reality (as society sees it) contributes little,” for “the theorist is not simply in the business of
detached description. The engagement with reality must be humble.” Furthermore, answers in the real
world can only be “approximate” and “provisional.”47 Looking at the devastation of war, Grotius sought
some sort of contingent, realistic approach to mutually acceptable behaviors and actions among enemies.
He also sought to establish whether there was such a thing as a “just” war and, if so, its parameters. In
short, Grotius fused morality and law. He began with the concept that, “The law of nature is a dictate of
right reason, which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature, has
in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity; in consequence, such an act is either forbidden or
enjoined by the author of nature, God.”48 The fact that natural law forbid certain acts by man and
commanded others is true anywhere and everywhere. Moreover, “Clearly, for Grotius, natural law, rational
in nature, has a decidedly theological foundation, for it is God who forbids or commands.49
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DCG, I.6.22.
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For a helpful analysis of Grotius’ ideas, see NYU law professor Benedict Kingsbury’s “A Grotian
Tradition of Theory and Practice?: Grotius, Law, and Moral Skepticism in the Thought of Hedley Bull,”
Quinnipac Law Review Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 1- 33, 31 (1997).
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LWP, Bk I, Ch. 1, §10, pp. 28-29.
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According to political scientist Charles Edwards, there are scholars who contend that Grotius’ theory of
natural law was decidedly secular and rational, and therefore modern, “a drastic departure from medieval
concepts of man and morality.” Edwards included among such scholars Ernst Cassirer and Otto Gierke. I
subscribe to Edwards’ view that, “even though Grotius was a late medievalist who freed natural-law
theory from its traditional medieval tie, he was not a secularist in terms of the above definition because he
retained theological presuppositions in his thought and stressed the dependence of man on the divine
order.” Edwards, “The Law of Nature in the Thought of Hugo Grotius,” pp. 784-85. For further discussion
of the matter of secularists vs. medieval theological thinkers and, particularly, the ideas of medieval
historian Brian Tierney, see Appendix B.
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Scholars debate whether Grotius was strictly a rationalist or also included “voluntarist” concepts
within his definition of natural law.50 It seems clear, however, that in addition to natural law, for Grotius
there was another kind of God’s law – a bit confusing – and that was “volitional divine law.” This
consisted in something that God willed and, as a result it became law; but it was not ineluctable or in
accordance with the rules of logic or morality, nor was it necessarily, by its very nature, law; and it could
be applicable to mankind generally, or to communities or individuals specifically. Volitional law also could
be human, and either the law of communities and nations – “municipal law” – or the law of nations, i.e.,
the will of the international community of nations. 51
Echoing the medieval scholars who viewed natural law in terms of justice, whether termed jus or
ius, for Grotius law was divided into natural law on the one hand, and positive or instituted law – law
made by man – on the other. Recall that ius or jus is Latin for law or right. As law, jus could mean “the
law” in the more abstract sense, as distinguished from any specific enactment or rule. It sometimes
referred to law as an aggregate, a system, a whole. Additionally, it could mean a particular system or a
body of specific laws, as in the phrase the jus civile, the civil law. The term was also used to refer to what
was morally right, or in accordance with religious principles.52 Presumably, law that was instituted was
intended to be morally right.
We can agree that Grotius created a hierarchy of law to which men were bound. Natural law
came first. Even God was bound by it. For the law of nature was so unchangeable that it was not even
subject to modification by God, e.g., two plus two will always be four.53 More profoundly, God “cannot
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This question is sophisticated and abstruse. The medieval debate over whether God’s reason was
superior to his will, the “realists” or “rationalists” versus the “voluntarists” or “nominalists,” came down to
the question of whether God could alter the laws of nature if he chose to do so. Edwards convincingly
argued that while Grotius was “not a unified” thinker, and while commentators are tea-leaf-reading to
some extent since Grotius’ ideas not only evolved, but he “did not elaborate on his chosen posture,” we
can “piec[e] his reasoning together,” and arrive at the following understanding: that Grotius was a
moderate who accepted the “middle course” of Suarez and Aquinas rather than the views of extremist
rationalists or voluntarists. In particular, he believed that acts may in themselves be obligatory or
impermissible, and therefore “enjoined or forbidden by God”; but they also could be volitional divine law
that are not obligatory or impermissible in their own right, but because God has commanded them so.
Edwards, “The Law of Nature in the Thought of Hugo Grotius,” pp. 787-803.
51

See n. 50.
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For a more detailed parsing of scholarly interpretations of Grotius’ use of these terms, see Appendix B.
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LWP, Bk I, Ch. 1, §§ 9 & 10, pp. 28-31.
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cause that that which is intrinsically evil be not evil.”54 Cicero also said that natural law was “unchanging
and eternal. …There will not be one such law in Rome and another in Athens, one now and another in the
future, but all peoples at all times will be embraced by a single and eternal and unchangeable law.”55
One can see the continuing interest by international law experts in Grotius, who concluded that war
cannot justify evil.
In sum, for Grotius, while natural law remained the same, instituted law was not abstract but
concrete, and it originated “in the will or consent of men.” These laws were adopted as “customs of
nations” – pragmatic, contextual, contingent. At the same time, natural law was incorporated into the
specific law of a nation – jus civile – and the universal law of nations – jus gentium. From these principles
Grotius derived the concept of human rights, what he called “faculties,” which enabled men to perform a
just act or achieve a particular just end. Between individuals as well as between communities, it was not
utility – “expediency alone” (which one could roughly equate with reason of state) – but a common
concept of natural law and natural rights that upheld laws governing human conduct.56
Scholars have been diverted by Grotius’ infamous statement in The Law of War and Peace that
natural law was valid “even if we should concede that which cannot be conceded without the utmost
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Id, p. 30.
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Cicero, “The Republic,” Cicero, The Republic and The Laws, Bk Three, ¶33, pp. 68-69. Significantly,
legal scholar Benjamin Straumann pointed out that, “the crucial reason why these Roman sources and
especially Cicero were attractive to Grotius was that they were sympathetic to Grotius’s legal defense of
Dutch military expansion.” As Grotius argued, the “’boundless sea’” could not reasonably belong to one
nation that had “’the right to prevent other nations from selling to one another,’” any more than “a manifest
injustice [manifesta iniuria] of long standing’” could ever “create a ‘specific right.’” “Benjamin Straumann,
“Ancient Caesarian Lawyers’ in a State of Nature: Roman Tradition and Natural Rights in Hugo Grotius’
De iure praedae,” Political Theory, Vol. 34, No. 3 (June 2006), pp. 328-50, 331-32 (citing Grotius’ Mare
liberum, The Freedom of the Seas); see Thomas Mautner, “Grotius and the Skeptics,” Journal of the
History of Ideas (2005), pp. 577-601; Martine Julia van Ittersum, “The wise man is never merely a private
citizen: The Roman Stoa in Hugo Grotius’ De Jure Praedae (1604-1608),” History of European Ideas 36
(2010), pp. 1-18; compare Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, Ch. 3, “Grotius,” pp. 58-81.
56

Neff, Introduction, LWP, p. xxvii & id, Prologue, p. 7; see Berman, “The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence,” p. 1659; compare Annabel Brett, “Natural Right and Civil Community: The Civil Philosophy of
Hugo Grotius, The Historical Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 31-51 (Grotius’ natural rights
theory was partially Aristotelian and partially humanistic, and it was consistent with his view that the civic
community functioned on the basis of communal interest, transcending individual rights or the free man’s
pursuit of his own personal good or utility); Charles Reid, “The Achievement of Brian Tierney” (citations
omitted), p. 461 (“Generally speaking, Grotius, like his medieval sources, ‘emphasized both individual
rights and the common good as complementary rather than conflicting aspects of the human condition.’
Not surprisingly, Tierney concludes that ‘Grotius was in fact using the medieval tradition of thought about
natural law and natural rights to sustain a new vision of the world and the church.’”)
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wickedness: that there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of no concern to Him.” 57 But Grotius’ point
here was entirely rhetorical; it is indisputable that Grotius’ theory was founded on the principle that God
endowed man with certain unique qualities.58 “For Grotius the world was created and permeated by
divine reason.” He also believed that revelation could provide valid knowledge about reality and that,
“True laws … existed from the beginning of creation in God as divine reason and were employed through
God’s ultimate will and providence as rules for the governance of all His creatures.”59Among man’s
unique qualities that were absent in other animals was the ability to reason and that “special instrument,”
the facility of speech.60 Moreover while all animals have instincts, man, by use of his reason, was the
only creature capable of “acting in accordance with general principles”; accordingly, he alone was
capable of making laws.61 As Cicero said, “there is nothing better than reason, and reason is present in
both man and God” in a “primordial partnership.”62 In Grotius’ words, quoting the ancients, “Jupiter has
ordained that Fishes, wild Beasts, and Birds should devour each other, because Justice doth not take
place amongst them: But to Men he has prescribed the Law of Justice, which is the most excellent Thing
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Prologue, LWP, p. 4.
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This “even” or “even if” style of argument is repeatedly used throughout On The Law of War and Peace.
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Edwards, “The Law of Nature in the Thought of Hugo Grotius,” pp. 806-07.
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Prologue, LWP, p. 3.
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Id. This idea comes from Cicero: “The primary function of justice is to ensure that no one harms his
neighbor unless he has himself been unjustly attacked.” Cicero, On Obligations, Bk I, ¶20, p. 9. Locke
expressed the same thought. Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, Ch. XVI, pp. 385-86 (“Should a
Robber break into my House, and with a Dagger at my Throat, make me seal Deeds to convey my Estate
to him, would this give him any Title? Just such a Title by his Sword, has an unjust Conquerour, who
forces me into Submission. …What is my Remedy against a Robber, that so broke into my House?
Appeal to the Law for Justice.”)
62

Cicero, “The Laws,” Cicero, The Republic and The Laws, Bk One, ¶23, p. 105. Straumann asked, “If
‘positive’ ancient liberty indeed lacked any notion of rights, and if the keen contrast between ‘positive’
ancient liberty and modern ‘negative’ liberty therefore deserves credit, how can it be understood that
Hugo Grotius, one of the major protagonists in the history of natural rights, based his account of just
causes of war explicitly and to an overwhelming degree on classical ethics and jurisprudence?”
Straumann’s answer is that Grotius’ arguments in support of the concepts of “just war,” and “natural
justice” relied on Roman law, and “a Roman tradition of rights-based ethics and laws,” particularly Cicero,
but also the ius civile. Challenging Richard Tuck, Straumann maintained that Grotius’ theory of natural
law was not a response to Carneades and other “second-order moral skeptics,” nor a response to
Hobbes. Rather, it was a defense of the Roman just war doctrine, “essentially a legal condition, where
the norms of natural law are enforced by the holders of subjective natural claims-rights.” Unlike Benjamin
Constant and his juxtaposition of modern and ancient liberty, “Grotius did not conflate all of classical
antiquity into one.” Benjamin Straumann, “Ancient Caesarian Lawyers in a State of Nature,” pp. 328-50,
328-29, 331-32 (citing Grotius’ Mare liberum, The Freedom of the Seas), p. 350.
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in the World.”63
Recall from our discussion in Chapter One on Sidney’s background that Sidney enormously
admired Grotius, who he likely met when he was a young man living in Paris with his father, who was the
English ambassador to the French Court in the late 1630s and early ’40s. Grotius had been in a Dutch
prison because of his affiliation with Oldenbarnevelt, the United Provinces’ chief minister who lost a
political battle and was executed for advocating religious toleration.64 With the help of his wife, Grotius
made a daring escape and absconded to France. There he was asked by Queen Christina to serve as
Sweden’s ambassador in Paris, an appointment that overlapped with Leicester’s ambassadorship. The
two intellectuals because acquaintances.65 This association is not at all surprising given their mutual
interest in the cause of international Protestantism and Protestants’ well-being on the Continent. There
were other commonalities between Leicester and Grotius, including the fact that Leicester’s father was a
friend of Lipsius, who was a friend (and teacher) of Grotius’ father, both were intellectuals (and sons of
intellectuals) steeped in humanism and Tacitism, both tolerant Protestant diplomats serving intolerant
Catholic France. Both men also had close ties to the Dutch Protestants. In sum, Grotius may have been
a hero to Sidney; he most certainly was a role model and an intellectual beacon.66
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Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Book 1, Richard Tuck, ed. & intro., from the Edition by Jean
Barbeyrac (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005) Liberty Fund E-Book PDF Format, Ch.I, § X.1, p. 67.
Grotius also noted that, “Cicero in his first book of Offices remarks, that we do not say Horses and Lions
have any Justice.” Id. Grotius explicitly relied on Cicero, Plutarch, the Christian apologist Lactantius and
Polybius. Cicero also stated, “obligations of justice … are to be given precedence over the pursuit of
knowledge and its obligations.” Cicero, On Obligations, Bk I, §155, p. 52. For a discussion of the work of
medieval and early modern jurists in which “the true meaning of a law (mens legum) was transformed into
a concern for the spirit of laws in general, …especially as derived from a critical and comparative canvassing of the ‘law of nations,’” see Donald R. Kelley, “Vera Philosophia: The Philosophical Significance
of Renaissance Jurisprudence,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 14, No. 3 (July 1976), pp. 26779 (quotation on p. 279). In addition to Tierney and Tuck, see also Michael Zuckert, Natural Rights and
the New Republicanism, Princeton University Press, 1998); Knud Haakonssen,"Grotius and the History of
Political Thought," Political Theory, Vol. 13, Issue 2, pp. 239–65 (1985).
64
The Oldenbarnevelt trial arraignment record was part of the Sidney Library. The Library of the Sidneys
at Penshurst Place circa 1665, p. 79.
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Thomas G. West, “Foreword,” DCG, p. xxix.
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While Grotius may have been imprisoned in the Netherlands, after his escape he remained an
important contributor to Dutch imperial policy through the Dutch East India Company. He also was invited
by Cardinal Richelieu to become involved in the newly created French East India Company. See Martine
Julia van Ittersum, “The Long Goodbye: Hugo Grotius’ Justification of Dutch Expansion Overseas, 16151645,” History of European Ideas 36 (2010), pp. 386-411.
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Sidney “called Grotius’s On the Law of War and Peace the most important of all books in political
theory.”67 Indeed, one could say that Grotius’ treatise informed Sidney’s political ideas. As Grotius had
expounded, “the universal law of God and nature is always the same,” said Sidney.68 On the matter of the
natural world that God gave to man, Sidney referenced Grotius repeatedly. In one of his more concise
allusions, Sidney stated, “inasmuch as God having from the beginning ordained that men should not live
like wolves in woods, every man by himself, but together in civil societies, left to every one a liberty of
joining with that society which best pleas’d him, and to every society to create such magistrates, and
frame such laws as should seem move conducing to their own good, according to the measure of light
and reason they might have.” Sidney then quoted Grotius for the proposition that, “God approved and
ratified the salutary constitutions of government made by men.”69 Needless to say, there are numerous
Grotius texts in the Sidney Library.70
Various principles of natural law were something that Sidney took for granted.71 Discussing
ancient societies, for example, he stated, “The Israelites, Spartans, Romans and others, who thus framed
their governments according to their own will, did it not by any peculiar privilege, but by a universal right
conferred upon them by God and nature. They were made of no better clay than others: They had no
right, that does not as well belong to other nations.” Sidney’s writing were pragmatic; he certainly was not
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West, “Foreword,” DCG, p. xxix.

68

DCG, I.17.57.
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Id, III.10.373 (emphasis in original).
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The Library of the Sidneys of Penshurst Place circa 1665, pp. 56, 124, 134 181-82, 196, 241.
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So did Neville: “Although republicanism has often been disassociated historiographically from natural law
theory, Neville clearly embraced the idea of an original state of nature and war, which was ended by the
creation of civil society by contract and the establishment of law.” According to Mahlberg, “Neville’s interest
in religion focused on Scriptural interpretation and the relationship of Christian faith to natural law theory.”
Mahlberg, Henry Neville and English republican culture in the seventeenth century, pp. 121-22, 200. In
Patriarcha non Monarcha James Tyrrell said that “since the first Law of Nature is Self-preservation, it is
lawful for a man to use all means conducing to this end, that do not prejudice another mans Right in his
particular life or happiness.”71 Tyrrell, Patriarcha non monarcha. The Patriarch unmonarch’d [1681]
(Indianapolis, IN: The Liberty Fund, 2011) Online E-Book, Ch. II, p. 66. In “The Character of a Trimmer”
Halifax stated, “God himself thought it not enough to be a creator, without being a lawgiver. …All laws flow
from that of Nature, and where that is not the foundation, they may be legally imposed but they will be
lamely obeyed.” “The Character of a Trimmer,” Halifax Complete Works, p. 51. Indeed, “there were few
seventeenth-century republicans who did not also extensively use the language of natural law and rights.”
Jonathan Scott, “What were Commonwealth Principles,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 47, Issue 03 (Sept.
2004), pp. 591-613, 593.
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metaphysical in his analyses. Unsurprisingly, he did not dabble in the intricacies of Grotius’s ideas, such
as the philosophical distinctions between the rationalists and the voluntarists. But perforce, the issue of
will, God’s or man’s, versus reason, is present in his work. Sidney repeatedly avowed that reason was
the law of man’s nature, not something created by positive law, e.g., Again, “man being a rational
creature, nothing can be universally natural to him, that is not rational.”72 Similarly, “nothing but the plain
and certain dictates of reason can be generally applicable to all men as the law of their nature.” Like
Grotius, Sidney also turned to natural law in both the context of the individual and society.73 Locke, too,
stated in his Second Treatise, “The obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, but only in many
cases are drawn closer.”74 Matters of governance, on the other hand, were not dictated by God or natural
law. “For as we have already proved that no government is imposed upon men by God or nature.” Thus,
for example, Sidney argued that while “civil or administrative law,” viz., laws willfully, intentionally passed
by a nation or community, could adopt hereditary monarchy, “This therefore can never be the work, much
less the law of nature.”75 Sidney also discussed the legitimacy of constitutions in terms of natural law.
Constitutions “cannot be rightly made, if they are contrary to the universal law of God and nature...; but
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Section 20 is entitled, “Man’s natural love to Liberty is Temper’d by Reason, which originally is his
Nature.” DCG, II.20.191. There are other similar statements in Discourses, e.g., “man being a rational
creature, nothing can be universally natural to him, that is not rational.” Similarly, “as reason is our
nature, that can never be natural to us that is not rational.” DCG, I.16.51, II.4.94.
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“[R]ights, historically understood, have not necessarily exalted individual self-seeking over the demands
of community life. At least in their early development, natural rights and community life were seen as
compatible phenomena.” Charles Reid, “The Achievement of Brian Tierney,” p. 462.
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The subject of natural law and Locke is a complicated one. This is largely because of the very different
discussion about the subject in his Essay on Human Understanding than his treatment of natural law in
Two Treatises. Locke’s view in The Second Treatise is completely consistent with Sidney’s natural law
principles: “The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And Reason,
which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no
one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.” Natural law applies in communal
life, not just in a state of nature. “The Obligations of the Law of Nature … have by Humane Laws known
Penalties annexed to them, to enforce their observation.” In sum, said Locke, “the law of Nature stands as
an Eternal Rule to all Men, Legislators as well as others. The Rules that they make for other Mens
Actions, must, as well as their own and other Mens Actions, be conformable to the Law of Nature, i.e. to
the Will of God, of which that is a Declaration, and the fundamental law of Nature being the preservation
of Mankind, no Humane Sanction can be good, or valid against it. In contrast, in the Essay on Human
Understanding, Locke did not refer to natural law as the basis for men’s actions; indeed, it would seem
inconsistent with the concept of tabula rasa, and that man’s actions are based entirely on his own
experience. It was this inconsistency that Tyrrell pointed out to Locke that infuriated and alienated Locke.
Laslett, “Introduction,” pp. 79-92, & Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, §§ 6, 135, pp. 271, 357-58.
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DCG, II.20.191, II.4.94; id, II.5.104-05.
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every people is by God and nature left to the liberty of regulating these matters relating to themselves
according to their own prudence or convenience.”76
How does one determine how to “regulate” communal matters? First, said Sidney, we must
distinguish between good and evil, the medieval and Grotian moral component of natural law. There are
three ways to do so. We can understand the differences between good and evil through revealed Truth –
“When God by his word reveals it to us.” We also can discern what is good and what is evil when God
“declareth it” through His deeds. Both of these methods of distinguishing good and evil suggest a
voluntarist approach – that the will of God determined natural law. But Sidney’s third method of
distinguishing between good and evil is by “the light of reason,” the law of man’s nature, “which is good, in
as much as it is from God.” Indeed, the title of Section 20 of Chapter Two of Discourses is entitled, “Man’s
natural love to Liberty is temper’d by Reason, which originally is his Nature.”77 In précis, Sidney is
adopting Grotius’ hybrid concept of natural law.
One of the myriad disapprobations Sidney levelled at Filmer concerned his failure to understand
that God gave men the opportunity and responsibility to regulate themselves. When Filmer “propose[d]
doctrines to the contrary,” he “must either be thought rashly to utter that which he does not understand, or
maliciously to cast balls of division among all nations, whereby every man’s sword would be drawn
against every man, to the total subversion of all order and government.”78 The world was governed by
natural law, and mankind was uniquely endowed with the facility to discern, understand and apply it.79
Another important perspective should be considered here – the distinct vantage point of the
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.Id, I.18.61.
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Id, Il.20.191.
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Id, I.13.38.

79

Sidney described this God-given universal law of nature even more elaborately in another Filmer
rebuttal: “[M]en lived under laws before there were any kings. …To say that there was then no law, is in
many respects most absurd; for the nature of man cannot be without it. …Cain could not have feared that
every man who met him would slay him, if there had not been a law to slay him that had slain another.
But in this case the Scripture is clear.” The result is that, “There is therefore a law not given by kings, but
laid upon such as should be kings, as well as on any other persons, by one who is above them. …[H]e
that will exempt kings from this law, must either find that they are excepted in the text, or that God who
gave it has not a power over them.” Id, III.1.323. Grotius argued that sovereigns are subject to divine law
and natural law, e.g., “It is not … contrary to the nature of society to look out for oneself and advance
one’s own interests, provided the rights of others are not infringed.” Neff, On the Law of War and Peace,
Introduction, p. xxx-xxxi & Book I, Ch. 2, §2.
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jurisprudential scholar not the historian, which parallels historians’ analyses. In a very detailed study,
“The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale,” Harold Berman described the three
schools of jurisprudence that existed in seventeenth-century England. Before then, there were two
schools of jurisprudence, natural law theory and legal positivism. As we have just established and as
Berman affirmed, “Natural law theory treats law essentially as the embodiment in rules and concepts of
moral principles that are derived ultimately from reason and conscience.” In contrast, the perspective of
the positivist is that law is “a body of rules laid down (‘posited’) and enforced by the supreme lawmaking
authority, the sovereign.” In legal positivism, law is rooted primarily in “the will of the lawmaker.”80 The
divergent legal perspectives of natural law jurisprudence and positivism also relate to the disparate
concepts of “law” and “the Law” that we will address in the context of rule of law. “Most positivists do not
deny that law ought to serve moral ends, the ends of justice, but argue that what law is is a political
instrument, a body of rules manifesting the policies of the legitimately constituted political authorities.
Only after it is established what law is may one ask what it ought to be.” In contrast, said Berman,
“Naturalists, if I may so call them, believe, on the other hand, that one cannot know what the law is unless
one considers at the same time what it ought to be, since, they argue, it is implicit in legal norms that they
have moral (including political) purposes and are to be analyzed, interpreted, and applied in the light of
such purposes. The naturalist will deny the validity, indeed, the legality, of a rule or action of the political
authority that contradicts fundamental principles of justice.”81
For the positivist, the law is a set of particular laws. For the proponent of natural law
jurisprudence, the law is much more. While it includes instrumental laws, it also reflects a value system
designed to promote justice. It is the Law, as we will discuss shortly. The third and new school of
jurisprudence that emerged in seventeenth-century England was historical jurisprudence, which
understood law as “ongoing; it had a history; it constituted a tradition.” The historical dimension of the
issues that were debated by philosophers concerning the nature of law was unarticulated prior to the
seventeenth century.82 Beginning in the twelfth century during the formation of Western legal systems, “it
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Berman, “The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence,” p. 1653.
Id.
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Id. The legal philosophy that became known as historical jurisprudence may well relate to the
historiographic visions of history as progress and continuity – the “continuity thesis” and the notion of a
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had been taken for granted that a legal system has an ongoing character, a capacity for growth over
generations and centuries. This was a uniquely Western belief: that a body of law, a system of law,
contains, and should contain, a built-in mechanism for organic change and that it survives, and should
survive, by development, by growth.” Canon and civil law developed progressively as each generation
built on the work of its predecessors. This perspective was consciously embraced in the seventeenth
century. Before then, Western legal philosophers were either adherents of a natural law or a positivist
jurisprudence “or of an uneasy mixture of the two.” Legal philosophers did not maintain that the history of
a legal system “embodies basic norms” that not only govern but as a result of their historicity, should both
“govern subsequent developments” and “bind the sovereign political authority itself.” This concept, which
we call a system of precedence, emerged in seventeenth-century England among common law lawyers,
who believed that “the primary source of the validity of law – including both its moral validity and its
political validity – is its historical character, its source in the customs and traditions of the community
whose law it is.” It was Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634), his protégé John Selden (1584-1654) and, later in
the century, Sir Matthew Hale (1609-1676), “who consciously built on the work both of Coke and of
Selden” to “present[] a systematic theory of the historical character of law and integrate[] that theory with
both natural law theory and positivism.”83
A major and compelling component of Berman’s thesis is that prior to the seventeenth century,
English jurisprudence was not unique; it followed the trends and debates of European scholastic
jurisprudence. Indeed, there was “a surprising dearth of English writings on legal theory as such or,
indeed, legal history.”84 Although this is a matter of controversy among scholars, we need not resolve the

great divide between medieval times and modernity – the “rupture thesis” that medievalist Cary
Nederman described. See n. 20. If this is the case, Nederman would likely challenge Berman’s dating
this development as a seventeenth, and not an earlier phenomenon.
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There were modest, earlier suggestions of the importance of historicity: a sixteenth-century French
historicist approach to law that “held up the ancient Frankish customary law as a model to be opposed to
‘foreign’ Romanist and canonist legal traditions,” and was invoked against royalist “innovations,” and
sixteenth-century English royalists who endorsed absolute monarchy and “invoked ancient English
traditions and precedents to support their royalist position.” Berman, “The Origins of Historical
Jurisprudence,” pp. 1654-55; see also Hogue, Origins of the Common Law, passim.
84

See Berman, “The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence,” pp. 1656-64.
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matter to understand the essentially of law in the early modern republicanism of Sidney and others.85
Whether one considers natural law theory from the perspective of the historian or the jurisprudence
scholar, we can conclude that by the seventeenth century, historicity became a part of the divergent
jurisprudential perspectives of natural law theory and positivism, a result that was fully integrated into
early modern republicanism, including the ideas of Sidney, whose political thought adopted both natural
law theory and a decidedly historical jurisprudential character, with modest emphasis on positivism, and
law as “the will of the lawmaker.”
Finally, it is important to understand the exacting distinction that Berman makes between
historicism and historicity. Historicism, defined in the OED, inter alia, as a “regard for or preoccupation
with the styles or values of the past,” constitutes a reverence for the past. It is “adherence to the past for
its own sake.” In contrast, historicity, defined in the OED as historical accuracy or authenticity, “draw[s] on
the past in building a new future,” and was both a significant seventeenth-century legal development and
a fundamental element of Sidney’s methodology. Historicity contemplates a belief in “the normative
significance of ongoing historical experience.” It has enormous significance for the study of history, of
course, but it also produces, in law, a system of precedence.86 “The law evolves, is ongoing, it has a
history, it tells a story.” Changes in the law are not random but proceed by a “conscious reinterpretation
of the past to meet present and future needs.”87 Historians Donald Kelley, John Pocock and others blur
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In this regard, Berman effectively demolished Quentin Skinner’s assertion that as early as the thirteenth
century, as evidenced in Bracton’s defense of custom, there existed an English nationalist hostility to
Roman law and canon lawyers. “In fact, Bracton, in his great treatise on English law, quoted Roman law
favorably in hundreds of places” (referencing another authority that stated that Bracton’s treatise has
quotations from almost 500 different sections of Justinian’s Digest and Code), id, p. 1656-57, n.10; see
also John Phillip Reid, Rule of Law: The Jurisprudence of Liberty in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Century (DeKalb, ILL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004), pp. 10-13; cf. Benjamin Straumann, Crisis
and Constitutionalism: Roman Political Thought from the Fall of the Republic to the Age of Revolution
(Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press. 2018; Benjamin Straumann, Roman Law in the State of
Nature: The Classical Foundation of Hugo Grotius’ Natural Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015).
86

Precedence is the doctrine that “judicial decisions are an authoritative source of law, binding on courts
in later analogous cases.” A distinction is made between the reasons provided in the decision that are
essential to the outcome of the case, which are binding, and what is called “dictum,” the opinion of the
court that is not essential to the outcome. Berman, Law and Revolution II, pp. 273-74; cf. Hogue, Origins
of the Common Law, pp. 255, 257 (definitions of “precedent” and “dictum”).
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Berman, Law and Revolution II, pp. 3, 270; Berman, “The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence,” p. 1657.
On the dictionary definitions, see the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (Third Edition, March 2012),
http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/view/Entry/87305?redirectedFrom=historicity#eid (6-5-14) and
http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/view/Entry/87304?redirectedFrom=historicism#eid (6-5-14).
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the distinction between historicism and historicity in their analyses, explained Berman, focusing for
example on Francois Hotman’s idealization of the Gallican past as a foundation for Coke’s historical
jurisprudence.88 But Coke argued that the English constitution “survived intact despite incremental
changes in it.” His was an argument based on jurisprudential historicity, not historicism. There is much
more than the idealized picture of the Goths emphasized by Pocock and others, and then the Normans,
who brought their concepts of justice to the English isles, although a critical analysis of Coke would find
some of that, too. More importantly, there was an effort to rely on verifiable fact and accepted custom. It
was an effort to discern the “real” English constitution and judicial precedent, not an idealized picture of
the past.89 We “owe to Coke more than to any other single person the belief in the unbroken continuity of
the common law, and the survival of the authority of its precedents, from early times.”90 It is historical
jurisprudence (or jurisprudential historicity) that adopts both natural law and a system of legal precedence
– historicity – that is the hallmark of seventeenth-century English legal thought. From our perspective,
what is important is that these same ideas – both natural law and legal precedence – informed the
republicanism of Sidney and fellow early modern Anglo-American republican thinkers.91
The early modern republicans were not alone in relying comfortably on principles of natural law to
support their political arguments. Natural law was part of seventeenth-century English political lingua
franca. Ashcraft pointed out that natural law was invoked in all sorts of exclusion crisis pamphlets.92 It
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Notice that Pocock used the term “historicism” to describe early modern republican theory. Pocock,
MM, p. 3.
89

Much earlier, in the thirteenth-century, Henri de Bracton referred to some 500 cases from the plea rolls
of the English royal courts in order to formulate a system of precedent. “Bracton laid down the principle
that ‘if any new and unwonted circumstances … shall arise, then if anything analogous has happened
before, let the case be adjudged in like manner (sit amen similia evenerint per simile iudicentur), since it
is a good opportunity for proceeding from like to like (a similibus ad similia).’” Hogue, Origins of the
Common Law, p. 200, citing Henry de Bracton, De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae, Sir Travers Twiss,
ed. & tr., 6 Vols, Rolls Series (1878-83), fol. 1b.
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Berman, “The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence,” pp. 1663 & n.29, 1680. Per Hogue, “the common
law is a body of general rules prescribing social conduct, enforced by the ordinary royal courts, and characterized by the development of its own principles in actual legal controversies, by the procedure of trial
by jury, and by the doctrine of the supremacy of law.” Hogue, The Origins of the Common Law, p. 190.
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In Discourses Sidney referred to the details of an extraordinary number of historical precedents. In
some cases his analysis is idealized (historicism), and in other cases it is factual (historicity).
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See, e.g., Richard Ashcraft, “Revolutionary Politics and John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government,
pp. 186-97, 316-20. It is not clear, as Ashcraft asserted, that Filmer’s Patriarcha popularized natural law
arguments.
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was no less essential to the arguments of the republicans. In The Case of the People of England, for
example, Henry Vane stated, “The Original Impressions of Just Laws are in Mans Nature and very
Constitution of Being… .The liberty which man was at first created in, is that Priviledge and Right which is
allowed to him by the Law of Nature, of not being compelled under any pretence whatsoever to sin
against God, or to go against the true good and welfare of his own Being; that is to say, of his inward or
outwardman, but in both these cases, to have and to use his just liberty, to Dissent and refuse to Obey.”93
Other illustrations abound.94
I see not then how the children of Adam, or of any man else,
can be free from subjection to their parents. And this subjection
of children is the only fountain of all regal authority, by the ordination
of God himself. …Nor leaves it any place for such Imaginary pactions
between kings and their people as many dream of.
Filmer, Patriarcha95

ii.

Man-Made Law: The Social Contract

Sidney transitioned from the law that governed the universal and natural order, in which man had
a unique status, to the law that created civil society. The term “social contract” is typically associated with
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s eighteenth-century work, as well as John Locke and liberalism.96 As one
political scientist stated, “Since the seventeenth century, the theory of the social contract has emerged as
an axiom of liberal democratic political legitimacy.”97 One infrequently hears the social contract discussed
in the context of republicanism and, indeed, there are scholars who assert that it is not part of early
modern republican theory. For example, in a contributing chapter to the 2014 text, Perspectives on
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Henry Vane, The Case of the People of England, pp. 3, 16.
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Just to take one example, in 1649, some dozen years before Vane’s The Case of the People of
England, Milton wrote The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, in which he adamantly stated: “No man who
knows ought, can be so stupid to deny that all men naturally were borne free, being the image and
resemblance of God himself, and were by privilege above all the creatures, born to command not to obey:
and that they livd so.” Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, p. 38.
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Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 7.
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A typical example of this is the article, “Social Contract Theory,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/ (10-1-14).
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Andrew R. Murphy, “The Uneasy Relationship between Social Contract Theory and Religious
Toleration,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 59, No. 2 (May, 1997), pp. 368-92, 368; accord, M. P. Thompson,
“A Note on ‘Reason’ and ‘History’ in Late Seventeenth Century Political Thought,” Political Theory, Vol. 4,
No. 4 (Nov. 1976), pp. 491-504, 492, who referred to a group of seventeenth-century thinkers, including
Tyrrell, the “other guy” who wrote in opposition to Filmer, who relied on social contract theory
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Revolutionary Republicanism, historian Günther Lottes stated, “Unlike Locke, [Sidney] did not explicitly
introduce the contract model,” although he “drew conclusions which came close to it.”98 In fact, Sidney
very explicitly endorsed social contract theory, challenging Filmer on the subject and once again following
the ideas of the jurist Hugo Grotius.99
Sidney’s analysis began with an explanation of the context in which civil society arose. The “first
fathers of mankind left all their children independent on each other, and in an equal liberty of providing for
themselves: that every man continued in this liberty, till the number so increased, that they became
troublesome and dangerous to each other; and finding no other remedy to the disorders growing, or like
to grow among them, joined many families into one civil body, that they might the better provide for the
conveniency, safety, and defence of themselves and their children.” The consequence was “a collation of
every man’s private right into a publick stock.”100 Sidney stated the same thing more negatively when he
said, “The fierce barbarity of a loose multitude, bound by no law, and regulated by no discipline, is wholly
repugnant to it: Whilst every man fears his neighbor, and has no other defence than his own strength, he
must live in that perpetual anxiety which is contrary to that happiness, and that sedate temper of mind

98

Günther Lottes, “Language and Content: The Political Thought of Algernon Sidney between
Republican-ism and Enlightenment,” Perspectives on English Revolutionary Republicanism, Ch. 3, pp.
53-61, 58. In contrast, Worden described English republicanism as divided into two different traditions,
one of which rested on the tradition of the ancient constitution, whereas the other (of which he
characterized Sidney as the principal representative) relied on a contractual tradition. In fact, as this
chapter makes plain, neither Lottes nor Worden recognized the layers of law that informed Sidney’s
thought, including both ideas from the ancient constitution and contractual traditions. See Worden,
“Marchamont Nedham and English Republicanism,” Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society,
1649-1776, pp. 49-50.
99

Furley pointed out that the Whig pamphlets that were published during the propaganda war on the succession of the Duke of York also relied on contract theory. “Such a theory was, of course, familiar from
the literature of the Civil War, and from continental writers such as Grotius and Pufendorf. These were
quoted freely, along with the English Philip Hunton, Parker, Prynne and their fellows.” Consequently,
“most exclusionist writers presupposed an entirely secular and utilitarian view of monarchy, very similar to
Locke’s in his Second Treatise, though not so comprehensive, and in particular without his account of the
various circumstances in which the contract was broken and the government dissolved.” In Furley’s view,
“once the contract was postulated, there could be few variations of the Whig ideal: a contract was always
implied by the very nature of government, they said, and although few contracts were apparent in
recorded history, they must have existed once: ‘they were not dreams, but real things,’ Sidney insisted in
his Discourses, “and a contract could be annulled or revised.” Furley, “The Whig Exclusionists: Pamphlet
Literature in the Exclusion Campaign, 1679-81,” p. 30.
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DCG, II.1.78.
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which is required for the search of it.”101 Although not quite the “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”
life that Hobbes envisioned in the state of nature, Sidney was not far afield.102 Accordingly, the “first step
towards the cure of this pestilent evil, is for many to join in one body, that everyone may be protected by
the united force of all; and that the various talents that men possess, may by good discipline be rendered
useful to the whole; as the meanest piece of wood or stone being placed by a wise architect, conduces to
the beauty of the most glorious building.” It was strictly self-interest that motivated men to enter into civil
society: “and nothing obliging them to enter into this society, but the consideration of their own good.”103
What was it that bound together such a group of people? It was a contract – “a mutual compact”
whereby a people “joined together in a civil society.”104 This contract was fundamental to Sidney’s legal

101

Id, II.1.83.

102

Indeed, elsewhere in Discourses, Sidney referred to Hobbes’ bellum omnium contra omnes, the war of
all against all, the condition in which man falls in the absence of civil society. DCG, III.19.432; see
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. XIII, “Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning Their Felicity,
and Misery.” Tyrrell, on the other hand, left it to Filmer “to build and pull down … Mr. Hobs…as he
pleases without my intermedling … [f]or in many things I think neither of them are in the right.” Tyrrell,
Patriarcha non Monarcha, Ch. IV, p. 79.
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DCG, III.19.432, II.5.99. Tyrrell also “conjured up images of a state of nature and the very first institution of government” in Patriarcha non Monarcha: “So every particular person having before, in the state
of Nature, a Right to preserve himself and to govern his own actions, when many men joyn together to
confer this care upon one or more there arises a Political Power indeed more noble, yet of the same kind
with the other. …So that it is absurd to alleadge, that Soveraignty is not derived from men.” Rudolph,
Revolution by Degrees, p. 36; Tyrrell, Patriarcha non Monarcha, Ch. II, p. 68.
104
DCG, II.5.102. Sidney’s understanding of the social contract was shared by his fellow English
republicans. To the extent there was any debate, it focused on the nature of men who entered the social
contract. For example, Milton stated that while men were born free, once “wrong and violence” began to
“fall among themselves,” men “agreed by common league to bind each other from mutual injury, and
jointly to defend themselves against any that gave disturbance or opposition to such agreement. Hence
came Citties, Townes, and Commonwealths.” Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, p. 38. Tyrrell
was unabashedly hostile to Milton: “And less shall I take upon me to vindicate Milton, since that were at
once to defend downright Murder and Rebellion.” Tyrrell, Patriarcha non Monarcha, Ch. IV, p. 79. Henry
Neville said essentially the same thing as Milton: “For every man by the first law of nature (which is
common to us and brutes) had, like beasts in a pasture right to everything…which made a state of
perpetual war. To remedy which … every man consented to be debarred of that universal right to all
things; and confine himself to a quiet and secure enjoyment of such a part, as should be allotted to him.
Henry Neville, Plato Redivivus; or, A Dialogue Concerning Government, 2nd ed., with Additions, 1681
[repr. UK: Dodo Press, undated], p. 11. On the other hand, Marchamont Nedham, while recognizing the
social contract, seemed to think that it superseded natural law, a view with which Sidney would have
strenuously disagreed, as would Neville, Locke and others. In (at least one of) Nedham’s view, “There is
a Government Political, not grounded in Nature, nor upon Paternal Right by Natural Generation; but
founded upon the free Election, Consent or mutual Compact of men entring into a form of civil society.”
Nedham, Excellencie of a Free State, p. 29. Of course, Locke is famous for his social contract analysis,
e.g., “For ‘tis not every Compact that puts an end to the State of Nature between Men, but only this one of
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analysis and framework; he termed it “the root and foundation of civil power, ” the legal manifestation of
the people’s consent.105 No one was or “is obliged to enter into the society.”106 On the other hand, if you
want to “enjoy the benefit of that society,” you must enter into it. Sidney’s largest strata of law was God’s
natural universe. Within that framework, man was privileged. He not only had the ability to reason but,
as Grotius had emphasized, man had the unique gift of speech – that ability to communicate in the most
expressive way.107 Man could communicate that he wanted to be part of a civil society or that he did not;
and consent was essential. “There is therefore no natural propensity to anyone, but they chuse that
which in their judgment seems best for them.”108 Once again, Sidney was following Grotius.109

agreeing together mutually to enter into one Community, and make one Body Politick. Locke, “Second
Treatise,” Two Treatises, Ch. II, “Of the State of Nature,” §14, pp. 276-77.
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DCG, II.5.104. Zook asserted that the Whig clergyman Rev. Samuel Johnson was “not a republican”
but a monarchist, like his fellow constitutionalists Tyrrell and William Atwood. At the same time, she
pointed out that “his contractarianism had much in common with the political ideas of John Locke. Their
politics both revolved around similar fundamental concepts: contract; resistance; the devolution of power
to the people; the rights of life, liberty, and estate.” Johnson and Locke differed in the latter’s conviction
that the government may be dissolved, and in Locke’s reliance on natural law language and avoidance of
“critical historical and constitutional issues.” Each of these matters will be addressed in turn but, in sum,
the commonalities that Zook pointed out between Johnson and Locke apply equally to Johnson and
Sidney; and like Johnson, Sidney addressed critical historical and constitutional issues.
As a separate matter, Zook erred in her inference that Johnson’s embracing of constitutional monarchy
ipso facto meant that he was not a republican. As we shall see, it was only absolute monarchy that was
wholly inconsistent with republicanism. A republican certainly could be a constitutional monarchist. The
critical issue in republicanism was the necessity of consent to the form of government. Additionally,
republicans could also embrace natural law and, obviously, could argue from history. Thus, Whig lawyer
and constitutionalist William Atwood relied on history, both because human nature does not change and
so history is meaningful; also, we can interrogate history, consider “the. Sense of them,” in order to
ensure the legitimacy of our reliance, viz., “historical evidence must be interpreted by the light of reason.”
Martyn P. Thompson, “A Note on ‘Reason’ and ‘History’ in Late Seventeenth Century Political Thought,”
Political Theory, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Nov. 1976), pp. 491-504, 497-98, citing Atwood’s Superiority and direct
Dominion of the imperial Crown of England over the Crown and Kingdom of Scotland, &c., 5 Vols.
(London 1704) In short, in Zook we have another instance of the muddling of elements of republicanism,
of which Locke’s ideas are one derivation. We can leave to another day whether Reverend Samuel
Johnson’s are another. See Melinda Zook, “Early Whig Ideology, Ancient Constitutionalism, and the
Reverend Samuel Johnson,” Journal of British Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr. 1993), pp. 139-65, 160-62;
William Thomas Lowndes, The Bibliographer’s Manual of English Literature: Containing An Account of
Rare, Curious, and Useful Books, etc., Vol. I (London: William Pickering, 1834), pp. 81-82.
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Grotius stated, “But as there are several Ways of Living, some better than others, and every one may
chuse what he pleases of all those Sorts; so a People may chuse what Form of Government they please.”
Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Richard Tuck, ed. & intro, from the Jean Barbeyrac ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005). Vol. I, Ch. 3, §8.
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Upon consent, civil society constituted the next layer of law within which man operated. “Human
societies are maintained by mutual contracts.”110 It is not only Grotius who Sidney was following here; the
monarchomachs Beza and Mornay said the same thing.111 Sidney was unequivocal that the legal basis of
civil society was contractual. As the root and foundation of civil powers, the social compact resulted in
“purely human ordinances, proceeding from the will of those who seek their own good.” Again, “As these
contracts are made voluntarily, without any previous obligation, ‘tis evident men make them in consideration of their own good; and they can be of force no longer, then he with whom they are made perform his
part in procuring it; and that if he turn the power which was given to him for the publick good, to the
publick inconvenience and damage, he must necessarily lose the benefit he was to receive by it.”112
Entering into a social contract was an act of will, an act of assent. Conversely, in the absence of such
agreement, there was no social contract. We are left with the original legal framework of the law of nature
without the additional legal stratum of social contract. “Those multitudes that enter into such contracts,
and thereupon form civil societies, act according to their own will: Those that are engaged in none, take
their authority from the law of nature.”113 Sidney’s multi-leveled legal conceptual framework was clearly
stated, in support of which Sidney was armed with the law of contracts and fortified by the ideas of
Grotius, Beza and Mornay, along with the more ancient sources on which they and he independently
relied.
The human ordinances or laws that were created as a result of the social contract did not apply to
men who were living outside of civil society. “[T]heir rights cannot be limited or diminished by any one man,
or number of men; and consequently whoever does it, or attempts the doing of it, violates the most sacred
laws of God and nature.” Whether or not a particular civil society already existed, men chose whether to be
a part of it, and therefore whether to be governed by its laws. If men had not so chosen, then they were
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DCG, II.30.295. Cicero similarly stated, “there is no public except when it is held together by a legal
agreement.” Cicero, “The Republic,” Cicero, The Republic and The Laws, Bk Three, ¶45, p. 73.
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Giesey, “The monarchomach triumvirs: Hotman, Beza and Mornay,” p. 44.
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Discourses included other statements about the nature of contract law that reflected Sidney’s
familiarity with the subject. For example, in discussing the social contract he stated, “The duty arising
from a benefit received must be proportionable to it: that which grows from a promise is determined by
the promise or contract made.” This is basic contract law. DCG, II.5.104, III.1.326.
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subject to rule by force, to which they were not bound. “The institution of a kingdom is the act of a free
nation; and whoever denies them to be free, denies that there can be anything of right in what they set up.”
Similarly, Sidney averred, “no man is or can be a lord amongst us, till we make him so.”114 This seemed to
be a two-step process: first, people come together and create a social contract; then they agreed to be led
by a member or members of their community, which is effectuated by a separate mutual agreement.115
Rule by force was illegal and invalid. Conquest was always tyranny. “’Tis hard to comprehend
how one man can come to be master of many, equal to himself in right, unless it be by consent or by
force. If by consent, we are at an end of our controversies; Governments, and the magistrates that
execute them, are created by man.” Sidney here acknowledged that a people could choose to be ruled
by a tyrant, although elsewhere he termed this “madness.”116 But “[w]hosoever therefore like Nimrod
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DCG, I.11.35.

115

Sidney was not explicit about whether there are two contracts or one, viz., a contract first among the
community, and then between the community and a magistrate, or only the latter. He used the word
repeatedly in the singular and the plural. Sidney observed that different peoples have accomplished the
social contract in different ways. “In some places they have voted all together in their own persons. …
Sometimes by delegates. …In other parts many cities are joined together in leagues.” DCG, II.5.105.
Just to take the last example, it seems unlikely that cities join together without first contracting among
themselves, after which they select a magistrate, which is confirmed by a second contract; and so
perhaps in at least this circumstance, two contracts would be necessary. In general, these distinctions
seem unimportant to Sidney. In contrast, Hobbes suggested that there is one contract in which every
individual gives up personal freedom in order to ensure safety and selects an absolute monarch to rule
over them. See The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of. Malmesbury; Now First Collected and. Edited
by Sir William Molesworth, Bart., 11 Vols.,, London: John Bohn, 1839-45. Vol. 3 (1839) (Leviathan)
[1651]. [repr. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2011]. Locke also emphasized the social contract among
the people to create a community. “The first stage of the social contract for Locke is the formation of a
community.” Leonard C. Feldman, “Judging Necessity: Democracy and Extra-Legalism,” Political Theory,
Vol. 36, No. 4 (Aug. 2008), pp. 550-77, 563; see “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, §97. This is followed
by a second stage, in which political power is entrusted to constituted authorities: “The Constitution of the
Legislative is the first and fundamental Act of Society.” “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, §212. As
Feldman pointed out, the second stage creates not only government, but a constitution, whether written
or not written. Cf. Houston, Algernon Sidney, pp. 128-29, concerning Beza and Mornay’s concept of two
separate contracts signed by the people at the inauguration of a commonwealth, “the religious covenant
or foedus by which they promise God to act as a godly people; and the political covenant, embodied in
the Lex Regia, by which they agree to transfer their Imperium to an elected ruler on certain mutually
acceptable terms.” I agree with Houston that there are no parallels in Sidney with this religious/secular
contract duality, although I disagree with his suggestion that Sidney was not particularly influenced by
Beza and Mornay.
116

“Whoever therefore would persuade us, that one or more nations are, by virtue of those contracts,
bound to bear all the insolences of tyrants, is obliged to show, that by those contracts they did forever
indefinitely bind themselves so to do, how great soever they might be. I may justly go a step farther, and
affirm, that if any such should appear in the world, the folly and turpitude of the thing would be a sufficient
evidence of the madness of those that made it, and utterly destroy the contents of it.” DCG, III.1.328; see
also id, II.5.105, II.30.294.
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grounds his pretensions of right upon usurpation and tyranny,” not consent, “declares himself to be, like
Nimrod, a usurper and a tyrant, that is an enemy to God and man, and to have no right at all.” Such
tyranny could not be justified after the fact. “That which was unjust in its beginning, can of itself never
change its nature.” Sidney relied on Grotius: “Tempus in se, saith Grotius, nullam habet vim effectricem
[Time in itself has no power as a cause]. He that persists in doing injustice, aggravates it.”117
One could argue, as some theorists have, that it is a convenient fiction to suggest that a choice is
made to live in society; for very few people are able, should they want to do so, to opt out of the civil
society in which they were born. Indeed, Sidney seemed to recognize that as a practical matter, men do
not opt to live outside of their civil society. “[W]e find no place in the world where the inhabitants do not
enter into some kind of society or government to restrain it: and to say that all men desire liberty without
restraint,” which is what Filmer argued, “and yet that all do restrain it, is ridiculous.” But Sidney attributed
this to the very nature of man. “The truth is, man is hereunto led by reason which is his nature. Everyone
sees they cannot well live asunder, nor many together, without some rule to which all must submit. …This
general consent of all to resign such a part of their liberty as seems to be for the good of all, is the voice
of nature, and the act of men (according to natural reason) seeking their own good.” Although he did not
satisfactorily answer the conundrum of the impracticality of opting out of a society, particularly in his own
day, Sidney viewed political life through the social contract prism.118 Man could opt in or opt out; “if he
enter into the society, he is obliged by the laws of it.”119
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DCG, I.11.33 & n.2. This section of Discourses is entitled, “No Man comes to command many, unless
by Consent or by Force.”
118

The argument can be and was made by some in America that the seventeenth-century Englishmen
and women who left their native land and established new societies in the American colonies had opted
out of England’s social contract.
119
DCG, II.20.192, II.5.104. Tyrrell endorsed the same thing. “But as for Subjects, though they are not
directly or expressly bound by the Acts or Consents of their Ancestors, who first instituted the Government,
yet indirectly or consequentially they are obliged to stand to what their Ancestors have done: For since, as
I said before, no man will deny to accept of the Promise or Conditions of his Ancestor, if it be for his
advantage, and since the Institution of Government was for the common good of mankind in general;” and
“no man can believe that the Posterity of those that first instituted this Government, will go about to undo
what their Ancestors have done so much for their benefit, and reduce all things to the state of Nature
again.” The consequence, said Tyrrell, is that, “So that as long as they submit to, and enjoy the benefits of
the Government which was first establisht by the consent of their Forefathers, they are supposed to yield a
tacite Assent to those Compacts which they long since made, and implicitely become Subjects to that
Government under which they were born.” Tyrrell, Patriarcha non monarch, p. 48. On this point and Locke,
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What was the nature of civil society to which men consented? Sidney seemed to have profited
mightily from his years of legal wrangling in the English court system.120 For he set forth the fundamental
legal principle that the terms of a contract were set by the contract itself. “If a covenant or promise be
pretended, the nature and extent of the obligation can only be known by the contents expressed, or the
true intention of it.” People came together and decided what type of government they wanted. “These
contracts are made voluntarily, without any previous obligation, based on self-interest.121 If the people
wanted a leader, they mutually agreed to contract with someone to lead them. The terms of that
arrangement were set forth in a contract. “[N]ations can owe nothing to kings merely as kings, but what
they owe by the contract made with them.” There was no such thing as general rules to which people
were bound. Sidney mockingly remarked, “If there be a general form of covenant set and agreed upon, to
which all nations must submit, it were good to know where it may be found, and by whose authority it is
established, and then we may examine the sense of it.”122 Sidney also relied on Grotius in his explanation of the nature of “divers magistrates,” viz., that there were virtually an unlimited number of “deviations”
in how nations can be ruled.123 Supreme magistrates might be elected annually or they might have power
for life; sometimes their power was hereditary, or perhaps under various rules and limitations. Sidney
provided all sorts of examples – from the Sabeans to the Goths, from Spain to ancient Rome, from the
Moors to the Franks. What was essential was that “none is set by nature”; rather, “every people proceeds
according to their own will.” 124 Governing a people’s decision to grant a magistracy was Cicero’s famous

see Julian H. Franklin, “Locke on the Dissolution of Society,” Politics, Ideology and the Law in Early
Modern Europe, pp. 175-84.
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See, e.g., Scott II, Ch. 5, “Family politics 1677-83,” pp. 85-103; see Ch. One, n. 382.
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DCG, III.4.341.
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Id.
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There were “those who have the summum imperium summon modo,” that is, kings who hold “supreme
power in the supreme manner,” which Sidney believed Grotius intended as “merely speculative,” and
those who have power “modo non summo,” viz., “not in the supreme manner.” There were magistrates
who had “liberrimum imperium,” unlimited power. Others held power “cum rex partem habeat summi
imperii, partem senatus, sive populus,” namely, who share power with the senate or with the people.
Sidney described how there were various ways in which to invest power in a magistrate, and sometimes
more than one name applied to the same allocation of power. Id, II.6.115-17.
124

Sidney recognized that there may not be absolute equality between the parties; indeed, there may be
a foedus inequale, an unequal treaty, “wherein the weaker, as Grotius says, does usually obtain
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principle, salus populi est lex suprema: the supreme law is the welfare or safety of the people.125
Fundamental contract law provides that a breach of contract by one party relieves the party of his
obligations under the contract, e.g., “A contract is also said to be discharged by breach or default of
performance.”126 Sidney knew the law: contracts “can be of force no longer, than he with whom they are
made perform his part in procuring it; and that if he turns the power which was given to him for the publick
good, to the publick inconvenience and damage, he must necessarily lose the benefit he was to receive
by it.” This was precisely the social contract context from which Sidney arrived at the right of resistance.
“Several nations have plainly and explicitly made contracts with their magistrates.”127 Sidney referred to
the Roman consuls and examples in Scripture, and noted that such social contracts were either plainly
expressed or implicit.128 “[T]hey are not dreams, but real things, and perpetually obliging.” Using
Berman’s language, this is historicity, not historicism. “[J]udges are in many places appointed to decide
the contests arising from the breach of these contracts; and where they are not, or the party offending is
of such force or pride that he will not submit, nations have been obliged to take the extremist course.”129
Clearly, the “extremist course” was rebellion.

protection, and the stronger honour; but there can be none at all, unless both parties are equally free to
make it, or not to make it.” DCG, II.7.117-19, relying on Grotius’ On the Law of War and Peace.
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Id. See Cicero’s Laws, Bk III, Part III, ¶ VIII. The anonymous 1690 pamphlet, Political aphorisms,
which cribbed substantial portions of its argument from Locke’s Two Treatises, stated, “By the Law of
Nature, Salus Populi, the welfare of the people is both the supreme and first law in government, and the
scope and end of all other laws, and of government itself; because the safety of the body politic is ever to
be preferred before any one person whatsoever.” The Bible stated the same thing metaphorically: “And
Judah and Israel dwelt safely, every man under his vine and under his fig tree.” Political aphorisms, p.
12, discussed in Richard Ashcraft and M. M. Goldsmith, “Locke, Revolution Principles, and the Formation
of Whig Ideology, The Historical Journal, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Dec. 1983), pp. 773-800, pp. 775-80. For the
American context, see Ellis Sandoz, “Editor’s Introduction: Fortescue, Coke, and Anglo-American
Constitutionalism,” The Roots of Liberty: Magna Carta, Ancient Constitution, and the Anglo-American
Tradition of Rule of Law, Ellis Sandoz, ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1993), p. 2.
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See, e.g., Thomas Brett, Commentaries on the Present Laws of England, 2nd ed., Vol. I (London:
William Clowes & Son, 1891), Book III, “Contracts,” Ch. 8, “Discharge of Contracts,” §3, p. 433; in
American law, see, e.g., Baldwin v. Kubetz, 307 P.2d 1005, 1012, 147 Cal. App. 2d 937, 947 (1957), a
California oil well sublease case in which the sublessee’s rights under the sublease were terminated. The
Court stated, “one who is wilfully in default cannot be relieved from a forfeiture.”
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DCG, III.4.342, II.32.310.
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It is actually precisely at this point in the text that the editor, West, explained that there was a textual
omission that clearly seems to be the passage seized by the government when Sidney was arrested.
West inserted the passage in the form presented during Sidney’s trial. Id, II.32.311-312 & n.7.
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Id, II.32.310.
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Here we should recall the views of James I, who maintained that the foundation of absolute
monarchy as a divinely ordained and sanctioned institution was not only Scripture, but also the “Law of
Nature,” which designated the king as “a natural Father to all his Lieges at his Coronation.” James
embraced the metaphor of pater patriae as a means of understanding the nature of kingship: “The king
towards his people is rightly compared to a father of children.” As we know, it is this latter point, the
patriarchal nature of kingship, which constituted the guts of Filmer’s argument although Filmer veered off
into an elaborate, far-fetched “proof” that in the Garden of Eden God gave Adam the role of king of the
world and Adam passed on this appointed sovereignty to monarchs for millennia.130 In this patriarchal
view, as the relationship between king and people was one of father and children, the duties of each party
corresponded accordingly.131 The King “as the father of his fatherly duty is bound to care for the
nourishing, education, and virtuous government of his children, even so is the king bound to care for all
his subjects.”132 The children, i.e., the English people, were obligated “only to obey.” In the face of kingly
behavior to which they objected, their only recourse was to “arm [them]selves with patience and humility.”
As Bodin said, the “main point of sovereign majesty and absolute power consists of giving the law to
subjects in general without their consent.”133 The people must be “content to bear whatsoever burden it
shall please our King to lay upon” them. Unlike the concept articulated by scholastic theologians and
philosophers for centuries, which conceived of reason as inherent in and pervading nature, society, and
every man, for James it was ultimately up to the king to determine what was reasonable and what reason
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James I and Filmer were both absolute monarchists. James II tried to accomplish this, too. But the
rationale and justification for this political position among the kings and Filmer was very different. Cf.
Brewer, “Slavery, Sovereignty, and ‘Inheritable Blood’: Reconsidering John Locke and the Origins of
American Slavery,” American Historical Review (Oct. 2017), pp. 1038-78, 1045 & n. 16 & 1055 n.44.
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Although his mother had been a monarch and he succeeded Queen Elizabeth, James apparently “regarded women with contempt,” including their capacity to rule. Id, p. 73; see generally Gordon Schochet,
Patriarchalism in Political Thought (Oxford: Basic Books, 1975); De Lisle, After Elizabeth, p. 47.
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While The Trew Law of Free Monarchies tended to focus on the responsibilities of the king, Richard
Mocket’s 1615 dialogue, God and the King, emphasized the king’s power and authority. This text was
“directed at potentially rebellious Catholics”; but in 1615, King James ordered every household to buy it,
and required it as part of the curriculum in schools and universities. James I, The True Law of Free
Monarchies, p. 57; Gaby Mahlberg, Henry Neville and English republican culture in the seventeenth
century (Manchester University Press, 2009), p. 85.
133

Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from Six Books of the Commonwealth, ed. & trans. Julian
H. Franklin (Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 23.
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required, regardless of the arbitrariness or, from his subjects’ view, the unreasonableness of his action.
Generally, reason was “a standard to which will ought generally to conform, as well as a means through
which will ought generally to be effectuated.”134 Nevertheless, in whatever way, wise or ignorant, fair or
cruel, that the king chose to exercise his “reason,” no one was entitled to challenge or otherwise hold him
to account, just as no one could do so with God.135
James believed that the “Law of nature,” on which “the laws and constitutions of God, and man”
were based, was reflected in both the pater patriae metaphor and the popular medieval reference to a
king as “a head of a body composed of divers members.” It would be “monstrous and unnatural” for a
people to rise up against their king, just as it would be for a son to rise up against his father, or a man to
cut off his own head.136 A wicked king is a curse upon the people, “a plague for their sins.” The monarch
was bound by his coronation oath, said James, to maintain the law, and serve the public interest. At the
same time, the only lawful means available to the people by which to relieve itself of the curse of a wicked
king was “patience, earnest prayers to God, and amendment of their lives,” which presumably means
change, not suicide. Notwithstanding his own use of the term “contract” to explain the election of kingship,
like Filmer James expressly rejected the ancient argument that there was a social contract between a
king and his people such that, if broken by the king, “the people are no longer bound to keep their part of
it.” Arguing from civil law, James maintained that even if there was such a contract, which he expressly
denied, the people were not in a position to determine whether the king had breached the contract; that
was God’s job. “It follows, therefore, of necessity that God must first give sentence upon the King that
breaketh before the people can think themselves freed of their oath.”137
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Berman, Law and Revolution II, p. 235.
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James I, The True Law of Free Monarchies, pp. 60, 62.
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The republican Henry Neville also used this metaphor when he discussed the “causes of our
misfortunes” in Restoration England. “And as in the body of man, sometimes the head and all the
members are in good order, nay, the vital parts are sound and entire; yet if there be a considerable
putrification in the humours, much more, if the blood (which the scripture calls the life) be impure and
corrupted; the patient ceases not to be in great danger, and oftentimes dies without some skilful
physician: and in the meantime the head and all the parts suffer, and are unquiet, full as much, as if they
were all immediately affected: so it is in every respect with the body politic, or commonwealth, when their
foundations are mouldered.” Henry Neville, Plato Redivivus; or, A Dialogue Concerning Government (UK:
Dodo Press, undated), pp. 8-9; James I, The True Law of Free Monarchies, pp. 73-74.
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James’ denial of the concept of popular sovereignty stands in stark contrast to the views of his primary
tutor, George Buchanan, whose De jure regni apud Scotos set forth “the Presbyterian view that God had
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In sum, there was no way out. This may well be one reason why, given its royal, Stuart pedigree,
Filmer’s subsequent and closely related arguments in Patriarcha, in the midst of what historians often
term “the exclusion crisis,” provoked such intense and extensive rebuttals.138
In the course of his explanation of the contract between a people and its magistrate, Sidney
explicitly challenged Filmer’s fear of the headless multitude. “I know not why the multitude should be
concluded to be headless; it is not always so. Moses was head of the multitude that went out of Egypt; …
the multitude that opposed Saul and Ishbosheth had David for its head: …All the multitudes that afterwards revolted from them … were not headless.” Moreover, the issue was not just an historical curiosity. It
pertained to the present. “And in all the revolutions we have had in England, the people have been
headed by the parliament, or the nobility and gentry that composed it.” Sidney not only accepted but found
political solace in the responsibility of the English nobility to protect the people. He was aware of the
special place in society of the nobility generally, and of his family, particularly. “[I]n all the legal kingdoms of
the North, the strength of the government has always been placed in the nobility; and no better defence
has been found against the encroachments of ill kings, than by setting up an order of men, who by holding
large territories, and having great numbers of tenants and depends, might be able to restrain the
exorbitances, that either the kings or the commons might run into.” This phenomenon was not unique to

vested power in the people.” James I, The True Law of Free Monarchies, pp. 77, 79; De Lisle, After
Elizabeth, p. 49. Unsurprisingly, works by Buchanan are in the Sidney Library.
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I qualify the use of the term “the exclusion crisis” because of Scott’s interesting conviction that we
inaccurately elevate the matter of exclusion when the compelling political issue was succession;
exclusion was one of many proposals for how to deal with the problem of succession. There was “an
attempt made,” actually three attempts made, “between 1679 and 1681, to exclude James Duke of York
from the succession to the throne.” But according to Scott, “the exclusion proposal was one result of this
crisis, not a cause of it; and that it was never one of the primary issues that fuelled it throughout its
duration. Exclusion – or rather, the problem of the succession … was one of the several secondary
expedients thrown up in the course of a crisis about other things. …To speak of the ‘exclusion crisis’ is,
therefore, to perpetuate a misstatement of what the crisis was about. This misunderstanding was not
shared by contemporaries.” This is a fascinating story on its own, focused to a significant extent on the
relative importance of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the 1st Earl of Shaftesbury, and his leadership of the early
Whig faction during the Restoration. I agree with Scott that the issue was the succession; but the
language of exclusion was prevalent in connection with the efforts led by Shaftesbury to exclude Charles
II’s brother, James Stuart, from the English throne. For example, a provision was added to the bill
introduced in the House of Commons in October 1680, “that the exclusion in the said bill do extend to the
persons of James, duke of York, only.” Journal of the House of Commons, Oct. 26 & Nov. 11, 1680;
Hannis Taylor, The Origin and Growth of the English Constitution (Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press.,
1898), p. 385 ns. 4-6; see Scott II, pp. xiii, 3-82; Melinda S. Zook, Radical Whigs and Conspiratorial
Politics in Late Stuart England (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), p.
xii n.2.
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England. “For this end Spain, Germany, France, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Scotland and England,
were almost wholly divided into lordships under several names, by which every particular possessor owed
allegiance (that is, such an obedience as the law requires) to the king, and he reciprocally swore to perform that which the same law exacted from him.”139 Sidney provided many more examples of a righteous
people that revolted against an evil magistrate, e.g., the yoke of Pharoah that the Israelites shook off, the
oppression of the Catholic Spaniards against which the Protestants of the Low Countries courageously
resisted. The multitude “is not ever headless,” and the people were entitled to take extreme action if the
magistrate, the leader with whom they contracted, failed to live up to his side of the bargain.140
It is in the context of this contractual arrangement that Sidney defined the qualities of a good
magistrate: “The good magistrate seeks the good of the people committed to his care, that he may
perform the end of his institution: and knowing that chiefly to consist in justice and virtue, he endeavours
to plant and propagate them; and by doing this he procedures his own good as well as that of the
publick.” Justice and truth were at the core of Sidney’s analysis. The magistrate “knows there is no safety
where there is no strength, no strength without union, no union with[out] justice; no justice where faith and
truth, in accomplishing publick and private contracts, is wanting.” There also was an educational,
leadership role for the magistrate, who “thinks it a great part of his duty, by precept and example, to
educate the youth in a love of virtue and truth, that they may be seasoned with them, and filled with an
abhorrence of vice and falsehood, before they attain that age which is exposed to the most violent
temptations, and in which they may by their crimes bring the greatest mischiefs upon the publick. …In
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DCG, III.28.484-85. Henry Neville echoes this perspective when he opined, “no government, whether
mixed monarchy or commonwealth, can subsist without a senate: …as from a certain kingdom of the
Vandals in Africa; where, after their conquest of the natives, they appointed a government consisting of a
prince and a popular assembly; which latter, within half a year, beat the king’s brains out; he having no
bulwark of nobility, or senate, to defend him from them.” Neville, Plato Redivivus, p. 29. Morley provided a
useful description of the role of the nobility in early modern Europe. “The nobility, who had hitherto ruled
each Province like little princes, had been bludgeoned into seeing that their interests could be better served
by a strong central power than by the maintenance of separate fiefs. Their independence had been the
price asked of them and they had been forced to pay it.” What did they get in return? “The monarchy
remained the guarantee of an increasingly efficient exploitation. This was a familiar process in all countries.
In England it had happened in the days of the Tudors, though the smallness of the population, the fact that
the Crown possessed only trifling coercive powers, and that the wealth of the kingdom was increasingly
derived from a mercantilism which flourished as best it could, all set very definite limits on the monarchy.”
In France, it was very difference. “[H]aving ended her feudal wars so much later, the monarchy found itself in possession of powers of which the Tudors never dreamed.” Morley, A Thousand Lives, pp. 17-18.
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DCG, II.32.314-15.
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leading them to virtue, [the magistrate] increases their strength, and … provides for his own safety, glory
and power.141
Sidney contrasted the good magistrate with the worthless magistrate, the man who “fancies he is
not made for the people, but the people for him,” a man who “does not govern for them, but for himself,”
who believed that the people “live only to increase his glory, or furnish matters for his pleasures,” who
failed to consider “what he may do for them,” focusing instead on what they might do for him, it was this
man, the “ill” magistrate, who created “a most fierce and irreconcilable enmity.” This ill magistrate often
aggravated his wrongdoing through perjury and ingratitude and even by virtue of a “small” but unsuitable
matter that he might pursue, “sets men’s spirits on fire.” The crimes of such men “divide the nation into
parties.” Even if “no accident happens to blow them into a flame,” justice is interrupted, public affairs are
neglected, the people’s “affections are alienated,” and “jealousies are on both sides multiplied.” In such
circumstances Sidney (and Grotius) believed that the people were motivated to and justified in
“vindicat[ing] their rights.”142
Was Sidney writing this to incite rebellion against Charles II? There are scholars who contend that
this is the case.143 These experts align the writing of Discourses with the post-Shaftesbury efforts to
instigate rebellion against the Stuarts, and conclude that Sidney was guilty on both counts – both for his
advocacy of rebellion, and for his treasonous activities. But it is not clear that Sidney wrote these words at
this time, nor is it clear precisely what actions Sidney took; and given the fact that he did not publish his
sentiments, the jury at worst should be out on these matters. At the same time, aside from our interest in
knowing what actually happened, with respect to legal outcome it makes no difference. As a matter of
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Id, III.19.432-33.

142
Notice that this description of the ill magistrate could apply to leaders of Parliament, like Shaftesbury,
as well –the man who divided Parliament into parties. DCG, III.19.433-34; see also A Just and Modest
Vindication of the Proceedings of the Two last Parliaments (1681), p. cxxxvi. Sidney went further than
Grotius, as Grotius “did not hold that there was a general right on the part of a people to recover their
sovereignty from a ruler who acted oppressively.“ He therefore did not endorse a general right to rebel.
On the other hand, under certain circumstances, Grotius recognized that rebellion was permissible. Neff,
Hugo Grotius on the Law of War and Peace, Introduction, pp. xxx-xxi; see id, Bk I, Ch. 4, The Law of War
and Peace, entitled, “Of a War Made by Subjects against their Superiors”; see also Tyrrell, Patriarcha
Non Monarcha, passim.
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See, e.g., Jonathan Scott, Commonwealth Principles: Republican Writing of the English Revolution
(Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 125 (“By 1683 Sidney was attempting to organize a repetition of
the events of the year 1640”).
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law, it was illegal to convict Sidney of treason on the basis of his statements in Discourses, as if the
manuscript was a live witness. This is all the more offensive when the sole witness against Sidney utterly
lacked credibility. The case simply was not made, which is why Sidney’s family was able to obtain a legal
resolution that overturned his conviction for treason and Sidney’s reputation was at least officially restored
along with his property (to be inherited by his family). In all respects, the answer to the question of
whether Sidney did commit treason, just as the question of whether a magistrate had gone so far in the
wrong direction to be legitimately subject to rebellion is a question of fact, not a matter of law. Neither
factual case was established at the time and the evidence is not clear today. On the other hand, the
combination of Charles’ increasingly absolutist behavior with his sympathy for and affiliation with
Catholicism created a combustibility that was far greater than “a small matter” that Sidney acknowledged
set some men’s spirits on fire!144 Whether Sidney was one of those men is very possible, but it was not
proven. The fact that Sidney may have recorded his views on the right of resistance at some other time
makes the ideas no less cogent or more treasonable. Like Grotius, Sidney believed that there were
behavioral limits, set by the terms of the social contract, beyond which both parties were no longer bound.

It is wise to be cautious at the beginning and acknowledge that we are standing on a slippery slope. …
As much an ideality as an ideal, the words “rule of law” have served a wide range of purposes,
stretching from political sloganeering to the protection of individual rights from the power of government.
John Phillip Reid, Rule of Law145

iii.

Rule of Law

Rule of law is a legal term of art; but it is also an expression that is bandied about so readily in all
sorts of books – history, political theory, and many other genres – that we all think that we know what we
mean when we talk about the rule of law. As political theorist James Murphy stated, “It is often observed
that where you stand depends on where you sit. But how we understand and how we evaluate the rule of
law will often reflect, implicitly or explicitly, a particular point of view.”146 Generally when people talk about
the rule of law they mean that there is some sort of legal system functioning in a society so that govern-
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John Phillip Reid, Rule of Law, p. 3.
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James Bernard Murphy, “The Lawyer and the Layman: Two Perspectives on the Rule of Law,” The
Review of Politics, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Winter, 2006), pp. 101-31, 103. There is a vast literature on the rule of
law. See Appendix B.
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ment decisions are not completely arbitrary, and so that there is a means of redress for private and public
grievances.147 As legal scholar M. N. S. Sellers explained, “The ‘rule of law’ signifies here the enterprise
of subjecting human conduct to the governance of known rules.”148 At the same time, the term is
sufficiently broad, and perhaps even vague, that one is hard pressed to imagine a society in which there
is no rule of law.149
In jurisprudence the term “rule of law” seems to have much greater resonance. “The suggestion
that the law contains ‘complexities and hidden antinomies’ may arouse some skepticism. It may be said
that though reactions to the law – like those toward the weather – may be complex and subtle, there is
nothing about the notion of law itself that suggests such qualities.” Individual laws “may be complicated
and forbiddingly so, with their endless paragraphs, their ‘aforsaid’s’ and ‘provided however’s.’ But about
the notion of law itself there is no mystery. Everyone knows what it is and why it exists.150 According to
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To provide one particularly relevant example of the degree to which scholars assume we all know what
we are talking about (and agree!) when we refer to the rule of law, consider Alan Houston’s article in A
Nation Transformed, which is entitled, “Republicanism, the politics of necessity, and the rule of law.” A
Nation Transformed, Ch. 9, pp. 241-71. As the title to the article makes clear, and as evidenced by the
two article subsections entitled, “The Rule of Law (I)” and “The Rule of Law (II),” the article is in significant
part about the rule of law. Yet Houston did not consider it necessary in the article to define, much less
provide a basis for a definition of the rule of law. The same thing can be said about Alan Cromartie’s
essay entitled, “The Rule of Law” that is Chapter III in Revolution and Restoration: England in the 1650s,
John Morrill, ed. (London: Collins & Brown, 1992), pp. 55-69.
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Sellers, Republican Legal Theory, p. 60.
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Modern references define the rule of law variously. Black’s Law Dictionary, the standard English
language legal reference, states that the rule of law is, “A legal principle, of general application,
sanctioned by the recognition of authorities, and usually expressed in the form of a maxim or logical
proposition. Called a ‘rule,’ because in doubtful or unforeseen cases it is a guide or norm for their
decision,” referencing the nineteenth-century commentary by the French jurist, Charles Toullier, on the
French Civil Code. “Rule of law,” Black’s Law Dictionary, Second Edition (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing
Co., 1910), http://blacks. worldfreemansociety.org/2/R/r1047.jpg (3-31-14). (The 1891 first edition defined
it the same way.) The Oxford Dictionary of Law (7 ed.) defines rule of law as “1. The supremacy of law. 2.
A feature attributed to the UK constitution by Professor Dicey (Law of the Constitution, 1885). It
embodied three concepts: the absolute predominance of regular law, so that the government has no
arbitrary authority over the citizen; the equal subjection of all (including officials) to the ordinary law
administered by the ordinary courts; and the fact that the citizen’s personal freedoms are formulated and
protected by the ordinary law rather than by abstract constitutional declarations.“ “Rule of law,” Oxford
Dictionary of Law, Jonathan Law & Elizabeth A. Martin, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2014),
http://www.oxfordreference. com.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/ view/10.1093/acref/9780199551248.001.
0001/acref-9780199551248-e-3493?rskey=Irzjor &result=7 (3-31-14). For several additional definitions,
see Appendix B.
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Fuller, Anatomy of the Law, pp. 14-15. The 2007 American Bar Association World Justice Project
recognized the problem that “the ‘rule of law’ is a frequently used term that is rarely defined.” One goal of
the World Justice Project was to develop a broadly accepted definition of the rule of law that could be
used to measure adherence to the rule of law both in the United States and abroad. Based on the belief
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Sellers, “Law supplies the traditional boundary between liberty and license, … and … there can be no
liberty without law.”151 Similarly, American liberal philosopher John Rawls wrote that rule of law “is
obviously closely related to liberty.”152 Sandoz went further: “liberty is inseparable from rule of law.”153
Sidney understood this, and used the term in its full and intended meaning. So did Locke. “For Law, in its
true Notion, is not so much the Limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper
Interest, and prescribes no farther than is for the general Good of those under that Law.” As Locke
reminded us, “Could they be happier without it, the Law, as an useless thing would of itself vanish; and
that ill deserves the Name of Confinement which hedges us in only from Bogs and Precipices.” Thus,
“however it may be mistaken, the end of Law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge
Freedom: For in all the states of created beings capable of Laws, where there is no Law, there is no
Freedom.”154 Locke’s reference to “hedges” likely rebutted Hobbes’ much narrower concept of law: “For
the use of Lawes is … to direct and keep [the People] in such a motion, as not to hurt themselves … as

that the rule of law is a prerequisite for building societies that offer opportunity and equity to all their
citizens, the World Justice Project proposed to use its definition of the rule of law to create an index that
would measure how nations around the world are—or are not—following the rule of law. The World
Justice Project proposed a working definition of the rule of law that comprises four principles: “1. A
system of self-government in which all persons, including the government, are accountable under the law.
2. A system based on fair, publicized, broadly understood and stable laws. 3. A fair, robust, and
accessible legal process in which rights and responsibilities based in law are evenly enforced. 4. Diverse,
competent, and independent lawyers and judges.” American Bar Association (ABA), Division for Public
Education, Part I: What is the Rule of Law, 2014, at https://www.google.com/search?q=rule+of+
law&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org. mozilla: en-US:official&client=firefox-a (9-14-14).
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Sellers, Republican Liberty, p. 84. As Worden pointed out, it is John Milton who, among the English
republicans most insistently dwelt on the difference between liberty and license. “[L]icense is the sway of
passion and appetite, whereas ‘nothing can so effectively mould and create virtue as liberty.” Worden,
“Marchamont Nedham and English Republicanism,” Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society,
1649-1776, p. 57, quoting Complete Prose Works of John Milton D.M. Wolfe et al, eds. (New Haven,
1953-83), 8 Vols., Vol. 4, p. 679.
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John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 207. In “Reconsidering the Rule
of Law,” law professor Margaret Jane Radin explored modern theories about the rule of law, including the
differences and similarities between Fuller and Rawls’ theories, which are termed instrumental and
substantive definitions, respectively. Radin argued that individuals who implement rules, including
judges, police and administrators, are supposed to be rule-bound but not “merely instrumental
functionaries.” Rules are mutable and governed by accepted social practice. Margaret Jane Radin,
“Reconsidering the Rule of Law,” 69 Boston University Law Review 781, 810 (July 1989).
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Sandoz, “Editor’s Introduction,” The Roots of Liberty, p. 1.
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Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, Ch. 6, §57, pp. 305-06 (emphasis in original).
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Hedges are set, not to stop Travellers, but to keep them in the way.”155
It was government professor James Murphy’s thesis, and one which it will be evident I wholly
embrace, that the distinction between “a” law and “the” law, which Murphy connected to the Latin terminology “lex” and “ius,” is at the heart of the confusion over the meaning of the rule of law.156 According to
this thesis, “laymen,” viz., non-lawyers, think of the law in terms of a collection of discrete laws – statutes,
ordinances and by-laws, both statutory and common law, civil and criminal – that are particular precepts,
rules and commandments that forbid or permit particular acts.157 Laws are therefore primarily commands
to do or not do something, and are found in the enactments of legislatures.158 In contrast to the layman’s
view, “One of the chief purposes of legal education, especially in common law jurisdictions, [which includes England and America,] is to undermine the lay view of the laws as a promiscuous heap of statutes
and to introduce students to the Law.”159 From the attorney’s perspective, the Law is neither an aggre-
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Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 30; cf. Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, Ch. 6, §57, line 16
note. For the surprising similarities between Hobbes’ and Locke’s views on the rule of law, see Michael
P. Zuckert, “Hobbes, Locke, and the Problem of the Rule of Law,” The Rule of Law: Nomos XXXVI, pp.
63-79, 76 (“Hobbes is not a ‘Hobbesean’ and Locke is not a ‘Lockean’”).
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“The history of the relation of ius to lex is nothing less than the history of the ancient and modern
Roman law.” Murphy, “The Lawyer and the Layman,” p. 110.
157

“[P]hilosophers turn out to be rank amateurs. Philosophers, like all laymen, tend to refer to ‘laws’ in the
plural: thus Plato’s treatise is titled Nomoi, leading Cicero, Aquinas, and Suarez to write their treatises as
De Legibus; Hobbes, too, titles his work A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Lawyer on the Common
Laws of England. The leading jurists of the Roman law, by contrast, whether the ancient Ulpian, Caius,
and Paulus or the modern Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, and Wolff, title their treatises “On the Law” (De Jure).
Of course, legal philosophers who are also professional lawyers tend to speak more holistically about the
law (Fuller, Hart, Raz, Dworkin, Finnis).” Murphy, “The Lawyer and the Layman,” p. 108.
158

“[N]o legal philosopher so self-consciously champions the layman’s perspective as does Thomas
Hobbes. Hobbes begins by proposing a definition of ‘the Nature and Essence of a Law.’ He admits that
by a law (lex) he means a statute…[H]e brags that he will show us, not ‘what is law here or there, but
simply what is law (as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and divers others have done, without taking upon them the
profession of the study of law.’) Hobbes is right that Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero were not jurists but mere
laymen; but he is wrong to assert that a proper philosophy of law has no need for the lawyerly understanding of law.” Murphy, “The Lawyer and the Layman,” p. 118. See Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 26.1.
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Murphy, “The Lawyer and the Layman,” p. 106. England is often described as a common law jurisdiction historically rooted in the legal tradition of northern Europe in contradistinction to much of the continent
of Europe, which is said to be based on a Roman, statutory legal system. In fact, these distinctions are
not cut and dry; indeed, they are potentially misleading. The solidification (indeed, one might contend, the
petrification) of Roman law came about with the creation of Justinian’s Code in the sixth century; but the
earlier development of Roman law was highly flexible, and determined by professional jurists and not by
statute. In contrast, Northern Europe’s legal system was largely customary, that is, based on unwritten
law. This has been “translated” to mean non-statutory, which is not the same thing. English law has
deep roots in both customary and Roman law. In short, these distinctions only create confusion, not
clarity. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law, passim; Berman, Law & Revolution I, p. 3 (“The
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gate, nor is it made up solely of rules.160 While one could designate this concept as the law, lower case L,
I deliberately utilize the Law, capital L, to emphasize its encompassing, conceptual and compound
character; indeed, some refer to it as The Law, capital T, capital L.161 In fact, the Law embraces “a
bewildering assortment of heterogeneous items,” including the rules to which the layman typically refers,
but also much more. It encompasses standards, principles, categories of classification, maxims, doctrine
and ideals. The Law is also “crucially” all about “the art and technique of interpreting, developing and
applying the applicable, heterogeneous norms in the administration of justice.”162
In Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, Berman focused on the
breadth of the law. The terms “legal” and “law” have a history, but defining law as a “body of rules,” or
even as “the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules,” which is Lon Fuller’s
definition, is too narrow. As part of the concept of law, Berman included many other activities associated
with governance, such as casting votes, issuing orders, appointing officials, handing down judgments,
and the facilitating of voluntary arrangements (negotiated transactions, the outcome of which is often
reflected in a contract, issuing documents, and other civil law activities). “Law in action consists of people

Hebrew culture would not tolerate Greek philosophy or Roman law; the Greek culture would not tolerate
Roman law or Hebrew theology; the Roman culture would not tolerate Hebrew theology, and it resisted
large parts of Greek philosophy. Yet the West in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries combined
all three, and thereby transformed each one”); Arthur R. Hogue, Origins of the Common Law
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1986) (discussion of extent of Roman influence on English common law).
John H. Langbein, Renée Lettow Lerner, & Bruce P. Smith, History of the Common Law: The
Development of Anglo-American Legal Institutions (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2009), pp. 138-39
(“Although the Roman canon legal tradition was much less consequential for England than for the
Continental states, there were many points of contact and influence across the centuries, most notably in
the rise of the Court of Chancery at the end of the Middle Ages”).
160

Some might prefer to make this distinction by talking about “laws” versus “law” utilized as a collective
noun.
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John Austin, author of The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832) and an early legal positivist,
believed that “all laws consist, directly or mediately, of rules laid down by a sovereign power enjoying the
habit of obedience within a given society.” The role of the judge in England’s system of law, from Austin’s
perspective, was problematic. Austin considered it “childish fiction” for judges to contend that, “judiciary
or common law is not made by them, but is a miraculous something made by nobody.” In contrast,
judges who issued decisions contended that they are applying a law already made plain or implied in
earlier decisions. In short, the “childish fiction” of judges “has greatly facilitated communication and
commerce among the nations of the common law. By acting as if there existed a body of legal principle
that could be called simply “The Law,” they have brought into existence something not wholly
undeserving of that name.” Lon L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law (New York & Toronto: Mentor Books,
1968), pp. 72, 154.
162

Murphy, “The Lawyer and the Layman,” p. 118, citing Cicero’s De Legibus I, vi, 19.
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legislating, adjudicating, administering, negotiating, and carrying on other legal activities. It is a living
process of allocating rights and duties and thereby resolving conflicts and creating channels of
cooperation.”163 In connection with this concept of “law in action,” Berman’s concept of law intersects with
Murphy’s analysis. For Berman, “law in action” is all about real life – the application of the law – “not only
with the law in books.” As Berman explained, “Law in action involves legal institutions and procedures,
legal values, and legal concepts and ways of thought, as well as legal rules. It involves what is
sometimes called “the legal process,” or what in German is called Rechtverwirklichung, the ‘realizing’ of
law.”164
Returning to Murphy’s thesis that at the heart of the confusion over the meaning of the rule of law
are the Latin terms ius and lex, ius “means the rule of law as well as the rule of what is right and just
(iustum). So ius refers to the ethical.” In contrast, lex refers to “the imperative dimension of the rule of
law.”165 Notwithstanding the fact that ius “primarily refers to the whole body of law (ius civile) while lex
primarily refers only to a statute,” even within republican and classical Roman jurisprudence throughout
antiquity, the Middle Ages and modernity, both lex and leges were sometimes used by jurists to refer to
“the whole rule of law,” which further explains our understandable confusion and conflation of these
jurisprudential terms.166
Among the authorities that Murphy cited in support of his thesis about the rule of law, the lawyer
and the layman, is Cicero, who complained about the same thing: the fact that the crowd understood law,
ius, to be limited to that which is enacted by statute, lex.167 In fact, said Cicero, “we have to encompass
the entire issue of universal justice and law; what we call civil law will be confined to a small, narrow,
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Berman, Law and Revolution I, pp. 4-5.
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Id, p. 4.
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“It thus makes sense that those who deny any necessary connection between the ethical and the
imperative dimension of law tend to use lex rather than ius as their main word for law, as do Hobbes,
Bentham, and Oakeshott.” Murphy, “The Lawyer and the Layman,” p. 111.
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“Schiller says: ‘Unfortunately, many writers have identified ius with customary law’; but, he says, ius is
‘jurists’ law.’ A. Arthur Schiller, Roman Law: Mechanisms of Development (The Hague; Mouton, 1978),
pp. 226-27.” Murphy, “The Lawyer and the Layman,” p. 111 and n.23.
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English and Greek are the two modern European languages that have not preserved the distinction
between ius and lex by comparable distinct words. Id, pp. 105, 109.
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corner of it.”168 Murphy traced the vital distinction between a law or laws, and the Law, through a variety of
experts, ancient and modern, concluding that it is ius, not lex, which refers to the complex concept that
jurists call the Law, and it is jurists who are authoritative interpreters of the Law. Furthermore, and of
great significance with respect to Sidney’s republicanism, “Although lex is often a vehicle for political
command and control, ius, as the body of law and legal reasoning we inherit from the Roman jurists, is
largely immune from transient political manipulation.”169 The Law’s relative (although not absolute)
invulnerability to political manipulation relates to the question that Murphy raised at the beginning of his
essay, a question specified by medieval scholastics, the answer to which, said Murphy, is that, “The king
makes lex but ius makes the king.”170 We will return to this principle shortly.
For our purposes, the issue is not whether it is for the linguistic reason Murphy emphasized that
modern Anglo-Americans fail to make the distinction between law or laws, on the one hand, and the Law,
on the other or, rather, whether this significantly different perspective is simply a product of the nature of a
layman’s education in contrast to a lawyer’s education and training. What is vitally important is to
recognize that “rule of law” as understood by those who implement the legal system is the principle that
there are both laws, plural, that are particular, pragmatic, contingent, normative rules, and then there is
the Law, singular in its entirety, and subsuming the layman’s understanding of the law as well as a variety
of principles and other ideas and ideals sometimes (although not always) quite conceptual in nature.171
Consciously or unconsciously these values are often founded on tradition.172 The poet Octavio Paz
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Cicero, “The Laws,” Cicero, The Republic and The Laws, Book One, ¶17, p. 103.
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Murphy, “The Lawyer and the Layman,” pp. 130-31.
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In Roman law, the plural of ius, which is iura, meant rights. Id, p. 114 n.34.
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Murphy’s thesis proverbially makes a hole big enough to drive a truck through with regard to the
infamous reputation of lawyers as always narrowly focused on the particulars such that they do not see
the forest for the trees, to mix metaphors. To the contrary, Murphy suggested that lawyers may deal with
the nitty-gritty of particular laws, but they are trained to think conceptually about the Law. It is laymen
who tend to think literally.
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Pocock seemed to trip over this concept. In The Machiavellian Moment he recognized, for example,
that, “Fortescue declares it to be a universal truth in the study of law that all human laws are either law of
nature, or custom, or statutes.” This alluded, in different nomenclature, to several of the layers of law in
which republicanism is grounded: God’s natural law; and then the rule of law and process and procedure,
which were part of the Englishman’s common law and positive or statutory law. It omitted explicit
reference to the social contract. Whether it intended to cover the other layers of law, and how comfortable
Pocock was with this description of law, cannot be assumed. Nevertheless, while analytically incomplete,
as a practical matter Pocock’s articulation of law possibly was parallel to the systematic approach
575

astutely observed that tradition “is a society’s visible side – institutions, monuments, works, things, -- but it
is especially its submerged, invisible side: beliefs, desires, fears, repressions, dreams.” Elaborating on
Paz’s insight, Berman noted, “Law is usually associated with the visible side, with works; but a study of
the history of Western law, and especially its origins, reveals its rootedness in the deepest beliefs and
emotions of a people.”173Within the Anglo-American jurisprudential system, it is “universally” recognized
that the “central idea of juridical theory” is the Law.174
Even if they do not always succeed in accomplishing this, jurists intend that laws implement the
Law; and, as Berman made clear and Murphy reminded us, “Law in any complex legal system cannot be
understood apart from the activity, the ideas, and the customs of the legal profession itself.” When
someone versed in the Law, whether or not a lawyer (Murphy, for example, is not one), talks about the
rule of law, he is referring to the principle that the Law governs men in society, and is often implemented

advocated here. I.e., his perspective possibly suggested the lion’s share of the legal underbelly of
republican theory. What Pocock concluded, however, was that this substructure of English law “was not
rational,” since “the study of customary law was not a scholastic process of rational deduction but – as
Coke was to tell James I – a matter of lifelong study in the records and working experience of the courts,”
eluding to Coke’s artificial reason. Why Pocock viewed the former, based on authority and experience,
as irrational whereas the latter was rational is perplexing. Compare Planned Parenthood v. Casey, cited
by Berman, “which grounds the ‘very concept of the rule of law’ on ‘continuity over time’ and ‘respect for
precedent.’” 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808 (1992); ; Harold J. Berman, “The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence:
Coke, Selden, Hale,” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 103, No. 7 (May 1994), pp. 1651-1738, 1653 n.1.
Pocock rejected, misunderstood, or otherwise could not come to terms with the critically important
concept of the Law, viz. a body of ideas and the means to implement them, based largely in equity, from
which a panoply of legal principles can be and have been derived. Why Pocock either was oblivious to or
considered the Law not to be rational because it came from court or legal reasoning is unclear and
certainly not self-evident. Pocock equated Plato’s philosopher-king, who grounded his decision-making in
wisdom and experience, with Fortescue’s judicial decision-making, in contrast to Aristotle’s preference for
positive law, which he was convinced would be wiser than any individual philosopher-king (not to mention
a judge) could be. Again, there is nothing self-evidently true about this bias. Cf. J. G. A. Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Moment, 2nd ed.
(Princeton University Press, 2003)(“MM”), pp. 15-30.
173
Berman, Law and Revolution I, pp. 557-58. As American Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes explained, “The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have
had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed. The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot
be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know
what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become. We must alternately consult
history and existing theories of legislation. But the most difficult labor will be to understand the
combination of the two into new products at every stage.” Holmes, The Common Law, pp. 3-4.
174

It is similarly understood that the ius civile is grounded on the interpretations of learned jurists. Murphy,
“The Lawyer and the Layman,” pp. 113, 116.
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through laws, which are then interpreted in the courts. “Interpretation creates law interstitially; it is the
mortar of the legal edifice.”175 In the Anglo-American legal system, when we refer to the common law, or
what some refer to as “lawyer’s law,” we are talking about the ideas of jurists in adjudications, as well as
juridical views contained in other highly regarded legal texts such as, from the seventeenth century, Sir
Edward Coke’s Institutes. The Law is both a collection of particular rules – speed-limits, tax codes,
inheritance laws, and other rules ad infinitum – as well as a collection of concepts and aphorisms that are
intended to apply principles of justice to life – e.g., a man should not profit from his own wrongdoing,
ignorance of the law is no excuse, the law does not force a man to do a vain thing, one who acts through
another acts himself, and innumerable other legal maxims that are often imbued with ethical values and
frequently relate to matters of fundamental fairness, another well-worn legal concept; most of these
maxims have ancient, and usually Roman origins.176 Berman talked in terms of the “meta-law,” the legal
science within the law that reflects what legal scholars say about the institutions, commands and
decisions of the law.177
In her award-winning 1956 biography of Sir Edward Coke, Catherine Drinker Bowen provided a
fascinating and, for our purposes, important description of a speech by Sir Walter Raleigh (or Ralegh)
during the Elizabethan courtier’s trial for treason. Raleigh was not only a famous explorer, soldier,
politician and writer but he was also a friend of the 1st Earl of Leicester. He was tried shortly after James I
became the king of England. Raleigh was found guilty on the basis of insufficient evidence including only
one witness, as was the case during Algernon Sidney’s trial, the fact of which was the subject of strenuous
objection by Raleigh, as it was by Sidney.178 Raleigh “was condemned to death on nothing more than
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One sees this emphasis on maxims in seventeenth-century English legal thought. Recognizing that
local custom alone was insufficient to achieve justice, equity, “that whatsoever falleth under the same
reason will be fond the same law,” was the stated goal such that a “primitive maxim” was “deduced” from
“learning, wisdom and excellency of reason.” As historian Paul Christianson noted, “This subtle interplay
of maxims and immemorial custom built continuity and flexibility into the laws. The rationality of maxims
assured that ‘no unreasonable usage will ever make a custom (pleadable in law),’ while the ability to
overrule judgments assured that the mere ‘reason or opinion of 3 or 4 judges’ could not make law.” Paul
Christianson, “Ancient Constitutions in the Age of Sir Edward Coke and John Selden,” The Roots of
Liberty, Ch. 3, pp. 115-84.
177

Berman, Law and Revolution I, p. 8.
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Bowen, The Lion and the Throne, Chs. 15 & 16.
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presumption and surmise.”179 It should be noted that this trial took place under the direction of the
Attorney General who, at the time, was Sir Edward Coke! Raleigh had spent one year in his youth at the
Inns of Court but he was not an attorney. Nevertheless, his description of English law in his trial statement
dovetails precisely with Murphy’s thesis. “It was a long speech and there was more, [Raleigh] referring not
only to Deuteronomy but to St. Paul. How the judges were to receive it would presently be seen, but to the
audience it was supremely effectual. Ralegh, in calling on the Law of God, appealed not alone to religious
faith but to the national conception of LAW as apart from the laws – a distinction sharp in English minds:
the laws were made by men and could be found in statute book or in judicial maxim and decision. LAW
was deeper, higher, derived from God. LAW antedated the laws and would exist if every manmade statute
were expunged.180
Bowen commented on the familiarity of the English people with the distinction between English
laws, on the one hand, and the concept of the Law, on the other. This differentiation, she said, “was a
native conception, part of the common inheritance. Sir Walter had presented the law as plain citizens
knew it in their minds and held it in their hearts, no matter what construction had been put upon it by
legalists now or in Queen Mary Tudor’s time.”181 As another scholar put it, “The simple fact was that
Tudor government, under the measured influence of sixteenth-century humanism – and abetted by the
print revolution – had unmistakably transformed English law from a private into a public commodity.”182
In sum, the Law is more – much more – than just the laws. Obviously, then, if rule of law is
understood to be the rule of (lower-case) law it is something very different from the rule of (upper-case)
Law. Laymen may not appreciate this distinction; indeed, there is little reason why they should, although
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Hart, The Rule of Law, 1603-1660, p. 14. For a useful description of the English legal system in this
timeframe, see id, Chs. One & Two, pp. 21-76, “The Structure and Machinery of the Law,” & “The
Judiciary.” From an American’s vantage point, a likely unappreciated aspect of the English system of law
is that Parliament constituted “the apex” of the system as the King’s High Court. “Just exactly what
authority that title conferred was never precisely defined,” but it clearly included appellate authority and
general oversight of the legal system’s effectiveness. “Sir Edward Coke once described the members of
the House of Commons as ‘Inquisitors General’ in matters of the law.” On numerous occasions,
Parliament reviewed and reexamined lower court findings, e.g., in the Ship Money Case of 1641, and
when it considered the matter of judicial misconduct during the 1680 Popish Plot. Id, p. 36.
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Bowen was confident that this was not only something Raleigh knew; it was a well-understood distinction
in seventeenth-century England. Most people understandably think it appropriate to describe the law as
the aggregate of laws that exist in a society; some would also include the legal “hardware” – the courts,
juries, judges, and other legal machinery – as part of the law.183 Whether because of the availability of
numerous, celebrated legal texts in his family’s library, his misfortune in having to spend years tending to
family legal matters, or for other reasons, Sidney was particularly well versed on the rule of law. This
depth of understanding is reflected in his republicanism, which is saturated with discussion of the Law.184
Section 1 of Chapter One of Discourses is Sidney’s very brief “Introduction” to his lengthy
treatise. In juxtaposition to what Filmer maintained, in these three pages Sidney summarily set forth the
very foundation of government to which he and many other men subscribed, all of which was “mistaken
… [i]f we believe Sir Robert.” Sidney maintained that it is “just,” i.e., consonant with justice, that people
have “constituted commonwealths or kingdoms” in ways designed to prevent a monarch from being

183
“Laymen and legal philosophers alike have often thought of law as being something like a command or
order, issued by the estate and directed to the citizen.” Fuller, Anatomy of the Law, p. 153; see Murphy at
128 n.81. Those in this category have good company. It is Hobbes who stated that any man who
commits two months of study to the law should be able to master it, for, he opined, “I think it were well
that every Man that can Read had a Statute Book.” Thomas Hobbes, A Dialogue of the Common Laws of
England, pp. 56, 72; see Murphy at 120.
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In the excellent collection of essays in The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe
(Cambridge University Press, 1990), the editor, Anthony Pagden, introduced the book’s prodigious
subject by noting that the essays “cover four of the most important, most easily identifiable languages of
political theory in use in early-modern Europe.” Those, he contended, were the languages of political
Aristotelianism and the law of nature, of classical republicanism (which Pagden maintained “stood in
broad opposition” to the language of political Aristotelianism and “the natural law”), of political economy,
and of the science of politics. The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, “Introduction,”
pp. 3-7. It is my contention that the language of the law, including the rule of law, was an essential –
indeed, perhaps the essential – language of early-modern political theory in Europe. Moreover, as is
already evident, one also could hardly be more in error in saying that early modern republicanism,
whether termed classical or otherwise, “stood in broad opposition” to the language of natural law. It also
should be noted that a brief chapter by cultural historian Günther Lottes in the 2014 compilation, English
Revolutionary Republicanism, asserted that Sidney relied upon at least four different political languages;
Lottes’ four political languages are not the same as Pagden’s, although there is overlap. Lottes
designated biblical language, the language of civil humanism, the natural law tradition, and the language
of constitutional historiography. Although his analysis is very brief, Lottes did not appreciate the legal
sinews – layers of law – that tie together the various aspects of Sidney’s republicanism. He was also
profoundly incorrect that, “[u]nlike Locke,” Sidney “did not explicitly introduce the contract model,” and that
it was not until the eighteenth century that the “participatory elements of the contractual model gain
political weight and came to inspire a movement for parliamentary reform.” Günther Lottes, “Language
and Content: The Political Thought of Algernon Sidney between Republicanism and Enlightenment,”
Perspectives on English Revolutionary Republicanism, Ch. 3, pp. 53-61, 58-59.
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“absolute and uncontrolled.”185 Halifax, as usual very cleverly, alluded to the same thing: “the end of
government being that mankind should live in some competent state of freedom, it is very unnatural to
have the end destroyed by the means that were originally made use of to attain it.”186 Relying on Cicero,
and valuing those who “had endeavoured to make men better, wiser and happier” by means of the pursuit
of justice, Sidney asserted, “no government was thought to be well constituted, unless the laws prevailed
above the commands of men.”187 He footnoted this statement (his first footnote) with a maxim he recalled
from Tacitus: Potentiora legume quam hominum imperia meaning, “The rule of laws is more powerful than
that of men.188 One can more readily understand this axiom in juxtaposition to what Sidney presented as
the alternative, namely, “subjection to the fluctuating and irregular will of a man,” something only “the
worst of beasts” would prefer.189 Berman stated this idea succinctly: “in some important respects law
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DCG, I.1.5-6. In the judgment of Sidney’s intellectual biographer, “The debate between Filmer and his
opponents is of great significance because it helped set the terms for the thought of the eighteenth
century, not only in England, but in Europe, America and still in much of the western world today.” Scott
II, p. 210.
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“A Rough Draft of a New Model at Sea,” Halifax: Complete Works, pp. pp. 151-63, 156.

187

Sidney, DCG, I.1.6. In 1659, John Wildman similarly wrote, “the government of England ought to be
‘by laws and not by men.’” John Wildman, [John Wildman], The Leveller: Or the Principles and Maxims
concerning Government and Religion, which are assented to by those commonly called Levellers,
Maurice Ashley, John Wildman, Plotter and Postmaster (London: Jonathan Cape, 1947), p. 137. Notice
that the expression “well constituted,” which has its own legal history that we will discuss shortly, is
generally how the term “constitution” is used in early modern political theory (and earlier). Well
constituted meant that a government was organized and instituted properly.
188
DCG, I.1.6.n.2. West noted that the statement was actually from Livy’s History of Rome, Book 2,
Chapter 1. Here we have an example of what Murphy described as the tendency, even in ancient Rome,
to utilize the fashionable Greek term for law, which is nomos, and then translate nomos to lex. “[T]he word
lex increasingly came to refer to the whole legal order. …Still, despite the vagaries of historical usage,
jurists have always attempted to preserve the fundamental distinction between ius as the law and lex as a
law (or statute). The contrast of ius and lex was born and will flourish wherever we find a contrast
between legal professionals and laymen, which is why ius and lex is foreign to ancient Greek legal
discourse” as there was no legal profession in ancient Greece. In fact, those who attempt to understand
Roman law by reference to Greek terminology as, for example, the medieval historian Walter Ullmann did,
will invariably “distort our understanding of Roman law and of lawyers’ law generally.” Murphy, “The
Lawyer and the Layman,” pp. 112-13.
189
DCG, I.1.6. Halifax emphasized the same thing, “Our Trimmer, as he hath a great veneration for laws
in general, so he hath a more particular for our own. He looketh upon them as the chains that tie up our
unruly passions, which else, like wild beasts let loose, would reduce the world into its first state of
barbarism and hostility; all the good things we enjoy we owe to them, and all the ill things we are freed
from is by their protection.” Laws “are to mankind that [which] the sun is to plants, whilst it cherisheth and
preserveth them. …They secure men not only against one another but against themselves, too.” “The
Character of a Trimmer,” Halifax: Complete Works, pp. 51-52. These statements could have been written
by Sidney, and there are many more to this effect.
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transcends politics.”190 The drumbeat of the rule of law began at the very beginning, and is an ever-present theme throughout Discourses, as Sidney explored the nature and constitution of good governance.
It is worthwhile to divert momentarily from Sidney’s comments on the rule of law to place them in
the context in which he pondered and reacted to Filmer’s ideas. That context was Sidney’s explanation of
why Filmer worried him so much – an explanation that helps us understand why not only Sidney, but also
Locke and Tyrrell, felt compelled to write a treatise in opposition to Patriarcha. “I cannot know how to
obey, unless I know in what, and to whom. Nor in what, unless I know what ought to be commanded: Nor
what ought to be commanded, unless I understand the original right of the commander, which is the great
arcanum,” the mystery. Characterizing Filmer as an author “involved in many difficulties,” who proposed
a “ridiculous” expedient that is “nothing more than an absurd begging the main question, and determining
it without any shadow of proof,” Sidney articulated how Filmer urged “active or passive obedience” before
establishing why men should be persuaded or obliged to do so. Filmer’s political purposes posed a clear
and present danger; his Patriarcha was a “compendious way of obviating that which he calls popular
sedition, and of exposing all nations, that fall under the power of tyrants, to be destroyed utterly by them.”
Comparing Filmer to Nero and Domitian, Sidney argued that these tyrants “would have desired no more
than that those who would not execute their wicked commands, should patiently have suffered their
throats to be cut by such as were less scrupulous.” The danger was palpable: “and the world that had
suffered those monsters for some years, must have continued under their fury, till all that was good and
virtuous had been abolished.” In “those ages,” in addition to tyrants and those who actively or passively
subject themselves to tyrants, “we may observe a third sort of men, who would neither do villainies, nor
suffer more than the laws did permit, or the consideration of the publick peace did require.” Urging activism, and self-protection, Sidney stated, by way of analogy to ancient Rome, “Whilst tyrants with their
slaves, and the instruments of their cruelties, were accounted the dregs of mankind, and made the objects of detestation and scorn, these men who delivered their countries from such plagues were thought
to have something of divine in them, and have been famous above all the rest of mankind to this day.”191
Manifestly, Filmer was extraordinarily threatening to Sidney, “a mortal enemy.” This seems like an
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Berman, Law and Revolution I, p. 9.
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DCG, I.3.15.
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awfully melodramatic response to a dry treatise. But Filmer’s argument was perilous; for It was seductive. Filmer recognized and manipulated the weaknesses in man’s nature, utilizing them to convince
others of the merits of his advocacy of absolutism and to justify the support of tyrannical government. In
fine, from Sidney’s perspective Filmer’s argument constituted effective entrapment. Sidney confronted
Filmer by exposing his approach. Sidney described man’s natural vulnerability to Filmer’s absolutism.
Some men were passively obedient and would do whatever a magistrate wanted them to do. Other men
might be active but, for a variety of reasons, became more than willing to implement the despotic, cruel
actions of a tyrant. Both of these kinds of people, Sidney ruminated, did not ask questions; they followed.
But thankfully, there was a third sort of man, and it was to this man that Sidney’s Discourses appealed,
viz., to himself. The third sort of man could not obey unless he understood “in what, and to whom.” Such
men followed a magistrate inasmuch as “the publick peace did require”; but no more than that. “[T]he
question is not whether that which is Caesar’s should be rendered to him, for that is to be done to all men;
but who is Caesar, and what doth of right belong to him.” Obeisance was precisely the human inclination
that Sidney so vehemently fought and occasionally mocked. No matter how comfortable it might be,
submission was a mistake. For instance, on the issue of whether absolute monarchs governed well,
Sidney was dripping with sarcasm: “But says our author, yet will they rule their subjects by the law…. This
is therefore an effect of their goodness; they are above laws, but will rule by law, we have Filmer’s word
for it.” To “not question or quarrel,” which was what Filmer wanted men to do, was a threat “to every
nation in the world as well as to our own,” although Sidney believed that Filmer’s “malice seems to be
most especially directed against England.”192 The threat was the loss of liberty; and it was such a
prodigious threat because of the nature of man, and his ready willingness to be submissive (or sometimes
cruel). The threat was also the inability to avoid subjection to priorities with which one disagreed, to
values that might be anathema and, most profoundly, to subjugation. For Sidney, to not question or
quarrel was slavery.193
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Id, III.15.398, I.15.18, 1.3.16, I.4.16.
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According to Sidney, in ancient times, “Asiaticks and Africans, for being careless of their liberty, or
unable to govern themselves, were by Aristotle and other wise men called slaves by nature, and looked
upon as little different from beasts.” Sidney’s source is Aristotle’s Politics, bk. I, part 6, in which Aristotle
stated, “We see then that there is some foundation for this difference of opinion, and that all are not either
slaves by nature or freemen by nature, and also that there is in some cases a marked distinction between
582

The answer to this fundamental threat to mankind, and an answer that informed Sidney’s entire
study of republicanism, was the rule of law. Sidney repeated the ancient maxim with which he began
Discourses: “Potentiora errant legume quam hominum imperia,” the rule of law overcomes the weaknesses in many men. The ancient Greeks, Italians, Gauls, Germans, Spaniards and Carthaginians all
avoided slavery by their determination to “be governed only by laws of their own making.” Furthermore,
laws are “no less … necessary” to monarchies than they are to popular states: “’tis no less impossible for
any [state or government] to subsist without them, than for the body of a man to be, and perform its
functions without nerves or bones.”194 But beyond “laws” themselves, the rule of law allowed men to
achieve justice, and Filmer should know, said Sidney, that “there can be no peace, where there is no
justice; nor any justice, if the government instituted for the good of a nation be turned to its ruin.”195
Halifax said the same thing: “There can be no greater solecism in government than a failure of justice.”196
Sidney was convinced that implementation of the rule of law protected men from themselves and
thereby provided the opportunity for the creation of a just society. Patriarcha threw down the gauntlet,
challenging the very foundation on which Sidney based his republicanism, namely, the law. All men, said
Sidney, have “in some degree a capacity of judging what is good for themselves.” This is not a quality
that is in any way unique to a king: “the crown doth neither bestow extraordinary qualities, ripen such as
are found in princes sooner than in the meanest, nor preserve them from the decays of age, sickness, or
other accidents, to which all men are subject.” To the contrary, kings were “wise or foolish, good or bad,

the two classes, rendering it expedient and right for the one to be slaves and the others to be masters:
the one practicing obedience, the others exercising the authority and lordship which nature intended them
to have.” Aristotle, Politics, Benjamin Jowett, tr., http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html (6-514); DCG, 1.2.9. As far as the necessity to have the right to challenge in order not to be a slave, Sidney
stated, “those who are skilled in the laws of that nation [France] do still affirm, that all publick acts which
are not duly examined and registered, are void in themselves, and can be of no force longer than the
miserable people lies under the violence of oppression.” In England, “Without prejudice to themselves
and their liberties, a people may suffer the king to advise with his council upon what they propose.” DCG,
III.46.574.
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DCG, III.13.391.

195

Id, I.6.21.
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“The Character of a Trimmer,” Halifax: Complete Works, p. 66. The author(s) of the Fifteenth Dialogue
of Court Maxims made a similar statement: “Laws are made and governments constituted as remedies to
human frailty and depravity. Those laws only are good which leads to and encourage virtue, and punish
vice … In a commonwealth, therefore, well-constituted laws govern, not men.” Court Maxims, p. 196.
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valiant or cowardly like other men.” As Sidney noted in another passage, “I cannot be confident that they
[kings] are generally in an extraordinary manner preserved by the hand of God from the vices and frailties
to which the rest of mankind is subject.” Indeed, magistrates were more subject to “temptations and
snares” than ordinary men, and so they were more in danger of both being corrupted and of corrupting
others.197 Accordingly, ordinary men (and perhaps particularly their educated and often noble leaders such
as Sidney?), must rise up and establish a form of government supported by a system of law that would
protect their liberties. The balance of over five hundred pages of Discourses is a footnote to this conviction.
Why not conclude that Sidney simply meant that men must pass laws - various rules and regulations, to protect their freedom? In other words, how can we be confident that Sidney was an advocate of
the rule of Law, ius, and not simply the rule of law, lex? The answer is that the pursuit of justice is a much
more complex goal than the establishment of particular laws; and it is the former, not the latter, to which
Sidney’s republicanism subscribed. Indeed, for Sidney, justice was so pivotal that, “That which is not just,
is not Law; and that which is not Law, ought not to be obeyed” – the title of a section of Discourses.198
The efficacy of law is not that it is a command; for Sidney, the coercive power of law “is merely
contingent.”199As Cicero stated, “Most foolish of all is the belief that everything decreed by the institutions
or laws of a particular country is just. What if the laws are the laws of tyrants?”200 One must follow that
which is right and good; otherwise, “David was not to be obeyed, when by the wickedness of his son he
was driven from Jerusalem, and deprived of all coercive power; and the conscientious obedience that
was due to him was transferr’d to Absalom who sought his life.”201 Similarly, men should not have
followed St. Paul, but Caligula, Claudius and Nero instead. “If this were so, the governments of the world
might be justly called magna latrocinia [“robbery on a grand scale,” from Augustine’s City of God]; and
men laying aside all considerations of reason or justice, ought only to follow those who can inflict the
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DCG, I.6.20, 1.3.14, II.19.189.
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Id, III.11.380.
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Id, III.11.381.

200

Cicero, “The Laws,” Cicero, The Republic and The Laws, Book One, ¶42, p. 111.
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DCG, II.11.381.
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greatest punishments, or give the greatest rewards.”202 Call this old fashioned, as Pocock did; but one
cannot ignore values, said Sidney, when considering the nature of governance. At the same time, one
must be a realist – a conviction that may not readily square with the desire to do what is right and good.
This was no less relevant in seventeenth-century England, or Machiavelli’s fifteenth-century Florence,
than it is today.203
Accordingly, said Sidney, “since the reception of such opinions would be the extirpation of all that
can be called good, we must look for another rule of our obedience.” What is that other rule? What can
men rely upon in determining their own behavior in civil society? For Sidney it was clear that we “shall
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Id. Cicero also talked about robbery: “If on the other hand laws were validated by the orders of
peoples, the enactments of politicians, and the verdicts of judges, then it would be just to rob, just to commit adultery, just to introduce forged wills, provided those things were approved by the votes or decrees
of the populace.” Cicero, “The Laws,” Cicero, The Republic and The Laws, Book One, ¶43, p. 112.
203

In their Introduction to A Nation Transformed, Alan Houston and Steve Pincus described an ancient/
modern split in political ideology between those committed to classical virtue and those who place a
priority on political economy: “The republican citizen ‘was so much of a political and so little of a social
animal as to be ancient and not modern’, John Pocock trenchantly argued, ‘ancient to the point of being
archaic’ [citing his own Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 48].
Republicanism, according to Scott, was the antithesis of ‘modern politics’ [citing “The English Republican
Imagination”, John Morrill, ed., Revolution and Restoration: England in the 1650s (London: Trafalgar
Square, 1993), pp. 37-39. See Houston and Pincus, “Introduction. Modernity and later-seventeenthcentury England,” A Nation Transformed, pp. 1-19, 5 & ns. 22, 23. Houston and Pincus also suggested
that, “This seems to be the point of Quentin Skinner’s recent claim that ‘the neo-roman theory rose to
prominence in the course of the English revolution of the mid-seventeenth century’ only to be supplanted
‘during the nineteenth century’ by ‘classical liberalism’: [citing his own Liberty Before Liberalism
(Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. ix-x].” Id, n.21; but see Stephen Macedo, “The Rule of Law,
Justice, and the Politics of Moderation,” The Rule of Law: Nomos XXXVI, pp. 148-77, 161 (“Liberal
constitutionalism has an irreducible republican element.”)
In my own view, this ancient/modern, virtue/political economy polarity confounds the intellectual history,
and creates a false dichotomy. The pursuit of a good society, defined in terms of the protection of the
public interest of the people, is ancient. The idea is equally modern. Indeed, as discussed throughout
this study, the classical liberalism of the nineteenth century, to which Skinner referred, was simply a
rendition of the republicanism of the seventeenth century, which was itself a rendition of classical
republicanism. Furthermore, a concern for political economy was not inconsistent with a priority placed on
the public interest; it was very much a part of it. Recall that a Swiss man visiting London in the late
sixteenth century had observed that most city inhabitants were employed in commerce – “they buy, sell,
and trade in all the corners of the globe” producing “vast amounts of money.” See Ch. One & Appendix
B, Ch. One, n. 22. Thus, while Sidney believed that all republics must carefully prepare for war as a
means of obtaining peace – “those only can be safe who are strong” – he also maintained that by so
doing, they could pursue trade. “[T]hat government is evidently the best, which, not relying upon what it
does at first enjoy, seeks to increase the number, strength, and riches of the people; …This comprehends
all things conducing to the administration of justice, the preservation of domestick peace, and the
increase of commerce, that the people being pleased with their present condition, may be filled with love
to their country, encouraged to fight boldly for the publick cause.” DCG II.22-23.204-09. This was Sidney
and many other early modern republicans’ view as well as that expressed centuries earlier by the
republicans Cicero and Machiavelli. Do we want something else today?
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find that to be the law.”204 For it is the law that is sanction recta – again paraphrasing Cicero: “If any man
ask what I mean by justice, I answer, that the law of the land, as far as it is sanction recta, juvens
honesta, prohibens contraria,” a “right sanction, commanding honest deeds, forbidding the contrary.”205 It
is “the law of the land” that “declares what justice is.”206 We all know that there are bad laws: “there have
been and are laws that are neither just nor commendable.” Sidney provided an abundance of
Illustrations. But the coercive power of particular laws is merely contingent. To understand Sidney’s
republicanism and its reliance on law, we must understand that, “These [bad laws], and an infinite number
of others like to them, were not right sanctions, but such as have produced unspeakable mischiefs and
calamities. They were not therefore laws. The name of justice is abusively attributed to them.”207
For Sidney, there are laws, and there is the Law. If laws are unjust, they cannot be viewed as the
Law, and justice will not prevail in a society in which such laws are recognized by the rule of law. The
rule of law depends on the Law to ensure that society is just. Locke alluded to the same thing when he
wrote about how punishment is in the hands of the magistrate, who can often, “where the publick good
demands not the execution of the Law, remit the punishment of Criminal Offences by his own
Authority.”208 The rule of law depends on ideas that are consistent with right reason, and with the Law of
Nature, and which promote and protect the welfare of the people. “The sanction therefore that deserves
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DCG, II.11.381.
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This maxim was also endorsed by Sir Edward Coke in his Institutes, who maintained that the law
“includes many maxims as well as particular rules, and these maxims have a certain force in law.”
Stoner, Common Law & Liberal Theory, pp. 18, 22. Coke also spoke in terms of “the Law,” e.g., “when
we apprehend the reason of the Law, that is, when we bring the reason of the Law so to our own reason,
that we perfectly understand it as our own.”
206

DCG, III.10.379. Cicero also stated, “The establishment of laws had the same origin as that of kings;
for rights made fair for all have always been sought, and they could exist in no other way.” Cicero, On
Obligations, Book 2, ¶¶41-42, p. 68.
207
DCG, III.10.380. In ancient Rome, “Even the Roman people as a whole had no authority to enact anything incompatible with the ancient concepts of the ius civile. To ensure that such statutes did not derogate from the law, most were equipped with a salvatory clause that read: If this bill contains anything
which is not ius, then no such thing is proposed in this bill.” Similarly, the jurist Sir Edward Coke stated,
“when an Act of Parliament is against Common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge such Act to be void.” Murphy, “The Lawyer and the
Layman,” p.126. The reference is to Dr. Bonham’s Case, 8 Co. Rep. 114a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P. 1610).
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Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises of Government, Book II, §11, pp. 273-74 (emphasis in
original). Unfortunately it is confusing when Locke used “the Law” here; he clearly meant the execution of
a particular criminal law. See Macedo, “The Rule of Law, Justice, and the Politics of Moderation,” The
Rule of Law: Nomos XXXVI, pp. 148-77.
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the name of a law, which derives not its excellency from antiquity, or from the dignity of the legislators, but
from an intrinsick equity and justice [citing Tertullian’s Apology], ought to be made in pursuance of that
universal reason to which all nations at all times owe an equal veneration and obedience. By this we may
know whether he who has the power does justice or not.” It is law’s “inherent good and rectitude” which
makes it compelling. Law must be “founded upon that eternal principle of reason and truth, from whence
the rule of justice which is sacred and pure ought to be deduced.” This is something very different from
commands that are based on the will of one man which varies as the wind blows, governed by “different
interests, humors and passions.” Sidney was very tough here. Men who choose to be coerced by what is
unjust, and by laws that a magistrate may falsely impose, are understandably afraid; but if such a
magistrate “has therefore a coercive power over me, ‘tis through my weakness.” Relying on a quotation
from Seneca’s The Madness of Hercules, Sidney stated, “he that will suffer himself to be compell’d,
knows not how to die.”209 Consistent with his principles to the end, Sidney knew how to die.
There are so many places in Discourses in which Sidney discussed law, justice and the rule of
law that it would be immoderate and wearisome, not to mention impracticable, to reference them all. A
useful way to organize illustrations of these principles are the contexts of the purpose of law, the legal
authority of the ancient constitution, and the wisdom of English jurists.
Surely we will not dare say that these laws are unjust,
or rather, that they are not laws at all. For it seems to me
that an unjust law is no law at all.
St. Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will 210
This a more innocent, and happy Chace,
Then when of Old, but in the self same Place;
Fair Liberty pursued, and meant a Prey,
To lawless Power, here turned, and stood at Bay:
When in that remedy all hope was plac’t,
Which was, or should have been at least the last.
Here was that Charter Seal’d wherein the Crown,
All marks of Arbitrary Power lays down:
Tyrant, and Slave, those Names of hate and fear,
The happier Style of King, and Subject bear:
Happy, when both to the same Center move,
When Kings give Liberty, and Subjects love.
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DCG, III.11.381-82.
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Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, Thomas Williams, tr. and intr. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Publishing Co., 1993), p. 8.
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James Tyrrell, Patriarcha Non Monarcha (citing poem by Coopers Hill) 211

a. The purpose of law
In a description of the impact of various evil leaders on their nation, including Marius, Sulla,
Catiline, Julius and Octavius Caesar, Sidney asserted, “The law of every instituted power, is to
accomplish the end of its institution, as creatures are to do the will of their creator, and in deflecting from
it, overthrow their own being.” Men are meant to institute the law of nature, God’s will, and when they do
not do so, they “over-throw their own being.” In contrast, “Magistrates are distinguished from other men,
by the power with which the law invests them for the publick good. He that cannot or will not procure that
good, destroys his own being, and becomes like to other men.” The role of the magistrate, the man or
men in charge, is a frequent topic of discussion in Discourses. For example, in the context of a discussion
about how all magistrates, “in any form of government,” are “equally the ministers of God,” Sidney stated
that the work of all magistrates was “always and everywhere the same, even the doing of justice, and
procuring the welfare of those that create them.” We learn this, said Sidney, “from common sense: Plato,
Aristotle, Cicero, and the best human authors lay it as an unmoveable foundation, upon which they build
their arguments.”212 (Note that at the same time, Sidney felt free to cherry pick, borrowing concepts and
priorities from Plato and Aristotle selectively for, he brazenly remarked in Chapter Three, “’Tis not my
work to justify these opinions of Plato and his scholar Aristotle: They were men, and tho wise and
learned, subject to error.”213)
The purpose of the law is postulated in the second part of Discourses. In a passage describing the
nature of a lawful kingdom, the aspiration of which is to pursue wisdom and justice, Sidney stated,
“[N]othing could induce them to join, and lessen that natural liberty by joining in societies, but the hopes of
a publick advantage. Such as were wise and valiant procured it, by setting up regular governments, and
placing the best men in the administration; whilst the weakest and basest fell under the power of the most
boisterous and violent of their neighbours.” What sort of men established these two radically different
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Tyrrell, Patriarcha non Monarcha, Ch. IV, quoting “the Excellent Poem” by Coopers Hill, “speaking of
the King’s hunting the Stag over Runny-Mead, where the great Charter was Seal’d, he falls into this
reflection.”
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Id, I.16.51, 1.20.70.
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DCG, II.1.86; see Ch. Three’s discussion of Sidney’s realism.
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kinds of governance? “Those of the first sort had their root in wisdom and justice, and are called lawful
kingdoms or commonwealths; and the rules by which they are governed, are known by the name of laws.
These governments have ever been the nurses of virtue: The nations living under them have flourished in
peace and happiness, or made wars with glory and advantage: whereas the other sort springing from
violence and wrong, have ever gone under the odious title of tyrannies.”214 Sidney reiterated that the
essential ingredient of a successful society is a form of governance – not one particular form, but any form
– in which the law fosters the public welfare, is binding on the magistrate, and the people have the right to
consent to their government “subject to no other human law than their own.”215 This correlates with
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Furthermore, Sidney stated, “These rights, in several nations and ages, have been variously executed,
in the establishment of monarchies, aristocracies, democracies, or mixed governments, according to the
variety of circumstances; and the governments have been good or evil, according to the rectitude or
pravity of their institution, and the virtue and wisdom, or the folly and vices of those to whom the power
was committed: but the end which was ever proposed, being the good of the publick, they only performed
their duty, who procured it according to the laws of the society, which were equally valid as to their own
magistrates, whether they were few or many.” DCG, II.1.78-79 (emphasis added).
Scholars have commented on the seeming inconsistency between Sidney’s conviction that conquering is
unjust (“No right can come by conquest”), and his assertion that war can be glorious (“The nearer
Hannibal came to the walls, the more obstinate was their resistance. …I know not, if at any time that
conquering city could glory in a greater number of men fit for the highest enterprises, than at the end of
that cruel war”). DCG, II.11.32, II.21.200. But there is no inconsistency. Sidney regarded war as a
necessary evil, whether to protect one’s territory, government, or way of life, to preempt an enemy, or to
defend other nations that advocated values that were consonant with one’s own, e.g., English military
support of the Protestant Low Countries against Catholic Spain and France in which his great-uncle Philip
Sidney fought and died. In some of these circumstances war could be glorious; men sometimes behaved
with great courage. But it was not necessarily so. Sidney was an expert in war, both as a soldier and as
a strategist. He also found war repugnant, as reflected in his 1643 letter to his mother when he was
twenty. See Scott I, p. 83 His views were virtually identical to Machiavelli’s on this subject; both men
found war anathema but recognized that it was sometimes unavoidable or necessary and, indeed, less
likely if one was prepared for it. Both men were adamant that the survival of a state required the ability to
successfully wage war. The one political or historical book that Machiavelli published in his lifetime was
The Art of War in which he stated, “a well ordered City, therefore, ought to desire that this training for war
ought to be employed in times of peace as an exercise, and in times of war as a necessity and for glory.”
The Seven Books on the Art of War, by Niccolo Machiavelli, Citizen and Secretary of Florence [1521], tr.
Henry Neville (1675) (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2004), E-Book pdf, p. 13; “Chronology,” Discorsi, p.
xxxii. Recall that all of Part II of the Discorsi is about war. There, Machiavelli said, for example, “Of all
the unhappy situations, the most unhappy is that of a prince or a republic reduced to a state where it can
neither accept the peace nor continue the war. … All of them finish in such dire straits through poor
advice and poor planning, through not having taken careful measure of their own forces.” Discorsi, BkII,
Ch23, 216. In The Prince, as well, Machiavelli stated, “the foundations of all states … are good laws and
good armies.” Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, Peter Bondanella, tr. & ed., Maurizio Viroli, intro. (Oxford
University Press, 2008), Ch. XII, p. 42.
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DCG, II.5.99 (emphasis added).
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Murphy’s conviction that in a society governed by the Law, “The king makes lex but ius makes the king.”216
Sidney said exactly the same thing: “The kings of England cannot change the laws. …’Tis not therefore
the king that makes the law, but the law that makes the king.” He explained this point in the title to one
section of Discourses: “Laws are not made by Kings, not because they are busied in greater matters than
doing Justice, but because Nations will be governed by Rule, and not Arbitrarily.”217
Arbitrariness is a fundamental concept in the law. The definition of arbitrariness in Sidney’s time
was “the possession of power unchecked.” Arbitrary power was unrestrained power. Locke observed,
“[E]ven absolute Power where it is necessary, is not Arbitrary by being absolute.”218 The exercise of
absolute power could be benign. The exercise of arbitrary power was inherently uninhibited. This invariably
resulted in the corrupt, unfair, random, and sometimes cruel exercise of power, viz,, the exercise of power
in a way that was unjust and therefore inimical to the public interest. Exerting arbitrary power was the
product of the absence of the rule of law. “The monarch, it is argued, may make law, but he may not make
it arbitrarily, and until he has remade it – lawfully – he is bound by it.”219 England lacked a written
constitution; and in “the customary jurisprudence of an unwritten constitution there is no element more
essential to liberty than security against arbitrariness.”220
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This particular axiom has formidable roots in the ideas of Plato, and was also expressly articulated by
medieval scholastics. “Ever since Plato distinguished the rule of law from the rule of men (Statesman
300A-303B), jurists and political theorists have continued to argue about how to characterize the relation
of law to politics. Plato sharply contrasts the administration of justice according to law with the
administration of justice according to the unfettered wisdom of the rulers.” Thus, explained Murphy, for
Plato the “ideally best regime, … is the rule of the unfettered judgment of the fully virtuous while the
worst regime is the rule of the unfettered judgment of the vicious.” But even Plato recognized that this
probably was impracticable. “Yet because tyrants are so much more common than wise and virtuous
rulers, Plato emphasizes the importance of the rule of law as a ‘second-best’ regime: not as good as the
rule of unfettered wisdom but better than the rule of sheer caprice.” After Plato, the debate moved on. It
was “not about justice according to law and justice without law, but rather the question of the relation of
political power to law: assuming a government both of laws and of men, where does supreme authority
lie? As the medieval scholastics framed the question, ‘does the king make the law or does law make the
king?’” Murphy, “The Lawyer and the Layman: Two Perspectives on the Rule of law,” pp. 101-02.
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DCG, II.14.392-93. Halifax made this point: metaphorically “That a Prince who falleth out with laws
breaketh with his best friends,” and, therefore, “That the exalting his own authority above his laws is like
letting in his enemy to surprise his guards; the laws are the only guards he can be sure will never run
away from him.” “Maxims of State,” Halifax Complete Works, p. 147.
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Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, §139, p. 361.
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Berman, Law and Revolution I, p. 9.
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John Phillip Reid, “The Jurisprudence of Liberty: The Ancient Constitution in the Legal Historiography
of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” Sandoz, The Roots of Liberty, Ch. 4, pp. 185-308, 235.
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Sidney focused on the danger of arbitrary government, as did the other English republicans; for
many, it was a mantra. Sidney and Locke particularly appreciated the relationship between the law and
arbitrariness. Section 45 of Part III of Discourses is entitled, “The Legislative power is always Arbitrary,
and not to be trusted in the hands of any who are not bound to obey the Laws they make.”221 Sidney
explained here how government should manage arbitrariness. “If it be objected that I am a defender of
arbitrary powers, I confess I cannot comprehend how any society can be established or subsist without
them; for the establishment of government is an arbitrary act, wholly depending upon the will of men. The
particular forms and constitutions, the whole series of the magistracy, together with the measure of power
given to everyone, and the rules by which they are to exercise their charge, are so also.” Here Sidney
meant arbitrary in the sense of contingent, elective, variable. “The difference therefore between good and
ill government is not, that those of one sort have an arbitrary power which the others have not, for they all
have it; but that those which are well constituted place this power so as it may be beneficial to the
people.”222
How does one accomplish this? Sidney’s answer is straightforward: “[A]n arbitrary power was
never well placed in any men and their successors, who were not obliged to obey the laws they should
make.” Parliaments “may make prejudicial wars, ignominious treatises, and unjust laws. Yet when the
session is ended, they must bear the burden as much as others.”223 To make a Parliament the instrument
of the people’s slavery it must be the instrument of its own slavery; this protects the people from its
government (although never completely).224 For different reasons, Locke ends up essentially where
Sidney does, namely that, “The Legislative, or Supream Authority, cannot assume to its self a power to
Rule by extemporary Arbitrary Decrees, but is bound to dispense Justice, and decide the Rights of the
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DCG, III.45.569.
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Id.
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Id, III.45.570-71.
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Eric Nelson’s recent monograph, The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding,
focused intently on the matter of the overweaning power of Parliament in connection with the eighteenthcentury American colonists’ break from England. The point that I want to make here is that the
recognition that not only a monarchy, but also a legislature, can exercise too much power was an idea
expressed earlier, in seventeenth-century English republican thought.
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Subject by promulgating standing Laws, and known Authoris’d Judges.”225 Whether the Legislature is so
bound, as Locke stated, or otherwise persuaded to act justly, as Sidney proposed, both men recognized
that law protects people from arbitrary government.226
Sidney’s explication of the rule of law is consonant with Murphy’s thesis. For the rule of law to exist
in more than name, the king or other chief magistrate(s) must be subject to the law. An ostensible rule of
law that is inapplicable to a chief magistrate simply is not the rule of law – that is, not the rule of the Law.
In such a society, there may be lots of laws. But to serve its intended purpose, the rule of law requires
the unimpeded operation of a legal system and one that embraces the Law. As Murphy reminded us, “to
be ruled by law is ultimately to be ruled by men,” for laws are “the instruments of rulers.” In order for the
rule of law to “define our political, civil, and personal freedom,” the “autonomy of legal institutions and
norms from direct political control” is essential. This is accomplished by means of legal processes and
procedures.227 If the chief magistrate is not subject to the laws, legal institutions and norms are not
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Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, §136, p. 358. Locke did not recognize the innately arbitrary
nature of governance in the sense that Sidney suggested, namely, that consent to the form and nature of
governance is entirely free. Rather, Locke stated, “Though the Legislative, whether placed in one or
more, whether it be always in being, or only by intervals, tho’ it be the Supream Power in every Commonwealth; yet, First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely Arbitrary over the Lives and Fortunes of the
People.” Locke’s rationale was that no one can transfer more power to another than one has in himself;
accordingly, “no Body has an absolute Arbitrary Power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own
Life, or take away the Life or Property of another.” Id, §135, p. 357.
226

On the concurrent but more pessimistic perspective of Milton and a sampling of other republican
views, see Appendix B.
227
In this context, Murphy elaborated on the distinction between what he terms a political conception of
law versus a legal conception of politics. Debates about the relationship between law and politics were
“at the center of both jurisprudence and political philosophy.” A political conception of law focuses not on
the formal institutions of government, but on what are seen as “deeper sources of political power and
influence within the society,” such as the pressures of party, financiers, and other political forces. In
contrast, a legal conception of politics focuses on formal institutions of government, as well as “the norms
and conventions that define the location and the scope of political power.” Is law “merely deployed
strategically or ignored in the play of powerful interests?” Does “enduring law” ensure fundamental rights
and liberties? How does law influence politics? These are questions that political theorists and
jurisprudence experts continuously debate. “The conception of laws as commands underpins the political
interpretation of the rule of law. On this view, laws are instruments of public policy wielded by those
authorized by sovereign political power. We are thus ruled, not by law, but by laws, that is, by the
commands of the current holders of political power.” But, Murphy pointed out, “to be ruled by laws is
ultimately to be ruled by men, since laws are the instruments of rulers.” While it is “natural to think of law
in terms of the hierarchy of political command and control, the ideal of the rule of law depends upon some
considerable degree of autonomy of legal institutions and norms from direct political control. The ideal of
the rule of law defines our political, civil, and personal freedom, all of which depend upon the availability
of certain legal procedures and the stability of many legal rules. If our basic civil and political liberties and
our basic rights of private ordering were subject to electoral caprice, we would lack meaningful liberty.”
Murphy, “The Lawyer and the Layman,” pp. 128-29 (emphasis added). Political scientist Francis
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relatively safe from direct political control.228 Sidney makes this point over and over again.229
Sidney is well aware that the Law is “impartial and inexorable,” in contrast to the arbitrary wishes of
an absolute monarch. As one scholar succinctly put it, “liberty … as the pulse of effective governing
institutions … is inseparable from rule of law”; and we know that for Sidney and his fellow republicans,
liberty was the essence of what they sought, viz., “that man is naturally free; that he cannot justly be
deprived of that liberty without cause, and that he doth not resign it, or any part of it, unless it be in
consideration of a greater good, which he proposes to himself.”230

Fukuyama discussed the necessity for the individual(s) holding political power to feel bound by the law in
his monumental The Origins of Political Order: From Pre-human Times to the French Revolution (New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012), Ch. 17, “The Origins of the Rule of Law, pp. 245-61. Murphy
noted that it was the modern legal philosopher Joseph Raz who suggested that our puzzlement over the
relationship of law and politics can be understood by appreciating “the difference between the professional and the lay sense of ‘law.’” Murphy, “The Lawyer and the Layman,” p. 102; see Joseph Raz, “The Rule
of Law and its Virtue,” The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 210-29, 213.
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This principle has contemporary relevance.

229
“The vanity of these whimseys will farther appear, if it be considered that as kings are kings by law,
and tyrants are tyrants by overthrowing the law, they are most absurdly joined together; and ‘tis no more
ridiculous to set him above the law, who is what he is by the law, than to expect the observation of the law
that enjoin the preservation of the lands, liberties, goods and lives of the people, from one who by fraud or
violence makes himself master of all, that he may be restrain’d by no law, and what he is by subverting all
law.” DCG, II.6.403. Again, “But nothing can be more absurd than to say, that one man has an absolute
power above law to govern according to his will, for the people’s good, and the preservation of their
liberty: For no liberty can subsist where there is such a power.” Similarly, “A Monarchy cannot be well
regulated, unless the Powers of the Monarch are limited by Law.” In contrast, “the chief work of an
absolute monarch,” that form of governance that Filmer emphatically required and Sidney feared, “is to
place himself above the law.” Id. II.21.440, II.29.286, II.30.287. As Nedham stated in The Excellencie of a
Free State, “It was not to destroy Magistracy, but to regulate it; nor to confound Propriety, but to inlarge it:
that the Prince as well as the People might be governed by Law; that Justice might be impartially
distributed without respect of persons; that England might become a quiet Habitation for the Lion and the
Lamb to lie down and feed together; and that none might make the people afraid; it was for these things
they fought and died.” Nedham, “To The Reader,” The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 78. The author(s) of
A Just and Modest Vindication also emphasized that the king has his power from the law: “It is from the
Law that he hath his Power, it is by the Law that he is King.” A Just and Modest Vindication, p. 44.
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DCG, I.II.8. See Sandoz, “Editor’s Introduction,” The Roots of Liberty, p. 1. The importance of law is
echoed in the consonant view of many English republican theorists, although not necessarily with the
same nuanced understanding. Harrington, for example, was certainly very rule-oriented in Oceana. But
he had unrealistic expectations of the ability of rules, formulated into laws, to address every contingency.
Indeed, in Harrington’s view, if you set up the system correctly and equitably, it will last forever.
Harrington (and, perhaps, Pocock) seemed unaware of the necessity and value of some degree of
flexibility in the Law because a law cannot possibly anticipate every set of circumstances that will arise.
This is why principles of equity and judicial discretion were developed – to address the square peg that
does not precisely fit into the round holes that are laws. According to English professor Elliot Visconsi,
“Milton saw equity as a hermeneutic process to be replicated broadly in the English public and a political
ideal or theoretical norm of ‘sovereign charity’ to be inserted into human government by any means
necessary. In tracts such as the Tenure of Kings and Magistrates and Eikonoklastes, Milton’s critique of
the Stuart theory of kingship hinged on Charles I’s abuse of the equitable function.” In Eikonoklastes,
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If we would be measured by our acres, we are poor inconsiderable people;
we are exalted above our natural bounds by our good laws and our excellent constitution.
Halifax, “A Rough Draft of a New Model at Sea” 231

b. The ancient constitution and Magna Carta
In analyzing issues related to the rule of law a fundamental question is, what law rules? There is a
history of Anglo-American constitutional theory pertinent to Sidney’s ideas about the rule of law. Once
again, Pocock’s pioneering foray into this field over fifty years ago renewed scholarly interest in the roots of
Anglo-American constitutional theory. The thesis of Pocock’s classic work, The Ancient Constitution and
the Feudal law, was that English legal history constitutes a paradox. Historically, English jurists had argued
that the ancient constitution, grounded in Gothic history-cum-lore, was established and immutable; at the
same time and in Pocock’s view remarkably and contradictorily, jurists constantly reinterpreted these laws
to suit their more contemporary purposes.232 Pocock elaborated: “If the idea that law is custom implies
anything, it is that law is in constant change and adaptation, altered to meet each new experience in the
life of the people. …Yet the fact is that the common lawyers, holding that law was custom, came to believe
that the common law, and with it the constitution, had always been exactly what they were now, that they
were immemorial … in the precise legal sense of dating from time beyond memory – beyond, in this case,

Milton also stated that, “a parliament is by all equity and right, above a king and may judge him.”
Generally speaking, Nedham was all over the place, but in The Excellencie of a Free State, he stated, “If
a People once conceive they ought to be free, this conception is immediately put in practice; and they
free themselves. Their first care is to see, that their Laws, their Rights, their Deputies, their Officers, and
all their Dependents, be setled in a state of freedom. This becomes like the Apple of the eye; the least
grain, atome, or touch, will grieve it: it is an espoused virgin; they are extreme jealous over it.” Nedham,
“An Introduction To The Following Discourse,” The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 79. On equity generally
see Elliott Visconsi, Lines of Equity: Literature and the Origins of Law in Later Stuart England (Ithaca &
London: Cornell University Press, 2008), Ch. 1; on Visconsi’s discussion of Milton and equity, see p. 81,
citing Milton’s “Eikonoklastes,” John Milton: Complete Poems and Major Prose, Merritt Hughes, ed. (New
York: Macmillan, 1952), p. 809.
231

“A Rough Draft of a New Model at Sea,” Halifax: Complete Works, p. 157.
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Once again Halifax is on point: “A Constitution cannot make itself; somebody made it, not at once but
at several times. It is alterable, and by that draweth nearer perfection; and without suiting itself to
differing times and circumstances it could not live.” “Political Thoughts and Reflections,” Halifax:
Complete Works, p. 195. Halifax was talking about the English unwritten constitution. The same thought
was expressed over a century later by John Adams in the closing sentence of his three-volume treatise,
A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Against the Attack of M.
Turgot in his Letter to Dr. Price (Philadelphia: William Young, 1797). [repr. Clark, NJ: The Lawbook
Exchange, 2015], Vol. III, p. 506: “A people who could conceive, and can adopt [the United States
Constitution], we need not fear will be able to amend it, when, by experience, its inconveniences and
imperfections shall. Be seen and felt.”
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the earliest historical record that could be found.” He called this “the doctrine or myth of the ancient
constitution, a theory that “bulked so large in the political thought of the seventeenth century.”233
One might reasonable ask, why are we diverting to a discussion of the ancient constitution when
our subject is early modern Anglo-American republicanism and the rule of law? And for that matter, if we
have read Sidney’s Discourses, we might wonder essentially the same thing: why does Sidney spend so
much time talking about the Britons and the Saxons, the Goths and the Normans, about Offa, Ine, Alfred,
Canute and Edward the Confessor? Part of the answer to this question is that we were not yet at the
juncture in British history in which statutory law, written and enacted by Parliament, dominated common
law that was developed and applied by jurists, particularly, as to the source of the law.234 Instead, we
were engaged in a turf war over the nature of common law in which not only early modern English jurists,
but Englishmen generally, took great pride.235 When Filmer argued that English common law embraced
the principle that the king makes law, the law does not make the king, Sidney infamously characterized
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J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought
in the Seventeenth Century, A Reissue with a Retrospect (Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 36. In
the reissued monograph, thirty years after The Ancient Constitution was first published, Pocock
expressed concern that he was understood to have said that “the whole body of the law was held to be
immemorial”; what he meant was that “any element of it could be held immemorial at will.” (In fact, In
discussing Sir Edward Coke, a brilliant jurist, Pocock stated that in Coke’s time, “the concept of the
ancient constitution had meant essentially that the whole body of English law – including the customs of
the high court of parliament – could be represented as immemorial in the sense that custom was
immemorial.” Id, p. 233.) In his 1986 Retrospect, Pocock denied that he made this statement: “I submit it
is not a proper reading of The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law that Coke held the whole body of
English law to be immemorial, static and unchanging. His notion of custom (and usage) was more
flexible than that.” Id, p. 274. Even with Pocock’s revisionism, the paradox remained: “both preservation
and adaptation.” Id, pp. 274-75. For an edifying analysis of Pocock’s thesis, see Sandoz, “Editor’s
Introduction,” The Roots of Liberty.
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For an overview, see “The Law of the Middle Ages,” Robert W. Shaffern, Law and Justice from
Antiquity to Enlightenment (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), Part III, pp. 101-72.
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For example, Tyrrell opined that Filmer’s Patriarcha had “served rather to inflame the Distemper.”
Indeed, because of the extremism of his views, he had “given too much advantage to the Enemies of
Kingship” by “taking away all distinctions between Kings and Tyrants, and between Slaves and Subjects.”
Indeed, Tyrrell wondered whether Filmer “hath not given many of his Readers a prejudice against that
Government, which temper’d by known Laws, I take to be the. best in the world.” James Tyrrell,
Patriarcha non monarcha. The Patriarch Unmonarch’d [1681](London: Richard Janeway, 1681)[repr.
Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2011), p. 6; cf. Alan Cromartie, “The Rule of Law,” in Morrill, Revolution
and Restoration, p. 57-50. The distinction between principles of the Law, and the contingent nature of
laws, may allow for consonance between English pride in English law. As Cromartie acknowledged, the
“essence of the law, as it existed at some imagined point in the historical past, was the treasured
‘inheritance’ of the ‘freeborn Englishman,” viz., the Law, in contrast to concomitant seventeenth-century
disapproval, dismay and disappointment at delays, corruption and incompetence in the implementation of
English laws and courts. Id, p. 58.
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this position as akin to saying that God “caused some to be born with crowns upon their heads, and all
others with saddles upon their “backs.” To the contrary, he said, Filmer’s understanding of the common
law was wrong. He was “pursuing the mistakes to which he seems perpetually condemned.”236
There are two questions of importance that this analysis is intended to address. The first is the
obvious one: What is this ancient constitution that preoccupied Sidney and informed his understanding of
the rule of law? As a secondary matter, it would be useful to add clarity to the historiographic and juridical
debate over the ancient constitution. What is all the fuss about, and why does there seem to be a
particularly obnoxious divide and, I would suggest, failure to communicate among the different disciplines,
particularly historians and legal scholars, who have analyzed the meaning and significance of the ancient
constitution?
There are three preliminary matters that will immediately get us into the thick of things. First, what
is a constitution? Second, was there an ancient constitution? Third, how should one think about a
constitution that is not written? Over half a century ago, in Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern,
renowned legal scholar Charles Howard McIlwain reviewed the roots of the concept “constitutionalism.”
Americans tend of think of a constitution as unalterable through the normal legal process and, in that
sense, as Thomas Paine articulated in early America, as antecedent to government – the law that
“constituted” the government.237 For Americans, English constitutionalism can be confusing if not
disorienting because it was built up over time, coexisting with a legitimate government. Part of our coming
to terms with the concept of constitutionalism is bridging this gap.
In medieval England, constitutionalism referred to particular administrative enactments, which
was its ancient Roman meaning, distinguishing it from ancient custom, or consuetudo.238 The thirteenthcentury English jurist Henri de Bracton, for example, called provisions of a particular statute a “new
constitution”; he also referred to a section of Magna Carta reissued in 1225 as “constitutio libertatis,” the
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DCG, III.33.511, II.14.392.
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Charles Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism Ancient & Modern, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1966), p. 2.
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Id, p. 24.
596

constitution of liberty.239 The first example in England of the use of the term “constitution” to signify “the
whole legal framework of a state,” which is its modern meaning, comes from Bishop Hall’s Apology
against the Brownists in 1610; but this refers to the constitution of the kingdom of Israel, not England.
McIlwain focused on a contemporaneous statement by Sir James Whitelocke, jurist and father of the
Bulstrode Whitelocke who was Sidney’s acquaintance. Whitelocke argued that, “taxation without sanction
of parliament ‘is against the natural frame and constitution of the policy of this Kingdom, which is Jus
publicum regni, and so subverteth the fundamental law of the realm, and induceth a new form of state
and government.’” Whitelocke’s formulation relied on both ancient Greek and Roman principles related to
the concept of constitution. In its “natural frame,” the concept of constitution harkened back to the Greek
term “politeia,” meaning “the state as it actually is.” The Greeks had no word that corresponded in any
way with the Latin word jus, or law; and there certainly was no Greek constitution in the sense of a body
of laws, or what we might call fundamental law. In short, we have a concept of society that is so different
from our own that we need to pause and consider how society worked if it was not governed by law. The
Greeks thought in terms of the ideal state, e.g., Plato’s Republic, which did not need to have laws. In the
ancient Greek ideal world, laws were restricting and did not deal with exceptional cases in which
application of the law was inequitable. Plato’s philosopher-king was an idealized ruler. As Aristotle
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Bracton’s ideas were complicated. On the one hand, he recognized that the king had no peer, “much
less a superior.” On the other hand, he was “bound by the laws.” Indeed, he was “under God and the law.”
(McIlwain juxtaposed Justinian’s “doctrine of practical absolutism” and Bracton’s “clear assertion of
constitutionalism.”) From the principle that the king was bound by the law we can appreciate the
significance of the coronation oath, binding the king to laws chosen by the people (early on represented by
the king’s royal counsel or curia.) Id, pp. 71-72. Accordingly, in the seventeenth-century confrontations
with the Stuarts, Bracton is quoted both in support of royal absolutism and the king’s prerogative and
against it. McIlwain asked, “Was Bracton, then, an absolutist or a constitutionalist, or was he just a
blockhead? This is our question.” This was “the principle riddle, not of Bracton alone, but of medieval
constitutionalism generally.” Bracton was making the distinction between first, the king’s absolute power
over “all things incidental or ‘annexed’ to government,” intending here “powers needed for an effective
administration” of government, and in this sense there was “no legal restriction on the king’s power.” In
contrast, the monarch could not ignore “legal right,” that is, “the immemorial custom” that right defined, viz.,
custom “approved by the consent of those using [it] and confirmed by the oath of kings.” Id, pp. 72-83.
McIlwain described this as Bracton’s sharp distinction between gubernaculum and jurisdictio, between the
administration of the government, and obligations and rights confirmed by law. Government “proper” was
“’limited’ by no coercive control,” it was subject to the king’s prerogative.“ At the same time, there existed
“rights definable by law and not by will.’” Of course, the problem, “the defect,” was that conformance to this
distinction lay entirely in the hands of the monarch. Id, pp. 84-91. Quoting another scholar, Prof. McIlwain
observed, “Skeptical as to the existence of unicorns and salamanders, the age of Machiavelli and Henry
VIII found food for its credulity in the worship of that rare monster, the God-fearing prince.’” Id, p. 91.
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stated, if such a man “should appear among men, godlike rule would and should be gladly conceded to
him.”240 Referring to Aristotle’s very point, Sidney gibed, “Where such a man is found, he is by nature a
king, and ‘tis best for the nation where he is that he govern.”241
But the Greeks knew, as did Sidney, that man’s life on earth was not ideal, and man could not rely
on the wise discretion of a philosopher-king; accordingly, laws, which institute “the experience of the best
of our elders,” i.e., ancient custom, were binding.242 But what was customary, and therefore required in
terms of the ancient Greek understanding of the “natural frame” – the politeia, “soul of the polis” (Plato,
Laws), “in a sense the life of the city” (Aristotle, Politics) – was politically expedient, not fundamental.
Particular enactments might be good or bad; but they were not illegitimate. The “law of the constitution”
was normative not coercive, that is, there was no associated sanction for failure to follow it.243 Also, a law
could not be struck down because it was unconstitutional. As McIlwain pithily stated, the Greeks “thought
of law in terms of the state, not of the state in terms of law.”244
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Id, pp. 13-14, 26-27, 33.
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Sidney went on to defend Aristotle’s position about the absolute power that could be given to the
virtuous philosopher-king while at the same time suggesting that there was no such human being or,
certainly, as he recognized earlier in his treatise, that such virtues “ill applied to all kings.” Consequently,
“The practice of most nations … has been as directly contrary to the absolute power of one man as their
constitutions.” Again, the focus is on giving absolute power to one man, a king: “If any man should think
Aristotle a trifler, for speaking of such a man as can never be found, I answer, that he went as far as his
way could be warranted by reason or nature, and was obliged to stop there by the defect of his subject.”
In short, the concept of a virtuous philosopher-king was just that, a concept. Real men are not perfect.
“He could not say that the government of one was simply good, when he knew so many qualifications
were required in the person to make it so; nor that it is good for a nation to be under the power of a fool, a
coward, or a villain, because ‘tis good to be under a man of admirable wisdom, valour, industry and
goodness.” Just because the rule by a virtuous philosopher-king would be good did not mean that giving
absolute power to a man who was less than that ideal would be; which meant absolute power could not
be given to any man. Furthermore, if such a virtual virtuous philosopher-king did appear, that did not
mean that his son would be, viz., “that the government of one should be continued in such as by chance
succeed in a family, because it was given to the first who had all the virtues required, tho all the reasons
for which the power was given fail in the successor.” Finally, good government was defined in terms of
good for its people, not for its ruler: “much less could he say that any government was good, which was
not good for those whose good only it was constituted to promote.” DCG, III.10, 374, II.30.289, III.23.453.
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As Judith Shklar put it, “Even judges, though among our most respected public officials, do not enjoy
universal confidence: ‘a judge is just a lawyer who is friends with a governor,’ is how one of my
colleagues once put it.” Macedo, “The Rule of Law, Justice, and the Politics of Moderation,” The Rule of
Law: Nomos XXXVI, p. 161 & p. n.49, citing a conversation with Shklar.
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McIlwain, Constitutionalism Ancient & Modern, pp. 27-28.

244
Id, p. 37. “There is probably no change in the whole history of political theory more revolutionary” than
the shift from the Greek to the Roman concept of constitutionalism. In the Greek world, there was “no
remedy for an unconstitutional act short of actual revolution.” Moreover, “such revolution, when it occurs,
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The second aspect of constitution identified by Whitelocke is that it was Jus publicum regni, the
public law of the realm, an ancient Roman idea. Once again we need to turn to Cicero, who focused on
the concept of “constitution.” In The Republic, Cicero not only spoke of law as a bond, but also that it was
“as old as the mind of God, existing long before there were any states in the world … and that no state
can ever enact any binding law in derogation of this law of nature,” an utterly un-Greek idea.245 The
Romans were not interested in the ideal state. Neither was Sidney. They were pragmatists. Political
authority was based on lex,” law, which was “what the people orders and has established.” Four centuries
later Justinian’s Institutes restated this definition. Roman constitutional theory was that the source of the
law was the Roman people “and the people alone.”246 The Roman constitution was the people’s law
developed over time. 247
This leads to an essential point, which is that, “Law…is one thing, jurisprudence quite another.
Law is the material of jurisprudence, jurisprudence the rationalization of law.”248 We can appreciate the
different sources or roots of law, and the fact that English constitutional law developed incrementally, not
only through the creation of new law but, of more importance, through the development of the
rationalization of law, which created a constitutional framework on which the law was based. Endemic to
England’s understanding of its own “ancient” constitution was the process whereby that constitution was

is…a complete overturn of the state’s institutions, a change in its whole way of life. It is social as well as
a merely ‘political’ revolution in our modern narrower sense of political. …Thirdly, it is this fundamental
and far-reaching character of most actual revolutions in Greece … that accounts for the Greek fear of
statis,” a lack of equilibrium, “and the nervous desire to risk almost anything that might prevent it.” Id, pp.
37-38.
245

Id, pp. 37-38.
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Id, p. 46. In recommending a mixed form of government, Cicero said, “’This constitution (haec constitutio) has a great measure of equability” – lack of variance, balance! – “without which men can hardly
remain free for any length of time. …[T]he constitution of the republic (costitutionem rei republiae) is the
work of no single time or of no single man.’” Id, pp. 25-26. Cicero also referred to a “definite model or form
of constitution.” Cicero, The Republic, Cicero, The Republic and The Laws, Book II, §22, p. 41.
247

McIlwain spent considerable time discussing the distinction between public and private law in ancient
Rome, the jus publicum and the jus privatum, including the fact that, “the law of property then included
probably four-fifths of all law” upon which individual rights were based; for it was upon the law of property,
in ancient Rome and then in medieval England, that constituted the basis for the law of franchises or
“liberties.” Even in the case of the prerogative exercised by the king, the English courts utilized the same
general rules on the propriety rights of any subject to analyze this matter. McIlwain, Constitutionalism
Ancient & Modern, pp. 46-61.
248

Id, p. 59.
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defined, primarily by English lawyers, through a process that was called “prescription.”249 The prescriptive
nature of England’s constitution was the satisfactory metamorphosis of English custom into law – what is
known as common law – through a gradual process of incorporating local customs “common” to the
people and identified by jurists, not legislators, as fundamental. Not all custom became law; there was a
rigorous test created by prominent English judges, particularly Sir Edward Coke, to establish whether a
specific custom was indeed part of the ancient constitution and therefore common law.250 In other words,
immemoriality was a necessary but not a sufficient condition to establish that the people had acquired a
privilege or right.251 Nevertheless, incorporated in the ancient constitution were the rights of the citizen,
superior in character to all acts of government. These rights informed the law and often embodied
principles of the law of nature. Through precedent a constitutional state preserved ancient liberties; this
was “an inheritance of free institutions.”252 For Coke this meant the preservation of England’s customary
law, viz., common law. Liberty was not an abstract notion for Coke; it consisted in a panoply of rights
recognized in common law and “the whole body of these specific rights.” 253As Bolingbroke explained in
1733, “By constitution, we mean, whenever we speak with propriety and exactness, that assemblage of
laws, institutions and customs, derived from certain fixed principles of reason, directed to certain fixed
objects of public good, that compose the general system, according to which the community hath agreed
to be governed.”254 While the recognition of a right by an early modern English court or jurist might be
new, its origin was not. For the ancient constitution was timeless in the sense that it was so ancient, “of
yore,” that it was understood as “immemorial.” Perhaps of most importance in Sidney’s time, these
ancient constitutional principles were grounded in age-old custom; they decidedly did not owe their
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John Philip Reid, “The Jurisprudence of Liberty,” Sandoz, The Roots of Liberty, Ch. 4, p. 229.
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Sir Robert Molesworth would, no doubt, have considered Coke to be a “real Whig,” which he defined
as follows: “My Notion of a Whig, I mean a real Whig (for the Nominal are worse than any Sort of Men) is,
That he is one who is exactly for keeping up to the Strictness of the true old Gothick Constitution.” Sir
Robert Molesworth, Preface to François Hotman, Franco-Gallia (London, 1711), prefatory quotation (page
unnumbered), Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience, pp. 37-38, 230-31.
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John Phillip Reid, “The Jurisprudence of Liberty,” Sandoz, The Roots of Liberty, p. 229.
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McIlwain, Constitutionalism Ancient & Modern, p. 12.
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Id.
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Id, p. 3, citing “A Dissertation upon Parties” (1733-1734), The Works of Lord Bolingbroke (1841), II, p.
88.
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authority to “will, power, or royal creation.”255
As to whether there actually was an ancient constitution, the question is asked and answered very
succinctly by medieval historian J. C. Holt. “The answer is ‘no.’ It is and was a figment. Professor Pocock
agreed: ‘It may be conceded here that the term “constitution,” as used throughout this book, has not been
systematically cleared of anachronism.’”256 To complicate things further, political theorist Ellis Sandoz
characterized Holt’s findings somewhat differently. According to Sandoz, when you begin reading Holt’s
essay you think that there is no ancient constitution; but by the end of the essay you have changed your
mind. This deliberate obscurity, one might call it, is fully consistent with the whole concept of the ancient
constitution, as we shall see.
Third, the issues at stake in analyzing the English constitution, which is not a written document, are
inherently different than would be applicable in American constitutional study. “The ‘constitution’ – the
inherited ‘assemblance of fundamental laws, institutions, and customs’ that formed the sinews of the state
– did not speak with a single authoritative voice but with a plurality of disparate voices.”257 The absence of
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John Phillip Reid, The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American Revolution (The
University of Chicago Press, 1989), p.13.
256

J. C. Holt, “The Ancient Constitution in Medieval England,” Sandoz, The Roots of Liberty, Ch. 1, pp.
32-74, 32, citing Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, p. 261 n.8; Sandoz, “Editor’s
Introduction,” The Roots of Liberty, p. 30. Holt maintained that the constitutive, “ordaining” sense of
constitution came from the ancient Romans, and that this understanding carried into the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, at which point a “newer prescriptive sense” of the term, constitution was added.
Since Pocock is concerned with the latter, prescriptive concept, it is our anachronism that we are
pursuing, not Coke’s or Selden’s (the latter of whom Pocock faulted). J. C. Holt, “The Ancient Constitution
in Medieval England,” p. 33. Holt also pointed out in a note that historian Corinne C. Weston, in her
article, “The Theory of Mixed Monarchy under Charles I and After,” English Historical Review 75 (1960),
pp. 426-43, 428-29, established that “the term constitution, as good and ancient,” emerged with the
royalist-parliamentary confrontation during the reign of Charles I. It “was appropriated to the royalist
cause by Falkland, Culpeper and Hyde” in Charles’ fateful response to the Nineteen Propositions of June
1642, which referred to “the antient, happy, well-poysed, and never enough commended Constitution of
the Government of this Kingdom.” Holt, “The Ancient Constitution in Medieval England,” p. 33 n.7. What
is important to recognize (and John Phillip Reid is faulted for failing to do so) is that the timing of the
origins of Parliament became of enormous polemical importance during the seventeenth century debate
about the nature of the English monarchy. For if one dated the ancient constitution to 1265, as the Tories
did, which is the beginning of the first House of Commons, this was within legal memory (not time
immemorial), and was the act of the king, i.e., “Commons had no legal base independent of the crown”
that convened it. Accordingly, the king could summon, dismiss, prorogue, and dissolve Commons at will,
a conclusion against which the ancient constitutionalists, including Sidney, fought. Corinne Comstock
Weston, “Epilogue: Diverse Viewpoints,” Sandoz, The Roots of Liberty, pp. 309-33, 329.
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D. Alan Orr, “A Prospectus for a ‘New’ Constitutional History of Early Modern England,” Albion: A
Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Autumn, 2004), pp. 430-50, 433.
601

a self-consciously deliberate act of association among “citizens ‘constituting’ themselves as a sovereign
entity” makes analysis of the English constitution, ancient or otherwise, very different. For instance, there
is no scrutiny of original intent. By definition, since common law is the product of obscure beginnings,
there are no original intenders. History is opaque; inquiry seems murky. One must consider custom and
long-standing usage including “what had been the accepted practice of government since ‘time out of
mind.’”258 As much constitutional debate as we have in the United States, the absence of a foundational
text intrinsically invited unending debate about the nature and content of the English constitution, and this
is precisely what occurred in the seventeenth century. Yet intriguingly, because a custom “commonly
glides into being imperceptibly, as the interactions of the parties come increasingly to express a fixed
pattern of reciprocal expectations,” customary law was “something capable of accommodating itself to the
relationship of the parties as that relationship develops through time,” a splendidly pragmatic, politically
useful quality.259
Common law was “described as a customary or traditional law with deep medieval roots, not
willed by a legislator but declared by royal judges in common law courts, and already ancient when
declared. … [C]ommon law … gave ancient constitutionalism its distinctive flavor.”260 I would suggest that
Weston’s trope should be reversed. It was ancient constitutionalism – the legal analysis, or what
McIlwain called rationalization that was used to define what was part of the ancient constitution – that
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Id. In “the most famous single work in legal anthropology,” Sir Henry Sumner Maine’s Ancient Law: Its
Connection with the Early history of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas (1861) identified six stages
in the development of law. Although Maine’s ideas have been discounted, he nevertheless showed great
“insight into the processes by which law grows.” In Maine’s construct, the second developmental stage of
law is custom, or Customary Law. The “fact that some mode of conduct has become customary is
regarded as a reason for following it. … [M]en have become aware, however dimly, of the fact that there
may be an alternative to the ways in which they have acted in the past. In instances where there is some
element of choice in their conformity, they may follow custom because of a perception of the need for
shared and accepted rules of conduct and a realization that a departure from established rules would act
disruptively. Plainly in this sense of choice, however restricted it may be, there is the first germ of the
notion that law can be deliberately made.” Fuller, Anatomy of the Law, pp. 80-81.
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“The great advantage of customary law is that in its inception it permits the parties subject to it ‘to try it
on for fit.’ If it does not fit at all, it will normally be abandoned before it has become so firmly fixed that it
cannot readily be discarded. If it does not quite jibe with the needs of the situation, it may undergo some
reshaping in the later interactions of the parties.” Fuller, Anatomy of the Law, pp. 120-21.
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Corinne C. Weston, “England: ancient constitution and common law,” The Cambridge History of
Political Thought 1450-1700, J. H. Burns & Mark Goldie, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.
374-411, 376.
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gave common law its distinctive flavor.261
There were three technical parts to the rigorous prescription standard for defining the common law.
If a “modern” court determined that an ancient custom was in accord with God’s will and with reason, had
existed beyond time of memory (legally defined as before 1189, the date of Richard I’s coronation), and
had been invoked and used regularly and constantly both before and after 1189, a “customary usage”
was established demonstrating “tacit consent” by the people to the custom. This enabled the “rights and
liberties” involved in that custom to be recognized as common law. A collectively understood element of
this analysis required the denial of an interruption in this customary usage when the Normans invaded.
Not only did this perspective assume there to have been a post-conquest political accommodation of the
laws of the Saxon Edward the Confessor (1042-66) by the Normans William the Conqueror and Henry I,
the Conqueror’s fourth son; it also assumed that at the time the Normans came to England, they
accepted and fostered the continuance of Saxon customs and laws. This implicitly required an
understanding of the concept of custom as a practice, principle, or rule authenticated through its
acceptance and use by the people; it was not the product of a fiat by a king.
Let us return to the question of why we should care about how early modern English courts defined
their ancient constitution, and how this relates to the nature of republicanism. The answer is that the
ability of jurists to define a part of the law according to articulated ancient customs was one means by
which liberties claimed by seventeenth-century Englishmen could be established. It also was a way to
effectively challenge the Stuart concept of kingship and law.262 Stuart kingship was unequivocal that the

261
For this reason I have difficulty assigning to His Majesty’s Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of Both
Houses of Parliament the “crucial” watershed significance attributed to it by Pocock. No doubt Charles I’s
1642 acknowledgement, whether intentional or not (and apparently through words drafted by his advisors
albeit reasonable to assume he reviewed, even if not carefully), that there was an ancient constitution,
and that the king was simply one part of the English system of government, was a tremendously
advantageous admission for the advocates of ancient constitution analysis in their efforts to increase the
power and responsibility of Parliament. But well before the King’s Answer, Coke and others had utilized
this argument in connection with their treatment of the common law; the ammunition was thus otherwise
available. See Pocock, MM, pp. 361-66. Indeed, the Answer’s reference to how England is a “kingdom of
Laws,” and that the “government according to these laws is trusted to the king,” comes right out of
Bracton, as we have seen. See MM, p. 363, & n. 239.
262

In explaining Skinner and others’ neo-Roman theory of free states, Shagan stated that, “the revolutionary moment of the regicide and its obvious discontinuity with England’s ‘ancient constitution’ is seen
as creating a unique intellectual space for a republican synthesis.” Shagan, The Rule of Moderation, p.
257. The problem with this perspective is that the regicide was not an “obvious discontinuity” with the
principles embodied in the doctrine or myth of the ancient constitution; for the latter focused on English
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king made the law, not vice versa; pace Pocock’s suggestion that this changed in post-1642 England, it
rested on the concept of a divinely ordained monarch accountable only to God. The Stuarts’ use of their
prerogative to assert and maintain greater political control was a logical consequence of this understanding of kingship. For example, in the 1630s the exercise of prerogative to impose a Ship Money tax
on Englishmen to whom the tax had never before applied effectively took people’s property without any
opportunity for them to challenge the taking because the king was able to unilaterally implement this
action while either ignoring his sitting Parliament or functioning without it.263 The assertion of liberties
grounded in the ancient constitution was the foundation for challenging the king’s exercise of his
prerogative. This bears emphasis: the invocation of the ancient constitution was a control-of-the-law issue
at the heart of Parliament’s continuing confrontation with the Stuarts. The Stuarts’ challenge to this
understanding of England’s ancient constitution was both heartfelt and strategic, a rationale that
supported their political ideology. This actual, not theoretical threat was part of what drove Sidney to
reflect on and write about his political ideas, as the politically-attuned members of his family had always
done, including the use of the ancient constitution argument to counteract the Stuarts’ unilateral
assertions of power. Incorporating this language and argument into his own analysis also reflected the
perspective of Sidney and many Englishmen that the ancient constitution was the soul of English law. As
political theorist Sandoz put it, “This constitution of a double majesty, of a political people represented in
parliament and of a kingship bounded by law, … is the heart of England’s ancient constitution.”264 While

liberties, which would suggest that Charles I deserved to be executed for the threat he represented to
those liberties.
263
On the ship money controversy, see Michael Mendle, “The Ship Money Case, The case of Shipmony,
and the Development of Henry Parker’s Parliamentary Absolutism,” Historical Journal 32 (1989), pp. 51336.
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Sandoz, “Editor’s Introduction,” The Roots of Liberty, p. 11. While there have been many articles on
the subject, according to political scientist David Resnick, Locke was the conspicuous theorist who
shunned this debate in favor of what Resnick believed was a deliberate decision by Locke to avoid the
controversies associated with constitutional analysis and therefore to rely exclusively on reason, an
argument which Resnick clearly believed was much more sensible than that embraced by most other
seventeenth-century theorists. “The absence of an appeal to the common law and the ancient
constitution in Locke can be explained by the fact that he sought certainty through philosophical
conceptual analysis, and such a mode of analysis must set aside appeals to immemorial custom and
tradition. Locke’s philosophical struggle against such deeply imbedded assumptions in the thought of his
contemporaries explains his rejection of one of the dominant modes of political discourse.” I agree with
Resnick that Locke avoided discussion of history, including (but, I would add, not limited to) the history of
English constitutionalism. Resnick noted Pocock’s consistent perplexity at this decision by Locke. While
asserting a reasonable explanation for why this was the case, Resnick did not establish that this
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Sidney’s theory of republicanism can stand alone – it is a compelling political theory – Discourses was
plainly driven by an oppressive reality.265 Sidney was a political activist – he was working on theory
designed to be applied, even if only by himself, to the Stuart infringements on English liberties. One of a
number of grounds Sidney invoked as proof positive of the existence of these liberties was the legal
exposition on the ancient constitution.266 Following the rule of law required the monarchy to respect the
liberties recognized pursuant to common law that were derived from the ancient constitution and had
been identified by Coke and other eminent jurists.267 Whether those liberties were “created” or “located,”

explanation was, in fact, Locke’s. One could just as easily maintain that, consistent with Locke’s general
aversion to any sort of uncertainty, his motivation was largely psychological. Furthermore, I am skeptical
that Locke’s approach was a “rejection of one of the dominant modes of political discourse,” for the very
reason acknowledged by Resnick, viz., that Locke was quite explicit in his view that English history was
important to know and to utilize in analyzing politics. Another explanation that I have not seen in the
scholarship is that Locke, trained in physic, did not feel sufficiently knowledgeable in history (which likely,
from his perspective, would have required exceptional expertise) to formulate an argument in political
theory on the basis of it. In any event, Locke’s republican argument did not rely on ancient
constitutionalism; but contrary to Resnick’s assertion, neither did it “systematic[ally] exclu[de]” appeals to
it.” Davis Resnick, “Locke and the Rejection of the Ancient Constitution,” Political Theory, Vol. 12, No. 1
(Feb., 1984), pp. 97-114, 97-98, 111-12; see also Ross J. Corbett, “The Extraconstitutionality of Lockean
Prerogative,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Summer 2006), pp. 428-48, 433 (citing Resnick for
the proposition that, “The ancient constitution, over whose character the Tories and Whigs wrangled, was
of no authority in Locke’s schema except (and only) to the extent that it was the product of express
consent”). Zook’s article on the Whig constitutional arguments of Whig clergyman Samuel Johnson
characterized Resnick as “both a victim of the Whig propaganda of the Restoration as well as a Whig
interpretation of history” in his assertion that the politics of the Whig constitutionalists was “inherently
conservative, antirational, obscurantist and mystifying.” Zook, “Early Whig Ideology, Ancient
Constitutionalism, and the Reverend Samuel Johnson,” p. 162, citing Resnick, “Locke and the Rejection
of the Ancient Constitution,” p. 100.
265
In that regard, Resnick was wrong that Locke was the only republican theorist whose analysis was not
dependent on an ancient constitution theory; he also incorrectly described Sidney, specifically, as falling
in this latter, “dependent” category. In fact, Sidney’s analysis was multi-dimensional, including both
Locke’s “popular remedy” for the origins of parliament as “a political invention that the people discovered
as a cure for monarchical tyranny,” and a theory supported by the English system of law grounded in the
ancient constitution. See Resnick, “Locke and the Rejection of the Ancient Constitution,” pp. 102-03.
266

Perhaps it is precisely because Harrington was neither politically involved nor trained in the law that
“Harrington’s purposes seem to have been, first, to argue against any return to the traditional ‘ancient’ or
‘balanced’ constitution by showing that it had rested on foundations which had always been insecure and
were now swept away.” Pocock, MM, p. 385 (emphasis added).
267

Once again, here is an element of Sidney’s republicanism to which Henry Neville took exception, along
the lines of Harrington. “For Neville, the ancient constitution had died with the Civil Wars. The changes
in the ownership of property and power that had led to the wars had marked its breakdown.” Mahlberg,
Henry Neville and the English republican culture in the seventeenth century, p. 89. But Locke, Neville
and Harrington were the exception. This was not a part of Milton’s republican views, or the views of
Ludlow, Marvell, Bethel, or Nedham, for example.
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“derived” or “discovered” – one’s critical choice of verb depended entirely on one’s politics.268
In addition to common law, with its genesis in ancient custom, Magna Carta was routinely invoked
in the seventeenth century as a statutory basis for Englishmen’s liberties, particularly in connection with
the issuance of Parliament’s 1628 Petition of Right. “Coke was fond of saying that Magna Carta was like
Alexander the Great, magnum in parvo (a great thing in small form).”269 Magna Carta was actually an
armistice agreement; its purpose in 1215 was to end civil war. It also was a charter freely given by King
John and granted in perpetuum. It was made up of capitula, which included articles of peace (articula
pacis), and customs (consuetudines), and the content was all about the “jurisdictional, legal, and financial
relationships between lord and vassal.” Such feudal customs might have been ancient or contemporary at
the time Magna Carta was created; they might have been unwritten or they might have been new.270 The
law of Magna Carta was not created through prescription; accordingly, the technical rules for defining
those customs that constituted common law were inapplicable. What was most significant was that
Magna Carta was a charter of liberties. “Indeed, the term liberties itself receives a broad stroke from
Coke’s brush. While liberties can refer more specifically to the freedom of subjects from interference in
basic pursuits, it is also used to comprehend the whole of the fundamental laws of the realm, so that
Magna Charta is sometimes styled “the Great Charter of the Liberties of England, so called of the effect,
because they make men free [citing Coke’s Reports].”271
Sidney referred a number of times to the conveyance of liberties contained in Magna Carta, which
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For example, William Petyt wrote “the most important of anti-court tracts,” entitled Antient Right,
published in 1680, that was “a full-scale argument of unprecedented scope on behalf of an immemorial
house of commons, a house rendered independent of the king and the house of lords by the workings of
prescription.” This led, within the year, to the publication by William Atwood of his ancient constitution
essay, Jani Anglorum Facies Nova. Dr. Robert Brady, “doyen of the tory historians,” about whom Prof.
Pocock is the leading expert, wrote a rebuttal to the Petyt argument in 1681 entitled, Full and Clear
Answer to a Book lately written by Mr. Petyt. From the dates of these publications it is clear that they were
written in the context of the succession controversy. See Weston & Greenberg, Subjects and
Sovereigns, Ch. 7 incl. notes.
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James R. Stoner, Jr., Common Law & Liberal Theory: Coke, Hobbes, & the Origins of American
Constitutionalism (Lawrence, KA: The University of Kansas Press, 1992), p. 59.
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In short, the customs of Magna Carta, also called Magna Charta, invoked in language of seventeenthcentury jurists as well as Algernon Sidney, did not automatically “translate” to Pocock’s or any other
unwritten ancient constitution.
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Stoner, Common Law & Liberal Theory, p. 21.
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was of course in the Sidney Library, e.g., “However ‘tis certain that in England, according to the Great
Charter, Judgments are passed by equals: no man can be imprison’d, disseiz’d of his freehold, depriv’d of
life or limb, unless by the sentence of his peers,” quoting from chapter 29.272 Magna Carta was effectively
England’s “first statute.” Later legislation invoked Magna Carta, which was maintained as a source of law
as well as a conveyance of liberties, ”a dual function that was “entirely pragmatic.” As a conveyance of
liberties, “men and communities could appeal to it against acts of government.” As a source of law, “it laid
down governmental procedures and established points of law which the courts would follow and
enforce.”273
Perhaps most importantly, the Great Charter was glossed in the medieval practice of continuing to
make it relevant so that “it could achieve the perpetuity it proclaimed.” This judicial process of
interpretation mimicked the ecclesiastic method of glossing. As Holt explained, “It is with the
consequences of interpreting and glossing that serious historical difficulties arise. The purist,” meaning
Pocock, and others, “is likely to argue that any departure from the strict or literal sense of the original text
amounts to distortion or misrepresentation. Once that is allowed Coke and Selden are condemned out of
hand as inventors of a figment which they foisted on seventeenth-century England and thence on half the
world.” But Holt is persuasive that this argument missed two points. “First it is not always easy to decide
what the precise sense of the Charter originally was; … Second, and much more important, how could
the intention of the charters as grants in perpetuum be met except by glossing, interpretation, and
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The most pressing liberties in Sidney’s time were the entitlement of the English people, particularly
those with property, to select representatives for a Parliament that was entitled to participate in the
governance of England. Related to this issue was the right or liberty of citizens to not be taxed absent
consent by their parliamentary representatives. Related to these issues was the right (or absence of a
right) by the monarch to decline to call Parliament into session, or to postpone (“prorogue”) or dismiss it at
will once it was in session. Also encompassed within the liberties of the English people derived from the
ancient constitution were the right to not have one’s property taken by the king without cause; the right to
a fair trial; and, analyzing Bracton, the right to impartial justice, viz., judges who are not motivated “by fear
or favour.” DCG, II.26.467-71 (emphasis in original); see also id, II.27; The Library of the Sidneys of
Penshurst Place Circa 1665, pp. 110, 371.
273
Stoner suggested that Coke may have seen liberties “as the obverse of the laws,” a concept that
sounds like negative liberty – i.e., that the law was seen as a necessary infringement on liberties
otherwise extant. Just as Coke highly respected the infinite particularity of laws, he accorded enormous
respect under English law to individuals. “Whether these forms of respect can be grounded in the
doctrines of divine providence on the one hand and man’s free will on the other, Coke the legal scholar
does not say. It is clear that the liberties he describes are not necessarily political, though he does
include as liberties the privileges of members of Parliament. But neither are they limited to a right to be
left alone and ignored by the larger world.” Stoner, Common Law & Liberal Theory, p. 21.
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adjustment to new circumstances?”274
Once again, a brief digression is in order. For Pocock as for James I, there was only one way to
read a statute and that was literally; legal interpretation was inherently suspect, or at least foreign, alien,
peregrine. It smacks of ulterior motives and connivances. But in law, this obviously is not the case.275 In
the United States, for example, we categorize the interpreters of constitutional law as strict
constructionists, original intent subscribers, and those who advocate a broadly constructed and
interpreted or a “living” constitution.276 If fundamental law is not capable of more than one meaning, strict
construction applies. But this is rarely the case. If a higher court has determined what the meaning is,
the principle of stare decisis, that the decision stands, also ends the matter. But in most disputes, the law,
constitutional or otherwise, includes ambiguities, sometimes gaping but often tiny interstitial spaces that
invite exegesis. Sometimes past interpretations are fusty, with unclear application to contemporary
circumstances or to the parties in a particular case; and then there is the coaptation of one law to the
many others affected by it. Sometimes the question is, what did the legislature intend in passing the law,
or what did the court mean in a prior interpretation? The question may be, what are the underlying
principles that the law is meant to uphold or protect? The law itself may be poorly written, inviting
disambiguation. Inevitably, legal lacunae are subject to more than one filling, and perhaps many.
The role of the attorney is to advocate an interpretation of the law that is in the best interest of his
client. This is not disingenuous, “distortion or misrepresentation,” as characterizations are wont to aver;
to the contrary, this advocacy is the attorney’s obligation and is essential in an adversarial system of law
that relies on the marshaling of the best case by attorneys representing different and often opposing or
mutually inconsistent interests in court. Pushing a law to its logical limit may be precisely what such
advocacy requires. Pocock had no great fondness for lawyers. In the Machiavellian Moment he
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Holt, “The Ancient Constitution in Medieval England,” Sandoz, The Roots of Liberty, Ch. 1, pp. 53, 5960.
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As Sidney appreciated, “faults may be found in many statutes, and that the whole body of them is
greatly defective, it will not follow that the compendious way of referring all to the will of the king should be
taken. But what defects soever may be in our law, the disease is not so great to require extreme
remedies, and we may hope for a cheaper cure.” DCG, II.27.474-75.
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There is a body of literature on original intent, strict constructionism, and the concept of a living
constitution. For just one example of this scholarship, see Zuckert, “Hobbes, Locke, and the Problem of
the Rule of Law,” The Rule of Law: Nomos XXXVI, pp. 63-79.
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described the eminent jurist Sir John Fortescue as “an English lawyer and the kind of amateur of
philosophy who helps us understand the ideas of an age by coarsening them slightly.”277 He even
disparaged Fortescue’s approach to law. “But the prince in Fortescue’s dialogue, when he doubted
whether he could study English law, expressed doubt also whether he could study it in preference to civil
law, i.e., the law of Rome; and the chancellor undertook to settle both doubts, that is, to convince him that
there existed a readily accessible rational science of English law as distinct from the law of other nations.
Fortescue’s purpose seems entangled in contradiction from the start.”278 More importantly, Pocock
seemed to stonewall or at least dodge the adversarial process; but this is the lawful way in which a
determination is made as to what law means! Although there are differences between the American and
the English systems of law, the former is a product of the latter, and both embrace and rely upon
interpretation as the very essence of the legal process. This is what Anglo-American jurisprudence and
the ratiocination process endemic to it is all about.
Returning to the glossing of Magna Carta, from the beginning of Discourses Sidney relied on the
Great Charter in its original constitutive intent, viz., for the “liberty” it recognized that “solely consists in an
independency upon the will of another,” and which required that Englishmen be governed “only by laws of
their own making.” Indeed, “When their laws and liberties were in danger, they resolved to die or to
defend them.” This, said Sidney, was “without doubt” the “intention of our ancestors” as reflected in
Magna Carta “and other preceding or subsequent laws.”279 Utilizing a theory of the participatory nature of
English government that began well before Magna Carta’s issuance and was subsequently affirmed by it,
English parliamentarians wielded a formidable weapon, viz., an effective means to rebut both the Stuarts’
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Pocock, MM, p. 9. We all know how mundane, even hackneyed, the practice is of bashing lawyers. A
funny example, however, is one mentioned by John Adams in an angry letter that he wrote to Mercy Otis
Warren for what he considered to be her incorrect and unfair account of Adams’ activity during the American revolution. In the course of his letter Adams described Benjamin Franklin’s attitude towards Adams’
fellow American diplomat John Jay, who was a lawyer: “When I arrived in Paris nothing was done.
Franklin would agree with Jay in nothing. …Franklin and his Satellites insinuated about, that Mr. Jay was
a Lawyer, and addicted to disputation &c &c.” Ergo, Pocock was in good company. John Adams to
Mercy Otis Warren, Aug. 8, 1807, Founders Online, National Archives, last modified June 29, 2017,
http://founders.ar-chives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-5203 (10-29-17). [This is an Early Access
document from The Adams Papers. It is not an authoritative final version.]
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DCG, II.26.473; I.5.17-18.
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and Filmer’s conviction that law originated with the king, who was solely granted the power to make it.
Reliance on Magna Carta, however, was not without complications. It also introduced a formidable
difficulty for Sidney and others, including the jurists on whom Sidney relied. The Great Charter was a
royal charter – a grant of liberties from a king. Accordingly, by its very nature, the document raised the
question of whether such a grant could be unilaterally revoked by a king. By Sidney’s time the
identification of Magna Carta with the very identity of England was so strong that it was inconceivable that
Magna Carta would be revoked. Nevertheless, effort was made to entirely avoid the question of whether a
monarch could modify the liberties that a prior monarch had granted in Magna Carta. This was
accomplished by returning to the existence of the ancient constitution – in effect, the use of legal
precedent to maintain that the liberties granted in Magna Carta actually originated much earlier and were
simply reaffirmed and recorded in the Great Charter. Thus, even if Magna Carta was revoked, the rights
embodied in it were customary rights that had attained the force of law, viz., common law by title of
prescription. As Sidney stated, “Magna Charta could give nothing to the people, who in themselves had
all.” In this sense, these liberties were, to use Pocock’s word, “ancient.” Magna Carta simply confirmed or
publicly declared them. As Coke insisted, Magna Carta, that “greatest of statutes,” was declaratory of
ancient common law; it was not the invention of King John’s angry barons.280 Sidney echoed this view:
“Magna Charta was not the Original, but a Declaration of the English Liberties.”281
We now begin to see the source and, for some, the necessity of the “myth” of what modern historians term, “the ancient constitution”; indeed, one could say that in his own pursuits, Sidney facilitated
that myth.282 The Great Charter was cloaked in a hazy past that provided Englishmen with an opaque
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On the “angry barons,” see Lucy Barnard, “A little piece of history in Magna Carta Island up for sale at
nearly £4 m,” The National, cover of Business section, (July 24, 2014),
http://www.thenational.ae/business/industry-insights/the-life/a-little-piece-of-history-in-magna-carta-islandup-for-sale-at-nearly-4m (9-14-14).
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DCG, III.28.493; II.27.474.
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Sidney stated, for instance, “The like may be said of almost all the nations of the world, that have had
anything of civil order amongst them. The supreme magistrate, under what name soever he was known,
whether king, emperor, asymnetes, suffetes, consul, dictator, or archon, has usually a part assigned to
him in the administration of justice and making war; but that he may know it to be assigned and not
inherent, and so assigned as to be employ’d for the publick good, not to his own profit or pleasure, it is
circumscribed by such rules as he cannot safely transgress.” He then alluded to the Goths: “This is
above all seen in the German nations, from whom we draw our original and government, and is so well
described by Tacitus in his treatise of their customs and manners, that I shall content myself to refer to it.
…The Saxons coming into our country retain’d to themselves the same rights. They had no kings but
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sense that even before Magna Carta, Englishmen had rights. This is not entirely fictitious. We know that,
as Coke described and Sidney echoed, the Saxons in their pre-English lives in northern Europe utilized a
court, micel gemott, a great assembly, wittena gemott, and an assembly of wisemen.283 As Sidney stated,
“the variety of government … amongst the Saxons, who in some ages were divided, in others united;
sometimes under captains, in other times under kings; sometimes meeting personally in the micklegemotes, sometimes by their delegates in the witenagemotes, does sufficiently testify, that they ordered
all things according to their own pleasure; which being the utmost act of liberty, it remained inviolable
under all those changes.”284 The Saxons also had kings. Where fact seems to transmute into myth is in
the seventeenth-century conviction, which Sidney shared and repeatedly affirmed in Discourses, that the
Saxon kings were chosen by freemen. Whether or not this is true, it is what Tacitus said, subsequent
medieval historians affirmed, Coke articulately maintained, and Sidney repeatedly described, relying on
numerous early medieval texts as well as Tacitus.285 It is worth noting, as well, that Sidney’s belief in the

such as were set up by themselves, and they abrogated their power when they pleased.” DCG, II.9.376.
The author(s) of A Just and Modest Vindication talked about England’s “Ancient Legal Monarchy” that
was “instituted for the benefit of the Commonwealth.” A Just and Modest Vindication, p. 44. For the early
modern English republicans other than Locke, this was common parlance.
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In The Lamp of Experience, historian Trevor Colbourn explained how the role of the Saxons in English
history and the popularization of Tacitus was transmitted to the early Americans through the work of Paul
de Rapin-Thoyras, a Frenchman, whose work, entitled History of England, was translated in the first half
of the eighteenth century. Colbourn reviewed the work of a number of authors who transmitted this history and lore to America. Included in this group was David Hume, who while considered a Tory historian
because of his fondness for the Stuarts, praised the Britons and Saxons as “lovers of liberty, and fighters
against despotism.” Hume also based his ideas about the Saxons on Tacitus. The early medieval text
Mirrour of Justices, relied upon by Coke, was “an essential reference for the colonial lawyer’s bookshelf,”
and it set forth the “ancient laws and usages” adopted by the Saxons to govern themselves before the
Norman conquest. Mirrour of Justices was also a basic text on Saxon law and government on which the
Stuart monarchists relied. Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience, pp. 32-35 & Appendix I; Christianson,
“Ancient Constitutions in the Age of Coke and Selden,” The Roots of Liberty, p.141; Weston, “England:
ancient constitution and common law,” p. 390. Mirrour of Justices happens to be a text Pocock relied on
to castigated Coke’s approach. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, pp. 41-46, 67-68.
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For example, in Chapter II Section 5 of Discourses, Sidney relied on Roger of Wendover, Flowers of
History, ascribed in Sidney’s day to “Matthew Westerminster,” vol. I (in the years 957 and 959); Henry
Spelman, Concilia, decreta, leges, constitutions, in re ecclesiarum orbis Britannici (London: Warren,
1664), p. 300, from the Council of Calcuth of 787; William of Malmesbury, Chronicle of the Kings of
England (written early 1100s); Polydorus Vergilius, English History (Basil, 1534); Henry of Huntington,
Chronicle (written mid-1100s); Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 2 vols., (written late 1100s); Florence of
Worcester, Chronicle (written c. 1100); and others. According to Sidney’s translator, several of the AngloSaxon chroniclers that Sidney referenced were available to him in a collection that had been published in
1596 by Sir Henry Savile (apparently no relation to the Saviles to whom Algernon Sidney was related –
Halifax and his brother, Henry Savile), entitled Rerum Anglicarum scriptores post Bedam (London, 1596).
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historic origins of English liberties coincided with his conviction that man was born free, and that he did
not lose that liberty unless he expressly relinquished it. “This liberty therefore must continue, till it be
either forfeited or willingly resigned.”286 With the same intensity, Coke argued that the assembly convened
by the Saxons was the antecedent of Parliament.287 The Normans then adopted Saxon ways, with William
the Conqueror “swearing to observe the ancient good and approved laws of England.”288 The interstices
of Magna Carta’s place in the English constitutional system was carefully filled.

Laws are generally not understood by three sorts of persons,
viz. by those that make them, by those that execute them,

Rerum Anglicarum is a heavy calf-bound folio in the Sidney Library that was originally owned by Sidney’s
grandfather, Robert Sidney, the 1st Earl of Leicester. The author of this important text was a distinguished
mathematician who was part of the group, from time to time, with whom the 1st Earl travelled on the
Continent between 1579 and 1582. Sir Henry Savile was also aligned with Essex. DCG, II.5.106-07,
especially ns.17-28; The Library of the Sidneys of Penshurst Place circa 1665, p. 19, 59-60; Shephard,
“The Political Common-place Books of Sir Robert Sidney,” pp.8-9; Womersley, “Sir Henry Savile’s
Translation of Tacitus and the Political Interpretation of Elizabethan Texts,” passim. On Coke’s
determination to base common law on institutions that existed before the Conquest rather than simply on
unwritten custom or the concept of immemoriality, see Christianson, “Ancient Constitutions in the Age of
Coke and Selden, in The Roots of Liberty, p. 141.
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While it is tempting to digress at some length here, I will simply note in passing that the English
concept of the ancient constitution, which became so intensely debated in the seventeenth century,
existed in parallel with a very similar Dutch argument, a connection that is not evident in the literature.
See Appendix B.
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In the late 1640s Nathaniel Bacon, the nephew of Sir Francis Bacon of both scientific fame and
member of the Essex group, wrote An Historical Discourse of the Uniformity of the Government of
England, which identified Saxon England as “the major source of Stuart political institutions.” This is
another text in the Sidney Library. Weston, “England: ancient constitution and common law,” p. 485 n.13;
The Library of the Sidneys of Penshurst Place circa 1665, p. 202. On Coke, see Paul Christianson,
“Ancient Constitutions in the Age of Coke and Selden,” in Sandoz, The Roots of Liberty, ch. 3, pp. 11584, 141, citing Sir Edward Coke’s La Neufme Part des Reports (London, 1613) As Rose pointed out,
while Coke was “not above defending royal supremacy,” his “pride in English common law led him not
only to delineate royal supremacy by the boundaries of statutes, but also to measure those boundaries by
common law.” Rose, Godly Kingship in Restoration England, p. 70.
288

DCG, II.9.377; cf. DCG, III.26.473 (more critical discussion of William). By the middle of the second
decade of the seventeenth century, i.e., around when Sidney was born, “the seamless discourse of the
common law, if it had ever existed … had become a collection of competing scripts.” There was King
James VI and I’s concept of constitutional monarchy created by kings. “James proclaimed that absolute
lawmaking power in England resided with the king-in-parliament.” In addition, the parliamentarian Thomas
Headley argued in favor of constitutional monarchy governed by the common law. In contrast to King
James, Headley maintained that, “the unwritten nature of the common law provided greater certainty than
statutes and civil law.” The third major interpretation of the ancient constitution was a modification of
Headley’s argument and was provided by Selden in 1610, who argued precisely what Sidney maintained
in Discourses, viz., that the concept of “a mixed monarchy in which kings, clergy, nobles and freemen
shared sovereignty” existed from “the very beginning” because it came to England with the Saxon
invasion and “provided a lasting framework for the ancient constitution.” Christianson, “Ancient
Constitutions in the Age of Coke and Selden,” in Sandoz, The Roots of Liberty, pp. 120-23, 129, 132-33.
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and by those that suffer if they break them.
Halifax, Political Thoughts and Reflections 289

c. The jurists: common law after Magna Carta
The development of common law after Magna Carta is embodied in the ideas of the legendary
jurists Bracton, Fortescue, Coke and “Coke’s great parliamentary ally John Selden,” who edited Coke’s
De Laudibus. “The history of Magna Carts is the history not only of a document but also of an argument.
The history of the document is a history of repeated re-interpretation. But the history of the argument is a
history of a continuous element of political thinking” which “sought to establish the rights of subjects
against authority and maintained the principle that authority was subject to the law.”290 Henry de Bracton
was the great “near-contemporary” jurist to Magna Carta; he died in 1268. Sir John Fortescue (c.1385c.1479) is the author of De Laudibus Legum Angliae, written between 1468 and 1471, which Coke said
was of such “weight and worthiness” that it should be “written in letters of gold.” 291 Sir Edward Coke
(1552-1634), a contemporary of Leicester, and his articulation of prescription as a means of defining the
ancient constitution, has already been discussed. Coke served as solicitor general, attorney general,
chief justice of Common Pleas, and chief justice of the King’s Bench. John Selden (1584-1654) was
known as “the most learned person in England in the seventeenth century.” These four men were the
most highly regarded members of the legal bar in the thirteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Sidney referred to, and relied upon all these authorities in Discourses.292 It is not my purpose
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“Political Thoughts and Reflections,” Halifax Complete Works, p. 207.
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Sandoz, “Editor’s Introduction,” The Roots of Liberty, p. 6.
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Sir Edward Coke, Coke on Littleton [1628], The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England
(1628), Preface (n.p.); Sir John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae, S. B. Chrimes, ed. and trans.,
General Preface by Harold D. Hazeltine (Cambridge University Press, 1942), pp. xlix, lxx, xviii; Sandoz,
“Editor’s Introduction,” in Sandoz, The Roots of Liberty, pp. 1-31, 5-6, 11-12 n.18, 21; Paul Christianson,
“Ancient Constitution in the Age of Coke and Selden,” in Sandoz, The Roots of Liberty, pp. 115-84, 126;
Jason P. Rosenblatt, Renaissance England’s Chief Rabbi: John Selden (Cambridge University Press,
2008), pp. 1, 3,11. For my discussion of the ancient constitution I am greatly indebted to the contributions
of the editor and diverse contributing scholars of The Roots of Liberty.
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Once again, we can see the roots of Sidney’s extraordinary knowledge, in this case principles of law,
from the books in the Sidney Family Library, which included a remarkable legal collection. The Library
contained Fortescue’s De Laudibus Legum Angliae, eight Coke texts including his Institutes and Reports,
and sixteen tracts by Selden. It also included various statute books, e.g., The Acts made in the XXII
Parliament [1617], Parliamentary Declarations, Robert Parson’s An Answere to the Fifth Part of Reportes
lately set forth by syr E. Cooke [Coke], Cooke upon Littleton, a book entitled Arguments used by St.
Johns, Glyn &c to persuade Cromwell to bee King vide Monarchy asserted, various trial records and court
orders (e.g., Oldenbarneveld’s trial record), Bartolus on civil law, multiple ecclesiastic texts on the law
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to systematically present the jurisprudence of Bracton, Fortescue, Coke or Selden; that would take many
books – and has. Rather, it is worthwhile to at least recognize the degree to which Sidney’s language on
the rule of law was highly influenced by the jurisprudential convictions of these eminent jurists.
Bracton was a thirteenth century jurist who wrote On the Laws and Customs of England, on which
Sidney explicitly relied. Sidney embraced Bracton’s statement from common law that, par in parem non
habet imperium, “equals can have no right over each other,” which led him to find that because magistrates
are men no different from other men, they have no inherent right over the people.293 Contrary to the autocratic assertions of James I, not to mention Charles I and Charles II, the Stuarts were not different from
other men. “But who knows not, that no families do more frequently produce weak or ill men, than the
greatest?” Sidney described many ineffectual and corrupt kings, including “the late king.” Governments
were established “for the obtaining of justice,” and therefore “power be not conferred” upon kings, nor is law
“the signification of their will.” Rather, laws “are that to which the prince owes obedience, as well as the
meanest subject,” a conclusion based quite explicitly on the authority of Bracton as well as Fortescue.294
Sidney emphasized that Bracton’s hierarchy of God, law, and Parliament contemplated that “the
power originally in the people of England, is delegated unto the parliament.” This, asserted Sidney, was a
condition of the English monarch’s kingship. “If he doth not like this condition, he may renounce the crown;
but if he receive it upon that condition (as all magistrates do the power they receive), and swear to perform
it, he must expect that the performance will be exacted, or revenge taken by those that he hath
betrayed.”295 One of the strongest statements in Discourses, with language of betrayal and revenge,
Sidney was addressing the consequences to the English monarch if he continued to claim the rights of

including the Corpus Juris Civilis, Codex, Decretum and other works, many editions of Magna Carta,
multiple copies of various Cicero works, foreign law compilations, numerous Grotius books, John Cowell’s
The institutes of the laws of England, Sir Robert Wiseman’s The law of laws: or, the excellency of the civil
law, and William Fulbecke, A parallel or conference of the civill law, the canon law, and the common law
of England. Surprisingly, there is no record in the 1665 Sidney Library Catalogue of works by Bracton;
but this almost certainly is an example of the incomplete nature of the Catalogue, for Sidney was
extremely familiar with Bracton as there were multiple citations to his work in Discourses.
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Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England, fol. 5, p. 33; DCG, III.33.511.
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DCG, III.14.393, III.42.554.
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Id, II.32.313. (Note that this statement was contained in a passage of Discourses read at Sidney’s trial
that was “wanting in the original manuscript” and so inserted back in the book by the editor of the first
edition, i.e., Toland. See II.32.312 n.7.)
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absolute monarchy.296 Elsewhere in the text Sidney also quoted from Bracton to support their shared
belief in the rule of law, e.g., the king’s “power is from the law that makes him king”; “the king doth no
wrong, in as much as he doth nothing but by law. The power of the king is the power of the law, a power
of right not of wrong. Again, If the king does injustice, he is not king”; “That if he do injustice, he ceases to
be king, degenerates into a tyrant, and becomes the viceregent of the Devil”! 297
Two centuries after Bracton, Fortescue wrote “in praise of the laws of England.” Coke was not the
first jurist to focus on the ancient customs of the English. Fortescue maintained that English law dated
back to pre-Roman times and immemorial custom. “These included universal principles, which teachers
of the laws of England call maxims … and which the civilians call rules of law.” Fortescue’s “orthodox,”
and commonly held view was that “human law, including the statutes of Parliament, were derived from
natural law, which was a reflection of divine law, and that statutes contrary to natural law were void.”298
This sounds a lot like the layers of law on which Sidney relied. Fortescue equated “ancient English law as
it structures the living constitution of the realm with Justice and divine and natural law. …Thus, the
historically ancient and the ontologically higher law – eternal, divine, natural – are woven together to
compose a single harmonious texture in Fortescue’s account of English law.” 299 Fortescue’s De Laudibus
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In contrast, visceral comments positively abound in Court Maxims about what happens to kings who
claimed the powers of an absolute monarch. See, e.g., Fourth Dialogue: “All such laws and cautions
seems to show to me that kings are such wild beasts as will break all chains that can be put upon them.
The only means, therefore, of enjoying safety and preserving liberty is by destroying them, or having none
at all”; Ninth Dialogue: “These were the pillars upon which that monarchy stood. By their means the king,
their detestable master, was made fat with blood and spoiled. His power was by them enlarged and
upheld, until. God raised up an avenger to overthrow it.” Court Maxims, pp. 63, 143.
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Sidney, DCG, II.32.313, III.8.360, III.15.399; see also A Just and Modest Vindication, p. 44. Sidney
frequently cited Bracton, but the Sidney Library catalogue does not include Bracton. Sidney could have
had his own copy; but given his traveling lifestyle, it is much more likely that this is an illustration of the
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Sir John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Anglie, S. B. Chimes, ed. & tr. (Cambridge University Press,
2011), Ch. 4. There is a difference of opinion among scholars over the extent to which Coke later relied
on natural law. Stoner, Common Law & Liberal Theory, pp. 19 & 237 n.22; Edward S. Corwin, The
“Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1955)).
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Legum Angliae, part of the Sidney Library, emphasized that “all human laws are sacred, inasmuch as law
is defined by the words, “Law is a sacred sanction commanding what is honest and forbidding the
contrary. …Law may also be described as that which is the Art of the Good and the Just. …Moreover, all
laws that are promulgated by man are decreed by God.” Here we are talking about the Law, which
included the particular laws of England, but also much more. Recognizing “the frailty of human nature,”
and “the corruption reigning in the hearts of men,” wise men “have reserved to themselves as much as
might keep their magistrates within the limits of the law.”300
At this juncture, however, writing before the Reformation, Fortescue swerved in a very different
direction than Sidney, maintaining that the Catholic Church was the ultimate custodian of divine and
human law, and that the pope had final authority in interpreting that law. But Sidney quoted Fortescue for
the proposition that, “The kings of England cannot change the laws…. ’Tis not the king that makes the
law, but the law that makes the king.” The king “must therefore take the laws and customs as he finds
them.” A king who is not required to do this is a tyrannical absolute monarch: “the chief work of an
absolute monarch is to place himself above the law.” Again, Sidney focused on society’s reliance on the
rule of law, and not the will or passions of a king. “[T]he force and essence of all laws would be
subverted, if under colour of mitigating and interpreting, the power of altering were allow’d to kings. …The
good of a people ought to be established upon a more solid foundation. For this reason the law is
established, which no passion can disturb.”301
Fortescue distinguished between regal and political governments, a difference in terminology from
the political/legal dichotomy that Prof. Murphy used, but with Fortescue’s regal government roughly
equating to Murphy’s political interpretation of law, and his political government roughly equating to
Murphy’s legal interpretation of politics: “If he were to preside over them with a power entirely regal, he
would be able to change the laws of his realm, and also impose on them tallages and other burdens
without consulting them; this is the sort of dominion which the civil laws indicate when they state [in lex
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regia] that What pleases the prince has the force of law [Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem].” But,
said Fortescue, “the case is far otherwise with the king ruling his people politically, because he is not able
himself to change the laws without the assent of his subjects nor burden an unwilling people with strange
imposts, so that, ruled by laws that they themselves desire, they freely enjoy their properties, and are
despoiled neither by their own king nor any other.” 302 Fortescue stressed that, “the rule of law is the
same as true kingly rule of the kind enjoined by God. …Merely regal rule is founded in coercion, on the
pattern of Nimrod.” He used the terminology of political versus civil law to distinguish between governance in which kings can “change laws at their pleasure,” which is tyrannical, versus laws that “emanate
from the entire community not merely from the will of the king.”303 Sidney did not use Fortescue’s civil and
political law terminology; but there is no doubt that this distinction is ever-present in Discourses.304
Moving from the sixteenth to the seventeenth century, Coke’s scholarship is “the great dividing
line,” the formal beginning of English legal lore about the ancient constitution. 305 Coke’s Reports (160015), made up of eleven parts, provided law cases used by students, and along with his Institutes of the
laws of England (1628-44), a legal textbook, provided the legal and historical ideas that enabled Coke to
comfortably link the ancient constitution and common law.306 The Sidney Library had all eleven parts of
Reports with multiple editions of some parts, as well as a complete set of the Institutes – a valuable
collection.307 In sum, Coke preserved the concept of the supremacy of the law, articulated by medievalists, while also asserting that the sovereign person or body was above the law.
Coke’s proclaimed “master in the law of the constitution” was Fortescue. In The First Part of the
Institutes of the Laws of England (1628), Coke stated that Magna Carta “was for the most part
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declaratory of the principle grounds of the fundamental laws of England, and for the residue it is additional
to supply some defects of the common law.”308 In Calvin’s Case Coke developed the theme of experience
– the view that the common law had withstood the test of time. English law was grounded on “the custom
and usage of every several town or place, for consuetudo loci est observanda,” the custom of the place
must be observed.309 This also explains Sidney’s reference at the beginning of Discourses to the fact that
English liberties were established by Magna Carta but also by “other preceding and subsequent laws.”310
The “great tradition” of Magna Carta was interpreted as it was applied to current circumstances. This was
also the position of Crown legal officials such as the antiquarian William Lambarde, a prolific jurist himself
and an acquaintance of Sir Henry Sidney, Algernon’s great-grandfather, evidenced in Sidney Library
records that include a dedication letter in one of Lambarde’s works, written in his hand, to Henry “because
of Sidney’s knowledge of antiquities.”311 In one scholar’s view, Lambarde’s description of the “origins of
political life sounds very much like that found in the most popular Ciceronian work in England, De Officiis.312 As we know, Sidney and his forefathers relied extensively on, and echoed many of the political ideas
of Cicero, including particularly those set forth in De Officiis, which of course was in the Sidney Library.
Coke was not only a scholar but an active member and leader of Parliament. Notwithstanding the
difficulty of conducting “manifest private ware” within the royal government while serving as a government
judge, Coke “did just that and had the intellectual confidence, the indignation, to persist.” For his troubles
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Coke repeatedly went to jail, tossed into the Tower of London.313 (Selden did something similar, with the
same consequences, as reflected in a 1629 letter from the artist Rubens stating, “poor Selden is a
prisoner of state for having spoken too freely in the last assembly of the English Parliament.”314) Perhaps
as Holt suggested it was sympathy with such acts of defiance that was grist for the mill with regard to the
intellectual origins of the English Civil War. Certainly, this is very much in line with the role in English
society that the Sidney/Percy family, particularly the Northumberlands, had fashioned for themselves:
remember Hotspur, the self-proclaimed “Protector of the Commonwealth,” who led a rebel army in opposition to the king. Notwithstanding Coke’s determined insubordination late in his career, he had already
served as Elizabeth’s attorney general and upheld her Act of Supremacy over the Church of England.
Coke was a committed Anglican and a monarchist “through and through.” For Coke, the monarch
was the head of church and state; indeed, he wrote that, “by the authority of many acts of Parliament the
kingdom of England is an absolute monarchy.”315 How could Coke possibly maintain the supremacy of
the law and yet be an absolutist? And how could Sidney cite Coke while also asserting, “The coercive
power of the Law proceeds from the Authority of Parliament”?316 The answer is that Coke’s absolutism
was complex and paradoxical. He believed that the monarch was above the law, that is, that she was the
supreme maker of the law. But he also believed that no one could challenge a monarch who did not
observe the law. Simultaneously, Coke argued that the monarch’s authority was limited by law, and that
her prerogative powers were subject to both common law and parliamentary control. Thus, it was the
monarch with Lords and Commons that were entitled to “an equal share” in lawmaking.317 At the same
time, it was the role of judges to interpret the law and in so doing, they did not “look into the king’s mind in
each case,” but made decisions on the basis of historical usage and precedent.
Coke’s emphasis was chiefly on English common law, which he believed represented “perfect
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reason, which commands those things that are proper and necessary and which prohibits contrary
things.” This was not the common man’s reason or, for that matter, the king’s reason. Indeed, when
James I suggested that he was as reasonable as anyone else and could interpret the law, Coke
demurred, provoking the King’s ire. In general, James I did not respect the independence of the
judiciary.318 Rather, common law represented the reasoning of many generations of learned jurists – the
“practical prudential reason of the experts.” This concept became known as artificial reason.319 It is Coke
who deserves our recognition as the individual who more than any other created the mindset – which is
not accurate – that English law meant common law. In fact, by Coke’s time, in addition to common law
English law had absorbed substantial Roman and canon law in its statutes and court decisions; and there
were a number of English courts not governed by common law, e.g., the law of the merchants, the law of
the chancery, ecclesiastical law. Nevertheless, it is with Coke that the process of limiting James I’s divine
right absolutism is first effectuated by English jurisprudence and particularly, with reference to the scope
of the king’s prerogative – one of the issues of greatest contention between the Stuart monarchy and
Parliament.320 As Sidney averred, “All those that compose the society, being equally free to enter into it or
not, no man could have any prerogative above others, unless it were granted by the consent of the whole;
and nothing obliging them to enter into this society, but the consideration of their own good.”321 Even
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Coke’s concept of “artificial reason” comes from his conception of common law as the accumulation of
the wisdom of the ages, “an artificiall perfection of reason gotten by long studie, obseruation and
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more emphatically he stated: “The question will not then be what pleases the king, but what is good for
the people; not what conduces to his profit or glory, but what best secures the liberties he is bound to
preserve; he does not therefore reign for himself, but for the people; he is not the master, but the servant
of the commonwealth; and the utmost extent of his prerogative is to be sure to do more good than any
private man.”322 We can hear Coke in Sidney’s words.
One generation after Coke, Selden carried Coke’s mantle, enhancing and strengthening it. Selden
was a brilliant polymath, a “titanic intellect” Milton “revered,” and a jurist whose legal scholarship included
not only England’s ancient constitution but also ancient Jewish law. Selden also was an MP in the
turbulent years preceding the Civil War, as well as a member of the parliamentary committee appointed to
petition the king for payment of damages to those unjustly required to pay tax in the ship money case.323
The Sidney Library included a large collection of Selden tracts.324 Selden studied rabbinic literature for
decades although he was not Jewish, and the honorific moniker of “Rabbi” was bestowed upon him as a
title of respect for his astonishing mastery of Judaic scholarship, including many years studying the fortyfour tractates of the Babylonian Talmud. Selden conceived of “the imperatives of natural law in terms of
the rabbinic Noachide laws,” an approach shared by Grotius, which focused on the universal moral
imperatives that the Talmud states were given to Noah by God. “For Selden, whose torah is law, the
English common law has an added status as a natural law ordained by God, a parallel to the Mosaic law
as the civil law of the Jews. There could then be no appeal to a higher law or to general principles
outside the law.”325 Selden also considered Parliament from the perspective of the great Sanhedrin,
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ancient Israel’s communal religious legislature and court.326
Selden integrated political philosophy, rabbinic scholarship, law and realpolitik. Like Coke he was
passionately committed to the common law, which gave him strength “in coping with the tactics of the
crown” – especially the king’s attempt to appeal “outside the common law to an inalienable
prerogative.”327 Going beyond Coke’s analysis, Selden emphasized the law’s historical development, to
which he assigned “normative significance.” He saw this development in terms of both continuity and
change. For instance, he “traced a development of the German wapentakes described by Tacitus into
the witans of the Anglo-Saxons, which in the thirteenth century became parliaments; and he found, in that
development, principles – norms – applicable to parliamentary government in his own day.” 328 Sidney
discussed this historical development. 329 The concept of consent was essential to Selden – the law’s
legitimacy was hypostasized through the people’s consent. Consent was also essential to Sidney. It was
“manifested in custom, that is, the patterns and norms of behavior tacitly or expressly accepted by the
community. Selden and Sidney shared the conviction that “men are civic creatures, who, when they first
people a land, ‘plant a common society.’ In succeeding ages, however, they add to, interpret, and limit
natural law according to ‘the several conveniences,’” meaning the particular wants and needs of that
society. This thought was repeated throughout Discourses.330
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On the formation of civil society, Sidney stated, “[F]reemen … think it for their convenience to join
together, and to establish such laws and rules as they oblige themselves to observe: which multitude,
whether it be great or small, has the same right, because ten men are as free as ten million of men; …
and the ten may as justly resolve to live together, frame a civil society, and oblige themselves to laws, as
the greatest number of men that ever met together in the world.” He caustically continued, “Did God
create man under the necessity of wanting government … that unless they should use the first
opportunity of dividing themselves into such parcels as were to remain unalterable, the right of reigning
over everyone shall fall to the first villain that should dare to attempt it? Is it not more consonant to the
wisdom and goodness of God, to leave to every nation a liberty of repairing the mischiefs fallen upon
them...?” DCG, II.5.98, II.5.100. He also observed that, “there can be no general law given to all; but
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Selden maintained that the quality of the law was not a product of its antiquity – all legal systems
were grounded in history, based on customs and norms within a society. Rather, the caliber of the law
should be judged by “the extent to which it ‘best fits’ the wants and needs” of the people for, as Sidney
stated (quoting Cicero), “salus populi est lex suprema,” the welfare or safety of the people is the supreme
law.331 Selden’s legal philosophy was distinct in its recognition of the legitimate diversity among different
peoples with disparate legal systems, and their roots in diverse customs of these peoples. Two other
features endemic to Selden’s analysis are relevant. First, of particular interest to Selden was the moral
imperative in contracts. 332 Second, mixed monarchy was also an essential part of Selden’s argument
about the genesis of English liberties.333 Both of these ideas were critical elements of Sidney’s
republicanism.
Beyond the significance of the ancient constitution and Magna Carta, Sidney’s ideas about law and
the rule of law are informed by the jurisprudence of Bracton, Fortescue, Coke, and Selden, and are
reflected in numerous statements by Sidney about proper governance and the Law. Without even getting
to the fourth tier of law that was part of Sidney’s analysis, namely, legal process and procedure, it is
manifest that Sidney’s discourse is steeped in the Law. 334

every people is by God and nature left to the liberty of regulating these matters relating to themselves
according to their own prudence or convenience”; “And the infinite variety which is observed in the
constitution, mixture, and regulation of governments, does not only shew that the several nations of the
world have considered them [rules by which to govern]; but clearly prove that all nations have perpetually
continued in the exercise of that right. Nothing is more natural than to follow the voice of mankind.” Id,
I.18.61, II.6.112.
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“Perhaps his most distinctive contribution was his interpretation of the contractual character of moral
obligations generally: it is not only breach of a prohibition that is offensive to God, and punishable by him,
but also breach of a covenant. Indeed, for Selden the most important rule of natural law appears to have
been the rule that contracts are to be kept, pacta sunt servanda, which he applied not only to divine
contracts but also to human contracts generally.” Berman, Law and Revolution II, p. 247.
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In Discourses Sidney referred twice in passing to the extremely important seventeenth-century jurist
Sir Matthew Hale. Hale (1609-1676) was a little older than Sidney (1623-1683), an orphan whose
guardian sent him to Oxford, from which Hale went to Lincoln’s Inn in 1628. He studied (but did not
know) Coke, and was a protégé and later a close friend of Selden. However, Hale’s work was all
published posthumously, years after both his death and Sidney’s. We do know that many of Hale’s
voluminous legal writings circulated in manuscript. Whether Sidney read any of these manuscripts, we do
not know. As previously indicated, the Sidney Library included a vast legal collection. Hale’s legal
philosophy represented the apogee of the combined wisdom of Coke, Selden, and Hale’s own insights.
Hale integrated his general theory of historical jurisprudence with the principles of natural law theory and
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There are three fundamental conclusions that we can draw from the extraordinary emphasis in
Sidney’s Discourses on the rule of law. First, Sidney passionately maintained that implementation of the
rule of law protected men from themselves and thereby provided the opportunity for the creation of a just
society. As such, rule of law was an essential part of republican governance. Second, Sidney subscribed
to the Law, not just the laws. As Fortescue stated, “Law is … the Art of the Good and the Just.” While
rule of law includes the innumerable details of the law, it also includes maxims, principles, and ideas that
ensured the protection of both men’s natural rights, and the social contract entered into when men formed
a civil society. Rule of law was the third and similarly vital tier of law on which Sidney’s republican theory
was based. An essential element in Sidney’s advocacy of the rule of law was his conviction that England
had always been a free country that chose its own leaders. Englishmen’s legal rights originated in the
distant past by way of the ancient Britons, Saxons, and Normans, and it is this respect – although Sidney
did not use the term – that the ancient constitution indeed existed in early modern English republicanism.
Furthermore, to the extent that the Stuarts were seeking to infringe on customary rights – practices that
were longstanding and accepted in England – or those spelled out in Magna Carta, or liberties delineated
in the common law that jurists had developed over centuries, the Stuarts were breaking the first three
tiers of the law: they were in violation of principles of natural law, the social contract, and the rule of law.
As a common lawyer stated in response to the autocratic inclinations of King James, “To rule by law is the
King’s and the people’s security.”335 In the absence of the rule of law, there was no such security. Finally,
it is important to recognize that Sidney’s reliance on the rule of law was not only grounded in English

legal positivism – a result that is paralleled in Sidney’s discussion of the law, although there is much more
emphasis in Sidney on historical jurisprudence and natural law theory than on legal positivism. During
the height of the Civil War and for years thereafter, Hale represented leaders on all sides of the political
aisle, e.g., counsel to Charles I during his trial, counsel to Strafford when he was impeached, counsel to
Laud, intercessor on behalf of Puritans charged with treason during Charles II’s reign. He also held
numerous important judicial positions, e.g., chief justice of the King’s Bench. Hale’s “absolute integrity
was acknowledged by virtually everyone who came into contact with him.” He lived a very modest life,
and was influenced by his profound Puritan convictions. Given Sidney’s long absences from England and
the very different worlds in which they operated, it is unlikely that Sidney knew Hale. Obviously he knew
of him. See Berman, Law and Revolution, pp.248-63, 466-71; Berman, “The Origins of Historical
Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 103, No. 7 (May 1994), pp. 1651-1738; Alan
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jurisprudence; it was a fundamental part of republicanism from the time of Cicero, that “passionately
convinced Republican” who expressed many of the same views that Sidney articulated in Discourses:
that men were human and subject to corruption, and the world was imperfect; the value of a mixed form
of governance; the unique and privileged role that man had in the state of nature; that man entered into a
social contract in order to live peaceably with other men; that law protected men from themselves and
from each other, guided by the highest principles embodied in the Law.336 Machiavelli agreed with these
ideas. (Machiavelli was cynical; but so was Cicero, and so was Sidney.) Many of Sidney’s fellow early
modern English republicans also concurred.
Sidney’s emphasis on the rule of law was anything but a “far out” or atypical version of
republicanism. What was atypical was the articulation of a utopian republic, such as Harrington described
in Oceana and his fellow republican Neville embraced; this was out of the republican mainstream.
Indeed, the pervasive emphasis on law by Sidney and the other English republicans, following Cicero and
Machiavelli, informed early modern republicanism. Yet it is a fundamental element of the theory that has
been lost in the shuffle of the historiographic wars over the English Civil War, the ineluctable
Harringtonian starting point of most republican analysis in the post-Machiavellian Moment world, and the
scholarly battle over the relationship between liberalism and republicanism.

I have neither the scholar's melancholy, which is emulation, nor the musician's,
which is fantastical, nor the courtier's, which is proud, nor the soldier's,
which is ambitious, nor the lawyer's, which is politic.
336

Philosopher-theorists Richard Flathman and Friedrich Hayek seemed to be referring to what I term
“the Law” in the following discussion: “Articulating his Humean views concerning the vital role of custom
and convention in human affairs, Hayek seems to diminish the incompatibility between the ideas of
generality and predictability by invoking tacit but widely shared understandings that are the background of
any rule-governed activity or practice.” Quoting Hayek, Flathman explained that, “There are ‘rules’ which
can never be put into explicit form. Many of these will be recognizable only because they lead to
consistent … decisions and will be known to those whom they guide as, at most, manifestations of a
‘sense of justice.’” In this regard, legal reasoning is not necessarily explicit. “Many of the general
principles on which the conclusions depend will be only implicit in the body of formulated law and will
have to be discovered by the courts.” For those non-lawyers who would object to resort to such implicit
understandings, Hayek pointed out that, “This, however, is not a peculiarity of legal reasoning. Probably
all generalizations that we can formulate depend on still higher generalizations which we do not explicitly
know but which nevertheless govern the workings of our minds.” Accordingly, “Though we will always try
to discover those more general principles on which our decisions rest, this is probably by nature an
unending process that can never be completed.” R. Flathman, “Liberalism and the Suspect Enterprise of
Political Institutionalization: The Case of the Rule of Law,” The Rule of Law: Nomos XXXVI, p. 309, citing
F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 208-09.
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iv.

Legal Process and Procedure

The mechanism by which the Law implements its maxims and rules is the legal process; that
process is embodied in the judicial system. The legitimacy of the judicial system, in turn, is fostered by
legal procedures that govern its nature and fairness. Cicero said, “By establishing fair dealing, he [the
virtuous leader] reined in highest and lowest together under the equality of justice.”338 Equitable treatment
under the law is fundamental. As one scholar stated, “justice demands that similar cases be similarly
disposed of.”339 Sidney put it this way: “The laws that aim at the publick good, make no distinction of
persons.”340 Legal processes and procedures were not a dominant aspect of Sidney’s treatment of law;
nevertheless, Sidney relied on them, and a discussion of the entire fabric of law that informed Sidney’s
republicanism would be incomplete without including what Sidney aptly referred to as “the administration
of justice.”341 The legal or judicial process was an umbrella under which a panoply of means existed to
implement the law. The judicial system – both the courts and the system of judicial review for which it
provided – constituted the guts of the judicial process.
As a preliminary matter, it should go without saying that the importance of participation in government, including consent, which has been addressed at some length, was the necessity to have a government considered legitimate by the people.342 This legitimization required the right to participate
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established in law. Legal processes and associated procedures were the mechanisms by which this
value was implemented. Sidney and other republicans’ notion of the “well-constituted” government
required the institution of a legitimate legal process. We take this for granted; the seventeenth-century
did not. Sidney stated: “Consideration ought to be had of human frailty, and some indulgence may be
extended to those who commit errors, after having done important services; but a state cannot subsist,
which compensating evil actions with good, gives impunity to the most dangerous crimes, in
remembrance of any services whatever.” In other words, the system has to work justly. That doesn’t
mean that it will be perfect. But evil men must be punished, just as good men should be recognized.
Accordingly, “He that does well, performs his duty, and ought always to do so: Justice and prudence
concur in this; and ‘tis no less just than profitable, that every action be considered by itself, and such a
reward or punishment allotted to it, as in nature and proportion it doth best deserve.”343
Sidney defined justice as “the law of the land, as far as it is sanction recta, jubens honesta,
prohibens contraria,” referring to Cicero’s famous statement in Second Philippic that justice was a “right
sanction, commanding honest deeds, forbidding the contrary.”344 The trial process was an essential
means by which society ensured that there was justice. Sidney made this very clear: “none can be
exempted from the penalties of them [the laws that aim at the publick good], otherwise than by approved
innocence, which cannot appear without a trial.”345 The failure to implement an effective trial system
created tyranny: “He that will not bend his mind to them [the laws] … usurps a power above the law.”346
This wreaks havoc, for “no man submits upon any other condition, than that none should be exempted
from the power of it.”347
An uncorrupted judiciary was another vital component of a legitimate legal process. “Common
sense declares, that governments are instituted, and judicatures erected for the obtaining of justice.”348
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This was not an idle concern. Action was taken by early Stuarts to fetter, if not control, the judiciary.
James I fired Coke “for the content of his judicial opinions and not for any misconduct on the bench,” a
disturbing precedent. “Any pretense of judicial independence – if it had ever existed – was now under
direct assault.”349 Things only got worse when Charles became king. Judges were humiliated and their
credibility increasingly undermined as they were forced to comply with royal demands or be purged from
the bench. The consequence was judicial complicity, about which “Coke must have turned in his grave.”
Judges became servants of the Crown – exactly what Charles thought judges should be. This eliminated
their ability to adjudicate fairly. By the 1630s, the judiciary was the object of public derision.350 After the
eleven-year period of Charles I’s Personal Rule, with the return of the Long Parliament in 1640 when
Sidney was about seventeen, Parliament’s first order of business was the impeachment and
imprisonment of members of the common law bench considered complicitous in Charles’ unconstitutional
policies.351 Ironically, the English judiciary was just as subject to executive control under Cromwell as it
had been under the Stuarts. The will of the Protector was paramount; Cromwell exercised a royal
prerogative in the same way that the Stuarts had, with little regard for judicial independence. “[J]udges
basic predicament had not changed.”352
One way in which the English judiciary was expressly protected was that judges “swear to have
no regard to the king’s letters or commands, but if they receive any, to proceed according to law, as if
they had not been.”353 Similarly, “kings can neither make nor change laws: They are under the law, and
the law is not under them: their letters or commands are not to be regarded: In the administration of
justice, the question is not what pleases them, but what the law declares to be right.”354 The irony of this
observation is manifest given Sidney’s railroading at his own trial for high treason by Judge Jenkins.
Sidney applauded Rome’s judicial system. “Yet of all the states that are known to us, none was ever so
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free from crimes of malice and willful injustice; none was ever guilty of so few errors as that of Rome.”355
Liberty demanded justice; the absence of justice precluded liberty. “[I]t cannot be denied that the best
men, during the liberty of Rome, thrived best; that good men suffer’d no indignity, unless by some fraud
imposed upon the well-meaning people; and that so soon as the liberty was subverted, the worst men
thrived best.”356 Sidney turned again to object lessons from ancient history to establish that during the
reign of Rome’s tyrannical emperors, “The best men were exposed to so many calamities and snares,
that it was thought a matter of great wonder to see a virtuous man die in his bed.” What we learn from this
history is that justice is “at the root of liberty.” As long as this root “remain’d untouch’d,” the state “never
failed to recover from any disorders” and “became more powerful and glorious than ever”; conversely, if
the “root of liberty…was destroy’d, the city fell into a languishing condition, and grew weaker and weaker,
till that and the whole empire was ruin’d by the barbarians.”357
Sidney wrote about the “king that renders justice” that is “indeed always there. He never sleeps;
he is subject to no infirmity; he never dies unless the nation be extinguished, or so dissipated as to have
no government.” Juries had to give verdicts “in his sight.” When justice was executed upon Dudley, this
king was there; on the other hand, he “was injured when the perjur’d wretches who gave that accursed
judgment in the case of ship money, were suffered to escape the like punishment by means of the
ensuing troubles which they had chiefly raised.” Sidney’s “king” was the bar of the court, the judiciary,
and the English jury system. When “a noble lord who was irregularly detain’d in prison in 1681, being by
habeas corpus brought to the bar of the king’s bench, where he sued to be releas’d upon bail,” and was
told by “an ignorant judge” that he had to apply himself to the king, the noble lord replied, “he came thither
for that end; that the king might eat, drink, or sleep where he pleased, but when he render’d justice he
was always in that place.” It was the ever presence of a legitimate judicial system that ensured the rule of
law. “This is he to whom we all owe a simple and unconditional obedience.”358 Sidney was quite explicit
about this “king”: “I may justly conclude, that the king, before whom every man is bound to appear, who
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does perpetually and impartially distribute justice to the nation, is not the man or woman that wears the
crown; …Whether such matters are ordinary or extraordinary, the decision is and ought to be placed
where there is most wisdom and stability, and where passion and private interest does least prevail to the
obstruction of justice. …[T]his is done in England by judges and juries.”359
Besides uncorrupted judges and juries, what was it that made for a legitimate and fair judicial
process? Sidney only touched on this, but he did identify elements of due process that we rely upon
today. As lawyers are taught, there are two components to due process: substantive and procedural.
Substantive due process relates to the appreciation of a law’s legitimacy because of its merits, viz.,
because it contributes to the common good and thereby justice; procedural due process concerns the
fairness of the process by which the law is made and enforced.360 For example, with respect to
procedural due process, Sidney pointed out that in ancient Rome a citizen could not be put to death
without being heard in public; at least in a capital case, there was a right to publicly defend oneself.
Sidney relied on “the Great Charter,” which “having been confirmed by more than thirty parliaments,” was
the foundation for Englishmen’s entitlement to justice.361 Magna Carta’s provision of legal rights of which
Englishmen could not be deprived addressed the fairness of state action that adversely affected the
people. The broadest of such Magna Carta provisos was that, “No freeman shall be taken, imprisoned,
disseised, outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will We proceed against or prosecute him,
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land,” and “To no one will We sell, to no
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one will We deny or delay, right or justice.”362 This is procedural due process.363
Sidney was wary of contemporary difficulties with legal procedure, particularly the tendency for
the legal process to be so arcane that no one but the most versed barrister could understand the rules.
“[I]n many places, and particularly in England, the laws are so many, that the number of them has
introduced an uncertainty and confusion which is both dangerous and troublesome.” The intention of
English law was “just and good”; but its complexity can “serve for a pretence to justify almost any
judgment.”364 On more than one occasion Sidney noted that, “No law made by man can be perfect.” But
where there are deficiencies, every nation must have the power to correct it. (In this regard, the power to
correct the law should reside in the same hands as those who made it – e.g., by means of parliamentary
participation, if not control.)365
There was also the issue of the rigidity of the law. Sidney pointed to the principles of equity that
applied in certain English courts in order to compensate for the unfairness of an outcome where the law
had been applied very literally to ill effect. English professor Elliot Visconsi provided a very useful
definition of equity in his book on equity in late Stuart law and literature: “Equity is an unusually protean
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idea with an unusually stable intellectual trajectory. Derived from the Greek epiekeia, equity is a
sovereign act of deliberative legal interpretation that realizes justice in the world by relaxing the strict
letter of the law. Equity is also an ethos, a person’s inclination toward fairness and equal justice before
the law.”366 Equity and equitable jurisdiction are vital to the law. “In the first comprehensive treatise on
advocacy, Aristotle distinguishes between the written law, the rules governing a particular community,
and the unwritten law, those equitable principles ‘supposed to be acknowledged everywhere.’ Aristotle
advises advocates that when the written law supports their cases, they should stress the virtue of respect
for authority and the vice of “trying to be cleverer than the laws.” Conversely, when the written law tells
against their cases, lawyers “must appeal to the universal law, and insist on its greater equity and justice
– a legitimate as well as an effective appeal, Aristotle suggested, since “there really is, as everyone to
some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men.“367
Aristotle’s famously said, “Equity is justice that goes beyond the written law.”368 In another work,
Aristotle further explained that “the essential nature of the equitable” is that it is “a rectification of law
where law is defective because of its generality.” Indeed, he recognized, this is why there has to be
judicial discretion, a concept comparable to prerogative. The law cannot address everything; “there are
some cases for which it is impossible to lay down a law.”369 Sometimes mercy is needed to achieve
justice. Equity is flexible, which laws are often unable to be. “Equity is a mode of legal interpretation, a
hermeneutic task to be executed faithfully in order to cultivate justice.” It is “a challenge.”370 The
recognition that injuries and wrongs deserve to be remedied as best they can whether or not positive law
– statutes – do so created a discretionary and practical authority in the judiciary, with associated
processes and procedures.371 Aristotle’s millennia-old advice is no less valid in seventeenth-century
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England (or in eighteenth-century America or in the twenty-first century) than it was when he said it.
Aristotle made several important points. First, a lawyer’s responsibility is to zealously represent the
interests of his client. Second, relying on statutory law is simpler, and if one’s client has a case to be
made pursuant to a statute it made sense to proceed accordingly. But if this was not the case, and
justice compelled a decision in a client’s favor – or at least that the zealous advocate could make such an
argument– then that was the correct legal strategy.
Cicero similarly foregrounded equity; for universal law recognized the principles of justice and
fairness that underlay and are the purposes of all law. To serve these purposes a judge might have to go
beyond the letter of a particular law.372 Because “no law can be so perfect,” Sidney recognized the
importance of judicial discretion to interpret the law fairly.373
It cannot be gainsaid that tiers of law infused Sidney’s concept of republican governance. These
layers of law – natural, contract, rule and process – are fundamental to what it means to be free; and the
advocacy of freedom is what Sidney’s republicanism was all about.

IAGO: If the beam of our lives had not one scale of reason
to peise another of sensuality, the blood and baseness of our natures
would conduct us to most preposterous conclusions.
Shakespeare, “Othello” 374

B. The Topos of Balance
The final major component of Sidney’s republicanism is balance and related concepts of moderation and toleration, ideas explored in a distinct and vast scholarly universe, both primary and secondary,
over centuries of time, to which this study will not begin to try to do justice. While the idea is not new, its

… The perception was widespread that English public life had ‘run out of square’ between 1640 and
1660. Scathing claims of wretched hypocrisy and crushing tyranny were ubiquitous, and one very
popular formula was to indict one’s opponent for transgressing against ‘all equity and right’ or, in a slightly
more technical sense, against ‘equity and law.’ Such grievances were aired across the political spectrum.”
Visconsi, Lines of Equity, p. 13.
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importance to early modern republican theory has been surprisingly unrecognized.375 Ethan H. Shagan’s
2011 study, The Rule of Moderation, is a brilliant analysis of what one might facilely term the “down side”
of moderation and other expressions of balance in early modern England, viz., the perverse and
paradoxical use of ostensibly moderate goals to justify all sorts of patently immoderate behavior.376
Shagan insightfully pierced the veil of the euphemistic use of the rhetoric of moderation. Reliance will be
placed on Shagan’s analysis; at the same time, maugre the fact that exceedingly immoderate acts were
justified by resort to the language of moderation, I am doubtful that Shagan was suggesting that this
rhetoric necessarily authorized repression or violence, or was used to legitimate authoritarian control. 377
While I agree with Shagan that the language of moderation and balance were pervasive in early modern
English society, not all expressions of moderation were equivalent, nor were all either sincere or
disingenuous. In short, notwithstanding concurrence with many of Shagan’s important findings, my
purpose is to “redeem” balance and the related concepts of moderation and toleration as legitimate
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One could become side tracked by the linguistic nuances of the term “balance,” and the related
concepts of moderation and toleration. For our purposes, however, we need not resolve how early
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considered it sensible to apply these concepts to matters of politics, and why. Shagan’s focus was on
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political goals in early modern England. This assessment is strictly limited, however, to an appreciation of
these ideas, with a particular pedigree and history, as constituent elements of the republican political
thought of Sidney and fellow travelers.378
But in England our ancestors who seem to have had some such thing in their eye,
as balancing the powers, by a fatal mistake placed usually so much in the hands
of the king that whensoever he happened to be bad, his extravagances could not
be repress’d without great danger. … ‘[t]is the cause of our present difficulties.
Sidney, Discourses 379
i. Balance in government
Once again, we turn to Cicero: balance and the related concept of moderation were important
elements of Cicero’s republicanism. The political goal was maintenance of the republic; but Cicero began
by focusing on the individual, not government.
An individual’s honor required “order and due measure”; the consequent equilibrium or balance is
reflected in one’s ideas and actions, which depend on “underlying moderation and self-control.”380 Sidney
could be a hot head; but self-control, rationality, and a moderate disposition were clearly Ciceronian goals
he embraced, as evidenced by his prayer that God defend him from his outward enemies, but even more,
from those “within.”381 This adage is particularly true for those who aspire to leadership, and Sidney surely
saw himself as at least a Protector of the Commonwealth, as the 2nd Earl of Northumberland had declared
centuries before. The maintenance of balance was a prerequisite for leadership: “a proportion of wisdom,
moderation of spirit, and justice is require’d in a supreme magistrate.”382 This is not easy to achieve. Men
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“are naturally propense to corruption”; those who lead must rise above their passions.383 In order to
accomplish a successful social enterprise, says Sidney, nations do not “seek the most ancient, but the
most worthy” individuals to lead them, that is, those “who could best perform their duty…. In matters of
the greatest importance, detur digniori is the voice of nature,” let it be given to the worthier. “Worthier
men” are those who “act according to the law of their own nature, which is reason.” While men are
passionate beings, the law of their nature is reason, which balances what can be the misguided impulses.
Leaders are able to control and balance their passions. They provide for “the public good” through the
use of reason, which also may prescribe that they exhibit a selflessness that is not natural. Thus, not only
do leaders require wisdom and a sense of justice; they need to exhibit “moderation of spirit.” In contrast,
when an individual simply pursues political power for his own benefit, whether psychological or material, it
“can have no effect of right.” Leaders must have “integrity of will,” which is “not to be diverted” from
performing the highest works “by any temptation.” It’s not easy. “[T]he work of a magistrate, especially if
he be the supreme, is the highest, noblest, and most difficult that can be committed to the charge of a
man.” A leader must be extraordinary, for “a more excellent virtue” is required to be worthy of the
responsibilities of leadership.384
In his declination to wholly reject man’s passionate nature, Sidney is actually much less strident in
his view of man than most of his contemporaries. His characterization of man reflects a kind of
moderation in itself, a perspective that can be contrasted with other early modernists, most notably
Hobbes, who viewed man as only susceptible to his own passions, which then wholly controlled his sense
of self-interest. As Shagan puts it, Hobbes was a writer “with little time for classical ethics,” who “was yet
more radical in eliding any distinction between passions, reason and the will.”385 Sidney is also more
moderate in his analysis of man than the more conventional position in early modern England, which was
that it was necessary – and, indeed, possible – to bridle man’s passions. Religion served this purpose,
illustrated ironically by a Calvinist preacher through the pagan myth of Pegasus and Minerva’s golden
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bridle (Thomas Playfere’s 1596 The Pathway to Perfection) or, more typically, in standard Christian
rhetoric, whereby “’Divine Grace’ stands behind enthroned ‘Reason’, guiding and advising her use of the
shackled passions” (the 1649 English translation of Jean-François Senault’s The Use of the Passions).386
Once the importance to the individual of conquering one’s own often misguided passions is
established, there is the collective value of individual moderation.387 Men are naturally free; this means
that, “where there is no society, one man is not bound by the actions of another.”388 But when men “come
together and live in a society, they voluntarily “lessen” the “natural liberty” they would otherwise have in
“the hopes of a publick advantage.” This is collective self-moderation. For both personal reasons – the
classical pursuit of honor, which is integral to virtue – and for the good of one’s country, the first level of
balance to which Sidney subscribes is an internal, individual one: self-control. “Stability” is another word
that Sidney used in this context: “All will confess, that if there be any stability in man, it must be in
wisdom and virtue, and in those actions that are thereby directed; for in weakness, folly and madness
there can be none. The stability therefore that we seek, in relation to the exercise of civil and military
powers, can never be found, unless care be taken that such as shall exercise those powers, be endowed
with the qualities that should make them stable.”389 Sidney applauded wisdom and virtue because, "if
there be any stability in man, it must be in wisdom and virtue."390 It is not enough for one’s heart to be in
the right place; one must have integrity of will to be a good man and a good leader.
While natural liberty was unlimited for Sidney, the natural right to unlimited freedom is
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inapplicable in civil society, an inherently “non-natural” place. “Such as enter into Society, must in some
degree diminish their Liberty.”391 For republicans like Sidney, liberty is self-determination. But because
liberty was exercised within civil society by a vast number of self-determining individuals, laws were
required to avoid the potentially dangerous exercise of unrestrained liberty by one or many at the
expense of the liberty of others. Sidney was very clear about this, too: “man cannot continue in the
perpetual and entire fruition of the liberty that God hath given him. The liberty of one is thwarted by that
of another; and whilst they are all equal, none will yield to any, otherwise than by a general consent. This
is the ground of all just governments.”392 This is also what the concept of license was all about – the reckless exercise of liberty. Halifax emphasized the distinction between liberty and license when he stated
that the Trimmer “professeth solemnly that were it in his power to choose he would rather have his ambition bounded by the commands of a great and wise master than let it range with a popular license.”393
Moderation in liberty was paralleled by moderation in externalities as well. “Some of the Baconian scientists who underlined the material improvement to be expected from scientific advance were
careful to insist that the aim was an Aristotelian moderation, ‘moderate riches’ broadly distributed, not
individual covetousness and excess, a theme taken up by many of their successors…. It had little appeal
to advocates of unalloyed virtue or unrestrained consumption.”394 Republicans like Sidney subscribed to
this application of moderation, as well. Greed was a corruption of the legitimate desire for economic
improvement. But in a sense this was a “happy problem.” Even absolutists like Bodin recognized that the
power of a state was related to wealth and trade, including private profit. In the 1640s, economic
depression in England “turned attention to the model and threat of the Dutch, and civil war prompted
republicans to examine the Roman republic and contemporary Venice, as well as Amsterdam, for lessons
in economic and political management.” Such management required balance – not “the balance” of land
advocated by Harrington, but the balance of trade so as to avoid tyranny –this seems to be what Sidney
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was suggesting when he stated, “the proper act of justice is to give to everyone his due.”395 Halifax
elaborated on this point: “[W]e cannot subsist under a despotic power, our very being would be destroyed
by it. For we are to consider, we are a very little spot in the map of the world, and make a great figure
only by trade, which is the creature of liberty; one destroyed, the other falleth to the ground.”396
Shagan contended that an adverse consequence of the early modern English application of
moderation was society’s exercise of restraint or “external moderation” over individuals’ exercise of their
liberty.397 But this conclusion necessarily rests on an idealized concept of liberty rejected by republicans
like Sidney. To suggest that protecting men’s liberty in civil society meant in some adverse way “bridling”
men misses the point that the consequence of society’s failure to restrain what the society collectively
deems individuals’ aberrant exercise of their liberties likely leads to liberty’s dimunition and the associated
loss, at least for some, of the right of self-determination. As we have established in detail, Sidney
repeatedly emphasized that the primary way society balances the different and often conflicting interests
of its members is through the law and the legal process. As Coke famously said in the context of the ship
money case, “Now as justice hath a sword, so it hath a balance.”398 The “moderate” exercise of liberty,
what Sidney terms “due liberty,” was not only the way in which liberty could be exercised in the real world;
it was a necessity in order for liberty to be sustained at all. 399
This is Sidney’s response to Filmer; but it is also a qualification to Shagan’s perspective: there is no
such thing in civil society as natural liberty, and the ways in which a society limits individual liberty is a
matter of choice, consent and balance for republicans. In parallel with the individual expression of
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Parl. Hist. vol. viii, p. 67, quoted in Cuthbert William Johnson, The Life of Sir Edward Coke, Lord Chief
Justice of England in the Reign of James I, with Memoirs of his Contemporaries, Vol. II (London: Henry
Colburn, 1837), p. 235.
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“It were a folly hereupon to say, that the liberty for which we contend, is of no use to us, since we
cannot endure the solitude, barbarity, weakness, want, misery and dangers that accompany it whilst we
live alone, nor can enter into a society without resigning it; for the choice of that society, and the liberty of
framing it according to our own wills, for our own good, is all we seek. This remains to us whilst we form
governments, that we ourselves are judges how far ‘tis good for us to recede from our natural liberty;
which is of so great importance, that from thence only we can know whether we are freemen or slaves;
and the difference between the best government and the worst, doth wholly depend upon a right or wrong
exercise of that power.” DCG, I.10.31. On the use of the term “due liberty,” see II.20.194.
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balance, there is the essential external, communal concept of balance. Here, legitimately, Shagan, finds
corruption, manipulation and hypocrisy, by which he thinks not only early modern England, but also its
historians have been seduced. “Even the many scholars who dispute this putative moderation are
nonetheless bound within its terms, so that the question of whether particular persons, positions and
institutions were really moderate recurs in a surprising number of debates,” including the Anglican
Church’s development, the Civil War’s origins, the legal system’s participatory nature, “and so forth.”
Shagan’s goal in “challenging the notion that moderation was normatively peaceful, and by suggesting
that the middle way could be a path of domination as much as a path of accommodation,” is not “merely”
to “take issue with some particular historiographical position; rather, his purpose is “to challenge the
framework of our debates,” – “not … so much to argue that particular historians have been wrong to
identify specific instances of moderation in early modern England, but rather to suggest that the whole
question of moderation and its discovery in our sources means quite different things than we assume,
denoting conflict and coercion as much as peace and consensus.”400
Shagan’s analysis immediately raises the question of whether Sidney’s use of balance, particularly with regard to the nature of England’s government, denotes “a path of domination” involving “conflict
and coercion” or “a path of accommodation” by means of “peace and consensus” or something else
entirely. Unless Sidney was utterly disingenuous, which the facts of his life and death belie, the
essentiality of consent as a component of republicanism precludes the possibility of domination, conflict
and coercion as the overt or covert purpose of Sidney’s reliance on balance and moderation. Consent
and coercion are mutually incompatible. For instance, unlike some of his fellow republican thinkers,
Sidney could not entirely reject monarchism as a viable form of government, even though he seemed to
believe that there was little chance that it would protect the interests of the people. The reason for this
position, which muddies the sleek Cambridge school definition of republicanism as anti-monarchic, is
Sidney’s genuine commitment to consent: people are entitled to choose monarchy. Those republicans
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Shagan began this analysis with the following statement: “This brings us to the role of moderation and
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who reject monarchy outright are qualifying their endorsement of consent: the people are entitled to
consent to their form of government as long as that to which they consent is not monarchy. At the same
time, the necessity to allow for consent is a messy process and, in that regard, frequently not harmonious
in the sense that “peace and consensus” suggests. As we have previously established, Sidney was like
Machiavelli in his lack of fear of political tumult and change; participatory government was, by its nature,
tumultuous; and “Changes therefore are unavoidable…. [H]e who would oblige all nations at all times to
take the same course, would prove as foolish as a physician who should apply the same medicine to all
distempers, or an architect that would build the same kind of house for all persons.”401 Disorderliness,
disputation, dissension and, above all, imperfection is a modest price to pay for freedom. The goal was to
achieve “that stability… in that which is good.”402 Thus, to answer Shagan’s concern, Sidney’s republican
politics relied on balance and moderation for some other purpose – not because it is “a path of
domination,” involving “conflict and coercion” or alternatively, “a path of accommodation” by means of
“peace and consensus.” For Sidney and fellow republicans, the importance of balance and related
concepts was that they, too, promoted freedom.
This takes us to Polybius, and the advocacy of mixed monarchy – what Sidney also termed “a
regular mixed government” – as a means of achieving political balance.403 One of the fundamental
reasons Sidney was unconditionally opposed to absolute monarchy was because, “of all things under the
sun, there is none more mutable or unstable than absolute monarchy.”404 In contrast, the balancing of the
different elements of society that takes place in a mixed monarchy is much more stable. Sidney actually
went beyond England’s mixed monarchy to discuss “All the kingdoms peopled from the north,” in which
mixed monarchy was the norm. “In all of them the powers were divided between the kings, the nobility,
clergy, and commons; and by the decrees of councils, diets, parliaments, cortes, and assemblies of
estates.” In these mixed monarchies, “authority and liberty were so balanced, that such princes as
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assumed to themselves more than the law did permit, were severely punished.”405 Those with the
responsibility to hold princes in check, and indeed to hold the people in check, too, were the noblemen:
“the strength of the government has always been placed in the nobility; and no better defence has been
found against the encroachments of ill kings.”406 Thus, when Sidney talked in terms of a balanced
government, he described the historic role of the nobility within England’s mixed monarchy – a subject, as
we know, that was dear to his heart. “They knew that the kings of several nations had been kept within
the limits of the law, by the virtue and power of a great and brave nobility; and that no other way of
supporting a mix-d monarchy had ever been known in the world, than by putting the balance into the
hands of those who had the greatest interest in nations.”407 By today’s standards, Sidney’s lionizing of
the nobility sounds elitist and decidedly unequal. Stepping as best we can into Sidney’s historical
perspective, however, and admittedly simplifying, with an uneducated peasant population and an
emerging middle class – the “middling sort” – who were wholly preoccupied with making a living so that
their family could prosper in England’s thriving world of commercial trade, noblemen continued to hold a
highly privileged and unique position in English society, as they had done for generations. Rather than
viewing this privileged condition as simply one of entitlement, Sidney viewed it as a responsibility. The
nobility, including the Sidney/Percy family, had received the luxury of a fine humanist education, the
cosmopolitan perspective gained from world travel, financial security, and vital discretionary time, all of
which placed them in the most likely position to be able to take care of the political rights of themselves as

405
DCG, II.30.291. Sidney also noted, “And in all the revolutions we have had in England, the people
have been headed by the parliament, or the nobility and gentry that composed it; and when the kings
failed of their duties, by their own authority called it. The multitude therefore is never headless, but doth
either find or create heads unto itself, as occasion doth require.” Id, II.32.314-15.
406
“As among the Turks, and most of the Eastern tyrannies, there is no nobility, and no man has any
considerable advantage above the common people, unless by the immediate favour of the prince; so in
all the legal kingdoms of the North, the strength of the government has always been placed in the nobility;
and no better defence has been found against the encroachments of ill kings, than by setting up an order
of men, who by holding large territories, and having great numbers of tenants and dependents, might be
able to restrain the exorbitances, that either the kings or the commons might run into.” Sidney also
discussed, at some length, the emergence of the English nobility during the time of the Saxons. Id,
III.28.484-93.
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Id, III.37.pg [1st ¶] Note that this concept of political balance is entirely different from Harrington’s
version of “the balance,” which refers to his unique, utopian concept of rearranging land ownership in
order to achieve economic and social uniformity. How such an arrangement can be maintained without
significantly stifling the liberty that Harrington ostensibly sought to protect is highly problematic.
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well as others less privileged than themselves. By the seventeenth century things had changed. This
was a source of nostalgia for Sidney, but also provoked a call to arms. The balance that the nobility
historically represented in England’s mixed monarchy was the “cement” that had “maintain[ed] the
union.”408 It was the nobility on which the system of mixed monarchy had relied to maintain political
balance and protect the common good by staving off the tendency of a monarchy to become corrupt; in
so doing, the nobility protected the society from tyranny (since “all tyrannies have had their beginnings
from corruption.”)409
Times change. Since “common sense teaches, and all good men acknowledge, that
governments are not set up for the advantage, profit, pleasure or glory of one or a few men, but for the
good of the society,” men must consider whether England’s historic reliance on the nobility to protect their
best interests continued to be effective. Sidney recognized that England’s successful governmental
system of balance, which relied on a privileged class of ancient nobility, “has not proved to be perpetual,
which is no more than may be justly said of the best human constitutions that ever have been in the
world.”410 Once the monarchy began entitling and privileging all sorts of people who were beholden to the
king, “the foundations of that government which they had established, were removed, and the
superstructure overthrown. The balance by which it subsisted was broken.”411 The ancient nobility was
overrun. The “new” nobility no longer felt the sense of responsibility towards the state and the people that
had been carefully taught to the nobility in the past – an idealized notion, but factual, too. “’Tis indifferent
to me, whether they are called earls, dukes, aldermen, herotoghs or thanes; for ‘tis certain that the titular
nobility now in mode amongst us has no resemblance to this ancient nobility of England.”412 Accordingly,
it was incumbent to pursue “new constitutions to repair the breaches made upon the old”; for “if we do
not, the fault is owing to ourselves,” not to the failure of a mixed monarchy that for centuries had
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protected the nation’s “ancient liberty, dignity and happiness.”413
Regrettably from Sidney’s perspective, the English nobility would no longer, at least necessarily,
serve the unique balancing role it had assumed in England’s system of government; another means had
to be found to achieve that end. “{T]his rather shows that the balance of power is broken, or hard to be
kept up, than that there ought to be none.”414 But do not throw the baby out with the bath water, said
Sidney! Just because the country was no longer able to offset the power of the king with the power of its
nobility, largely because of the flood of men newly ennobled by the king and therefore indebted to him,
that does not mean that one should no longer strive for balance and instead endorse “unmixed”
monarchy. To the contrary, in the face of pervasive corruption, Sidney reasserted his commitment to
mixed monarchy. As he wrote to his father shortly after the Restoration, “If things are carried in a legall
and moderate way, I had rather be in employment, than without any. If I am trusted, I shall performe my
duty with as much fidelity and care, as any that I have ever undertaken in my life.” 415 As he reaffirmed
towards the end of Discourses: “’tis certain that the most part of the governments of the world (and I think
all that are or have been good) were mixed.”416
This brings us to the un-ennobled, the common man. Sidney comfortably recognized that in the
mixed governments in which the nobility played a leading part, commoners also had an important role.
He repeatedly referred to the tribunes of Rome, and the check that they placed on the Senate.417 Today
every citizen should have the opportunity to politically participate. Indeed, in view of the demise of the
ancient nobility, the protectors of the realm, the common people were now “as free as the nobles.” Thus,
for Sidney, by his time, “the strength and virtue of the nation is in them, it must be confessed,” and in that
sense, in contrast to the “court-creatures” given the name of noblemen by the Stuarts, it was commoners
who had become “the true noblemen of England.”418 Here we see an increasing democratization, as
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Sidney, much more than his father or his greatly admired uncle, the aristocratic leader and 9th Earl of
Northumberland, began to shed the belief that the English nobility could save the monarchy.
Indeed, Sidney issued a warning – the most radical statement in Discourses. Those who could
achieve the goal of a balanced political system through participation, he said, will be estranged and
potentially dangerous if this is no longer an avenue open to them: “Whilst the ancient constitutions of our
Northern kingdoms remain’d entire, such as contested with their princes sought only to reform the
governments, and by redressing what was amiss, to reduce them to their first principles; but they may not
perhaps be so modest, when they see the very nature of their government chang’d, and the foundations
overthrown.” Once again, we return to the concept of moderation as a necessary element of English
government. In an eerily autobiographical statement about the consequences to a government that fails
to address such imbalances, Sidney said: “I am not sure that they who were well pleased with a moderate monarchy, will submit to one that is absolute; and ‘tis not improbable, that when men see there is no
medium between tyranny and popularity, they who would have been contended with the reformation of
their government, may proceed farther, and have recourse to force, when there is no help in the law.”419
Other republicans shared Sidney’s views about balance and moderation, recognizing its value in
assessing the success of governance, with Sidney’s nephew Halifax as the exemplar. Indeed, Halifax
defined himself as the moderate man, quintessentially all about balance, labelling himself “the Trimmer”
in his essay, “The Character of a Trimmer:” “This innocent word Trimmer signifieth no more than this, that
if men are together in a boat, and one part of the company would weigh it down on one side, another
would make it lean as much to the contrary; it happeneth there is a third option of those, who conceive it
would do as well, if the boat went even, without endangering passengers.”420 Balance and moderation

harmonizing value in social diversity within society: "Hereby that variety of nature in the individuals is
rendered useful to the beauty of the whole.... He that would have a state composed of one sort of persons
only, will appear little wiser than he that would have a body composed of one element, or music of one
note." Court Maxims, Third Dialogue, p. 23; see Charnoff, “A Second Look at the Question of Who
Authored Court Maxims.”
419
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within the power of the law, and the law to be a guide to kings, equally provide for the good of king and
people. Whereas they who admit of no participants in power, and acknowledge no rule but their own will,
set up an interest in themselves against that of their people, lose their affections, which is their most
important treasure, and incur their hatred, from whence results their greatest danger.” Id, III.30.303.
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were the touchstones of Halifax’s philosophy, and he persuasively advocated their value. “Why do angry
men ail to rail so against moderation?,” he asked. “[I]nspired by this divine virtue,” said Halifax, “Our
Trimmer … thinketh fit to conclude with these assertions: That our climate is a Trimmer, between that part
of the world where men are roasted, and the other where they are frozen; That our Church is a Trimmer
between the frenzy of platonic visions and the lethargic ignorance of popish dreams; That our laws are
Trimmers, between the excess of unbounded power and the extravagance of liberty not enough
restrained; That true virtue hath ever been thought a Trimmer, and to have its dwelling in the middle
between the two extremes; that even God Almighty himself is divided between his two great attributes, his
mercy and his justice.”421
For Halifax the problem with an immoderate form of government that did not mollify if not meet the
needs and demands of its people was that, however constituted, it did not deal with men’s passions, and
“our corrupted nature” – “a formidable adversary.”422 As he stated in “Political Thoughts and Reflections,”
“The angry buzz of a multitude is one of the bloodiest noises in the world.”423 This cautionary note was
repeated in “The Character of a Trimmer”: “Our Trimmer therefore dreads a general discontent, because
he thinketh it differeth from a rebellion only as a spotted fever doth from the plague, the same species under

use he failed; there is no subsequent evidence of a group of ‘Trimmers’ in Halifax’s sense of the word,
and no contemporary described him as a Trimmer. The phrase ‘Halifax the Trimmer’ is a creation of posterity.” Editorial Introduction, “The Character of a Trimmer,” Halifax Complete Works, p. 48; id, pp. 86-87.
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“Id, pp. 102. Sidney shared the common concern, expressed here by Halifax but a view held by
contemporaries across the political spectrum, that there was a problem with too much liberty, generally
termed license. See Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, Ch. II, §6, pp. 270-71 (“But though this be
a State of Liberty, yet it is not a State of License, though Man in that State have an uncontroleable
Liberty.”). At the same time, Sidney was an optimist on the subject. Any government could go awry; but
still, liberty was a good thing, recognizing it’s achievement admittedly often required compromise. For
example, “all that was ever desirable, or worthy of praise and imitation in Rome, did proceed from its
liberty.” Indeed, “all wise and good men have in all ages esteemed [liberty] to be the most valuable and
glorious privilege of mankind.” Nevertheless, compromise was required to achieve liberty in society. For
the “liberty of one is thwarted by that of another,” and “we ourselves,” that is, “mankind,” are “judges how
far ‘tis good for us to recede from our natural liberty” in the choice of government that we make. DCG,
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a lower degree of malignity.”424 Halifax here echoed the views of Sidney, which harkened back to
Machiavelli, that men mistakenly were afraid of tumult – dissent – when that was a sign of a healthy
Commonwealth. For “there will ever be some matter of strife and contention.” But the English “Government
is like our climate. There are winds which are sometimes loud and unquiet, and yet with all the trouble they
give us, we owe great part of our health unto them; they clear the air, which else would be like a standing
pool, and instead of refreshment would be a disease unto us.” Milton and Nedham also referred to the
balanced, moderate nature of the English Commonwealth’s civil government.425 In short, said Halifax, while
there “may be fresh gales of asserting liberty,” they need not turn into “such storms or hurricanes, as that
the state should run any hazard of being cast away by them.” He believed that these “strugglings” were
particularly “natural to all mixed governments,” something with which Sidney no doubt would have agreed,
and rather than being hazardous, what Machiavelli called “tumults” actually “support and strengthen rather
than weaken or maim the constitution.”426
The Trimmer made an even broader statement than Sidney about the balance of international
political power on the Continent. He identified England’s pivotal role in Europe, at least formerly, in
balancing the power of France against her neighbors, and called for England to regain its senses and not
simply back the ambition of France, e.g., in that country’s intent “to commit a rape upon her,” referring to
Louis XIV’s “designs” on Flanders, but identifying many other indicia of France’s predatory and untrust-
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worthy political behavior.427 Bethel, a Sidney acquaintance with republican sympathies, forcefully stated
this view when he argued in 1668 that Cromwell “broke the balance betwixt the two Crowns of Spain, and
France,” and, as well, had destructively tampered with the balance of power in the Baltic, “where it had in
all Ages been the policies of the Northern States and Potentates, to keep the Dominion of the Baltick Sea,
divided among several pettie Princes and States, than no one might be sole Maker of it.”428
In striking contrast to the traditional Polybian concept of balance utilized by Sidney and fellow
republicans, there is the idiosyncratic emphasis on “the balance” in Harrington’s Oceana.429 "The
balance" is a specific, unique, and disparate concept that is all about property and the belief that it is the
responsibility of government to control wealth by maintaining an "equal Agrarian," which Harrington
considered vital to the creation of his utopian republic. As part of the "fundamental laws of Oceana,"
Harrington mandated that land must be inherited equally by male heirs and, moreover, than no man be
allowed to inherit land that generates more than two thousand pounds in revenue.430 Harrington’s protégé
Neville also argued for an equal agrarian: “Force or fraud may alter a government; but it is property that
must found and eternize it.”431 In Scott’s view, “behind the fashionable form of classical republican
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had learnt only to weigh the pensions, and take the heaviest.” The Character of a Trimmer,” Halifax
Complete Works, pp. 86-88 (It is a little unclear who was King when Halifax completed “The Character of
a Trimmer.” Almost certainly Charles, who died in Feb. 1685, at which point James, Duke of York
became James II; for Halifax’s essay was circulated in manuscript in Dec. 1684/Jan. 1685 “or
thereabouts.” It was printed in 1688 under the name of Halifax’s uncle, an attribution “repeated as late as
1697.” Editorial Introduction, id, p. 48.)
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Slingsby Bethel, The World’s Mistake In Oliver Cromwell, pp. 4-5.
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Incidentally, Oceana was in the Sidney Library. The Library of the Sidneys of Penshurst Place circa
1665, p. 120.
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See, e.g., Harrington, Oceana, p. 12, 33; Fink, The Classical Republicans, pp. 63-64; Robbins, The
Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman, pp. 30-32; Kathleen Toth, "Interpretation in Political Theory: The
Case of Harrington," The Review of Politics, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jul., 1975), pp. 317-39.
431
Neville, Plato Redivivus, p. 87. On the Gracchi and the Agrarian Law, see pp. 91-101. Eric Nelson
has argued that the essence of republicanism is ancient Greek political thought and, particularly, the
egalitarianism of the Gracci. Nelson, The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought, particularly Ch. 3, “The
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language what we find in Oceana is a work of Hobbesian moral philosophy.” Whether or not Oceana is
Hobbesian, it is clearly distinguishable from other early modern republican tracts. 432 It is not only utopian
but, as Scott pointed out, it used conventional republican terms in a decidedly unconventional way,
including balance but also the concepts of virtue, liberty and interest.433 I concur with Scott that Oceana
is “a deliberate subversion of classical republicanism.”434

Roman agrarian laws and Machiavelli’s modi privati,” and Ch. 4, “James Harrington and the ‘balance of
justice,’” pp. 49-126. I agree with Nelson that Greek and Roman political theory were substantially
different, and with his criticism of Pocock in that regard. See Introduction. Nevertheless, most early
modern English republicans (and other republicans, too, e.g., Cicero) explicitly or implicitly reject the
egalitarianism of the Gracchi. The exception is the republicanism of Harrington and Neville, which is
highly idiosyncratic.
432

Jonathan Scott, “The rapture of motion: James Harrington’s republicanism,” Political Discourse in Early
Modern Britain (Cambridge University Press, 2011), Ch. 7, pp. 139-63, 162. Because Locke defined
liberty in terms of property, his views about property become entangled in this mix. In general, for Locke,
property meant not only realty, but the ownership of things, and the ownership of one’s self. Man “hath by
nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries
and attempts of other men,” but the right to create a community. . Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two
Treatises, Bk2, ch11, §131. In the present discussion of moderation and toleration, Locke’s views also
become very entangled. See Ch. Two.
433

Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 325. Henry Vane used the language of moderation in several different
ways in his political writing. In one use, balance is both political and spiritual. Vane was well aware of
Harrington’s conviction that good governance required an economic foundation and a superstructure that
would guarantee the protection of public over private interest. For Vane, who agreed with the goal but not
Harrington’s approach, a successful government required the continuing and abundant grace of God.
Judson, The Political Thought of Sir Henry Vane the Younger, p. 49. “[W]hat is that which is wanting to
balance and complete the motion of man’s will, in the exercise of his own freedom, that it is so little to be
trusted and relied on, in the pursuit of that which is the common interest of mankind and the public good
of human societies? And if in this we search to the bottom, we have it declared in that Scripture, which
says, it is not in man to order his own steps. Man, at his best, stands in need of the balancing and ruling
motion of God’s spirit to keep him steadfast.” Henry Vane, A Needful Corrective, p. 6. Vane also used
balance in another context. When discussing the necessity of a strong military as a part of effective government, Vane described “the right balance necessary to be held up between sovereignty and subjection
in the exercise of all righteous government,” which “makes all sound and safe at the root.” It is essential,
however, he said, that the military, which can greatly influence “the right balance,” be in the right hands.
Those hands are not those of anyone independent of the people; rather, to ensure stability in government, “the sword” must be subordinate to the people through their supreme judicature. The military had
to be subordinate to the people. This will “maintain the whole Body [of the people] in a most delightfull
harmony, welfare, and correspondency. The sword never can, nor is it to be expected ever will do this.”
Henry Vane, A Healing Question, p. 15; see Judson, The Political Thought of Sir Henry Vane the
Younger, pp. 32-34.
434

Scott, “The rapture of motion: James Harrington’s republicanism,” p. 146. Note, too, the observations
by Eric Nelson, referenced in Ch. Three, that Milton vilified Harrington’s support of an equal agrarian,
Nedham soundly rejected the agrarian laws, which he equated with the Levellers and, meanwhile, Sidney
did not bat an eyelash at Harrington’s equal agrarian. See Ch. Three.
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Extremity is always ill, that which is good cannot live a moment with it.
Halifax, “Miscellaneous Thoughts and Reflections,”435
ii. Religious balance – viz., toleration
One of the most interesting aspects of Sidney’s Discourses is the prevalent but largely implicit
application of the concept of balance to address the most catastrophic evidence of its absence in early
modern Europe, i.e., applying balance to the state’s approach to religion. Preliminarily it should be noted
that religious intolerance can be characterized as the rejection of religions other than one’s own. Not only
does this more accurately convey the extremity or the lack of moderation of the sentiment, but it also
recognizes that this, our modern application of the concept of “toleration,” is a revisionist use; the term
has a distinguished linguistic history, rooted in Latin, but which in general had the pejorative connotation
of “a lax complacency towards evil,” e.g., as it was used in Latin by Augustine and Ambrose. As
explained by Mario Ricciardi, philosophy of law professor at the University of Milan, “Far from being
unquestionably a virtue, toleration for these early Christians was highly suspect, and even more so when
a tolerant attitude towards different creeds and religious practices was advocated by pagans.”436 It was in
the context of the early modern religious wars in Europe and their enormous human toll that toleration
was embraced as a way out of irreconcilable differences locked in violence.
In an article entitled, “Religion in Early Modern Times,” distinguished historian Herbert Butterfield
explored the phenomenon of society ceasing to require absolute unanimity in religious faith and
practice.437 Even where toleration became pragmatic as a viable way to cope with religious diversity, what
other scholars term “charitable hatred,” it was generally accompanied by the assumption that generous
treatment of “heretics” would result in these individuals voluntarily returning “to the fold.” Unity was also
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“Miscellaneous Thoughts and Reflections,” Halifax: Complete Works, p. 236.
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Mario Ricciardi, “Toleration and the Need for Historical Understanding in Philosophy,” June 26, 2014
essay in Reset DOC (Dialogues on Civilizations), www.resetdoc.org/story/00000022419 (8-6-14). In
Dictionary of the History of Ideas, French philosopher and historian Elizabeth Labrousse similarly
explained the early modern understanding of “toleration.” “Lexicology tells us that up to the beginning of
the eighteenth century, the word "tolérance” had, in French, a pejorative meaning a lax complacency
towards evil. In 1691, in his admonition to Protestants (VIe avertissement aux protestants, 111, ix),
Bossuet still proudly described Catholicism as the least tolerant of all religions and, as if to compete with
this proud boast, the Walloon Synod of Leyden (an overwhelming majority of whose members were
Huguenot refugees) firmly condemned religious toleration as a heresy.
437

Herbert Butterfield, “Toleration in Early Modern Times,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 38, No. 4
(Oct.-Dec. 1977), pp. 573-84.
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contemplated with the policy termed “comprehension,” which envisioned a compromise Church. Small
religious minorities might be seen an inevitable; toleration of an organized alternative church was not.
Gradually, however, freedom of conscience became recognized as an essential component of religion,
that “inner light that should guide one’s choice of a course of action; in other words it was the director of a
man’s religious and moral life,” synonymous with the liberty to follow one’s own religious convictions.438
Exception was made for Catholics, to whom toleration was denied. This was true in both England and the
Netherlands, which instituted severe legislation against Catholicism. The religious settlement in post-civil
war Germany in 1555 established the principle of Cuius region eius religio for Catholics and Lutherans,
with religion controlled by the local prince. Religious variations generally were not permitted; however,
dissidents were able to move to a principality in which their religion was practiced. Gradually, in Austria
and then in Poland, Protestants were tolerated, although insistence on uniformity returned in the
seventeenth century.439
In England religious division and struggle continued, particularly characterized by “the lurid,
psycho-sexual demonization of that national villain, the Society of Jesus,” reflected in the writings of
Andrew Marvell and others and projected onto the political scene with the 1678 Popish Plot allegations.440
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Id, pp. 578-79. Other scholars describe the early history of toleration similarly, e.g., ”In the course of
the religious-political conflicts throughout Europe that followed the Reformation, toleration became one of
the central concepts of political-philosophical discourse, yet its history reaches much further back into
antiquity.” Philosopher and political Rainer Forst continued, “In stoic writings, especially in Cicero,
tolerantia is used as a term for a virtue of endurance, of suffering bad luck, pain and injustice of various
kinds in a proper, steadfast manner. But already in early Christian discourse, the term is applied to the
challenge of coping with religious difference and conflict. The works of Tertullian and Cyprianus are most
important in that respect.” Arguments for toleration developed that were “based on charity and love for
those who err, for example, or on the idea of the two kingdoms and of limited human authority in matters
of religious truth, i.e., in matters of the divine kingdom. The most important and far-reaching justification of
toleration, however, is the principle credere non potest nisi volens, which holds that only faith based on
inner conviction is pleasing to God, and that such faith has to develop from within, without external
compulsion.” Rainer Forst, “Toleration,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 edition), pp. 8-9
(citations omitted), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/toleration/ (9-21-17).
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Herbert Butterfield, “Toleration in Early Modern Times,” pp. 579-82.
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Gabriel Glickman, Review, The Historical Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Mar., 2008), pp. 251-67, 261.
“Catholicism, or ‘popery’ as it was disparagingly called, played a constitutive role in the development of
ideas about personal and collective autonomy that featured significantly in both liberal and republican
theories of liberty. It was by no means the only, or even necessarily the primary, influence in the
development of English notions of liberty, but it was a pervasive influence that broadened and deepened
the understanding of liberty. …In the heat of battle for the literal survival of Protestantism and a free way
of life, the theoretical tension between individualistic conceptions of freedom that centered around the
protection of personal rights and collective ideas of freedom that revolved around civil ideals of selfgovernment did not seem to matter to English thinkers as much as confronting the popish menace did.
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Marvell’s widely disseminated 1678 Account of the Growth of Popery, add Arbitrary Government in
England has been described as “the literary apogee of anti-popery.”441 Along with Marvell’s influence was
the political anti-popery pamphlet campaign led by Shaftesbury. To be hostile to Catholicism was, in many
cases, to view oneself as a patriot. Intolerance to Catholics was the norm. As Butterfield explained, the
development of religious toleration certainly was not linear, and it was the result of many factors, including
the inability to continue to wage endless war, economic interests that promoted immigration, increased
governmental power, and many other influences.442
In analyzing Sidney’s religious tolerance, we should be cognizant of Skinner’s cautionary
instruction that to understand a text properly one must be mindful of what an author actually says, and not
attribute to him ideas that he could have but did not express. In other words, Leo Strauss’s method of
reading between the lines is highly susceptible to error.443 At the same time, it would be a mistake to fail

Since Catholicism threatened both types of freedom, liberals and republicans defended both.” Clement
Fatovic, “The Anti-Catholic Roots of Liberal and Republican Conceptions of Freedom in English Political
Thought,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Jan. 2005), pp. 37-58, 38.
441

Id, p. 45.
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Butterfield, “Toleration in Early Modern Times,” p. 584. As Gabriel Glickman explained in an article
reviewing recent scholarship on religious persecution in early modern England, “Between the accession
of Henry VIII and the death of Elizabeth I, just fewer than 600 English subjects were put to death as the
penalty for suspicions aroused by their religious beliefs. The fact that this toll of bodies ranged from
Roman Catholics, to supporters of a Protestant royal supremacy, to radical evangelicals and suspected
Anabaptists discloses a confessional environment marked by flux and insecurity, where the boundaries
between heresy and sound doctrine were being persistently and bewilderingly redrawn.” While “a
monopoly in affairs of faith” was sought by the state, “conformity of thought was almost impossible to
achieve in a context where regimes were far from sure of their grip on power, when entrenched
ecclesiastical authority could be blown apart by dynastic change and factional conflict, and theological
certainties scattered to the winds. From the Edwardian reformers to the Marian revivalists, the guardians
of orthodoxy in one decade could become the hunted dissidents, prisoners, or victims on the scaffold in
the next. Moreover, ”The passing of the Tudors offered no respite. The return of a tidal wave of religious
conflict on the continent saw the polity rendered dysfunctional by rumours of plots, claims of creeping
tyranny, and fears of imminent massacres. Rival conspiracy theories shot through with the rhetoric of
religious confrontation erupted into civil war and revolution, and resulted in the wresting of the throne –
twice – from the hereditary line of the house of Stuart.” While England “saw no outright religious
bloodbath, no equivalent to the massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day, or the duke of Alva’s Council of
Blood in the Netherlands, or the displacement of thousands of refugees from France, Piedmont, and the
Palatine,” recent scholarship casts “new light on the choices that converged upon the church-going
English layman, forced to navigate a way through an unstable world of fragile consciences, clouded
political horizons, and disputed truth.” Glickman, Review, pp. 251-52.
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See Skinner’s critique of Leo Strauss’s Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, ILL, 1952), in
Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory, Vol. 8, No. 1
(1969), pp. 3-53, 21-22. Wootton pointed out that Locke effectively said the same thing! “Locke himself
warns us of the danger of explaining authors’ meanings ‘by what they never thought of whilst they were
writing, which is not,’ he said, ‘the way to find their sense in what they delivered, but our own, and to take
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to consider what an author, in this case Sidney, quite glaringly does not say, along with what he does; we
do so here in the context of the concept of balance.
A constituent element of Sidney’s republicanism was the utilization of religious tolerance as a
form of social balance that he incorporated in his republican political platform as a further means of
ensuring its success.444 It is really quite remarkable that, in contrast to most seventeenth-century political
texts, Discourses neither pursued nor staked out a position on religious issues.445 Religious doctrines,
practices, disputes, and related matters of faith simply are not discussed. Sidney only obliquely even
referred to religious ideas and practices, such as when he commented that Filmer was preoccupied with
disproving two well-known Catholic thinkers, Bellarmine and Suarez. He quipped, “I shall leave their
followers to defend their quarrel: My work is to seek after truth.”446 The suggestion here, of course, is that

up from their writings not what they left there for us, but what we bring along with us in our selves.’” David
Wootton, “Introduction,” to John Locke Political Writings, David Wootton, ed. and intro. (Indianapolis, IN
and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 2003), p. 12, citing John Locke, A Paraphrase and Notes on
the Epistles of St Paul, ed. Andrew W. Wainright (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 114.
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By far the most well known seventeenth-century early modern English tract on toleration is John
Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration. However, it is beyond the scope of this study because it was not
published, and thereby made public, until 1689, six years after Sidney’s execution. In general, Locke
advocated toleration for dissident Protestants but not for Catholics. See n. 501.
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As previously discussed, Sidney’s lack of pervasive religious subjects, passion and language
completely distinguishes Discourses from much of Court Maxims.
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DCG, II.1.77. Elsewhere Sidney stated, “I will not take upon me to define who they are” who are “an
enemy to virtue and religion.” DCG, 11. 27.266. The full Halifax passage about “the goddess truth”
resounds with anguish at the polarization of English leadership and the inability to compromise, whatever
the truth may be. This can only lead to dangerous popular discontent. And what is the point, he says.
“What do angry men all to rail so against moderation?” Indeed, these closing remarks to “The Character
of a Trimmer” read as a warning to those who think that they can succeed politically by either
confrontation or evasion, whatever the truth may be. “Our Trimmer adoreth the goddess truth, though in
all ages she hath been scurvily used, as well as those that worshipped her. It is of late become such a
ruining virtue, that mankind seemeth to be agreed to commend and avoid it; yet the want of practice
which repealeth all other laws hath no influence upon the law of truth, because it hath a root in Heaven,
and an intrinsic value in itself, that can never be impaired.” For Halifax, and Sidney too, truth was
unassailable. The rub, however, was its role in politics and political stability. “She showeth her greatness
in this, that her enemies, even when they are successful, are ashamed to own it; nothing but powerful
truth hath the prerogative of triumphing, not only after victory, but in spite of it, and to put conquest itself
out of countenance.” Efforts to suffocate the truth simply did not work. “She may be kept under and
suppressed, but her dignity still remaineth with her, even when she is in chains; falsehood, with all her
impudence, hath not enough to speak ill of her before her face. Such majesty she carrieth about her that
her most prosperous enemies are fain to whisper their treason; all the power upon earth can never
extinguish her; she hath lived in all ages; and let the mistakes of prevailing authority, christen any
opposition to it and what name they please [she] makes it not only an ugly and unmannerly, but a
dangerous thing to persist.” Of course, sometimes truth sat on the sidelines. “She hath lived very
retiredly indeed, nay sometimes so buried, that only some few of the discerning part of mankind could
have a glimpse of her.” Nevertheless, “with all that she hath eternity in her, she knoweth not how to die;
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one need not defend any particular religious position in order to arrive at the truth – a remarkably modern
or even post-modern idea that one would not expect to see in a seventeenth-century thinker. Elsewhere
Sidney quoted Seneca’s tragedy Thyestes: “Sanctitas, pietas, fides/Privata bona sunt: qua juvat reges
eant.” If this quotation is best understood literally it is akin to that made a century earlier by Elizabeth I,
who did not want to “make windows into men’s souls.” 447 For Sidney, sanctity, piety and faith were
private; they were not the subject of kings – i.e., civil government. “Gospel…is the light of the spiritual
man.”448 The influence of Melanchthon and the Christian humanist tradition of tolerance is palpable.
Perhaps Sidney only hinted at this view because the separation of secular and religious matters
advocated in his time by Anabaptists was attacked on many sides as heretical.449 Perhaps Sidney only
hinted at this view because to do otherwise would have been inconsistent with it. In any case, the “almost
silence” on the matter is very loud indeed.450
At the same time, Sidney was not opposed to religion. To the contrary, he repeatedly sang its
praise, e.g., “virtue is the dictate of reason, or the remains of divine light, by which men are made

and from the darkest clouds that can shade and cover her, she breaketh from time to time with triumph for
her friends, and terror to her enemies.” In sum, said Halifax, “true virtue hath ever been thought a
Trimmer, and to have its dwelling in the middle between the two extremes.” “The Character of a
Trimmer,” Halifax Complete Works, pp. 101-02.
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Although this has been translated by the classicist Frank Justus Miller to mean “Honour, virtue, faith
are the goods of common men; let kings go where they please,” a more literal translation seems to be, as
West suggested, “Sanctity, piety, faith are private goods; let kings go where they please.” DCG,
II.19.188; cf. translation by Frank Justus Miller, http://www.theoi.com/Text/SenecaThyestes.html, 7-12-14.
448

DCG, 11.27.266.
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On the Anabaptists in seventeenth-century England, see Peter Pauls, “’A Pestiferous Sect’”: The
Anabaptists in England from 1530-1660,” Journal of Mennonite Studies, Vol. 3 (1985), pp. 60-72; C. Eden
Quainton, “Cromwell and the Anabaptists during 1653,” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Jun.,
1932), pp.164-78.
450

Once again, Halifax was not so silent in his “argument for gentleness.” In the interest of toleration he
wrote, “Our Trimmer therefore endeavoureth to separate the detestation of those who had either a hand
or a thought in the late plot [Rye House] from the principle of prudential as well as Christian charity
towards mankind, and for that reason would fain use the means of reclaiming such of the Dissenters as
are not incurable, and even of bearing to a degree those that are, as far as may consist with the public
interest and security.” Moderation and reconciliation was his plea: Our Trimmer ‘would have no
supercilious look to fright those strayed sheep from coming into the fold again, no ill-natured maxims of
eternal suspicion, or a belief that those who have once been in the wrong can never be in the right again.”
The answer seemed obvious to Halifax. “All this is prevented, and falleth to the ground, by using welltimed indulgence, and the stubborn adversary who valueth himself upon his resistance whilst he is
oppressed yieldeth insensibly to kinder methods, when they are applied to him, and the same man
naturally melteth into conformity, who perhaps would never have been beaten into it.” “The Character of a
Trimmer,” Halifax Complete Works, pp. 69-71.
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beneficent and beneficial to each other. Religion proceeds from the same spring, and tends to the same
end; and the good of mankind so entirely depends upon these two, that no people ever enjoyed anything
worth desiring that was not the product of them.”451 Sidney and Halifax had a shared sense of the
personal nature of religion. Moreover, Sidney exulted in the existence of God who, as he frequently
noted, gave “to all” the “same law of truth and justice.”452 Indeed, it was in reliance on God that Sidney
concluded that, “a civil society is composed of equals.”453
Nevertheless, Sidney could not and did not ignore the political impact of religion. As Van
Gelderen explained in the context of early modern Dutch political thought, ideology was “praxis- oriented.”
It advocates specific solutions and aims “to persuade an audience to adopt these solutions.”454 Sidney
was an activist; he was interested in the application of political ideas to facts on the ground. His historical
context, early modern Europe, was a civilization steeped in endless rounds of senseless religious war and
consequent extraordinary loss of life. This enormous cost was paid with no apparent benefit; people
remained religiously polarized. Applying the concept of balance to pervasive extant religious intolerance,
it was clear that toleration was at least part of the solution to the monstrous problem of religious division
and persecution. Not only did toleration address the problem of virulent religious hatred; it was another
necessary consequence of Sidney’s commitment to consent. If “all that is or can be inherited by everyone is that exemption from the dominion of another,” how can we impose particular religious practices on
people who do not want them, much less intrude on their most private thoughts and beliefs?455
Sidney’s refusal to entangle politics in religion, and his tolerance of whatever religious ideas
individuals sought to live by, was not a new idea for a member of the Sidney/Percy family. The 9th Earl of
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DCG, II.27.267.
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Id, III.17.417.

453

Id, II.2.88. Houston makes the argument, pace Pocock, that republican liberty was not essentially civic
in nature because religious faith is entirely personal, and by placing toleration at the center of his theory
of republicanism, Sidney’s liberty is highly personal. Houston, Algernon Sidney, p. 125, referencing J. G.
A. Pocock, “Virtues, Rights, and Manners,” Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge University Press,
1985), pp. 40-41. Once again, I would suggest that Sidney emphasized the individual and the personal,
the collective and the communal aspects of liberty; both were vital. For Sidney, liberty was personal and
civil.
454
Martin Van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt 1555-1590 (Cambridge University
Press, 1992), p. 8.
455

DCG, I.17.57.
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Northumberland, Sidney’s grandfather and a member of the Elizabethan Court, was a champion of
religious toleration in his day, protecting Catholics who lived in northern England.456 The “grim lesson” of
the 1572 St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre, in which Sir Philip barely escaped with his life, drove home
the recognition of “how sacred ideas so easily become the helpmate of barbarous acts.”457 Sidney’s family
had been members of the Essex Circle, that Melanchthonian, neo-Tacitian group of scholars and
intellectuals. Sidney reminded us that it was not only Nero who slaughtered excellent men; Christian
princes did so too.458 Melanchthon’s Christian humanism advocated both religious toleration and a
moderate, active international Protestantism as the means of safeguarding the community, as Cicero also
would have put it. It was this philosophy of life that was exuberantly embraced by the Sidney/Percy family
over many generations, evident in the Essex Circle and in various close relationships with
Melanchthonians, including Languet and Mornay.459 Sidney was steeped in this culture from birth. He
studied these ideas in the many books on the subject in the Sidney Library.460 Sidney also was educated
at Saumur Academy, founded by the monarchomach and Melanchthonian Duplessis-Mornay. He lived for
a substantial portion of his adulthood in southwestern France, welcomed by the Huguenot aristocratic
community there that was similarly imbued with these ideas. He also comfortably lived among Catholic
leaders during his several year sojourn in Rome.461 In all of these contexts, religious toleration was either
advocated or a life-threatening necessity (or both).
Furthermore, Sidney would have been well-aware of the “weight of conscience” referenced by Sir
Philip in his infamous letter to Elizabeth, “Touching her Marriage with Monsieur,” the Catholic Duke of
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Van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, Ch. 2, p. 35. In addition to discussion in. Ch.
One, see “Percy, Henry, ninth Earl of Northumberland (1564-1632),” Dictionary of National Biography,
Vol. XLIV, Sidney Lee, ed. (New York: MacMillan, London: Smith, Elder, 1895), pp. 411-13.
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Van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, p. 38.

458

DCG, II.27.267.

459

Van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, Ch. 2, p. 39 & n.1.
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See Ch. 2.
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As Carswell observed, “There is little in [Sidney’s] life to show that he shared the almost irrational
horror of Irish Catholics that was felt by so many Englishmen of his time….he was in a position to take a
balanced view of the atrocity stories that fed mainland prejudice. He was himself tolerant in matters of
science and religion, which, as we shall see, extended even to the cardinals of Rome itself.” Carswell,
The Porcupine, p. 34.
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Anjou, brother of the French monarch – a letter that got Philip into considerable trouble with the Queen
notwithstanding her affection for him. Sir Philip was deeply troubled by the “weight of conscience” of
Protestants and Catholics and the mutual religious intolerance it had engendered, propelling men into
decades of war.462 Sidney had been similarly troubled and his concern had only been heightened by the
Civil War. He was part of the group in Parliament who had sought to avoid that war through compromise,
“the middle road” to which his uncle, the Earl of Northumberland, was committed (and likely Sidney’s
father, too). This approach failed; and the price of that failure had been too high, both for the country
generally and for Sidney specifically. The political and the religious were inextricably entangled, and the
reason why some of Sidney’s friends had died was a consequence, at least in part, of their religious
convictions. This was likely the case with the religious enthusiast Sir Henry Vane the Younger, for
example, who also had been a powerful voice of political opposition in Parliament.
When Sidney finally returned to England in 1677, he became convinced if he had not already
been so that in view of the Catholic proclivities of the Stuarts, Filmer’s strident absolutism only
encouraged the regime’s intolerance and persecution. As Sidney sarcastically commented in referring to
Catholicism in Discourses, “The principles of that religion are so full of meekness and charity; the popes
have always shew’d themselves so gentle towards those who would not submit to their authority…. The
fatherly care shew’d to the Protestants of France, by the five last kings of the house of Valois; the mercy
of Philip the second of Spain to his pagan subjects in the West-Indies, and the more hated Protestants in
the Netherlands; the moderation of the dukes of Savoy towards the Vaudois in the marquisat of Saluzzo
and the valleys of Piedmont; the gentleness and faith of the two Marys queens of England and Scotland;”
etcetera.463 Halifax was even more strident on this point in The Character of a Trimmer: “If a man would
speak maliciously of this religion, one may say it is like those diseases where as long as one drop of the
infection remaineth there is still danger of having the whole mass of blood corrupted by it.464
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“Sir Philip Sidney to Queen Elizabeth, Anno 1580, Dissuading Her from Marrying the Duke of Anjou,”
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In sum, for Sidney, religious toleration was de rigueur. It was essential. It required no further
explanation. The explanation had already been given many times by many men. What it required was
implementation. This perspective is reflected in the approach of Discourses, and in Sidney’s renewed
efforts to become an MP. When that failed, it is not surprising that Sidney may have become convinced to
actively oppose the Stuarts in whatever way he could. The evidence is not dispositive as to precisely
what that amounted to; but we know that Sidney strongly believed in the right to rebel, and that he was
involved in meeting(s) with the rebellious sort.
Finally, it is worth highlighting two particular, significant influences on Sidney’s ideas that relate to
the advocacy of religious toleration. First is the profound influence of sixteenth-century Dutch political
thought and, specifically, the extensive Dutch analysis of the political value of religious toleration. This is
a linkage that is insufficiently appreciated in the literature. Second, it will be helpful to turn to an essay by
Sidney’s Quaker friend William Penn, who in 1675 well articulated the application of balance to
governmental policy towards religion.
Sidney did not fight for religious freedom in the Low Countries; by his lifetime, that lengthy war
was over. But generations of Sidney/Percys had done so. These were men Sidney fiercely admired and
whose ideas he studied. Sidney’s heroic great-uncle Philip died defending the Dutch against the
Spanish. Philip’s brother Robert, Algernon’s grandfather, and his father Leicester, also fought on behalf
of Dutch efforts to gain autonomy, both political and religious. There were other family members who did
so too, Robert Dudley, Elizabeth I’s paramour, being the most infamous. The family also was intellectually
connected to the Dutch independence movement – particularly, Philip and the 1st Earl of Leicester’s
friendship with the Flemish philosopher Lipsius, and the 2nd Earl’s friendship with Grotius (whose father, in
turn, was a friend and student of Lipsius). Grotius had worked for years for the great Dutch republican
patriot Oldenbarnevelt. Lipsius and Grotius were advocates of religious toleration.
Grotius published works on a range of subjects including humanist and literary works, Christian
studies, and legal analyses, beginning in his youth and continuing, with some work published posthumously. On the Law of War and Peace was first published in Paris in 1625. In the timeframe when the

the other day, ‘he neither could live with or under a Papist.’” Sidney to Henry Savile, April 28, 1679,
Sidney-H. Savile Letters, p. 17.
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Sidneys moved to Paris (1636), Grotius wrote a series of tracts that focused on the theological
implications of his ideas. “Their common theme, already adumbrated in earlier work, was that Christians
are actually required to believe very few dogmas, and that the statements of faith of the major churches
… can be interpreted in a minimalist manner such that a rational Christian can see himself as part of a
universal Christian church with a continuous history from the time of Christ to the present day.”465 Grotius’
views about religion sound strikingly like Leicester’s contemporaneous perspective and even more like
the commitment to religious tolerance that later became a feature of Sidney’s ideas and reputation as an
unusually unaffiliated Christian.466 Grotius’ religious views also sound very much like the international
Protestantism with which the Sidney/Percy family had been aligned for generations.467
More connections exist. Essex had been a student of Tacitus, and the new humanism of the
Essex Circle, a Sidney/Percy bastion, embraced Tacitism; indeed, the Circle was known for its association
with Neostoicism, Lipsius and Tacitus. In addition to the generations of family history, commitments and
ideas, Sidney was formally educated in the history and discourse of the Dutch Revolt. Once again, a
component of this philosophy of life was religious toleration. Not surprisingly, the Sidney Library was
chocked full of Tacitus, Lipsius and Grotius works, not to mention panegyrics to Sir Philip’s education in
these matters, both formal and informal. This history and associated ideas are reflected in Sidney’s
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knowledgeable references in Discourses to the events of the Dutch war of independence, e.g. Algernon’s
sarcasm in Discourses in describing “the mercy of Philip the second of Spain to … the more hated
Protestants in the Netherlands,” and his copious references to Tacitus.468
There also was an intimate interplay between the Dutch Protestants and the French Huguenots,
and this connection is evident in Sidney/Percy family history. One indicia of this relationship is the fact
that members of the Essex Circle, with its intense interest in Lipsius and Tacitus, “moved into the ambit”
of the famous French Huguenot, Prince Henry of Navarre (who, pragmatically, later converted to
Catholicism to unite France), when Essex was executed and the Essex group disbanded.469 Many of the
leading French Huguenots fought for the Dutch and vice versa.470 The Sidney/Percy family association
with Huguenot leaders, and with the historical events themselves, was multi-generational. One might
describe the extended family’s allegiances as utterly informed by their international Protestantism. As we
have already explored, the ideas of the French Huguenots, which embraced Dutch political thought, also
informed Sidney’s experience as a young student at Saumur, as an older student of his father whose
university was the Sidney Library, and as a guest of the Huguenot aristocracy of southwestern France for
many of the eighteen years of his continental exile.
What, then, are the major elements of Dutch political thought that embraced the idea of religious
toleration? We have already identified the Dutch commitment to its own Batavian myth that, having
declared the free, self-governing nature of the Dutch people seemed to necessitate a commitment to
religious toleration.471 Such a people would not be free if it could not practice its religion freely, including
both external observance and practices, but also freedom of conscience – internal beliefs.472 In the
sixteenth-century, the Dutch Reformed Church was built up “from scratch” alongside the Dutch rebellion
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under the leadership of William of Orange.473 Part of Orange’s effort to establish religious peace, even as
the Dutch Reformed Church became the principal church of the provinces, was an unwillingness to adopt
a religious policy of coercion. “The principle of freedom of conscience was accepted by the States of
Holland from the outset; it was enshrined in the 1579 Union of Utrecht.”474 While Catholic worship became
illegal once Dutch Protestantism predominated, the actual policy of the Dutch was relatively tolerant.
Religious peace, the relationship between church and political governance, and the matter of
toleration were issues that took center stage between 1572 and 1590 in the Low Countries, and were
pivotal in the debate about the culture that would be embraced in the Dutch Republic.475 Religious peace
was a means of solving the Dutch rebels’ political problem by coalescing the diverse Dutch Protestant
views against the Catholic Spanish – an incomplete but partial tolerance. The “forcing of consciences” by
the Spanish was not something that the Dutch wanted to mimic. Indeed, it was the persecution and
repression of Protestant “heretics” who had allied not only with Dutch Protestants, but of moderate Dutch
Catholics who had allied with their Protestant brethren. Consequently, supporters of the Dutch Revolt
“unanimously” favored freedom of conscience.476 The constraint of conscience was denounced as
contrary to the rule of nature; civil authorities should not concern themselves with people’s religious
views.477 Persecution would only create sedition – as the Dutch knew firsthand from their own rebellion.
One of the treatises advocating these ideas, Admonition and advice for the Netherlands, is considered by
some scholars to have been written by the French monarchomach and friend of Sir Philip, Philippe
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Duplessis-Mornay; others point out its similarity to Mornay’s 1579 Discourse on the permission of liberty
of religion, called “religions vrede” in the Low Countries, and which was written at the same time as
Vindicaie Contra Tyrannos, the famous right of resistance tract which Mornay almost certainly coauthored with Languet, Sir Philip’s mentor and teacher.478 In Discourse on the permission of liberty of
religion, Mornay stated, “if the good or evil of the Republic is at stake, one can not doubt that welfare
depends on union and total ruin on division.” Mornay believed that it was improper for Christians to
persecute each other. While religious uniformity was preferable, it was better to tolerate diversity than to
ruin the country.479 To “re-establish the country in repose and tranquility” was the goal stated in another
Dutch treatise that required “reunit[ing] all the members of the res publica in one body.”480 Other works
published in the Low Countries echoed these views. In Good admonition to the good citizens of Brussels
(1579), it was asserted that freedom of conscience was the essence of liberty. Man was accountable to
God, not to other men, for his religious views; freedom of religion necessarily included freedom of
conscience, and freedom of conscience is an inalienable right and an essential part of liberty.481 One
plea for toleration by the Dutch Reformist Pieter de Zuttere was based on the works of Erasmus,
Augustine, Luther and Melanchthon. Van Gelderen argued that it was political freedom – preserving
liberty – that was the overriding concern of the Dutch Revolt, e.g., “the States would rather ‘demand the
assistance of the Turk’ than subject the country to tyranny,” i.e., the tyranny of the Spanish.482 But even if
religion was not at least one driving ideological impetus, which is doubtful, in order for liberty to be
protected ideas that contravened liberty had to be opposed. Religious intolerance was one such idea.
Turning to a less significant but similarly overlooked foundation for Sidney’s republican concept of
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toleration, consider William Penn’s work on the subject. Penn and Sidney put their heads together on
more than one occasion; they were clearly simpatico. Penn urged Sidney to contest an election if it
proved to be unfair when Penn was promoting Sidney’s run for membership in Parliament.483 Like Sidney
but years later, Penn studied at Saumur.484 Penn, too, was greatly troubled by the religious intolerance of
Western Europe. This would seem particularly true given Penn’s conversion to Quakerism, apparently as
a young adult, which was probably the least tolerated Protestant sect in England.485 After Sidney’s death
Penn’s affiliation with the very Catholic James II, of which Sidney almost certainly would have
disapproved, was driven by James’ overtures of religious toleration to dissidents, including the Quakers.
In this regard, one interpretation is that Penn was manipulated by James in the way Shagan outlined in
The Rule of Moderation. But Penn was quite consistent; and he dedicated his life to freedom of
conscience and the right to act in accordance with that conscience as long as it did not cause civil
discord. The Political Writings of William Penn are dominated by his advocacy of freedom of conscience
in the face of the fact that, “TOLERATION (for these Ten Years past) has not been more the Cry of some,
than PERSECUTION has been the Practice of others, though not on Grounds equally Rational.”486
Penn’s tract England’s Present Interest Considered, with Honour to the Prince, And Safety to the
People, 1675, explored the issue of how to resolve contrary interests and make them subservient to the
overall interest of society. Penn’s answer was compromise. But the arguments favoring compromise
were all about toleration and “Ballance.”487 Penn’s analysis began with the recognition that, certainly,
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“there are few Kingdoms in the World more divided within themselves, and whose Religious Interests lye
more seemingly cross to all Accommodation, than that we Live in.” Because this is the case, the
Magistrate’s task was “hard.” Like Sidney, Penn argued that uniformity doesn’t work. “Your Endeavours
for an Uniformity have been many; Your Acts not a few to enforce it; but the Consequence, whether you
intend it or not,” through “Barbarous Practices,” has been the death of several thousand free people,” and
the forfeiting of their “Rights.” Penn righteously described what had happened: “Persons have been
flung into Goals, Gates and Trunks broke open, Goods distrained, till a Stool hath not been left to sit
down on: Flocks of Cattle driven, whole Barns full of Corn seized, Thresh’d, and carried away: Parents
left without their Children, Children without their Parents, both without Subsistence.” Moreover, this
consequence was aggravated by further Cruelty: “The Widow’s Mite hath not escaped their Hands; they
have made her Cow the Forfeiture of her Conscience; not leaving her a Bed to lye on, nor a Blanket to
cover her.” Penn continued with increasingly vivid horrors; but the bottom line was that, “by sad
Experience, and a long Tract of Time, that the very Remedies applied to cure Dissension, increase it; and
that the more Vigorously an Uniformity is Coercively Prosecuted, the wider Breaches grow,” etc.488
Penn voiced the obvious, pragmatic question: what was the solution that “is most Fit, Easie and
Safe, at this Juncture of Affairs, to be done, for Composing, at least Quieting Differences; for allaying the
Heat of contrary Interests, and making them Subservient to the Interest of the Government, and
Consistent with the Prosperity of the Kingdom?” The answer, he said, has three components: the
“INVIOLABLE and impartial maintenance of English rights”; “Our Superiors Governing themselves upon a
Balance, as near as may be, towards the several Religious Interests”; and “A Sincere Promotion of

with James II to create a more tolerant England, a story that has been completely overshadowed by the
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Revolution. See Scott Sowerby, “Forgetting the Repealers: Religious Toleration and Historical Amnesia in
Later Stuart England,” Past and Present, No. 215 (May 2012), pp. 85-123.
488
Penn, “England’s Present Interest Considered, With Honour to the Prince, And Safety To The People,”
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General and Practical Religion.”489 Like Sidney, Penn’s discussion of English rights rested on common
law principles recognized in British, Saxon and Norman times, about which he expounded in scholarly
detail. His discussion of general and practical religion focused on “the Ten Commandments, or moral
law,” and other Christian precepts to which “all Men professing God and Religion” subscribe.490 Penn
also introduced the notion of Moderation, a concept like Toleration that is not synonymous with, but a
means of achieving Balance: “So if Practical Religion, and the Laws made to maintain it, were duly
regarded, the very Natures of Men, now wild and forward, … would learn Moderation, and see it to be
their greatest Interest to pursue a Sober and Amicable Conversation.”491 Penn argued that if men learned
moderation, it “would Ease the Magistrate of much of his present Trouble, and increase the Number of
Men fit to govern.” For it “is out of this Nursery of Virtue, Men should be drawn to be planted in the
Government, not what is their Opinion, but what is their Manners and Capacity? Here the Field is large,
and the Magistrate has Room to choose good Officers for the Publick Good.”492 All of this sounds
strikingly familiar; for Sidney, too, emphasized the necessity for the magistrate to be able to place the
public good above his own interests and inclinations. For Penn, “Opinions or Professions of Religion”
were not enough. The issue was “Practice” – not what one thinks, but how one behaves.493 Discourses
was a manifesto of republican implementation or Practice.
We have briefly considered Penn’s work on toleration not because the work was the basis for a
political platform advocated by Sidney that subsumed toleration; indeed, if Sidney began writing
Discourses earlier than is generally averred, this would not have been possible. Rather, the point is that
in addition to the views and influence of generations of his family, Sidney shared his commitment to
toleration with others with whom he collaborated. Writing about “Religion,” Halifax said, “It is not true
devotion to put on an angry zeal against those who may be of a differing persuasion.”494 Benjamin Furly,
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the expat English Quaker in Rotterdam with whom Sidney remained in touch all his life similarly shared
what we would call a “liberal” perspective about religious toleration.495
Sidney took his embracing of toleration, as he had done with his commitment to consent, to its
logical conclusion such that it included the toleration of Catholics. If liberty was the goal of society, it must
include religious liberty, as well. Excluding from that liberty religions with which one disagreed was
unequivocally intolerant. Here again, Sidney would have been following a family tradition. Other
republicans were divided; some agreed with Sidney, others advocated the exclusion of Catholics.496 Most
notably, Locke consistently wrote about toleration, beginning with an intolerant view soon after the Civil
War, and evolving into the advocacy of tolerance in A Letter Concerning Toleration, The Reasonableness of Christianity, as Delivered in the Scriptures and Two Treatises of Government. Indeed, “Locke
reflected and wrote about toleration across four decades,” beginning in 1660.497 Nevertheless, scholars
disagree about Locke’s tolerance of Catholics, and whether he believed that Catholics could be entrusted
with political authority. Locke’s ideas on toleration are abstruse, fundamentally relating to protection of
society and society’s reliance on the fear of God as a means of its protection. According to law professor
and political theorist Jeremy Waldron, by the time the Letter Concerning Toleration was published in
1689, Locke’s intolerance of Catholicism was “contingent rather than necessary.”498 Nevertheless, in “not
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being too Straussian about this,” as Waldron suggested, the plain language of the Letter Concerning
Toleration indicated that, in Locke’s mature view, society could not politically tolerate atheists, and absent
overt assertions to the contrary Catholics could not be tolerated either. (Note that Jews and Muslims
could and should be tolerated!). 499 At the same time, Locke did not believe that civil government had
intrinsic authority over religious beliefs and observances; rather, “it is a necessary feature of the individual
religious predicament. …Individual religious behaviour, if it is to attain its end, is necessarily defined by
subjective conviction” that cannot be imposed by government action.500 Locke’s views represent one
among a range of English republican ideas about toleration. 501
The real question is not whether Sidney’s ideas were informed by concepts of balance,
moderation, and toleration, but how Sidney’s political ideas could have possibly excluded the lessons
learned from past and contemporaneous events, generations of family experiences, and the commitment
to principles of balance, moderation, and toleration that flowed therefrom? Imposing religious beliefs on
people with which they disagreed, and therefore to which they would not consent, would have been flatly
inconsistent with the principles of freedom that Sidney’s republicanism required, and on which his political
ideas were based. The guiding principle for Sidney was “the universal law of God and nature”; and he
meant “universal” literally.502 If one nation adopted one practice and another nation held to another, and if
both were to be followed, “there can be no general law given to all.” This guidance applied to religious
matters. Each nation and each people is “by God and nature” endowed with the liberty of regulating
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“matters relating to themselves,” and were free to do so “according to their own prudence or convenience.
…This seems to be so certainly true, that whosoever does, as our author [Filmer], propose doctrines to
the contrary, must either be thought rashly or utter that which he does not understand, or maliciously to
cast balls of division among all nations, whereby every man’s sword would be drawn against every man,
to the total subversion of all order and government.”503
************************************************************
Sidney’s republicanism is plain to see if one open-mindedly studies Discourses. The array of
English republicans did not agree on all aspects of their theory, which is entirely to be expected; but there
is a great deal of commonality of thought, of which Sidney’s ideas are forcefully and usefully
representative. Like most of his fellow republicans, Sidney’s republicanism was made up of an overriding
commitment to liberty; the necessity of the people’s consent to government, with participatory government
a manifestation of collective consent; a recognition of the lack of necessity and, indeed, the inconsistency
of specifying one form of government as requisite to freedom; the right of resistance to oppressive
governance; and the endorsement of the classical concept of virtue, both personally and communally.
Early modern English republicanism was also richly informed by multiple layers of law that
protected the individual and the community from oppression, e.g., through arbitrariness. Those legal strata
were natural law, contract law, rule of law, and legal process and procedure, all of which formed the
structure that undergirded English republicanism. The systematic treatment of the law subsumed the
traditions of the ancient constitution and common law, and the articulation of these traditions by jurists and
others, which are subsidiary matters that have been the focus of considerable scholarship, albeit without
their placement in the rubric of legal strata that inform republican theory. Notwithstanding the negligible
attention paid to, and the lack of integration in, the historiography of the multi-layered legal foundation of
early modern republicanism, these four legal tiers pervade early modern English republican thought,
including but not limited to Sidney’s work, and collectively constituted the crucial sinews, the bedrock of
republican governance. Finally, ideas of balance, moderation, and toleration are important and necessary
elements of Sidney’s republicanism because the failure to implement these ideas readily disabled
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republican government. Additionally, in the case of religious toleration, freedom was incomplete and, at
least in the seventeenth century, fatally flawed without it. Some might argue that many theories of
governance rely on law; and that balance is a factor independent of Sidney’s republicanism. The answer
to this is that these elements of republican thought by Sidney and others are foundational; one could not
have the early modern republicanism of Algernon Sidney and other English early modernists without them.
On the other hand, contrary to the assertions of some scholars, early modern English republican-ism did
not require a rejection of monarchy. It also did not entail an abhorrence of “commerce,” which Pocock
asserted in The Machiavellian Moment, “seems radically inseparable from conflict,” or of trade, which he
maintained was “an innovative force … like virtù … and a disturber of the natural order.”504 That does not
mean that the avoidance of corruption of all stripes, including the corruption of money and favors in
commerce and elsewhere, was not a commonplace feature of republican analysis. The exception to this
comfort level with early capitalism was the outlier Harrington and his protégé, Neville, who entirely rejected the structure of English society, and whose republicanism sought economic and social transformation,
ideas which are not characteristic of the movement generally.505 Many of Harrington and Neville’s ideas
are inconsistent with the republicanism of Sidney and fellow travelers, as well as important republicans
who went before them, including Cicero and Machiavelli, all of whom recognized the tremendous value to
a republican society of trade, commerce, economic competition, and financial success.
Examining Sidney’s extraordinarily rich and tragic personal, multi-generational family and national
history not only evidences the depth of Sidney’s republican convictions, but also establishes a profound
family commitment to public service. Appreciating the complexity of the interrelationships among the
extended Sidney/Percy clan, and the significant impact of these relationships on the lives and ideas of
this noble lineage, sometimes for the better and sometimes not, enables us to appreciate the profundity of
Sidney’s political convictions. One cannot overstate the impact on Sidney, the man who was not afraid to
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Pocock, MM, p. 444.
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Laslett argued that notwithstanding the fact that Locke “followed his wealthy patron into his investments,” and “showed himself the determined enemy of beggars and the idle poor, who existed, he
thought, because of ‘the relaxation of discipline and the corruption of manners,’ Locke “profoundly
mistrusted commerce and commercial men.” For our purposes, none of this matters. While Sidney would
have completely disagreed with Locke about commerce, Locke’s political theory was quite similar to
Sidney’s and very different from Harrington’s. Laslett, “Introduction,” Locke’s Two Treatises, p. 43. For a
radically different take on Shaftesbury and Locke’s activities in Carolina, see Appendix B.
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own it, of generations of forebears who were leaders of the English nobility, particularly those who fought
and not infrequently died for many of the ideas that Sidney espoused.
We turn now to Part II of our study, and what will be dispositive in defining the nature of early
modern Anglo-American republicanism: the verisimilitude between Sidney’s early modern republican
thought and, an ocean and a century apart, the republicanism of John Adams.
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PART II: JOHN ADAMS’ IDEAS
CHAPTER FIVE
The Ideas of a Lawful Revolutionary
On the death of JAMES OTIS, killed by lightning, at Andover, soon after the peace of 1783, written at the time.
When flush’d with conquest and elate with pride,
Britannia’s monarch Heaven’s high will defy’d;
And, bent on blood, by lust of rule inclin’d,
With odious chains to vex the freedom mind;
On these young shores set up unjust command,
And Spread the slaves of office round the land;
Then OTIS rose, and, great in patriot fame,
To list’ning crowds resistance dar’d proclaim.
From soul to soul the bright idea ran,
The fire of freedom flew from man to man;
His pen, like Sidney’s, made the doctrine known,
His tongue, like Tully’s, shock a tyrant’s throne….
From men, like OTIS, INDEPENDENCE grew.
Anon., 17831

When he was twenty-three Adams wrote in his Diary about the importance of governance: “Aim at
an exact knowledge of the nature, end and means of government.”2 That was two years before he
witnessed James Otis give his memorable performance in the writs of assistance case, in which “Mr.
Otis’s oration, against writs of assistance, breathed into this nation the breath of life.”3 From the time he

1

Anonymous verse appended by John Adams in his letter to Mr. Niles, Editor of The Weekly Register,
Quincy, Mass., Jan. 14, 1818, introducing “Letters from the Hon. John Adams, to the Hon. Wm. Tudor,
and Others, of the Events of the American Revolution,” Novanglus and Massachusettensis; or Political
Essays, Published in the Years 1774 and 1775, On the Principal Points of Controversy, Between Great
Britain and Her Colonies. The Former by John Adams, Late President of the United States; the Latter by
Jonathan Sewall, Then King’s Attorney General of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, to which are
added a number of Letters, lately Written by President Adams, to the Honourable William Tudor; some of
which were never before published (Boston: Hews & Goss, 1819), FAU/Weiner Collection (“‘Adams
Introduction,’ 1818 Political Essays”), pp. 229-312, 232. Sidney’s ideas were certainly known and
appreciated in colonial America. See Appendix B.
2

John Adams Diary & Autobiography (“JA D&A,”), Vol. I: Diary 1755-1770 (January 1759), p. 73. Note
that Adams’ early correspondence (before 1774) is missing, particularly letters written to him.
“Introduction,” Papers of John Adams (“PJA”) Vol. I: Sept. 1755-Oct. 1773, Robert J. Taylor, ed.
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977), p. xviii.
3

As Adams vividly recalled fifty-eight years later, when Britain decided to “assert and maintain the
sovereign authority of parliament over the colonies, in all cases of taxation and internal policy,” they
began that process with “an order of council to the officers of the customs in Massachusetts Bay, to carry
into execution the acts of trade, and to apply to the supreme judicature of the province for writs of
assistance, to authorize them to break and enter all houses, cellars, stores, shops, ships, bales, casks,
&c. to search and seize all goods, wares, and merchandizes, on which the taxes imposed by those acts
had not been paid.” A Salem customs deputy applied for the writ in November 1760. While the court
“doubted [the] constitutionality” of such a writ, “and consequently its legality,” it was obliged to consider
the king’s order. “The community was greatly alarmed. The merchants of Salem and of Boston, applied
to Mr. Otis to defend them and their country, against that formidable instrument of arbitrary power. They
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was a young man, good governance was Adams’ preoccupation, and in pursuing it for some seven
decades, he consistently and vociferously advocated republican principles. Jefferson, who certainly also
had disparaging things to say about the man, “believed that Adams possessed the attributes necessary
for extraordinary statesmanship, including honesty, a rare ability to persevere in the face of foreboding
hostility, formidable intelligence, and remarkable disinterestedness.” According to Jefferson, he was also
a visionary with tireless energy who was accurate in his judgment.4 There is no question that Adams was
a realist, and notwithstanding his fears and biases, his remarkable honesty often made him an extraordinarily impartial man, although his ego not infrequently got in the way. Indeed, Adams’ impartiality
from time to time worked to the detriment of his best interest, such as in his refusal to become a true party
man or an apologist for his Federalist colleagues.
While Adams’ formative years established his well-known values, personality and character, it
was Adams’ life in the law or, perhaps more precisely, the law in his life – John Adams in practice – that

tendered him rich fees; he engaged in their cause, but would accept no fees.” Adams explained that
James Otis was an extraordinary man, a “classic scholar” who was also “a great master of the laws of
nature and nations,” having read “Puffendorph, Grortius, Barbeyrac, Burlamaqui, Vattel, Heineccius” as
well as, in civil law, “Domal, Justinian , and, upon occasions, consulted the corpus juris at large.” The
motto of one of Otis’ essays was salus populi Otis, as Gridley had done before him, “inculcated” his pupils
with the conviction “that a lawyer ought never to be without a volume of natural or public law, or moral
philosophy, on his table, or in his pocket.” In sum, said Adams, “In the history, the common law and
statute laws of England,” Otis “had no superior, at least in Boston.” Otis’ writs of assistance “argument,
speech, discourse, oration, harangue – call it by which name you will, was the most impressive upon his
crowded audience of any, that I ever heard before or since,” with the exception of other Otis political
speeches made “for ten years afterwards.” “Adams Introduction,” 1818 Political Essays, pp. 229-31;
Stephen Botein, “Cicero. As Role Model for Early. American Lawyers: A Case Study in Classical
“Influence,” The Classical Journal, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Apr.-May, 1978), pp. 312-21, 316-17.
4

These Jefferson comments went to Adams’ character, of course, not to his politics. Perhaps dating from
their strong differences over the French Revolution, Jefferson vehemently disagreed with and disapproved
of Adams’ politics. In 1796, for example, in the famous letter Jefferson wrote to Philip Mazzei, Jefferson
denounced the Federalists as “an Anglican, monarchical and aristocratic party,” and rejected all the
Federalist “apostates,” including Adams. Thomas Jefferson to Mazzei, Apr. 24, 1796, The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 29: 1 March 1796 to 31 December 1797 (Princeton University Press, 2002), 81-3,
https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selected-documents/thomas-jefferson-philip-mazzei-0 (2-19-19); see
also Jefferson to Rush, Dec. 5, 1811, Founders Online, National Archives, last modified June 29, 2017,
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=Jefferson%20to%20Rush%2C%20Dec.%205%2C %201811&s=111
1311111&sa=&r=7&sr= (2-19-19)[Orig. source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Retirement Series, vol.
4, 18 June 1811 to 30 April 1812, ed. J. Jefferson Looney. Princeton University Press, 2007, pp. 312–314.]
For a good read on the 1800 elections see John Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson: The Tumultuous Election of
1800 (Oxford University Press, 2004).
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has been woefully underappreciated and therefore exiguously addressed.5 Indeed, as is recognized sport,
Adams’ lawyerly perspective is not uncommonly diminished and even occasionally treated as an
unfortunate circumstance meriting dainty avoidance, scholarly atonement, or at least a fact on which to
tread lightly indeed. The murky, even impenetrable subject of the law, and the complete blanketing of
Adams’ political ideas by its influence, has beclouded the scholarship, resulting in a disconnect between
the facts on the ground and the ideas associated with them – ex factis jus oritur, the legal and, no doubt,
the political consequences associated with the facts. The result skews and therefore erroneous
understands Adams’ ideas and early modern Anglo-American republicanism generally. Accordingly, we
begin the study of Adams’ ideas with a brief introduction to the influence of the Law on the man.

Why in yonder Village, (the Village is named Morality) there dwells a Gentleman,
whose name is Legality, a very judicious man (and a man of good name) that
hath such skill help men off with burdens such as thine are from their shoulders.
John Bunyan, the words of World Wiseman, The Pilgrim’s Progress 6

A. A Few Facts: Adams and the Ubiquitous Law
Adams’ professional identity – his life-long perspective as a highly analytical, jurisprudential, but
also a quintessentially pragmatic attorney – informed his republican ideas. As the editors of Adams’ legal
papers stated, “John Adams was before anything else a practicing lawyer.”7 Just as Sidney entered
adulthood in the midst of a political maelstrom, so too did Adams. We can add to this, and to Adams’
associated strongly-held republican convictions, the fact that he inherited and well-displayed the Boston
town meeting legacy of skillful political articulation, which was a part of his vast array of political

5

Perhaps the only scholar who focused, albeit briefly, on the impact of Adams’ legalistic perspective on
his political theory is Stephen G. Kurtz in his insightful 1968 essay, “The Political Science of John Adams:
A Guide to His Statecraft,” William & Mary Quarterly, Vol. 25 (1968), pp. 605-13. In recognizing that,
“Adams was an outstanding lawyer and a powerful advocate,” Kurtz pointed to the fact that Adams’
“Massachusetts friends sent him to the Continental Congress, but it is sometimes forgotten that the
highest office which they awarded him was that of chief justice of their highest court.” Id, p. 612.
6

This quotation was cleverly used by scholar Edward Ryerson to describe John Adams. Edward
Ryerson, “On John Adams,” American Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Autumn, 1954), pp. 253-58, 257; see John
Bunyan, The Pilgrim’s Progress: From this World to that which is to Come, Vol. I, Rev. Robert Maguire,
notes (London: Cassell, Petter, and Galpin, [1863]), p. 22.
7

“Introduction,” Legal Papers of John Adams (“JA Legal Papers”), Vol. I, I. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B.
Zobel, eds. (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1965), p. xxxi.
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discourse, both written and oral.8 The two-fold question for Adams was almost invariably what lawyers
like to call “the bottom line”: what was the goal, the realistically optimal solution, in any given situation,
and how best could he achieve it? This same query underlay Adams’ republicanism and his
determination to educate his people on the facts, the law, and their choices. What was the purpose of
politics and, having formulated and articulated his personal and political values, how did one achieve a
world in which these values were at least protected, if not embraced? As for politics’ purpose, Adams
answered that fundamental question early on and consistently from then on: politics existed to protect the
best interests of the people through what two centuries later Bailyn termed “a cluster of convictions
focused on the effort to free the individual from the oppressive misuse of power, from the tyranny of the
state.”9 Adams put it this way: “Power always sincerely, conscientiously, de tres bon Foi, believes itself
Right. Power always thinks it has a great Soul, and vast Views, beyond the Comprehension of the Weak;
and that it is doing God Service, when it is violating all his Laws.” The responsibility of the citizenry was
accordingly self-evident: “Power must never be trusted without a Check.”10
What, then, were the ideas that Adams disinterestedly advocated and forcefully championed in
support of this purpose? In this chapter we will consider the nature of Adams’ republicanism, linking it to
the man’s experience, and adjoining Adams’ language and ideas with those of Algernon Sidney. As we
have established, there are well-recognized elements of republican theory notwithstanding the fact that
those elements are not necessarily defined in the same way by their devotees or by scholars. Sidney and
Adams subscribed to these recognized political principles and they did so in very much the same way.
Indeed, in spite of the different social contexts into which each man was born, there is remarkable
intellectual and political similitude. Sidney and Adams’ shared ideas and consequent concept of republicanism can sensibly be characterized as mainstream, falling within the middle-of-the-road or median of the

8

See Page Smith, John Adams, Vol. I: 1735-1784 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962), pp. 6-7.

9

Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. v-vi. Throughout this chapter, while I take him on from time to time, I
would like to acknowledge my personal extraordinary regard for, and our profession’s enormous debt to
Bernard Bailyn, who in many ways was the point of the spear of the cataphracts that took on the wellestablished doctrine that ideology was immaterial to the origins of the American Revolution.
10

Adams to Jefferson, Feb. 2, 1816, The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence
Between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams. Lester J. Cappon, ed. (Chapel Hill, NC. The
University of North Carolina Press, 1988), pp. 461-63, 463.
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wide bandwidth of convictions to which men with republican ideas subscribed. That bandwidth can be
envisioned as ranging from radically liberal on the Left to radically conservative on the Right, with a
centrist or moderate point of view situated midstream.11 The advocacy of ideas across this bandwidth
were variations on a theme, albeit with some adaptations that were much more idiosyncratic than others.
It will become quite clear that as had Sidney, Adams embraced republicanism’s core principles and a
political theory that we can comfortable term mainstream early modern Anglo-American republicanism.
We begin our analysis of Adams’ ideas with the same set of well-recognized attributes of
republican thought that were identified in Part One. It is evident that Sidney and Adams shared a common
understanding of the nature of man, the omphalos of liberty, the essentiality of consent and participatory
government, and the value of virtue. We also can say that it is veridical, indeed indisputable, that their
work was informed by and permeated with the essentiality of law to republican ideas and their
implementation. Both men also dwelt on the constitutive nature of balance and moderation in republican
theory; indeed for Adams, this was an unfaltering, prevalent theme. Consideration also will be given to
whether there were other components of republicanism that Adams emphasized or rejected, and how he
dealt with factors that other theorists or scholars emphasized, such as monarchy, democracy, and commerce. Certain contemporaries – Jefferson, for example – as well as influential scholars subsequently,
have been entirely diverted, even confusticated, by Adams’ views on monarchy which, as we will
establish, were often misunderstood and at times deliberately misrepresented; in fact, they in no way
undercut or detract from his republican convictions. Finally, to be flagged along the way are the variety of
definitions or non-definitions of republicanism in both the primary and secondary literature that have
proven to be distracting – red-herrings in the pursuit of the apperception of this slippery subject.12

11

The idea of the political Left and Right is anachronistic here but useful; it is of course a product of early
modern republicanism in a different context, the politics of the French Revolution. One cannot resist
mentioning, in this context, that Tom Paine inexplicably escaped execution in revolutionary France. See
Craig Nelson, Thomas Paine: Enlightenment, Revolution, and the Birth of Modern Nations (New York:
Penguin, 2006), Ch. 10, pp. 273-304.
12

There may be no better illustration of what one might term republicanism’s “non-definitionalism” than
that provided by Ferling in his book on Joseph Galloway. Galloway was an “imperial constitutionalist,” a
British American who “argued persistently for the necessity of instituting changes within the empire and
unswervingly urged the perpetuation of the Anglo-American relationship.” Ferling, The Loyalist Mindset,
pp. 15-16 (emphasis added). In his study of Galloway Ferling described the “growth of republican sentiment” in America by the time the First Continental Congress met, and the fact that Galloway “assuredly
was not a republican.” Id, p. 29. No definition of either republican sentiment or a republican is provided.
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Whether or not Forrest McDonald is right that, “Most Patriots … came to republicanism as the nation did,
which is to say late and willy-nilly, with neither a historical nor a philosophical understanding of what they
were embracing,” this characterization most assuredly does not apply to John Adams.13

Ferling frequently referenced radicals; but whether all radicals were republicans, all republicans were
radicals, neither of the two, or somewhere in-between is unclear. Ferling described the “Real Whig
ideology” that historians Bailyn, Wood and Maier addressed in their path-breaking work; but again, there
is no indication whether Real Whig ideology is another term for republicanism and, if not, how the two
relate to each other. Ferling noted, too, that Galloway, “like the radicals, … accepted some Whig concepts and rejected others.” Id, pp. 67-69. But whether all these variances fall within the rubric comfortably termed “republicanism” is unclear. Ferling also concluded that Galloway “did not distinguish between
republican and democratic polities”; but it is not clear whether or how Ferling did either, e.g., one page
earlier the author stated that Galloway considered the “most deadly threat to stability was posed by
democracy,” which Ferling specified as “the government championed by the restless, ambitious masses.”
Does this mean that in Galloway’s view, Ferling’s view, or both, that republicanism posed the most deadly
threat to stability? Id, pp. 74-75. Much later in the monograph Ferling emphasized this point: “The
loyalists, including Galloway, regarded republicanism as the greatest threat to the established order; they
used the terms ‘republican’ and ‘democratic’ synonymously and with equal reproach. Republican
government, they believed, would inordinately shift the balance of power to the masses.” Id, p. 115.
Unfortunately, however, what these two allegedly synonymous terms meant to the loyalists, the patriots
or, for that matter to Ferling, is not specified. Ferling maintained that Galloway considered republican
government to be “so unavoidably contentious and discordant as to make the calamity of rebellion
inevitable.” Id, p. 103; see also p. 115 (“Many Tories believed both civil war and foreign war to be
inevitable companions of republicanism.”) Ferling also implicitly confirmed this assertion with the
statement that, “Moreover, the republican nature of these societies blinded the ignorant masses to the
virtues of the British system.” Id. Again, it is unclear what “republican government,” “republicanism,” or
“the republican nature of these societies” meant in these contexts. The statements also suggest that
British Americans were living in colonial republics, a dubious proposition. Ferling stated, “trained in
republicanism,” whatever that was, “these colonists were steeled to resist – by violence, if necessary –
any British attempt to alter their provincial governments.” Id. Once again, there is nothing self-evident
about the connection between the theory of republicanism and opposition to any attempts to alter
provincial governments. For example, what about alterations that might enhance participatory governance? Later Ferling used the phrase “republican rhetoric,” indicating that as a result of this rhetoric, most
loyalist writers feared that “people have been taught a dangerous truth, that all power is derived from
them.” Ferling also flagged the specter of “democratic anarchy.” Id, pp. 113, 121. Once again we have
the wholesale conflating of democratic and republican ideas, in this case combined with fear and even
loathing of the masses, but still without definitional clarity. Finally, in his conclusion Ferling stated, “The
republican nature of the United States Constitution must have appalled Galloway, but he must have
thought the new government consisted of prudently balanced branches.” Id, p. 132. It is not self-evident
what would have appalled Galloway, particularly since Ferling emphasized that Galloway’s ideas were
remarkably consonant with those of the Federalists. Id, pp. 99, 132-33.
In sum, there seems to be a sort of secret handshake mode in this and other discussions of early American republicanism, as if we all know what we mean by the term republicanism before we start, and therefore can all apply that meaning, whatever it may be, with consistency to statements asserted. The
problem is that to my knowledge there is no secret handshake. See also the entire conflating of republicanism and democracy in James T. Kloppenberg, Toward Democracy: The Struggle for Self-Rule in
European and American Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), discussed throughout this
study. Helena Rosenblatt does the same thing in her recent monograph, The Lost History of Liberalism:
From Ancient Rome to the Twenty-First Century (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018).
13

Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, KN:
University Press of Kansas, 1985), p. 67.
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An illiterate Yankee was a rare phenomenon.
Staloff, Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson14
Here is a young man totally committed to mastering the “unlimited Field” of the law.
L. H. Butterfield and associated editors, The Earliest Diary of John Adams15
[B]ooks were resources for the forensic combat that the constitutional issues of the day required.
R. B. Bernstein, “‘Let us dare to read, think, speak, and write’: John Adams’s Use
of Reading as Political and Constitutional Armory”16

B. The Synergy of Adams and the Law
Adams was the product of a profoundly law-imbued society. This was true from the beginning.
The Mayflower Compact, after all, had been signed by all the men who disembarked from the ship of the
same name that landed at Plymouth Rock in 1620.17 While there wasn’t a lawyer in the group, John
Adams’ ancestor was.18 John Quincy Adams, sixth president of the United States and John’s son,
described the Compact as a social contract in every sense of the term, signed by the freemen aboard the
Mayflower, “loyal subjects of our dread sovereign lord King James,” who collectively agreed to create the
first colony in what was then considered the northern part of Virginia. Indeed, in an 1802 speech celebrating the anniversary of Plymouth Colony, John Quincy declared, "This is perhaps the only instance, in
human history, of that positive, original social compact, which speculative philosophers have imagined as
the only legitimate source of government. Here was a unanimous and personal assent by all the [male]

14

Darren Staloff, Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson: The Politics of the Enlightenment and the American
Founding (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), p. 140.
15

The Earliest Diary of John Adams, p. 39.

16

R. B. Bernstein, “‘Let us dare to read, think, speak, and write’: John Adams’s Use of Reading as Political
and Constitutional Armory,” The Libraries, Leadership, & Legacy of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson,
Robert C. Baron and Conrad Edick Wright, eds. (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing and the Massachusetts
Historical Society. 2010), pp. 81-93, 83.
17

The Mayflower Compact, Nov. 21, 1620, www.pilgrimhallmuseum.org/mayflower_compact_text.htm (516-16).
18
In a letter to his friend Benjamin Rush, Adams referred to “our celebrations of the rock on which my
great, great, great, great (and I know not how many more greats) grandfather John Alden at twenty years
of age first leaped at Plymouth in 1620.” John Adams to Benjamin Rush, June 21, 1811, in The Spur of
Fame: Dialogues of John Adams and Benjamin Rush, 1805-1813, John A. Schutz and Douglass Adair,
eds. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1966), pp. 196-97. See also Adams to Rush, July 19, 1812, id., p.
260. For Adams’ description of his English ancestry, see Adams to John Trumball, March 12, 1790, John
Adams, Writings from the New Nation 1784-1826, Gordon S. Wood, ed. (New York: The Library of
America, 2016), pp. 236-38.
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individuals of the community to the association, by which they became a nation.”19 John Quincy’s father
put it this way: his people “have the most habitual, radical sense of Liberty, and the highest Reverence for
Virtue. They are descended from a Race which, in a Confidence in Providence, set the seas and skies,
Monsters and savages, Tyrants and Devils at Defyance, for the sake of their Liberty and Religion.”20
In 1635, close to fifty years before Sidney was subjected to a kangaroo court and then executed
for his political convictions and precisely a century before Adams was born, a highly participatory political
process was in place in Massachusetts Bay. It produced a code of law, the Body of Liberties, that both
specified the final structure of the government of the colony the British inhabitants wanted, and placed
limits on that government “in resemblance to a Magna Charta.” The Body of Liberties actually went much
further than Magna Carta in its recognition of individual rights: there were ninety-eight provisions in the
code specifying the rights of the (male, free) people of Massachusetts Bay.21 On the other hand, what the
Body of Liberties did not do was recognize religious freedom. Indeed, in 1647 the Bay legislature, called
the General Court, enacted a law making religious heresy a capital offense, putting a damper on

19

John Quincy Adams, An Oration, Delivered at Plymouth, December 22, 1802, at the Anniversary
Commemoration of the First Landing of Our Ancestors (Boston: Russell and Cutler, 1802), p. 12.
20

Diary & Autobiography of John Adams, Vol. I, p. 272 (Dec. 23, 1765). There are four volumes in L. H.
Butterfield’s edition of the Diary & Autobiography of John Adams, L. H. Butterfield, ed., Leonard C. Faber
& Wendell D. Garrett, ass’t ed. (New York: Atheneum, 1964), (hereinafter JA D&A), the first two of which
are Adams’ Diary, the third of which completes the Diary and begins the Autobiography, and the fourth of
which is the remainder of Adams’ unfinished Autobiography and includes a very useful chronology.
21

The Massachusetts Bay Body of Liberties provided for “[t]he free fruition of such liberties Immunities
and privileges as humanity, Civility, and Christianity call for as due to every man in his place and proportion without impeachment and Infringement hath ever been and ever will be the tranquility and Stability
of Churches and Commonwealths.” On the Body of Liberties, see https://www.mass.gov/servicedetails/massachusetts-body-of-liberties (2-27-19). For further details about those rights, see Appendix B.
Self-governance by the Puritans left a profound legacy of independence among New Englanders. At the
most local level, colonial New England is famous for the institution called the town meeting, in which
every free male was invited to participate. Modeled after the Puritan Congregationalist practice of church
government, the town meeting provided the opportunity for men from all walks of life to become actively
involved in local politics and governance – a degree of civic participation completely unknown in
seventeenth-century England. The legal foundations of Plymouth Colony, as well as Massachusetts Bay
that later absorbed Plymouth and other small New England enclaves, unsurprisingly emphasized this
broad civic participation.
Finally, note that the English context of the 1635 passage of the Body of Liberties was Charles I’s
Personal Rule, which continued from 1629 to 1640, during which Parliament did not convene. This was
an interval when emigration from England was encouraged, whether intentionally or unintentionally,
because of the absence of the option of a parliamentary solution to the religious persecution that
continued against nonconformists in England.
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emigration to Massachusetts by people who were not Puritans.22 Nevertheless, from the beginning of
English occupancy of the northeastern American seaboard, towns operated independently, with broad
public civic participation, the active voicing of political opinions, localized decision-making, and the
observance of civil liberty. New Englanders were accustomed to political freedom.23 As a fifth generation
New Englander Adams inherited and was born into this self-determining political culture. He participated
in it, and proudly internalized his rights as a freeman. In a distinctly different political environment than the
English one with which Sidney grappled, the rights of the British-Americans in Massachusetts Bay were
not political rights to which New Englanders aspired. They were rights to which the people were entitled,
rights already gained and exercised. 24
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that the thought of American independence,
founded on republican principles, materialized wholesale out of the Mayflower Compact or the Body of
Liberties. To the contrary, its manifestation was complex and surprising.25 This was the case in Sidney’s
world too, but for opposite reasons. In the latter instance, notwithstanding the centuries of powerful,
dynastic monarchy in England and a hierarchical social structure, there were many generations of
republican influence, both direct and indirect, that ironically constituted an essential part of Sidney's
aristocratic legacy and, perhaps as well, his albatross. In contradistinction, notwithstanding the benefac-

22
The Book of the General Lawes and Libertyes Concerning the Inhabitants of the Massachusets
Collected Out of the Records of the General Court for the Several Years Wherein They Were Made and
Established, 1647, https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/1647-laws-and-liberties-of-massachusetts (3-5-19)
[partial text]. The Puritans tried unsuccessfully to keep Anabaptists and Quakers, particularly, out of the
colony, but without success. Three Quakers were executed for refusing to leave in 1659. After executing
one more Quaker in 1661, the law prescribing death for heretics was repealed. Bruce C. Daniels, New
England Nation: The Country the Puritans Built (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 193-98.
23

Political liberty did not translate into religious liberty in Massachusetts Bay. See Appendix B.

24
While I have marked disagreements with Edward Handler’s assessment of John Adams, he is correct,
at least with respect to most people from Massachusetts Bay Colony, that, “The equality of condition
which [the revolutionary generation of] Americans had received as a portion from their ancestors had
rendered social revolution unnecessary in his [John Adams’] own country.” Edward Handler, America
and Europe in the Political Thought of John Adams (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 15.
Note, however, that this was not universally true in colonial America; and even in Massachusetts, there
were slaves. See Michael P. Winship, “Godly Republicanism and the Origins of the Massachusetts
Polity,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 63, No. 3 (July 2006), pp. 427-62, 427.
25

John Quincy Adams, An Oration, Delivered at Plymouth, December 22, 1802, at the Anniversary
Commemoration of the First Landing of Our Ancestors (Boston: Russell and Cutler, 1802), p. 12. For
more on John Quincy’s perspective, see Appendix B.
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tion to Adams of a new world separated by an ocean from the metropole and therefore of necessity an
environment that fostered much greater political independence in its religiously inspired, distinctly middleclass citizenry than was offered to their compatriots back home, a profound connection to the British
monarchy was not only sustainable but, indeed, highly valued. This tie had to be severed – uncoupled or
overcome – before the surge towards political activism and the creation of an independent republic could
consciously be entertained. Adams and his generation stood on this cusp between the time when
Massachusetts Bay was a proud colony of Great Britain and when life changed in America such that a
profound intellectual and emotional shift in political perspective became possible.26 In making this change,
the Law was the heart of the matter; and Adams became the most powerful voice of the Law.
As a preliminary to our consideration of Adams ideas, there are three aspects of the Law that so
profoundly influenced Adams that they must be flagged and included in any serious consideration of
Adams’ republicanism. First there is Adams’ education, formal and informal. Second, it is difficult to
sufficiently emphasize Adams’ extraordinary, life-long commitment to legal scholarship, including the
amassing of a splendid library, including an exceedingly formidable legal library. Third, there is Adams’
commitment to the Law. Fourth, we must recognize the extraordinarily formative importance of Adams’
diverse and busy almost two decades of legal practice, including some of the most famous cases
associated with the American Revolution. All of these factors provide a window into the depth and breadth
of Adams’ immersion in the Law and, concomitantly, the impact on Adams’ political ideas of that legal
experience and the Law. For instance, Adams’ view of the nature of man, his realistic understanding and

26
Adams’ biographer Page Smith believed that this attachment was never really overcome by John
Adams; it simply coexisted with his even stronger attachment to America. See Appendix B. In contrast,
recent historians describe an American colonial society with an increasing devotion to the British
monarch, a culture that was consciously cultivated by the metropolis and British magistrates in America
as a means of cementing what had become a far-flung British Empire. This was a relatively quiet century
in which England was politically occupied, and life in the colonial backwaters of the British Empire has
tended to be swept up into the study of 1750 and later. No doubt hostility to the king was a view shared
by some emigres who had left Stuart England for religious reasons, and this most definitely included
Englanders. This did not, however, equate to hostility to kingship. For studies on the British empire, see
Appendix B. For one study on the diverse and multiple environments of colonial America, see Brendan
McConville, The King's Three Faces: The Rise & Fall of Royal America, 1688-1776 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2006), Ch. 1. Note that the Kingdom of England, which included
England and Wales, did not unite with the Kingdom of Scotland to become Great Britain, until the Acts of
Union in 1707, i.e., after the Stuarts. (Great Britain did not unite with the Kingdom of Ireland, to become
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland or the UK, until 1922).
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acceptance of human beings with all their flaws and glorious attributes, was significantly impacted by
Adams’ every day legal practice. Some of Adams’ cases will be introduced in connection with the ideas to
which they relate, and from which Adams undoubtedly drew lessons that contributed to his political views.
The other three factual matters will be addressed here. The cumulative impact of these influences
overwhelmingly inform Adams’ ideas, and go a long way in explaining how it was that the very lawful,
conservative Adams became the beacon of republican revolution.
Adams was born in 1735, two years and a century after Algernon Sidney's nascence. Unlike
Algernon’s anticipated portion, there were no family expectations that John would achieve the greatest
heights of public service. He was a farmer’s oldest son. John Adams Senior was a man who worked with
his hands, a highly respected community member, deacon of the Congregationalist church in the Massachusetts Bay town of Braintree.27 From his father Adams inherited a strong sense of community and duty to
his fellow man. The town of Braintree was ten miles from Boston, the capital of the Bay colony and the
largest city in the American colonies with a population in 1760 of about sixteen thousand.28 A thriving
commercial center with well-established merchant and other first-families, Boston teemed.29 Adams’ bio-

27
In 1802, when the elderly (seventy-year-old) former President began his Autobiography, he described
his father as "the honestest Man I ever knew. In Wisdom, Piety, Benevolence and Charity In proportion to
his Education and Sphere of Life, I have never seen his Superiour."Autobiography of John Adams (“Autobiography”), JA D&A, Vol. III, p. 256. Adam’s father was dubbed Deacon John by historians to distinguish
him from his prominent son, the good life in Congregationalist terms was a life in consonance with and
service to God, one’s community and one’s family. Deacon John was a role model, working not only as a
farmer, but also as a cordwainer (shoemaker), tithingman (which meant something like a local law enforcement official responsible for preventing disorderly conduct, or serving in an annually elected capacity
as the local official responsible for preserving order in church and enforcing Sabbath observance), tax
collector, militia officer, selectman (elected nine times), and deacon of the North Precinct Church for
fourteen years. Adams said that, “almost all the Business of the Town [was] managed by” his father “for
20 Years together.” JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 1 n.2, quoting “Memoranda on a copy of Deacon John Adams’ Will,
10 July 1761, Adams Papers, Wills and Deeds; “tithingman” in OED, entry first published in 1912, http://
www.oed.com.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/view/Entry/202581?rskey=GkZSqZ&result=1#eid (May 2, 2015).
28

Experts debate the accuracy of population data in the colonies generally and New England specifically.
According to Lawrence W. Kennedy's Planning the City Upon a Hill: Boston Since 1630 (Amherst, MA:
The University of Massachusetts Press, 1992), Boston had a population of 1,200 in 1640, 6,700 in 1700,
16,382 in 1742 and 15,631 in 1760. There is no data for 1750; my 16,000 figure is an approximation.
See "Boston History and Architecture" at www.iboston.org/mcp.php?pid=popFig (12-25-14).
29

At twenty-four, Adams remarked, “Who can study in Boston streets…. My Eyes are so diverted with
Chimney Sweeps, Carriers of Wood, Merchants, Ladies, Priests, Carts, Horses, Oxen, Coaches, Market
men and Women, Soldiers, Sailors, and my Ears with the Rattle Gabble of them all that I cant think long
enough in the Street upon any one Thing to start and pursue a Thought…. My Attention is solicited every
moment by some new object of sight, or some new sound.” JA D&A, Vol. I, pp. 80-81 (March 19, 1759).
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graphers like to illustrate the social stratification that existed in eighteenth-century Boston by referencing the
fact that Adams was number fourteen out of twenty-five when he entered Harvard, where student ranking
was based on social status not merit.30 Worth noting, however, is that a farmer’s son could attend at all.
Deacon Adams expected his son to become a pastor, but the profession did not appeal to John .31
Taking a position upon graduation as a grammar school Latin master, Adams decided to study law.32 There
were no law schools in America. With the exception of the fortunate wealthy few who were sent to London to
study at the Inns of Court, British Americans studied law by apprenticing with a practicing attorney. Even this
was not a ready option for Adams. As he later remarked, "I had no Money."33 Adams became an apprentice
to an attorney in Worcester, where Adams taught, who “had all the most essential Law Books.” He spent
about two years “Reading Law.”34 In contrast to what Adams perceived to be the mentally inhibiting and
interpersonally ugly professional life of a preacher, in law he would “have Liberty to think for myself without
molesting others or being molested myself.”35 To be free in life Adams needed professional liberty.

30

It is interesting to note that, “of the thirteen classmates ranked above Adams, just one became a
minister; most became merchants, lawyers, or judges.” Alan Ryerson, John Adams’s Republic: The One,
the Few, and the Many (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), p. 29; see also Grant,
John Adams: Party of One, pp. 24-25. What we do not see in the 1750s among the socially high-ranking
students in Adams’ class at Harvard is a gentleman farmer or plantation owner, viz., an aristocratic young
man, which contrasts sharply with the social milieu and opportunities available to the middle class in
some of the other colonies, e.g., Virginia. Alan Ryerson’s study covered Adams’ life, including Harvard,
which Ryerson characterized as “a decidedly small affair” in 1751 when Adams began his studies there.
John Adams’s Republic, p. 27. I am indebted to Ryerson’s study for several reasons. It provides a very
useful jumping off point or baseline for my own convictions about Adams’ political ideas, some of which
dovetail with those of Ryerson, others not. It also constitutes a rich documentary resource, and includes
a very useful Chronology of John Adams’s Political Study and Writings. As the former academic director
and historian of the David Library of the American Revolution, Ryerson was the editor-in-chief of The
Adams Papers for almost thirty years, from 1983 to 2001. His familiarity with all texts “Adams” is
unsurpassable, particularly those within the array of Adams’ collections.
31

As the son of a religious man, young Adams frequented church, a practice he continued throughout his
life. For details on Adams’ religious observance, see Appendix B.
32

“[I]t was whispered to me and circulated among others that I had some faculty for public Speaking and
that I should make a better Lawyer than Divine… My Inclination was soon fixed upon the Law."
Autobiography, JA D&A, Vol. III, p. 263. Ryerson maintained that from the time Adams was at Harvard
he was “thinking politically”; that seems a stretch. Adams had started to read Henry St. John, Viscount
Bolingbroke in 1756; but in his dotage Adams opined that Bolingbroke had little impact on him, and there
is no reason to challenge his studied observation. See “A Chronology of John Adams’s Political Study
and Writings” Ryerson, John Adams’s Republic, pp. 32-33 & 525.
33

Autobiography, JA D&A, Vol. III, p. 263.

34

Id, p. 264.

35

As Adams philosophically and religiously mused in this very letter at the age of twenty-one, “that Being
who has poured around me, a great Profusion, of those good Things that I really want, because he has
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Adams began practicing law in his home town, but quickly turned to the most highly-regarded
members of the Boston bar to sponsor his appearance in the Boston courts, which led to a Boston legal
career.36 To gain the support of the most impressive attorneys in town, Adams embarked upon an
extraordinary program of self-study beginning with the analysis of the civil law in the original Greek and
Latin.37 In a late-1758 draft of a letter to a Harvard classmate, Adams waxed poetic on the “unlimited
Field” that he had entered: “A Field in which Demosthenes, Cicero, and others of immortal Fame have
exulted before me! A Field which incloses the whole Circle of Science and Literature, the history, Wisdom,
and Virtue of all ages. …[C]an no Pleasure be found in tracing to their original sources in Morality, in the
Constitution of human Nature, and the Connections and Relations of human Life, the Laws which the
Wisdom of perhaps fifty Centuries, has established for the Government of human Kind.”38 Adams

kept from me other Things that might be improper and fatal to me if I had them. That Being has furnished
my Body with several senses … But all the Provision that he has made for the Gratification of my senses,
tho very engaging Instances of Kindness, are much inferiour to the Provisions for the Gratification of my
nobler Powers of Intelligence and Reason. He has given me Reason to find out the Truth.” Another
Cicero! Adams to Richard Cranch, August 29, 1756, PJA, Vol. I, pp. 15-17.
36
For an entertaining description of Adams’ courting of the leading members of the Boston bar, see
Smith, John Adams, Vol. I, pp. 37-43. The “unchallenged masters” of the Boston bar at the time were
Jeremiah Gridley, Oxenbridge Thacher, Benjamin Prat and James Otis, who intensely competed for
business.
37
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes would have been proud of Adams. In a speech, he remarked, “high
among the unrealities I place the recommendation to study the Roman law. I assume that such advice
means more than collecting a few Latin maxims with which to ornament the discourse, -- the purpose for
which Lord Coke recommended Bracton. If that is all that is wanted, the title “De Regulis Juris Antiqui”
can be read in an hour. I assume that, if it is well to study the Roman law, it is well to study it as a
working system. That means mastering a set of technicalities more difficult and less understood than our
own, and studying another course of history by which even more than our own the Roman law must be
explained.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. Law Rev. No. 8, 457-78, 476 (1897).
38

Indeed, the breadth of the potential professional world and arena of intellectual challenge that lay open
to Adams at times could be daunting: “I have so many Irons in the Fire, that every one burns. – I have
common, civil, natural Law, Poetry, Oratory, in Greek, latin, french, english to study so that when I set
down to read or think, so many subjects rush into my mind that I know not which to chuse.” The Earliest
Diary of John Adams, pp. 65, 76. At the ripe old age of twenty-three Adams wrote down his thoughts on
the purpose of such an intense intellectual effort: “But to what End this subtle Inquiry into Niceties.” What
were the motives that “ought to” compel him to study hard? “The Desire of Fame, Fortune and personal
Pleasure. A critical Knowledge of the Greek and Roman [languages] and french Poetry, History and
Oratory, a thorough comprehensive Knowledge of natural, civil, common, and Province Law, will draw
upon me the Esteem and perhaps Admiration, (tho possibly the Envy too) of the Judges of both Courts, of
the Lawyers and of Juries, who will spread my Fame thro the Province, will draw around m[e a S]warm of
Clients who will furnish me with a plentiful Provision for my own Support, and for the Increase of my
fortune.” Id, p. 77. Similarly, Thomas Jefferson counseled a cousin who was studying law that “Politics
and History” were essential components of a legal education. “Every political measure will forever have
an intimate connection with the laws of the land; and he who knows nothing of these, will always be
perplexed and often foiled by adversaries having the advantage of that knowledge over him.” David T.
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fantasized about the grand impact of such an accomplishment: “And by means of this Authority and
Consideration, with the Judges, Lawyers, Juries and Clients, I shall be able to defend Innocence, to
punish guilt, and to promote Truth and Justice among Mankind.”39
Although he was never able to live up to his own impossible expectations, Adams was a
jurisprudence autodidact, absorbing legal texts, principles and theory like a sponge. One of Boston’s
leading attorneys, Jeremiah Gridley, detailed for Adams the breadth of law requiring mastery, including
common law and civil law, admiral law and natural law. Gridley urged Adams to study the common law
most intensely and, specifically, to “conquer” Sir Edward Coke’s Institutes. Adams did so.40 Winning the
approval of the highly-regarded Gridley and others, at twenty-two Adams was admitted to the Boston bar.
He became an active member.41
Most formative in these early years was Adams’ exposure to the Writs of Assistance case, the
legal event that thrust Massachusetts Bay into center stage in the colonies’ struggle with the metropole
over the rights of the American colonists. Life in Massachusetts Bay had been relatively quiet during the
governorship of Thomas Pownall (1757-1760) and initially during Governor Francis Bernard’s administra-

Konig, “Whig Lawyering in the Legal Education of John Adams,” The Libraries, Leadership, & Legacy of
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, pp. 97-112, 101, citing Jefferson letter to Thomas Mann Randolph
Jr., July 6, 1787.
I wholly subscribe to Jacob Soll’s perspective that there is no question about “the important role of
classics in late-eighteenth-century North American pedagogical and intellectual culture,” and “Whether it
was the primary moving force or simply a major element of early American republicanism seems a point
of semantics.” Jacob Soll, “J.G.A. Pocock’s Atlantic Republicanism Thesis Revisited: The Case of John
Adams’ Tacitism,” Republic of Letters: A Journal for the Study of Knowledge, Politics, and the Arts, Vol. 2,
Issue 1 (Dec. 01, 2010), pp. 21- 37, 23; see also James M. Farrell, “‘Syren Tully’ and the Young John
Adams,” The Classical Journal, Vol. 87, No. 4 (Apr.-May 1992), pp. 373-90, especially 373 n.4 (string
citation of literature on the familiarity of eighteenth-century Americans with the classics).
39

Adams’ goal at this juncture did not seem to be political; it was predominantly moral. But there also
was a different sort of motive, one that stayed with Adams throughout his life: “the active Acquisition of
Knowledge.” The Earliest Diary of John Adams, p. 77.
40

Most famously, Gridley also advised Adams “to pursue the Study of the Law rather than the Gain of it,”
although he should “Pursue the Gain of it enough to keep out of the Briars.” Adams also should not marry
early, “[f]or an early Marriage will obstruct your Improvement, and in the next Place, twill involve you in
Expence.” Finally, per Gridley, Adams should not “keep much Company. For the application of a Man
who aims to be a lawyer must be incessant.” JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 55 (Oct. 25, 1758).
41

See, E.g., Autobiography, JA D&A, Vol. III, p. 274; The Earliest Diary of John Adams, pp. 82-98; JA
D&A Vol. I, pp. 48-50, 57-58, 62-65.
684

tion (1760-1771).42 But the Writs of Assistance case, followed by the passage of the American revenue
acts including first the Sugar Act of 1764 and then, most damningly, the Stamp Act of 1765, jolted the
colonies and, of our interest, Massachusetts Bay, out of their political doldrums.
The Writs of Assistance case was of great interest to many in the Bay as well as the other British
American colonies; but it had a particularly powerful impact on Adams. In 1760 a Salem customs official
applied to Suffolk County Superior Court for a writ of assistance to enable the royal customs officer to
break into private property – homes, warehouses, ships, shops – if he suspected that smuggled goods
were located there. Writs of assistance were the product of several Acts of Parliament that established a
comprehensive colonial customs system. The writs were valid until six months after the death of the
sovereign who issued them! Indeed, the writ that sparked this famous controversy seems to have been
procured in connection with the six-month rule, which required the issuance of a new writ because of the
death of George II (October 1760) and the assumption of the British throne by George III.43 The writs of
assistance were justified because of the suspicion of smuggled goods that were being hidden from
customs officials in order to avoid the tax Britain placed on them. Unlike a standard search warrant, a writ
of assistance was not specific to a particular person or property. It permitted its holder to enter any house
during the day with a sheriff, justice of the peace or constable if smuggled goods were “suspected to be
concealed” and, if necessary, in the event of resistance, “to break open such houses” in order to “seize
and secure the same goods.”44 No particularized warrant was required beyond this writ, effectively

42
For a detailed discussion of the changes in the political environment in the Bay in this timeframe, see
Brown, Revolutionary Politics in Massachusetts, Chs. 1 & 2, “Massachusetts Politics in the MidEighteenth Century,” & “The Beginning of the Revolution in Massachusetts,” pp. 1-37.
43

In 1978 M. H. Smith wrote an opus on The Writs of Assistance Case (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London:
University of California Press, 1978). Smith demonstrated that British interest in utilizing such writs was
afoot well before King George II’s death in 1760 since the Bay superior court issued the first customs writ
to a customs’ official in late 1755 or early 1756. The purpose of the writs was to successfully uncover
hidden illegal goods that had been smuggled into the colony, discovery of which provided income not only
to Britain, but to the customs officials who uncovered and condemned them. In addition to Smith’s work,
see Bruce H. Mann, “A Great Case Makes Law Not Revolution,” Law in the American Revolution and the
Revolution in the Law, Hendrik Hartog, ed. (New York & London: New York University Press, 1981), pp.
3-19 [originally appearing in 11 University of Conn. Law Rev. 353 (1979)].
44

12 Car. 2, c. 19, §1 (1660), 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. II, §5(2)(1662) and 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §6(2) (1696), cited
in JA Legal Papers, Vol. 2, L. Kinvin Wroth and Hiller B. Zobel, eds. (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 108 ns.5 & 7, 111 n.15. There is another applicable statute that
relates to the power of the Superior Court to adjudge the case, a matter immaterial here. See id, p. 132.
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constituting a general search warrant which was arguably over-broad and too intrusive and therefore
arbitrary - an unconstitutional search and seizure. The Writs of Assistance case, officially known as
Petition of Lechmere, stirred up Boston, particularly the Boston bar. The case in opposition to the issuance of such writs was argued by James Otis – a flamboyant, brilliant litigator whose capabilities
mesmerized Adams.45 Two of the other most renown lawyers in town also argued the case, Messrs.
Gridley (for the writs) and Thacher (with Otis, against). Adams sat in the courtroom and took minutes, or
what he subsequently termed “despicable notes” of the arguments. Months later he prepared an “Abstract
of the Argument for and against the Writs of Assistance.”46 The Writs of Assistance case was profoundly
formative for Adams in two striking respects. His eyes were fully opened to the constitutional dimensions
of the Bay’s difficulties with the metropole; and Otis’ impassioned, effective advocacy indefatigably inspired and motivated Adams throughout his life as he pursued a legal, political, and diplomatic career.47
Although the arguments on behalf of the colonists’ rights as British citizens, which was how the
Americans viewed themselves, would be teased out, elaborated upon, debated, and written about for
many years to come, it was Otis’ early articulation, in 1760, of the constitutional issue at the heart of the
controversy that for Adams (and others) stunningly expressed the fundamental principles at stake that led
to the American Revolution, e.g., “I will to my dying day oppose, with all the powrs and faculties God has
given me, all such instruments of slavery on the one hand, and villainy on the other, as this writ of assistance is. It appears to me (may it please your honours) the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most
destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of the constitution, that ever was found in an
English law-book. …It is a power that places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.”48

45
The other two lawyers were Jeremiah Gridley, representing the Crown, and Oxenbridge Thacher,
representing the merchants of Boston. Gridley, Thacher, and Otis were three of the four “unchallenged
masters” of the Boston bar. Editorial Note, “44. Petition of Lechmere (Argument on Writs of Assistance)
1761, JA Legal Papers, Vol. 2, p. 106.
46
Adams’ Abstract contained in the JA Legal Papers is actually a reconstructed rendition of Adams’ work
based on five distinct but very similar versions of the text. No copy of the Abstract has been found in
Adams’ handwriting. JA Legal Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 107 n.1, 122 & 134 n.103.
47

No doubt one of Otis’ capabilities that enthralled and impressed Adams was that he was a true scholar
of the classics “who wrote treatises on Latin and Greek prosody.” Bailyn, The Intellectual Origins of the
American Revolution, p. 25.
48

Adams’ Abstract of the Argument, “Petition of Lechmere (Argument on Writs of Assistance), 1761, JA
Legal Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 139-40, 141-42.
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Notwithstanding his exacting, coruscating argument, Otis lost; the writs were upheld. Sixty years
later, in a letter to his former law clerk, Adams vividly described the proceedings that he had witnessed
and, most dramatically, his appreciation of their significance. “Otis was a flame of Fire! With the
promptitude of Clasical Allusions, a depth of Research, a rapid Summary of Historical Events and dates,
a profusion of legal Authorities, a prophetic glare of his eyes into futurity, and a rapid Torrent of impetuous
Eloquence, he hurried away all before him; American Independence was then and there born.”49 Otis’
legal and oratory skill, and his command of history as a forensic tool, became a blueprint for the way in
which Adams sought to function as an attorney and throughout his career.
Whether Otis’ argument had the far-reaching political and constitutional impact that Adams
claimed, a matter that historians debate, for our purposes it does not matter. What matters is that Adams
thought so – at the time, sixty years later, and in-between when, for example, he substantially drafted the
fourteenth Article of the Declaration of Rights in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, the purpose of
which was paralleled in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution passed by Congress in
1789 and ratified in 1791, which protected the people against unreasonable searches and seizures. Otis’
constitutional argument, citing to the famous 1610 judicial opinion by Sir Edward Coke in Bonham’s Case,
challenged the doctrine of absolute parliamentary sovereignty that the illustrious jurist Sir Edmund Blackstone recognized in 1765 when he said in his Commentaries, “if the parliament will positively enact a
thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no power that can control it.”50 Consistent with

49

Otis continued, “The seeds of Patriots and Heroes to defend the non sine Diis animosus infans, to
defend the vigorous Youth, were then and there sown. Every man of an [immense] crowded Audience
appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take up Arms against Writts of Assistants. Then and there
was the first scene of the first Act of Opposition to the arbitrary Claims of Great Britain.” JA Legal Papers,
Vol. 2, p. 107, citing Adams to William Tudor, March 29, 1817. Adams’ letter to his former student William
Tudor, written over six decades later!, was not an entirely accurate depiction of Otis’ arguments; Adams
“put into Otis’ mouth the entire body of arguments against the power of Parliament developed over the
whole of the next decade.” Id. In another letter written by Adams in the same timeframe, Adams characterized Otis as “a genius, equally bold and daring, equally well tempered and qualified, as a wedge to
split the knotty lignum vitæ block of parliamentary usurpations over the colonies.” Adams to Dr. Jedidiah
Morse, Dec. 5, 1815, The Works of John Adams, Vol. 10 (Letters 1811-1825, Indexes), https://oll.liberty
fund.org/ titles/2127#lf1431-10_head_085 (3-3-19). Otis also wrote the 1764 pamphlet, “Rights of the
Colonies Asserted and Proved,” a highly influential essay that Adams described as “a work that was so
popular, that it was read in the [Massachusetts] House of Representatives, and went out to the public
under a kind of sanction from that body, who by their resolutions solemnly denied the right of parliament
to tax the colonies.” The work was then adopted in Virginia on May 29, 1765, and not long after by all the
other colonies. By this time, however, the Stamp Act had already passed – on March 22, 1765.
50

I Blackstone, Commentaries *91, cited in JA Legal Papers, Vol. 2, p. 117 & n.32. See Donald S. Lutz,
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Sidney’s views about the danger not only of absolute monarchy but of governmental imbalance of power
in any component of government, including the swaggering, overweening actions of a legislature, Otis
argued that Parliament’s power was not absolute but was tempered by principles of natural law, equity
and the British constitution.51 It was up to the judiciary to enforce these “principles of the law.”52 Years
later, in the final hours of his presidency, Adams selected John Marshall as Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court. Marshall’s most famous case was Marbury v. Madison (1803), in which the Chief
Justice made clear that Congress was bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of matters that raised
constitutional questions. In contrast, Otis had acknowledged that in England Parliament was supreme.53
Notwithstanding Otis’ admission about parliamentary power, he also argued that a legislature was
not error proof, and that it was the judiciary’s responsibility to advise Parliament of its errors. Its passage
of a law that legalized writs of assistance was a product of a legislature gone awry. 54 Accordingly, Otis
argued, the judiciary must genteelly encourage Parliament to avoid being arbitrary, which it was neither

The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge, LA & London Louisiana State University Press,
1988), pp. 139-47 who lists who was read the most during the founding era – 1760-1805; see also
Michael Zuckert, “Social Compact, Common Law, and the American Amalgam,” Ronald J. Pestritto and
Thomas G. West, eds., The American Founding and the Social Compact (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2003), Ch. 2, 37-73,39-42.
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JA Legal Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 119-20. Beyond Bonham’s Case we cannot definitively say what the
precedent was for Otis’ argument in the writs of assistance case. Adams’ “despicable notes” reference
Bonham’s Case but, beyond that, simply refer to Otis saying, “This Writ is against the fundamental
Principles of Law” and “An Act against the Constitution is void: an Act against natural Equity is void.” We
do know that in his pamphlet Rights of the British Colonies, which Otis published in 1764, reliance was
placed on Locke. We also know that Adams stated in his letter to William Tudor that Otis relied on the
same arguments and authorities in the writs argument. Id, pp. 119-20 n.41, 125 & 127-28; see Bernard
Bailyn, ed., The Pamphlets of the American Revolution: 1750-1776 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 419-82.
As we will pursue in more detail, Eric Nelson’s recent monograph, The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and
the American Founding, (Cambridge, MA & London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
2014), explored what Nelson saw as the supreme irony of the British Americans making the same
argument against Parliament that Parliament had made against the monarchy a century earlier. Sidney,
at least, precisely anticipated this overweening legislature circumstance.
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Adams’ Abstract, Petition of Lechmere, JA Legal Papers, Vol. 2, p. 144.
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Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
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JA Legal Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 120-22. On the Writs of Assistance case, see JA Legal Papers, Vol. 2, pp.
106-47; Smith, John Adams, Vol. I (1735-1784), pp. 51-56; Bruce H. Mann, “A Great Case Makes Law
Not Revolution,” Hendrik Hartog, ed., Law in the American Revolution and the Revolution in the Law
(New York and London: New York University Press, 1981), pp. 3-19 [orig. pub. 11 U. Conn. Law Rev. 353
(1979)]; see also M. J. Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University
of California Press, 1978).
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constitutionally designed nor did it intend to be. A “rapid Torrent of impetuous Eloquence” indeed. Adams
was captivated.
Both the Writs of Assistance “bottom line” and the content and delivery of Otis’ argument
constituted a life-long lesson for Adams. Substantively we will see this in the matters he addressed in
many of his essays. He also sought to cure this problem, or prevent it from happening, in the constitution
that he drafted in 1779 for the Bay, which became the basis for other state constitutions and, years later,
was further cemented by Adams’ three-volume opus, Defence, published between 1787 and 1789.55 Of
course there were other powerful influences along the way. But Adams’ pedagogical voice, legal
reasoning, and historical emphasis in support of the assertion that government must be designed in a
way that avoided to the maximum extent possible the exercise of arbitrary power by a component of that
government, whatever form of government there might be, and whatever part of the government
exercising arbitrary power, was a lesson learned from Otis in the Writs of Assistance case.56
The first component of Adams’ entirely legal mentality and approach to problem solving and
governance, his formal and informal education, melds into a second profound and legal influence – his
extraordinary commitment to self-education, a project that began upon completion of his law studies and
continued for the close to seven additional decades of his life.57 Adams’ scholarship had placed
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John Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Governments of the United States of America, Against
The Attack of M. Turgot, in Three Volumes (Philadelphia: Budd and Bartram, 1797)(repr. Clark, NJ: The
Lawbook Exchange, 2015)(“Defence”).
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For another challenge to the. crown by Otis, and commentary on the political use of Sidney by British
American republicans, see Appendix B.
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The commitment to intensive study and the intellectual development of John Adams, particularly with
regard to political ideas and matters related to his profession, began in his early twenties when he was
studying law. As Grant observed, “Adams became the rarest of alumni, the lifelong student, a true
prototype of what another age would call an intellectual.” Grant, John Adams Party of One, p. 23. In
November 1760 Adams wrote in his Diary about what he had been reading and studying. “I have read a
Multitude of Law Books – mastered but few. Wood. Coke. 2 Vols. Lillies Ab[ridgemen]t. 2 Vols.
Salk[eld’s] Rep[orts]. Swinburne. Hawkins Pleas of the Crown. Fortescue. Fitzgibbons. Ten Volumes in
folio I read, at Worcester, quite thro – besides Octavos and Lesser Volumes, and many others of all sizes
that I consulted occasionally, without Reading in Course as Dictionaries, [Law] Reporters, Entries, and
Abridgements, &c.” JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 173 (Nov. 26, 1760). After he left Worcester for Braintree, Adams
continued this work, reading Justinian’s Institutes in Latin, Van Muyden’s Traccatio Institutionum
Justiniani in Latin, Thomas Wood’s Institutes of the Civil Law, John Cowell’s Institute of the Laws of
England, Sir Henry Finch’s Discourse of Law, Sir Matthew Hale’s History of the Pleas of. the Crown, and
some law Reporters, Cases in Chancery, “&c.” He was particularly intent upon re-reading “over and over
again” certain key legal texts, e.g., Coke on Littleton, the leading authority on common law. Additionally,
Adams sought to improve upon his understanding of natural law and civil law: “I am but a Novice in
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insufficient emphasis on this constitutive element of Adams’ republican thought. At the end of the
nineteenth century, the celebrated Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes asserted, “If a man
goes into law it pays to be a master of it, and to be a master of it means to look straight through all the
dramatic incidents and to discern the true basis for prophecy.”58 Adams surely embraced this modus
operandi. As early as 1756 the twenty-year-old Adams wrote in his Diary about the cultivation of
knowledge. Adams’ reflections constitute a window into the mind of a man whose life-long intellectual
fervor remained as he described as a young man. “I have never looked attentively into my own Breast. I
have never considered, (as I ought), the surprizing Faculties and Opperations of the Mind. Our minds are
capable of receiving an infinite Variety of Ideas.” Reflecting the enlightened thinking of the times, Adams
mused, “Our minds are able to retain distinct Comprehensions of an infinite multitude of Things without
the least Labour or fatigue, by curiously enquiring into the Scituation, Fruits, Produce, Manufactures, &c.
of our own, and by travailing into or reading about other Countries, we can gain distinct Ideas of almost
every Thing upon this Earth, at present, and by looking into Hystory we can settle in our minds a clear
and a comprehensive View of This Earth at its Creation, of its various changes and Revolutions, of its
various Catastrophes, of its progressive Cultivation, sudden depopulation, and graduall repeopling, of the
growth of several Kingdoms and Empires. Of their Wealth and Commerce, Warrs and Politicks, of the
Characters of their principal Leading Men,” etcetera, etcetera. Moreover, man’s capacity to absorb ideas
was virtually unlimited. “[A]fter our minds are furnished with this ample Store of Ideas, far from feeling
burdened or overloaded, our thoughts are more free and active and clear than before, and we are
capable of diffusing our Acquaintance with things, much further. We are not satiated with Knowledge, our
Curiosity is only improved, and increased.”59

natural Law and civil Law. There are multitudes of excellent Authors, on natural Law, that I have never
read, indeed I never read any Part of the best authors, Puffendorf and Grotius. In the Civil Law, there are
Hoppius, and Vinnius, Commentators on Justinian, Domat, &c. besides Institutes of Cannon and feudal
Law, that I have to read.” JA D&A, Vol. I, pp. 173-74. Adams’ “course of study” in the law “has been
described as the most exacting of any of its kind in that day.” Grant, John Adams Party of One, p. 36,
citing Charles Warren, A History of the American Bar (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1911), p. 171. Adam
often utilized his Diary as a way to remind (or chastise) himself about meeting his commitment to
intellectual development and legal scholarship, especially through reading.
58

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “The Path of the Law,” 10 Harv. Law Rev., No. 8, 457-78, 475 (1897).
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JA D&A, Vol. I, pp. 40 (Aug. 7, 1756). Around the same time Adams scolded himself about neglecting
his studies: “May I blush whenever I suffer one hour to pass unimproved.” Id, p. 35 (July 21,1756).
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This was the Adams mantra. He was never satisfied with his own intellectual commitment or
achievement even though both were remarkable. Notwithstanding Adams’ more than full-time career,
which began as an attorney and then evolved to political leader, diplomat, and president, his was an
insatiable intellectual appetite, a matter of becoming and remaining a very learned person, of internalizing
the knowledge and wisdom reflected in the innumerable texts available to him. It was also a matter of
maximizing his potential, e.g., “To form a style, therefore, read constantly the best Authors. Get a Habit of
clear Thinking and strength and Propriety and Harmony of Expression.”60 We have the ghost of the
autodidactic Sidney here.61 At twenty-five Adams observed, “[I]n Protestant Countries and especially in
England and its Colonies, Freedom of Enquiry is allowed to be not only the Priviledge but the Duty of
every Individual.” What did this “Duty” entail? “We know it to be our Duty, to read, examine and judge for
ourselves, even of ourselves what is right. …Every Man has in Politicks as well as in Religion, a Right to
think and speak and Act for himself. …I must judge for myself, but how can I judge, how can any Man
judge, unless his Mind has been opened and enlarged by Reading.”62 In part, these were Sidney’s
words; he also believed that men forming a civil society must determine what is in their own best interest.
“[E]very man must therein be his own judge.” This is true if “ten may as justly resolve to live together,
frame a civil society, and oblige themselves to laws, as the greatest number of men that ever met
together in the world … and nothing obliging them to enter into this society, but the consideration of their

60

Id, p. 84 (Apr. 8, 1759).
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As noted in an epigraph to this study, Sidney wrote the following to his father from his refuge in Italy, “I
have applied my self to studdy, a littell more than I have done formerly, and though one who beginns at
my Age, cannot hope to make any considerable Progresse that Way,I find soe much Satisfaction in it, that
for the future I shall very unwillingly (though I had the Opportunity) put my self into any Way of living that
shall deprive me of that Entertainement.” Algernon Sidney to Robert Sidney, 2nd Earl of Leicester, June
13, 1661, Arthur Collins, ed., Letters and memorials of state, in the reigns of Queen Mary, … part of the
reign of King Charles the Second, and Oliver’s usurpation. Written and collected by Sir Henry Sydney, …
Sir Philip Sydney, and his brother Sir Robert Sydney …Robert, the second Earl of Leicester, … Philip
Lord Viscount Lisle … Whereunto is added, genealogical and historical observations, Volume 2 of 2
(London: T. Osborne, 1746) [Ecco reprint from the Trinity College Library Watkinson Collection, undated],
pp, 718-20, 719.
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Id, p. 220 (Aug. 1, 1761). It was President John Adams who, in 1800, signed legislation to establish the
Library of Congress. Jefferson refilled the shelves of that Library with 6,707 volumes of his private
collection that he sold to the federal government after the British burned the Capitol in 1814, including the
new federal library, during the War of 1812. Robert C. Baron, “Introduction,” The Libraries, Leadership, &
Legacy of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, pp. ix-xxvi, xvii.
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own good.”63 For Adams the path was clearly emblazoned; one had to assume one’s duty when it came
to both politics and religion, and educating oneself was an essential component of that duty. As Sidney
said, “The wisest and best have ever employed their studies in forming kingdoms and commonwealths, or
in adding to the perfection of such as were already constituted.”64 Adams never believed that he had
done enough; there was always more to learn. But as a young man especially, Adams frequently chided
himself, e.g., in a very early Diary entry in which Adams inveigned, “I am constantly forming, but never
executing good resolutions,” referring to resolutions to study more intensely.65 Actually this was not true.
Adams’ determination to be extraordinarily well-educated was a resolution fully executed. John F.
Kennedy once wrote that the Adams family “had a special concern to foster links between government
and learning.”66 “Learning,” and particularly legal learning, was Adams’ lifelong preoccupation, as was
building a library to support the habit. At thirty-seven Adams regretted that he had not maintained “an
exact Journal” of his life, including “the gradual Increase of my Library.”67 Attention is due to the almost
unparalleled early American collection that is the Adams Library.68
Is it pure coincidence that, like Algernon Sidney’s father, the first book that Adams acquired, when
he was about fourteen, was a text by Marcus Tullius Cicero – in Adams’ case, The Orations of Cicero
Against Cataline?69 “Adams’s ‘earliest preserved possession’ is this small copy of Cicero’s Orations filled
with blots, pen trials, and swaggeringly grandiose signatures. The book’s battered covers shows significant
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DCG, II.5.98-99.
Id, II.6.112.
JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 6 (Feb. 11, 1756).
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“A Review by John F. Kennedy,” appearing in the American Historical Review in January 1963 and
published at the beginning of the four-volume Diary and Autobiography of John Adams. JA D&A, Vol. I,
[unnumbered] p. iv.
67

JA D&A, Vol. II, p. 67 (Nov. 21, 1772).
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In a recent essay, Beth Prindle, who is manager of the John Adams Library Project at the Boston Public
Library, similarly stated that Adams “collected widely and read deeply because he believed in the transformational power of books to distinguish the reader from his peers and elevate one’s stature on many
essential levels: intellectual, financial, social, moral, and spiritual. These were goals worth striving for.
Book collecting – from first to last – was John Adams’s pathway, not his destination.” Beth Prindle,
“Thought, Care, and Money: John Adams Assembles His Library,” The Libraries, Leadership, & Legacy of
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, pp. 3-19, 247.
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Zoltán Haraszti, John Adams & the Prophets of Progress (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1952), p. 15;
atalogue of the John Adams Library in the Public Library of the City of Boston (Boston: Boston Public
Library Trustees, 1917), p. 52; see
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wear from being jammed into 14-year-old Adams’ pocket as he walked the Massachusetts countryside.
Adams acquired and hand-dated the book in 1749 while preparing for Harvard.”70 Early in his career Adams
proposed to his Harvard classmate, friend, and fellow fledgling attorney Jonathan Sewell that they
correspond “upon the lofty subject of Law.” Adams had no doubt that, “Multitudes of needless Matters and
some that are nonsensical, it must be confessed have in the Course of Ages, crept into the Law.” At the
same time, “if the Grandeur and Importance of a subject, has any share in the Pleasure it communicates, I
am sure the Law has by the far the Advantage of most other sciences.” Accordingly, Adams proposed an
“exchange of observations” between the two friends via private (“secrete”) Letters. “But if we should be
detected, we can say that Tully and Atticus held some such Correspondence before, that never raised a
Laugh in the World.”71 Again, Tully – Cicero – was the litmus test. Adams was not unique in this regard; he
was traveling a well-worn path. For centuries Cicero had been an integral part of a fine education in which
the classics were prevalent.72 In Elizabethan England, for example, Sir Philip Sidney had embraced and,
indeed, embodied the Ciceronian concept of accomplishment through service to the state; and to be that
patriot one had to be learned.73 In colonial America Cicero’s work was utilized to teach Latin, and his
writing was viewed as a model of prose to emulate.74 Indeed, Cicero’s De Oratore (Orations) was used at
Harvard to teach rhetoric, and De Officiis (On Moral Duties or On Obligations), Sidney’s first Cicero text,
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Memorandum by Beth Prindle, Manager of Exhibitions and Programming, John Adams Library,
4/17/12, revised 10/22/12 (unpublished). I do not understand Ryerson’s suggestion that it was not until “a
littler later” than “the 1760s and early 1770s” that Adams “became immersed in this older literature,” and
“read the political and constitutional writings of the Romans Livy and Cicero, and of Polybius, a Greek
historian living in Rome, and finally studied the most celebrated political texts of Aristotle and Plato.” For
many studies on this subject, see Appendix B.
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JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 197 [January? 1761].
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As noted in Ch. One, while travelling on the Continent, Philip improved his mastery of Latin and other
languages by translating Cicero “into French, then from French into English, and then back into Latin
again by an uninterrupted process.” Ch. One, quoting Biography of Sir Philip Sidney, 1554-1586, The
Poetry Foundation, https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems-and-poets/poets/detail/philip-sidney (5-2817).
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Recall, as well, that Sir Philip, in advising his friend on the best way to experience “the delight of
knowledge,” said that above all else one should study Cicero’s De Officciis. Ch. One, n. 203.
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James M. Farrell, “‘Syren Tully’ and the Young John Adams,” The Classical Journal, Vol. 87, No. 4
(Apr.- May, 1992), pp. 373-90, 373-74. For some of the scholarship on revolutionary America’s reliance
on the classics, see Appendix B.
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was likely part of the curriculum as well. In short, well-educated men read and breathed Cicero.75 Adams’
attachment to Cicero remained for life and is profoundly reflected in his work.76 This was much more than
an intellectual attachment. It was a guide on how to live. It also was the gospel of a republican.
From early on Adams was fixated on building an extensive library and, particularly, a legal library.
“I was desirous of seeking the Law as well as I could in its fountains and I obtained as much Knowledge
as I could of Bracton, Britton, Fleta and Glanville, but I suffered very much for Want of Books, which
determined me to furnish myself, at an Sacrifice, with a proper Library: and Accordingly by degrees I
procured the best Library of Law in the State.”77 This lifelong pursuit is, of course, another reflection of
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Farrell, “‘Syren Tully,’” pp. 375-76.
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As an apprenticing lawyer in October 1768 Adams copied a Latin passage of Orations into his Diary.
Translated, the passage read: “Go forward therefore, my young friends, in your present course, and bend
your energies to that study which engages you, that so it may be in your power to become a glory to
yourselves, a source of service to your friends, and profitable members of the Republic.” JA D&A, Vol. I,
pp. 44-45, quoting from De Oratore 1.34; see Farrell, “‘Syren Tully,’” p. 379 & n.30. Another
contemporaneous entry in his Diary one wintry day recounted: “Yesterday and to day I have read loud,
Tullius 4 Orations against Cataline. The Sweetness and Grandeur of his sounds, and the Harmony of his
Numbers give Pleasure enough to reward the Reading if one understands none of the meaning. Besides
I find it, a noble Exercise. It exercises my Lungs, raises my Spirits, opens my Porr[s], quickens the
Circulations, and so contributes much to Health.” JA D&A, Vol. I, pp. 63 (Dec. 21, 1758). After he lost his
first legal case because he filed a defective writ, the mortified Adams “took up Tully to compose [him]self.”
JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 65 (Dec. 30, 1758).
Adams also read and applauded Cicero’s Pro Milone, from which he could draw upon the Roman’s
techniques and skill as a lawyer, and the specific methods of advocacy he used to “move the Passions”
and to convey “Grief and Fear” in defending an accused. Cicero’s effort to secure the judges’ admiration
of the accused by using a raised voice, the warmth of repetition, and the invocation of “pungent, keen
Questions,” were arrows in the lawyer’s litigation bow to “raise, in the Judges, Jury and Spectators, an
Admiration, and Esteem of the wise, humane, equitable and free Constitution of Government we are
under.” There was another decidedly political and equitable goal that would prove particularly relevant to
Adams: “The Talent and Art of moving the Passions … may be used to rouse in the Breasts of the
Audience a gallant Spirit of Liberty, especially when declaiming upon any Occasion, on any Instance of
arbitrary Conduct in an Officer or Magistrate.” The Earliest Diary of John Adams, pp. 74-76.
Cicero’s Orations was one of two books that Sodalitas, the Boston legal club to which Adams received a
coveted invitation, began its study group; the other was a text on the feudal law. Indeed, “the main object” of the legal “Junto, a small sodality,” was “to read in Concert the Feudal Law and Tullies orations.”
Nine years later, in a 1774 letter to former law clerk and friend William Tudor, Adams related an anecdote
about Cicero, who was highly effective in his governorship as Quaestor of the Roman colony of Sicily.
Through various experiences Cicero learned that “‘the People of Rome had dull Ears, but quick Eyes.’”
This led Cicero to conclude that to have an outstanding professional reputation one must be highly
accessible; it also was essential that one be seen and, therefore, “to stick close to the Forum, and to live
perpetually in the View of the City.” Adams’ lesson to his friend was to follow Cicero, and “mix yourself
with the World and through yourself in their sight.” For further illustrations of the vitality of Cicero to
Adams and his use of Cicero in his work as a lawyer, politician, diplomat and president, see Appendix B.
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JA D&A, Vol. III, p. 274. “He made his most considerable purchases during his ten years’ residence
abroad, especially in Paris.” Haraszti, John Adams and the Prophets of Progress, p. 14. It is interesting to
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Adams’ commitment to learning;78 When he was twenty Adams wrote in his Diary, “I long to know a little
of Ethicks and moral Philosophy. But I have no Books, no Time, no Friends.”79 Within three years of
initiating his law practice Adams noted that he had “bought some Books &c.” (even though, with the press
of increasing legal work, he had “read little Law”).80
Intermittently Adams recorded the growth of his Library. In January 1768 he recognized this
commitment in an interesting reflection. “To what Object, are my Views directed? What is the End and
Purpose of my Studies, Journeys, Labours of all Kinds of Body and Mind, of Tongue and Pen? Am I
grasping at Money, or Scheming for Power? Am I planning the Illustration of my Family or the Welfare of
my Country? These are great Questions.” Adams’ work limited the time he had to be a scholar. “In Truth,
I am tossed about so much, from Post to Pillar, that I have not Leisure and Tranquillity enough, to
consider distinctly my own Views, Objects and Feelings.” Nevertheless, however hazy the “Object” of his
studies, Adams was, as always, focused on the practical. “I am mostly intent at present, upon collecting a

note that Haraszti, who focused on Adams library, said that, “Naturally, law and government make up its
larger part,” but that, “Of all his books, Adams studied the works of the eighteenth-century English and
French philosophers with the greatest care.” Apparently Adams had purchased the latter “during his
embassy in Paris, but he evidently did not have time to read them then. It was during the French
Revolution – when he was Vice President and then President – that he read these books, most of them
twice. In his retirement at Quincy he returned to them for the third time.” Haraszti, John Adams and the
Prophets of Progress, pp. 15, 17. On the Adams library, see also n. 87. I would suggest that this
understanding may more properly reflect Haraszti’s primary interest than Adams. Law books
unquestionably dominated the Adams library, along with anything and everything related to governance,
including history. Some of the books that Haraszti may have in mind – “the works of eighteenth-century
English and French philosophers” – fit this category. In my own view, Adams’ interest in the philosophes,
which is the subject that Haraszti is broaching in this description, was precisely because of their impact on
governance, both directly, e.g., “Turgot’s essay on the American constitutions,” and indirectly, e.g., in their
treatment of human nature such as “Madame de Staël’s Influence of the Passions.” Id, pp. 17-18. But as
we will learn in considering the publication of “Discourses on Davila” and Defence, Adams was particularly
concerned about the impact of Turgot and what Haraszti called “the young radicals, the followers of
Turgot” who fomented a revolution in France that Adams thought treacherous to the welfare of the people.
Id, p. 20. An important part of this was their advocacy of unicameralism.
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We cannot precisely delimit the John Adams library because of the melding of his own vast collection
and that of John Quincy, as well as the impenetrability of distinguishing between books borrowed and
books owned. Sometimes we have records of his purchases; usually we do not. For example, a
December 1775 accounting that is part of the Diary referred to Adams’ purchase of the three-volume set
of James Burgh’s Political Disquisitions, or an Inquiry into Public Errors, Defects and Abuses (London,
1774-1775). JA D&A, Vol. II, p. 223 (“Robert Aitken’s Bill for Books,” and “Dec. 8th. 1775 Recd. of the
Above account in full for Robt. Aitken Frans: Sellers”).
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JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 22 (Apr. 24, 1756).
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Id, p. 224 (Nov. 10, 1761).
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Library, and I find, that a great deal of Thought, and Care, as well as Money, are necessary to assemble
an ample and well chosen Assortment of Books.”81
In a letter to Abigail in 1772 written while Adams was riding circuit and leading the “wandering,
itinerant Life” that was required to serve as counsel to people in remote regions of Massachusetts Bay,
Adams wrote, “I want to see my Wife and Children every Day, I want to see my Grass and Blossoms and
Corn, &c every Day. I want to see my Workmen, …But above all except my Wife and Children I want to
See my Books.”82 The Adams Library was “one of the greatest private collections of its day,” not to
mention “the largest personal library collected in America during Adams’ lifetime known to remain extant
and intact,” with nearly 3,000 volumes collected by John Adams in his lifetime and another 600 or so
added by family and friends.83 The collection included books published between 1514 and the late
nineteenth century, with the vast majority printed in Europe or America between 1700 and 1825. The
collection covered classics, literature, history, government, politics, religion, philosophy, law, science,
mathematics, medicine, language and linguistics, agriculture, economics and travel.84 Most exceptional,
and of course evidence that the books were read, is the marginalia by the man himself: “thousands of
interpretive and critical comments in handwritten notes throughout the margins of hundreds of his
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Adams continued, “But when this is done, it is only a means, an Instrument. When ever I shall have
compleated my Library, my End will not be answered. Fame, Fortune, Power say some are the Ends
intended by a Library. The Service of God, Country, Clients, Fellow Men, say others. Which of these lie
nearest my Heart? …I am certain, however, that the Course I pursue will neither lead me to Fame,
Fortune, Power Nor to the Service of my Friends, Clients or Country” Id, p. 337 (Jan. 30, 1768). Later
that year Adams bought many of Jeremiah Gridley’s books that had been put up for auction at his death.
“Introduction,” JA Legal Papers, Vol. 1, p. lxxv; Beth Prindle, “Thought, Care, and Money: John Adams
Assembles His Library,” The Libraries, Leadership, & Legacy of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson,
Robert C. Baron & Conrad Edick Wright, eds. (Golden, CO & Boston, MA: Fulcrum Publishing &
Massachusetts Historical Society, 2010), pp. 3- 19, 9.
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John to Abigail, May 1772, My Dearest Friend: Letters of Abigail and John Adams, Margaret A. Hogan
and C. James Taylor, eds (Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2007), pp. 26-27.
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“According to Colbourn, Adams’ library had 4,800 volumes which, bizarrely, is exactly the size of the
impressive Sidney Library that had 481 titles under the letter A!!! See Ch. One. Colbourn found that
Jefferson’s library at its peak had about 6,000 volumes. See Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience, pp. 13-14;
see also The Libraries, Leadership, Legacy of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. For more details on
Jefferson’s unique way of accumulating, housing, buying, selling, and re-buying books, see Appendix B.
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Memorandum by Beth Prindle, Manager of Exhibitions and Programming, John Adams Library,
4/17/12, revised 10/22/12 (unpublished).
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books.”85 And no matter how much Adams read, he was always interested in reading more. As he wrote
to Abigail in 1794, “I read my Eyes out, and cant read half enough neither. - The more one reads the
more one sees We have to read.”86
Given Adams’ commitment and interest, we can fairly assume that Adams read most, if not all the
books he purchased. In addition to the marginalia, another indicia of this is his profuse and ready citation
to so much of this literature in his own work, correspondence, and note-taking. Akin to the pervasive use
and associated grasp of history and other subjects that Sidney evidenced in his Discourses, Adams
exhibited an extraordinary breadth of legal and other scholarship in his work. The printed Catalogue of
Adams’ books, if not precise, is a solid indicia of the dimensions of the John Adams’ Collection, and lists a
vast array of legal texts – treatises, reports, books on the philosophy of law, and on legal history.87 The
breadth and depth of literacy and, most notably, legal and political literacy manifest in the Adams Library
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Id. Cf. H. J. Jackson, “John Adams’s Marginalia, Then and Now,” in The Libraries, Leadership, &
Legacy of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, pp. 59-79, 63 (“Though he left an interesting body of
commentary in about a hundred extant books, that is a hundred out of three thousand or more.)
Harazsti’s brilliant monograph, John Adams and the Prophets of Progress, is devoted to the consideration
of Adams and his ideas in light of his most substantive marginal commentary.
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John to Abigail, Dec. 28, 1794, Founders Online, National Archives, last modified June 29, 2017,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-10-02-0209 (9-3-17). [Original source: The Adams
Papers, Adams Family Correspondence, vol. 10, January 1794 – June 1795, ed. Margaret A. Hogan, C.
James Taylor, Sara Martin, Hobson Woodward, Sara B. Sikes, Gregg L. Lint, and Sara Georgini.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011, pp. 325–327.]
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Recognizing the limitations of reliance on the John Adams Library Catalogue, the “Introduction” to JA
Legal Papers, Vol. 1, p. lxxvi, described Adams’ collection as follows: “This work shows, for example, that
he owned at least nineteen volumes of reports, including Barnardiston, Burrow, Coke, Croke, Hobart,
Delyng Lord Raymond, Salkeld, Saunders, and Vernon; Bacon’s and Viner’s Abridgements; Ruffhead’s
English Statutes at Large; Rastell’s, Coke’s and Lilly’s books of entries; and a large number of treatises
and general works on common law, civil law, the law of nations, and more general jurisprudential topics.”
Furthermore, “Among the treatises were Gilbert’s works on the Exchequer, the Court of Chancery, and
feudal tenures; Barrington, Observations on the Statutes; Godolphin, Orphans’ Legacy and Repertorium
Canonicum; Foley, Poor Laws; Fortescue, De Laudibus Angliae; Calvinus, Lexicon Juridicum; Gardiner,
Istructor Clericalis; Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown; Hawkis, Pleas of the Crown; the State Trials;
Selden, Opera Omnia; Malynes, Lex Mercatoria; Swinburne, Testaments and Last Wills; Blackston,
Commentaries, in English and American editions (to the latter of which Adams was a subscriber); and
many other 18th-century legal works.”
A detailed description of the extraordinary collection, including the vast legal library that Adams amassed,
is provided in Appendix B. For another example of a fine seventeenth-century colonial legal library, see
the list of books owned by attorney Jahleel Brenton, Rhode Island’s colonial agent in England and the son
of a former Rhode Island governor, in Mary Sarah Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution: Colonial Legal
Culture and the Empire (Harvard University Press, 2008) p. 75 & 229-30 n. 4.
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is astounding, and insufficiently documented in the literature.88
Third is the matter of Adams’ commitment to the Law. This was an integral part of Adams’
identity, of which his ideas are one part.89 We can only begin to touch on this aspect of Adams’ personality and values, as well as its impact. In fine, it informed his career and his life. One example of this
commitment is evident in the so-called Clarendon letters that Adams authored in 1766. More detailed
consideration of the ideas in the Clarendon letters will follow.90 But what is important to recognize here is
that these letters were intensely autobiographical, poignantly display Adams’ passionate adoration of and
commitment to the Law, and evidence his keen juridical acumen. In January 1766, thirty-one-year-old
Adams, a/k/a Clarendon, wrote, “The gallant Struggle in America, is founded in Principles so indisputable,
in the moral Law, in the revealed Law of God, in the true Constitution of great Britain, and in the most
apparent Welfare of the Nation as well as the People in America, that I must confess it rejoices my very
Soul.” Noting that he, Clarendon, had been “of the Royal Party,” he “never defended what could be
proved to be real Infringements on the Constitution.” Indeed, when he sat in Parliament he “was as
heartily for rectifying those Abuses, and for procuring still further Security of Freedom” as anyone. What
was the source of this commitment? For my “Education had been in the Law, the Grounds of which were
so riveted in me, that no Temptation could induce me, knowingly, to swerve from them.”91 Adams was
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Recently, see The Libraries, Leadership, & Legacy of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, Robert C.
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Iacuzzi,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Jan. 1953), pp. 127-28.
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Indeed, when he left the Presidency in 1802, Adams’ greatest disappointment was that because he had
lost so many teeth, he no longer conveyed the necessary studied demeanor suitable to his original
profession, making the return to legal practice impracticable. Joseph J. Ellis, Passionate Sage: The
Character and Legacy of John Adams (New York & London: W. W. Norton & Co., 2001) (orig. pub. 1993),
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Adams, “II. The Earl of Clarendon [Adams] to William Pym,” [Jan. 20, 1766,] (“Clarendon II”) PJA, Vol. I,
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attributing to Clarendon a profound commitment to the Law; but the quality could not be more
quintessential John Adams. He was no poet; but Adams was a brilliant jurist, as well as a precise and
strategic legal thinker and writer. He thought in terms of justice: witness his Earliest Diary entry when he
returned home to Braintree in 1758 after apprenticing with a lawyer in Worcester: “Q[uery]. Has any
Species of Animals, besides Mankind, ever given Proofs that they have any idea of Justice, of R[igh]t or
Wrong.”92 Adams honed his legal skills as a practicing attorney and then applied them frequently to
generate legal solutions to concurrent and often volatile political controversies. Adams’ ambition and
political interest were prerequisites to his success. But it was his commitment to the Law that was the
sine qua non of his revolutionary role. This was empowered by the formidability of Adams’ legal acumen,
and his ability to express in writing his redoubtable analytical skill as well as the ideas of others that
repeatedly propelled him into pivotally important legal and political posts.
One can only understate Adams’ orientation to say that he was a legally-minded man. Not only
was his personal writing drenched in legal cases and concepts, Adams’ perspective on the world was
suffused by law. In the many hats that he wore over his lifetime, it is patently clear that Adams functioned
most effectively, and contributed most dramatically, when he was able to be a legal advocate, whether in
oral arguments, e.g., in defending men accused of the Boston Massacre, or in the Continental Congress or
his numerous written works – not only legal essays, articles, instructions, letters, and correspondence, but

pp. 161-64. The law was “riveted” in Adams from the time he began his legal education. As he noted in
his first Clarendon letter and in another draft “Clarendon” entry in his Diary, in considering the events of
the times, one must “Recollect the old Sage Coke,” and recollect Magna Charta. Adams, “I. The Earl of
Clarendon [Adams] to William Pym,” [Jan. 13, 1766,] (“Clarendon I”) PJA, Vol. I, pp. 158-61, 159; JA
D&A, Vol. I, p. 274 (Dec. 25, 1765); id, p. 276 (Dec. 26, 1765). In Clarendon II, the Earl (a/k/a Adams)
told a story about a conversation he had with his father just before the “good old Gentleman” died.
Describing his dad, he stated, “I see … in his venerable Countenance, that parental Affection to me, that
Zeal for the Law, that fervent Love of his Country, that exalted Piety to God and Good will to all Mankind,
which constituted his real Character” – surely an encomium by Adams to his own father, who had died
just four years earlier. “Clarendon” then explained how his father charged him, “on my Blessing, never to
forget this Nation, but to stand by the Law, the Constitution, and the real Welfare and Freedom of this
Nation vs. all Temptations, &c.” Clarendon II, PJA, Vol. I, p. 161; JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 276 (Dec. 26, 1765).
The anecdote ends because immediately upon uttering these words Clarendon’s father melodramatically
dropped dead! Clarendon II, PJA, Vol. I, p. 162; JA D&A, p. 276 (Dec. 26, 1776). But the message
remained: if one stands by the Law, one protects one’s country and one’s people. Whether or not
Clarendon held this view, Adams certainly did.
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“[On the Law of Nature and the Moral Sense Among Animals and Among Men, October-December
1758],” The Earliest Diary of John Adams: June 1753-1754, Sept. 1758-1759 (Cambridge, MA: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 53.
699

draft treaties, rules for the navy, constitutions and other critically important legal documents. Adams could
both write laws that his fellow Congressmen sought; he applied the law, and he did so exceedingly
pragmatically and brilliantly. “John Adams was before anything else a practicing lawyer – a man of the
office, the library, and the courts.”93 Although Adams’ legal career ended prematurely as he segued into
diplomacy and politics, the man left the practice of law but the law did not leave the man. The formidability
of Adams’ legal acumen was evident from the beginning. Young Adams had an unusually strong grasp of
law for a fledgling attorney, and his depth of understanding and the scope and nature of the legal work that
he did only grew profoundly over time. In all his work and in the variety of roles that he played Adams’
constant frame of reference, his benchmark, his touchstone, was the Law, that overarching understanding
of law as a means by which man can create a just society and achieve a good life.94
Adams also embraced the dignity of the Law, what he saw as its high-mindedness, its moral
compass. “Labour to get distinct Ideas of Law, Right, Wrong, Justice, Equity. Search for them in your own
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Adams’ redoubtable advocacy skills are evident in a remarkable set of 1780 letters, generally
overlooked or dismissed by scholars, that were written to a Dutchman named Hendrik Calkoen when
Adams was serving as a diplomat in Amsterdam. Calkoen was described by Adams as “the giant of the
law in Amsterdam,” a “man of letters, well read in law and history, and an elegant writer.” Beyond a onepage discussion in the 1962 two-volume Smith biography, scholars have not detailed the Calkoen-Adams
correspondence, which consists in a lengthy letter from Calkoen setting forth twenty-nine very good
questions about the status of events in America, and twenty-six responsive letters by Adams. See PJA,
Vol. 10, pp. 196-252. Most formidable was Calkoen’s first question: To encourage and Establish as much
as possible the general credit of the United States of North America here in Holland,” which “above all
things” would require “exact authentic and True information of the present Situation of her affairs,
accompanied by a previous, Short, tho real account of their course, before during and after the
commencement of the troubles, till this day.” Hendrik Calkoen to John Adams, Aug. 31, 1780 letter in
Dutch with an English translation, PJA Vol. 10, pp. 99-117, 107. Adams undertook this intimidating
assignment that likely no one else could have possibly done, and certainly not alone, because Calkoen
was the critical voice, the expert, on whom Dutch bankers were relying before they would loan
desperately needed money to the newly united States. Some scholars, including the editors of The
Adams Papers, have characterized the Calkoen letters as “JA’s first propaganda effort in Amsterdam.”
This misjudges the letters’ significance as well as their method. The Calkoen letters were pure advocacy,
not propaganda. The former requires formidable substantiation in order to be taken seriously, particularly
given the audience to whom these letters were addressed; the latter does not. Adams’ reliance on law in
the panoply of legal matters that he successfully undertook is a story unto itself. See JA D&A, Vol. II
(Aug. 28, 1780), pp. 445-47 & n.3, citing Nieuw Ned. Biog. Woordenboek 3:195-197. In a letter to
American Foreign Secretary Livingston Adams similarly described Calkoen as “the first gentleman of the
bar at Amsterdam.” The description of Calkoen as “a man of letters,” etc., is in this correspondence.
Adams to Secretary Livingston, Sept. 4, 1782, The Works of John Adams, Vol. 7: Letters and State
Papers 1777-1782 (“Adams-Livingston letter”), pp. 385-91; Page Smith, John Adams, 2 Vols. (New York:
Doubleday, 1962), Vol. 2, p. 485 (Calkoen was “the leading lawyer of Amsterdam.”)
700

mind, in Roman, grecian, french, English Treatises of natural, civil, common, Statute Law,” he wrote.95 He
enjoined himself to do this in January 1759, at age twenty-three. “Nothing less than the Preservation of the
Health and Properties, Lives and Tranquility, Moralls and Liberties of Millions of the human species, is the
object and Designs of the Law.”96

He complimented a peer, a fellow young attorney, with the observation

that, “He has a sense of the Dignity and Importance of his Profession, that of the Law.”97 From the
beginning, Adams strove to be “a Lawyer of distinguished Genius, Learning, and Virtue.”98
At the same time, as lawyers are trained to do, Adams continuously challenged the Law, questioning the meaning, the purposes and the limits of virtually every legal matter that presented itself, sometimes
reflecting a surprising progressiveness.99 “Divorce. Is it for the Benefit of Society, for the Convenience
and Happiness of human Life, to allow of Divorces, in any Cases. I think it is.”100 In a memo to himself
about how Massachusetts Bay towns assessed taxes on people for the repair of the roads, Adams
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Id, p. 78 (March 14, 1759). With the passing of Massachusetts Bay Chief Justice Stephen Sewell in
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that would be requisite in his replacement, given the fact that this magistrate holds in his hands “the
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America,” Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 33, Issue 1, Article 4 (12-1-1957), pp. 51-97 (“It has been
estimated that down to the American Revolution only about forty-eight legal treatises were printed in the
colonies,” and “none of these…could be called a treatise intended for the use of the professional lawyer.”
Rather, they were meant to be used by laymen in their everyday business affairs. Moreover, “courts, as a
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highest bench between 1692 and 1775 were lawyers of a sort.”) Id, p. 55, 57-58; see Law and Authority
in Colonial America, George Athan Billias, ed. (New York: Dover, 1965).
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“I trust that no one will understand me to be speaking with disrespect of the law, because I criticise it so
freely. I venerate the law, and especially our system of law, as one of the vastest products of the human
mind. No one knows better than I do the countless number of great intellects that have spent themselves
in making some addition or improvement, the greatest of which is trifling when compared with the mighty
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Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Path of the Law, 10 Harvard Law Rev. No. 8, 457-78, 473-74 (1897).
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commented, “a Tax upon the Poles, and real and Personal Estates of the Town will not bring the burthen
to Equality…. Now what Reason, what Propriety can there be in taxing Ruggles and Hubbard equally to
the high ways. One gets his living by ruining the Ways, the other neither gets a farthing by them nor does
them a farthing Damage.”101 Again, in an entirely different context, “Quaere. What is an Insanity, in Law?
that disqualifies to make testament? And whether Saml. Edwards was so insane. ...There is perhaps, in
every human Mind, in some appearance or another, some Spice or Degree of Madness.”102 The subjectmatter of Adams’ challenges were as varied as the multifariousness of his work and his venues, which
changed from the bread-and-butter work in local and superior courts of Massachusetts Bay to the much
loftier legal issues of the province vis-à-vis the metropole that were argued in the press and the courts, to
the matters of importance to the Continental Congresses, the royal Courts and corridors of power in
France, the Netherlands and Britain and, ultimately, to the world of the Vice Presidency and Presidency
and finally in retirement. But the process remained the same: Adams questioned everything, and
particularly the legal basis for everything.
Virtually all his life – until he was an old man – Adams had to work for a living. In Massachusetts,
attorneys were most definitely legal jacks-of-all-trades. Adams represented clients in matters that ranged
from the ridiculous – “the Case of Dumb Tom the Pauper”– to the sublime – the high-profile challenge of
representing the accused in the two Boston Massacre trials.103 Adams was admitted to the bar to practice
law in Massachusetts Bay in late 1758 and continued to do so until he set sail for France in early 1778.
Historians typically flag Adams’ involvement in four celebrated cases: the 1761 Writs of Assistance case
in which he was an observer and note-taker; his 1769 representation of John Hancock for smuggling and,
later that year, his criminal defense of Michael Corbet on the charge of murder on the high seas; and the
most notorious cases of Adams’ career, the two 1770 trials in which Adams represented Captain Thomas
Preston and British troops indicted for the Boston Massacre.104 But in the Legal Papers of John Adams
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we have documentation on sixty-four of Adams’ court cases. That’s a lot of litigation; but it’s sixty-four out
of the thousands of legal proceedings in which Adams participated, sometimes only briefly but also it
varied tremendously, over the course of his legal career.105 The extraordinary diversity of Adams’ legal
practice is apparent from the Adams legal papers, as is his talent to both state the case in practical terms
so that a jury could understand it while also unfurling and integrating the theory of the law, particularly
English common law, into his advocacy and legal parlance. From the beginning Adams understood from
his mentors that, “A Lawyer in this Country must study common Law and civil Law, and natural Law, and
Admiralty Law, and must do the duty of a Counsellor, a Lawyer, an Attorney, a solicitor, and even of a
scrivener, so that the Difficulties of the Profession are much greater here than in England.”106 There was
no such thing as a legal specialty in colonial Massachusetts Bay; attorneys took the work that came in the
door. Accordingly, Adam’s legal practice was a ragbag, mishmash, hodgepodge of cases that covered
the fields of admiralty law, torts, contracts and commercial law, property, domestic relations,
administrative law, town government, conservation, religion, slavery and, last but not least, criminal
law.107 Bay lawyers traveled the circuit; Adams spent years representing clients in remote areas of the
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See JA Legal Papers, Vols. I-III, and “Chronology John Adams’ Legal Career, 1756-1778,” id, Vol. III,
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Adams (and his descendants) kept a rich storehouse of Adams’ legal papers. He retained abstracts of
reported opinions; but he also held on to “barely legible jottings of courtroom testimony,” research for his
cases and all sorts of other legal records – a resource that provides us with a window into colonial legal
practice in Massachusetts Bay in the 1760s and 1770s. On the state of the fledgling Massachusetts bar
in the decade before the American Revolution, see Charles R. McKirdy, “Massachusetts Lawyers on the
Eve of the American Revolution: The State of the Profession,” Daniel R. Coquilette, ed., Law in Colonial
Massachusetts 1630-1800 (Boston: The Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1984), pp. 313-58. Adams’
personal testament, his Diary, is chocked full of entries about pending cases, notes about applicable law,
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upon Court. Boarded at Treadwells. Have had no Time to write.” JA D&A, Vol. II, p. 38 (June, 1771).
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province in which courts only convened periodically.108 Throughout his life, not only as an attorney but
also as a diplomat and politician, it was evident to Adams that the best source of insight was everyman.109
The popular image of Adams is of a blustering talker. But Adams was a talented listener, a skill that he
fine-tuned while practicing law and, years later, applied in politics and diplomacy. He also had “a keen
sense of humor,” reflected in his Diary, frequently draped in sarcasm, that he put to good use as an
attorney, member of Congress, diplomat and statesman. As stated by Lester J. Cappon, editor of the
Adams-Jefferson correspondence, Adams had “an eye for the ridiculous and the incongruous, and a
willingness to poke fun at himself.”110 Of course, he was particularly attuned to attorneys’ skills, foibles,
and methods and, in the footsteps of Cicero, studied the art of law – rhetoric, affectation – as well as its
substance.111
Turning to Adams’ political thought, we will counterintuitively begin in the middle. For in Sidney’s
work the right of resistance was best understood as part of the issue of form and choice of government,
and particularly the right to resist a tyrannical monarch, a subject logically not the starting place for an
analysis of Sidney’s ideas. But in Adams’ work, the right of resistance is front and center for purposes of
appreciating what can only be characterized as the becoming of a lawful revolutionary.

[A] Revolution of Government, successfully conducted and compleated,
is the strongest Proof, that can be given, by a People of their Virtue and good Sense.
An Interprize of so much difficulty can never be planned and carried on without Abilities,
and a People without Principle cannot have confidence enough in each other.
Diary & Autobiography of John Adams, July 16, 1786112
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C. How did the Pragmatic Adams Become a Lawful Revolutionary?
Adams and his fellow Bay men and women were proud British Americans, patriots and happy to
be so. Their identity had been settled long before their birth, generations before, and while Bay citizens
were unusually politically active relative to the citizenry in many colonies due to the well-established,
ubiquitous, participatory institution called the town meeting, they were all British loyalists. As Adams
recognized in Thoughts on Government, “The Spirit of the People, among whom I had my Birth and
Education, … was always republican. …It was wholly owing to the Constitution of their Towns, which were
Small Districts incorporated by an early Law, and vested with Powers to assemble frequently, deliberate,
debate and act, upon many Affairs.” Unsurprisingly, Adams also gave credit to education, “the Establishment of Grammar Schools in every one of those Towns.” 113 Almost all the revolutionaries, including
Adams (Thomas Paine a notable exception), had to travel far politically, intellectually, psychologically, and
emotionally to cross over from the mindset of a British loyalist to that of an American patriot. Notwithstanding the benefaction to Adams of a new world separated by an ocean from the metropole and a consequent
environment that fostered political independence in its religiously inspired, distinctly middle-class citizenry,
a profound connection to the British monarchy was not only sustainable but, indeed, highly valued. It was a
complex thing for this tie to be uncoupled and then severed, only after which could the surge towards
revolutionary politics and the creation of an independent republic be consciously entertained.
Adams and his generation stood at the historical juncture between the time when Massachusetts
Bay was a proud colony of Britain, and when life changed in America such that a profound shift in political
perspective became possible. To those who were unable to successfully make that transition, being a
patriot meant committing treason.114 As noted in our consideration of Sidney’s ideas, it is the unique
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Adams (“PJA”) Vol. 4: Feb.-Aug. 1776 (Boston, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
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interplay of political ideas and historical contingency that made early modern Anglo-American republicanism explosive in its time. Certainly in the case of John Adams this is true. Adams was a practicing attorney. Attorneys pledge to their government that they will uphold the law. Moreover, Adams also became
a legal scholar, imbued in the law. How did he justify to himself, much less to others, this tectonic shift?
It is this rationale that enabled Adams to assert his republican values and be a lawful revolutionary.115
Throughout his writing, and beginning from early in Adams’ foray into public affairs with the
publication in 1765 of his articles collectively entitled, A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law
followed, about a decade later, by the Novanglus essays, Adams argued that it was the citizen’s right,
indeed his responsibility, to resist tyranny.116 Adams’ Dissertation was written as an intellectual exercise
when as a young attorney he had received the coveted invitation to join with members of the senior bar to
discuss the law. In it, Adams asserted, man has “RIGHTS … undoubtedly, antecedent to all earthly
government – Rights that cannot be repealed or restrained by human laws – Rights derived from the
great legislator of the universe.”117 What was “earthly government”? Adams talked about it all the time;
but perhaps his most succinct and useful definition is contained in his third, 1766 letter as the Earl of
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Colbourn may well have been alluding in a more ephemeral way to this juxtaposition of values when
he said that Adams’ intention was “to prevent the sins of the English fathers being visited upon American
descendants.” But while Adams was “Radical in his language against England,” Colbourn said he was
“conservative in his domestic political expression. ‘I dread the Spirit of Innovation,’ wrote Adams
anxiously a few weeks before independence.” Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience, p. 119, citing Adams
to Benjamin Hitchbourne [Hichborn], May 29, 1776, see PJA Vol. 4: Feb.-Aug. 1776, pp. 216-19, 218.
Note, however, that Colbourn’s reference here to Adams’ letter to Hichborn is somewhat misplaced. In
that letter Adams was commenting on his fears of instability in the country when faced with military threat
from Britain, and before “all the other Colonies have Constitutions to frame” and “a Confederation well
settled for all the Colonies” in need of formation.
116

Reverend Jonathan Mayhew, republican in his politics, had dramatically said the same thing years
earlier. See Appendix B.
Note that “George Washington’s papers are projected to fill ninety volumes, the Adams family papers one
hundred, Jefferson’s papers approximately seventy-five, and James Madison’s and Benjamin Franklin’s
papers at least fifty volumes each. Even Hamilton’s papers required twenty-seven volumes. By contrast,
paper collections for most other founders, if they are published at all, are usually between one and two
volumes.” Mark David Hall, Roger Sherman and the Creation of the American Republic (Oxford, UK &
New York: 2015), p. 211 n.4.
117

“III. ‘A Dissertation on the. Canon and Feudal Law,’ No. I” [Aug. 12, 1765], PJA Vol. I, p. 112. It was
precisely the exercise of this Right about which Adams voiced pride when he wrote James Warren on
Dec. 17, 1773, immediately after the Boston Tea Party: “The Dye is cast: The People have passed the
River and cutt away the Bridge: last Night Three Cargoes of Tea, were emptied into the Harbour. This is
the grandest, Event, which has ever yet happened Since, the Controversy, with Britain, opened! The
Sublimity of it, charms me!” Adams to James Warren, Dec. 17, 1773, JA Rev. Writings I, p. 288.
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Clarendon writing to William Pym.118 Government, said Adams, “is a frame, a scheme, a system, a
combination of powers, for a certain end, viz. the good of the whole community. The public good, the
salus populi is the professed end of all government.”119 Of course, the question then became, in every
instance, what particular actions were in the best interest of the public, which Adams came to realize was
not necessarily the same for all people in all situations (perhaps a lesson we have not yet grasped today).
As he reviewed the history of canon and feudal law Adams was unequivocal that men had a right to
their liberty as well as to knowledge – matters of natural law. He was quite clear that the right to knowledge
included “a right, an indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible divine right to that most dreaded, and envied
kind of knowledge, I mean of the characters and conduct of their rulers.” In Adams’s view, “Rulers are no
more than attorneys, agents and trustees for the people.” Accordingly, if they engaged in misconduct, or
materially failed to do their job, viz., if that “cause, the interest and trust is insidiously betray’d, or wantonly
trifled away,” the consequence was the logical one that followed when an attorney, agent, or trustee failed
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Adams’ Clarendon letters were contrived missives from a resurrected “Clarendon” submitted to and
published in the Boston Gazette in January 1766 during the Stamp Act crisis. The letters were written
under the nom de plume of Edward Hyde, the 1st Earl of Clarendon, that moderate, royalist English
political leader and historian who vainly tried to prevent the English Civil War from breaking out in 1640,
went into exile with Charles II, and later helped bring the Stuart king back to England, serving as Charles
II’s lord chancellor. On Hyde, see, e.g., Godfrey Davies, The Restoration of Charles II 1658-1660 (Oxford
University Press, 1955); on Adams’ Clarendon, see, e.g., Smith, John Adams Vol I, pp. 85-86.
Clarendon also wrote history, and was a member of the conservative, humanist Great Tew Circle in the
1630s. Adams’ letters were prompted by an August 1765 article that had been published in the London
Evening Post, reprinted in the Boston Evening-Post, and signed by “William Pym,” presumably intended
to be John Pym, parliamentary leader during Parliament’s confrontations with James I and Charles I in
pre-Civil War England. Pym “loftily dismissed the colonial arguments against the validity of the Stamp Act
with the simple assertion that, ‘a resolution of the British parliament can at any time set aside all the
charters that have ever been granted by our monarchs.’” Editor’s note, JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 273 n.3 (Dec.
26, 1765). Pym represented the ultimately victorious whigs of Glorious Revolutionary days who
advocated the supremacy of Parliament. Clarendon’s ideas were more nuanced, reflecting the fact that
he had been a critic of Charles I but also a monarchist who supported the king’s prerogative. Otis, whose
great legal skill we know Adams admired, replied immediately to Pym under the name of Hampden, the
famous hero of the English Civil War. Otis’ reply was less a rebuttal than an essay reminding the English
of their constitutional roots, to which Adams replied as well. (Unsurprisingly, the Adams Library included
Clarendon’s The history of the rebellion and civil wars in England, begun in the year 1641…, described in
the Dictionary of National Biography as “the most valuable of all the contemporary accounts of the civil
wars.”) On Clarendon and Pym, see “Hyde, Edward, Earl of Clarendon (1609-1674),” Dictionary of
National Biography, Vol. XXVIII, Sidney Lee, ed. (New York: McMillan, London: Smith, elder, 1891), pp.
370-89; “Pym, John (1584-1643),” id, Vol. XLVII (1896), pp. 75-83; see also “Hyde, Edward, Earl of
Clarendon (1609-1675,)” and “Pym, John (1584-1643),” Historical Dictionary of Stuart England, 16031689, Ronald H. Fritze & William B. Robison, Editors-in-Chief (Westport, CN and London: Greenwood
Press, 1996,) pp. 239-40, 440-41; .
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This statement is from Cicero’s De Legibus. See Adams, “III. The Earl of Clarendon [Adams] to William
Pym,” Jan. 27, 1766, PJA Vol. I, pp. 164-70, 167.
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to do theirs: “the people have a right to revoke the authority, that they themselves have deputed, and to
constitute abler and better agents, attorneys and trustees.”120 Sidney said the same thing, including the
rather poetic statement that, “The general revolt of a Nation cannot be called a Rebellion.”121
A critical event in the political transition of Adams and others was the passage in March 1765 of
the Stamp Act, the infamous crossroad at which Britain began its slide down the proverbial chute of its
American colonies’ independence. “This Year 1765 was the Epocha of the Stamp Act.” 122 Like the Sugar
Act, the Stamp Act was adopted as a means to recoup some of Britain’s costs from the Seven Years War
and the ongoing expense of maintaining colonial government; but in America, the Act was viewed hostilely
as an alarming ratcheting up of metropole control over the everyday activities of the British colonists.123 It
was an intrusive statute, and it is in that sense even more than in its actual economic impact, which
nevertheless was not trivial, that colonial reaction against the Stamp Act was so strong and pervasive.124
“As William Smith, Jr., a young, influential New York City lawyer, assembly-man and ardent loyalist, wrote
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Adams, “V. ‘A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law,’ No. 3,” PJA Vol. I, pp 118-23,121. The
Dissertation was written in segments and “at widely different times, under widely different circumstances,
and for widely different reasons,” beginning as an academic exercise in connection with Adams’
participation in the legal colloquium the Sodality in 1765. “[W]hat had begun as an essay in historical
analysis now became, in addition, an eloquent justification of American resistance to alleged British
tyranny,” viz., Parliament’s March 1765 passage of the Stamp Act. “Introduction,” “A Dissertation on the
Canon and the Feudal Law, May-21 October 1765,” PJA Vol. I, pp. 103-06.
121

Sidney, DCG, III.36.519.
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Autobiography, JA D&A, Vol. III, p. 282.
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For brief comments on the Seven Years War, including George Washington’s role, see Appendix B.

124
The Stamp Act required stamps of various sorts to be obtained in connection with all sorts of business
and personal activities. Some twenty-five pages long, the Act prescribed stamp taxes for a vast array of
documents that would be required in court proceedings, including the licensing of attorneys, which was
assigned the highest tax. Also included on the list of taxable activities were the papers required to clear
ships from harbors, bonds, grants and deeds for land, mortgages, leases, bills of sale, articles of apprenticeship, dice, playing cards, pamphlets and newspapers. All documents required to accomplish these
activities would now have to be written on specially stamped paper imported from Britain and embossed
by the British Treasury. Massachusetts Bay was up at arms, often led by Adams’ cousin Samuel and the
famous Otis. Standiford, Desperate Sons, p. 36. The Stamp Act especially burdened lawyers, including
John Adams, but also adversely affected skilled labor because of the tax on apprenticeship agreements.
It left virtually no one untouched. Id, pp. 14-15; see also Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution:
Colonial Radicals and the Development of American opposition to Britain, 1765-1776 (New York: W. W.
Norton & Co. 1992), Ch. Three, “The Stamp Act Riots and Ordered Resistance, 1765,” pp. 51-76. In his
Diary Adams bemoaned the economic impact of the Stamp Act on his legal practice, which was finally
blossoming in 1765. JA D&A, Vol. I, pp. 264-65 (“So sudden an Interruption in my Career, is very
unfortunate for me,” etc.)
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to a friend in England, ‘This single stroke has lost Great Britain the affection of all her Colonies.’” 125
Many Americans, including Adams, suddenly became acutely politicized. An eloquent reflection
of this is Adams’ authorship, an open secret, of the highly publicized Sept. 24, 1765 “Braintree
Instructions,” the purpose of which was to provide the town’s views on the Stamp Act for the benefit of its
representative to the Bay legislature. The Instructions denounced the Act, denied Parliament’s right to tax
the colonists without their consent and, “most grievous Innovation of all,” rejected the extension of the
Courts of Admiralty’s powers, an aspect of Britain’s encroachment that is often unappreciated. Boston
was a port town, and many legal matters related to events at sea. In Admiralty Court one judge would
now sit alone, without a jury, and with a built-in bias against the accused because of the “pecuniary
Temptation” to find against him, for which the judge would be financially rewarded by means of a sizable
commission.126 “What can be wanting, after this,” said Adams, “but a weak or wicked Man for a Judge, to
render Us the most sordid and forlorn of Slaves.” In Adams’ view this aspect of the Stamp Act was
“directly repugnant to the Great Charter itself.”127
While the Acts of Trade had consistently been viewed by the colonials as a “grievance,” the
Braintree Instructions warned, “In all the Calamities that have ever befallen this Country, we have never
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Standiford, Desperate Sons, p. 36. Adams was very disappointed in the behavior of his legal
colleagues. “The Bar seems to me to behave like a Flock of shot Pidgeons. They seem to be stopped, the
Net seems to be thrown over them, and they have scarcely Courage left to flounce and to flutter.” He was
an impatient man, dissatisfied with attorneys’ seeming acceptance of the Stamp Act. While he admired
“The People, even to the lowest Ranks,” who “have become more attentive to their Liberties,” men in
authority, which included the bar, seemed to be timid. Adams mused, “The executive Courts have not yet
dared to adjudge the Stamp Act void nor to proceed with Business as usual.” Adams found this “languid
Condition, this passive Obedience to the Stamp Act,” to be intolerable as a principle of law and in practice.
On legal principle, the passivity of the courts could be deemed and certainly understood as “by Implication
at least an Acknowledgement of the Authority of Parliament to tax Us,” which would lead inevitably to “the
Ruin of America.” On a practical level, “So sudden an Interruption in my Career, is very unfortunate for
me. I was but just getting into my Geers, just getting under Sail, and an Embargo is laid upon the Ship.”
Adams was dramatic, and took the Stamp Act very personally: “Thirty Years of my Life are passed in
Preparation for Business. I have had Poverty to struggle with – Envy and Jealousy and Malice of Enemies
to encounter – no Friends, or but few to assist me, so that I have groped in dark Obscurity, till of late, and
had but just become known, and gained a small degree of Reputation, when this execrable Project was set
on foot for my Ruin as well as that of America in General, and of Great Britain.” JA D&A, Vol. I, pp. 264-65
(Dec. 18, 1765).
126
“Instructions to Braintree’s Representative Concerning the Stamp Act,” Sept. 24, 1765, John Adams
Revolutionary Writings 1755-1775 (“JA Rev. Writings I”,) pp. 125-28, 126-27.
127

Id, p. 127. Immersed in developing his legal practice, Adams does not seem to have been privy to all
the political activity underfoot, but political opposition to the Stamp Act progressed. See Appendix B.
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felt so great a Concern, or such alarming Apprehensions, as on this Occasion.”128 Abiding loyalty to the
King was expressed; but so was a sense of betrayal. “Such is our Loyalty to the King, our Veneration for
both Houses of Parliament, and Our Affection for all our Fellow subjects in Britain, that Measures, which
discover any Unkindness in that Country towards Us, are the more sensibly and intimately felt. And we
can no longer forbear complaining, that many of the Measures of the late Ministry, and some of the late
Acts of Parliament, have a Tendency, in our Apprehension, to divest us of some of our most essential
Rights and Liberties.”129 Accordingly, the Braintree Instructions “apprehend[ed] this Tax to be unconstitutional.”130 Multiple grounds were cited: the rights granted to British subjects, including the Americans, in
Magna Charta, and “the Spirit of the Common Law and of the essential fundamental Principles of the
British Constitution” that the people should not be subject to “any Tax” imposed by the British Parliament
because British citizens living in America “are not Represented in that Assembly in any Sense, unless it
be by a Fiction of Law, as insensible in Theory as it would be injurious in Practice, if such a Taxation
should be grounded on it.”131 Aside from the fact that the Stamp Act “would drein the Country of Cash”
and “strip Multitudes of all their Property, and reduce them to absolute Beggary,” it was discriminatory,
making “such a Distinction and creat[ing] such a difference between the Subjects in Great Britain, and
those in America as we could not have expected from the Guardians of Liberty in Both.”132 The “Braintree
Instructions” was published in the Massachusetts Gazette in October 1765.133
Notwithstanding Adams’ pride in his community, he remained less than sanguine about the
potential outcome. “The executive Courts have not yet dared to adjudge the Stamp Act void,” instead
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“Instructions to Braintree’s Representative Concerning the Stamp Act,” Sept. 24, 1765, JA Rev.
Writings I, p. 125.
129

Id, pp. 125-26.

130

Id, p. 126.

131

Id.

132

Id, pp. 126-27.
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On the three drafts of the Braintree Instructions written in the Fall of 1765, and an associated Note
from the editors of the Adams Papers about its editing that is taken from PJA Vol. I, pp. 129-32, see
https://founders.archives. gov/ancestor/ADMS-06-01-02-0054 (3-18-19) As detailed by Edmund and
Helen Morgan in The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution, it was in this context in the summer of
1765, that an organization was formed, first dubbed The Loyal Nine and later, as it grew, the Sons of
Liberty. For details on the Sons of Liberty, see Appendix B.
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shutting down – failing to “proceed with Business as usual” – leading to a “languid Condition” pervading
Massachusetts Bay. The British Americans were litigious by nature, and the absence of court processes
and means to authorize significant business transactions ground commerce to a halt. This has personal
repercussions for Adams, who envisioned the demise of his budding legal career after spending “Thirty
Years of [his] Life … in Preparation for Business.”134
Little did Adams know that it was precisely because of the opportunity to enter into the political
fray that his extraordinarily distinguished legal and political career took flight. It was not only Adams’
authorship of the Braintree Instructions but also, in the late summer and fall of 1765, his writing and
publishing A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law in four installments in the Boston Gazette, that
brought his mastery of the law into the public eye. As one nineteenth-century historian characterized it,
“In the year 1765, … John Adams, at the age of thirty, entered the service of his country.”135 A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law was prepared by Adams as part of the legal study he undertook for his
weekly meetings with Boston’s leading attorneys.136 In sum, the Dissertation was one of the second
president’s major republican tributes, an ode to the British birthright of liberty, focusing on its historical,
constitutional grounding and the implication for the British in America: “Let the [legal] Bar proclaim, ‘the
laws, the rights, the generous plan of power,’ delivered down from remote antiquity. …Let them search for
the foundations of British laws and government in the frame of human nature, in the constitution of the
intellectual and moral world.”137
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JA D&A, Vol. I, pp. 263-65 (Dec. 18, 1765).
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Anson D. Morse, “The Politics of John Adams,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Jan.
1899), pp. 292-312, 293. (Adams “gave birth” to something else in July 1765 – his first child, Abigail,
known as Nabby.)
136
Adams’ Dissertation was later reprinted several times, including in the London Chronicle and in book
form in London (1768). “Chronology,” JA Rev. Writings I, p. 654; see also n. 76.
137

Years back, in an interesting article that endeavored to integrate jurisprudential, legal history and
traditional historical scholarship, Yale law professor James Q. Whitman argued that the revolutionary
lawyers, including Adams, confused custom and reason into “a farrago of ideas, without inner logic.”
James Q. Whitman, “Why Did the Revolutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and Reason?” The University
of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Autumn, 1991), pp. 1321-68. One response to Prof. Whitman’s
analysis, however, is why must the revolutionaries or anyone else, for that matter, have to choose or even
fully reconcile custom and reason? As we know, Algernon Sidney, who was not a political author covered
by Whitman, comfortably relied on independent but compatible arguments based on customary tradition,
as well as principles of natural law and reason.
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No doubt because of the legal ability displayed in his “Braintree Instructions,” in December 1765
Adams was recruited to participate in the legal work associated with Boston’s opposition to the Stamp
Act, as were Gridley and Otis.138 This dovetailed with the contemporaneous statement by General
Thomas Gage, Commander-in-Chief of his Britannic Majesty’s armies in North America, that, “The
Lawyers are the Source from Whence the Clamors have flowed in every Province. In this Province
Nothing Publick is transacted without them, and it is to be wished that even the Bench was free from
Blame.”139 Massachusetts lawyers had refused to use the contemptible stamped paper and, as a result,
the courts were closed.140 Ultimately without success, Boston sought to reopen the Bay courts of law
without the necessity of stamped paper. Adams had quite suddenly arrived at center stage. A Memorial
was prepared by the Boston town meeting and submitted to the Governor in Council, the executive power
of the province, seeking a hearing.141 It stated, “That your Memorialists having a Just Sense of the value
of the British Constitution of Government, under which they have enjoyed all the Blessings of Civil Life,
cannot but be deeply affected, when the Channels through which these Blessings are derived to us are
obstructed; which is at present our unhappy Case.” Justice could only be “distributed among the People”
through the Bay’s courts of law which, “to all intents and purposes,” were “shut up” without “Just and legal
Reason.” The Memorial asked the Governor to direct the opening of the courts and to hear the arguments
of “their Council learned in Law … upon this most important Subject.” The Memorial recognized a
principle that was pure Adams: “We have always understood that the Law is the great rule of Right, the
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This is the conclusion of the editors of Adams’ Diary and Autobiography. See JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 265 n.
1 (Dec. 18, 1765).
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Reid, In a Defiant Stance, p. 177 n.1, citing letter from General Thomas Gage to Secretary of State H.
S. Conway, Dec. 21, 1765.
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Adams/Warren Correspondence, p. 357; see also JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 265 (Dec. 19, 1765); “Chronology,”
JA Rev. Writings I, p. 654.
141
The Memorial stated, “That your Memorialists having a Just Sense of the value of the British Constitution of Government, under which they have enjoyed all the Blessings of Civil Life, cannot but be deeply
affected, when the Channels through which these Blessings are derived to us are obstructed; which is at
present our unhappy Case.” Justice can only be “distributed among the People” through the Bay’s courts
of law which, “to all intents and purposes” are “shut up” without “Just and legal Reason.” A Report of the
Record Commissioners of the City of Boston, containing the Boston Town Records, 1758 to 1769 (Boston: Rockwell & Churchill, 1886), p. 159. On the saga of the Stamp Act, see generally Morgan and Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis. For more information on the role of the Governor’s Council, see Appendix B.
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Security of our Lives and Propertys, and the best Birth right of Englishmen.”142 Whether Adams authored
this Memorial is not known; but as we shall see, the theme of the Law as “the great rule of Right” is a
critical, indeed the predominant element of mainstream early modern Anglo-American republicanism,
including Adams’ thought.
In his Diary Adams ruminated about the possible theories that should be used to make the legal
case for reopening the courts, recurrent ideas in Adams’ subsequent writing as well as other colonists’
work: “Shall we contend that the Stamp-Act is void? That the Parliament have no legal Authority to
impose Internal Taxes upon Us? – Because We are not represented in it? And therefore that the Stamp
Act ought to be waived by the Judges, as against natural Equity and the Constitution? Shall we use
these, as Arguments for opening the Courts of Law? Or shall We ground ourselves on Necessity only.”143
During the hearing on the reopening of the courts and to his surprise, Adams was nudged forward to
speak first. “Then it fell upon me, without one Moments Opportunity to consult any Authorities, to open an
Argument, upon a Question that was never made before, and I wish I could hope it never would be made
again, i.e. Whether the Courts of Law should be open, or not?”144 The upshot was that the Governor
punted, holding that he had no authority to decide this question because it was a matter of law; rather, the
issue brought by Boston to the Governor in Council was a matter for the Bay courts to decide.
Little is made of Adams’ description of events the day after this hearing and his own contemporaneous reflections, e.g., “I grounded my Argument on the Invalidity of the Stamp Act, it not being in any
sense our Act, having never consented to it.”145 Most recently, for example, Ryerson simply commented
that Adams was “not sure what could legally be done.”146 But further consideration of what was going on
here suggests that the days after the Governor’s punt were critically important. For the first time we are
witnesses to Adams’ unique analytical talent, his superb legal mind at work, relied on in the first instance
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A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston, containing the Boston Town Records,
1758 to 1769 (Boston: Rockwell & Churchill, 1886), p. 159. On the saga of the Stamp Act see generally
Morgan and Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis.
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JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 266 (Dec. 19, 1765).
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Id, p. 267 (Dec. 20, 1765).
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Id.
Ryerson, John Adams’s Republic, p. 53.
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by the people of Braintree, then Bostonians, later representatives from all of the British American
colonies, and ultimately the nation at large as well as the international community. Second, this was a
turning point in Adams’ thinking. For it was in this context that Adams posited a new legal reality, namely
that the metropole was prepared to legally unmoor its British colonies, or at least that colony, essentially
offering to the people of Massachusetts a choice between two untenable options, a legal conundrum.
Parliament had passed a statute the impact of which was either commercially oppressive and a denial of
the most essential rights of British citizens – as Otis had so brilliantly described in his 1764 pamphlet The
Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, “Can there be any liberty where property is taken
away without consent?” – or, Parliament was prepared to close the colonial civil court system, thereby
denying Bay citizens their fundamental right to justice.
What literally happened at the time was that after the evening meeting with the Governor in
Counsel Adams stayed in Boston overnight. The next day it was made clear to him by the Committee –
presumably, by his cousin Samuel – that “as I was of Council for the Town I not only had a Right, but it
was expected I should attend the [Town] Meeting” that took place that day.147 As the city’s attorneys,
Adams and Otis were asked to give their legal opinion about what Boston should do next, viz., “whether
any other legal and Constitutional Steps can be taken by the Town, towards removing the obstructions to
Justice.”148 When called upon, Adams ruminated – on the one hand, on the other hand – which may be
why Ryerson suggested that Adams wasn’t sure what legally could be done. But this was not what was
going on. It wasn’t that Adams had no ideas about what could lawfully be done; rather, it was not selfevident to Adams what the best legal option was. We see the quintessential judicial mind of Adams at
work, a man who did not give a minor legal opinion much less one of this momentousness without
thoroughly studying the matter. “I dared not give any opinion possitively, in a Matter of so much
Importance without the most mature Deliberation.”149
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JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 268 (Dec. 21, 1765).
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Id, p. 269.
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True to his word, Adams spent the next day, “At Home, with my family. Thinking.”150 Adams’ Diary
displays Adams legal deliberations on the impact of the Governor’s evasive finding that he was not
authorized to decide the question of law as to whether the courts should be opened without the use of the
detested stamps. In Adams’ view, the consequence of this evasion was that this was “the first Time I
believe, that such a Question was ever put,” whether the judges were supposed to decide this legal
question, “since Wm. the Conquerer, nay since the Days of King Lear.”151 Under the English common law
system of jurisprudence the question was unprecedented. It was clear to Adams that if they were in
England and “the officers of Justice Judicial and Ministerial suddenly stop[ped] and shut up their offices
… the King, in Council, would hardly recommend any Points of Law to the Consideration of those
Judges.” It seemed patently futile and circular to ask judges to decide whether their own actions were
lawful. “The King it is true of his Prerogative could not remove the Judges, because in England a Judge is
quite another Thing from what he is here.” On the other hand, the King had resort to other remedies: “I
believe the Commons in Parliament would immediately impeach them all of high Treason.”152 Astutely
recognizing that the Governor was the representative of George III in Massachusetts Bay, Adams
realized that the Governor’s non-decision created a legal vacuum, an ejection of the Bay citizenry out of
the protection of the King, their King, and indeed out of the “time immemorial” legal framework of British
constitutionalism. Revealing his legal talent, his ability to be ten steps ahead of others in his analysis of
the legal ramifications of an action, Adams appreciated that, “The King is the Fountain of Justice by the
Constitution – And it is a Maxim of the Law, that the King never dies.”153 Accordingly, the Governor, who
stood in the shoes of the King in Massachusetts, should have been able to decide the question. If this
was not the case, as the Governor’s decision suggested, and therefore if the people were “out of the
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Id, p. 270 (Dec. 22, 1765).
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JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 269 (Dec. 21, 1765).
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Id, pp. 269-70.
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Id, p. 270. Blackstone had explained this common law principal, distinguishing between a particular
king’s body and the office of kingship, which maxim apparently originated in the thirteenth century at the
time of Edward IV. See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Oxford Ed., Book I Of
the Rights of Persons, Wilfrid Prest, gen., ed., David Lemmings, Intro., Notes & Textual Apparatus
(Oxford University Press, 2016)[orig. 1765-69], ¶242, Ch. 7, “Of the King’s Prerogative,” p. 161; Hannis
Taylor, The Origin and Growth of the English Constitution, An Historical Treatise, 3rd Ed., in Two Parts,
Part 1. The Making of the Constitution (Boston & New York: Houghton, Mifflin, 1895), p. 405.
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Kings Protection,” was it not true that they were “discharged from our Allegiance. Are not all the
Ligaments of Government dissolved? Is it not (a Declaration of) an Abdication of the Throne? In short
where will such an horrid Doctrine terminate? It would run us into Treason!”154
If we want to identify an “ah-ha” moment in Adams’ awareness of the political realities of the legal
relationship between the British American colonies and the metropole, although I prefer to describe
Adams’ thinking, like many of his compatriots, as developing and gradually evolving in response to
changing events on the ground, this moment was pivotal. Adams’ acute analysis led him to conclude that
the legal consequences of the Governor’s action, not the actions of the colonists, produced a treacherous
result, viz., that however you wanted to characterize its relationship with the metropole (matters debated
then and now, e.g., part of the realm, of the empire, a dominion, etc.), Massachusetts Bay simply was no
longer part of Britain.155 It was on its own.
How did Adams react to his own legal analysis? As he always did. Here we have the second
prong of Adams’ talent as an attorney: his pragmatism and moderation. Indeed, as we shall see, Adams’
political philosophy always relied on a very realistic, grounded approach to problem solving. Accordingly,
Adams wrote in his Diary, “My Advice to the Town will be, to take the Board,” viz., the Governor in
Counsel, “at their Word,” and to go to the various courts, from highest to lowest, and ask them to answer
the question. In short, Adams sought to avoid the confrontational, existentially-threatening approach of
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For one exposition of the scholarly debate that reflects the contemporaneous debate about how to
characterize the relationship between the American colonies and the British metropole, see Appendix B.
Note that Adams’ conclusion that the colonists had been abandoned by the metropole and therefore were
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the concept of an act of civil disobedience. “Civil disobedience is an open challenge to law, but one based
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University Press, 2017), p. 232. This was not Adams’ perspective. He had concluded that there were no
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been perceived to be) who ruled contrary to law had ceased to be a ruler.). Reid, John Philip Reid, Rule
of Law: The Jurisprudence of Liberty in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth. Centuries (DeKalb, IL: Northern
Illinois University Press, 2004), pp. 68-69. One can distinguish this view from Adams’ empathy with, but
as a non-participation in the Boston Tea Party, for instance, which will become evident that Adams likely
found to be an act of civil disobedience.
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the Governor and simply solve the problem. His was a different legal approach, a less extreme course of
action, than the one Otis proffered. Otis “knew of no legal and Constitutional Course the Town could take
but to direct their Representatives to request the Governor to call a Convention of the Members of both
Houses.”156 Adams did not dismiss Otis’ suggestion; it was an option. But as a practical matter he
considered it a more extreme solution than his own recommendation. Adams considered Otis’ approach
Plan B, the second course of action that Boston should take if the first one didn’t work. After that, as Otis
also proposed, if the Governor refused to call a Convention of the two Houses of the Bay legislature the
people of Boston by means of their town meeting should “call one, themselves.”157
Whether we see another clear juncture, another step in Adams’ revolutionary development, when
Adams went back into town the next day is also an interesting question. For it was on Dec. 23, 1765 that
Adams went to Boston and attended Samuel Adams’ “Monday night Clubb,” mingling with many of the
prominent men of Boston, “Politicians all at this Clubb.”158 Perhaps to his surprise, Adams’ first Boston
entirely political experience was informed by “Gentlemen” whose “Behaviour” was “very familiar and
friendly to each other, and very polite and complaisant to Strangers.” It was hardly a rabble-rousing
environment from which he immediately would have been alienated.159 Here we have Adams’
conspicuous entrée into Boston’s grassroots political world notwithstanding his perspective, years later,
that “I do not say when I became a politician, for that I never was.”160 Adams’ Diary is chocked full of

156

Id, pp. 269-70.

157

Id, p. 270.

158
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insights about some of the personalities he encountered there, including Samuel Adams. His cousin was
“zealous, ardent and keen in the Cause,” but “always for Softness, and Delicacy, and Prudence where
they will do, but is stanch and stiff and strict and rigid and inflexible, in the Cause.” Meanwhile, Adams
literarily noted, “The Il Penseroso,” John Milton’s melancholy poem “The Serious Man,” nevertheless was
“discernible on the Faces of all four” of the men he described – Samuel Adams, Otis, and two other
activists, the lawyer Thomas Cushing and the merchant Harrison Gray, each of whom brought different
attributes to the political mix. For example, Samuel was “a Man of refined Policy, stedfast Integrity,
exquisite Humanity, genteel Erudition, obliging, engaging Manners, real as well as professed Piety, and a
universal good Character, unless it should be admitted that he is too attentive to the Public and not
enough so, to himself and his family.” Adams foreshadowed the distinctive roles played in American
history by his revolutionary cousin and by himself, e.g., why it was that Samuel faded, very gradually over
time, in historical importance as the revolution took flight whereas John’s trajectory went the other way.
John observed that Samuel had “the most thourough Understanding of Liberty, and her Resources, in the
Temper and Character of the People.” He also possessed “the most correct, genteel and artful Pen.” And
yet notwithstanding Samuel’s understanding of principles and people, his mastery was “not in the Law
and Constitution.”161 Samuel had enormous integrity, and was committed and talented in many ways,
particularly as a political organizer and pamphleteer. But aside from his inclination not to speak much in
public, likely because of a stutter, Samuel was neither a legal nor a constitutional expert, the bedrock of
the multiple roles that were of increasing and ultimately crucial importance as the colonists first sought to
justify to themselves their opposition to their government, then to publicly condone an insurrection, and
finally to articulate to the world the constitutional underpinnings of their new country. These roles required
the skills of a John not a Samuel Adams.
It cannot be a coincidence that we have the first sighting of Adam’s Clarendon letters at this very
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JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 271 (Dec. 23, 1765). In his article on John Adams’ early revolutionary politics, Colin
Nicolson described Adams as, “especially wary of Samuel Adams (1722-1803), who had emerged as a
local leader coordinating protests in the street and town meeting. While he appreciated his cousin’s
activism, he feared his excesses would push the colonies into conflict with Britain.” As we will see, while
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Nicolson’s general perception of John’s views of his cousin. See Colin Nicolson, “The Revolutionary
Politics of John Adams, 1760-1775, A Companion to John Adams and John Quincy Adams, Ch. 3, p. 68.
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moment.162 Included in the same Dec. 23, 1765 Diary entry in which Adams brilliantly analyzed the legal
implications of the Governor’s non-action and described his entrée into the rough and tumble of Boston
club politics, was “the first of a number of fragmentary drafts or first rough thoughts, scattered among the
Diary entries,” of Adams’ three Clarendon letters.163 For Adams, Clarendon represented political
moderation during difficult years in seventeenth-century English politics. In the Clarendon letters Adams
articulated his devotion to God, and described the people of America in their “gallant Struggle,” as well as
the nature of the Law, Freedom, and “the true Constitution of great Britain.” In Clarendon’s dialogue with
a Londoner nom de plume Pym who had been the leader of the seventeenth-century Long Parliament,
Adams outlined his concept of how the British Constitution functioned and the government created in
accordance with it. As to the mentality of the American colonists, Adams stated in early 1766, “You are
pleased to charge the Colonists with ignorance of the British constitution – But let me tell you there is not
even a Son of Liberty among them who has not manifested a deeper knowledge of it, and a warmer
attachment to it, than appears in any of your late writings.”164
The consequence of the pervasive American opposition to the Stamp Act was that in March 1766
the British repealed it. The exciting news reached Boston in May, creating a brief lull in the political
maelstrom of American colonial politics.165 The following year, using the pseudonym “Winthrop” of
seventeenth-century Bay Governor fame, and responding to public letters that had defended the Gover-
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JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 312 n.1 (May 26, 1766). “The Repeal of the Stamp Act, has hushed into silence
almost every popular Clamour, and composed every Wave of Popular Disorder into a smooth and
peaceful Calm,” wrote Adams in November 1766. Id, p. 324 (Nov. 11, 1766). There was an inauspicious
law passed in association with the repeal legislation, however – one on which Adams did not comment in
his Diary – and that was the Declaratory Act, which stated that Parliament “hath, and of right ought to
have, full power and authority to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the
colonies and people of America … in all cases whatsoever,” an unequivocal assertion of Parliamentary
authority to tax the colonies whenever it wanted to, and in whatever way it chose to do so. See The
American Colonies Act of 1766, 6 Geo3 c 12, formally entitled, “An Act for the better securing the
Dependency of His Majesty’s Dominions in America upon the Crown and Parliament of Great Britain,” a
remarkable title. Looking back on this provision years later Adams wrote, “We expected it would not be
executed,” and therefore “good humour was in some measure restored” when the Stamp Act was
repealed notwithstanding passage of the Declaratory Act. Autobiography, in JA D&A, Vol. III, p. 285.
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nor’s action, Adams published epistles addressed to the late John Winthrop’s contemporary, the Governor of Plymouth Colony, William Bradford. 166 Adams’ Winthrop reflected on the “principles, maxims, and
schemes, which have been adopted, warmly defended, and zealously propagated in America, since our
departure out of it.”167 Waxing philosophical he stated, “Calamities are the causticks and catharticks of
the body politick. They arouse the soul. They restore original virtues. They reduce a constitution back to
its first principles.” Adams was conspicuously striking a Machiavellian theme – the value of renewing a
government’s first principles.168 He turned to recent events: when faced with “the iron sceptre of tyranny,
which so lately extended over all America,” the people rose to the occasion. Nevertheless, Winthrop was
worried. “But how soon is this ardor extinguished!” With the 1766 repeal of the Stamp Act, “they have
cooled down, into such a tame, torpid state of indolence and inattention; that the missionaries of slavery,
are suffered to preach their abominable doctrines.”169 What Winthrop sought and confidently said would
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Recognition of this “cooled down” state is contained in Adams’ Diary: “I presume, it not be deny’d, that
this Province is at present, in a State of Peace, order and Tranquility: that the People are as quiet and
submissive to Government, as any People under the sun – as little inclined to Tumults, Riots, Seditions,
as they were ever known to be, since the first foundation of the Government.” This sounds great; but it
was dangerous. “The Repeal of the Stamp Act, has hushed into silence almost every popular Clamour,
and composed every Wave of Popular Disorder into a smooth and peaceful Calm.” JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 324
(Nov. 10, 1766). Adams’ view was not universally shared. The loyalist Joseph Galloway interpreted the
impact of the Stamp Act’s repeal quite differently. He believed the repeal was a misguided act of
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growing fast to a dangerous maturity.” Joseph Galloway, Historical and Political Reflections on the Rise
and Progress of the American Rebellion … . (London, 1780), p. 15.
720

happen was that the people would quickly evidence “cool contempt and dispassionate abhorrence” for
those advocating the curtailment of their freedom. Adams made clear that even an “attempt” by the Bay
governor to interfere in “the freedom of elections” was proof of a design to “demolish[] the constitution,”
constituting “a direct, and formidable attack on the freedom of elections” regardless of whether the governor succeeded in the attempt.170 In another Winthrop letter Adams wrote, “The constitution of all free
governments, especially that of the English, is of such a nature, the principles of it are so familiar, and so
interwoven with the human mind, and the rulers are so circumscribed with positive laws, for the directing
and controling their power, that they can never impose chains and shackles on the people, nor even
attempt it, without being discovered.” To think that the people would accept such behavior was naïve. “In
such a government and among such a people, the very first act, in pursuance of a design to enslave or
distress the subjects in general, must be so obvious … and will be the surest means to convince the
people of their danger.”171 Liberty’s motto needed to be Obsta Principiis, said Adams, usually translated
as, “Nip the shoots of arbitrary power in the bud,” i.e., resist the first encroachments on one’s rights or, as
Ovid stated, Princippis obsta, “Withstand evil when it starts”; for if you do not, it will be too late to stop
it.172 Negative liberty was insufficient, as we shall discuss in considering Adams’ concept of liberty.
On the other hand, in the context of the Stamp Act, Adams worried about the dangerous passivity
of the community, the “(Timorous) Inactivity, … Cowardice, and too much Respect (and Regard) to the
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Vol. 83, No. 6 (Oct. 1983), pp. 1365-404.
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Act.”173 On the matter of the refusal to pay the requisite Stamp Act fee for legal papers, which shut down
the Bay court system, “necessity alone” justified the opening of the courts; passive obedience could only
lead to “the Ruin of America.”174 Adams came by this perspective naturally: we know that while humility
was an important virtue for Puritans, submissiveness was not. New England towns had operated
independently from the beginning of the English settlement of the American northeastern seaboard. As a
fifth-generation New Englander Adams inherited and was born into this self-determining and proactive
political tradition, a culture of generations of broad public participation, the active voicing of dissent, and
localized decision-making.
In his early public discourse and subsequently, for example in the 1775 Novanglus letters and
other essays, an overriding motivation that drove Adams was his determination to be proactive, educate
the public about the legal questions at issue between Britain and her American colonies, and provide a
lucid picture of the justifiable and legitimate position of the colonies vis-à-vis the metropole.175 The
Adams Papers’ editors characterized the Novanglus letters as “an astonishing display of legal scholarship
that might have impressed lawyers but would certainly have left ordinary readers bewildered, exhausted,
and finally bored.176 The fact is that the letters are long and sometimes tedious. So, too, were the
disquisitions of Massachusettensis, or “M,” to whom Adams was responding. Indeed, Adams’ essays are
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more in the nature of legal briefs, which perhaps explains why they were not reprinted as widely in the
colonies as were M’s epistles which, although prolix, were not as highbrow as Adams’ essays.177
Novanglus I came out the same day that M published his seventh letter (Jan. 23, 1775), i.e., six M letters
had already had their impact on the public when, finally, Adams’ erudite first in a series of Novanglus
essays appeared.178 Much later, in his Autobiography, Adams emphasized his motivation for responding
to M: “These Papers were well written, abounded with Wit, discovered good Information, and were
conducted with a Subtlety of Art and Address, wonderfully calculated to keep Up the Spirits of their Party,
to depress ours, to spread intimidation and to make Proselytes among those, whose Principles and
Judgment give Way to their fears, and these compose at least one third of Mankind. Week after Week
passed away, and these Papers made a very visible impression on many Mind[s].” Adams waited. But,
“No Answer appeared, and indeed, some who were capable, were too busy and others too timorous. I
began at length to think seriously of the Consequences and began to write, under the Signature of
Novanglus, and continued every Week, in the Boston Gazette, till the 19th of April 1775. The last Number
was prevented from impression, by the Commencement of Hostilities.”179
While the Novanglus letters began as a public rebuttal to M’s generally formidable tory or antipatriot arguments, Adams frequently digressed in his twelve rejoinders, the last not published, as he later
explained, because it was interrupted by the Battles of Lexington and Concord, the first blow of the
American Revolution in which seventy-three British soldiers and forty-nine Americans were killed, a fitting
indicia of the tense, fraught circumstances in which this war of words was waged. (In a contemporaneous
account of the Battle of Lexington, historian William Gordon wrote, “You must look back to the origin of
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The Adams Papers editors noted, “They are arguments that a skillful lawyer might have addressed to
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the United Provinces, that you may have an idea of the resolution of this people. May the present struggle
end as happily in favour of American liberty, without proving the destruction of Great Britain. We are
upon a second edition of King Charles the First’s reign, enlarged” – an interesting contemporaneous
comparison that makes the juxtaposition of Sidney and Adams particularly apt. “May the dispute be adjusted before the times are too tragical to admit of it.”180) Adams often reviewed colonial history in his
legalistic, adversarial way such as in Novanglus II, in which he reviewed the actions of the succession of
Bay governors “through all their dark intrigues, and wicked machinations; and to shew the rise, and
progress of their schemes for enslaving this country.”181 M also spun his version of the story, “the plain
truth” of how the colonies came to be “on the brink of a horrid precipice.”182 Reviewing the events that had
led up to the state of crisis in the Bay in Novanglus V, Adams again acknowledged his focus: “Suffer me
to introduce here, a little history.” “Little” is a euphemism. Indeed, in Novanglus III Adams admitted, “I
ought to apologize for the immoderate length of this paper. But general assertions are only to be confuted
by an examination of the particulars which necessarily fills up much space.”183
The second and fifth Novanglus letters are a veritable diatribe against “the junto,” the “famous
triumvirate” of Bay Gov. Francis Bernard, Lieut. Gov. and later Gov. Thomas Hutchinson, and Chief
Judge Peter Oliver, who controlled far too much in the Bay in the opinion of Adams and many others,
holding multiple government positions in the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government.
The junto also was joined by marriage, introducing a nepotistic distaste to their dominance and control;
even worse, their “designs” were “concealed as carefully as possible,” engendering complete distrust.184
The eighth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth Novanglus letters are chocked full of legalese (and history),
particularly quotations from famous English jurists, especially “my lord Coke,” and from Latin legal texts,

180

See Editorial Note, “William Gordon’s Plan for An American Parliament,” Appendix, PJA Vol. 2, pp.
419-428, 420.
181

“II. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay,” Jan. 30, 1775 (“Novanglus II”), PJA Vol.
2, pp. 233-42, 233.
182

Massachusettensis II, JA Rev. Writings I, pp. 333-340, 333-34.

183

Adams, “V. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, Feb. 20, 1775 (“Novanglus V”),
PJA Vol. 2, p. 269-88, 279; Adams, “III. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, Feb. 6
1775 (“Novanglus III”), PJA Vol. 2, p. 243-56. 254.
184

Id, pp. 273-74.
724

all of which make one ponder to whom Adams was writing. Some letters involved constitutional matters;
other raised political issues; and some advanced both, such as Novanglus V’s focus on the right of
resistance, a rebuttal to M’s fighting words on the subject, viz., “It is an universal truth, that he that would
excite a rebellion, … when he is insinuating and worming himself into the good graces of the people, is at
heart as great a tyrant as ever wielded the iron rod of oppression.”185
While the Novanglus letters were largely devoted to the facts of the ongoing crisis and refuting
the loyalist attorney M’s arguments, Adams also fiercely sought to assure the public and, frankly, himself,
that Americans had a legitimate, lawful basis for resisting Britain’s oppressive policies.186 As Adams
stated in 1775, it was Americans’ charge to “continue struggling, at much greater hazards still, and like
the Prince of Orange resolve never to see its entire subjection to arbitrary power, but rather to die fighting
against it, in the last ditch.”187 Sidney, too, had turned to the example of the Low Countries, with which
his family had such deep connections, and to the Dutch resistance to the tyrannical Catholic king of
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opening of this Parliament, to inform you, that a most daring spirit of resistance, and disobedience to the
law still unhappily prevails in the Province of the Massachusetts-Bay, and has in divers parts of it broke
forth in fresh violences of a very criminal nature.” The Bay’s behavior had provoked other colonies to
rebel: “These proceedings have been countenanced and encouraged in other of My Colonies and unwarrantable attempts have been made to obstruct the commerce of this kingdom by unlawful combinations.”
Accordingly, said the King, “I have taken such measures, and given such orders, as I judged most proper
and effectual for carrying into execution the laws which were passed in the last session of the late
Parliament, for the protection and security of the commerce of My Subjects, and for the restoring and
preserving peace order and good government, in the Province of the Massachusetts-Bay.” The King’s
Speech To both Houses of Parliament on the 30th of November, 1774, Together with their Addresses to
his Majesty, printed in London, Dec. 1, 1774; see photocopy of broadside of King’s speech, Fig. 3.11, “A
Place for Reading: Revolutionary Taverns,” An AAS Online Exhibition, http://www.americanantiquarian.
org/Exhibitions/Reading/revolutionary.htm (9-3-17).
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Spain, in justifying the right to rebel.188
One important distinction that Adams made was to emphasize that subjugation to oppression was
not the same thing as consent.189 Locke had articulated this view: “For the régime of a conqueror to acquire
legitimacy it required the voluntary and formally conveyed acceptance of its subjects, a general consent.
And a general submission is not the same as a general consent.”190 Once a king is tyrannical, he loses his
legitimacy, said Sidney. Nevertheless, passivity made Adams nervous. In Massachusetts, the King had
through its Governor severed the legal bond between the Bay and the metropole by refusing to take
responsibility for the matter of the inherent lack of justice in a colony where the courts were not permitted to
operate. It was the monarchy that abandoned the people of the Bay, not vice versa. In so doing, the
monarchy lost its legitimacy. Note the similarity of this argument to that advanced by the whigs in their
assertion that James II abandoned the people not the other way around, thereby requiring a new government, which legitimized the monarchy of William and Mary. Once King James took this action, not only
were the people free to act independently; they had no choice but to do so. William and Mary did not
conquer; they filled a vacuum. For as Locke had asserted, “[T]hough conquest may well be the historical
origin of many, or even most, political societies, it cannot be the basis of the legitimacy of any.”191 Sidney
was more blunt: people were entitled to take action “vindicating their own laws and liberties against a prince
who violates them.”192
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DCG, II.32.315.
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Novanglus I, PJA Vol. 2, pp. 234, 242.
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John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the “Two
Treatises of Government” (Cambridge University Press, 1982) (orig. pub. 1969), p. 145 and ns. 4 & 5,
citing Locke’s Two Treatises, §192, ll.7-14 and MS Locke c 28, fo. 96r (from notes on Sherlocke’s The
Case of Allegiance). See also William Hicks, The nature and extent of Parliamentary power considered,
in some remarks upon Mr. Pitt's speech in the House of Commons, previous to the repeal of the StampAct.: With an introduction. Applicable to the present situation of the colonies, September 1767, p. 10 (“I
am no favourer of violent measures. I would endeavour to support our pretensions by force of reasoning,
not by force of arms; but yet I would anxiously wish that nothing may intimidate us into an acquiescence
with the measures of oppression. We may be compelled to submit, but never to relinquish our claim to the
privileges of the free-men.”)
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Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke, p. 145, citing Locke’s Two Treatises, II, §175, ll. 3-6.
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DCG, III.36.519-523. Locke was more cautious. Locke’s Two Treatises, responsive to Filmer’s
assertion of “limitless royal power … as a gift of God,” set forth “the limits of political right, the status of
which depends upon knowledge of the law of nature." The Two Treatises followed prior work in which
Locke had “denied a right of resistance,” and where political obligation was “an unequivocal duty.” By the
time he wrote Two Treatises, however, in the 1681-83 timeframe, Locke’s view on this matter had
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Addressing his fellow citizens of Massachusetts Bay Adams asked, if the community was erring in
its timidity, what should it do instead? Novanglus I referenced what M characterized as “revolutionprinciples,” and described the “principles of nature and eternal reason” that were the prescripts of
“Aristotle and Plato, of Livy and Cicero, of Sydney, Harrington and Lock.”193 These axioms included the
convictions that “kings are but the ministers of the people”; that their authority is delegated to them by the
people for their good, and they have a right to resume it,” that is, that the people have the right to resume
or take back that authority, “and place it in other hands, or keep it themselves, whenever it is made use of

changed. At the same time, Two Treatises was “not a book about how to construct governments or about
just when it is desirable to resist but a book about why under some circumstances men have a right to
resist.” Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke, pp. 49-50. Turning to Locke’s own words, “whereever Law ends, Tyranny begins,” and a magistrate, whether a “petty officer” or a King, has no authority to
exceed the power given him by the law. On the other hand, it “will unhinge and overturn all Polities, and
instead of Government and Order, leave nothing but Anarchy and Confusion,” if every time someone
“finds himself aggrieved” he is entitled to oppose the commands of a magistrate. Locke, “The Second
Treatise,” Two Treatises of Government, Ch. XVIII, §§ 202-203, pp. 400-01. Subdividing the universe of
possibilities, Locke first found “That Force is to be opposed to nothing, but to unjust and unlawful Force.”
In all other circumstances, the resister “draws on himself a just Condemnation both from God and Man.”
Limiting the right to resist to this dire circumstance would avoid the unhinging, anarchy and confusion to
which Locke had previously referred. Id, §§204-05, p. 402. The exception that Locke made was when the
Magistrate’s illegal acts had either impacted the majority of the people or, while only impacting some, also
seemed “to threaten all.” When “they,” presumably that “all,” were “perswaded in their Consciences, that
their Laws, and with them their Estates, Liberties, and Lives are in danger, and perhaps their Religion
too,” Locke did not say that they were then entitled to resist; rather, he stated the outcome in the negative:
“how they will be hindered from resisting illegal force, used against them, I cannot tell.” This he described
as “an Inconvenience, I confess, that attends all Governments whatsoever.” Id, §209, pp. 404-05. Of
course, for the aggrieved, Locke’s set of criteria is not particularly useful; indeed, it could be considered
esoteric. For example, notwithstanding Adams and the Founders’ efforts generally to justify – in my
view, most importantly to themselves – that their revolution was legal, they well knew that if the revolt
was successful they would be heroes; if it failed, they would be traitors. From this perspective, it was the
outcome of the revolt that determined whether it was legitimate, not the criteria used to instigate it.
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Novanglus I, PJA Vol. 2, p. 230. In John Adams’ Republic, p. 140, Ryerson referred to Adams’
“revolution-principles” as ideas indebted to Locke. While this is not wrong, it is misguidedly incomplete.
From Adams’ own recitation it is clear that Locke was one of six thinkers, Sidney and Cicero being two
others, on whom Adams’ explicitly relied. Adams was not alone. For example, in the 1765 petition The
Rights of Colonies Examined, likely authored by the governor of Rhode Island Stephen Hopkins, the
author stated, “Liberty is the greatest blessing that men enjoy, and slavery the heaviest curse that human
nature is capable of.” Quoting Sidney, he said, “’For liberty solely consists in an independancy upon the
will of another; and by the name of slave, we understand a man who can neither dispose of his passion or
goods, but enjoys all at the will of his master,’ says Sidney on government.” [Stephen Hopkins,] The
Rights of Colonies Examined, Published by Authority (Providence: William Goddard, 1765), The American
Revolution: Writings from the Pamphlet Debate 1764-1772, Gordon S. Wood, ed. (New York: The Library
of America, 2015), pp. 123-42, 125-26.
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to oppress them.”194 Sovereignty resided in the people.195 “Every Man has in Politicks as well as
Religion, a Right to think and speak and Act for himself.”196 Indeed, for. Adams this was man’s
responsibility. Sovereignty was another legal concept entangled in the confrontation between the
colonies and the metropole. It was the principle that, as Blackstone said, “a supreme, irresistible, absolute
uncontrolled authority” must exist in every government, “in which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of
sovereignty reside.”197 There was no such thing as qualified supreme authority. “It was either complete
or nonexistent.”198 Adding to the legal overtones of this aspect of colonial/metropole mutual and
escalating intolerance was the legal doctrine of imperium in imperio, the proposition that it was “a
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Novanglus I, PJA Vol. 2, p. 230 (emphasis added). There are scholars who contend that Adams’
orientation was highly scientific; that his ideas invariably related to principles of the “new science” and
Newton. See generally Edward S. Corwin, The ‘Higher Law’ Background of American Constitutional Law
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund,2008), pp. 55-56 (orig. pub. Harvard Law Review, 42 (1928-1929), pp.
149-85, 365-409). Adams was well-read in both scientific literature and enlightenment thought, and like
the good lawyer that he was, when it was useful to do so he used its principles as precedent by analogy.
But Adams’ ideas were not based on science. Rather, when scientific precedent was a useful prism
through which to argue political ideas, such as when the analogy was made to gravity, Adams did so.
The same thing, he contended, was true of “what are called revolution-principles.” Id.
195
Pace Wood, Adams never deviated from his embracing of popular sovereignty. It was never an issue
for Adams. The question with which he consistently grappled was not popular sovereignty, but the way
the people chose to exercise that sovereignty, viz., the form of government to which the people consented, and how that choice could be effectively protected. It simply is not the case, as Wood averred, that
“Adams continued to think and argue within the context of classical political thought, in which the people
and the government are opposed, and society falls into the immemorial categories of the one, the few,
and the many.” Cf. Bernstein, “John Adams: The Life and the Biographers,” A Companion to John
Adams and John Quincy Adams, p. 33. Adams did not think that the people and the government were
opposed. On the other hand, he did believe that any person, anywhere, and any institution, which after all
is made up of persons, could be corrupted. Bernstein also addressed Wood’s view that, “By contrast,
most Americans accepted the idea of popular sovereignty, under which the people rule themselves
through a government devised and elected by and responsible to them. By winning independence,
Americans believed, they had purged themselves of monarchy and aristocracy and were working to tame
and constitutionalize democracy. Thus, in their eyes, Adams was increasingly irrelevant to the evolving
nature of American constitutional democracy.” This is far too monolithic a perspective. No doubt some
Americans, particularly Jeffersonians, believed something along these lines. Many did not. Bernstein
goes on to point out that notwithstanding these findings, “Wood praised Adams for his realistic grasp of
truths that his countrymen were unprepared to learn. We are left with a brilliant Adams who is nevertheless out of step (whether rightly or wrongly) with both Americans and other contemporary leaders.”
Bernstein concluded that, “To some extent, Adams scholarship has yet to recover from Wood’s brilliant
yet faint praise.” Throughout this chapter effort will be made to address the major issues raised by Wood
in The Creation of the American Republic.
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JA D&A, Vol. I (Aug. 1, 1761), p. 220. For Jefferson too, religion was “a matter solely of conscience.”
Annette Gordon-Reed, and Peter S. Onuf, “Most Blessed of the Patriarchs”: Thomas Jefferson and the
Empire of the Imagination (New York & London: Liveright Publishing, 2016), p. 276.
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Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. I, pp. 50-51, 178-80.
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Greene, The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution, p. 99.
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contradiction in terms” and therefore impossible to have a sovereign authority within a sovereign
authority, or a divided sovereignty.199 In fact, one need not be quite so absolutist about the matter. In
earlier times, the monarch was the authority. In post-Glorious Revolutionary Britain, it became “the kingin-Parliament,” royal concurrence combined with the will of the legislature on law and policy matters
debated by Commons and Lords. As for the dispute with the Americans about the role Parliament was
lawfully entitled to play, the argument was made by the Americans that it was not king-in-Parliament but
the institution of the monarchy in which sovereignty resided, an ironic reversion to the seventeenthcentury political quagmire.200
Adams embraced popular sovereignty, but the way he did so distinguished his moderate republicanism from the ideas of radical republicans such as Jefferson. Whereas the latter had no difficulty with
a unicameral legislature, for example, it was far too risky to Adams, who sought to diffuse the danger that
the power of the people constituted; for Adams believed that the people were just as subject to corruption
and perhaps even more so than when sovereign power resided elsewhere. Accordingly, while sovereignty resided in the people, Adams sought to maintain the allegiance of the traditional purveyors of power,
the aristocracy and the chief magistrate, through the structure of government. In contrast, from the British
perspective, challenging Parliament’s authority to impose taxes on the Americans was “nothing less than
a challenge to British sovereignty.”201 This is important because while the Americans may have
strenuously disagreed with this position, it was a legitimate argument and therefore would have naturally
mitigated, in part and for some, the image of an intolerant and power hungry metropole.

199
Id, p. 100. “The conventional British position understood ‘sovereignty’ as that indivisible, final, and unlimited power that necessarily had to exist somewhere in every political society. A single nation could not
operate with two sovereigns any more than a single person could operate with two heads; some single
supreme political will had to prevail, and the only limitations on that sovereign will were those that the
sovereign itself voluntarily chose to observe. To try to divide or limit sovereignty in any way was to create
the ‘political monster’ or ‘hydra’ of ‘imperium in imperio’ – ‘the greatest of all political solecisims.’” Akhil
Reed Amar, “Of Sovereignty and Federalism,” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 96, No. 7 (June 1987), pp.
1425-1520, 1430; Paul O. Carrese, “States’ Rights and the Union: Imperium in Imperio, 1776-1876,” June
2001, First Things, https://www.firstthings.com/article/2001/06/states-rights-and-the-union-imperium-inimperio (2-27-19); Eric Nelson, “Taking Them Seriously: Patriots, Prerogative, and the English Seventeenth Century,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Oct. 2011), pp. 588-96, 589-90.
200
See The Royalist Revolution, in which Prof. Nelson established that the colonists reverted to the royalist position in England before the English Civil War, which sought to place power and prerogative in the
hands of the monarch, not Parliament. See Appendix B, n. 470.
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Greene, The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution, p. 99.
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As C. Bradley Thompson observed, Adams “drew a sharp distinction between his ‘revolutionprinciples,” which were sometimes necessary to exercise in the defense of freedom, “and the spirit of
anarchy,” which he abhorred.202 Recall Sidney’s metaphor: “A flock cannot subsist under a shepherd that
seeks its ruin, nor a people under an unfaithful magistrate. ....[H]e that sets himself to destroy his flock, is a
wolf. His authority is incompatible with their subsistence.”203 Like Sidney, Adams had studied the
monarchomach right-of-resistance literature.204 Adams too was very familiar with the centuries of Roman
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Thompson, John Adams & the Spirit of Liberty, p. 61.
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DCG, II.24.224.
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The pickings are relatively sparse; but, for example, in Defence, Adams referred to the famous,
anonymous monarchomach text, Vindicæ Contra Tyrranos, as an important work that was reprinted
during the Interregnum as part of the study of works on government to which the English were dedicated.
Adams, “Letter VI. The right Constitution of a Commonwealth, examined,” Defence, Vol. III, p. 211; see
also id, Vol. II, p. 4. One of Buchanan’s very important late works, Rerum Scoticarum historia, History of
Scotland, is referenced in the Adams Library catalogue. Appended to that History was Dialogus de jure
regni apud Scotos, On the Law of the Realm among the Scots, first published in 1579. Adams’ edition
was published in 1762. The central point of this text “was the distinction between king and tyrant.” One
can see how Adams’ ideas (as well as Hobbes and others) reflected Buchanan’s political views. For
example, Buchanan maintained that “[s]ociety and government originate … in the effort of men to escape
from the primordial state of nature, when, as Polybius had described it, they lived the bestial life, without
law and without fixed abodes.” Buchanan spoke of the natural social nature of man: “The impulse to
social life came partly from the sense of self-interest, but rather more fundamentally from the instinct of
association implanted by nature, or, better, by God.” While the individual’s well-being requires good
health, said Buchanan, society’s well-being requires justice. “In society thus constituted the attribute
essential to continuous existence is justice, as in the physical man it is health.” This fact leads ineluctably
to the role of the chief magistrate. “The function of the king, therefore, is to maintain justice.” How does
the king do this? Per Buchanan, “experience teaches men that justice is to be maintained rather by laws
than by kings; hence it is that the rulers, originally unlimited in power, have with the development of
enlightenment been always subject to law.” Who makes the law? In Buchanan’s view, “The maker of the
law is the people, acting through a council of representatives chosen from all classes, and the interpreter
of the law should be, not the king, but a body of independent judges.” This perspective therefore
produces the conclusion that, “The tyrant is a monarch who either has obtained his power without the
consent of the people, or has exercised it otherwise than in conformity to justice. In the former case he is
a mere outlaw …; in the latter case he is by nature of the office … liable to the people for violation of the
law.” In short, “Buchanan controverts, with great skill and precision, the arguments drawn from the
Scriptures for passive obedience to tyrants.” William A. Dunning, “The Monarchomachs,” Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2 (June 1904), pp. 277-301, 286-87 (emphasis added).
Adams also had read and owned a copy of Boston cleric Jonathan Mayhew’s famous sermon, A
discourse concerning unlimited submission, and Mayhew was "equally attached" as a fellow minister “to
Sidney,” which was an American right of resistance tract that, on the centennial anniversary of the
regicide, supported the execution of Charles I, arguing that the king, through bad acts, had “’unkinged
himself’ long before his trial.” Colbourne, The Lamp of Experience, pp. 71-80. For details on Mayhew and
his reliance on Sidney, see Appendix B.
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law on which the monarchomachs based their theory.205 While the Huguenot monarchomachs were driven
to rebel because of the deprivation of their religious right to observe Protestantism in Catholic France,
deprivation of political freedom constituted another intolerable intrusion on liberty. Once again, such a
tyrannical monarch was an illegitimate monarch. Challenging M in Novanglus I Adams stated, “What
‘worse purpose’ is there than established tyranny? ...The most sensible and jealous people are so little
attentive to government, that there are no instances of resistance, until repeated, multiplied oppressions
have placed it beyond a doubt, that their rulers had formed settled plans to deprive them of their liberties.
…Even Machiavel himself allows, that not ingratitude to their rulers, but much love is the constant fault of
the people.”206 In Novanglus V Adams remarked, “Hampden, Russell, Sydney” and others “were no tyrants nor rebels, altho’ some of them were in arms, and the others undoubtedly excited resistance, against
the tories.” This was because “avowed resistance by arms, against usurpation and lawless violence, is not
rebellion.”207 Here we have the essence of Adams the Lawful Revolutionary. Recall Sidney’s description of
the Biblical King Saul and David. Saul was chosen by lot by the people, and placed on the throne “by the
general consent of the whole nation.” But when he became a tyrannical despot, “disobeying the word of
the prophet, slaying the priests, sparing the Amalekites, and oppressing the innocent,” he “overthrew his
own right.” Saul’s entitlement to rule was nullified by his own despotism. A tyrant loses his prior legitimacy. “This did not only give a right to the whole people of opposing him, but to every particular man.” In
the case of Saul, that included the champion of everyman, David. “[E]very man might kill a tyrant; and no
names are recorded in history with more honour, than of those who did it.”208 Recall Sir Philip’s embracing
of Everyman, and his participation in armed resistance to the tyrannical Philip II of Spain.
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See Ralph E. Giesey, “The monarchomach triumvirs: Hotman, Beza and Mornay,” Bibliothèque
d’Humanisme et Renaissance 32:1 (1970), pp. 41-56, 53, as well as the discussion of the
monarchomachs in Ch. One.
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Novanglus I, PJA Vol. 2, pp. 226-33, 231-32. Jefferson famously wrote from Paris to Abigail Adams in
London in the context of events in France in 1787 that, “The spirit of resistance to government is so
valuable on certain occasions, that I wish it to be always kept alive. It will often be exercised when wrong,
but better so than not to be exercised at all. I like a little rebellion now and then. It is like a storm in the
Atmosphere.” Jefferson to Abigail Adams, Feb. 22, 1787, Thomas Jefferson Writings (New York: Library
of the United States, 2011), pp. 889-90.
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Over the centuries many political thinkers recognized that the people had a right to challenge the
authority of a tyrannical king. The literature quibbled over who actually had the authority and
responsibility to exercise that right; but theorists consistently recognized that the right of resistance was a
necessary component of a free society. As for the more controversial question of who could legitimately
exercise that right, for British Americans like Adams it was the responsibility of the people, individually
and collectively, to do so. Sidney had espoused this view throughout his work but particularly in a section
of the Discourses entitled, “The general revolt of a Nation cannot be called a Rebellion.”209 Like Adams,
Sidney placed his confidence in the judgement of the people, who would not undertake a rebellion in the
absence of exceptionally adverse circumstances.210 While Adams recognized in Novanglus I that, “the
bulk of the people are generally but little versed in matters of state,” it did not take that kind of knowledge
for a people to appreciate they were in political peril. Again he emphasized, “I appeal to all experience,
and to universal history, if it has ever been in the power of popular leaders, uninvested with other
authority than what is conferred by the popular suffrage, to persuade a large people, for any length of
time together, to think themselves wronged, injured, and oppressed, unless they really were, and saw and
felt it to be so.”211 People naturally were patient with the mistakes and wrongs committed by their rulers.
“The people are in their nature so gentle, that there never was a government yet, in which thousands of
mistakes were not overlooked.” But that patience was not unlimited. “[R]epeated, multiplied oppressions”
make it “beyond a doubt,” that the purpose of the ruler is to deprive the people of their liberties.212 As
Sidney had taught Adams, “[E]very man has recourse to force, as if he liv’d in a wood where there is no

209

DCG, III.36.519.
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Pace Prof. Pocock’s thesis, herein begins the distinction between Harrington’s kind of republicanism
and the view of many other republicans, including Adams, Sidney and also John Locke. As we have
established, in Harrington’s utopian republic, the people were not entitled to resist.
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Novanglus I, PJA Vol. 2, pp. 228-29.
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Id, pp. 231-32. Adams also said that this deprivation was “not to oppose an individual or a few, but to
break down the fences of a free constitution, and deprive the people at large of all share in the
government and all the checks by which it is limited.” Id, p. 232. Later, in Defence, Adams made the
related point that, “it is not only most proudent then, but absolutely necessary, to avoid continual violence,
to give the people a legal, constitutional, and peacable mode of changing these rulers, whenever they
discover improper principles or dispositions in them.” Adams, Defence, Vol. I, p. 71.
732

law; and that force is always mortal to those who provoke it.”213
While their contemporaries did so with moderation, Adams and Sidney positively drenched their
writing in classical historical precedent, including references to the ideas of “the ancients.”214 The past
usually provided evidentiary proof of the best path to take. In Novanglus I, discussing the right of
resistance, Adams’ historical references included the Prince of Orange, Philip of Macedon and his son
Alexander the Great, Caesar in ancient Rome, Charles V of Spain, the French king Louis XI, “and ten
thousand others” who Adams described as men who played the “same game, with the same success,” in
“all ages and countries” and “have conceived the design of enslaving their country, and building their own
greatness on its ruins.”215 In Novanglus IV it was the Roman poet Juvenal on the subject of a guilty
conscience, Jugurtha at the time of the inescapable corruption of Rome, as well as Hobbes and
Machiavelli.216 Recall that Henry Savile, who translated Tacitus into English in the late sixteenth century,
credited Tacitus with “setting us downe a theorem of history … that an historiographer is to give
knowledge of counsailes and causes … so shall we see the reasons and causes of things, not only the
bare eventes, which are most commonly governed by fortune.”217 As his Library suggested and his
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DCG, II.30.297 (emphasis added), II.24.221, III.1.330. Massachusetts activist Edward Bancroft cited
Sidney for the proposition that allegiance “’signifies no more than such an Obedience as the Law
requires.’” Edward Bancroft, Remarks on the Review of the Controversy Between Great Britain and her
Colonies (London, 1769)[repr. New-London, New-England: T. Green, 1771], pp. 667-742, 726.
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Bailyn emphasized the colonists’ reliance on English history. As he explained, the pamphlets of the
American Revolution “contain a good deal of discussion of English history, for much of the intellectual
coherence of the colonists’ political arguments rested on the views of their views of the past. The ancient,
presumably Saxon, origins of the English constitution was of particular importance to them…. Most
agreed with Charles Carroll that ‘the liberties which the English enjoyed under their Saxon kings were
wrested from them by the Norman conqueror.’” Bailyn pointed out that, “the view most characteristic of
the Revolutionary pamphleteers … postulated an ideal constitution based on an elected assembly in
Saxon England, destroyed by the conquest, regained with modifications in the course of centuries of
struggle that culminated in the Glorious Revolution, and that was once again challenged by the corruption
of eighteenth-century politics. In accepting this view the colonists sought not to undermine Parliamentary
authority as such but to establish its true character in its ancient origins in such a way as to emphasize
the corruptions of the Parliament of George III.” Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, pp. 81-82 n.26; see also Colbourn, Lamp of Experience, esp. Ch. II.
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Adams, “IV. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay, Feb. 13, 1775 (“Novanglus IV”),
PJA Vol. 2, pp. 256-68, 257, 266-67.
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The Ende of Nero and Beginning of Galba. Fower Bookes of the Histories of Cornelius Tacitus. The
Life of Agricola, Sir Henry Savile, trans. (Oxford, 1591), p. 3, cited in in Alan Bradford, “Stuart Absolutism
and the ‘Utility’ of Tacitus,” Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1983), pp. 127-55, pp.
133, 153 n. 23.
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writings established, Adams was very familiar with the ideas of Tacitus. Indeed, Soll argued that on a
quest to figure out what it meant to be a republican, Adams “turned to the classical and early modern
traditions of Tacitism as his primary intellectual tool for interpreting politics.”218
Given all this similitude, it is not surprising that over the years Adams felt he had become
increasingly appreciative of Sidney. Recall that in 1823 Adams wrote Jefferson that once again he was
reading Algernon Sidney’s book on government, and while he had read it many times before, “ it now
excites fresh admiration.”219 Perhaps Adams appreciated Sidney more and more over time; or perhaps his
recollection had faded on how much he had, from a young age, appreciated Sidney! Although it seems to
have been rarely (if ever) quoted, Adams wrote an “Epitaph” that was copied into his Diary in the Fall of
1772. He was thirty-six at the time. The epitaph’s query was, what happens to the “good” rebel? Its subject was Algernon Sidney. Surely Adams, the prospective lawful revolutionary, was identifying with Sidney:
Algernon Sidney fills this Tomb
An Atheist for disdaining Rome
A Rebel bold for striving still
To keep the Laws above the Will
Of Heaven he sure must needs despair
If holy Pope be turnkey there
And Hell him ne’er will entertain
For there is all Tyrannick Reign
Where goes he then? Where he ought to go.
Where Pope, nor Devil have to do.220
Perhaps Adams also noticed the remarkable similarity of language and metaphor between
Sidney’s statement on which the title of this dissertation is based and an opposing statement by the
loyalist M, to whom Adams’ aggressively responded in his Novanglus letters. In Discourses, Sidney
declared, "When a magistrate ... sets up an interest ... in himself, repugnant to the good of the public. ...
This creates a most fierce and irreconcilable enmity. …When men's spirits are thus prepared, a small
matter sets them on fire."221 A century and continent apart, M averred, “The bulk of the people are
generally but little versed in matters of state. Want of inclination or opportunity to figure in public life,

218
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220
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makes them content to rest the affairs of government in the hands, where accident or merit has placed
them. …There is a latent spark however, in their breasts, capable of being kindled into a flame; to do this
has always been the employment of the disaffected.”222 Adams pounced on M’s language, famously
asserting in his first Novanglus letter. “What is this ‘latent spark’? The love of Liberty? A Deo, hominis est
indita nature [It is given to the nature of man by God]. Human nature itself is evermore an advocate of
liberty. There is also in human nature, a resentment of injury, and indignation against wrong. A love of
truth and a veneration for virtue.” Undoubtedly, Adams continued, “These amiable passions, are the
‘latent spark’ to which those whom this writer calls the ‘disaffected’ apply. If the people are capable of
understanding, seeing and feeling the difference between true and false, right and wrong, virtue and vice,
to what better principle can the friends of mankind apply, than to the sense of this difference.”223
Adams was not only intimately familiar with Sidney and well aware of the monarchomachs’ work,
he had broadly read seventeenth-century English political literature that defended and opposed absolute
monarchy (including Filmer’s books, albeit not catalogued as part of the Adams Library) and, in that
context, was well-versed in British authors who rejected or defended the right of resistance; and then
there were the English civil wars which provided, in the not-very-distant past, profound historical
instances of acts of resistance to tyrannical kings. The Glorious, remarkably non-destabilizing Revolution,
and the dethroning of the Stuarts in late seventeenth-century Britain, was another even more recent
instance. Finally, there was the century of American colonial history before Adams’ birth in which BritishAmericans grappled with these ideas. Adams and others argued that in America the British government’s
intrusion into local governance in the colonies and, particularly, Parliament’s imposition of taxes in a host
of daily contexts, was beyond the prerogative of the metropole; this was a responsibility of the king’s
colonial legislatures, not the Parliament of the British Isles. Once again, we have another short step not
from religious to political freedom, but from the tyranny of a king to the tyranny of a legislature. Sidney
had recognized that it was not only absolute authority in a king that undid republicanism; such authority in
any branch of the government, including Parliament, would almost certainly be tyrannical. Indeed, one
section of Discourses is devoted to the subject. An “arbitrary power was never well placed in any men
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and their successors, who were not obliged to obey the laws they should make.” A parliament can be “full
of lews young men chosen by a furious people. …[S]uch as these might be easily deluded, corrupted, or
bribed. Some are fond of their seats in parliament,” said Sidney, “and delighted to domineer over their
neighbours by continuing in them.” And there are other types of corruption that was the result of arbitrary
power, e.g., preference for the “cajoleries of the court before the honour of performing their duty to the
country,” the relief of “ruined fortunes,” “pensions,” and “temporary protection against … creditors.”
Etcetera.224 In short, parliaments, too, could “be the instruments of our slavery.”225
Pace Skinner and to be discussed further, early modern Anglo-American republicanism was not
antimonarchism; it was all about balance and moderation, and the absence of imbalance in any powerwielding component of government.226 It makes no difference whether that power-wielding branch of
government was a monarch or a legislature. Until close to the end of the colonial pre-revolutionary
confrontations, the Americans seemed to believe and certainly they argued, as had Sidney a century
earlier, that Parliament was overstepping its authority. In the American context, the colonists also argued
that the king was being misled by Parliament. It was Parliament, not George III, that was exercising
tyrannical authority in British America. Finally, however, when the King did not even deign to respond to
the Olive Branch Petition, it became very difficult not to admit that the King was a tyrant, with Parliament
endorsing and effectuating his wishes. The consequence of the evolving circumstances and realizations
by the colonists, including Adams, was that while they almost intuitively advocated well-worn ideas
related to republicanism, including the right of resistance which is a consistent component of Adams’
republican thought, as circumstances changed they utilized several theories and rationales in support of
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We see this concern, as well, in the second Novanglus letter, when Adams confronted Governor
Bernard’s “junto,” viz., “the famous triumvirate, Bernard, Hutchinson and Oliver,” that sought to control the
payment of salaries to the governor, lieutenant governor and judges through the metropole, not through
the Bay legislature, rendering “the whole government, executive and judicial, … wholly independent of the
people.” This “new-modeling,” as Adams called it, would take away the colonists’ political freedom.
Novanglus II, PJA Vol. 2, p. 238; see also Novanglus V, id, p. 273. As Adams noted in another context,
that of “dividing America into many governments and different modes of government, …There is no
government in America at present, whose powers are properly balanced; there not being in any of them,
a real and distinct third legislative power mediating between the king and the people, which is the peculiar
excellence of the British constitution.” Novanglus II, id, p. 240.
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their rights, beginning with Adams’ arguments in the Novanglus essays.
Thus, for example, in the Declaratory Act the illegal taking of property, seemingly without restraint
but instead with the assertion that such action was part of the unequivocal supreme authority of
Parliament, constituted in Adams’ and others’ eyes an exercise of arbitrary power. In Novanglus V
Adams addressed the right of resistance in the face of such action. He also caustically remarked, “A
democratical despotism,” but not necessarily the inverse, as we shall see, viz., a despotic democracy, “is
a contradiction in terms.”227 In Novanglus II Adams declared that, while “the people of this continent have
the utmost abhorrence of treason and rebellion,” rebellion in these circumstances was “a noble stand
against tyranny.” It was not those who rebelled who were committing treason; rather, it was those who
accepted commissions from a parliament that “has not a legal authority to overturn their constitution, and
subject them to such acts as are lately passed.”228 In Novanglus VI Adams reminded Bay citizens, “Be it
remembered then, that there are tumults, seditions, popular commotions, insurrections and civil wars,
upon just occasions, as well as unjust.” Once again, he referenced Locke and Sidney, among others.229
Given the natural latent spark existent in man, what justifiably ignited it? In Novanglus V, Adams
noted M’s assertion that, “It is a universal truth, that he that would excite a rebellion, is at heart as great a
tyrant as ever wielded the iron rod of oppression.” Adams did not disagree. “Be it so,” he said. But
Adams also made a critical distinction, founded on his definition of rebellion. “Resistance to lawful
authority makes rebellion,” explained Adams.230 But that was not what the colonists were doing. “We are
not exciting a rebellion. Opposition, nay, open, avowed resistance by arms, against usurpation and
lawless violence, is not rebellion by the law of God or the land.”231 Adams did not cite legal authority but,

227

“Novanglus V, PJA Vol. 2, pp. 269-88, 287.

228

Novanglus II, id, p. 246.

229

“VI. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay,” Feb. 27, 1775, (“Novanglus VI”), PJA
Vol. 2, pp. 288-307, 288-89, 292-93.
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Novanglus V, PJA Vol. 2, pp. 269-88, 269 (emphasis added).
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In the Introduction to Volume One of The Adams Papers, the editors elaborated upon Adams’ advocacy
of the view that the colonies were “distinct States” that were united under the King but not subject to
Parliament. They described Adams’ advocacy as follows: “Adams whittled away at the absolute powers of
Parliament until nothing was left. …And the whittling away was done without sacrificing the legal tradition
which Adams revered: indeed, that legal tradition furnished him with the ammunition he needed.” The
Editors characterized Adams’ effort, such as the statement that the colonies “’cheerfully’ consented to
Parliament’s regulating trade,” as an initiative in which “Adams had supplied the wording” of an answer to
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following in Sidney’s footsteps, he relied on historical precedent – a miscellany of famous Englishmen,
seventeenth-century rebels including Sidney, who opposed the Stuart’s absolutist concept of monarchy,
viz., “Hampden, Russell, Sidney, Somers, Holt, Tillotson, Burnet, Hoadly, &c. were no tyrants nor rebels,
although some of them were in arms, and the others undoubtedly excited resistance against the tories.”232
In law a lawyer can, indeed she is expected to, and would not simply be foolish but would be
failing to advocate in the best interests of her client if she did not argue in the alternative.233 The purpose
of such arguments is to give to the decision-maker, whether judge or jury, different possible ways to reach
a determination favorable to the lawyer’s client. Adams’ did the same thing when talking about opposition
to tyranny. In fact, this was the typical lawyerly approach Adams utilized.234
The right to resist was the lawful responsibility of the citizen. But returning to Adams’ “unmooring”
epiphany, Adams presented an alternative valid argument supporting the colonists’ opposition to the

a complicated question. These statements are very true. I would also suggest, however, that it was more
than wording that Adams was providing. He was articulating, indeed implementing, through words, the best
interest of Congress, viz., functioning as Congress’ counsel. This was not only wording; it was also something of much more importance to Adams: the establishment of a legal basis for the colonies’ position.
“Introduction,” PJA Vol. I, pp. xxviii-xxix. On “the constitutional right to just rebellion” and Sidney’s role in
propounding it, see also John Phillip Reid, “The Irrelevance of the Declaration,” in Law in the American
Revolution and the Revolution in the Law: A Collection of Review Essays on American Legal History,
Hendrik Hartog, ed. (New York & London: New York University Press, 1981), pp. 46-89, 54-58.
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Novanglus V, PJA Vol. 2, p. 269. Earlier, in July 1772, one sees Adams’ grappling with the concept of
lawful resistance when he quoted in his diary entry the following lines from an obscure play:
He, who contends for Freedom,
can ne’er be justly deem’d his Sovereign’s Foe:
No, ‘tis the wretch that tempts him to subvert it,
The soothing Slave, the Traitor in the Bosom,
Who best deserves that name; he is a worm
That eats out all the Happiness of Kingdoms.
JA D&A, Vol. II (July 1, 1772), p. 62.
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As Prof. Trachtman explained in his book on the variety of types of legal arguments available to
attorneys, a lawyer’s job is to take all the available facts and “see[] with what ‘diseases’ they are consistent. In the modern legal system, plaintiffs are often not required to choose only the ‘right’ one. They may
bring whatever case they want, and sometimes they may proceed on multiple ‘theories’ of the case.”
Trachtman, The Tools of Argument, p. 42. The attorney is trying to provide to a judge or jury a rationale
that hits home. If we want someone to like our cupcakes, we might provide a choice of chocolate, vanilla,
lemon and who knows what else so that one of these choices will be appealing and taken.
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In 1769 “Draft Instructions of Boston to its Representatives in the General Court,” for example, Adams
argued in the alternative, asserting Hutchinson & Co.’s misrepresentations to the metropole deprived the
Bay of (i) its “Charter Liberties privileges and Immunities,” (ii) “the rights of British subjects derivd to us
from the Constitution”; and (iii) the rights of Men derived to us from the laws and Nature of God and
Nature.” A lawyer need only win on one alternative argument to win his case. “Draft Instructions of
Boston to its Representatives in the General Court,” May 8, 1769, PJA Vol. I, pp. 224-30, 225.
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metropole that was founded on basic contract theory: the king had breached his contract to rule justly
over the colonies and in so doing had nullified the contract. As a result, the other party to the contract,
the colonists, had been thrust “outside” the contract and, accordingly, outside the protection and authority
of George III.235 If one accepted this theory, there was not even a need, as a matter of law, to assert a
right of resistance; for there was no longer a legitimate authority extant to which one could resist even if
one wanted to. It is this precise recognition that lit up Adams’ thoughts like a lightbulb when he mused
about the legal status of Massachusetts Bay when the Governor and his Council refused to address the
question of opening the courts.236
Both Sidney and Adams unabashedly recognized every man’s right of resistance in the absence
of what they considered to be legitimate government. At the same time, both men understood that it
would have been very dangerous to the community for citizens to invoke this right without an extraordinary basis for doing so. Furthermore, for Adams personally, who was an officer of the court and
committed body and soul to the rule of law, the principle that King George had broken the law, leaving the
colonists out to dry, was much easier to stomach that the notion that the colony had no recourse but
rebellion. As Adams wrote in Novanglus I, it was not the case, as M suggested, that the colonists were
arguing that, “the smallest defect in the prince [justifies] a revolution.” “By no means,” said Adams.
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Adams was not the only British American lawyer making this argument. See, e.g., W. Drayton, A
Charge on the Rise of the American Empire Delivered by the Hon. William-Henry Drayton, esq: Chief
Justice of South-Carolina: To the Grand Jury for the District of Charlestown 5 (1776), cited in John Phillip
Reid, “The Irrelevance of the Declaration,” in Law in the American Revolution and the Revolution in the
Law: A Collection of Review Essays on American Legal History, Hendrik Hartog, ed. (New York &
London: New York University Press, 1981), pp. 46-89, 77 & n. 147. Drayton was a plantation owner,
lawyer, judge, and delegate to the Continental Congress from Charleston, South Carolina. See “Drayton,
William Henry (1742-1779), “Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-Present,”
http://bioguide.con gress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=D000491 (8-19-17).
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Years later, the first two sentences of President John Adams’ Inaugural Address reminded Americans
of this extraordinary circumstance. “When it was first perceived, in early times, that no middle course for
America remained between unlimited submission to a foreign legislature and a total independence of its
claims, men of reflection were less apprehensive of danger from the formidable power of fleets and
armies they must determine to resist than from those contests and dissensions which would certainly
arise concerning the forms of government to be instituted over the whole and over the parts of this
extensive country.” In the face of wholesale instability, the colonial leadership courageously moved
forward. “Relying, however, on the purity of their intentions, the justice of their cause, and the integrity
and intelligence of the people, under an overruling Providence which had so signally protected this
country from the first, the representatives of this nation, … launched into an ocean of uncertainty. John
Adams “Inaugural Address in the City of Philadelphia,” March 4, 1797, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/adams.asp (9-4-17).
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Indeed, as Adams noted in Novanglus IV, relying on a proposition by Machiavelli “which no wise man
ever contradicted, … that ‘while the mass of the people is not corrupted, tumults,’” that is, acts of
opposition, “‘do not hurt.’ By which he means, that they leave no lasting ill effects behind.237 On the other
hand, if there was “a manifest design in the Prince, to annul the contract on his part,” that act, a breach of
contract, “will annul it on the part of the people.” Obviously, then, “A settled plan to deprive the people of
all the benefits, blessings, and ends of the social contract, to subvert the fundamentals of the constitution
– to deprive them of all share in making and executing laws, will justify a revolution.”238 The use of the
term revolution here isn’t quite right; the described breach of contract would justify the colonists’ taking
hold of the ship of state, otherwise floundering. Thus, Adams muddied the waters a bit here; for if there
was no contract between people and king, as a matter of law there was nothing to revolt against. What is
clear to Adams, however, as it was for Sidney, was that citizens were free to act independently of their
former king, including no longer acknowledging his legitimacy or that of his representatives.239
In the Novanglus essays, and notwithstanding the adamant, prolix, and legalistic rhetoric, Adams
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Novanglus IV, PJA Vol. 2, p. 267. In his extremely insightful article, “J.G.A. Pocock’s Atlantic
Republicanism Thesis Revisited: The Case of John Adams’ Tacitism,” Jacob Soll maintained that, “To be
sure, the republicanism of quattrocento Florence was not the republicanism of colonial America.” At the
same time, Soll found that the American founders, “Remarkably,” built “their republican founding texts
with the intellectual tools of humanism from Italy, Britain, and France.” Soll focused on cultural traditions;
thus, he concluded, “The way Machiavelli read for politics was the way that …Adams, and even Jefferson
and Franklin did too.” Consequently, said Soll, “Pocock’s republican thesis still has resonance.” While I do
not agree with Pocock’s concept of republicanism, nor do I subscribe to the very concept of a paradigm in
real history, i.e., in an historical context, the republicanism of quattrocento Florence was very much the
republicanism of colonial America, not to mention the republicanism of seventeenth-century England.
Accordingly, Soll’s conclusion can be broadened to include not only cultural parallels between quattrocento Florence and colonial America, but the nature of the republican ideas themselves. Here, for
example, we see Adams’ explicit endorsement of a fundamental principle of Machiavelli’s republicanism.
He does this repeatedly. Moreover, as this study makes plain, Adams’ republicanism is virtually identical
to the seventeenth-century republicanism championed by Algernon Sidney. See Soll, “J.G.A. Pocock’s
Atlantic Republicanism Thesis Revisited,” pp. 23, 37.
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Novanglus I, PJA Vol. 2, pp. 230-31.
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The most interesting Novanglus analysis is Adams’ proposal for how to deal with the fact that the
colonies were “within the dominion, rule or government of the king of Great Britain,” and not within a
British empire, realm or kingdom. Novanglus VII, PJA, Vol. 2, p. 315. We need not reach a judgment on
the merits of Adams’ position to appreciate Adams’ method. The enormous attention that has been paid
to the precise terminology and the persuasiveness of Adams’ argument perhaps has thoroughly analyzed
the trees but thereby missed the forest. What is so fascinating and overwhelming about Adams’ approach
to this jurisdictional sort of question is his modus operandi: the classically legal nature of the argument,
the fine parsing of words, the reference to legal precedent but, of most significance, his pragmatic solution. For a detailed discussion of this Adams analysis, including the status of the colonies vis-à-vis the
metropole and the implications of the answer to that question, see Appendix B.
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was proposing a solution to Britain’s leaders. When we ask to whom he was writing, this is the answer.
Novanglus constituted not only a wake-up call, a tocsin and an educational effort intended to inspire
Adams’ fellow colonists or at least its leaders; it also was a legal proposal for a reasonable resolution with
the metropole that would avoid omnishambles – a confrontation that crossed the Rubicon. To mix
metaphors, after such a donnybrook, Adams knew that Humpty Dumpty would not be able to go back on
the wall. Adams’ solution was common sensical, seeking a middle ground that would suffice for the
colonies and satisfy the determined sense of superiority and rapacity of the British. In fine, the proposal
was pragmatic and moderate, a legal mediation approach that was quintessentially John Adamite.
Once King George declared the colonies in rebellion on Oct. 26, 1775 and Parliament supported
the King’s declaration, the issue of resistance, flamboyantly recognized in the Novanglus essays, became
moot. As Adams wrote in the May 15, 1776 Preamble to Resolution on Independent Governments, “his
Britannic Majesty … has, by a late act of Parliament, excluded the inhabitants of these United Colonies
from the protection of his crown.”240 Adams had earlier referred to this extraordinary legal status in his
March 1776 letters that became the pamphlet, “Thoughts on Government”: “In the Present State of
America, when by an Act of Parliament, We are put out of the Royal Protection,” here is what we have to
do to do to set up a state government.241 With the king’s action, the British Americans were
instantaneously either British traitors or lawful Americans. To live within the rule of law they had to govern
themselves. Denied the Crown’s protection, the exercise of British royal authority in America had now
become the exercise of power by a foreign, hostile power, necessarily inimical to the best interests of the
colonists, now viewed as traitors by the British. For example, the Americans could no longer “in good
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This was the preamble to the Resolution that “recommended to the respective Assemblies and
Conventions of the United Colonies, where no Government sufficient to the Exigencies of their affairs
hath been hitherto established, to adopt such Government as shall in the Opinion of the Representatives
of the People best conduce to the happiness and Safety of their Constituents in particular and America in
General.” JA D&A, Vol. III, p. 386.
241
The specific trigger that prompted Thoughts on Government, distributed in Spring 1776, and created
momentum for a declaration of independence likely was the publication of Thomas Paine’s Common
Sense on January 9, 1776. Note, too, that there were several different versions of Thoughts on
Government as colonial America lacked photocopiers. When Adams was repeatedly asked to set down
for the benefit of a different Continental Congress representative what his thoughts were on how to go
about forming a government, the rendition modestly but trivially changed. See Thoughts on Government
[all three editions], ante 27 March-April 1776, PJA Vol. 4, pp. 65-92 (detailed editorial note on pp. 65-73).
For contextual history related to the publishing of Thoughts on Government, see Appendix B.
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Conscience … take the oaths and affirmations necessary for the support of any government under the
crown.”242 Each colonist had to make a choice whether to give up their claims, ask for clemency, and
seek to become lawfully British or, alternatively, to be lawful Americans; for the choice had been made for
them by George III and Parliament that they could not be both.
Wrapped up in the necessity to justify to himself, his fellow American leaders, and to the world at
large that it was the colonists right to first oppose tyranny and if necessary to break from it (although, as it
turned out it was the British who first expelled the colonists from the British Empire), Adams became preoccupied for some time with the daunting problem of how to accomplish this epoch-making shift in government consistent with the rule of law, viz., without anarchy and lawlessness.243 As he stated in a letter
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“V. Preamble to Resolution on Independent Governments,” May 15, 1776, PJA Vol. 4, pp. 11-12. The
unmooring of the colonists from the mother ship is also reflected in Adams’ September 1774 letter to
William Tudor. Adams described the activity of the First Continental Congress, at which he was a
delegate. The other colonies were supportive of Massachusetts in many ways; but they were also
hesitant. The result, said Adams, was that they wanted something unrealistic. “You see by this What they
are for – vizt., that you Stand Stock Still, and live without Government, or Law. At least for the present
and as long as you can. I have represented to them, wherever I see them, the Utter Impossibility, of four
hundred Thousand People existing long without a Legislature or Courts of Justice. They all Seem to
acknowledge it: Yet nothing can be as yet accomplished.” In short, at this juncture Congress was leaving
the Bay uniquely exposed to political instability and chaos. “We hear, perpetually, the most figurative
Panegyricks upon our Wisdom, Fortitude and Temperance: The most fervent Exhortations to
perseverance. But nothing more is done.” Adams to Tudor, Sept. 29, 1774, PJA Vol. 2, pp. 176-78.

Adams elaborated on this stalemate in a letter to Tudor about a week later and, in January 1775,
described the situation as a “cruel state of Suspense.” Indeed, as early as October 1774 Adams was
extremely worried about the legal status of the Massachusetts Bay. “I lie down with it, in my Mind, I
dream of it all night, and awake with its ghastly Spectre before my Eyes.” But the Congress was not
ready to do anything. “They dread the Thoughts of an Action because, it would make a Wound which
could never be healed. It would fix and establish a Rancour, which would descend to the latest
Generations: It would render all Hopes of a Reconciliation with Great Britain desperate. It would light up
the Flames of War, perhaps through the whole Continent, which might rage for twenty year, and End, in
the Subduction of America, as likely as in her Liberation.” The outcome was different; but the anticipated
evolution of events leading to that outcome was not. See Adams to James Warren, Jan. 3, 1775, and
Adams to Tudor, Oct. 7, 1774, PJA Vol. 2, pp. 208-09, 187-89.
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As he said, it “lay with great Weight upon my Mind as the most difficult and dangerous Business that
We had to do, (for from the Beginning I always expected We should have more difficulty and danger, in
our Attempts to govern ourselves and in our Negotiations and connections with foreign Powers, than from
all the Fleets and Armies of Great Britain.)” Autobiography, JA D&A, Vol. III, pp. 351-52. In correspondence with Horatio Gates, Brigadier General and Adjunct General of the Continental Army, Adams
wrote, “The success of this War depends upon a Skillfull Steerage of the political Vessell. The Difficulty
lies in forming Constitutions for particular Colonies, and a Continental Constitution for the whole, each
Colony should establish its own Government, and then a League should be formed, between them all.”
The editors of The Adams Papers suggested that this statement might indicate that Adams was working
on his Thoughts on Government at the time. It should be noted as well that this quotation is imbedded in
an inflammatory jab at the southern colonies, who were dragging their heels on independency and
“Republican Government,” Adams believed, because of the populist fears of their southern barons. He
also pointed a finger at “the Proprietary Interests in the Middle Colonies.” By this time, Adams had run
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written precisely in this timeframe: “I have ever Thought it the most difficult and dangerous Part of the
Business, Americans have to do, in this mighty Context, to contrive some Method for the Colonies to glide
insensibly, from under the old Government, into a peaceable and contented Submission to new ones.”244
Adams’ legal arguments on the right to rebel and how to go about doing so were essential to his
lawyerly mind as he steered the course for those reading his work towards the rapids of independence.
Adams had a mandate for himself and for the citizenry: he had to find a practical way to lawful
revolutionariness.245 To even begin to talk about republicanism and the nature of the government that
would be best for America, Adams had to get himself and his audience there – he had to lawfully,
consistent with the political values that he believed in and advocated, justify the creation of new, stable,
functional colonial-to-be-state republics that operated under the rule of law. Each colony needed its own
legitimate government; those governments could then either recognize that they had been evicted from
the empire or, alternatively, if they so chose, declare their own independence from the metropole and
then confederate to form united States. The argument that the king had severed his contractual
relationship with the colonies, and the alternative Monarchomach right-of-resistance argument, brought
Adams and his countrymen to their next challenge.
There is not a more unintelligible word in the English language than republicanism.
John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, 8 August 8, 1807 246
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out of patience with the necessary “Skillful Steerage” to which he referred. John Adams to Horatio Gates,
March 23, 1776, PJA, Vol. 4, pp. 59-60.
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Sidney discussed a similar thing, albeit with less nervousness. "[A]s long as it is done by those who
have a right of doing it, and he or they who are created continue within the power of the law to accomplish
the end of their institution, many forms being themselves equally good,” there is nothing irregular about
changing a magistracy.” Similarly, reviewing various instances in history in which “a people … lay aside
their kings when they receive nothing but evil, … nothing will be found more orderly than the change of
government” in many nations” when the change is made by “assemblies of the three estates.” Such “acts
therefore were lawful and good.” Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, Apr. 16, 1776, JA Rev. Writings I, pp. 6063, 61; DCG, II.12.148, II.16.168-69.
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Grant called Adams “a conservative revolutionary.” The problem that I have with this label is that it
does not sufficiently emphasize Adams’ determination to find a lawful way out of the intolerable circumstances in which the British Americans found themselves. See Grant, John Adams Party of One, p. 97.
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Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, Aug. 8, 1807, Founders Online, National Archives, last modified June
29, 2017, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-5203 (10-29-17).[This is an early
access document from The Adams Papers. It is not an authoritative final version.]
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In Chapter Three on Sidney’s republicanism, we identified five commonly understood, traditional
components of republican thought and eliminated two other mistaken components. The five wellrecognized features of republicanism are (i) a common understanding of the nature of man; and the
meaning and importance of (ii) liberty; (iii) consent; (iv) participatory government; and (v) virtue. The two
red herrings that, notwithstanding the contrary view by some scholars, are not part of traditional
republican thought are an aversion to commerce and a rejection of all forms of monarchy. In all these
respects, Adams unmistakably was a traditional or “classical” republican. This is very straightforward to
establish. The ho-humness of these aspects of British American republicanism will be evident from the
shared endorsement of these ideas by Adams’ fellow British American republicans. We will then dwell on
the two missing links in the historiography, law and balance, both essential, constitutive elements of
republicanism. It will be evident that there is virtually no difference in the way Sidney and Adams
incorporated these ideas into their understanding of the nature of republicanism.
One preliminary remark is in order. From youth Adams was absorbed in the issue of governance. Recall that when he was twenty-three, Adams wrote in his Diary, "Aim at an exact knowledge of
the Nature, End and Means of Government. Compare the different forms of it with each other and each of
them with their Effects on public and private Happiness."247 As an 1899 Adams scholar observed, “[t]o
the end of his life ‘no romance was more entertaining’ than politics. …The principles of government, so he
wrote his kinsman, Samuel Adams, are to be found by the observation and study of ‘human nature,
society and universal history.’” To fully understand those principles Adams studied the great political
thinkers, both ancient and modern. “[T]he works of Lord Bolingbroke, for example, he read through more
than five times although, in his opinion, the author was ‘a haughty, arrogant, supercilious dogmatist.’”248
Like any lawyer worth his salt, Adams generally “quote[d] to refute,” and so it is always important to
recognize the purpose of Adams’ references, e.g., in Defence, while Adams had a small chapter on
Locke, Milton and Hume, the purpose of these seven pages was to entirely defeat their ideas on
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(im)balance in government, not to support them.249
Is there no permanent, no steady pole,
To point us on, and Guide the Wandring soul,
Does prejudice, and passion, Rule Mankind.
Are there no springs that actuate the Mind,
Whose deep Mæanders, have some Nobler source,
Than Vain self Love; to Guide their Winding Course.
From Mercy Otis Warren to John Adams, Oct. 11, 1773250

i. The Nature of Man
From youth and with remarkable consistency throughout his life, Adams had a husky, occasionally
tough and, I would contend, profoundly realistic picture of man’s fundamental nature. He conveyed neither
idealism nor any sort of consistent pessimism when he wrote about man, not that he did not both glorify
Americans, particularly for literary effect, or occasionally rage against specific men and sometimes express
disappointment about the public.251 Adams’ Oct. 18, 1790 letter to his cousin Sam well illustrates this view.
“With you, I have also the honor most perfectly to harmonize in your sentiments of the humanity and
wisdom of promoting education in knowledge, virtue, and benevolence. But I think that these will confirm
mankind in the opinion of the necessity of preserving and strengthening the dikes against the ocean, its
tides and storms. Human appetites, passions, prejudices, and self-love will never be conquered by
benevolence and knowledge alone, introduced by human means.”252
Adams stated his adherence to blunt realism in a passage in Defence: “To amuse and flatter the
people with compliments of qualities that never existed in them, is not the duty nor the right of a philosopher or legislator; he must form a true idea and judgment of mankind, and adapt his institution to facts, not
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pessimistic may be just the sort of idealist that Adams most assuredly was not.
252
Jefferson similarly wrote in a 1787 letter to James Madison transmitting his objections to the proposed
Constitution that, “Above all things I hope the education of the common people will be attended to.” See
John to Sam, Oct. 18, 1790, “Four Letters on the Important Subject of Government,” https://democratic
thinker.wordpress.com/2010/04/11/ samuel-john-adams-on-government%E2%80%94letter-iii/ (3-3-19).
The Works of John Adams. 10 Vols., Charles Francis Adams, ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1850—56,
Vol. 6, pp. 416-20; Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Dec. 20, 1787, Thomas Jefferson Works, pp.
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compliments.”253 Adams typically began political works with a hearty simulacrum of man’s nature, inevitably the first building block of his political analysis.254 On the other hand, Adams also remarked in his 1775
“Notes of Debates in the Continental Congress” that “More Virtue is expected from our People, than any
People ever had.” Indeed, as Clarendon, Adams sweetly wrote that, “If ever an Infant Country deserved to
be cherished, it is America; If ever any People merited Honor and Happiness, they are her Inhabitants.” 255
Was Adams’ understanding of human nature a profoundly religious view? In The Lost Soul of
American Politics, John Patrick Diggins argued that “an even deeper source of Adams’s ideas” beyond
Enlightenment thought was Calvinism, viz., “his conviction that the people themselves could be the
source of evil.” Diggins maintained that Adams’ “psychology of political behavior derived from Calvinist
theology.”256 Without addressing the psychology of political behavior, there is no question that Adams
believed what may be the universally-held conviction that human beings’ passions could readily get them
into trouble; and religion tended to dictate how one defines “trouble.” It is also clear that part of Adams’
personal behavior and values were religiously motivated; after all, Adams affirmed and reaffirmed in his
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writing his belief in a provident God; he also attended church all his life.257 On the other hand, as early as
1761, at the ripe old age of twenty-five, Adams wrote to his friend Samuel Quincy with significant derision
about the Calvinist concept of election, “that strange religious dogma, that God elected a precious few (of
which few, however, every man who believed the doctrine is always one) to life eternal, without regard to
any foreseen virtue, and reprobated all the rest, without regard to any foreseen vice. A doctrine which,
with serious gravity, represents the world as under the government of humor and caprice, and which
Hottentots and Mohawks would reject with horror.”258 When he lived in London Adams befriended Dr.
Joseph Priestly, the famous Protestant radical, a Unitarian with whom Adams sympathized.259 If
anything, over time Adams’ dissatisfaction with church policy, if not dogma, grew. In 1825, in a letter to
Jefferson, the very elderly Adams was highly critical of the “whole Christian world” for its suppression of
free inquiry into religious matters. “The substance and essence of Christianity as I understand it is eternal
and unchangeable and will bear examination forever.”260
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constantly to improve our selves in Habits of Piety and Virtue.” Similarly, he referred to a discussion
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In short, it is easy to be misled by what Diggins termed Adams’ “residual Calvinism.” For all the
arguments that are made about his Puritan roots, the fact is that notwithstanding Adams’ attachment to
his religious heritage, he was highly selective in his religious convictions and remarkably ecumenical in
the practice of his faith. When serving as the ambassador to Britain Adams attended three different
church services on a Sunday: “In London he was partial to the preaching of Joseph Priestley at the Essex
Street Chapel, London’s first avowedly Unitarian church. But John Adams was no sectarian. While
touring the English countryside one Sunday in 1787, he would participate in an ecumenical triple-header:
Episcopal services in the morning, Presbyterian in the afternoon, and Baptist in the evening.” 261 Perhaps,
above all, Adams recognized the need for human beings to have religion to turn to, especially in the face
of tragedy, or oppression, or disaster.262
Most importantly for our purposes, Adams was notably secular in his politics. Not that he did not
believe in, and routinely refer to God. He did. But as with Sidney it is hard to find a religious tenor to
Adams’ political thought notwithstanding his recognition of a God that created nature and then created
man. Thus, while “The Liberties of Nations are from God and Nature,” and “not from Kings,” government
was uniquely human. It was framed by man and for man. “God leaves to Man the choice of Forms in
Government,” said Sidney. Man’s world was just that: man’s. “God having given the Government of the

… was consumed with the need to set the historical record straight.” Adams to Jefferson, Jan. 23, 1825,
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of Virginia, he discouraged Jefferson from bringing European scholars to the university who would be
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down to this little ball, to be spit upon by Jews. And until this awful blasphemy is got rid of, there never
will be any liberal science in the world.’” Adams to Jefferson, Jan. 22, 1825, The Adams-Jefferson
Letters, pp. 606-07; Haraszti, John Adams and the Prophets of Progress, p. 45 n.6.
262

As Soll observed, Adams wrote in marginalia while studying his texts in his Tacitean critical way, “Man
is by Nature a religious Animal.” Soll, J. G. A. Pocock’s Atlantic Republicanism Thesis Revisited,” p. 35.
748

World to no one Man, nor declared how it should be divided, left it to the Will of Man.” This is at the heart
of Sidney and Adams’ views, and of republicanism generally. Pace Filmer, monarchy was not from God!
Neither was any other form of government. “Thirteen governments thus founded on the natural authority
of the people alone, without a pretence of miracle or mystery, which are destined to spread over the
northern part of that whole quarter of the globe, are a great point gained in favour of the rights of
mankind,” said Adams. By the time he wrote Defence, the “experiment” had “succeeded.” It could “no
longer be called in question, whether authority in magistrates, and obedience of citizens, can be
grounded on reason, morality, and the Christian religion, without the monkery of priests, or the knavery of
politicians.”263 Sound governance was grounded on the ethical tenets of Christianity; but not on organized
religion or its intolerance. Writing to a leader of the Jewish community in 1818, Adams stated, “I wish
your nation may be admitted to all the Privileges of Citizens in every Country of the World.” For his times,
Adams was religiously open minded. ”This Country has done much I wish it may do more; and annul
every narrow Idea in Religion Government and Commerce. – Let the Wits joke; the Phylosophers sneer!
What then? It has pleased the Providence of the first Cause, the Universal Cause, that Abraham should
give Religion not only to Hebrews but to Christians and Mahomitans, the greatest Part of the modern
civilized World.” 264 This juxtaposes Sidney and Adams’ perspective on man and his activity in this world,
on the one hand, with Locke and others on the other. While there are differing views on Locke’s religious
ideas and their impact on the broad range of subjects on which he wrote, it seems quite clear that, as
historian John Dunn put it, “It was the meaning of most men’s lives for which Locke was fighting his
epistemological and theological battles, ‘the heart’, perhaps, ‘of a heartless world’.” Debating the details of
Locke’s “development of the Protestant ethic,” it is implausible to dispute the fact that Locke was wrapped
up with the notion of man’s calling, “a summons from God” to “each adult individual” “to fill a particular
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role” which they “can discern … by conscientious reflection on the relationship between their genetic
endowments and the social situation into which they are born.” 265 This intensely religious purpose was a
long way from the secular interests of Sidney and Adams. 266 Locke was convinced that once a man
figured out what his calling was supposed to be, his purpose in life was “to discharge it with energy.” The
concept of the calling, and Lockean reality, was religious egalitarianism; but it was an egalitarianism inapplicable to secular life, e.g., some people, like Shaftesbury, had great wealth; others, like Locke, did not.
Many practical and secular consequences flowed from this theologically-suffused view of life,
e.g., there was a duty to self-educate, and life was not fair.267 With respect to Locke’s republican thought,
the most relevant point is that political and social egalitarianism was not his goal, nor did he believe it was
possible. This goes a long way towards explaining Locke’s comfort, anyway, recognizing that as
Shaftesbury’s second he may have felt required to participate in the creation of a constitution for South
Carolina that embraced slavery.268 Ironically, notwithstanding Locke’s liberal political pedigree, in this
regard he was extremely conservative.
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Historian Staughton Lynd loudly and clearly made this point in Intellectual Origins of American
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allowing freedom of conscience to religion only after carefully barring it from all interference in secular
society.” Thus, in Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke “asserted that while liberty of conscience ‘is every
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One should appreciate, however, that in the eighteenth-century, Locke was most well-known for
his theory of human understanding, not his political ideas. As Ryerson pointed out, “John Locke’s Essay
Concerning Human Understanding was read and perhaps even taught at midcentury Harvard, but his
treatises on government were neither formally discussed nor assigned as additional reading.”269 Reid
pointed out, “The works of John Locke were cited as authority during the prerevolutionary debates, but
nowhere near as much as one might think reading the secondary literature. … If all the evidence were
tabulated and evaluated, the writings of John Locke would be found as often marshaled to support the
answer of American Tories as the argument of American Whigs.”270 The emphasis on Locke in the
secondary literature remains; and without literally reading every instance and context in which Locke is
cited in the pamphlet and other contemporary prerevolutionary writing, the matter of his influence remains
possibly unnecessarily murky. Why not just accept what the experts, Reid and Ryerson, are telling us?
Perhaps we can consider the matter another way: that there were many Lockes: the intensely
private, indeed secretive man, the almost-doctor, the academic, Shaftesbury’s side-kick, and the postShaftesbury guy. There were also a remarkable number of Lockean intellectual subjects on which he
wrote essays and other works. The diverse components of his life and personality and the related strands
of his thinking do not necessarily meld into one cohesive whole, nor is it necessary to try to accomplish
that to understand Locke’s republican thought which, while different from Harrington’s ideas, were equally
idiosyncratic (consider, e.g., the combination of the calling with his embracing of political freedom with his
views on equality).
Returning to Adams’ very secular perspective, Diggins had it right when he explained the
counterintuitive political implications of Adams and other leaders’ religious views. “The role of religion in
the Founders’ thought is as complex as it is ironic. The irony lies in the curious fact that those who
remained under the influence of Calvinism and Hume – Adams, Hamilton, and Madison – doubted the vital
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importance of religion in preserving the Republic, whereas those who remained free from the mistrusts of
skepticism and a concern for sin – Washington and Jefferson – often looked to religion as one of the
foundations of political morality.271 Adams’ views about human nature also did not reflect an abstract or
philosophical bent. He was a pragmatist who was grounded perhaps first and foremost in life-long
observations profusely reflected throughout his Diary.272 When he was twenty-three Adams mused about
Montesquieu’s ideas on the nature of man, contrasting them with Hobbes’ perspective. Adams’ comments
are funny and enlightening: “Secondat says, that a Man, in the State of Nature i.e. unimproved by
Education or Experience, would feel Nothing but his own Impotence and would tremble at the motion of a
Leaf. …But Q. – What proof can be given of this Assertion? What Reason is there to think that Timidity,
rather than Confidence or Presumption, would hold the Ascendancy in him?”273 The abstract, purely
theoretical nature of the concept of man in a state of nature bothered Adams: “What does he mean by a
Man in a State of Nature?” Adams posited various possibilities, turning to Hobbes’ view that domination
would be man’s natural state. Adams had already challenged this notion: “Two might meet, and be
pleased with each others looks, and fall to play, like two Lambs. Two others might meet, and one might
apply his Hands to the others Body and hurt him, and then both fall afighting like 2 Dogs. …Passions work
so differently in different men.” His ultimate point was pragmatic: “How can man be considered out of
Society, before the Establishment of Society. We put possible imaginable Cases, and then ask what
would be the Effect. The Species cant subsist, without Society, but an Individual may, as the wild Man
found in a forrest.” Adams analytically followed his own intellectual trajectory, concluding: “Copulation
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Given his age when he wrote these comments in his Diary, we can say that they were Adams’ ideas
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would soon succeed.”274
In sum, as Prof. Diggins perceptively put it, Adams’ “outlook was secular and modern, indeed even
postmodern in his view that politics could not depend upon philosophy, religion, or morality. Not that
values derived from these sources were not important; but government was not a matter of ‘self-evident’
truths but of institutional structures.”275 This is an extremely important insight. It is paralleled by Adams’
view that good government could not depend upon virtuous men, to be discussed shortly. Diggins also
stated that in Adams’ view, government “power is checked by the psychology of suspicion.” Here I
respectfully demur. Notwithstanding Bailyn’s preoccupation with colonial fear and distrust, “the fear of a
comprehensive conspiracy against liberty throughout the English-speaking world,” that “a conspiracy
believed to have been nourished in corruption … lay at the heart of the Revolutionary movement,” Adams’
did not believe that government power was checked by the psychology of suspicion.276 Government
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power was checked by its own structure and by the Law.277
For reasons that we will increasingly appreciate, Adams’ mind did not reject, but swung away
from the hypothetical world of man in a state of nature to the nature of Law and the very realistic environment in which men thrived. Adams starting point was the conviction that “Law is human Reason. It
governs all the Inhabitants of the Earth.”278 In a later composition writing as “U,” likely Everyman, in the
Boston Gazette, Adams explained his thought process: “To eradicate the Gothic and pernicious
principles of private revenge, that have been lately spread among my countrymen, to the debasement of
their character, and to the frequent violation of the public peace, -- and to recommend a careful attention
to political measures, and a candid manner of reasoning about them; instead of abusive insolence, or
uncharitable imputations upon men and character, has since I first understood the employment of
entertaining the Public, been my constant and invariable point of view.”279 Adams was preoccupied with
how to get from A to C – how to begin with insolent, uncharitable, vengeful man and get to reason and
politics. Accordingly, he remarked to himself as he posited man in society exercising reason and
implementing the Law, “Let me attend to the Principle of Government.”280
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Detailed discussion follows on Adams’ views on the structure of government and the law. One
explanation in an Oct. 18, 1790 letter from John to Sam well evidences Adams’ reliance on “checking”
government power. “’The love of liberty,’ you say, ‘is interwoven in the soul of man.’” Yes, agreed Adams.
But “[s]o it is, according to La Fontaine, in that of a wolf; and I doubt whether it be much more rational,
generous, or social, in one than in the other, until in man it is enlightened by experience, reflection,
education, and civil and political institutions, which are at first produced, and constantly supported and
improved by a few; that is, by the nobility.” Indeed, said Adams, “The wolf, in the fable, who preferred
running in the forest, lean and hungry, to the sleek, plump, and round sides of the dog, because he found
the latter was sometimes restrained, had more love of liberty than most men.” But most men are not
interested in politics, said Adams. “The numbers of men in all ages have preferred ease, slumber, and
good cheer to liberty, when they have been in competition. We must not then depend alone upon the love
of liberty in the soul of man for its preservation. Some political institutions must be prepared, to assist this
love against its enemies. Without these, the struggle will ever end only in a change of impostors.” John to
Sam, Oct. 18, 1790, “Four Letters: Being an Interesting Correspondence between Those Eminently
Distinguished Characters: John Adams, Late President of the United States; and Samuel Adams, Late
Governor of Massachusetts, on the Important Subject of Government,” The Works of John Adams,
Second President of the United States: with a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, by his Grandson
Charles Francis Adams, 10 Vols. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1856) [repr. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund,
2011], Vol. 6, pp. 271-74, 277-81.
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This sequence of ideas, espoused by a very young man in the Summer of 1759, remained with
him for life. Why worry about the hypothetical man in a state of nature? Man is a social being. There is “a
sort of innate desire on the part of human beings to form communities. For our species is not made up of
solitary individuals or lonely wanderers.”281 Man was “born to join a fellowship of citizens.”282 So said
Cicero. Waxing poetic, Sidney put it this way: “inasmuch as God having from the beginning ordained that
men should not live like wolves in woods, every man by himself, but together in civil societies, left to every
one a liberty of joining with that society which best pleas’d him, and to every society to create such
magistrates, and frame such laws as should seem most conducing to their own good, according to the
measure of light and reason they might have.”283 Adams concurred with both of these republicans. Men
naturally formed societies; societies needed laws to keep men on the up and up, and they needed
government to implement and enforce those laws. In Adams’ 1772 notes for an oration likely prepared in
anticipation of his speech at the March 1772 annual Braintree town meeting, Adams avowed, “Human
Nature therefore and human Life must be carefully observed and studied. Here we should spread before
Us a Map of Man. …He will be found, a rational, sensible and social Animal, in all. The Instinct of Nature
impels him to Society, and Society causes the Necessity of Government.” In short, “Government is
nothing more than the combined Force of Society, or the united Power of the Multitude, for the Peace,
Order, Safety, Good and Happiness of the people, who compose the Society.”284
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DCG, III.10.373. Sidney described man as the “instituter” of government, according to “the ordinance
of God … to which it was instituted.” Id. In the next chapter Adams is described as the legal “implementor”
of the republican ideas of the revolution. Implementor, instituter; the meaning is the same. As Sidney
stated, “God approved and ratified the salutary constitutions of government made by men.” Id.
284
Adams, “Notes for an Oration at Braintree,” Spring 1772, JA D&A, Vol. 2, pp. 56-61, 56-57. I must
challenge Pincus’ thesis that while the term “happiness” has many potential meanings, what the patriots
intended by the use of the term “happiness” in the Declaration of Independence was “promotion of the
public good or welfare,” which Pincus then interpreted to mean the promotion of a strong state that
instituted aggressive, “state-supported” economic policies, quoting several Adams statements as
evidence of the merits of this thesis. Indeed, this is what Pincus meant when he entitled his monograph
The Heart of the Declaration. Pincus is absolutely correct that for the American patriots, good
republicans all, happiness was associated with the public good and welfare which, as we know from
Sidney and will see in Adams’ writing, is an integral part of republican theory. The Greek concept of
eudaemonia, “best translated as all-round happiness, or human flourishing” involved different qualities
according to the philosopher on which one relied, and could include achieving one’s potential, including
one’s potential to reason most effectively, as well as also living with beneficial “external conditions,”
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In his “U” articles, written in his late-twenties, Adams reflected on man’s unattractive qualities – our
propensity to take revenge, to be deceitful, and to lust for power. In an Aug. 1, 1763 letter to the Boston
Gazette, for example, U considered the vengeful nature of man, driven by competition and resentment.285
In another “U” essay on “Self Decipt,” he bemoaned man’s ineluctable ability to deceive himself. “Insensible of the beams in our own eyes, are we not quick in discerning motes in those of others? …[E]ven the
few favourites of nature, who have received from her clearer understandings, and more happy tempers
than other men, … are often seduced by this unhappy disposition in their minds, to their own destruction.”286 In yet another essay entitled, “All Men would be Tyrants if they could,” he stated, “The Meaning of
that Maxim” that all men are tyrants “is not so uncharitable, as to suppose that all the sons of Adam, are
so many abandoned Knaves … who would violate their Consciences, and oppress, mangle, burn, butcher
and destroy their fellow Men, in direct opposition to their Judgments.” Instead, said Adams, “It means, in
my opinion no more than this plain simple observation upon human Nature … that the selfish Passions,

including health and prosperity. Honohan, Civic Republicanism, p. 19. We can see in this diversity of
goals the roots of different variants of republicanism, with some goals much more individually focused
and others more communal and civic-minded. I would agree with Pincus that for good republicans,
“Governments were much more than a necessary evil.” But I would not agree that this then translates
into wanting “a government that could promote economic prosperity” through “subsidies,” “infrastructure,”
“a broad consumer base,” and “the elimination of chattel slavery.” As is evident from the quotation in the
text above, Adams used the word “happiness” early on and not infrequently. It also will become very clear
that Adams did not consider there to be one form of government and, one cannot gainsay that the same
thing would be true with respect to one economic policy that universally worked to produce happiness.
Whether at the time of the Adams’ statements on which Pincus relied, from 1775 and 1776, including
statements from Thoughts on Government, Adams would have endorsed Pincus’ thesis is entirely
hypothetical. Economic policy was not something on which Adams was focused in this timeframe;
consequently, it is taking liberties to attribute this intention to Adams. He had bigger fish to fry – e.g.,
stability in the face of war, independence, and the military supplies needed to successfully engage in war
and win his new country’s independence, e.g., as Pincus noted, “saltpeter, sulfur, powder, cannon,” etc.
Pincus, The Heart of the Declaration, pp. 133-35, 151.
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In this letter, Adams also waxed poetic about how man was “distinguished from the other Animals”
when “he comes originally from the Hands of his Creator.” In this Hobbesian mode of thinking, “Self
Love, or Self-Preservation, is the only Spring, that moves within him” in those “natural” circumstances.
Each man “must be his own Avenger.” Man, said Adams, is driven by the sentiment of “Revenge,”
prompted by “Emulations and Competitions for Superiority,” which leads to “resentment in Proportion, and
Shame and Grief” that “will prompt the Savage to claim Satisfaction.” But, Adams asked, “would such an
Existence be worth preserving?” Luckily, however, unlike other animals, man has “a Capacity of
acquiring Knowledge and Civility.” The distinction, said Adams, between “Savage Nations and polite
ones” is that in the latter, the individual right to avenge is “resigned to Tribunals erected by the Public.”
Again, however, Adams saw “one of the highest and most important Strains, of civil and human Policy” to
be the goal of “exterminat[ing] from among Mankind,” his propensity for “such revengeful Sentiments and
Tempers.” “V. ‘U’ to the Boston Gazette,” Aug. 1, 1763, PJA Vol. I, pp. 72-76, 73-74.
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are stronger than the social, and that the former would always prevail over the latter in any Man.”287
Sidney and others had said the same thing: “Every man has passions; few know how to moderate, and
no one can wholly extinguish them.”288
Adams’ political perspective was distinctly modern; it was authentically secular and realistic.289 This
perspective was confirmed and endlessly reconfirmed throughout Adams’ lifetime in a vast array of daily
encounters, experiences that informed his diverse legal work, extensive diplomatic missions, and
relentless and protracted political involvement. So, too, was Sidney. Recall that he declined the presence
of a clergyman on the scaffold. There is no question that the Tacitean recognition of man’s imperfection
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“VII. An Essay on Man’s Lust for Power,” post-Aug. 29, 1763,” PJA Vol. 1, pp. 81-84, 82. Sixteen
years later, in “Discourses on Davila,” Adams wrote about man’s passions of emulation, ambition,
jealousy, envy and vanity. Acknowledging that, “There is in human nature, it is true, simple Benevolence
– or an affection for the good of others,” Adams nevertheless concluded that, “alone it is not a ballance for
the selfish affections.” Adams, “Discourses on Davila,” Adams’ edition, p. 28.
Adams’ political opponent Joseph Galloway, the Pennsylvania loyalist who worked extremely hard albeit
unsuccessfully to keep the colonies from breaking away from Britain, shared Adams’ views on the nature
of man. “Man, he argued, was by nature a selfish creature. All his mannerisms and vices sprang from his
instinct of self-interest.” Indeed, this seems to have been a common conviction, stated with some flair by
Ferling: “Like most English and colonial contemporaries, Galloway believed man had created government
to control his selfish instincts and to obstruct his otherwise inevitable slide into a cannibalistic social
environment.” According to this historian, “To understand the mind of Galloway, one must begin with his
attitude toward man and man’s attempt to govern himself. Everything else in Galloway’s intellectual
makeup flowed from the conclusions he reached in this realm.” While I obviously agree with the proposition
that it is sensible to begin by understanding the views about man’s nature held by these political thinkers
and activists it cannot be the case that everything else followed from there given the fact that both Adams
and Galloway had a virtually identical conception of man’s nature and yet the political outcomes that in
their view followed from that were diametrically opposed. See Ferling, The Loyalist Mind, pp. 70-71.
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As Soll established in his article on Pocock’s Atlantic republican thesis and Adams’ Tacitism, Tacitus
was “a primary staple of early American education and learned culture.” Like Livy, he was a source of
political wisdom. Soll maintained that while Tacitus was relied upon by Jefferson and others, he was
utilized novelly by Adams. “Of all the founders, John Adams was the most traditional in terms of his
humanist style of scholarship. Yet Adams would use Tacitism in new ways: to attack the optimism and
concept of human perfection of the Philosophes, and to defend an Augustinian, Protestant pessimistic
view of mankind and the political state of nature, and thus defend a literary conservative and cautious
Whiggish republicanism based on deep skepticism, which Adams pared with an Augustinian, Protestant
cynicism about humankind.” Soll continued, “Adams chose his personal motto from book 1 of Tacitus’s
Histories: “libertatem amicitiam retinebis et fidem,.” This passage was extracted from a description of
Augustus’s discussion of how to lead effectively and wield power in the face of power and flattery.” The
passage included the statement, “cling with the same constancy to honor, freedom, friendship, the best
possession of the human spirit, but others will seek to weaken them with their servility.” Soll, “J.G.A.
Pocock’s Atlantic Republicanism Thesis Revisited,” pp. 29-37. The quotations are on page 33. Pace Soll,
Adams’ words need not be viewed with an emphasis on pessimism and Protestant cynicism.
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and its impact on politics was a foundational, internalized principle of Adams’ republicanism.290 Similarly,
it had informed Sidney’s republicanism: “[T]here is a vast distance between what men ought to be, and
what they are. Every man ought to be just, true, and charitable; and if they were so, laws would be of no
use; but it were a madness to abolish them upon a supposition that they are so.”291 But that does equate
with pessimism or Protestant cynicism. As Haraszti cogently put it, “Above all,” Adams “feared a system
of government built on the theory of the ‘natural goodness’ of man.”292
Adams’ awareness of how men really were, what made them tick, the assessment of which
became a talent that he used not only in the practice of law but in his career as a diplomat and as a
statesman, was at the heart of his understanding of both politics and republicanism, just as it was for
Sidney. Thirty-eight years before the French Revolution began, an October 1761 Diary entry provides
one indicia of the remarkable continuity in Adams’ thought: “Among the numberless Imperfections of
human Nature and society, there is none that deserves to be more lamented, because there is none that
is the source of greater Evils, than the Tendency of great Parts and Genius, to imprudent sallies and a
Wrong Biass.” The young Adams turned to history. “If We move back, thro the History of all ages and
Nations, we shall find, that all the Tumults, Insurrections, and Revolutions, that have disturbed the Peace
of society, and spilled oceans of Blood, have arisen from the giddy Rashness and Extravagance of the
sublimest Minds. But in those Governments where the People have much Power, tho the best that can
be found, the Danger from such spirits is the greatest of all.”293
As early as 1763 Adams unwaveringly believed that given man’s imperfections, “we can never be
secure in a resignation of our understandings, or in confiding enormous power, either to the Bramble or
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Soll’s emphasis on Adams’ later works, Defence and “Discourse on Davila,” as well as his focus on the
French philosophes and related matters, might lead one to conclude that Adams’ Tacitean perspective
was something that emerged late in his career. I doubt Soll intended this inference; regardless, it is very
clear from the very early Adams’ essays quoted above that Adams’ views on man’s weaknesses and
predilections were constant from young adulthood and throughout his lifetime.
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JA D&A Vol. I, pp. 221-22. Distinguished scholar Adair Douglass wrote, “John Adams assumed
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the Cedar; no, nor to any mortal, however great or good.”294 Sidney had similarly said that recognition of
man’s weak character must be the starting point in the quest for good governance: “such as have been
more wise in the constitution of their governments, have always had regard to the frailty of human nature,
and the corruption reigning in the hearts of men.”295 Writing in 1763 about self-deceit as the anonymous
everyman “U,” Adams ironically warned, “Let not writers nor statesmen deceive themselves. The springs
of their own conduct and opinions are not always so clear and pure, nor are those of their antagonists in
politics.”296 Human nature was such that there could never be too much vigilance when it came to ensuring good governance. Adams could not have put it more clearly. “Every step in the public administration
of government, concerns us nearly. Life and fortune, our own, and those of our posterity, are not trifles to
be neglected or totally entrusted to other hands. …Let us not be bubbled then out of our reverence and
obedience to Government, on the one hand; nor out of our right to think and act for ourselves, in our own
departments, on the other. The steady management of a good government is the most anxious arduous
and hazardous vocation on this side of the grave.” How could there be another response, given the fact
that “we know that ignorance, vanity, excessive ambition and venality, will in spight of all human
precautions creep into government.” Accordingly, said Adams, “let us never relax our attention, or our
resolution to keep these unhappy imperfections in human nature, out of which material, frail as it is, all our
rulers must be compounded, under a strict inspection, and a just controul. – We Electors have an
important constitutional power placed in our hands.”297 Note how parallel this plaintive warning is to
Sidney’s assertion that, “such as have been more wise in the constitution of their governments, have
always had regard to the frailty of human nature, and the corruption reigning in the hearts of men.”298

“And the bramble said to the trees, If in truth you anoint me king over you, then come and put your
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Adams’ musings on the nature of man naturally led him to the subject of governance. The matter
of man’s nature “has been many thousands of Years considered by thinking Men, seems to have given
rise to the wisest and best of Governments which seems to be calculated on Purpose, to controul and
counteract the Ruinous Tendency of this Imperfection in our Natures.”299 As Sidney had recognized, “’Tis
ordinarily said in France, il faut que chacun soit servi a sa mode; Every man’s business must be done
according to his own mind: and if this be true in particular persons, ‘tis more plainly so in whole nations.”
For instance, given how man really was, in assessing what is safe for a people, “Many eyes see more
than one: the collected wisdom of a people much surpasses that of a single person; and tho he should
truly seek that which is best, ‘tis not probably he would so easily find it, as the body of a nation, or the
principal men chosen to represent the whole.”300 While Adams revisited, particularly in his Diary, his own
feelings about the weaknesses in men’s characters and the universality of those traits, his was anything
but an abstract preoccupation, having moved past the “man in a state of nature” question from a very
early age.301 Rather, Adams’ believed that we, and especially he needed to appreciate and be painfully
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DCG, III.10.373, III.36.519, I.17.54, II.3.91, III.16.403. As discussed in Ch. Two, in his Two Treatises
Locke did not discuss the corrupt nature of man. But like Sidney, he did emphasize that God made man
to be a social animal, and that community is what life was all about. As he put it, “God having made Man
such a Creature, that, in his own Judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong
Obligations of Necessity, Convenience, and Inclination to drive him into Society, as well as fitted him with
Understanding and Language to continue and enjoy it.” Locke, “Second Treatise,” John Locke Two
Treatises of. Government, ed., intro & notes, Peter Laslett (Cambridge University Press, 1997), Ch. VII,
“Of Political or Civil Society,” §77, p. 318. As Laslett pointed out, however, “Locke is, perhaps, the least
consistent of all the great philosophers. …The trouble was that Locke based right and wrong on God’s
commands and punishments, but also adopted a hedonistic ethic as well, an ethic of the Hobbesian sort.
Meanwhile he passionately believed in the possibility of demonstrating ethics mathematically, though he
was perpetually complicating everything with his anthropological relativism, noting the variety of ethical
values among the world’s peoples and hinting that virtue and vice were simply customary.” Laslett,
“Introduction,” Two Treatises, p. 82 & n.†. Per historian John Marshall, “Locke had never thought that all
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men.” John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility (Cambridge University Press,
1996), p. 453.
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honest about the variety of ways that man behave, the range of motivations and the consequences of
man’s nature, so that he and his fellow citizens could optimally design government to realistically address
man’s flaws and vulnerabilities. “[F]eigned commonwealths” and “phantasies of philosophers” would
never do.302 This alone explains Adams’ indefatigable distrust of the French philosophes. As Haraszti
put it, “Steeped as he was in English political thinking, with experience in the workings of government,
their aspirations appeared to him fantastic exaggerations, their notions of limitless progress ‘a chimera,’
and the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity ‘a swindle.’”303
Foremost among man’s deficiencies was his attraction to power.304 Power, said Adams, was “a
Thing of infinite Danger and Delicacy.” It always “turned [Men’s] Heads.”305 As Sidney had said, if every
man was incorruptible, we wouldn’t need law. But obviously, it was “madness” to abolish it on that
assumption.”306 In 1789 correspondence with Roger Sherman, a member of the Constitutional
Convention, Adams wrote, “Power naturally grows. Why? Because human passions are insatiable.”307
This was not a new idea either. Adams began his 1765 Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law
with the recognition that man has a “love of power, which has been so often the cause of slavery.”308
While much of his work in the timeframe of the Stamp Act reviewed the facts at issue and
enunciated the legal principles on which Adams and others relied to challenge the British government, we
find in the third essay of the Earl of Clarendon to William Pym, directed at the American people’s struggle to
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protect their constitutional rights as British Americans in the context of the Stamp Act, a ringing plea to the
British that jury trials and the power to vote, i.e., consensual government, “consist wholly, the liberty and
security of the people: They have no other fortification against wanton, cruel power: no other indemnification
against being ridden like horses, fleeced like sheep, worked like cattle, and fed and cloathed like swine and
hounds,” etc. etc.309 Sidney said the same thing in a slightly different way, namely, that he had no confidence that leaders were in any extraordinary way preserved by God “from the vices and frailties to which
the rest of mankind is subject.” In fact, if anything, they were subject to greater temptations and therefore
were more likely to become corrupt and exercise power corruptly.310 In one of his 1767 Governor Winthrop
letters to Governor Bradford, Adams wrote, “human Ambition is infinite. We know it because We have felt
the cruel oppressions, which Sprung out of it. From this expansive all grasping Passion, it has happened,
that nothing could ever satiate the Lust of Tyrants. Alexander and Cæsar after having desolated one World,
cryed for another to desolate.”311 Sidney said the same thing. “[A]mbition has produced more violent
mischiefs than allt he other desires and passions that have ever possessed the hearts of men.”312 In his
first Novanglus letter Adams stated, “The same game, with the same success, has been played in all ages
and countries, as Massachusettensis observes. When a favourable conjuncture has presented, some of
the most intrigueing and powerful citizens have conceived the design of enslaving their country, and
building their own greatness on its ruins.”313 Power is irresistible.314
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It is in this context that Adams made the famous statement about nipping the shoots of arbitrary power
in the bud, as this is “the only maxim which can ever preserve the liberties of any people. When the
people give way, their deceivers, betrayers and destroyers press upon them so fast that there is no resisting afterwards. …The people grow less steady, spirited and virtuous, the seekers more numerous and
more corrupt … until virtue, integrity, public spirit, simplicity, frugality, become the objects of ridiculous
and scorn, and vanity, luxury, foppery, selfishness, meanness, and downright venality, swallow up the
whole society.” Adams, “III. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay, Feb. 6, 1775
(“Novanglus III”), id, pp. 243-55, 255. Not that Adams’ view was uncommon in the colonies. Almost a
decade earlier, the New York pamphleteer and lawyer William Hicks had said the same thing. The
statement was written before the repeal of the Stamp Act. “A peaceable submission to the first attacks of
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The theme of power and its abuse is a constant drumbeat in Adams’ thought, pointing to the
danger to man of his fellow man because of the nature of man. As early as 1763, during Lord George
Grenville’s brief (two-year) tenure as British Prime Minister when Britain’s policy towards its American
territories became increasingly restrictive, Adams wrote an unpublished paper, An Essay on Man’s Lust
for Power, subtitled, “All Men would be Tyrants if they could.” The draft Essay on Power was directed at a
subject that preoccupied Adams for many years to come: man’s self-deceit, his “selfish Passions which
are stronger than the social,” and the attraction of power. Fundamentally conservative in his outlook,
Adams believed that over many thousands of years “thinking men” have devised “the wisest and best of
Governments” that were designed to cope with man as he truly was. This included, for example, the
recognition that throughout history standing armies were viewed as dangerous and, accordingly, had
been “watched and contrould by the State so as to keep them impotent.” Left unattended such armies
“ravish, plunder, Massacre and ruin, and at last inextricably inslave the People” – perhaps a prophetic
statement given Adams’ subsequent successful representation of British army Captain Preston and the
other Boston Massacre soldier-defendants. Interestingly, Adams also believed that the clergy had to be
watched and controlled, for “[w]as there ever a Clergy, that have gained … any important Power in the
State, that did not restlessly aspire … to establish themselves in opulence, Indolence and Magnificence at
the Expence of the Toil, and Industry, the Limbs, the Liberties and Lives of all the rest of Mankind”? The
British Constitution accordingly separated Church and State; indeed, “all such unnatural Powers, as those
of Arms and those of Confessions and Absolution for sin, should always bow to the civil orders that Constitute the State.” Most importantly, in the last paragraph of this early essay Adams stated with absolute
unequivocality that, “No simple Form of Government, can possibly secure Men against the Violences of
Power. Forty-four years later Adams attested, “This last Paragraph has been the Creed of my whole Life

encroaching power, is altogether incompatible with the genius of liberty! nor could it reasonably be expected, that in such a sudden and dangerous invasion of our most inestimable rights, the form of opposition could be perfectly model'd by the hand of prudence. Violent and precipitate as our measures were,
they wanted nothing but success to sanctify them; since the most superficial observer cannot but have
discovered, that in the political world, right and wrong are merely arbitrary modes, totally dependent upon
the rise and fall of contending parties. ”William Hicks (1735-1772), The nature and extent of Parliamentary power considered, in some remarks upon Mr. Pitt's speech in the House of Commons, previous to
the repeal of the Stamp-Act. : With an introduction. Applicable to the present situation of the colonies, p.
35, September, 1767.
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and is now March 27, 1807 as much approved as it was when it was written by John Adams.”315
Human nature caused men to lose their way. And there was no fighting it; human nature was
“immortal.”316 Government therefore must address this enormous vulnerability that all men faced. “Sincerity was laughed out of countenance: the whole order of human life was confounded.”317 The Greek
context was not unique in any way. “Such things ever will be, says Thucydides, so long as human nature
continues the same.”318 And why was this the case? What is it that inevitably led to this scary end game?
“The source of all these evils,” said Adams, “is a thirst of power, from rapacious or ambitious passions.”319
Man’s nature was immutable, constant in both its strengths and in its weaknesses. Government could not
succeed if it did not begin with this truth. The very nature of man required it. For “the human temper, too
apt to transgress in spite of laws,” in the absence of a balanced government, “now having gained the
ascendant over law, seemed to glory that it was too strong for justice, and an enemy to all superiority.”320
Because government’s purpose was to serve the needs of man, said Adams, it must be realistically designed; it was essential that its founders be realistic, not naïve or idealistic, about the nature of
man. This is probably the most fundamental way in which Locke and liberal republicans, including
Jefferson and the philosophes, whose ideas fell within the rubric of republican thought, nevertheless had
a different view of man and consequently different political solutions than Sidney, Halifax, Nedham,
Milton, and other like-minded Englishmen as well as Adams, Jonathan Mayhew, Madison and others.321
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“VII. An Essay on Man’s Lust for Power, with the Author’s Comment in 1807, post-29 Aug., 1763, PJA
Vol. I, pp. 81-83. Pontiac’s War between the British military and native American peoples began in 1763,
one consequence of which was an entirely other source of discontent among some American colonists,
e.g., George Washington and others who were speculating in or purchasing western lands, because the
Royal Proclamation of 1763 forbid the colonists from settling to the west of the Appalachians. See
generally Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and. the Fate of Empire in British North
America, 1754-1766 (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), including “Pontiac’s Progress,” Ch. 64, pp. 617-37.
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This statement was part of an 1813 annotation by Adams to his 1790 “Discourses on Davila.” See
Adams, “Discourses on Davila,” The Portable John Adams, p. 373, n.*.
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Id, p. v.
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Id, p. iv.
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Id, p. v.
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Id.
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It seems likely, for example, that Adams would have considered John Dickinson’s remarks in Letters
from a Farmer, that those who engage in the cause of liberty “should breathe a sedate, yet fervent spirit,
animating them to actions of prudence, justice, modesty, bravery, humanity and magnanimity,” to be
charmingly idealistic but naïve. Should, smoud. On the other hand, Madison’s statement in Federalist No.
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For Adams and like-minded republicans, “feigned commonwealths” and “phantasies of philosophers”
would never do.322 Adams recognized in “Discourses on Davila,” written years after his Dissertation, that,
“Bad men increase in knowledge as fast as good men; and science, arts, taste, sense, and letters, are
employed for the purposes of injustice and tyranny, as well as those of law and liberty; for corruption, as
well as virtue. …Consider that the government is intended to set bounds to passions which nature has not
limited; and to assist reason, conscience, justice, and truth, in controlling interests, which, without it,
would be as unjust as uncontrollable”323 At the same time, and in part as a consequence of Adams’ views
about the private and not public experience of religious conviction, it was essential that the lawful exercise
of power by government be civil; it should not endeavor to control man’s behavior within a society through

51 that ambition must be made to counteract ambition” could have been written by Adams. John
Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies (Kindle ed.)
(location 343 of 1964); James Madison, Federalist No. 51, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James
Madison, The Federalist [1787-88], George W. Carey and James McClellan, eds. (Indianapolis, IN:
Liberty Fund, 2001), p. 268.
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Adams, Defence, Vol. I, p. 207. Liberalism as a branch of republicanism can be distinguished by its
more idealistic approach to both mankind and problem-solving (solutions), in contrast to the realism of
“centrist” or mainstream republicanism . But the more common scholarly distinction drawn between
republicanism and liberalism is their respective communal and individual emphasis; as Wood put it,
“liberalism’s apparent obsession with procedural justice, neutrality, and individual rights at the expense of
the community and its needs.” Wood, “Preface to the 1998 Edition,” The Creation of the American
Republic, p. vi. Conversely, in this important work Wood referred to “the sacrifice of individual interests to
the greater good” as “the essence of republicanism” and “the idealistic goal of their Revolution.” Id, p. 53.
I would like to suggest that there is black or white and then there is grey; that is, that there is a range of
possibilities here, a sliding scale, and certainly there are forms of government that endorse something inbetween the complete hegemony of individual over communal interests or vice versa. Some forms of
republicanism sought to promote individual interests to the extent that doing so was not adverse to
important communal interests. This was Adams’ perspective.
Wood’s chapter on “Republicanism” in The Creation of the American Republic, pp. 46-90, raised another
complicated consideration in reflecting on the republican balance between communal and individual interests. When Wood identified “the public good” as a quashing of individual interests, one needs to recognize that for the eighteenth-century British American every man, “the welfare of the people” or “the general good of the community”, included him! The system from which the British Americans rebelled was a
system of favoritism, patronage, and elitism. If British government action was taken that either was or
was not in the public interest, that action almost certainly was not going to be in the interest of average
Joe American, the non-favored, non-patronized, non-elite colonial man. It might be in the Governor’s
interest, or his son-in-law’s interest. It might be in the interest of the king. It might possibly even be in the
financial or national interest of the metropole. But it was never going to be “for the People’s sake … on
the basis of the Public Good,” which had some chance of benefiting Joe American, the typical member of
a colonial community. In short, the colonists did not favor the public interest to their invariable own detriment because of some altruistic appreciation for “the Public Good”; rather, that Good, the welfare of the
people, res publica, left substantial room to encompass every man, including Joe American and his
family.
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Adams, “Discourses on Davila,” The Portable John Adams, pp. 337-94, 382.
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the exercise of “unnatural” power, meaning force (arms) or religion (confessions, absolution). Adams
reminded his readers in “Discourses on Davila” that, “Americans and Frenchmen should remember that
the perfectibility of man is only human and terrestrial perfectability.”324 The need to utilize civil
government to constrain men was Adams’ thesis in A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law.
Once we acknowledge the “usurping and encroaching Nature of Power, … all such unnatural Powers, as
those of Arms and those of Confessions and Absolution for sin, should always bow to the civil orders that
Constitute the State.”325 The next question obviously was what kind of civil government worked, i.e., what
kind of government could best protect the community it governed against the “imperfections” in man’s
nature; for one could not, and most definitely should not, expect a government to somehow make men
different than they naturally were. As Adams wrote to his old friend Benjamin Rush in 1809, “Philosophy,
morality, religion, reason, all concur in your conclusion that ‘Man can be governed only by accommodating laws to his nature,’” not the other way around.326 Forty-four years after writing his draft Essay on
Power, when Adams was in his seventies, he reviewed and reaffirmed that essay and his life-long view
on governance, which had been “the Creed of my whole Life,” viz., that “no simple Form of Government,
can possibly secure Men against the Violences of Power,” the conclusion he had reached at the end of
that 1763 essay.327 This Creed was founded on Adams’ life-long convictions about the nature of man.328
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Id, p. 386.
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Adams to Rush, Jan. 23, 1809, The Spur of Fame, pp. 138-41, 139.
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Id.
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Adams, “VII. An Essay on Man’s Lust for Power, with the Author’s Comment in 1807, post Aug. 29,
1763, PJA Vol. I, pp. 81-84, 83.
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Wood’s Creation of the American Republic included a chapter entitled, “The Relevance and
Irrelevance of John Adams,” that in the late twentieth century infamously marginalized Adams and his
political thought. The sum and substance of Wood’s view is reflected in his statement, “It is ironic that
Adams, of all people, should have misunderstood the meaning of the Constitution, for no American was
more deeply involved in the constitutionalism of the American Revolution.” Creation of the American
Republic, p. 567. Wood also believed that, “it was the very intensity of [Adams’] devotion to the science
of politics as he understood it that played him false,” and that, “Adams never really comprehended what
was happening to the fundamentals of political thought in the years after 1776.” Id, p. 568. Given Wood’s
extraordinary scholarship, attention must be paid to Wood’s views on Adams. I would suggest that it is
ironic that Wood “never really comprehended” Adams’ ideas given Wood’s profound contributions to the
history of the American Revolution.

The starting place for the attention that must be paid to Wood’s views on Adams is that Wood does not
properly address the Anglo-American perspective about the nature of man, as discussed above, or the
fact that this was the substratum out of which sprouted the political views of not only Adams but other
English and American republican thinkers including, of course, Algernon Sidney. Wood believed that in
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Manus haec inimical tyrannis
Ense petit placidam sub libertate quietem:
This hand, hostile to tyrants,
seeks with the sword a quiet peace under liberty.
Algernon Sidney, Inscription in Welcome Book at the University of Copenhagen329

ii. Framing Freedom
Once Adams was in full stride and past his early writing forays into Braintree drinking habits,
husbandry and other miscellaneous subjects, one cannot find a published piece by Adams that is not
about liberty or its synonym, freedom. Adams did, after all, receive his professional inspiration if not his
calling from Otis’ advocacy in 1761 in Petition of Lechmere, the writs of assistance case. There Otis
declared that a writ of assistance was “the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of
English liberty, and the fundamental principles of the constitution, that ever was found in an English lawbook.” Indeed, it was a power that placed “the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.”330
Fighting arbitrary power through every legal means possible became John Adams’ calling.

Adams’ view, “The Revolution had unleashed a bundle of passions.” Id, p. 570. This is confused. In fact,
in Adams’ view, “a bundle of passions” always existed in human beings; Adams expressed that thought
over and over again. Sometimes he was more critical or even despairing about this truth; at other times,
he felt cause for optimism. But government would not work, in Adams’ view, unless it came to terms with
this fact. Pace Wood, the existence of such passions had nothing to do with the Revolution. On the other
hand, because people were freer in a republican government than in a non-participatory one, there was
more room for the individual to act out or otherwise negatively express those ever-present passions,
wreaking havoc – “unbalancing” one’s individual system and potentially the community’s political system.
This was another fact of which Adams was acutely aware. Pace Wood, Adams perspective never
changed. Wood’s omission of this foundational component of republican thought resulted in a skewed
analysis from the get-go, and a misguided characterization of Adams’ political ideas. See, e.g., id. p. 575
(“By the 1780’s Adams had lost his former faith in the inspirational and ameliorating qualities of
republicanism”); id, pp. 578-79 (“No aspect of Adams’s ideas in his Defence more pointedly characterized
the changes that had taken place in his thought since 1776 than this new appreciation of the role of the
executive.”) As a result, while emphases may have been different in different works, and while Adams
and his ideas no doubt matured and developed, pace Wood, first and foremost Adams’ ideas about man
never changed and, as a result, neither did the guiding principles of his politics.
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Meadley, Memoirs of Algernon Sydney, p. 84.
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As we have discussed, the concept of a man’s liberty being in the hands of “every petty officer” is
precisely the kind of domination to which political theorist Pettit objected and which explains his theory of
liberty as non-domination. Regardless of the existence of the rule of law, in this situation there is the
ability for its arbitrary and coercive application, which inhibits freedom. Of course the problem with this
perspective is that consciousness of avoiding such situations is valuable in protecting liberty; but there is
no way to entirely remove discretion from the Law, for its application necessarily has human influence.
This quotation is taken from Adams’ Abstract of the Argument, “Petition of Lechmere (Argument on Writs
of Assistance), 1761, JA Legal Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 139-40, 141-42. In his highly circulated 1764 pamphlet,
The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, Otis set forth a further revolutionary apothegm
when he asked, “Can there be any liberty where property is taken away without consent?” Otis, The
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In describing his cousin Samuel a few years later, John paid him the highest compliment by
recognizing that while the man was not legally oriented, he had “the most thourough Understanding of
Liberty, and her Resources, in the Temper and Character of the People.”331 The rebellious Bay faction
was known as the Sons of Liberty, and Hancock’s sloop was called the Liberty. What was the point of
having a right to rebel, if not to assert one’s liberty? As Adams stated in a 1766 letter penned as the Earl
of Clarendon to William Pym, “I shall take for granted, what I am sure no Briton will controvert, viz. that
Liberty is essential to the public good, the salus populi. And here lies the difference between the British
constitution, and other forms of government, viz. that Liberty is its end, its use, its designation, drift and
scope, as much as grinding corn is the use of a mill, the transportation of burdens the end of a ship, the
measurement of time the scope of a watch, or life and health the designation of the human body.”332
Many years later, Adams ruminated that, “The political liberty of the citizen, is a tranquility of mind, arising
from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government
be so constituted, as that one citizen need not be afraid of another citizen.”333 Later still, Adams wrote

Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/1763-otis-rights-ofbritish-colonies-asserted-pamphlet (10-5-17). Fifty-four years later, Adams wrote, “I have been young,
and now I am old, and I solemnly say, I have never known a man whose love of his country was more
ardent or sincere; never one, who suffered so much; never one, whose services for any ten years of his
life, were so important and essential to the cause of his country, as those of Mr. Otis from 1760 to 1770.”
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JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 271 (Dec. 23, 1765). Similarly, Sidney described his colleague Sir Henry Vane as,
“the Glory and support of a reviving State, …a vehement Asserter of the rights and liberties of his
Country, …in sanctity of life and piety not one his Equal, …his only aim being not to live long but well…
heartily willing to offer up his life for an everlasting memorial and testimony to truth and justice.” Vane had
once been “the Defense of a reviving Liberty”; but unlike the fate of Sam Adams, he became “the willing
and happy Victim of its Decay.” “The Character of Sir Henry Vane by Algernon Sidney,” Rowe, Sir Henry
Vane the Younger, Appendix F.
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Adams, “Clarendon to Pym,” Jan. 27, 1766, PJA Vol. I, p. 167. It seems to be at this juncture that
Pocock, relying often on Harrington, diverged greatly in his concept of early modern republicanism in both
England and America. Writing, for example, about his own republican synthesis, Pocock emphasized
real property, agrarianism, and negative views about commerce as the critical components of early
modern republicanism: “It was a cardinal thesis with him [Pocock referring to himself] that a persistent
emphasis on the armed citizen, enshrined in perpetuity in the Second Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, had entailed as an ideological consequence the ideal superiority of real over personal
property, and that this had imparted an agrarian and classical character to eighteenth-century republicanism, infecting it with ineradicable doubts and ambivalences regarding the growth of a world commerce
that it otherwise ardently welcomed.” Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History, p. 218. This may be true
about Harrington; but if one views Harrington this way, it places him on the outskirts of the umbrella of
ideas that legitimately fall within the scope of early modern Anglo-American republican theory.
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Adams, “Letter XXVIII. Mixed Governments. Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, B.II.c.vi. of the Constitution
of England,” Defence, Vol. I, p. 153.
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that liberty “is an intellectual Quality. An attribute, that belongs not to Fate nor Chance. Neither
possesses it. Neither is capable of it. There is nothing moral or immoral in the Idea of it.” Here we find
the critical phrase: “The definition of it, is a Self Determining Power, in an intellectual Agent. It implies,
Thought, and Choice, and Power. It can elect between Objects, indifferent in point of Morality; neither
morally good nor morally evil.” This means that, “If, the Substance in which, this quality, Attribute,
Adjective, call it which you will, exists, has a moral Sense, a Conscience, a moral Faculty; if it can
distinguish between moral good and moral Evil, and has power to choose the former, and refuse the
latter: it can, if it will, choose the Evil, and reject the Good, as We See, in experience it, very often

In The Creation of the American Republic, Wood’s study on the evolution of early American political ideas,
Wood defined liberty as, “The minimal amount of power a man deserved, because he was a man.” Liberty
was “physical.” It was “what gave a man control of his own destiny; it was the inherent right man had to his
life and his property.” The first part of this definition, the minimal amount of power a man deserved, is
certainly sui generis; but in Wood’s view, it is the Whigs’ definition of liberty. In a chapter entitled, “The
Whig Science of Politics,” Wood seemed to comfortably embrace the confusion that I seek to avoid, viz.,
referring without clarification to the views of the Whigs, the real Whigs, and the radical Whigs. It also was
Wood’s contention that, “the ideas of radical Whiggism with their heightened language of intense liberalism
and paranoiac mistrust of power were found to be a particularly meaningful way of expressing the anxieties
Americans felt.” Adding the concept of “intense liberalism” into the mix of Whig/real Whig/radical Whig
politics is another complexity. Wood went on to identify a “public liberty,” or communal sense of liberty, “the
institutionalization of the people’s personal liberty” or, as Wood elaborated, “Liberty, defined as the power
held by the people,” which was “the victim and very antithesis of despotism. Yet the people, like the rulers,
could abuse their power,” which was called “licentiousness or anarchy.” At the same time, “collectively the
people’s liberty became the essential barrier against arbitrary power.” Wood then noted in passing that
“public or political liberty” was “equivalent to democracy or government by the people themselves.” Stated
another way, “liberty in a State is self-government.” Wood, “The Whig Science of Politics,” The Creation of
the American Republic, Ch. 1, pp. 3-45, esp. pp. 15-25.
Considering these remarks in our present context, John Adams would have concurred that power held by
any party, whether an individual or the people, could be subject to abuse. Second, as far as Adams was
concerned, power was a phenomenon of the world, a universal aspect of man’s nature that was then
reflected in every society. Power need not be greeted with “paranoiac mistrust”; but one ignored it at
one’s own peril. As to whether the accumulation of the liberty granted to individuals is equivalent to
“public liberty” which is equivalent to “democracy” seems to be unnecessarily jargonized confusion,
especially when one concludes, as Wood did, that “collectively the people’s liberty became the essential
barrier against arbitrary power.” This discussion begs many questions, such as what is arbitrary power,
what is democracy, precisely how does one define a man’s liberty (e.g., negative, positive, etc.)
Moreover, I would subscribe to what I believe would be Adams’ retort to this last Wood statement, which
is that it is law, not liberty, that is the “essential barrier against arbitrary power.”
As a separate matter, Wood also maintained that the colonists juxtaposed power and liberty; but perhaps
the more precise juxtaposition was between the excessive or abusive exercise of power and liberty, a
vital distinction. Id, p. 18 et seq. Additionally, in this chapter Wood discussed how, in prerevolutionary
America, because “the idea of prerogative remained meaningful, the distinction between rulers and ruled
was clear and vital.” Id, p. 19. As we know from our discussion of Sidney’s world, prerogative was the
monarch’s lawful exercise of discretion; once again, the issue should be framed as the excessive or
abusive exercise of prerogative; for one cannot avoid discretion in the law and, accordingly, discretion or
its exercise by a monarch or magistrate would always be meaningful.
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does.”334 As noted in Part One, if there is only one issue on which scholars of republicanism agree, it is
that the attainment of liberty – whatever that might be – lies at the heart of the republican quest. The
underbelly of the American revolutionary tiger was liberty.335

It certainly is a prime cause of the American Revolution that the colonial assemblies
in America could never rise to a higher legal status than that of the select body of some
little piddling incorporated village in medieval England. For it must not be forgotten that
that revolution was no revolution if the colonists were merely seeking redress for illegal wrongs.
McIlwain, High Court of Parliament 336

a.

On constitutionalism

Recall the two admonitions stated in the Introduction to this study, one from Adams, the other
from the historian James Kloppenberg: “Terms must be defined before we can reason,” but we must be
cautious about terminology, since “terms can have fundamentally different meanings to different
authors.”337 In both the metropole and the British colonies, the word “constitution,” often raised in the
context of liberty, was an extraordinarily multivalent term. Depending on who was using it, and even the
context in which that person invoked the word, its meaning could be quite different. Further complicating
our lucidity are the many variants and compound uses of the word: a constitution, the constitution, human
constitution, government constitution, the constitution of something (the intellectual and moral world,
machinery, nature, government), ancient constitution, English constitution, British constitution, written and
unwritten constitution, imperial constitution, colonial constitution, state constitution, US Constitution,
constitutional, constitutionally, constitutionality, constitute, not to mention unconstitutional and unconstitutionally.338 Once again, we have a subject deserving of its own study. The tip of the iceberg approach
will be employed here.
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Adams to John Taylor, 15 April 1814,” Founders Online, National Archives, last modified June 13,
2018, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-6278 (emphasis added), 11-3-18.
[This is an Early Access document from The Adams Papers. It is not an authoritative final version.]
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There is an extraordinarily vast literature on liberty in theory, beyond America (particularly in Britain)
and in America. For just a tip of the iceberg, see Appendix B.
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See, e.g., McIlwain, The High Court of Parliament and its Supremacy, p. 365.
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Adams to Taylor, April 15, 1814, The Portable John Adams, , p. 406; James T. Kloppenberg, “In
Retrospect: Louis Hartz’s “The Liberal Tradition in America,” Reviews in American History, Vol. 29, No. 3
(Sept. 2001), pp. 460-78, 465.
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J. H. Holt’s essay, “The Ancient Constitution in Medieval England” reviewed the derivation of the term
“constitution” and derivative or associated words. Sandoz, The Roots of Liberty, Ch, I, pp. 32-74.
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Our exploration of Adams’ political ideas and the transcendent importance of liberty to
republicanism require our consideration of how Adams used the term “constitution.” Adams often invoked
the word and its cognates, using it in different ways. When Adams said that, “the British constitution is
nothing more nor less than a republic, in which the king is first magistrate,” this was another instance of
equating the term constitution with form of government – in this case, a monarchic republic.”339 He also
frequently spoke of the ancient constitution with which we are very familiar from Sidney’s work among
others, as well as the English and British constitutions. But Adams’ deepest and most frequent use of the
term “constitution” was in its original “constituting” sense, that is, that a constitution was the collective and
incipient foundation, the bedrock, the most fundamental founding principles of government and the
embodiment thereof. Liberty was one such founding principle. The constitution of a political entity was its
foundational legal document or it could be an unwritten set of laws that a particular form of government
adopted. At the same time, when Adams lumped together “a British constitution, or a perfect democracy,
or any other form of government,” it is apparent that he viewed the British constitution, and presumably
other polities’ constitutions, as forms of government or, to be more precise, that each constitution adopted
a specific form of government.”340 This meaning is confirmed by the Preamble to the Bay Constitution
that Adams drafted, which stated that along with reliance on “the Great Legislator of the Universe,” “the
delegates of the people of Massachusetts,” were “in general Convention assembled, for the express and
sole purpose of framing a Constitution or Form of Government to be laid before our Constituents.”341
As Sidney said and as we will establish Adams avouched, republicanism required that there be a
government of laws and not of men. This takes us to the essence of constitutionalism, succinctly stated
by Prof. McIlwain: “All constitutional government is by definition limited government.”342 This is why a
constitution, the foundational law of a polity, and constitutionalism generally, is so important and
repeatedly emphasized in republican theory; for you cannot have republican governance unless it is
founded in law; and to be so founded, there must be original principles, reflected in a constitution whether
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Adams, “VIII. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay,” March 13, 1775 (“Novanglus
VIII”), PJA Vol. 2, p. 328.
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Preamble, The Massachusetts Constitution, PJA Vol. 8, pp. 228-71, 237.
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McIlwain, Constitutionalism Ancient & Modern, p. 21.
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written or unwritten, that establish this foundation.343 Furthermore, constitutional limits are “fundamental
not merely because they are basic, but because they are also unalterable by ordinary legal process.” Tom
Paine said that “a constitution is not the act of a government but of a people constituting a government”
and, per McIlwain, “if this be true, the consequence is that the forms and limits followed in this ‘constituting’ become the embodiment of a ‘constitution,’ superior in character to the acts of any ‘government’ it
creates.” In short, “this government cannot exercise any powers not so ‘enumerated.’”344
Our first inquiry must be, what did Adams actually say?345 In 1766, at the still incipient stage of
the colonies’ confrontation with the metropole and very early in Adams’ involvement in such heady
matters, when the colonial mindset was still very much focused on how Americans as British citizens
should be governed, Adams wrote about the definition of constitution: “The people in America,” Adams
said, “have discovered the most accurate judgment about the real constitution. …Some have defined it to
[be] the practice of parliament; others, the judgments and precedents of the King’s courts; but either of
these definitions would make it a constitution of wind and weather, because, the parliaments have some-

343
It is from this very starting point that Jefferson’s concept of republicanism diverged significantly from
that of Adams as well as the republicanism of Sidney and others. Jefferson stated that Adams, in his view
wrongly, “open[ed] the mantle of republicanism to every government of laws, whether consistent or not
with natural right.” Setting aside whether this is true, and what is or is not consistent with natural right,
Jefferson’s republicanism, or government in a republic, is “a government by its citizens in mass, acting
directly and personally, according to rules established by the majority.” This is what we would call
democracy, which indeed is one version, a “left wing” type of republicanism. Recognizing that this sort of
government “is evidently restrained to very narrow limits of space and population,” Jefferson argued that
there were “shades of republicanism,” gradations that were more or less republican according to how
much they diverged from this rule. “The further the departure from direct and constant control by the
citizens, the less has the government of the ingredient of republicanism.” This clearly was not Adams’ or
Sidney’s view. While they would have agreed about variations in republicanism, they disagreed on the
principle that defined that variety. Here Jefferson’s word choices are interesting. “Control,” for example, is
a word one readily associates with Harrington, not with Sidney or Adams. For the latter, the issue is consent, not control; accordingly, law is the critical embodiment of that to which the people have consented.
Jefferson’s pivotal factor of “direct and constant” citizen “control,” without a process to ensure consent, is
insufficient; it also fails to protect the interests of minorities, a preoccupation of Adams. See Jefferson to
John Taylor, May 28, 1816, Thomas Jefferson: Writings, Merrill D. Peterson, ed. (New York: The Library of
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times voted the King absolute and the judges have sometimes adjudg’d him to be so.” In short, defining
the constitution in terms of legal judgments and precedents, including laws, would trivialize it. But this
was not the only definition proposed by British Americans, said Adams. “Some have call’d it custom,” he
said. But the problem is the same: “this is as fluctuating and variable as the other.” Another definition is
offered: “Some have call’d it the most perfect combination of human powers in society, which finite
wisdom has yet contrived and reduced to practice, for the preservation of liberty and the production of
happiness.” The problem with this definition, said Adams, is that it is “rather a character of the
constitution, and a just observation concerning it, than a regular definition of it; and leaves us still to
dispute what it is.” There were yet more definitions of constitution that Adams considered. Some have
said that the constitution is “the whole body of the laws; others that King, Lords, and Commons, make the
constitution.” He did not comment on these definitions instead acknowledging that, “There has also been
much inquiry and dispute about the essential and fundamentals of the constitution, and many definitions
and descripttions have been attempted.” Adams’ bottom line: “[T]here seems to be nothing satisfactory to
a rational mind, in any of these definitions.”
On the other hand, and notwithstanding this confusion, Adams understood what it was! “Yet I
cannot say, that I am at any loss about any man’s meaning when he speaks of the British constitution, or
of the essentials and fundamentals of it.” It is in this context that Adams turned to the constitution of the
human body and of mechanical things, such as a clock, to further explore the meaning of the term.
Turning back, then, to politics and the British constitution, Adams stated, “I shall take for granted, what I
am sure no Briton will controvert, viz. that Liberty is essential to the public good, the salus populi. And
here lies the difference between the British constitution, and other forms of government, viz. that Liberty is
its end, its use, its designation, drift and scope.” Eventually Adams defined the British constitution: it was
a limited monarchy, a specific form of government. “[T]he British constitution is nothing more nor less than
a republic, in which the king is first magistrate.” 346 Constitution was equated with form of government – in
this case, a monarchic republic.”
In this embodiment, the constitution was “not grounded on the faith of millions made for one,” it
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was not based “on the supposition that kings are the favourites of heaven” or “the doctrine that a few
nobles or rich commons have a right to inherit the earth … and that the multitude, the million, the populace, the vulgar, the mob, the herd and the rabble, as the great always delight to call them, have no rights
at all.” In a famous passage in one of his Clarendon letters, the egalitarian Adams spoke clearly. “No, it
stands upon this principle, that the meanest and lowest of the people, are, by the unalterable indefeasible
laws of God and nature, as well intitled to the benefit of the air to breath, light to see, food to eat, and
clothes to wear, as the nobles or the king. All men are born equal: and the drift of the British constitution
is to preserve as much of this equality, as is compatible with the people’s security against foreign
invasions and domestic usurpation.”347 Unequivocally, equality was one of the foundational, constitutional
principles on which the British constitution stood.
If this was the young Adams’ perspective, what have the experts said? In his very famous 1928
essay on constitutional law, jurisprudence professor Edward S. Corwin told us that the source of the term
ius constitutionis was the fourth century Roman Emperor Gratian, for whom the term signified “a system
of written law, the first example being the legislation of Moses.”348 The US Constitution had been
approached in different ways. One view was that the Constitution was made up of “a series of acts of
human will,” the commands of a lawgiver, viz., positive law; another was that it is a reflection of popular
will. The latter definition actually explained the authority of the prince, the monarch, the magistrate, that
was recognized in Justinian’s Institutes: “Whatever has pleased the prince has the force of law, since the
Roman people by the lex regia [law court] enacted concerning his imperium [government], have yielded
up to him all their power and authority.”349 But beyond these attributions, said Corwin, is the understanding that the US Constitution is the “embodiment of an essential and unchanging justice,” which
reflects the fact that “certain principles of right and justice” have their own “intrinsic excellence … made by

347

Adams, “III. The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym,” PJA Vol. I, pp. 165-67.

348

Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law (Indianapolis, IN:
Liberty Fund, 2008) (orig. pub. Harvard Law Review 42 (1928-1929), p. 17 n.45. McIlwain was another
brilliant constitutional scholar who analyzed this subject. See, e.g., The High Court of Parliament and its
Supremacy; see also Essays in History and Political Theory in Honor of Charles Howard McIlwain.
349

Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, pp. 149-85, 365-409, p. 3. The
third-century Roman jurist Ulpian is the source of the Institutes statement. Id, p. 3 n.8, 17 n.45 (emphasis
in original).
774

no human hands … They are external to all Will as such and interpenetrate all Reason as such. They are
eternal and immutable. In relation to such principles, human laws are … merely a record or transcript,
and their enactment an act not of will or power but one of discovery and declaration.” This definition of
what the Constitution embodies – a “belief in a law superior to the will of human governors” – recognizes
the Constitution as “higher law.”350 It also eruditely states the same understanding that the young Adams
indicated in his 1766 Clarendon letter.
Corwin harkened back to various thinkers, all of whom were very familiar to Adams. This included
(i) Aristotle, who wrote that “an unjust law is not a law,” that there is a concept we can term “natural
justice”; and that the law is reason without passion and therefore preferable to the rule of any individual.
These ideas eventually found their way, two thousand years later, in the watershed 1803 Supreme Court
case on judicial review and separation of powers, Marbury v. Madison.351 It was Aristotle who advised
advocates to “appeal to the law of nature” when they could not win a case “according to the law of the
land.”352 (ii) Cicero, who emphasized the essentiality of natural law, viz., that “True law is right reason,
harmonious with nature, diffused among all, constant, eternal,” and that “it is a sacred obligation not to
attempt to legislate in contradiction to this law; nor may it be derogated from nor abrogated.” Furthermore,
said Cicero, “Nor is it one law at Rome and another at Athens; one now and another at a late time; but one
eternal and unchangeable law binding all nations through all time.” “Right reason” was the quality of
human nature whereby “man is associated with the gods” and that, “We are born for justice, and right is
not the mere arbitrary construction of opinion, but an institution of nature.”353 (iii) Grotius, who stated that
jus naturale est dictatum rectae, right reason and natural law dictates. We know that it was Grotius who
also waxed poetic on justice: “Jupiter has ordained that Fishes, wild Beasts, and Birds should devour each
other, because Justice doth not take place amongst them: But to Men he has prescribed the Law of
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Justice, which is the most excellent Thing in the World.”354 In all of these articulations we have the
invocation and reliance on a higher law, right reason, justice, natural law that superseded “the mere
arbitrary construction of opinion.” This was constitutional law, which might result in the overriding of a king
(or a parliament! Or a president! Or a congress!), not to mention overriding non-constitutional civil and
criminal law.355 Constitutional law also included the struggle over this concept and its implications. If
constitutionalism was “a legal limitation on government,” it was “the antithesis of arbitrary rule; its
opposition is despotic government, the government of will instead of law.”356 This was Parliament’s
struggle with the Stuarts; it was the Americans’ struggle with Parliament.
It is the Law, as opposed to laws, to which all of these thinkers referred and on which they relied,
which is another rendition of Corwin’s constitutional concept of “The Higher Law.” Recall the words of
Prof. Murphy, who explained that, in contrast to the layman’s view, “One of the chief purposes of legal
education, especially in common law jurisdictions, [which includes England and America,] is to undermine
the lay view of the laws as a promiscuous heap of statutes and to introduce students to the Law.”357 From
the attorney’s perspective, the Law is neither an aggregate, nor is it made up solely of rules.358 The Law,
capital L, emphasizes the encompassing, conceptual, and compound character of law; it embraces “a
bewildering assortment of heterogeneous items,” including the rules to which the layman typically refers,
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but also much more. It subsumes standards, principles, categories of classification, maxims, doctrines,
and ideals. The Law is also “crucially” all about “the art and technique of interpreting, developing and
applying the applicable, heterogeneous norms in the administration of justice.”359 It embodies justice, the
subject of constitutional law.
The dichotomy of the Law and laws is reflected in the terms ius and lex discussed in connection
with Sidney’s republicanism. The term ius “means the rule of law as well as the rule of what is right and
just (iustum). So ius refers to the ethical.” In contrast, lex refers to “the imperative dimension of the rule
of law.”360 But these jurisprudential terms tend to become confused and conflated.361 We know that
Cicero complained about this: the fact that the crowd understood law, ius, to be limited to that which is
enacted by statute, lex.362 In fact, said Cicero, “we have to encompass the entire issue of universal justice
and law; what we call civil law will be confined to a small, narrow, corner of it.”363 In other words, we have
to encompass the Law, reflected in founding constitutional principles, not just laws. It is laws that
implement the Law; it is laws in America, and that Adams argued was the case in British America, that put
meat on the bones of constitutionalism; and it was laws that post-Marbury v. Madison were found by the
Supreme Court to be unconstitutional. In the Anglo-American legal system, the common law, or what
some refer to as “lawyer’s law,” is the set of ideas of jurists in adjudications, as well as juridical views
contained in other highly regarded legal texts such as Sir Edward Coke’s Institutes. It is the interpretation
of both the Law and of laws. The Law is a collection of concepts and aphorisms that are intended to apply
principles or maxims of justice to life, from the most sublime to sometimes almost the ridiculous – e.g., a
man should not profit from his own wrongdoing, to act through another is as if you acted yourself – that
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frequently relate to matters of fundamental fairness. These maxims often have ancient Roman origins.364
The Law also encompasses the collection of particular rules adopted by a nation, e.g., a tax code. These
are “positive,” man-made laws.
Returning to Corwin and constitutionalism, not to mention Aristotle, Cicero, and Grotius, it is
evident that constitutional rights are often associated with natural rights; they are rights, express or
implied, to which people were equally entitled. “[C]lassical antiquity erected the conception of a law of
nature discoverable by human reason when uninfluenced by passion, and forming the ultimate source
and explanation of the excellence of positive law.”365 Liberty is an obvious example of a constitutional
right. So is equality. As Adams declared, “All men are born equal: and the drift of the British constitution
is to preserve as much of this equality, as is compatible with the people’s security against foreign
invasions and domestic usurpation.”366 Constitutional protections grounded in natural or other law
guarded such constitutional rights. Indeed, Corwin turned to the very young John Adams and his letter to
the Boston Gazette submitted as “U” when Adams was twenty-eight, for the proposition that “the liberty,
the unalienable, indefeasible rights of men, the honor and dignity of human nature, the grandeur and
glory of the public, and the universal happiness of individuals, were never so skillfully and successfully
consulted as in that most excellent moment of human art, the common law of England.”367 As we will
discuss in connection with the layers of law that are a part of Adams’ republican theory, the concept of the
common law as the English source of higher law was based on custom and the collective wisdom of
generations. It also embodied Cicero’s “right reason,” a reasoning that was judicial and accessible by
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legal experts but not, as indicated in the famous 1608 dispute between Lord Coke and James I,
accessible by the layman – even a king! (Eventually Coke did acknowledge that Parliament was a lawdeclaring body in its function as the High Court of Parliament.368)
There is a lot of complicated judicial history at play here: William the Conqueror supposedly
restored the laws of Edward the Confessor; Henry II created a court system; there was Henri de Bracton
in the thirteenth century and continuing to Sir William Blackstone in the eighteenth century; there was
legal history from Magna Carta to common law; and there was Sir Edward Coke’s famous ruling in Dr.
Bonham’s Case that “in many cases, the common law will controul acts of parliament, and sometimes
adjudge them to be utterly void.”369 Summarily pulling it all together Corwin said, “Common right and
reason is … something fundamental, something permanent; it is higher law.”370 American judicial
decisions incorporated this idea, including axioms associated with it, such as that no one should be tried
twice for the same crime. How to readily make sense of this? In sum, Magna Carta had actually
proverbially gone into remission in the fourteenth century, to be revived by the anti-Stuart, anti-absolute
monarchists in the seventeenth.371 During this interval, in the fifteenth century, Sir John Fortescue
categorized the common law as above both Acts of Parliament, i.e., the legislature, and royal ordinances,
i.e., the king; and common law was “the peculiar science of bench and bar,” viz., “a professional mystery”
and what was labelled “artificial reason.” Herein lies the source of the inherent conflict between what was
to be called the rule of law, both followed and determined by judges, and the monarch’s prerogative. As
for constitutional law’s roots and to make things more confusing, in Calvin’s Case Coke ruled that
subjects are obliged by the law of nature to obey their sovereign, that the law of nature was part of the
laws of England and was immutable, and that throughout the world the law of nature came before any
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judicial or municipal law. The law of nature, said Coke, was “the moral law.”372
In sum, it was Coke whose ideas underlay the constitutional doctrines of fundamental law, judicial
review, and Parliamentary supremacy under the law.373 As we will establish shortly, there is no question
that Magna Carta was common parlance in the American colonies and courts in the eighteenth century,
that Coke on Littleton was a primary law student text, and that the American judicial system and its
practitioners, including Adams, imbibed this history, along with the ideas of Cicero, Grotius, Pufendorf,
Vattel and other natural law proponents, reflecting it in their concept of constitutionalism, and amply
evidenced in their work.374 For instance, Corwin quoted from Adams’ summary of Otis’ argument in the
writs of assistance case: “As to acts of Parliament. An act against the Constitution is void: an Act against
natural Equity is void: and if an Act of Parliament should be made, in the very words of the petition, it
would be void.” While Adams’ subsequent commentary was that, “Then and there, the child Independence was born,” Corwin observed that today he would have added that, ““then and there American
constitutional law was born, for Otis’ contention goes far beyond Coke’s: an ordinary court may traverse
the specifically enacted will of Parliament, and its condemnation is final,” thereby bringing the idea of
judicial review “to the very threshold of the first American [state] constitutions.”375 Adams reiterated this
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principle in one of his Clarendon letters, and he entitled the longest chapter of Defence “the right
Constitution of a Commonwealth, examined.”376 This is a double entendre: it is both the makeup or
constitutive aspects of a commonwealth and a commonwealth’s foundation, its constitution, its basis in
natural law.
The other way in which it is important in this study to appreciate the term “constitution” and its
derivatives is its use by historians and other scholars. In The Constitutional Origins of the American
Revolution, historian Jack P. Greene reviewed the waning, waxing and, ultimately, the crescendoing
controversy between the British colonies and the metropole on the controlling power of Britain over what
Greene elsewhere termed “the peripheries” of the British empire.377 Greene’s thesis was that “the
American Revolution principally resulted from a dispute over the nature of the constitution of the British
Empire.” In this dispute, the “British-American world” was “left … with two competing definitions of the
constitutional situation within the expanding British Empire,” which was “a source of deep anxiety for both
colonial leaders and metropolitan authorities” 378 The two constitutions that Greene had in mind were the
British constitution and what he termed the imperial constitution.379 This thesis set aside other recognized
constitutions, the most significant of which was the ancient constitution on which English rights had been
founded. Interestingly, the ancient constitution was barely mentioned in Greene’s monograph, e.g., it was
not even a subject worthy of inclusion in the book’s index. Greene was intent upon viewing eighteenth-
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century Britain as the empire that it was and, particularly, analyzing the metropole’s relationship to its
colonies through this prism. This makes a great deal of sense and is an important component of the
revolutionary period. On the other hand, in the exuberance of thinking in these terms it is too easy to
attribute this perspective to those who did not have it, of whom John Adams certainly was one. Adams’
focus was Parliament: “America will never allow that parliament has any authority to “make any alteration
at all.” We need to think through the intended use of the term constitution and its derivatives by Adams
and other eighteenth-century political writers who absorbed the many centuries of juridical articulations
about constitutions, but whose own usage is not a foregone conclusion.380
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of powers for a certain end, namely, -- the good of the whole community. The public good, the salus
populi, is the professed end of all government, the most despotic as well as the most free.” Adams was
not prepared in this essay to examine “which kind of government, whether either of the forms of the
schools, or any mixture of them, is best calculated for this end. This is the proper inquiry of the founders
of empires.” Moreover, he distinguished such an inquiry from the subject at issue: “I shall take for
granted, what I am sure no Briton will controvert, namely, -- that liberty is essential to the public good, the
salus populi. And here lies the difference between the British constitution and other forms of government,
namely, that liberty is its end, its use, its designation, drift, and scope, as much as grinding corn is the use
of a mill, the transportation of burdens, the end of a ship, the mensuration of time the scope of a watch, or
life and health the designation of the human body.” Thus, if anything, Adams was referring to Britain as a
polity that was governed by the British constitution, as opposed to the inquiry he was not pursuing about
the kinds of governments that might be applicable to empires.
In the second quoted statement, once again there is no reference to an imperial constitution. Adams also
does not use the word “unilateral.” Adams’ statement in Novanglus VII was, “The question we insist on
most is, not whether the alteration is for the better or not, but whether parliament has any right to make
any alteration at all. And it is the universal sense of America that it has none,” viz., that Parliament had no
right to alter the constitution of Massachusetts, the antecedent to this statement. The subject of
Novanglus VII was not an imperial constitution. Indeed, Adams stated, “the British government is not an
empire.” Adams described the British constitution as “an equal mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and
democracy.” If the colonies were not governed by the British constitution, said Adams, but, instead,
parliament “is to be our supreme legislature,” then the colonies would be “under a compleat oligarchy or
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Turning to one other important use of the concept of “constitution” that relates to Adams and his
ideas, we need to consider John Phillip Reid’s study, The Ancient Constitution and the Origins of AngloAmerican Liberty, published in 2005. Reid devoted a substantial amount of his analysis to the rift among
scholars from various disciplines who have analyzed the ideas of the American revolutionaries. Reid
began his constitutional analysis with a description of the academic conflict that one could characterize as
an albatross around the neck of constitutional scholarship: “It has long been a matter of professional as
well as academic discussion that there is an unbridgeable dichotomy separating the writing and discipline
of history from the canons of the common-law methodology. When legal and constitutional points are
being argued, history and law are not comfortable as joint participants.”381 Considering how much history
has to do with law and vice versa, surely this is a problem in need of a solution.
Prof. Reid’s body of work is prodigious; he has made extraordinary contributions to our understanding of the ideas of the American revolution. In this book on the ancient constitution, Reid took on
the history academic establishment and, particularly, some of its most prestigious members. He took
great umbrage at views expressed by these historians, including their pejorative assessments of colonial
lawyers and the validity of the arguments made by those lawyers. Reid also confronted contemporary
historians’ opinions about fellow scholars who approached the subject of American revolutionary ideas
from a legal perspective.
Ships in the night: Reid and the various scholars he critiqued were talking entirely past each
other, which ironically was Reid’s point. The views expressed by certain scholars, beginning with the
perspective of Gordon Wood in The Creation of the American Revolution, and Wood’s take on lawyers’
use of history, particularly provoked Reid. Wood asserted that colonial whig lawyers’ arguments abused
history, viz., “lent a permissiveness to their use of history that makes it seem to us superficial and

aristocracy.” Adams also was very clear that if America’s provincial constitutions, such as the Bay’s
constitution, “are in any respect imperfect, and want alteration,” then Americans “have capacity enough to
discern it, and power enough to effect it, without the interposition of parliament.” This is what led to his
statement about whether his province’s constitution needed alteration and that regardless, parliament had
no authority to do so. Again, none of this has anything to do with Greene’s subject, which was whether
Parliament could unilaterally establish “the new imperial constitution.” Greene, The Constitutional Origins
of the American Revolution, pp. 173-74; Adams, Novanglus VII, PJA Vol. I, pp. 309-10, 314, 323-24.
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John Phillip Reid, The Ancient Constitution and the Origins of Anglo-American Liberty (DeKalb, ILL:
Northern Illinois University Press, 2005), p. 3.
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desultory.” Even worse, these colonial lawyers “often appear to be simply selecting from the past
examples to buttress generalizations deduced by pure reason”! (But of course they were!) Wood was
concerned about the misuse of history: “Since it was the constant and universal principles applicable to
solving immediate problems that they were really after, there was always the danger in the delicate
balance between historical experience and self-evident truth that the rational needs of the present would
overpower the veracity of the past.”382 Of course, the lawyer’s answer to this legitimate Wood concern is
that anyone who writes anything, and certainly a lawyer, is subject to rebuttal – to having his ideas
parsed, challenged, disproven. In short, the misuse of history has a ready solution. Reid also discussed
findings of Trevor Colbourn, “a scholar who published a book-length study contending that the founding
fathers were historians – that is, were serious students of history.” Colbourn was disturbed on making the
same discovery as Wood, namely, that ‘The colonists were selective in their use of whig history.’” Colbourn complained that, “They seized and made their own, specific concepts and ideals only. They took
seventeenth-century arguments against the Stuarts and directed these arguments against the eighteenthcentury Parliament.” This is Eric Nelson’s thesis. Unlike Colbourn and, unsurprisingly, Reid was not
troubled by Colbourn’s findings; indeed, he refined them: “To be more exact, the colonial whigs took
seventeenth-century constitutional arguments against the arbitrariness of Stuart rule and directed those
constitutional arguments against the arbitrariness of imperial legislation.”383
So what unhinged Reid? It was the pejorative nature of the conclusions contemporary historians
drew about lawyers’ use of history, both colonial lawyers and Reid’s contemporaries, and the fact that the
methodology of forensic history “has for some reason been found singularly irritating by professional
historians,” e.g., Wood’s complaints about colonial whig arguments. “While as long ago as the 1640s Sir
Roger Twysden pointed out that the historian’s law is different from the lawyer’s law and, therefore, lawyer’s history is different from historian’s history,” the exasperated Reid observed that British and American
historians nevertheless continued to evaluate forensic history “by the canons of the historical method.”384
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Ancient Constitution, p. 65.
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In most legal contexts lawyers do not resort to history. It’s not relevant or useful. But if a controversy
involves constitutional matters, forensic history was and is often the chosen approach. It is “the weapon
with which the instrumental fends off the analytical,” with the distinction being “utility.” “[B]ooks were
resources for the forensic combat that the constitutional issues of the day required.”385 Forensic history is
“a form of historical utilitarianism and judged favorably by its adjudicatory aspects rather than unfavorably
on its pseudo-historical trappings.”386 This is an essential point. Lawyers use history for present, practical
purposes – for utility; to win! There is a specific goal in mind when a lawyer relies on history. But surely it
would be naïve to suggest that historians are objective; that somehow the historian’s grasp of the past is
a “high” version of past events, a “real” version; that even the aspects of the past about which an historian
writes and chooses to emphasize do not, however professionally and modestly, present a highly
subjective perspective, and without ill intentions or rancor, manipulate the “real” past to support a reality
that the historian envisions. It is true that unlike attorneys, historians may not have an agenda related to
the present; but that does not mean that they lack an agenda. 387
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R. B. Bernstein, “‘Let us dare to read, think, speak, and write’: John Adams’s Use of Reading as Political
and Constitutional Armory,” The Libraries, Leadership, & Legacy of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson,
pp. 81-93, 83.
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387
In a 1996 study historian Laura Kalman identified the “ships passing in the night” phenomenon of
historians and lawyers who write about the constitutional foundations of the American revolution. Kalman
initially commented on her own perspective as “a scholar educated as both lawyer and historian, who
identifies with historians, but whose dual training and career in a history department makes her something
of an outsider to both disciplines.” Amen. The context of Kalman’s study was the end of the Warren
Supreme Court. “The discovery by liberal legal scholars of an eighteenth-century republicanism they can
attribute to the Founders responds to the exaltation by conservatives of ‘original intent.’” Notwithstanding
“the promise” that this revival “holds out of a virtuous citizenry pursuing communitarian goals,” Kalman
reported that “in the hands of some law professors,” it is an attempt “to recapture an ‘improved version” of
1960s legal and political liberalism, i.e., creating through a revitalized republicanism a renewed liberalism
with less emphasis on the individual and more on tolerance and other civic virtues. In her study, Kalman
repeatedly focused on the attorney/historian disconnect. “ “For many years, a gulf separated lawyers from
historians. We historians … assumed that we were the only ones with expertise on our turf. ‘Lawyers are
arrogant,’ we sniffed, ‘and they think they can do anything – even write history.’ Their reaction to Pocock,
we believed, showed their susceptibility to what one legal scholar called “‘the lawyer as astrophysicist’
assumption: We are people who have a generalized intelligence and can absorb and utilize the products
of any other discipline in which we happen to become interested.” In fact, law practice relies on this
assumption. How else, for example, could a lawyer with a history degree from a liberal arts college begin
legal practice litigating the latent defects in Inconel safe-ends, just to take one real example. “Law
professors who enlisted in the republican revival read Pocock and became authorities on republicanism.
…The gap between lawyers and historians has narrowed, but historians’ reactions to the republican
revival indicate it still exists.” Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1996), pp. 8-9, 147, 167.
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In his study of the ancient constitution Reid repeatedly sought to set the record straight, and to
explain to historians how they were asking the wrong question. “The doctrine of ancient constitutionalism
was a method of legal argumentation.” While some seventeenth and eighteenth-century writers may
have taken it literally as “an explanation of actual historical happenings,” lawyers did not. I would like to
amend Reid’s statement to say that for lawyers, it need not be an “actual” explanation. That does not
mean that a counter-explanation was necessary; it might just mean that an historic explanation was
irrelevant to the lawyer’s case. In fact, most likely, it was modestly relevant because a lawyer ignored the
contextual history of something on which he relied at his peril. Blackstone, for example, “was concerned
with legal thought, not historical thought or its ‘currents.’” If we are going to assess Blackstone’s

Over a decade later historian Janelle Greenberg, whose scholarship includes the “radical face” of the
ancient constitution, expressed disappointment in law professor Reid’s monograph on the ancient
constitution, asserting that Reid presented old work and neglected current scholarship, including her own.
In Greenberg’s view, “How differently the book could have read had Reid engaged with the recent work.”
No doubt the book would have been richer had Reid engaged with the many works to which Greenberg
appropriately referred. But I would differ on the value of the work as-is. In Greenberg’s view, “there is
now ample evidence that early modern common lawyers accepted as axiomatic the historical accuracy of
the ancient constitution and its central tales,” working “within a historical tradition that dated from the
eleventh century.” Accordingly, she concluded, “’forensic history’ turns out to be an analytical tool of
doubtful utility.” Janelle Greenberg, “The Ancient Constitution and the Origins of Anglo-American Liberty
by John Phillip Reid,” Law and History Review, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Fall 2007), pp. 653-54.
Forensic history may not be useful to Greenberg and like-minded historians; but that does not mean that
it is an analytical tool of doubtful utility. The question is, what are you using it for? The ways in which the
concept of the ancient constitution was used in political disputes in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was forensic, that is, to win a legal argument. There is an element of cherry-picking that is a part of
forensic history, although too much of it would only weaken one’s argument. As Kalman pointed out, the
lawyer is trying to make a case, whether he is doing so by the selection of factoids, or “by turning the historians themselves into factoids.” And as I have already indicated, whatever the lawyer (or the historian)
is doing is always subject to challenge. Kalman was referring to contemporary legal historians’ references to Bailyn, Pocock, Wood, Appleby, and others; but the same thing is true with respect to arguments
made by lawyers in early modern England. The factoids, whether of history or historians, and whether
today or in early modern times, are appropriated by attorneys “for advocacy purposes.” This is the
lawyer’s job; indeed, his responsibility. In contrast, “the historians would recoil. The very task of making a
case would compromise the historian.” Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism, pp. 184-85.
In our context, seventeenth-century English and eighteenth-century British-American attorneys, the
purpose of the forensic historical use of the concept of the ancient constitution was to buttress a legal
position of utmost importance, a constitutional confrontation – the matter of the scope of the king’s
prerogative and later, Parliament’s authority. Imaginative reliance on the concept of the ancient
constitution was mandated. An historical inquiry about the same subject would read differently. Indeed,
isn’t the proof of this distinction the continued assertions of historians, such as Wood and Pocock, that
lawyers are lousy historians? This seems logical unless one believes that lawyers are inherently less
intelligent than historians, which apparently is what Reid believed the historians he attacked were saying!
This business of shooting the messenger in lieu of addressing the message goes a long way towards
explaining Reid’s animosity in The Ancient Constitution.
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arguments,” said Reid, “we need to do so from Blackstone’s perspective, “not that of some discipline he
was not practicing.”388 Thus, pace another historian to whom Reid referred, the lawyers who “’popularized’
the ‘opinions of Edward Coke’” were not “play[ing] havoc with history.”389 That’s because they were not
writing history.
Reid reminded his readers that in his monograph of the ancient constitution he was not talking
about “how history should be written or about the canons or methodology of history.” Rather, his was a
study of ancient constitutionalism, which was “the instrument that lawyers, constitutionalists, and
parliamentarians used over several centuries to neutralize arbitrary power by placing a rein on discretionary decision making,” legally limiting prerogative and reinforcing the rule of law.390 History was used for
this purpose to solve a pressing legal problem. The argument, a legal argument, was that “the common
law was the ‘best’ of Saxon laws. Not all Saxon laws were incorporated in the current constitution; only
those laws that were the ‘best’ had survived … in the immemorial ancient constitution,” and they were
“laws that in the eighteenth century were identified with ‘liberty.’ Liberty – or constitutional restraints on
governmental power – was the connecting link across the centuries.”391 In short, this use of history by
both historical figures and constitutional scholars, including Reid, was in support of the fundamental,
constitutive nature of liberty to man and society, relying on the ancient constitution to establish this point.
Throughout his book Reid revisited the nature and practice of forensic history, usually by lawyers
although, amazingly, Reid also relied on Algernon Sidney and his Discourses for both the forensic
argument that the ancient constitution was timeless and that Magna Carta was “only an abridgement of
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Reid, The Ancient Constitution, p. 13. While historians may not always acknowledge it, they also are
appropriating “factoids” to make their case, just often less aggressively and more subtly than lawyers do.
Kalman genteely addressed this as well. “Yes, the ‘objective historian’s role is that of a neutral, or
disinterested judge: it must never degenerate into that of an advocate.’ Yes, many historians have
abandoned the search for absolute objectivity, preferring to concentrate on attaining what they see as the
more realistic goals of ‘qualified objectivity’ and ‘measured relativism.’” Kalman noted, “Just as attorneys
need not pursue ‘truth’ in their advocacy, so historians may wonder whether truth exists. Yes, ‘the
process of historical research and judgment on disputed issues of history is – indeed, must be –
essentially adversarial. …Still, significant differences exist between lawyers’ legal history and historians’
legal history.” Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism, pp. 187-88.
389
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our ancient laws and customs.”392 Thus, said Reid, “The American whigs, like other forensic historians,
did not turn to constitutional history or to legal records with open minds. They could not and did not
expect to base their case upon what the past had in fact been, for had they looked with a historian’s open
mind they would have found conflicting authorities and they would have had to deal with precedents
hostile to their argument. Practical people facing practical problems, they took from the past what they
needed or found useful.” The truth is that lawyers, good lawyers, typically do deal with precedents hostile
to their argument; but again, they do so to win the argument, not to present history. Perhaps Wood would
turn up his nose at this practice; but this was (and is) how lawyers functioned. In fact, historians function
the same way. This is not manipulating data or changing historical facts, which would be improper. The
difference is not in the method; it is in the purpose. “What separates the lawyer’s view of the past from
the historian’s is the reality for the lawyer of th[e] potential” that an old rule will be reinterpreted, modified
or rejected by a judge in a way that favored one’s client.393 It is the job of the lawyer to make that happen,
to convince a judge of that “correct” interpretation and outcome. This is not part of the historian’s agenda;
indeed, even if she wanted to, the historian has no way to accomplish it.
In the case of the forensic history associated with the ancient constitution, it “was used to propose
as well as oppose alterations in the constitution. It is true that it was a tactic of constitutional argumentation that Edmund Burke, at least, warned could be abused as well as used,” e.g., the past could too
readily be manipulated “by those who have a political axe to grind.” Indeed, said Reid, lawyers and
parliamentarians in the eighteenth century used the past “to serve their concept of liberty” and they did so
“in two ways: to define the current meaning of liberty (not a historical meaning) and to defend the
contemporary constitutional rights of liberty.” One need not swallow whole the notion that for seventeenth
and eighteenth-century students of the ancient constitution the issue was not historical accuracy or, to put
it more precisely, there was an indifference to historical accuracy, e.g., “whether the ancient constitution
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Reid, The Ancient Constitution, p. 71, 84, citing to 1698 edition of the DCG, at pp. 289, 356. E.g., “The
forensic historian, in contrast to the nonforensic or ‘scientific’ historian, searches the past for material
applicable to a current issue.” Forensic history has been dubbed “lawyer’s history,” “law-office history,”
and “magisterial history.” The forensic historian is an advocate; he “searches the past for material
applicable to a current issue.” Unlike the “nonforensic” or “scientific” historian, the forensic historian will
“use the past for the elucidation of the present, to solve some contemporary problem or, most often, to
carry an argument. It is the past put in the service of winning the case at bar.” Id, pp. 24-25.
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was historical fact or still existed in 1711” when, for example, “Viscount Molesworth translated Francis
Hotman’s Franco-Gallia” in order to show that “during the era of the ancient constitution on the Continent,
most of Europe,” Gothic Europe, “possessed liberty.”394 But alternatively, one could find that while the
purpose of the forensic historian was not historical accuracy, neither was it historical inaccuracy! Rather,
the matter was advocacy: how to push the history envelope in the maximum way to benefit one’s client. If
one were looking for “balance,” this might not sit well; the advocate is not the source of balance in the
Anglo-American judicial system. A lawyer represents his client and one side of an issue to the best of his
ability. Accordingly, history necessarily is employed with that adversarial goal in mind. Historians weigh
“every bit of evidence that comes to hand”; but the lawyer’s approach was (and is) quite different. He was
“after authority that will settle the case at bar,” meaning resolve the dispute in favor of his client. It was in
this way that the lawyer used history. And because of the major constitutional battles that occurred,
whether we are talking about the seventeenth-century English parliamentarian confrontation with the
Stuarts, the eighteenth-century American confrontation with Parliament, or the twenty and twenty-firstcentury battle between historians and lawyers, it was forensic history, history used by lawyers involved in
these confrontations, that “gave the ancient constitution significance.”395 The concept of the ancient
constitution was therefore very much a matter of law, a product of legal disputation, separate and apart
from its role in history and historiography. For example, in his representation of Hancock, accused of
smuggling on board his ship the Liberty, Adams argued that the statute was “made without our Consent,”
and denied the right to a jury trial, “a Brand of Infamy, of Degradation, and Disgrace, fixed upon every
American,” which “degraded … every American … below the Rank of an Englishman” contrary to Magna
Carta, and reinforced by Lord Coke in his Institutes.”396 This was a classic instance of the use of forensic
history. At the same time, such use can spill over into political reality and from there, to history.397
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One of the cause célèbres of the late 1760’s in Boston was the seizure of the sloop the Liberty, owned
by the wealthy merchant and long-time Adams’ friend John Hancock, by British customs officials acting
pursuant to the Townshend Acts’ reaffirmation of the legality of writs of assistance. The charge was that
Hancock’s crew had locked an official up in a cabin of the Liberty while they offloaded madeira wine,
thereby avoiding requisite duties. Various town actions followed but, for our purposes, what is important
to recognize is that by the time of his trial for smuggling, Hancock turned to Adams to represent him in
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“It is a wonder,” said Reid, “how we in the twenty-first century have come to think that these
controversies were solely disputes about history.” In the seventeenth and eighteenth century, “everyone”
understood that the “one fundamental issue at stake” was “whether the magistrate was the creature of the
law or the law the command of the magistrate.” This required the constitution to be ancient, not of the
magistrate’s creation.398 The stakes were enormous. If “the forensic history of ancient constitutionalism
were repudiated there would be no theoretical defenses against prerogativism,” nullifying the critical
balance of what we term the British mixed monarchy.399
Finally, Reid was highly critical of some of the statements made by specific historians that truly
troubled him: (1) Peter Laslett: “The unitary legal system in England, the prestige of the law and the

this very high-profile case that was all about “Liberty.” See Smith, John Adams, Vol. I, p. 102. Adams’
legal work dovetailed with politics. Within two months of moving his young family from Braintree to
Boston Adams was actively involved in the Boston town meeting committee process, utilizing his legal
skills in serving twice in 1768 and then again in 1769 on committees chosen to draft Instructions for the
town representatives to the provincial legislature. The June 17, 1768 Instructions constituted a protest
against the customs commissioners’ seizure of Hancock’s sloop Liberty and was Adams’ first participation
in Boston politics. Of course, all of this is history. See PJA, Vol. I, pp. 216-20.
As a separate matter, note, too, that it was not too many years later, right after Adams turned forty on
October 30, 1775, that he was appointed, although he never served as Chief Justice of Massachusetts
Bay, an impressive indicia of the esteem in which Adams was held in his native province as a practicing
attorney and legal scholar. Adams to James Warren, May 21, 1775, PJA, Vol. 3, p. 11; Chronology, JA
Rev. Writings I, p. 708. Little mention is made of this fact in biographies and studies of Adams. To the
extent there is any focus on the appointment it is that Adams could not possibly take on this job and do
everything he was already doing at the Continental Congress. Attention is sometimes paid to the question
of whether Adams had a conflict of interest in initially accepting the appointment given his Congressional
responsibilities. “Nothing has ever given me, more Mortification, than a suspicion that has been
propagated of me, that I was actuated by private Views and have been aiming at high Places. The Office
of C.J. [Chief Justice] has occasioned this Jealousy, and it never will be allayed, untill I resign it.” Said
Abigail, in reply, “Tho in your acceptance of it, I know you was actuated by the purest motives, and I know
of no person here so well qualified to discharge the important Duties of it. Yet I will not urge you to it. In
accepting of it you must be Excluded from all other employments.” What is overlooked is the significance
of the appointment itself, namely, that in 1775, at a young age for such preeminence, Adams was
officially recognized in Massachusetts, the province experiencing the most threatening and complex legal
challenges vis-à-vis the metropole, as the colony’s legal expert bar none. While he does not link it to this
appointment, Ryerson points out that Adams “became the most learned lawyer in the province.” Thus it
was the esteemed attorney and jurist John Adams who Massachusetts sent to the Philadelphia
Congresses not the oft-described plump, irascible little man from Braintree. See John to Abigail, Adams
Family Correspondence Feb. 10, 1777 (from July 31, 1775; Adams Fam. Corresp. Vol. 2, pp. 158-59,
John to Abigail – letter telling Abigail that he has submitted his resignation. “It has relieved me from a
Burden, which has a long Time oppress’d me”); John to Abigail, and Abigail to John, Aug. 18 & 29, 1776,
My Dearest Friend, pp. 143, 147; Autobiography, JA D&A Vol. 3, pp.359-63.
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lawyers, the intimate relationship between views of law and legal history and political realities combined
to keep Englishmen willfully ignorant of the past of their own society”; (ii) Donald Kelley (Reid
paraphrasing and quoting Kelley): “the English were ‘curiously’ reluctant ‘to consider historical perspective
or context.” (iii) Pocock (also paraphrased and quoted): “‘constitutionalists were forced into’ what has
been called ‘a kind of historical obscurantism – compelled to attribute their liberties to more and more
remote and mythical periods in the effort to prove them independent of the will of the king.” Once again,
Reid’s perspective was very different. In his view, there was “a legitimate question” whether not only
Coke, but “any of the forensic historians discussed in this study, gave much thought to whether the
history they wrote provided a historically accurate as well as a constitutionally useful picture of the past.”
In assessing the accusations of “the better historians of our day,” said Reid, we need to consider what the
intention was of those early modern lawyer-forensic historians, who these better historians believed did
not know “what they were about,” and “whether accurate history was one of their primary considerations
when arguing constitutional law.” No, said Reid. The question that we really should be asking is, “Did
lawyers care?”400 Turning the tables on “the better historians,” Reid sarcastically remarked, “Although it is
not permissible to suggest that the historiographers of the ancient constitution could have been mistaken,
it may be permissible to point out that there are questions that they appear to have overlooked. For it
does seem that they forgot to ask what lawyers are, and they forgot to consider what lawyers do.” Thus,
“It is an irrevocable error to miss the fact that lawyers are advocates and assume they are something
else. The general assumption seems to have been that when they are not writing amateur history they do
work akin to that of political theorists. Lawyers are not political theorists and political theory is not law, at
least not seventeenth- or eighteenth-century common or constitutional law.”401 Lawyers use history “not
as a piece of historical evidence, but as authority.” If a case could be won with the use of forensic history,
“then forensic history would do.”402
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Id, p. 122. Notwithstanding his convictions about the legitimacy of the way lawyers use history, Reid
was ultimately pessimistic. “The historians will continue to carry the day, for historiography is their
preserve and lawyers are always fair game.” He nevertheless reminded us that, “Something worth
remembering happened in the England where those uneducated lawyers clung tenaciously to ancient
constitutionalism during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. …It is a wonder for historians to
consider that those common lawyers were the only lawyers of Europe to keep viable the ancient
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To an imagination of any scope the most far-reaching form of power
is not money, it is the command of ideas.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.403
b.

The Nature of Liberty

Footnotes can only begin to do justice to this particular life-long Adams’ drum beat and its centrality to his thought.404 Neither was Adams alone. As Reid stated in his monograph on The Concept of
Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution, “The extent to which eighteenth-century legal, constitutional, and political commentators discussed liberty in the abstract is simply amazing.”405 Not that the Americans were the first to do this. Recall Halifax’s statement a century earlier: “Liberty is the mistress of mankind, she hath powerful charms which do so dazzle us that we find beauties in her which perhaps are not
there, as we do in other mistresses; yet if she was not a beauty, the world would not run made for her.”406
Here we focus on just one brilliant example of how liberty’s essentiality to man’s well-being resounded in
Adams’ political thought, turning to his first major work, Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law.

constitution, if not as a source of liberty, at least as a restraining force on arbitrary government.” Id, pp.
123-24.
403

Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Path of the Law,” 10 Harv. Law Rev. No. 8, 457-78, 478 (1897).
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Some of Adams’ most poignant prose about liberty were expressed in his voluminous correspondence.
For example, on June 3, 1776 Adams wrote a stirring letter to Patrick Henry in which he enclosed
Thoughts on Government, albeit forwarded as a “nullius Filius,” an unacknowledged child. In updating
Henry about events at the Continental Congress, Adams stated, “The Dons, the Bashaws, the Grandees,
the Patricians, the Sachems, the Nabobs, call them by what Name you please, Sign, and groan, and frett,
and Sometimes Stamp, and foam, and curse – but all in vain. The Decree is gone forth, and it cannot be
recalled, that a more equal Liberty, than has prevail’d in other Parts of the Earth, must be established in
America. Adams to Henry, June 3, 1776, PJA Vol. 4, pp. 234-35, 235 (emphasis added).
405

John Phillip Reid, The Concept of Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution (Chicago & London:
The University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 11. Prof. Reid analyzed the meanings of liberty utilized by
both British Americans and their metropole counterparts. The underlying paradox, of course, is that
Britain was viewed as the apogee of a free society. As Swiss jurisprudentialist J. L. De Lolme, a favorite
of Adams, stated, “Britain is the only kingdom, and Britons the only people who can truly say, we are
free.” Yet it was against that “free” society that the Americans rebelled. Reid, The Concept of Liberty, p.
15, citing J. L. De Lolme, The Constitution of England; or, an Account of the English Government; in
which it is Compared Both with the Republican Form of Government, and the Other Monarchies in
Europe (London, 1807; new ed.), pp. 490-91.
406

“The Character of a Trimmer,” Halifax: Complete Works, pp. 62-63. In a May 1766 sermon entitled The
Snare Broken, written in thanksgiving for the repeal of the Stamp Act, Jonathan Mayhew described
“Liberty” as, “the delight of the wise, good and brave; the protectress of innocence from wrongs and
oppression, the patroness of learning, arts, eloquence, virtue, rational loyalty, religion!” The Snare
Broken, (Boston 1766), http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/1766-mayhew-the-snare-broken-sermon (9-2-17).
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“Liberty” was the very first word in Adams’ working notes on the Dissertation:407 “Liberty, that has
been compelled to skulk about in Corners of the Earth, and been everlastingly persecuted by the great,
the rich, the noble, the Reverend, the proud, the Lasey, the Ambitious, avaricious, and Revengeful, who
have from the beginning constituted almost all the sons of Adam.” But “Liberty, that complication of real
Honour, Piety, Virtue Dignity, and Glory, … has never been enjoyd, in its full Perfection, by more than ten
or twelve Millions of Men at any Time, since the Creation, will reign in America, over hundreds and
Thousands of Millions at a Time.”408 The subject of the Dissertation was the “wicked confederacy” between religious or canon law, and medieval, feudal law that had been “calamitous to human liberty.”409
That the Dissertation emerged out of Adams’ happy acceptance in the elite Boston legal club Sodality and
was a statement of Adams’ professional caliber is well known. But it would be foolish to summarily pass
over the six-part essay without languishing in its magnificent language, which rings as true today as it did
in 1765 when Adams wrote and published his tocsin in installments in the Boston Gazette. We historians,
not to mention we lawyers as well as political theorists, have a tendency to skip over the emotional fervor
of language, especially when it comes from John Adams, technical (some might say pedantic) lawyer bar
none. But in the Dissertation Adams truly outdid himself in the manner of Paine’s commonsensical cry for
action and Jefferson’s declaration. We can appreciate the message intellectually and emotionally.410 At

407

We know that Sidney began his rejoinder to Filmer with the concept of liberty, viz., that Filmer was
“endeavouring to overthrow the principle of liberty in which God created us, and which includes the chief
advantages of the life we enjoy, as well as the greatest helps towards the felicity,” that intense happiness
“that is the end of our hopes in the other.” Five-hundred and seventy (printed) pages later, the last line of
Discourses was also about liberty: “And if we examine our history we shall find, that every good and
generous prince has sought to establish our liberties, as much as the most base and wicked to infringe
them.” DCG, 1.2.8, III.46.578. As we can now fully appreciate, liberty, and man’s associated liberties, was
what Sidney’s republicanism was all about, too; and he came to this view from Machiavelli and others:
“Among the most necessary things established by those who have founded a republic in a prudent
fashion is a safeguard for liberty, and according to whether it is well-established or not, that free way of
life is more or less enduring.” Machiavelli, Discorsi, BI, Ch5, 31. Indeed, Viroli emphasized that, “Liberty is
for Machiavelli the highest and most precious political value.” Viroli, Machiavelli, p. 76.
408

As Grant observed, “In these two chromatic sentences are the essential political thought of Adams:
his unquenchable faith in America (more than a decade before there was an American nation); his
unqualified love of liberty; and his unsentimental perception of the human condition.” Grant, John Adams
Party of One, p. 61. The quotation is taken from Adams’ fragmentary notes written in 1765 as he worked
on what became his Dissertation. See “I. Fragmentary Notes for ‘A Dissertation on the Canon and the
Feudal Law,’” PJA Vol. I, pp. 106-07, 106 (emphasis added).
409

Adams, “Dissertation 1,” PJA Vol. I, p. 113.

410

Reid maintained that scholars today may find the colonial language of liberty, and particularly slavery,
to be “overblown and the rhetoric melodramatic” because we “have lost the eighteenth-century meaning
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the same time, as Adams noted, “These are not the vapors of a melancholy mind, nor the effusions of
envy, disappointed ambition, nor a spirit of opposition to government.” Adams was not writing the
Dissertation out of some sort of unseemly motive. Rather, these were fervent, passionate words to his
people and for his country – “the emanations of a heart that burns for its country’s welfare.”411
Man “has certainly an exalted soul,” Adams proclaimed, and “the love of power,” that principle in
human nature “which has been so often the cause of slavery,” has also “been the cause of freedom.”412

of liberty and slavery. Most of all, we have changed our perception of legislative authority and of
sovereignty. We no longer think of constitutional or ‘legitimate’ government mainly in terms of restraint or
impotency; as a result, our definition of liberty is different from that of people for whom the word ‘slavery’
conjured images of arbitrary rule rather than of bondsmen picking cotton.” I don’t agree. I agree that our
sensibilities about chattel slavery are far more acute and realistic. But I do not think that means that we
cannot relate to colonial sensitivity about overreaching government and improperly restraining legislation,
such as the Declaratory Act. See Reid, The Concept of Liberty, p. 96.
411

“VI. ‘A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law,’ No. 4,” Oct. 21, 1765 (“Dissertation 4”), PJA
Vol. I, p. 128.
412

“Dissertation 1,” id, p. 111. The language of slavery was prevalent throughout Adams’ writing. Similarly, as Furstenberg noted, “John Locke, Algernon Sidney, and John Milton all contrasted slavery and
freedom.” Furstenberg, “Beyond Freedom and Slavery: Autonomy, Virtue, and Resistance in Early
American Political Discourse.” The fact is that the comparison was commonplace in the seventeenth and
eighteenth century, regardless of what side of the absolute monarchy aisle one sat. Reid reminded us in
The Concept of Liberty that in the eighteenth-century, slavery was a routine part of Anglo-American
political rhetoric and was depicted as the opposite of liberty. It also was “the hazard to shun. It was the
‘worst of evils,’ a condition ‘worse than death.’” Reid, The Concept of Liberty, p. 38. Reid actually
proposed three “opposites” to liberty: licentiousness, “the nether side of liberty”; slavery; and “the
arbitrary exercise of government power.” I would suggest that these three phenomena were all threats to
liberty but not liberty’s opposites.
Licentiousness was the dangerous component of human nature that threatened liberty and, if strong,
overwhelmed or, as Adams might have said, tipped the balance away from a mentality in which liberty
thrived. Adams would have endorsed Joseph Priestley’s view that while human nature could never be
“brought to perfection,” education curbed licentiousness. “[T]he tradition which passes from Priestley
through Paine and Godwin to Garrison and Thoreau insists that men can and must free themselves, rather
than be freed by the external manipulation of educators and planners.” (Note that Algernon Sidney was
one of the two favorite authors of William Lloyd Garrison, drafter of the manifestos of the American AntiSlavery Society in 1833 and the New England Non-Resistance Society in 1838.) Not that education was
not important to Priestley: the right to educate one’s own children was “as dear to any parent as the right of
conscience, and ‘if there be any natural rights which ought not to be sacrificed to the ends of civil society,’
freedom of education is one of them.” Lynd, Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism, pp. 5, 50-51, 111.
Slavery, on the other hand, was a personal physical condition that denied individual liberty and that was
imposed by men on other men, usually but not necessarily with government sanction. Living as a slave
was indeed an “opposite” way of life than living as a free man. As Reid pointed out, living as a slave also
was one way of living subject to the exercise of arbitrary power. But it was not the only way. Arbitrary
power was power exercised without the restraint of law, which could manifest itself in many ways. The
arbitrary exercise of government power was an official, institutional action that blocked or took away liberty,
in the self-determinative sense, that is, it either actually or potentially infringed on freedom, both of which
constituted restraints on liberty. See Reid, The Concept of Liberty, pp. 32, 38, 55, 60.
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Passions are not necessarily “bad.” Here we have the flip side of the ugly assertion of power: the
willingness to fight for freedom. Recall that the language of power and slavery also pervaded Sidney’s
discourse, viz., “He is a slave who serves the best and gentlest man in the world, as well as he who
serves the worst; and he does serve him if he must obey his commands, and depends upon his will”; “it
was said, that the people, who whilst they fought for their own interests, had been invincible,’ but when
they were “enslaved, were grown sordid, idle, base”; that when “their spirits were depressed by servitude,
they had neither courage to defend themselves, nor will to fight for their wicked masters; and least of all to
increase their power, which was destructive to themselves.”413 Sidney had been very clear that this was
in the nature of man; for the “same thing is found in all places.414 Adams agreed: “nine tenths of the
species, are groaning and gasping in misery and servitude.”415 In opposition to the Stamp Act Adams
wrote, “We further Recommend the most Clear and Explicit assertion and vindication of our Rights and
Liberties to be entered on the Public Records that the world may know in the Present and all future
Generations that We have a Clear Knowledge and a just Sense of those Rights and Liberties and that
with Submission to divine Providence we never can be Slaves.”416 In opposition to Governor Hutchinson’s
arguments to the Bay assembly, Adams stated, “nothing is more evident, than that any People who are
subject to the unlimited Power of another, must be in a State of abject Slavery.”417

413
Locke “was intent on criticizing Filmer’s Patriarcha because it would ‘perswade all Men, that they are
Slaves.’” Reid, The Concept of Liberty, p. 40, citing Locke, Two Treatises, Bk I.
414

See, e.g., DCG, III.21.441, III.33.510, II.21.197. In addition to Sidney and Locke, Neville and Milton
among others also juxtaposed freedom and subjugation, servitude and slavery. See Ch. Three.
415

“Dissertation 4,” PJA Vol. I, p. 123. In Defence, written over thirty years later, Adams quoted Sidney’s
views on liberty and slavery: “Sidney said, ‘Liberty consists solely in an independency on the will of
another; and, by a slave, we understand a man who can neither dispose of his person or goods, but
enjoys all at the will of his master.’ And again, ‘As liberty consists only in being subject to no man’s will,
and nothing denotes a slave but a dependence upon the will of another; if there be no other law in a
kingdom but the will of a prince, there is no such thing as liberty.” Defence, Vol. I, p. 127.
416

“Instructions Adopted by the Braintree Town Meeting, Sept. 24, 1765, PJA Vol. I, pp. 137-40, 139. “In
the early days of the revolutionary controversy, fear of slavery was cited to motivate Americans to be less
dependent on British manufactures. …Later, fear of slavery became a motivation for taking up arms.”
Moreover, “arbitrary taxation created political slaves,” a theme that resonated in both America and Britain.
Reid, The Concept of Liberty, pp. 91, 93.
417
“I. Reply of the House to Hutchinson’s First Message, March 26, 1773, PJA Vol. I, pp. 315-31, 321.
There is an extraordinarily vast literature not only on American slavery, but on the language of slavery in
British America. For a particularly relevant sample, see Reid, The Concept of Liberty, Chs. 5 & 6, “The
Opposite of Liberty,” and “The Concept of Slavery,” pp. 38-54; Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the
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Adams reminded his people that it was this same dangerous reality, the love of power, “the lust of
domination,” that had also “always stimulated the common people to aspire at independency,” a remarkable
observation in 1765.418 Moreover, because of man’s love of freedom the people historically had
“endeavor[ed] at confining the power of the great within the limits of equity and reason.”419 But “certain
officers of the crown, and certain other missionaries of ignorance, foppery, servility and slavery,” sought to
confound those in America who endeavored to remain constant to the freedom of the people. “Have not
some generals, from England, treated us like servants, nay more like slaves than like Britons?”420
Here, in a nutshell, we have the whole story! Man’s nature caused him to want to be free, and to
be free man had to make sure that the powers-that-be were limited such that they necessarily had to act
equitably (which subsumed the notion of acting reasonably).421 As will become quite clear, the equitable
way to limit freedom, maintained not only Sidney but Adams and other British American republicans, was
through law, which rejected domination, viz., subjection to the arbitrary will of another, while at the same
time allowing for what Skinner and Pettit would have deemed legitimate “interference.”422 As Sidney had

American Revolution, pp. 232-46; Furstenberg, “Beyond Freedom and Slavery: Autonomy, Virtue, and
Resistance in Early American Political Discourse”; McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, pp. 50-55.
418

Dissertation 1, PJA Vol. I, p. 111; Dissertation 3, id, p. 122. It was the latent spark in the breasts of
men that was “capable of being kindled into a flame” that Adams had identified in Novanglus I as liberty.
Massachusettensis No. III, JA Rev. Writings I, pp. 340-49, 341; Novanglus I, PJA Vol. 2, p. 229.
419

“Dissertation 1,”, PJA Vol. I, p. 111. In “Discourses on Davila” Adams wrote that, “It has been said, that it
is extremely difficult to preserve a balance. This is no more than to say that it is extremely difficult to preserve liberty. To this truth all ages and nations attest. …A balance, with all its difficulty, must be preserved,
or liberty is lost forever.” Reflecting his perennial realism, Adams added, “Perhaps a perfect balance, if it
ever existed, has not been long maintained in its perfection; yet, such a balance as has been sufficient to
liberty, has been supported in some nations for many centuries together; and we must come as near as
we can to a perfect equilibrium, or all is lost. “Discourses on Davila,” The Portable John Adams, p. 393.
420

V. Dissertation 3, PJA Vol. I, p. 120; Dissertation 4, PJA Vol. I, p, 124.

421

One of Sidney’s chapters in Discourses Concerning Government was entitled, “Man’s Natural Love to
Liberty is Tempered by Reason, which Originally is his Nature.” DCG, II.20.191.
422
Recall from the Introduction that Skinner’s liberty, which he called neo-Roman and which we call
negative liberty, is the right to be free from the interference of others unless one’s own actions are
interfering. This is a concept generally associated with liberalism. For Skinner the operative words were
dependence and inference. Over time Skinner moved closer to Pettit’s views. Pettit distinguished his
own similar ideas from Skinner’s thesis, emphasizing that “the interference suffered in living under a
coercive but fair rule of law must count as a secondary offence against freedom. Such a rule of law will
not compromise freedom, in the manner of a dominating agency, but it will condition freedom. …[I]t will
reduce the range or ease with which people enjoy undominated choice.” Philip Pettit, “Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On a Difference with Quentin Skinner,” Political Theory 30:3 (June 2002), pp. 33956, 342. Pettit’s operative word was domination. Pettit’s stated, “The republican conception of freedom
was certainly negative, I maintained, but it did not represent liberty as noninterference in the manner that
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written, “He is a free man who lives as best pleases himself, under laws made by his own consent.”423
The importance of law, to be discussed in much more detail shortly, reflected the shared Sidney-Adams
view that, “[L]iberty without restraint being inconsistent with any government, and the good which man
naturally desire for himself, children, and friends, we find no place in the world where the inhabitants do
not enter into some kind of society or government to restrain it: and to say that all men desire liberty
without restraint, and yet that all do restraint it, is ridiculous.”424 As Reid pointed out, legal restraint was

Hobbes inaugurated and that came to prominence among nineteenth-century liberal writers. It was,
rather, a conception of liberty in which the antonym is not interference as such but rather dominatio or
domination. Domination is subjection to an arbitrary power of interference on the part of another – a
dominus or master – even another who chooses not actually to exercise that power.” Id, p. 340; Pettit,
Republicanism; Pettit, “Liberalism and republicanism,” Australian Journal of Political Science 29 (1993),
pp. 162-89.
We also bump into the complex analytical world of Gordon Wood and progeny, which began with Wood’s
emphasis on non-dependency, viz., that “Nothing could be more radical than this attempt,” through
revolution, “to make every man independent. The Revolution became a full-scale assault on dependency.”
Notwithstanding its potential, Wood’s conclusions were sad –that the American revolution turned out to be
a failed opportunity to institute democracy. “Instead of creating a new order of benevolence and selflessness, enlightened republicanism was breeding social competitiveness and individuality; and there seemed
no easy way of stopping it. …The Revolution was the source of its own contradictions.” Wood, The
Radicalism of the American Revolution, pp. 179, 230; see Introduction. In this intellectual labyrinth we also
find McDonald’s critical assessment of Hartz, as well as Furstenberg’s analysis, which characterized
Hartz’s perspective on American history as “a long, essentially uninterrupted unfolding of the liberal seed.”
Per this view, the United States was “a liberal society, lacking feudalism and therefore socialism and
governed by an irrational Lockianism.” While Americans had been “born equal,” no dialectical spark ever
ignited History’s motor, said Furstenberg. Hartz had come not to praise American liberalism, nor even to
bury it; he came to lament “the psychic heritage of a nation ‘born equal’” whose “colossal liberal
absolutism” entailed “the death by atrophy of the philosophic impulse”: a crushing intellectual tradition
“reducing insight to platitude, transforming philosophy into the complacent after-dinner speech” of “a
thousand chambers of commerce epigoni”! Thus, said Furstenberg, liberalism’s hegemony in America
was not just an aesthetic or intellectual problem for Hartz; it was a political and perhaps even an existential
one: The “tyrannical force of Lockian sentiment” had exerted so great a “compulsive power” on the United
States “that it has posed a threat to liberty itself.” Perhaps this takes us back around to Pettit’s felt
necessity for non-domination, albeit through compulsively powerful ideas? See Introduction, discussing
McDonald’s reliance on François Furstenberg, “Hartz is Dead. Long Live Hartz.” Reviews in American
History, Vol. 40, No. 2 (June 2012), pp. 319-24, 319, citing Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America
(1955), at pp. 15, 285, 206, 31, 11; Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of
the Constitution (Lawrence, KA: The University Press of Kansas, 1985).
423

DCG, III.21.440. Recall the question raised in the Introduction to this study about the nature of liberty
from the beginning, viz., from the time of Plato and Aristotle: “What is liberty? Aristotle’s liberty in his
Politics, for example, is made up of two components: “for all to rule and be ruled in turn,” and “that a man
should live as he likes.” Contrast this perspective from that of Plato in the Laws: “Authority does not
simply tolerate the liberty of the citizens but rather constitutes its condition of possibility. That is, true
liberty depends on submission to a single legitimate power, that of the law.” See Aristotle, Politics, Part II,
¶1, at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.6.six.html (11/5/13); Rowe & Schofield, p. 279, discussing
Plato’s Laws.
424

DCG, II.11.191-92.
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“the probative concept converting theory into practicality, for liberty, rather than being the absence of
restraint, could not exist without restraint. Liberty from restraint could exist only if there were laws
restraining the liberty of others.” One could have too much of a good thing. “Precious as was liberty, too
much could be as undesirable as too little.”425
Adams’ freedom was all about the ability to exercise the right to self-determination that was the
liberty in which Sidney believed.426 Sidney had stated, “But nothing can be more absurd than to say, that

425

Reid, The Concept of Liberty, pp. 30-31. Note that there were other ways of categorizing liberty in the
eighteenth century. In Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism, Lynd described “two definitions” of
freedom, “control over the finished products of human activity,” and “self-determining human activity itself”
that English radical dissenters, such as Joseph Priestley, identified. In their view, true liberty was
“incapable of delegation,” inalienable, and therefore not capable of becoming a commodity. Juxtaposing
the ideas of John Brown, English author of An Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times,
published in 1757-58, with the views of Joseph Priestly in a 1765 rebuttal of Brown, Lynd described the
“authoritarian remedy” proposed by Brown as a solution grounded in civil liberty, that “salutary Restraint”
that society places on man’s natural desires, viz., the alienation of a natural right as property which is
traded for the value of “social Life.” Brown set “the stage for a godly totalitarianism: a state which will
manipulate the environment and dictate public education to ensure that its citizens are good,” and he did
so by “insisting on the distinction between vice and virtue while at the same time clinging to the Lockean
assumption that our ideas of vice and virtue derive from our environment. Priestley rejected this
approach. He accepted the idea that there was a distinction between political and civil liberty. Political
liberty “concerns the form in which the power of the state is exerted” whereas civil liberty is “the power
that people reserve to themselves” and is a “question of how much power the state, however organized,
exerts over individual lives. The task of political liberty is to safeguard civil liberty, but the most
democratic state will threaten civil liberty if its power is too great,” a worry that Adams had. Unlike Brown,
who believed that natural rights were property that could be “aliened in exchange for an equivalent
return,” Priestley believed that “natural rights are residually or conditionally inalienable.” Priestley
therefore went “beyond Locke” in maintaining that there were “some kinds of civil liberty, complete
personal freedom in certain areas of life,” that remained “in full force in the midst of society.” Lynd,
Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism, pp. 46-54.
426
Bailyn used the term “self-determination” in his discussion of slavery and its antinomy: “’Slavery’ in this
sense, far from being mere exclamation and hyperbole, was a term referring to a specific political
condition…. And it applied equally to the black plantation laborers in the American colonies, for their
condition was only a more dramatic, more bizarre variation of the condition of all who had lost the power
of self-determination… The degradation of chattel slaves – painfully visible and unambiguously
established in law – was only the final realization of what the loss of freedom could mean everywhere; for
there was no such thing “as partial liberty”: he who has authority “to restrain and control my conduct in
any instance without my consent hath in all.” While I do not agree with Bailyn’s eliding of chattel slavery
and political slavery, see, e.g., Introduction, n. 5, the applicability of the term “self-determination” applies
to both. Bailyn, The Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution, p. 234. An early Adams scholar
used the term, “self-realization,” a word that seems to be a little more passive than “self-determination.”
Morse, “The Politics of John Adams,” p. 312. Both Kloppenberg and Furstenberg used the term
“autonomy,” which Furstenberg defined as, “a belief that humans are endowed with the capacity for will or
agency and the consequent belief that worldly events are produced by human action, rather than
providential guidance, chance, or fortune.” Furstenberg, p. 1298. The problem that I have with this
definition, which Furstenberg thinks is more specific than “freedom,” is that it does not emphasize the
political side of the exercise of this human capacity, that is, that one doesn’t really exercise “autonomy” in
the inherently social universe of politics; rather, political autonomy suggests a view independent of
another, often mainstream view. In contrast, Thompson maintained that liberty for Adams was “self-
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one man has an absolute power above law to govern according to his will, ‘for the people’s good, and the
preservation of their liberty.’” This was because “no liberty can subsist where there is such a power; and
we have no other way of distinguishing between free nations, and such as are not so, than that the free
are governed by their own laws and magistrates, according to their own mind, and the others either have
willingly subjected themselves, or are by force brought under the power of one or more men, to be ruled
according to his or their pleasure. The same distinction holds in relation to particular persons.”427 Adams
echoed this view: “But the fact is certain … that wherever a general Knowledge and sensibility have
prevailed among the People, Arbitrary Government and every kind of oppression, have lessened and
disappeared in Proportion.” As we know, Adams believed that, “Love of Power” caused both slavery and
freedom. It was “this Principle … that has always prompted, the [Kings and] Princes and Nobles of the
Earth [to grasp at an unlimited P[ower]] by every subtlety to shake off, all the Limits of their Power.” This
“Same Principle,” Adams cautioned, not only caused the Common People “to aspire at Independancy”; it
also led the people “to confine the Power of the great ones, within the Limits of Reason, and Equity.428
As with Sidney, Adams’ liberty was all about self-determination; it was Pettit’s liberty. Pettit used
the language of domination, and argued that liberty required the people to be free from domination, “free
indeed.” At the same time, interference, if not arbitrary, was not an intrusion on one’s liberty. On the
other hand, negative liberty was insufficient; it was not enough for there to be an absence of obstacles or
constraints. One wanted the freedom to act according to one’s will, an assertive, positive liberty; at the
same time, legitimate constraints and interferences were not only acceptable, they were necessary.
Having addressed Sidney’s extensive reliance on history and historical examples to help forge his
political theory, we need not digress on that subject again. Suffice it to say, as Sidney and Adams were both

government in the fullest sense.” By this he seemed to mean the ability – “the virtue” – to “acquire and
then keep one’s political and civil liberty.” Thompson, John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty, pp. 54-55.
Whether Thompson was referring to the same thing as what Bailyn meant by “self-determination,” or how
I use the term, or what Kloppenberg and Furstenberg call “autonomy,” is unclear. Withal, self-determination seems to me to be a more politically active concept of liberty. Of course, all these terms are useful.
Cf. Gordon-Reed and Onuf’s description of Jefferson’s republicanism: “The religious quest he embarked
upon was inextricably connected to his political philosophy, which emphasized the importance of individual autonomy and self-determination.” Gordon-Reed & Onuf, “Most Blessed of the Patriarchs,” p. 278.
427

DCG, III.21.441.

428

Adams, “II. Draft of ‘A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law,” [August? 1765], and Adams,
Dissertation I, PJA, Vol. I, pp. 108, 111.
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wont to do, summarily considering the Greeks, Medes, Persians, Italians, Germans, Spaniards, Tarquins,
Romans, Swiss, Grisons, Venetians, Dutch, Tuscans, Neapolitans and Turks, Sidney explained how Filmer
had turned common usage topsy-turvy in his characterization of liberty. Per Filmer, said Sidney, “I who
esteem myself free, because I depend upon the will of no man, and hope to die in the liberty I inherit from my
ancestors, am a slave; and the Moors or Turks, who may be beaten and killed, whenever it pleases their
insolent masters, are free men. But surely the world is not so much mistaken in the signification of words and
things.”429If someone else is in the position to make your decisions for you, you are not free.430 “He is a slave
who serves the best and gentlest man in the world, as well as he who serves the worst; and he does serve
him if he must obey his commands, and depends upon his will,” said Sidney.431 From a very young age
Adams declaimed, “Every Man has in Politicks as well as Religion, a Right to think and speak and Act for
himself.”432 Liberty arose from the nature of man; “the question,” said Sidney, “ought not to be, how a nation
can come to be free, but how a man comes to have a dominion over it…. [L]iberty subsists as arising from the
nature and being of a man.”433 Adams said the same thing. “[A]ll such slavish subordinations were equally
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Id.
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Adams joined not only Sidney, but also Locke in staking out the territory of self-determination –
freedom from interference – that was the touchstone of liberty. See “X. Governor Winthrop to Governor
Bradford,” Feb. 9, 1767 and “Xi. Governor Winthrop to Governor Bradford,” Feb. 16, 1767, PJA Vol. I, pp.
198-211. For further discussion of Adams’ Winthrop letters, see Appendix B.
431

DCG, III.21.441.

432

JA D&A, Vol. I (Aug. 1, 1761), p. 220. Reid maintained that the metropole and the British Americans
contemplated two types of liberty: negative liberty – the absence of interference – and a liberty consisting
of the exercise of rights to which one was entitled, which is another way of saying positive liberty, the
liberty to do certain things, not the liberty from something. The concept of self-determination comes closer
to something that contemplates both types of liberty. Self-determination encompasses the right to act
according to one’s interest; at the same time, one needed to be free from the possibility of arbitrary interference, of prerogative “stretching … beyond its just bounds.” Adams’ “Right to think and speak and Act
for himself” is precisely this sort of self-determination. See Reid, The Concept of Liberty, p.22-23, 32; n.
157, supra.
433
DCG III.33.510. Here Sidney certainly had jettisoned Eric Nelson’s Platonic definition of liberty, as
noted in this study’s Introduction as “the condition of living according to nature.” See Nelson, The Greek
Tradition, p. 10 & n.38. On the other hand, if Rowe and Schofield were right that Plato intended “true
liberty” to depend on “submission to a single legitimate power, that of the law,” Sidney and Adams were
not far afield from Plato’s understanding of liberty. Id, p. 45 n.100, citing The Cambridge History of Greek
and Roman Political Thought, Christopher Rowe & Malcolm Schofield, ed. (Cambridge University Press,
2005), p. 279. In contrast, Nelson described Aristotle’s liberty as composed of two components: “for all to
rule and be ruled in turn,” and “that a man should live as he likes.” Id, p. 45 n.99, citing Aristotle, Politics,
Part II, ¶1, http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.6.six.html (11/5/13). This second definition also may be
consistent with Adams’ concept of equitable government limitations; on the other hand, one has to
wonder how “living as one likes” fits into Aristotle’s view that the rights of citizens of a republic do not
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inconsistent with the constitution of human nature and that religious liberty, with which Jesus had made them
free.”434 In his late-seventies, in a letter to a colleague, Adams actually defined liberty in terms of selfdetermination: “Liberty, according to my metaphysics, is an intellectual quality…. The definition of it is a selfdetermining power in an intellectual agent. It implies thought and choice and power.” In Adams’ view, “If the
substance in which this quality … exists, … can distinguish between moral good and moral evil, and has
power to choose the former and refuse the latter, it can, if it will, choose the evil and reject the good, as we
see in experience it very often does.”435
For Adams, individual man’s entitlement to freedom was a right, albeit one on which the powerful
had historically trampled. Sidney had said the same thing.436 In fact, said Adams, in Europe, “the
common people were held together in herds and clans in a state of servile dependence on their lords …
and in a state of total ignorance.”437 Indeed, said Adams, in his own time, “Believe me my countrymen,
they have imbibed an opinion on the other side the water, that we are an ignorance, a timid and a stupid
people, nay their tools on this side have often the impudence to dispute your bravery. But I hope in God
the time is near at hand, when they will be fully convince of your understanding, integrity and courage.”438
In late-eighteenth-century America the people had been told “that ‘the word rights is an offensive
expression,’ ‘that the king, his ministry, and parliament, will not endure to hear Americans talk of their

extend to husbandmen, artificers (those who provide to members of their community “clothes, habitations,
houses, and other things which depend upon the arts”), and merchants, a view that Adams resoundingly
condemned as “the most unphilosophical, the most inhuman and cruel, that can be conceived.” Defence,
Vol. III, pp. 159-65. Montesquieu also had his doubts about Aristotle, albeit in the context of monarchy:
“ARISTOTLE is greatly puzzled in treating of monarchy,” citing Aristotle’s Politics, Book 3, Ch. 14. “He
makes five species; and he does not distinguish them by the form of constitution, but by things merely
accidental, as the virtues and vices of the prince; or by things extrinsecal, such as tyranny usurped or
inherited. Among the number of monarchies, he ranks the Persian empire and the kingdom of Sparta. But
is it not evident that the one was a despotic state and the other a republic?” Bk II, Ch. IX, “Aristotle’s
Manner of Thinking,” Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Complete Works, Vol. 1, The
Spirit of Laws [1748] (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2011), p. 224.
434
Adams, “IV. ‘A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law,’ No. 2,” Aug. 19, 1765 (“Dissertation
2”), PJA Vol I, p. 117.
435

Adams to Taylor, April 15, 1814, The Portable John Adams, p. 407 (emphasis added).
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“If all princes are obliged, by the law of nature, to preserve the lands, goods, lives, and liberties of their
subjects, those subjects have, by the law of nature, a right to their liberties, lands, goods, &c. and cannot
depend upon the will of any man; for that dependence destroys liberty, &c.” DCG, III.16.406.
437

Adams, Dissertation 1, PJA Vol. I, p. 113.

438

Adams, Dissertation 3, id, p. 122.
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rights;’ ‘that Britain is the mother and we the children, that a filial duty and submission is due from us to
her,’ and that ‘we ought to doubt our own judgment, and presume that she is right, even when she seems
to us to shake the foundations of government.’”439 This could not possibly be true. In standard legal
modus operandi, Adams turned the issue on its head. Wouldn’t this, said Adams, then be “representing
your most gracious sovereign, as endeavouring to destroy the foundations of his own throne? … Are you
not representing every member of parliament as renouncing the transactions at Running Mede, and as
repealing in effect the bill of rights” etcetera, etcetera. “Do you not represent them as forgetting that the
prince of Orange, was created King William, by the People, on purpose that their rights might be eternal
and inviolable?”440 Instead of taking this obviously specious position, Adams asseverated, “Let us
presume, what is in fact true,” which is “that the spirit of liberty, is as ardent as ever among the body of
the nation, … that the same great spirit, which once gave Cesar so warm a reception; which denounced
hostilities against John ’till Magna Charta was signed; which severed the head of Charles the first from his
body, and drove James the Second from his kingdom;… is still alive and active and warm in England,” the
beloved metropole of the British Americans.441 Moreover, said Adams, nothing other than this “same
spirit in America” would “endear” the colonists to their brethren in Britain” – an infrequent example, on
Adams’ part, of youthful, wishful thinking.
Adams argued that throughout history, European religious and secular leaders had united in “a
wicked confederacy” of tyranny to deprive men of their natural right to freedom, “another event still more
calamitous to human liberty” in which “liberty, and with her, knowledge and virtue too, seem to have
deserted the earth.”442 As had Sidney, Adams spoke in terms of both individual liberty and communal
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Adams, Dissertation 4, id, p. 124.

440
Id, pp. 124-25. Ah! The politically-correct whig interpretation of history. Recall Sidney’s converse
take, viz., that the French Ambassador to the Netherlands said “that Sidney told him, or he told Sidney,
that the Prince of Orange, as the opponent of liberty in Holland, would be the opponent of liberty in
England. Minister Barillon had confirmed that this was Sidney’s perspective: “M. de Sidney est un de
ceux qui me larlent le plus fortement et le plus ouvertement sur cette matière,” viz., “Mr. Sidney is one of
those who speak to me most strongly and openly upon this matter.” As one historian noted, “So far from
displaying liberal constitutional attitudes,” the Prince of Orange “had conspicuously protected such
autocratic powers as he possessed in the Dutch Republic.” Kenyon, “The Character of a Trimmer,”
Halifax: Complete Works, p. 177 n.*; Speck, Reluctant Revolutionaries, p.18.
441

Dissertation 4, PJA Vol. I, p. 125.

442

Dissertation 1, id, p. 113. This was the circumstance to which Sidney would not submit. Reid
distinguished between arbitrary power, which was “power without restraint,” and tyrannical power, which
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freedom, viz., liberty for “the body of the nation.”443 In the sixteenth century, Adams explained, the
Reformation led to the settlement of America which, in combination with the spread of knowledge through
the Enlightenment caused the canon and feudal law to lose strength. This progress, however, was almost
reversed when “the execrable race of the Steurts” sought to return the English to a state of debasement,
dependence, and deprivation.444
Adams echoed Sidney’s challenge to Filmer. One of the reasons Filmer’s analysis was flawed,
emphasized Sidney, was his assumption that justice would best be served by determining and replicating
the form of the very first government. Sidney completely disagreed: “As governments were instituted for
the obtaining of justice, and (as our author says) the preservation of liberty, we are not to seek what
government was first, but what best provides for the obtaining of justice, and preservation of liberty.”445
Adams was of like mind. For example in his view, Cicero’s embracing of a three-branched government
was “founded on a reason that is unchangeable; the laws, which are the only possible rule, measure, and
security of justice, can be sure of protection, for any course of time, in no other form of government: and
the very name of a republic implies, that the property of the people should be represented in the legisla-

was “abuse of power.” Reid, The Concept of Liberty, p. 56. Isn’t this a distinction without a difference?
Both arbitrary and tyrannical power were conditions or levels of power, whereas the exercise of arbitrary
or tyrannical power “without restraint” or abusively, was the act of exercising power in a manner that
deprived others of their liberty.
443

Cf. Greene, The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution, pp. 73-74 (“Throughout the Stamp
Act crisis, colonial spokesmen put enormous stress upon the traditional conception of their assemblies as
the primary guardians of both the individual liberties of their constituents and the corporate rights of the
colonies. …The identification of individual rights with the corporate rights of the assemblies ran through
the entire colonial argument.”)
444

Dissertation 3, PJA Vol. I, p. 113.

445

DCG, III.25.460. Reid distinguished between assertions of political liberty, concentered on governmental interference, and assertions of legal liberty, which focused on rights and justice. For example, he
stated, “Adhering to the distinction between ‘political’ and ‘legal,’ however, we may think of the usage of
‘liberty’ in the eighteenth century more accurately as finding law than as promoting political programs.”
Reid, The Concept of Liberty, p. 116. Quoting Joyce Appleby’s Capitalism and a New Social Order, Reid
related this ascribed dichotomy to “Liberty in the classical republican paradigm and liberty in the historic
rights tradition.” This seems to me to be an unnecessary and unhelpful distinction. Many of the people
articulating these ideas, of which Adams was a prime example, were lawyers. But they were lawyers
using their skills out of the courtroom, no doubt drawing on their knowledge of the law but making political
assertions in the court of public opinion. Their perspective was not political or legal; it was both. To try to
segregate political assertions of liberty from legal ones cuts one-hundred percent in the wrong direction,
creating distinctions without material differences that have separated legal from other (political theoretical,
historical and philosophical) analyses, which is just what the literature unfortunately reflects, a
disagreeable consequence to which I previously alluded. See id, pp. 6-10.
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ture, and decide the rule of justice.”446 It was “this struggle” for both personal liberty and collective liberty
– the pursuit of the best form of government by which to obtain justice, “the civil and religious principles
and hopes and expectations” – that had “constantly supported and carried” the Americans “through all
hardships.” It was the struggle for liberty “that peopled America. It was not religion alone, as is commonly supposed; but it was a love of universal liberty, and a hatred, a dread, a horror, of the infernal confederacy before described, that projected, conducted, and accomplished the settlement of America.”447
After their arrival in America the British settlers established and implemented a “plan both of
ecclesiastical and civil government” consistent with their love of liberty.448 Adams invoked the ancestry of
his readers’: “Let us recollect it was liberty! The hope of liberty for themselves and us and ours, which
conquered all discouragements, dangers, and trials!”; for the Puritans and others faced “hunger, the
nakedness, the cold, which they patiently endured! … amidst dangers from wild beasts and savage men,
before they had time or money or materials for commerce.”449 Insinuating to his fellow Bay citizens that
they were basically spoiled, that they lived a free life because of the sacrifices of their forefathers, Adams
argued that it was a grievous mistake to lose touch with the value of that sacrifice. Indeed, he
sermonized, it was “God Almighty” that “has promulgated from heaven, liberty, peace, and good-will to
man!” – another clever albeit standard legal tactic: throw in the kitchen sink; suggest that to forget this fact
would be to contradict the will of God.450
Adams had a special message for his fellow attorneys, a statement that reflected his own
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Adams, “Preface,” Defence, Vol. I, pp. xvii-xviii.

447

Dissertation 4, PJA Vol. I, p. 126; Dissertation 1, id, pp. 113-14. Recall that in 1765 when he was
thirty Adams wrote in his Diary that his people “have the most habitual, radical sense of Liberty, and the
highest Reverence for Virtue. They are descended from a Race which, in a Confidence in Providence,
set the seas and skies, Monsters and savages, Tyrants and Devils at Defyance, for the sake of their
Liberty and Religion.” JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 272 (Dec. 23, 1765). When he was forty Adams wrote Thoughts
on Government, almost exclusively devoted to the mechanics of setting up government. In one edition of
that text Adams referred to Sidney, among others, in the context of freedom, citing to a Milton sonnet that
extolled “the plain Rules of ancient Liberty.” Said Adams, “A Man must be indifferent to Sneer and
Ridicule, in Some Companies to mention the Names of Sidney, Harrington, Lock, Milton, Nedham,
Burnet, Hoadley;” that “will bear an application even In this Country, upon Some Occasions.” “II. To John
Penn,” [Thoughts on Government, ante March 27, 1776]”, PJA Vol. 4, pp. 78-86, 79-80.
448

Dissertation 1, PJA Vol. I, pp. 114.

449

Dissertation 4, id, p. 126.

450

Id.
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profound commitment to the cause of the British Americans: “Let the Bar proclaim, ‘the laws, the rights,
the generous plan of power’ delivered down from remote antiquity.”451 It was the responsibility of lawyers,
said Adams, who promoted and protected justice, to “inform the world of the mighty struggles and
numberless sacrifices made by our ancestors in defense of freedom.”452 British liberties were not grants
graciously and paternalistically bestowed on the citizenry by “princes or parliaments.” Rather, they were
“original rights, conditions of original contracts, coequal with prerogative, and coeval with government.” It
was the lawyers, including Adams, who were best positioned by virtue of their legal education and
experience, to appreciate, share and teach this understanding, as well as protect it.453 “Be it remembred,
however, that liberty must at all hazards be supported. We have a right to it, derived from our Maker….
And liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people.”454 For the “spirit of
liberty … without knowledge, would be little better than a brutal rage.”455
Accordingly, Adams advised his people, “many of our rights are inherent and essential, agreed on
as maxims, and established as preliminaries, even before a parliament existed.” It was “in the frame of
human nature,” on which British laws and government were founded, Adams explained. He dubbed this
“the constitution of the intellectual and moral world.”456 What does this mean?! A constitution is the
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Id.
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Id, pp. 126-27. Of course, we know that Adams had a life-long love affair with the law and its practice,
in contrast to Jefferson, among others, who “soon became disenchanted with law as a profession and
found his true calling in life as a revolutionary and a politician.” Gordon-Reed & Onuf, “Most Blessed of
the Patriarchs,” p. 47.
453

“[T]he establishment of a free Commonwealth, in which law and liberty should be reconciled, -- this
was the great ruling passion of Sidney’s life.” Robert C. Winthrop, Algernon Sidney; A Lecture Delivered
Before the Boston Mercantile Library Association, Dec. 21, 1853 (Boston: S.K. Whipple, 1854), p. 15.
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Dissertation 3, PJA Vol. I, p. 120.

455

Id, pp. 125-26.

456
Dissertation 4, PJA Vol. I, p. 127. It was precisely the appreciation and elevation of “the constitution of
the intellectual and moral world,” i.e., freedom, that caused Adams to deplore the events of the French
Revolution. In a March 2, 1816 letter to Jefferson, Adams wrote, “No man is more Sensible than I am, of
the Service to Science and Letters, Humanity, Fraternity, and Liberty, that would have been rendered by
the Encyclopedists and Æconomists, by Voltaire, Dalembert, Duffon Diderot, Rouseau La Lande,
Frederick and Catharine, if they had possessed Common Sense. But they were all totally destitute of it.”
This is an essential point. Adams’ pragmatism and moderation rejected the utopian perspective of the
philosophes, which he viewed as inherently dangerous. “They all seemed to think that all Christendom
was convinced as they were, that all Religion was ‘visions Judaicques’ and that their effulgent Lights had
illuminated all the World.” This arrogance had distorted the potential of the philosophes’ ideas. “They
seemed to believe, that whole Nations and Continents had been changed in their Principles Opinions
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foundation, the essence, the nature, the structure, the embodiment of a thing. Adams was reminding his
people that freedom was a constituent part of being human.457 Indeed, within the intellectual and moral
world one could “see that truth, liberty, justice, benevolence, are its everlasting basis; and if these could
be removed, the superstructure,” presumably the government that sustained that way of life, was
“overthrown” as well, another remarkably radical and astute comment for 1765.458
Beyond the responsibility of lawyers Adams also spoke in the Dissertation about the responsibility
of the people generally to become knowledgeable. The early American settlers “were convinced by their
knowledge of human nature derived from history and their own experience, that nothing could preserve
their posterity from the encroachments of the two systems of tyranny … but knowledge diffused generally
thro’ the whole body of the people.”459 Education was essential. “But the wisdom and benevolence of our

Habits and Feelings by the Sovereign Grace of their Almighty Philosophy.” “And what,” said Adams,
“was their Phylosophy? Atheism; pure unadultered Atheism. Diderot, D’Alembert, Frederick, De Lalande
and Grimm were indubitable Atheists.” It was not so much the religious implications of atheism that so
troubled Adams; it was the practical and political impact. “The Univer[s]e was Matter only and eternal;
Spirit was a Word without a meaning; Liberty was a Word Without a Meaning. There was no Liberty in
the Universe; Liberty was a Word void of Sense.” Adams to Jefferson, March 2, 1816, The AdamsJefferson Letters, pp. 464-65 (emphasis added).
457

“Liberty, led by philosophy, diffuses her blessings to every class of men.” “Discourses on Davila,” The
Portable John Adams, p. 385. Note, however, that Adams was not talking about class in the Marxian
sense with which we are familiar. Rather, he was saying that whatever one’s situation in life might be, this
truth applied. “Obscure murmurs gather and swell into a tempest; the spirit of inquiry, like a severe and
searching wind, penetrates every part of the great body politic; and whatever is unsound, whatever is
inform, shrinks at the visitation. …[Liberty] even extends a smile of hope and promise to the poor African,
the victim of hard, impenetrable avarice.” On the other hand, Adams firmly believed that in all nations
there was a natural aristocracy, and that distinctions would always be made between men based on their
wealth, education, diligence, and ambition, as well as other distinctions, e.g., attractiveness. “As rest is
rapture to the weary man, those who labor little will always be envied by those who labor much, though
the latter in reality be probably the most enviable. … The controversy between the rich and the poor, the
laborious and the idle, the learned and the ignorant, distinctions as old as the creation, and as extensive
as the globe, distinctions which no art of policy, no degree of virtue or philosophy can ever wholly destroy,
will continue, and rivalries will spring out of them. These parties will be represented in the legislature, and
must be balanced, or one will oppress the other.” Id, p. 386; cf. Alexander Gambaccini, “’No Simple
Democracy’: Swiss History in John Adam’s Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United
States,” unpublished paper, 2017, unnumbered p. 29. (Adams “rejected the more common naïve belief
that democracy could erase social distinctions. His best hope was that class domination could be
prevented by a properly designed constitution. Perhaps he was wrong, but what is most relevant about
his thinking was his willingness to address class in a society beginning to deny its existence.”).
458

Dissertation 4, PJA Vol. I, p. 127.
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Dissertation 3, id, p. 118. This was his view throughout his life, e.g., “My humble opinion is, that
knowledge, upon the whole, promotes virtue and happiness. …I fear not the propagation and dissemination of knowledge. The conditions of humanity will be improved and ameliorated by its expansion and
diffusion in every direction. May every human being, -- man, woman, and child, -- be as well informed as
possible!” Once again, however, Adams was a realist and not naïve: “But, after all, did you ever see a
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fathers rested not here. They made an early provision by law, that every town consisting of so many
families, should be always furnished with a grammar school…. So that education of all ranks of people
was made the care and expense of the public.”460 Also imperative was the press and public discourse: to
make public disputation “the instruments of impressing on the tender mind, and of spreading and distributing far and wide, the ideas of right and the sensations of freedom.”461 The press should be freedom’s ally.
We are all responsible, said Adams, even if he was quite convinced that he and his fellow
attorneys had a special, heightened responsibility to protect political freedom. Because liberty could not
“be preserved without a general knowledge among the people,” they also “have a right, an indisputable,
unalienable, indefeasible, diving right to that most dreaded and envied kind of knowledge, I mean of the
characters and conduct of their rulers.”462 Adams’ timeless message was that we all must teach and
convey not only the ideas, but the sensations of freedom! And we must pay attention to the integrity and
conduct of our leaders. During the Boston Massacre trials Adams had invoked Sidney in his closing
statement, an imploration to the jury. The subject was on the nature of law. At the same time, Adams
described Sidney as “a martyr to liberty,” a man who “sought a tranquil retirement under the shadow of
the tree of liberty.”463 In the Dissertation Adams once again turned to Sidney, albeit as one of a number
of fellow freedom fighters: “In a word, let every sluice of knowledge be open’d and set a flowing. The
encroachments upon liberty in the reigns of the first James and the first Charles, by turning the general
attention of learned men to government, are said to have produced the greatest number of consummate
statesmen, which has ever been seen in any age, or nation. Your Clarendons, Southamptons, Seldens,
Hampdens, Faulklands, Sidneys, Locks, Harringtons, are all said to have owed their eminence in political
knowledge to the tyrannies of those reigns.” It was a clarion call to action. “The prospect now before us
in America, ought in the same manner to engage the attention of every man of learning, to matters of

rose without a briar, a convenience without an inconvenience, a good without an evil, in this mingled
world? Knowledge is applied to bad purposes as well as to good ones.” Adams to John Taylor, 1814,
The Portable John Adams, p. 454.
460
461

Dissertation 4, PJA Vol. I, p. 120.
Id, p. 127.
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Dissertation 3, id, pp. 118-23, 119.
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JA Legal Papers, Vol. 3, pp. 269-70.
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power and of right, that we may be neither led nor driven blindfolded to irretrievable destruction.”464
There is more to this story than the blossoming of Adams’ political ideas about freedom. What
occurred was the extraordinary confluence of personal maturation, professional development, ideas, and
events. This is most conspicuously evident in, but by no means limited to, two notorious Hutchinsondriven controversies: when the Governor made the foolhardy decision to try to persuade the Bay General
Court that the authority of Parliament was supreme in Massachusetts, and the consequences off the
exposure of Hutchinson’s damning correspondence with members of the British ministry. According to
Hutchinson, Parliament had an unlimited power to pass laws governing the American colonies, a principle
he believed had been reinforced by the 1766 Declaratory Act, the stated purpose of which was to better
secure “the dependency of his majesty’s dominions in America upon the crown and parliament of Great
Britain.”465 The fact that the people of the Bay were not represented in Parliament, said Hutchinson, was
the consequence and cost of its founding members’ decision to cross the Atlantic and live far from the
metropole. The lack of representation was not a denial of any constitutional or common law rights held by
the colonists.466 Hutchinson mistakenly believed that if the people of the Bay only knew what the law was,
they would agree with him on this matter! He therefore called a joint session of the General Court to
explain his position and invited the legislature to respond. It did, appointing a committee to draft a reply,
which then was unanimously accepted by the House. A second rejoinder followed Hutchinson’s rebuttal.
Adams recorded this exchange in a March 1773 Diary entry: “The Governor and General Court, has been
engaged for two Months upon the greatest Question ever yet agitated. I stand amazed at the Governor,
for forcing on this Controversy. He will not be thanked for this. His Ruin and Destruction must spring out
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Dissertation 4, PJA Vol. I, p. 127.
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The Declaratory Act (March 18, 1766), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/declaratory_act_1766
.asp (7-4-16); see Danby Pickering, Great Britain The statutes at large ... [from 1225 to 1867]
(Cambridge, ENG: Benthem, for C. Bathhurst; London, 1762-1869).
466
Hutchinson also argued that since Parliament reigned supreme, the Bay legislature could not possibly
be an independent governing body. That would be unconstitutional, for there could not be two
independent legislative bodies in one state; one body had to be supreme, and that was Parliament. The
exchange between Hutchinson and the Bay legislature, published in the papers, the Bay legislative
journal, and in a pamphlet in 1773, are contained in The Briefs of the American Revolution: Constitutional
Arguments Between Thomas Hutchinson, Governor of Massachusetts Bay, and James Bowdoin for the
Council. And John Adams for the. House of Representatives, John. Phllip Reid, ed. (New York & London:
New York University Press, 1981).
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of it, either from the Ministry and Parliament on one Hand, or from his Countrymen, on the other. He has
reduced himself to a most ridiculous State of Distress.”467
The Bay’s response, drafted by Adams, was that Commons was appropriating British Americans’
property in the form of taxes “without their Consent,” in violation of an essential component of liberty, the
colonists rights to their own property.468 Here again we see that by early 1773 Adams was recognized
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JA D&A, Vol. II (March 4, 1773), p. 77.

468

“Reply of the House to Hutchinson’s First Message,” Jan. 26, 1773, PJA, Vol. I, p. 315; Editorial Note,
id, pp. 309-15. There is one intellectual component of liberty that has a tendency to confuse, and that is
its association with property. See, e.g., Reid on Morton White, “writing on the Declaration of
Independence,” and “somewhat troubled by the fact ‘[t]he word ‘property’ is notoriously vague as well as
ambiguous in the literature of natural law.” Reid, “The Irrelevance of the Declaration,” p. 78; McDonald,
Novus Ordo Seclorum, p. 4 (discussion of “cloudy” nature of terms “liberty and property,” as well as
“society,” “capital,” and “natural and civil rights”; “the fact – rarely taken into account by scholars – is that
the vocabulary of political discourse was, during the eighteenth century, in a state of flux”). See generally
Liberty, Property, and the Foundations of the American Constitution, Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard
Dickman, eds. (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989); William B. Scott, In Pursuit of
Happiness: American Conceptions of Property From the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century
(Bloomington, IN & London: Indiana University Press, 1977).
The most well-known definition of property was (and still is) realty and possessions. The well-to-do were
“men of property.” As noted in Part One, it was Harrington who based his unusual vision of republicanism
on the citizen who owned real property. Pocock explained, “Since Harrington thought it the function of
property to provide a large but limited number of people with the basis of independence from which they
could practise the equal relations existing among republican citizens, he found that this could be best
performed by the relative stability of landed realty.” Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History, p. 107.
But sometimes references to property meant more intangible assets. In general, in understanding the
emphasis on property in the eighteenth-century, Reid reminded us that we must look beyond our own
contemporary usage of the word and appreciate that liberty itself was understood to be a form of personal
property as were other constitutional rights. Reid, The Concept of Liberty, Ch. 9, “The Security of Liberty,”
pp. 68-73. Note that today we accord “property” status to certain ideas, viz., the concept of “intellectual
property” encompasses patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. On the other hand, inclusion
in this category is selective and statutory. For example, in a famous US Supreme Court case that raised
the question as to whether news, lawfully acquired, is property, Justice Holmes stated in his dissenting
opinion that, “When an uncopyrighted combination of words is published, there is no general right to
forbid other people repeating them -- in other words, there is no property in the combination or in the
thoughts or facts that the words express. Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value, although
exchangeable -- a matter of fact. Many exchangeable values may be destroyed intentionally without
compensation. Property depends upon exclusion by law from interference, and a person is not excluded
from using any combination of words merely because some one has used it before, even if it took labor
and genius to make it. If a given person is to be prohibited from making the use of words that his
neighbors are free to make, some other ground must be found.” In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice
Brandeis stated that, “An essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from
enjoying it. If the property is private, the right of exclusion may be absolute; if the property is affected with
a public interest, the right of exclusion is qualified. But the fact that a product of the mind has cost its
producer money and labor, and has a value for which others are willing to pay, is not sufficient to ensure
to it this legal attribute of property. The general rule of law is that the noblest of human productions -knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas -- became, after voluntary communication to
others, free as the air to common use.” Accordingly, he concluded, news is not property. International
News Service v. Associated Press, 248 US 215, 246, 250-55 (1918) (dissenting opinions of Justices
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among Bay leadership as a legal, indeed perhaps the legal heavyweight in the province and, in that
regard, a very distinct contributor to the advocacy of colonial interests and their legitimacy than Samuel
Adams, who was a tremendous grassroots organizer and wrote stirring prose, but did not practice law.469
Similar descriptions could be made of Hancock and Warren. All three men were talented and committed
Bay political leaders in what had become a dramatically escalating confrontation with the metropole; but
they were not legal cognoscenti.470

Holmes and Brandeis). This was true in the seventeenth-century too, and Sidney said it well: property
was “an appendage of liberty.” It was “impossible for a man to have a right to lands or goods, if he has no
liberty.” DCG, III.16.402-03. Locke (and Reid) characterized the matter the other way around: liberty was
one part of property, along with one’s life and one’s estate. Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, Bk
2, Ch. 11, §131. For as Locke famously said, “The Reason why Men enter into Society, is the
preservation of their Property.” Adams said that, “property cannot be secure, unless the man be at liberty
to acquire, use, or part with it, at his discretion, and unless he have his personal liberty of life and limb,
motion and rest, for that purpose.” Id, Bk 2, Ch. 19, §222, p. 412; Adams, Defence, Vol. III, p. 160.
Adams’ writing consistently reflected an appreciation of the interconnection, and liberal (viz., frequent)
association of property and liberty. His views on property were comparable to Sidney’s not Locke’s, viz.,
as an appendage of liberty, and not vice versa. Security was another link in the chain: liberty secured
property and property secured liberty. We need not resolve the question of which one is a part of which;
what is significant is that these intangible rights and values associated with liberty were linked, interconnected and perhaps, as Edmund S. Morgan stated, “one and inseparable.” Edmund S. Morgan, The
Challenge of the American Revolution (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), p. 55. Property was not strictly
material, or limited to the physical, and liberty was not strictly immaterial, or limited to the intangible. But
even in its material capacity, property’s existence provided “a guarantee of individual autonomy,” a
phrase akin to the concept of self-determination and, in that sense, had enormous significance beyond its
material value.
469
Adams was no longer a representative to the General Court and was not on the reply committee. But
the prominent lawyer Joseph Hawley was, and Hawley insisted that the committee include Adams in its
deliberations. What apparently had happened was that Samuel Adams, Dr. Joseph Warren, or both, who
were also on the committee, had drafted a response but, in John Adams’ words, it was loaded with
“popular” portions and “democratical Principles which have since done so much mischief in this Country,”
rather than “legal and constitutional Reasonings.” Autobiography, JA D&A, Vol. III, p. 305. John was
enlisted to correct this emphasis and to most effectively counter the Governor’s legal argument with the
editors of the Adams Papers speculating that since Hawley was not on the second committee it was
probably Samuel who brought John back into the process of drafting the second Bay response. See
Editorial Note, “The Constitutional Debate Between Thomas Hutchinson and the House of
Representatives,” Jan. 26 - March 2, 1773, PJA Vol. I, pp. 311-12. As one law professor noted, “Lawyers
learn to suppress their biases and reflexes in order to follow an appropriate procedure that will be reliable
and that will be seen to be legitimate.” Trachtman, The Tools of Argument, p. 177. Writing almost two
centuries after Adams’ time but continuing the tradition that existed for centuries before him, Supreme
Court Justice Felix Frankfurter eloquently said the same thing: “For the highest exercise of judicial duty is
to subordinate one’s personal pulls and one’s private views to the law of which we are all guardians –
those impersonal convictions that made a society a civilized community, and not the victims of personal
rule.” Felix Frankfurter, “A Heritage For All Who Love The Law,” 51 American Bar Association Journal 330
(1965) (which also was quoted by Senator Howell Heflin during the confirmation hearings of Justice David
Souter on Sept. 24, 1990), S13540).
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Further contemporaneous evidence of Adams’ ascending legal status is the work that he did to define
the proper legal boundaries of the province of Massachusetts Bay, a several-month tedious factual and
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As we saw with Sidney, and will pursue in more detail with Adams, consent was an essential
component of a free people. It was the quiddity of liberty; that is to say, it was part of the inherent nature of
freedom, and therefore it was impossible to be free without it. British Americans had been talking about
consent at least since Otis, that “flame of Fire,” who asked in 1762, Can there be any liberty where
property is taken away without consent? Eleven years later, the question remained the same. Hutchinson
had asked for it and he got it: a full, responsive legal disquisition on the relationship between the
metropole and both the Bay specifically and the provinces generally, with an emphasis on whether the
colonies were intended to each have their own legislative body or were to be governed by Parliament and
the laws it enacted. Two lengthy submittals by the Bay House of Representatives analyzed the legal
underpinnings of the founding of the British American colonies, particularly Massachusetts Bay. Both
submittals bear the heavy imprint of John Adams.471
It was in this very timeframe, late March 1773, that Adams and other prominent Bay activists
became aware of the infamous and even more inflammatory cache of letters written between 1767 and
1769 from Hutchinson and his cohorts sent to officials in England. In a Jan. 1769 letter to MP Richard
Whately, Hutchinson established in writing the chasm in thinking that separated the royalists from the

legal inquiry that most scholars understandably skip. But fifty-nine pages of Volume 2 of the Papers of
John Adams, pp. 18-81, are devoted to the subject.
471
Philadelphia lawyer Joseph Reed was another prominent revolutionary leader. He served under
George Washington in 1775 and was adjutant general of the Army in 1776. He then served as a delegate
to the Continental Congress in 1778 and became president of the supreme executive council of
Pennsylvania from 1778 to 1781. In a letter from Reed to Thomas Cushing, reported by Josiah Quincy in
his publication of the Memoirs of his father, Reed (and Quincy in a note to the letter) speak with
veneration about the response of the House “refuting the argument of the Governor” in the “most
remarkable [controversy] preceding the Revolution.” Said Reed, “on your discussion of that important
question, ‘How far the Parliament is the supreme authority of the Colonies?’ In short, to comprise it in a
few words, your Assembly have gained immortal honour, not only from their nervous and manly strain of
reasoning, but from that cool and dispassionate temper they manifested on so trying an occasion. It is a
subject of great inquiry here, who is the original draughtsman of these masterly compositions. He is
honoured, though unknown, and his memory will be dear not only to the present, but future generations.”
Joseph Reed to Thomas Cushing, May 1773, in Memoirs of the Life of Josiah Quincy, Jr., of
Massachusetts Bay, 1744-1775, By his Son, Josiah Quincy, p. 113 & n.1.

The debate between Hutchinson and the General Court has engendered significant scholarly analysis.
Eric Nelson’s powerful 2014 revisionist monograph on the nature of the struggle between Parliament and
the colonies closely analyses the significance of the Hutchinson argument. See Eric Nelson, The Royalist
Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding (Cambridge, MA & London: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 2014). See Appendix B. Ryerson also addressed the matter in John Adam’s
Republic.
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patriots and probably from most British Americans.472 His most provocative statement was couched in
what appeared to be a plea for moderation, viz., that “the least degree of Severity” be employed that was
“absolutely necessary” in order “to maintain…the dependance which a Colony ought to have upon the
parent State.” Remarkably, Hutchinson spoke in the very dependency language Adams had discussed in
his Dissertation years previous, expressing a view that was anathema to Adams and many others.
Repeating the point, Hutchinson confessed that in the absence of “dependance,” “it is all over with Us,”
because “the friends of Anarchy” would be “afraid of nothing.” How did Hutchinson propose to “maintain
the dependance”? In perhaps his most famous statement, to secure “the Peace and good Order of the
Colonies without pain …[t]here must be an Abridgement of what are called English Liberties.” Writing in a
stream-of-consciousness mode, Hutchinson added that he comforted himself in imposing this
“Abridgement” because even in the “most perfect State of Government,” removed from the State of
Nature, “there must be a great restraint of natural Liberty.” Furthermore, when a colony was located
“3000 miles distant from the parent State,” Hutchinson doubted whether a “System of Government” could
be “project[ed]” on that colony that even “enjoy[ed] all the Liberty of the parent state.” Hutchinson, at
least, had never seen such a “Projection.” Genuinely wishing for “the Good of the Colony,” he
nevertheless advocated further restraints of liberty because that was a better option that breaking “the
Connection with the parent State,” which would “prove the Ruin of the Colony.”
As logical as Hutchinson may have seemed, he could not possibly have added more fuel to the
fire of the British Americans’ understanding of and commitment to their own political freedom. Hutchinson
was entirely genuine. In his opinion, for “the Good of the Colony,” further restraints of liberty were a
better option that breaking “the Connection with the parent State,” which would “prove the Ruin of the
Colony.”473 For this Adams and others excoriated him.474

472

While Americans were divided on what to do about it, it was probably a tiny minority that would have
agreed with Hutchinson that the nature and exercise of their liberty was of a lower caliber than the
exercise of that same liberty by Brits in England.
473
Letter from Governor Hutchinson to Thomas Whately, Jan. 20, 1769, quoted in JA D&A, Vol. II, p. 80
n. 1; see Bernard Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Pres of
Harvard University Press, 1974), Ch. VII, “The ‘Scape-Goat,’” pp. 221-73.
474
Copy of Letters Sent to Great-Britain, by his Excellency Thomas Hutchinson, the Hon. Andrew Oliver,
and several other Persons, BORN AND EDUCATED AMONG US (Boston: Edes and Gill 1773). On the
misguided Hutchinson, see Bernard Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson (Harvard University Press,
1974). The letters remained secret for just a few months; in the meantime, Adams opined, “The Secrecy
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One could legitimately argue that this was the nail in the coffin of reconciliation, at least in Massachusetts, given the broadly felt sense of betrayal. In this instance, the cart had come before the horse:
Adams wrote his Dissertation and expressed his ideas about liberty years before Hutchinson wrote his
antithetical letters that were subsequently exposed. We can see a spiraling, entangled relationship
between political ideas and events that were evolving one out of the other out of the other; and Adams’
was certainly one, if not the most prolific of the authors and activists caught in the middle of this whirlpoolweb.475 Again, if one is talking about the explanations patriots sought to justify the legitimacy of their
actions in fighting and then breaking away from the British empire, the colonists unquestionably wanted the
law to be on their side; and the right to liberty was certainly one such lawful argument confidently asserted.
What we have here is a legal dance – the beginning of the intense albeit unsuccessful verbal and
sometimes constitutional parley that preceded the outbreak of violence and revolution. John Adams was
perhaps the most active dancer. His ideas and, particularly, his ability to translate the interest, concerns
and position of first the Massachusetts Bay citizenry and later the shared interests of the colonies, into a
powerful legal argument, made Adams the prima ballerina in this dance. The fact that Adams was a
lawyer is obvious. But the extent to which Adams’ juristic mind not only informed, but utterly infused the

of these epistolary Genii is very remarkable – profoundly secret, dark, and deep.” Id, p. 80. By June the
letters were being sufficiently bandied about that the Speaker ordered their printing as a pamphlet.
Adams was one of many who lambasted them. The colonists now viewed Hutchinson with contempt, and
as a treacherous presence in their midst. One is reminded of the French sense of betrayal when Louis
XVI unsuccessfully tried to escape from France in his famous incognito flight to Varennes. See, e.g.,
Timothy Tackett, When the King Took Flight (Harvard University Press, 2003); Stanley Loomis, The Fatal
Friendship: Marie Antoinette, Count Fersen and the Flight to Varennes (New York: Doubleday, 1972);
Alexander Dumas, The Flight to Varennes, A. Craig Bell, tr. & ed . (London: Alston Books, 1962). See
Copy of Letters Sent to Great-Britain, by his Excellency Thomas Hutchinson, the Hon. Andrew Oliver, and
several other Persons, BORN AND EDUCATED AMONG US (Boston: Edes and Gill 1773). Just two of
many Adams’ characterization of Hutchinson and the other authors of the letters appear in his Diary
entries of April 24 and 25, 1773. On the 24th, Adams characterizes Hutchinson as “the vile Serpent.” In
his Sunday, April 24th Diary entry, Adams describes the sermons he heard that day, including the sermon
by Dr. Cooper, who “was up[on] Rev. 12.9. And the great Dragon was casts out, that old Serpent called
the Devil and Satan, which deceiveth the whole World: he was cast out into the Earth and his Angells
were cast out with him. Q[uery]. Whether the Dr. had not some political Allusions in the Choice of this
Text.” JA D&A, Vol. II ((Apr. 24 and 25, 1773), p. 81.
475
In his much later work, Defence, Adams reviewed republics throughout history. One of those republics, a teeny tiny one, was the republic of St. Marino, ostensibly a simple democracy that stood “on the top
of a very high and craggy mountain” in Italy. In fact, Adams’ point was that St. Marino was “a mixture of
monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy”; moreover the “annual administration” was “divided into executive, legislative, and judicial powers.” Once again speaking about freedom, Adams wrote: “Nothing indeed
can be a greater instance of the natural love mankind has for liberty, and of their aversion to arbitrary government, than such a savage mountain covered with people.” Defence, Vol. I, pp. 8-16, 9, 12, 14-15.
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debate is insufficiently appreciated. To focus on Adams without clothing him in this fierce, unabatingly legal
identity is to misunderstand the role he played first in the Bay, and then in Continental Congress as a
Founding Father. To misunderstand Adams’ legal persona and role is to misunderstand his vital
contributions to Anglo-American political discourse, and the way he functioned as a diplomat and
statesman; this then can contribute to a misunderstanding of the nature of both the colonial confrontation
with the metropole and the political outcome of the revolution in America. Adams’ prose unquestionably
“won” in the legal contest between the Bay legislature and Governor Hutchinson; but it made no
difference.476 The well-known major triggering events of the American Revolution continued to unfold: the
Boston Tea Party in December 1773, an act of bravado that turned out to have immense consequences for
Massachusetts as it resulted in the passage of the so-called Intolerable Acts of 1774.477
Finally, before turning to the subject of consent, it is important to address the analysis of Prof.
David Waldstreicher and independent scholar Staughton Lynd (W&L) in an important 2011 article, “Free
Trade, Sovereignty, and Slavery: Toward an Economic Interpretation of American Independence,” in which
the authors presented a very intriguing argument on the causes of the American revolution and the
consequent independence of America that touch upon the issue of self-determination.478 W&L identified
four strands of scholarly thought on the causes of the revolution from the nineteenth century to today: (i) “a
struggle for constitutional rights” that no doubt invoked the concept of liberty; (ii) “a struggle for economic
freedom” beginning with Beard’s thesis; (iii) Jeffersonianism, viz., “a democratic movement” akin to the
drive behind the French Revolution; and (iv) the contrary Federalist view that the Revolution was “a

476

About six months before the Boston Tea Party, in May 1773, on the eve of the Bay general election
(during which Adams won a seat in the assembly, but was then vetoed or “negatived” by Governor
Hutchinson), Adams wrote in his Diary, “If I should be called in the Course of Providence to take a Part in
public life, I shall Act a fearless, intrepid, undaunted Part, at all Hazards – tho it shall be my Endeavour
likewise to act a prudent, cautious and considerate Part.” JA D&A, Vol. II, p. 82 (May 24/25, 1773).
477

Unsurprisingly, for instance, Adams carefully (or at least publicly) distanced himself from the rabblerousers, often led by his cousin Samuel, who were looking for a reason to defy the British even though
the metropole had rescinded its duties on goods imported to America with the notable exception of tea.
While Adams’ Diary evinced his glee, at least initially, at the success of the Tea Party, he was not a
participant in either its organization or implementation.
478

David Waldstreicher and Staughton Lynd, “Free Trade, Sovereignty, and Slavery: Toward an Economic
Interpretation of American Independence,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Oct. 2011)
(“W&L”), pp. 597-630.
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colonial independence movement” and therefore contradistinctive from the revolution in France.479 Looking
at the facts on the ground, particularly the discourse utilized by both British American and British Isles
pamphleteers and others, W&L carved out an additional causation niche. In their view the American
Revolution was caused by a colonial independence movement driven in the first instance by economic
concerns originating during the Seven Years’ War, out of which came two legal actions brought by James
Otis, Jr., one of which was the infamous writs of assistance case.480
I would like to transpose or reformulate W&L’s argument. There is no question that the action by
the British that provoked American independency involved statutory changes related primarily to taxes and
other acts with financial consequences that were unattractive to the Americans, e.g., closing Boston
harbor. There also is no question that there was a colonial independence movement. Consider simply the
Sons of Liberty, and there was so much more. But in fact, the actual impact of the British trade laws on
most Americans’ pocket-book was insubstantial. As Bailyn observed, “The stamp tax was not a crushing
tax; it was generally considered to be an innocuous and most judicious form of taxation. The Townshend
Duties, which were also far from crippling, were withdrawn.”481 The economic action that turned out to be
impactful, as W&L noted, was the “economic game plan” of nonimportation and nonexportation that was
the action of the colonists’ Congress, not of the metropole. This “intricate and complicated Subject,” as
Adams described it in extensive correspondence with Warren and as referenced by W&L, preoccupied not
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The threat posed by Jeffersonianism was embodied in the antagonism between Jefferson, on the one
hand, and Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story on the other. “In a letter from Story to Marshall of
June 27, 1821, the former writes: ‘Mr. Jefferson … in the most direct terms denies the right of the Judges
to decide constitutional questions … and endeavours to establish that the people are the only proper
Judges of violations of constitutional authority and by changes in the course of election are alone
competent to apply the proper remedy. If, he says, it is objected they are not sufficiently enlightened to
exercise this duty with discretion, the remedy is to enlighten them the more,’” as Jefferson stated, “’to
inform their discretion by education.’” In Jefferson’s view, “’This is the true corrective of abuses of
constitutional power.’” Continued Story, “’There never was a period of my life when these opinions would
not have shocked me, but at his age, and in these critical times, they fill me alternately with indignation
and melancholy. Can he wish yet to have influence enough to destroy the government of his Country?’”
McIlwain, Constitutionalism Ancient & Modern, n. 58, pp. 165-66.
480

W&L observed that even the nineteenth-century “filiopietistic” or traditional and forebears-adoring whig
and historian George Bancroft acknowledged that the source of American independency was the
Navigation Act. Reference was also made by W&L to a host of scholarship supporting this view. Thus,
they found that in 1766, “English supporters of colonial whigs agreed that economic motives had caused
the constitutional standoff over taxation.” Id, pp. 599-602.
481

Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics: The Charles K. Colver Lectures Brown University
1965 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 159.
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only Adams, but the Continental Congress generally. Robert Livingston of New York’s statement, quoted
by W&L, went to the heart of the matter: “The People will feel, and will say that Congress tax them and
oppress them worse than Parliament.”482
The British knew that America was an increasingly valuable possession and that it was important
to reassert their authority there. Ultimately this undoubtedly included the potential for great economic gain
from the successful Anglo-American colonies. But of competing significance was the benefit this would
bestow on the British empire’s formidable international power, not to minimize the extraordinary significance of the self-image of empire.483 Among other things, it would ensure the international dominance
of the British empire vis-à-vis competing European empires.484 Adams wrote about this in his 1775
Novanglus VII letter. “To say that we ‘must be’ subject, seems to betray a consciousness that we are not
by any law or upon any principles, but those of meer power.” In short, the Brits did not have an intellectual leg to stand on. “The consequences that may fairly be drawn are these. That Britain has been

482

To first consider the view from the metropole, there were at least two motives for the imposition of
economic constraints on the colonies, and these motives cannot be disentangled. The Brits did seek
revenue because of the poor state of the Empire’s treasury following the Seven Years’ War. According to
some scholars, e.g., Prof. Greene, this was the sina qua non that drove the British. But they were also
driven by a desire to reassert control over the colonies (and their residents), which they considered
“theirs,” and which the metropole had been benignly neglecting if not ignoring for decades. See, for
example, the speech by King George to Parliament in which he talked about “his” colonies. I would
therefore suggest that while the means the British used to accomplish their dominance was primarily
economic in nature, the Brits’ primary motivation or the cause that drove them was knotty. For one thing,
their eyes were down the road. “Regarding any dimunition of parliamentary sovereignty as a prelude to
the eventual loss of control of the colonies that seemed to be so intimately associated with Britain’s new
rise to world power, the vast majority of the metropolitan political nation found it impossible to heed such
warnings.” Greene, The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution, p. 176; see W&L, “Free Trade,
Sovereignty, and Slavery,” pp. 620-27.
483

“It was even the case that the plantations did not ‘soe much depend upon the interest of England, as
the interest of England doth now depend upon them.’” Benjamin Worsley, secretary of the council of trade
(1650-51), member of the council from 1668 to 1672, and assistant and then secretary of the 1670 to
1673 plantations councils, “Memorandum on ‘The peculiar advantages which this Nation hath by the trade
of our plantations’, addressed to Lord Ashley (later the earl of Shaftesbury), 14 Aug. 1668, cited in Leng,
“Commercial Conflict and Regulation in the Discourse of Trade in Seventeenth-Century England,” The
Historical Journal, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Dec. 2005), pp. 933-54, 945, 950. See generally Niall Ferguson,
Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New York:
Basic Books, 2004).
484

As the editors of The Adams Papers noted in the “Editorial Note” to the Novanglus papers, both
Massachusettensis (M) and Novanglus “had one thing in common: neither believed that the confrontation
shaping up between Britain and America resulted from misunderstandings. Both men saw a calculated
effort, a drive for power in the colonies, as the root cause.” “The Letters of Novanglus, 23 January – April
1775, Editorial Note,” PJA Vol. 2, pp. 216-26, 219.
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imprudent enough to let Colonies be planted, untill they are become numerous and important, without
ever having wisdom enough to concern a plan for their government, consistent with her own welfare.” But
“now it is necessary to make them submit to the authority of parliament: and because there is no principle
of law or justice, or reason, by which she can effect it: therefore she will resort to war and conquest – to
the maxim delenda est Carthago,” viz., Cato’s famous statement that Carthage must be destroyed.485
As the venerable historian Charles McIlwain eloquently observed, “[T]he failure of the [British]
ministers to grasp the meaning or understand the spirit of colonial institutions is only too well proved.” In
McIlwain’s view, however, this was understandable. “It is not surprising that the true conception of the
British empire should be hidden from them. There is no gift more rare than the power to interpret
contemporary events, -- except, possibly, the ability to understand past ones.” The myopic perspective of
the British made them insensitive, if not oblivious, to the more profound implications of their decisionmaking. “When even present-day statesmen and historians make the mistake of ‘confounding the history of
England with the history of Parliament,’ it should hardly occasion surprise that the English borough-mongers
of the eighteenth century, the actors in the “petty struggles’ of an oligarchic Parliament, should have been
oblivious to those “other and vaster enterprises” which were moulding the history of the British Empire for all
future time.” Thus, for example, considering the career of Prime Minister William Pitt, the 1st Earl of
Chatham, “it seems probable that the key of it is to be found in his determination to check the power of
France in the world rather than to create a great colonial empire.”486
The cause of the British Americans’ ineluctable advance towards a declaration of independence
also was not fundamentally economic in nature. Again, while the source of the colonists’ alienation from the
metropole originated in the new trade laws, the primary motivation or the cause that drove them did not.
There simply was not enough economic clout in the British navigation and other trade acts to hit the
Americans in the belly sufficiently to provoke a revolt. As Adams said, the people generally, and certainly in
America, tolerated a great deal before they were prepared to resist; they certainly could not be persuaded
that they had been “wronged, injured, and oppressed, unless they really were.”487 Something else was
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Novanglus VII, id, p. 315.
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McIlwain. The High Court of Parliament, pp. 359-60 (citation omitted).

487

Novanglus I, PJA Vol. 2, p. 229.
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going on here.
There had been a storm of “continuous, if intermittent” activities by the metropole since the turn of
the century that, as Bailyn artfully put it, “were not in some pure sense simply objective events and they
were not perceived by immaculate minds aloft in a cosmic perch.” Bailyn saw these activities as “foreboding” events that were “charged with ideology.”488 Yes and no. One cannot deny that an ideologicallybased political battle was taking place, and the American patriots were not on the same side of the battle
as the British government. But I would suggest there was something impactful that was much more
personal, too, the flames of which were stoked by the onslaught of publications, pamphlet and
newspapers that Bailyn published in The Pamphlets of the American Revolution (to which W&L referred);
that was the metropole’s intrusion into what we might today call virtually every colonists’ personal space.
The metropole was also daily intruding on colonists’ accustomed political space, to which they felt
constitutionally entitled. For the Americans, these intrusions were intolerable. It wasn’t the money;
certainly not just the money. It was the offensiveness, the sheer audacity of the metropole’s unilateral and
repeated actions that encroached on the colonists’ quality of life, which was humiliating. A British
American now had to routinely pay for niggling stamps that had to be stuck on all sorts of weekly, if not
daily papers that he utilized. It was offensive, a personal intrusion, and one not experienced by a fellow
Brit who lived in the British Isles.
It was petty, incessant, discriminatory intrusion; and it was the lawyers, those guys with the
adversarial skills and the big mouths to exercise them, who were probably the most annoyingly impacted
by the Stamp Act. It was like swinging a baseball bat at a bee hive. Absolute provocation. Merchants
could not compete freely in an increasingly diverse and lucrative international trade; the constraints on
them, including actions like shutting down Boston harbor, were real, unfair, and probably the most
financially inhibiting of all the intolerable Acts, not to mention the disastrous impact on sailors that served
on their ships that were subject to being kidnapped – snatched by the British navy. In Rex v. Corbet,
Adams had defended a very high profile case in which a merchant sailor killed a British navy officer who
boarded the merchant ship and tried to “impress” Corbet and fellow sailors, i.e., forcibly conscript them
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Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, p. 159.
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into the British navy.489 Beyond these impacts, for the merchants there also was the assault on their daily
business life, the inhibiting effect on the business decision-making and options they were “permitted” to
consider.490 This perspective was not new. New Yorker William Hicks wrote in 1767 that, “To grasp at a
jurisdiction so infinitely extensive, and so little capable of limitation, is expressly declaring, that, from the
antiquity of their establishment, they are become sovereigns of the new-discovered world.”491
This was a legal objection: the matter was not within the jurisdiction of Parliament.492 But the
people were not walking around thinking about jurisdiction. Underlying that objection and other stronglyheld, and often ideologically-based legal objections, was the psychological impact on people who were
completely unaccustomed to being, and unwilling to be micromanaged. Even that so-very-English luxury,
imported TEA, was not exempt from what today we might call Big Brother’s eyes and the palm of his hand
(although the British empire is usually “her”): pay me every time you buy this commodity so that you will be
reminded of my control and power over you whenever you luxuriate in your daily cup(s) of tea!
In sum, the fundamental cause of revolutionary zeal in America was Britain’s decision to restrict
Americans’ self-determination, to constantly rub each and every American the wrong way, and to remind
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The 1769 Corbet case was inherently sensational because the British lieutenant had been harpooned
after searching the American merchant ship the Pitt Packet and finding the hiding seamen. “No trial had
ever interested the community so much before, excited so much curiosity and compassion, or so many
apprehensions of the fateful consequences of the supremacy of parliamentary jurisdiction, or the intrigues
of parliamentary courts.” Adams to Jedidiah Morse, Jan. 20, 1816, JA Works, Vol. 10, pp. 207-08,
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2127#lf1431-10_head_089 (3-2-19). For details on Rex v. Corbet, including
its lingering impact on Adams, who could not imagine a case more bizarrely handled by the Court, and
how Adams’ views have been misunderstood in the scholarship, see Appendix B.
490
W&L recognized that, “Jefferson made it clear that the objection to such regulations was not so much
that they were burdensome. Rather, parliamentary actions restricting ‘the exercise of a free trade with all
parts of the world’ were beyond the jurisdiction of the British Parliament. …[H]e asserted that Parliament
lacked fundamental authority – sovereignty – to micromanage the economies of its distant British American colonies.” W&L, “Free Trade, Sovereignty, and Slavery,” pp. 616-17.
491
William Hicks (1735-1772), The nature and extent of Parliamentary power considered, in some
remarks upon Mr. Pitt’s speech in the House of Commons, previous to the repeal of the Stamp-Act: With
an introduction. Applicable to the present situation of the colonies (Sept. 1767), p. 30, https://quod.lib.
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would-be ‘sovereigns of the new-discovered world’ had at once invaded the rights of both the people in
the colonies and the king, and thereby tried fundamentally to alter the constitution of the empire.” Greene,
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and extent of Parliamentary power considered, (Sept. 1767).
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each and every American that the British had the power to do so. Adams wrote “To a Friend in London”
in January 1775, “it is the most unnatural, detestable quarrel between them that ever happened in the
world. Britons and Americans may write or say what they will, but this quarrel never will and never can be
made up, but by restoring us to the state we were in, in 1763…. It is in vain, it is delirium, it is frenzy to
think of dragooning three millions of English people out of their liberties, at the distance of 3000 miles.”493
Surely this suggests, albeit on a communal, “national” level, that while the Brits accomplished
their encroachment on the colonists’ self-determination with economic constraints, the most important
word in that phrase is constraints, not economic. As New York lawyer, politician and Founding Father
Robert Livingston said, the matter involved oppressive taxation; again, the most operative word being
oppressive, not taxation. One’s liberty was impeded and thereby diminished in various personally-felt
ways through the passage of navigation and related laws. The colonists’ largely intangible feelings of
obnoxious constraint were then translated by the lawyers into formal constitutional claims. Law professor
Robert A. Ferguson observed, “The touchstones of Revolutionary achievement, 1776 and 1787, took their
meaning from the seminal legal documents that lawyers wrote in those years.”494 The lawyers
implemented the colonists’ antagonism to the routinely inhibiting activity of the metropole. There is no
violation of law for being in a colonists’ face, in their space all the time; it was up to Adams and others to
convert those feelings, widely held, into legitimate legal grievances. In this regard, Adams was both
talented and pivotal, e.g., British action constituted the taking of property without proper constitutional
protections, such as consent. As we have seen in our review of Adams’ legal practice, this was the bread
and butter of the lawyer. Every client who walked in the door had a factual problem that caused the client
to feel aggrieved and sometimes oppressed. The lawyer’s job was to convert the facts and those feelings
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into a cause of action.495
For the Americans to move from British protection to rebellion required a threat to something
primordial, something that was felt in the gut and not mildly in the pocketbook. That danger was the threat
to self-determination, to liberty. While economic constraints were the means, the change in post-1768
pamphlets away from the discussion of economic impacts, for example, was not a change in the nature of
the motivational cause that morphed into an intolerable disenchantment with Britain. Rather, as the
Americans waded deeper and deeper into Intolerable Acts mud, the British confidence, even cockiness,
about their Parliament’s supremacy, which was a condescendingly expressed notion and a fact
underlying the various tax and other laws, became increasingly evident and offensive – viz., “intolerable.”
The language of slavery, however outrageous to people who lived as slaves at the time and certainly to
their descendants, was intended very deliberately to be a stunning, indeed shocking metaphor to convey
to both the British and the world generally just how unendurable – how intolerable – the Brits had
become.496 Again, British intolerability, however, was not due to the economic impact of their actions. It
was their existence, per se, and their unbearable and very deliberate decision to barge into the wellestablished colonial way of life by means of the Navigation and related Acts, that intruded on Americans’
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ability to function in the free and independent manner in which they had lived for generations.497 Thus,
the metropole threatened a way of life that the Americans loved and wholeheartedly believed was their
God-given as well as British law-given right, e.g., Magna Carta, common law, etc. These are the legal
entitlements that undergirded the republicanism of Algernon Sidney and, as we shall see, the
republicanism of John Adams.
Laws human of what kind soever are available by Consent.
John Adams quoting John Locke quoting Richard Hooker498

c.

Consent & Participatory Government

In the 1773-74 public debate between the Massachusetts Bay General Court and Thomas
Hutchinson, Adams wrote that, “It is Consent alone that makes any human Laws binding.”499 Citing to
Otis’ 1763 The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Approved, Adams detailed this view, relying
upon Lord Coke, Puffendorf and Grotius, among others, the foundation for Sidney’s argument on consent.
The “Statutes of England are not binding on those who are not represented in Parliament there … for
Consent only gives human Laws their Force.”500 Again, “The Right of being governed only by Laws which
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Algernon Sidney, that, “no other plan of governing the province and the colonies, will ever restore a
harmony between the two countries, but desisting from the plan of taxing them and interfering with their
internal concerns, and returning to that system of colony administration, which nature dictated, and
experience for one hundred and fifty years found useful.”
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John Adams, “III. Reply of the House to Hutchinson’s Second Message,” March 2, 1773, quoting
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Government,” citing Richard Hooker, Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie, PJA Vol. I, pp. 331-46, 344 & n. 17.
499
“III. Reply of the House to Hutchinson’s Second Message, March 2, 1773, PJA Vol. I, pp. 331-46, 335,
342. Once again, this was far from a novel proposition. In the 1760s it was part of the pamphlet literature
and correspondence of numerous colonists. See, e.g., John Joachim Zubly, An Humble Enquiry,1769, in
Miller, ed., “A Warm & Zealous Spirit,” p. 66. cited in Greene, The Constitutional Origins of the American
Revolution, p. 130. For Zubly’s pamphlet, see https://www.consource.org/document/an-humble-enquiryby-john-joachim-zubly-1769-2-1/ (3-18-19).
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This was common parlance. For example, in a letter in the Boston Gazette in 1771 the author wrote:
“The end, of all government being common security, … [i]mposition of laws or taxes on any community
without their consent, being inconsistent with the faintest idea of public or private security, is utterly
subversive of all good government; it is a corruption of its very principles, and therefore it is the duty of
every loyal subject, of every honest man, to treat the authors, aiders and abettors of such ruinous, illegal
and unconstitutional usurpations, as traitors and public enemies.” Letter from “Mutius Scaevola,” Jan. 28,
1771, Boston Gazette, March 6, 1771 at 1, col. 1, cited by Reid in “The Ordeal by Law of Thomas
Hutchinson,” Law in the American Revolution and the Revolution in Law, pp. 29-30. For various other
renditions of the same principle, including the embracing of the British constitution’s principle of consent
by a Roman Catholic common law attorney who was not eligible to vote!, see Reid, The Concept of
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were made by Persons in whose Election they had a Voice, they looked upon as the Foundation of
English Liberties.”501 As he had explained in the 1773 second House Reply to Hutchinson, “The Question
appears to us to be no other, than Whether we are the Subjects of absolute unlimitted Power, or of a free
Government formed on the Principles of the English Constitution.”502
There are many contexts in which Adams turned to the concept of consent. In 1775, for example,
in his second Novanglus essay – quoting Benjamin Franklin! – Adams wrote, “That compelling the
colonies to pay money for their own defence, without their consent, would shew a suspicion of their
loyalty, or of their regard for their country, or of their common sense, and would be treating them as
conquered enemies, and not as free Britons, who hold it for their undoubted right not to be taxed but by
their own consent, given through their representatives.”503 In the same essay Adams stated, “There are
but two sorts of men in the world, freemen and slaves. The very definition of a freeman, is one who is

Representation, pp. 11-13. For Otis’ pamphlet, see https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/1763-otis-rights-ofbritish-colonies-asserted-pamphlet (3-18-19).
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Revolution and the Revolution in the Law, pp. 63-66.
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bound by no law to which he has not consented.”504 In his lengthy seventh Novanglus letter, Adams
averred, “The whigs allow that from the necessity of a case not provided for by common law, and, to
supply a defect in the British dominions, which there undoubtedly is, if they are to be governed only by
that law, America has all along consented, still consents, and ever will consent, that parliament being the
most powerful legislature in the dominions, should regulate the trade of the dominions.” Adams linked
that consent with basic legal principles of contract law. “This is founding the authority of parliament to
regulate our trade, upon compact and consent of the colonies, not upon any principle of common or
statute law, not upon any original principle of the English constitution, not upon the principle that
parliament is the supream and sovereign legislature over them in all cases whatsoever.”505 In the same
essay, finding “a defect” in the British government, discovered 150 years after the colonization of
America, Adams argued that the metropole had to address the matter in “some just and reasonable
means: that is by the consent of the Colonies; for metaphysicians and politicians may dispute forever, but
they will never find any other moral principle or foundation of rule or obedience, than the consent of
governors and governed.”506
Consent was not only a legal necessity, it was a moral and pragmatic one. In 1776 Adams wrote
to fellow Bay lawyer, politician and leader James Sullivan, “It is certain in Theory, that the only moral
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Id, p. 315. Note that Sir John Fortescue, one of the common law jurists very familiar to Adams, had
explained “how consent restrained power by delineating actions that the king could not constitutionally
undertake, such as altering statutes or levying taxes at discretion.” Richard Hooker, also very familiar to
Adams, characterized consent as “the ingredient that made government legitimate.” John Adams to the
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Collection, pp. 242-44, 243. On Fortescue, see Reid, The Concept of Representation, p. 14.
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Foundation of Government is the Consent of the People.”507 In sum, there was no debate on the
necessity of consent to avoid tyranny; the only questions were (i) what seems today to be a crabbed
factual inquiry, as to whether the Americans had somehow given their consent to “virtual” or some other
symbolic form of representation, or whether their very act of crossing the Atlantic constituted a waiver of
their right to consent to British rule without entitlement to American participation in government; and (ii)
who was entitled to give his consent, e.g., What about women? What about property qualifications?508
As Adams was acutely aware, Sidney and other English republicans had unequivocally said the same
thing a century earlier. Recall Sidney’s statements that (i) “naturally and properly a man is the judge of his
own concernments,” and therefore “No one can be deprived of this privilege, unless by his own consent,
and for the good of the society into which he enters”; (ii) “He is a free man who lives as best pleases
himself,” albeit in accordance with laws to which he has consented; (iii) the only way to enter into a social
contract was “by a general consent. This is the ground of just governments”; (iv) Men can agree to place
one man above another; but in the making of that decision, “no man could have any prerogative above
others,” unless that very circumstance is “granted by the consent of the whole.”509 Once again, Adams
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ideas about consent were not new; and they precisely tracked Sidney’s views. Nonetheless, they were
an important constituent of Adams’ republicanism.
Finally, Prof. Reid made the compelling argument that, “The basic constitutional argument
between the mother country and her colonies was about the rule of law and government by consent.”510
In other words, issues of consent raised questions about the rule of law and the Americans’ right to be
governed in accordance with the rule of law under principles of the English constitution, that “ancient,
Gothic, fixed constitution” that had existed from time immemorial. Thus, issues of consent immediately
segue into the momentousness of the rule of law, to which we will turn shortly. First, however, it is
important to briefly address the matter of participatory government, and its offshoot, representation.
As we discussed in the context of Sidney and seventeenth-century England, participation in
governance was a subset of the republican concept of consent. Accordingly, there was a continuing
entitlement to consent to one’s government and particularly decisions that it made that had serious
consequences to the people, e.g., “dreign the Country of Cash, Strip multitudes of the Poorer people of all
their property and Reduce them to absolute beggary,… so Sudden a Shock and Such a Convulsive
Change in the whole Course of our business and Subsistance.”511 The standard way of continuously
participating was through the process of electing a representative in one’s stead who acted on one’s
behalf. Decisions to tax were one of those important kinds of decisions that necessitated the participation
of the people, whether by their representatives or otherwise; therefore, there had to be a mechanism for
doing so. Even the most ardent loyalists such as Joseph Galloway, who posited “the constitutional
obligation of obedience created by constructive consent,” recognized that “there was an extralegal
obligation generated by actual consent. Laws made by actual consent will be obeyed because the

Character of a Trimmer,” Halifax: Complete Works, pp. 64-65; see also Ch. Three (discussion of views on
consent by Sidney contemporaries). As we know, Harrington’s utopian republic removed individual
choice. Finally, it is interesting to note that Rev. Jonathan Mayhew, in a 1766 Boston West Church
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heaven, to make us ‘free indeed’; and that ‘where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.’” This suggests
a decidedly religious genesis to this Nedham et al. political expression. Jonathan Mayhew, The Snare
Broken. Boston, 1766. http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/1766-mayhew-the-snare-broken-sermon (9-2-17).
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people, having in fact consented, obey what they sense is their own act.”512
It is a cliché but nevertheless true that at the guts of the American revolution was the offense of
“taxation without representation” – a denial of participatory government. There is no debating this issue,
of which innumerable illustrations of colonial sentiment abound, including Adams’ statements and others.
In “Instructions Adopted by the Braintree Town Meeting,’ for example, authored by Adams, the Stamp Act
was described as a vile “unconstitutional Tax.”513 This was the view articulated on behalf of “the Freeholders and other Inhabitants Legally assembled” from Braintree, for the express “Purpose” of conveying,
in their Instructions to their legislative representatives (and, of course, to the public), “our Sentiments of
that Act.”514 The conclusion of the assembled members of the town was all about consent by means of
participation in government. First, the people relied on Magna Carta: “By the great Charter no
americament shall be assessed but by the oath of Honest and Lawfull men of the Vicinage.” Accordingly,
they had “Always understood it to be a grand and fundamental principal of the British Constitution that no
Freeman should be Subjected to any Tax to which he has not given his own Consent in person or by
proxy. And the maxims of the Law as we have Constantly Received them are to the Same Effect that no
Freeman can be Separated from his property but by his own act or Fault.” Common law reaffirmed this
right. “We take it clearly therefore to be inconsistant with the Spirit of the Common Law and of the
Essential Fundamentall principles of the British Constitution that we should be Subjected to any Tax
imposed by the British Parliament because we are not Represented in that assembly in any sense unless
it be by the Fiction of Law as insensible in Theory as it would be Injurious in Fact if so heavy a Taxation
should be grounded on it.”515 Similarly, in the 1773-1774 Bay assembly debate with Hutchinson, Adams
wrote that, “it cannot be said that the Government and People of this Province have conceded that the
Parliament had Authority to make such [Revenue] Acts to be observed here …[except] by a deliberate
and solemn Act or Law of their own.”516
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Other parliamentary impositions also denied participatory government, e.g., the British
determination to impose on the British Americans a Court of Admiralty that sat without a jury. “Now if the
wisdom of the Mother Country has thought the Independency of the Judge[s] so Essential to an impartial
Administration of Justice as to Render them Independent of any Power on Earth…. What Justice and
Impartiallity are we at Three thousand miles distance from the fountain to expect from Such a Judge of
Admiralty.”517 Denying the ability of the Americans to participate in the selection, role, capability, and
performance of their judges by having Parliament hire and pay them produced the consequence that the
judges would have no accountability to the people who they served. Participatory government required
that the Americans not be “the Slaves of a Slave of the Servant of a Minister of State”!518 It was this
grievance that prompted Adams’ famous words, “What can be wanting after this but a weak or wicked
Man for a Judge to Render us the most Sordid and forlorn of Slaves.”519 Adams’ fellow patriots agreed;
the loyalists obviously did not.520 But there was no disagreement about the necessity of participation in
governance, either directly or through representatives. Adams stated the matter very clearly in his
Defence: “The end to be aimed at, in the formation of a representative assembly, seems to be the sense
of the people, the public voice: the perfection of the portrait consists in its likeness.” Adams also
described the unique value of representation for both the community and the individual. “Another
assembly, composed of representatives chosen by the people in all parts, gives the whole nation free
access, and communicates all the wants, knowledge, projects, and wishes of the nation, to government;
excites an emulation among all classes, removes complaints, [and] redresses grievances.” At the same
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time, for the citizen, participatory government “affords opportunities of exertion to genius though in
obscurity, and gives full scope to all the faculties of man; opens a passage for every speculation to the
legislature, to administration, and to the public: it gives an universal energy to the human character, to
every part of the state, which never can be obtained in a monarchy.”521
Once again we have an argument emphasized by Sidney and Machiavelli centuries earlier, the
need for a means of redress, access, within a governmental system to function as a safety valve that
might not prevent, but certainly would greatly minimize the likelihood of forcible resistance to
government.522 In Sidney’s time the conspiratorial activities of the Earl of Shaftesbury, for example, and
later other prominent English leaders including Sidney, were triggered by the king’s continual proroguings
and dismissal of Parliament, England’s representative assembly, thereby cutting off lawful means of
political participation and redress. “The liberty of the people depends entirely on the constant and direct
communication between them and the legislature, by means of their representatives.” Thus, in describing
the problem with the English constitution, Adams wrote that if “county-members were abolished, and
representatives proportionally and frequently chosen in small districts, and if no candidate could be
chosen but an established long-settled inhabitant of that district, it would be impossible to corrupt the
people of England, and the house of commons might be an immortal guardian of the national liberty.”523
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citizen has the right to make public speeches” about the “defects” of a man who is seeking appointment to
a supreme rank in the city. This results in “better judgements.” But it also is a venting mechanism.
Indeed, because republics are “slow to move, since no council nor any magistrate can undertake anything
alone,” it is necessary to have “extraordinary measures” to address such situations, as long as they are
not routinely used. Machiavelli, Discorsi, BkI, Ch7, 39; BkI, Ch34, 95-96; Bk 2, Ch23, 217.

In The Republic, Cicero endorsed a mixed constitution because “A state should possess an element of
regal supremacy; something else should be assigned and allotted to the authority of aristocrats; and
certain affairs should be reserved for the judgement and desires of the masses. Such a constitution has,
in the first place, a widespread element of equality which free men cannot long do without. Secondly, it
has stability; …For there is no reason for change in a country where everyone is firmly established in his
own place.” Cicero, Republic, Book One, ¶69, pp. 32-33. In On Obligations, Cicero makes the related
point that, “Freedom which has been discontinued has a fiercer bite than when it has been maintained.”
Cicero, On Obligations, Book 2, ¶24, p. 62.
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Adams, “Letter LIV: Locke, Milton, and Hume,” Defence, Vol. I, p. 371. According to Pocock, David
Hume, at the end of his life, “wanted to see the Americans independent” because he thought it would
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The Americans were well aware of this history. Recall, too, that Sidney and Machiavelli were
convinced that participatory government was, by its nature, tumultuous. That was not something to worry
about. The problem was when a tumult or opposition was forced underground and became a conspiracy,
as it did with Shaftesbury and then perhaps Sidney. Allowing participation and open opposition was the
best means available to prevent this outcome.524
[A]re the Fetters that Enslave the Mind
Of that Firm Base, that Adamantine kind,
So Firmly Lock’d, and so securely Reve’d,
The more we search, the More are we Deceived,
And truth, and Friendship, no where to be Found,
And patriot Virtue, Nothing but a sound.
Mercy Otis Warren to John Adams, Oct. 11, 1773525
If he dissembled, let us remember first, that he was a King,and that dissimulation
is a jewel of the crown; next, that it is very hard for a man not to do sometimes
too much of that which he concludeth necessary for him to practice.
Halifax, “A Character of King Charles II”526

d.

Virtue

Pace Skinner, virtue was understood and admired by Adams and his fellow British American
republicans as a comfortable, amalgamated version of the classical concepts articulated by Plato and
Aristotle, further emphasized by Machiavelli, and often referenced by the English republicans, including

undercut William Pitt, who he viewed as an “evil genius … who had done most to precipitate the crisis of
the sixties and seventies” by encouraging “the growth of populist, factious, and fanatical rhetoric … for his
own ends, in the manner of the classical demagogue”; Pitt was “responsible for a vast and unneeded
expansion of empire” that was inconsistent with a Polybian mixed government such as existed in Britain;
and because “the great war for empire that Pitt had waged had increased the national debt to near the
point at which Hume thought it must prove ruinous to society.” In sum, Hume did not believe the cost of
empire, including holding on to the American colonies, was worth it. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and
History, pp. 137-38.
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“Princes, therefore, have no greater enemy than a conspiracy.” Machiavelli, Discorsi, Bk III, Ch. 6,
275. Reid made the argument that representation meant one thing to the British Americans and another
thing to those who lived in the British Isles. “American voters told their representatives to consider
themselves part of their communities. The British told their representatives to consider themselves part of
an independent institution, with their primary duty to the preservation of institutional independence. …The
representatives’ duty was not so much to defend the rights and interests of their constituents as to
‘defend the rights and interests of the Commons against the power of the crown and nobility.’” Reid, The
Concept of Representation, pp. 63-64. In my own view, these are not mutually exclusive definitions.
Both the British Americans and the British Islanders sought a legislature responsive to the citizenry and,
to be so, it had to have independence from the executive and, once the American Constitution was
passed, from the Senate, the American version of crown and nobility. Indeed, Adams’ concepts of
bilateralism and balance of power were all about this.
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“A Character of King Charles II,” Halifax: Complete Works, p. 266.
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Algernon Sidney. In his longest “letter” in Defence, entitled, “The right Constitution of a Commonwealth,
examined,” which is a book unto itself at 297 pages constituting more than half of volume three, Adams
rambled on about the nature of virtue. “What is virtue?” he asked. Adams posited that it was both the
classical virtue of Hercules that “the ancient philosophers summed up in four words, prudence, justice,
temperance, and fortitude”; it was also Christian virtue, “so much more sublime,” and “summarily comprehended in universal benevolence. Then there were other renditions, including Montesquieu’s negative
quality – “the absence only of ambition and avarice” – a definition Adams rejected.527 Indeed, he said,
notwithstanding Montesquieu’s theories, sometimes “nations, as bodies” in fact were not “actuated” by
certain virtues, such as frugality.528 For example, loyalty to one’s country might require action that was not
particularly virtuous – e.g., it was not necessarily in one’s country’s interest to act benevolently towards
one’s enemies.529 Once again, Adams turned to the law: “it is the laws alone that really love the country,
the public, the whole better than any part; and that form of government which unites all the virtue, honour,
and fear of the citizens, in a reverence and obedience to the laws, is the only one in which liberty can be
secure.” Ultimately, Adams’ concluded that, “Moral and Christian, and political virtue, cannot be too much

527
Wood argued that by the mid-eighteenth century, “republican values, especially virtue, had become
more closely identified with politeness and sociability” than with “the severe public virtue of antiquity.”
Wood made this argument as a predicate for his segueing into the thesis that eighteenth-century
Americans fostered “the citizen’s participation in society, not in government,” relying on the views of
Thomas Paine, to conclude that republicanism had evolved and was helped “transition” people “to what
we call liberalism.” There was an emphasis in eighteenth-century Anglo-American culture on politeness
and sociability; but I doubt that this phenomenon or Paine’s point of view does justice to the contemporaneous understanding of virtue. Moreover, as this dissertation makes plain, republicanism was not a
transitional ideology that prepared Americans for liberalism. Whether or not one wants to view republicanism as an “ideology,” a word that may be associated with an element of rigidity that may be inapt, it was
not “transitional,” nor was it “transformed” into liberalism; rather, liberalism is one rendition, one strand,
one manifestation of republicanism. One also can concur with Wood on the following characterization of
liberalism while disagreeing with its application to republicanism: “It is important to remember that the
boxlike categories of ‘republicanism’ and ‘liberalism’ are essentially the inventions of us historians, and as
such they are dangerous if heuristically necessary distortions of a very complicated past reality.” Wood,
“Preface to the 1998 Edition,” The Creation of the American Republic, pp. ix-xi.
528

In Defence, Adams was harsher. “That therefore the democracy of Montesquieu, and its principle of
virtue, equality, frugality, &c. according to his definitions of them, are all mere figments of the brain, and
delusive imaginations.” Defence, Vol. III, p. 494.
529

This was a Machiavellian insight. Better to have to sacrifice virtue in order to remain a leader,
Machiavelli had written, so that one could do good things for one’s country and one’s people. Having
witnessed the virtuous Solderini’s demise because of his virtuousness, and the consequent devastating
impact on Florence and on Machiavelli personally, the realistic theorist recognized that the most important
thing for any leader to do was to survive.
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beloved, practiced, or rewarded.” On the other hand, as he repeated elsewhere and of paramount
importance, “to place liberty on that foundation only would not be safe.”530
From the beginning, however, e.g., in the Novanglus letters, Adams expressed confidence in the
virtuousness of his people – “a sensible and virtuous people.”531 Not that he did not have moments of
doubt. In a January 1776 letter to Mercy Otis Warren, for example, Adams wrote, “Virtue and Simplicity of
Manners are indispensably necessary in a Republic among all orders and Degrees of Men. But there is
so much Rascallity, so much Venality and Corruption, so much Avarice and Ambition such a Rage for
Profit and Commerce among all Ranks and Degrees of Men even in America, that I sometimes doubt
whether there is public Virtue enough to Support a Republic.” Adams opined, “Servility and Flattery” were
the “two Vices most detestably predominant in every Part of America,” which troubled him. He
considered it the responsibility of “a great Politician” to improve the character of the people, “to extinguish
among them the Follies and Vices that he sees, and to create in them the Virtues and Abilities which he
sees wanting.”532 Perhaps this was why Adams was such a harsh taskmaster of himself and why, for so
many years and in so many different circumstances, he assumed the role of teacher to his people.
Thus, in an April 1776 letter, as Congress debated how to proceed, Adams wrote to his good
friend James Warren, about the process that took place with respect to “communicating Some Hints upon
a subject, which seems not to have been sufficiently considered in the southern Colonies,” viz., thoughts
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Adams, “Letter VI. The right Constitution of a Commonwealth, examined,” Defence, Vol. III, pp. 209506, 487-92. For Aristotle, … virtue is not a matter of subordinating inclination to duty, but an ingrained
disposition to act in a certain way that leads to success in every dimension: it is acquired by ‘educating’
the desires, and by harmonizing them with reason. We need practical reason to act correctly, because
what is best in any case has to be identified in deliberation, and cannot simply be deduced from first
principles.” Honohan, Civic Republicanism, p. 21. This is an Aristotelian view to which Adams subscribed.
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Novanglus I, Jan. 23, 1775, PJA Vol. 2, p. 228; see also Adams to James Warren, Oct. 7, 1775,
Warren-Adams Letters, Vol. 1, pp. 126-29, 128 (“it has ever appeared to me since this unhappy Dispute
began, that We had no Friend upon Earth to depend on but the Resources of our own Country, and the
good sense and great Virtues of our People”).
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Adams to Mercy Warren, Jan. 8, 1776, Warren-Adams Letters, Vol. 1, pp. 201-03. Writing from Paris
to James Warren, Mercy’s husband, in 1783, Adams wrote an excoriating description of Benjamin
Franklin. The description began, “It is a saying of Algernon Sidney concerning Sir Walter Rawleigh, that
‘his Morals were not sufficiently exact for a great Man.’ And the Observation can never be applied with
more propriety than to Dr. Franklin.” As Adams explained in the course of his tirade, “A sacred regard to
Truth is among the first and most essential Virtues of a public Man…. I am sorry to say, but strict and
impartial Justice obliges me to say, that from five complete Years of Experience of Dr. Franklin, which I
have now had in Europe, I can have no Dependence on his Word. I never know when he speaks the
Truth, and when not.” Adams to Warren, Apr. 13, 1783, Warren-Adams Letters, Vol. 2, pp. 208-12, 209.
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on government. What Adams described was his work teaching fellow Congressmen and their
constituencies about how to “mark out a Path, and putt Men upon thinking” about literally how to transition
from the status of a royal colony to that of an independent state. Reflecting on the status of the colonies
and the inevitability, were there a military confrontation, of “a long, obstinate and bloody War,” virtue was
not removed from Adams’ thoughts. “A Mind as vast as the Ocean, or Atmosphere is necessary to
penetrate and comprehend all the intricate and complicated Interests which compose the Machine of the
Confederat Colonies. It requires all the Philosophy I am Master of and more than all, at Times to
preserve that serenity of Mind and Steadiness of Heart, which is necessary to watch the Motives, of
Friends and Enemies, of the Violent and the Timid, the Credulous and the dull, as well as the Wicked.”
Adams always felt his own inadequacies. “A Man must have a wider Expansion of Genius than has fallen
to my share to see to the End of these great Commotions. But, on such a full sea are We now afloat, that
We must be content to trust, to Winds and Currents with the best Skill We have, under a kind Providence
to land us in a Port of Peace, Liberty and Safety.” At the same time, he never waivered from his
commitment to lead. “But if I can contribute ever so little towards preserving the Principles of Virtue and
Freedom in the World, my Time and Life will be not ill spent.” 533
Many years later in Defence, Adams wrote about how Plato had said, “where the system, both of
laws and education, are contrived to produce the virtues of fortitude, temperance, wisdom, and justice, in
the whole city, and in all the individual citizens,” a commonwealth could be successful.534 The ancient
Greeks – Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato and Xenophon – had believed that men would only be happy under
a form of governance when “mankind were habituated by education and discipline to regard the great
duties of life, and to consider a reverence of themselves, and the esteem of their fellow-citizens, as the
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Adams to Warren, April 20, 1776, PJA Vol. 4, pp. 130-33, 132.
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Adams, “Letter XXXIII. Ancient Republics, and Opinions of Philosophers: Plato,” Defence, Vol. I, p. 189.
Similarly, in a 1774 “Reply to A Friendly Address to All Reasonable Americans,” which probably was never
published, Adams wrote, “For the Same Reason, I agree, with my friendly Addressor, that ‘those who
reside in the American Colonies, have been by far the happiest: and that were they Sensible of their own
Advantages, might still be so,’ meaning by that, they have it in their Power, by a vigorous Exertion of their
Abilities and a Resolute Practice of the great Virtues of Frugality, Temperance, Sobriety, Courage, Industry
and Fortitude, to resist the unrighteous Claims of the british Ministry and Parliament, and to obtain a full
Restoration and a firm Establishment of their ancient Constitutions.” PJA Vol. 2, pp. 193-97, 194.
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principal source of their enjoyment.”535 While the concept was attractive, Adams disagreed. In his view,
“aristocracy as well as democracy and monarchy, are singly, totally inadequate to the business of
restraining the passions of men, of preserving a steady government, and protecting the lives, liberties,
and properties of the people…. Religion, superstition, oaths, education, laws, all give way before
passions, interest, and power, which can be resisted only by passions, interest, and power.” After all,
“There is nothing in the world so excellent that it may not be abused.”536
Ever alert to the corrupting power of man’s passions, in 1775 Adams is famous for his adage that
one must always “Nip the shoots of arbitrary power in the bud.”537 For example, “Corruption in elections
is the great enemy of freedom.”538 In a letter to Bay friend John Trumball Adams wrote, “you will find no
Instance of a Republic conquered by a Monarchy, by Arms, nor any other Way but by Corruption and
Division.”539 Law was vital; but entirely alone it was insufficient to resist the power of man’s nature. One
can see why Adams was driven to persuade his world that republicanism demanded built-in balances in
government to protect the formulation and execution of the law.540
Unquestionably, however, men who were virtuous were to be admired; and it was important to try
to select political leaders and players who exercised virtue. But, “such examples are as rare among
statesmen as Homers and Miltons among poets.”541 Moreover, “Although there is but one principle of
virtue, those of vice are infinite.”542 (In fact, Adams referenced various principles of virtue; but the point is
well taken: no matter how many principles of virtue one might evoke, unlike vice they are not infinite.) As
we have noted, from the beginning of his reflections on governance, Adams admired his people for their
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Adams, “Preface,” Defence, Vol. I, p. iii.
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Adams, “Letter XLIV. Ancient Aristocratical Republics: Crotona. Pythagoras,” Defence, Vol. I, pp.
322-24. Once again, in discussing this matter, Adams relied on Sidney, as well as Plato and Aristotle,
Machiavelli, Milton, Harrington, “followed by Locke, Hoadley, &c.,” none of which Adams believed the
learned Mr. Hume understood! Id, pp. 325-26.
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“most habitual, radical sense of Liberty,” and their “highest Reverence for Virtue.”543
Adams drafted the 1776 Preamble to the Continental Congress’ Resolution recommending that the
colonies institute forms of government. This was the explanatory preface to what Adams characterized
as “the most important Resolution that was ever taken in America.” The Preamble asserted that authority
under the Crown of Great Britain had to be entirely suppressed, and “all the powers of government
exerted, under the authority of the people of the colonies, for the preservation of internal peace, virtue
and good order, as well as for the defence of their lives, liberties and properties, against the hostile
invasions and cruel depredations of their enemies.”544 Virtue was certainly a recognized part of the
equation for good governance.545

543
JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 272 (Dec. 23, 1765). Indeed, reflecting what he had been taught by his parents and
others in his Earliest Diary, written in his late teens and early twenties, Adams wrote about the importance
of moderating his passions and “increas[ing] my Veneration of Virtue, and Resolution to pursue it.” The
Earliest Diary of John Adams, p. 77.
544
“V. Preamble to resolution on Independent Governments, May 15, 1776, PJA Vol. 4, pp. 11-12; for
draft, see Adams to James Warren, May 15, 1776, Warren-Adams Letters, Vol. 1, pp. 245-47. There are
(very) minor differences between this Adams’ draft and the final Resolution; but there is no change with
respect to the reference to the preservation of virtue in America.
545
In one of those paragraphs that only Pocock can produce, incorrect distinctions are drawn between
contractarian and resistance theory, on the one hand, and republican theory on the other; and between a
juristic, rights argument on the one hand, and the republican concept of virtue on the other. As is clear
from Part One and will be confirmed in Part Two, both the English and British American republicans embraced a republicanism that included tiers of law, including natural rights, the social contract or contract
theory, and a constitutional foundation; they also relied on resistance theory and virtue, although virtue
alone was far from a sufficient basis on which to ground good governance. In contrast, Pocock stated, “If
we examine the roles of the various components of Whig doctrine in the [American] Revolution, we shall
be obliged to separate contractarian and resistance theory from republican theory, according to the
purposes for which each was used. The argument that parliament was not entitled to levy taxes in the
colonies was originally constitutionalist, but expanded to the point where it was expressed in terms of
natural rights and the powers and obligations of the state to maintain them. Locke took his place here
with Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel, and the end of the process was reached in the Declaration of Independence, when it had to be maintained that what had been colonies were now states, fully empowered
to protect the peoples inhabiting them and their property; for this end they had been established and it
made them states.” In Pocock’s view, however, “it had until very recently been accepted that this function
was rightfully discharged by another state, that of Great Britain, and a decent respect for the opinions of
mankind impelled Congress to endorse a quasi-Lockean rhetoric that enumerated the wrongful acts by
which the government of that state had lost its lawful authority over the American people (usually numbered in the singular, though organized into thirteen states).” Per Pocock, the result, however, “was less
the dissolution of all government over the people than the exaltation of their existing governments into
states; rather, it was contended – by arguments that made use of Locke’s doctrine of a right to emigrate –
that these governments already existed in history and by right of their historic origins enjoyed a contractual autonomy.” In Pocock’s view, “The chain of arguments to this point was juristic; it deployed the
concept of right rather than the republican concept of virtue.” Pocock cited both Jefferson’s Rights of
British America and Adams’ Letters of Novanglus to support this argument. It is clear, however, that
Adams believed that the actions of the metropole had legally unmoored the colonies from the British Isles
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Adams also was particularly focused on the importance of virtue in the practice of law. When he
asked himself to “Consider what Profession you have chosen?” and he answered, “The Law,” Adams’
concept of his professional role was to become “a great, useful, virtuous Lawyer.”546 Thus, from the
beginning, Adams strove to be “a Lawyer of distinguished Genius, Learning, and Virtue,” “the Compound
Ratio of Virtue and Knowledge.”547
Nevertheless, reverence for virtue could not supplant Adams’ realistic appreciation of human
nature, its weaknesses and strengths, its foibles and achievements, and often its spunk. One category
Adams used to define a natural aristocracy was people blessed with an unequal amount of virtue,
whether inherited or original, and evidenced in devotion to one’s country through “a long course of
service.” 548 But most men were not like this. Moreover, virtue did not protect against adverse governance. “[V]irtue and honour cannot be excluded from despotisms, nor fear nor virtue from monarchies, nor
fear nor honour from republics.” One could find solace, however, in the conviction that, “in a republic,
constituted as we propose the three principles of fear, honour, and virtue, unite and produce more union
among the citizens, and give greater energy to the laws.”549
In sum, the most realistic aspect of Adams’ republicanism, as well as that of Sidney and others,
was that one could not rely on any or many individual’s virtue as the means of ensuring the success of a
form of governance, whatever form it might be. “A free people of common sense will not depend upon
finding a sufficient number of such characters at any one time, but less a succession of them for any long
duration, for the support of their liberties.”550 Accordingly, the formula for good governance was neither

by dissolving the legal framework under which the colonies – certainly, Massachusetts Bay – had
functioned. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History, p. 266.
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It is interesting to see how explicitly Adams focused on the question of whether he should strive to
have “perfection of Knowledge in Theory,” or “Expertness in Practice,” or “Eloquence at Bar?” His answer
was to ask all of that of himself in order to be truly “useful.” Thus, he specified an extraordinarily
ambitious seven-year plan of humanistic studies, including literature, science, and mathematics, as well
as rhetoric and logic, but also “british Law, and roman and Grecian Antiquities.” JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 106
[Summer, 1759].
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virtue alone, nor the law alone. What was required was virtue when possible, the law always, and the law
protected as close to inviolate as possible: “Every citizen must look up to the laws, as his master, his
guardian, and his friend; and whenever any of his fellow citizens, whether magistrates or subjects,
attempt to deprive him of his rights, he must appeal to the laws.”551
This is precisely where Gordon Wood and fellow travelers, including those who were Adams’
contemporaries such as Jefferson, went astray. In an eloquent statement of the role of virtue in different
forms of government, one sees the fundamental flaw in Wood’s argument disfavoring mainstream
republicanism for its alleged vulnerability and what Wood viewed as the ease with which it could be
toppled – the mainstay of Wood’s thesis embracing democratic republicanism. This may be the most
fundamental analytical divide in both the relevant contemporary and scholarly literature, and therefore
well worth a brief diversion, particularly to understand the distinct philosophical underpinnings of
traditional, moderate, mainstream republicanism and its more extreme, “left-wing” form, supported by
liberal ideology, viz., democratic republicanism, which when achieved with the adoption of the US
Constitution, Wood argued, “marked an end of the classical conception of politics,” replaced by a system
in which “the stability of the government no longer relied, as it had for centuries, upon its embodiment of
the basic social forces of the state. Indeed,” Wood asseverated, “it now depended upon the prevention of
the various social interests from incorporating themselves too firmly in the government.” Instead, he
maintained, “Institutional or governmental politics was thus abstracted in a curious way from its former
associations with the society,” whatever that means.552
Once again there is virtually no grey – only black or white. From Wood’s rose-colored
perspective, either a government is invulnerable, or it is entirely vulnerable (or perhaps almost entirely
vulnerable) to destruction or subversion; either there is order or there is scary, imminent or actual
disorder, a “paranoiac mistrust of power.”553 Ironically, Wood viewed the former perspective, part of what
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Id, p. 17. Wood emphasized this point, e.g., “The English constitution, ‘heretofore so much the glory
and happiness of our own nation, and the envy and terror of foreigners,’ Americans saw by 1775 gradually undermined, ‘till at length, under the hands of bribery and corruption, it seems rotten to the very core.’”
Id, p. 12, citing Enoch Huntington, A Sermon Delivered at Middleton, July 20th, A.D. 1775 … (Hartford,
[1775]), 18. This is one of the ways in which I believe Wood’s analysis is misguided. It was not the
English constitution that became rotten to the Americans, but Parliament and its agent, the foreign mini837

he termed a new “romantic view of politics” embraced by Jefferson and others, as “attempting to
formulate a theory of politics that would represent reality as it was.” In so doing, Wood claimed, “the
Americans of 1787 shattered the classical Whig world of 1776.”554
In contrast, Adams and fellow mainstream republicans saw the world with very different colored
glasses. For Adams, there were innumerable gradations of vulnerability, a vast range of levels of stability,
and numerous ways to exercise and not exercise virtue. Moreover, none of these realities was static;
change was constant in every society, and part of the role of good government was to both tolerate and,
as necessary and appropriate, manage change. “Our bodies and minds, like the heavens, the earth, and
the sea, like all animal, vegetable, and mineral nature, like the elements of earth, air, fire, and water, are
continually changing. The mutability and mutations of matter, and much more of the intellectual and moral
world, are the consequences of the laws of nature, not less without our power than beyond our
comprehension.”555 Pace Wood, this eighteenth-century view of the world had not “sought to understand
politics, as it had all of life, by capturing in an integrated, ordered, changeless ideal the totality and
complexity of the world – an ideal that the concept of the mixed constitution and the proportioned social
hierarchy on which it rested perfectly expressed.”556 Here, Wood seemed to be reflecting Harrington’s
view of a good republic, a utopian view not shared by Adams, Sidney, and most republicans. Pace
Wood, Adams’ view wholly rejected “an ideal” – any ideal – where “there could be only potential energy,
no kinetic energy, only a static equilibrium among synthetic orders, and no motion among the particular,
miscellaneous parts that made up the society.” Pace Wood, the Americans had not “begun the Revolution
assuming that the people were a homogenous entity in society set against the rulers.”557 To the contrary,

stry, which were supposed to act in compliance with and, indeed, promote the British constitution. As
Huntington stated in the same context, “Is it not acknowledged that a venal corrupt majority in the British
Parliament, voting altogether at the nod of the minister, govern all the public acts and conduct of that
body … And is not this corrupt and venal body, sometimes with equal pomp and impiety held up to our
view by themselves and others, as omnipotent.” Id, pp. 18-19, cited in The Revolution of the People:
Thoughts and Documents on the Revolutionary Process in North America 1774-1776, Hermann Wellenreuther, ed. (Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2006), p. 108.
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Adams often opined on the diversity of the people, both in America and elsewhere. As we shall see,
Adams’ concept of the natural aristocracy was founded on it. Pace Wood, Adams maintained that it was
unrealistic to found one’s government on the notion that, “The people themselves must change as
well.”558 One could not puppeteer the behavior of the citizenry, nor would one want to do so in a free
society. On the other hand, that did not mean that men could not steer a more beneficial course through
the institution of republican government. “While we are thus assured that, in one sense, nothing in human
affairs will be perpetual or at rest, we ought to remember, at the same time, that the duration of our lives,
the security of our property, the existence of our conveniences, comforts, and pleasures, the repose of
private life, and the tranquillity of society, are placed in very great degree in human power.”559
Adams, Sidney, and other mainstream republicans believed that no society could possibly be
entirely virtuous, or so virtuous that it was existentially invulnerable; nor was it realistic to believe that
there was such a thing as an entirely virtueless society. Accordingly, it was impossible to provide
complete protection of any government from vulnerability within or without. This, by the way, was the
implicit starting place for Machiavelli’s Discorsi, the purpose of which was to consider how best to govern
given man’s imperfections and his imperfect reality. Adams, too, recognized that the trick was to structure
a government so that its vulnerability was as minimized as possible without jeopardizing the liberty and
other values of republicanism that the government was designed to promote and protect. Virtue assisted
in this project. But it was the law, not virtue, on which the system relied. Creating the maximum
opportunity for the fostering of virtue among the citizenry and the leadership was advantageous and
sensible while, first and foremost, relying on the law to strenuously protect the government against forces
that would unseat it. Pace Wood, “by the establishment of republicanism the Whigs were” not “founding
their new government solely on the people’s voluntary acquiescence” any more than every government
known to man theoretically relied solely on the people’s voluntary acquiescence – that is, that in any form
of government the people could opt to suffer the consequences of their own political defiance.560 Law,
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and the punishments that followed from disobeying much less flaunting it, would in most instances readily
persuade citizens to live peaceably regardless of their dissatisfactions, and it would coerce obedience by
those who other-wise might readily disobey it. The law was not full-proof; for instance the people had the
right and obligation to rebel in the face of tyranny. At the same time, a virtuous people effectively greased
the wheels of the law; this was why, from Adams’ perspective, it was the responsibility of “a great
Politician” to improve the character of the people, “to extinguish among them the Follies and Vices that he
sees, and to create in them the Virtues and Abilities which he sees wanting.” This also was why placing
liberty on the foundation of virtue “only” would “not be safe.”
In contrast, Wood’s mindset and his sensibilities were unable to tolerate the intrinsic imperfections
that Adams saw in every man and in every form of government – what Adams would describe as the
intrinsic imperfection of life – instead seeking what Adams would have dismissed as impossible, viz., the
perfectly ordered, invulnerable society. Wood’s many absolutes fly in the face of mainstream, moderate
republicanism, the latter of which was founded on Adams and others’ realistic assessment of man in
society.561
In sum, pace Wood and others, virtue is a component of republican thought but it most decidedly
is not its lynchpin. For Adams and his fellow mainstream republicans, society undoubtedly benefited from
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constitutional monarchy – Wood described the nature of a republic. “But in a republic which possessed
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Republic, pp. 65-66 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
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its virtuous citizens and magistrates. Educating the public on virtuous conduct and promoting virtue was
advantageous and therefore sensible. At the same time, it was unrealistic and therefore not a part of
republicanism that virtue would be a panacea. There was no one solution to the inherent variability of
men and society and the consequent potential for political instability. But if there was any one factor that
was most important, it was not virtue; it was the law.
As we can see, the English and British American republicans and, specifically Sidney and Adams,
were notably consistent in their views on the value of liberty, consent, participatory governance, and
virtue notwithstanding the diversity of opinion that did exist, not only between American loyalists and
patriots, but within the Sidney-era English and Adams-era British American republican communities. This
included differences of opinion on not only the role of virtue in a society, but also whether certain forms of
government could not be selected by the people in a republic. Consideration of this issue falls into four
inquiries: (i) What were Adams’ views on monarchy? (ii) Was democracy a favored or even an essential
way to effect political participation? (iii) What was the importance of unicameralism or its obverse,
bicameralism in republican theory? and (iv) Was mixed government essential and, if so, what kind of
mixed government? First, however, there is the distracting issue of commerce – a true “red herring” that
needs to be kiboshed. All these issues are familiar to us through Sidney’s work.

The Dutch Republic was unique in Europe in its practice of religious
liberty throughout its two centuries of existence…. Religious tolerance
was defended sometimes by an argument for freedom of conscience
in principle, but more often on the ground of the advantage to trade
when merchants and shippers were welcomed whatever their creed.
Herbert H. Rowen, “The Dutch Republic and the Idea of Freedom”562

E. The Red Herring: Did Adams’ republicanism abjure commerce?
Contrary to the suggestions of some scholars, Adams and his fellow British American republicans
very comfortably embraced the pursuit of commerce.563 Indeed, colonial commerce expanded in parallel
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with the population, and both had spectacularly grown in the eighteenth century. More people created
greater demand and, as Prof. Pincus emphasized, British exports to the colonies had “more than
quadrupled between 1720 and 1770, reflecting the value of a rapidly developing colonial society.564
Adams associated commerce with freedom, e.g., in writing about the republic of Biscay, in Spain, with
“the reputation of the best soldiers and sailors in Spain,” and whose people had a “love of liberty, and
unconquerable aversion to a foreign servitude,” Adams observed, “Many writers ascribe their flourishing
commerce to their situation; but, as this is no better than that of Ferrol or Corruna, that advantage is more
probably due to their liberty.”565 Analogously Adams challenged Marchamont Nedham’s contention that
the best form of government, where liberty was “most secured,” was a government in which the
magistrates “are least exposed to the baits and snares of luxury,” which Nedham argued was the case in
a simple democracy. What this amounted to, said Adams, was that liberty would be most secure when

Revenue, by Act of Parliament (1765), The American Revolution: Writings from the Pamphlet Debate
1764-1772, pp. 243-304, 279, This was not a new idea. See Leng, “Commercial Conflict and Regulation
in the Discourse of Trade in Seventeenth-Century England.” The definitive study establishing the fact that
Adams and fellow British American republicans embraced the pursuit of commerce is Steve Pincus’
recent work, The Heart of the Declaration: The Founders’ Case for an Activist Government (New Haven &
London: Yale University Press, 2016); cf. Joyce Appleby, “Republicanism in Old and New Contexts,” The
William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Jan. 1986), pp. 20-34. Leading the contrary viewpoint is John
Pocock’s magnum opus, The Machiavellian Moment. See, e.g., id, p. ix (“‘The Machiavellian moment’ in
its eighteenth-century form” has an “emphasis” that “is increasingly American. The confrontation of
‘virtue’ with ‘corruption’ is seen to have been a vital problem in social and historical philosophy during that
era, and its humanist and Machiavellian vocabulary is shown to have been the vehicle of a basically
hostile perception of early modern capitalism, grounded in awareness of the elaborate conventions of
public credit rather than of the more direct interchanges of the market. The role of ‘fortune’ was
increasingly assumed by the concepts of ‘credit’ and ‘commerce’…. This quarrel culminates, as far as the
eighteenth century is concerned, with … a utopian perception of global space in America.”). In my own
view, this Pocock description is far too fanciful; and while corruption was broadly condemned, commerce
was not. See also Paul A. Rahe, “Antiquities Surpassed: The Repudiation of Classical Republicanism,”
Republicanism, Liberty and Commercial Society, 1649-1776, Ch. 6, pp. 233-69, 236-37 on Adams’
ostensible views on commerce.
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the people were the poorest, a thought that was not only factually wrong, but certainly would be
unpopular – “this will never recommend a government to mankind.” Luxury was a part of life; and
“contentment is not in human nature.” “The truth relating to this subject is very obvious, and lies in a
narrow compass,” Adams explained. “The disposition to luxury is so strong in all men, and in all nations,
that it can be rest[r]ained, where it has the means of gratification, only by education, discipline or law.”
Furthermore, the “disposition to luxury is the same, though the habit is not, both in plebeians, patricians,
and kings.”566 Nedham “attempt[ed] to prove his point by reason and examples, but is equally unfortunate
in both.” First Adams shot down Nedham’s reasoning; then he rebutted the historical examples on which
Nedham relied. The point of emphasis here is that the problem for Adams was not commerce, but
excessive luxury, against which all governments needed to be on guard as it readily corrupted both those
who naturally sought it and those who already had it.
In fact, Adams promoted commerce. It was an offspring of liberty. After all, Adams lived outside of
Boston, the prime sea-merchant community of New England. Unlike some of his fellow Founding Fathers,
he had to work to make a living. Accordingly, Adams not only often represented men in commerce – the
merchants of Boston and environs -- but he fully appreciated the value of commerce, in which even the
high-minded Abigail pragmatically participated in her own modest way. The limitation Adams and most
republicans placed on commerce, Harrington, Neville, and the peripatetic Marchamont Nedham being the
conspicuous exceptions, was a concomitant and profound distaste for corruption, a distaste that included
but was in no way limited to commerce.567 This explains Adams’ concerns expressed to Mercy Owen
Warren in 1776 about the “rage for Profit and Commerce.” But to turn those statements into a rejection of
commerce generally would be to misunderstand Adams. First of all, Adams’ abhorrence for corruption
applied to virtually every sort of activity not just trade; it applied to corrupt action of individuals, most
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notably, early on, magistrates such as Hutchinson; it applied to the corrupt action of groups, such as
political parties, Jefferson and particularly Hamilton being the prime offenders; it also applied to the group
of “robber capitalists,” for example, who protected the interests of the wealthy while facilitating the
bankruptcy of the poor; and it applied to the corrupt actions of other nations, too (e.g., via a corrupt ruler or
minister, e.g., George III and sometimes, it seems, French minister Vergennes).568 At least one scholar
considered Adams to have changed his view, from a rejection of commerce to a complaisant acceptance
of it since it was part of the American way of life, “not to be restrained.”569 Here again we have an
oversimplification, seeing black and white in lieu of gray and, as a result, stating the matter too
negatively.570
As already established, Adams had a hearty first-hand appreciation for trade and those engaged
in it. He associated commerce with liberty. One can see this in his strenuous and successful fight for the
Newfoundland fishing banks, just to provide one salient example. As Adams explained in his “second
autobiography” published in the Boston Patriot, May 15, 1811, and as he had written to Congress at the
time, in 1790, “Our business with them,” the Europeans, “and theirs with us, is commerce, not politics,
much less war.”571 Perhaps the most obvious indicia of Adams’ appreciation for commerce can be found
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in his March 1797 Inaugural Address as well as his First Annual Message to Congress given later that
year. Just as Presidents do today albeit much shorter than we have grown to endure, Adams’ Inaugural
Address was largely a ticker tape of politically sensitive issues to which the new President was attuned,
and about which he promised to remain vigilant. There are sixteen “if” phrases presented by Adams,
beginning with, “if a preference, upon principle, of a free republican government, formed upon long and
serious reflection, after a diligent and impartial inquiry after truth;” and “if an attachment to the
Constitution of the United States, and a conscientious determination to support it until it shall be altered
by the judgments and wishes of the people, expressed in the mode prescribed in it.” The sixteen “if”
phrases are completed with the thought, “it shall be my strenuous endeavor that this sagacious injunction
of the two Houses shall not be without effect.” Two of Adams’ commitments concern commerce, viz., (i) “if
an inclination to improve agriculture, commerce, and manufacturers for necessity, convenience, and
defense;” and (ii) if an intention to pursue by amicable negotiation a reparation for the injuries that have
been committed on the commerce of our fellow-citizens by whatever nation, and if success can not be
obtained, to lay the facts before the Legislature, that they may consider what further measures the honor
and interest of the Government and its constituents demand.”572
In short, the pursuit of the people’s commercial interests – “our fellow-citizens” –was a
responsibility of the President. Adams elaborated forcefully on this subject in his message to Congress.
“The commerce of the United States is essential, if not to their existence, at least to their comfort, their
growth, prosperity, and happiness.” Commerce was at the heart of the American republic. “The genius,
character, and habits of the people are highly commercial. Their cities have been formed and exist upon
commerce. Our agriculture, fisheries, arts, and manufactures are connected with and depend upon it. In
short, commerce has made this country what it is, and it can not be destroyed or neglected without
involving the people in poverty and distress.” This applied to commerce by land and by sea. “Great
numbers are directly and solely supported by navigation. The faith of society is pledged for the
preservation of the rights of commercial and sea faring no less than of the other citizens.” Thus, said
Adams, “Under this view of our affairs, I should hold myself guilty of a neglect of duty if I forbore to

572

John Adams “Inaugural Address in the City of Philadelphia,” March 4, 1797,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/adams.asp (9-4-17).
845

recommend that we should make every exertion to protect our commerce and to place our country in a
suitable posture of defense as the only sure means of preserving both.573
Need we say more?

A thousand years of barons’ wars, causing universal darkness, ignorance,
and barbarity, ended at least in simple monarchy, not by express stipulation, but
by tacit acquiescence, in almost all of Europe; the people preferring a certain
sovereignty in a single person, to endless disputes, about merit and sovereignty,
which never did and never will produce any thing but aristocratical anarchy.
John Adams, “Discourses on Davila”574

F. Did Adams’ Republicanism exclude certain forms of government?
Within the scholarship one finds certain notions about early modern republicanism, both in
England and in America, that sometimes seem to take on a life of their own, leading scholars into
nettlesome debates about the nature of Anglo-American republicanism. We can settle these debates
quite easily.
The ministers of state, in a simple monarchy, can never
know their friends from their enemies: cabals in secret
undermine their influence, and blast their reputations.
John Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions 575

i.

What’s in a Form? On Monarchy

Sidney and Adams both believed that the form of government assumed by a nation was a matter
of choice. As Adams stated in his eighth Novanglus letter, “So that our ancestors, when they emigrated,
having obtained permission of the king to come here, and being never commanded to return into the
realm, had a clear right to have erected in this wilderness a British constitution, or a perfect democracy, or
any other form of government they saw fit.”576 Similarly, in the Instructions to the Commissioners to
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Canada adopted by Congress on March 20, 1776, based on the draft prepared by a committee chaired by
Adams, the statement is made that, “you are to declare, that it is our inclination, that the people of
Canada may set up such a form of government, as will be most likely, in their judgment, to produce their
happiness.”577 In Thoughts on Government, Adams stated, “If the Colonies should assume governments
separately, they should be left entirely to their own choice of the forms.”578 We know that it was Sidney’s
view that placing power in the people, e.g., “if the commons are as free as the nobles,” or else were “in
the hands of representatives chosen by themselves,” were two ways of governing that were “differing
rather in form than essentially, the one tending to democracy, the other to aristocracy.” But both
approaches “equally assert the rights of the people to put the government into such a form as best
pleases themselves.”579 Moreover, as Adams said years later, “A Democracy is as really a republick, as
an Oak is a Tree – or a Temple a Building – there are in strickness of Speech and in the Soundest
technical Language democratical and Aristocratical Republicks, as well as an infinite variety of mixtures

&c,” he accepted the invitation by Braintree to give an oration at the May 1772 Town Meeting on the
subject of “the civil & religious rights & Priviledges of the People.” JA D&A, Vol. II, p. 67 (Nov. 21, 1772).
We do not have the oration that Adams delivered but we have his detailed notes. In sum, the ideas
Adams expressed in 1772 reflect his remarkably consistent core political values including, for example,
the necessity to observe and study human nature and then apply one’s learning to the science of
government; that man is naturally social and society necessitates government; and that no form of
government has “the Honour of a divine original or Appointment. The Author of Nature has left it wholly in
the choice of the People.” JA D&A, Vol. II, pp. 56-61.
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of. both.”580 The fact that so many different types of constitutions and governments had existed over time
proved that man had perpetually exercised his right of consent and often come out differently. Being
“liberal,” that is to say possessing an open-minded attitude towards the form of government, was a
Sidney-Percy family tradition that Algernon simply continued. This view also was part of Grotius’ mantra:
“you can frame no Form of Government in your Mind, which will be without Inconveniences and Dangers .
. . but as there are several Ways of Living, some better than others, and every one may chuse what he
pleases of all those Sorts; so a People may chuse what Form of Government they please.”581 Grotius and
Sidney’s language was the same: “God … having given to all men in some degree a capacity of judging
what is good for themselves, he hath granted to all likewise a liberty of inventing such forms as please
them best, without favouring one more than another,” said Sidney, whose republicanism unequivocally
endorsed the conviction that the form of government under which a people lived was wholly the choice of
that people.582
In contrast, Neville and Harrington, for example, rejected monarchy as a legitimate choice by
anyone, including the popular majority.583 This is one of those issues about which republicans disagreed.
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So why should Harrington, for example, be considered a republican?584 As discussed in our Introduction,
one could narrow the spectrum of views within the umbrella of republicanism, and this is one possible
way to do so. To Sidney, a thinker who insisted that the people did not have every choice available in
form of governance was voicing a view inconsistent with republicanism. But when we see the other
values of republican theory embraced by all these thinkers, it seems more sensible to categorize their
ideas collectively as republican, albeit with a range of views that fall within this political theory.
One of the “musts” for any republican, however, was the rejection of absolute monarchy. Of
Filmer. For there was no way to have that form of government and sustain essential republican values –
liberty, consent, etc., etc.585 As Adams said in 1775 in one of his Novanglus letters, “I have said that the
practice of free governments alone can be quoted with propriety, to shew the sense of nations. But the
sense and practice of nations is not enough. Their practice must be reasonable, just and right, or it will
not govern Americans. Absolute monarchies, whatever their practice may be, are nothing to us. For as
Harrington observed, ‘Absolute monarchy, as that of the Turks, neither plants its people at home nor
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As discussed in detail in Ch. Three, the preeminent scholars Skinner and Pocock particularly, and
those who relied on their scholarship, defined republicanism as a rejection of monarchism. Not surprisingly, Pocock’s preeminent republican was therefore Harrington, who rejected all forms of monarchy. The
fact is, however, that Harrington’s highly controlled and utopian form of republicanism is not centrist or
moderate republicanism, which was much more pragmatic from the time of Cicero who, after all, effectively (recognizing a very different legal system) practiced law. Harringtonianism represents an extreme
way of looking at governance, one that very few other republican thinkers adopted. For example, as
noted earlier, it “requires no proof,” said Harrington, “that the perfection of government lieth upon such a
libration in the frame of it, that no man or men, in or under it, can have the interest or, having the interest,
can have the power to disturb it with sedition.” Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, pp. 30-31.
This is contrary to the ideas of Sidney and Adams, as well as other contemporaries of both men. At the
same time, there are elements of Harrington’s theory that are quoted by all sorts of republicans. The à la
carte menu approach to the components of one’s own republicanism has been standard practice among
republican theorists, which goes to the heart of the challenge of understanding the theory.
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Wood believed that republicanism and monarchism “had different values,” but in the “eighteenthcentury context … were mingled in people’s thinking”; in his view, “republicanism has come to seem to
many scholars to be a more distinct and palpable body of thought than it was in fact.” While I agree with
Wood that, “Republican values were not marginal,” and that “they spread everywhere in the culture of the
Western world,” I suspect that their commingling is a much more recent confusion than Wood ascribed to
the eighteenth century. I also would suggest that when people referred to monarchy in the eighteenth
century they may well have meant absolute monarchy, which if interpreted otherwise can readily confuse
the analysis. Combining this unprovable possibility with the failure to appreciate why monarchism could
be a form of republicanism may well have created Wood’s misperception that “monarchism and
republicanism [were] often blended and blurred,” e.g., “People, even good aristocrats, could be loyal
monarchists and still ardently promote republican values.” See Wood, “Preface to the 1998 Edition, The
Creation of the American Republic, p. vii.
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abroad, otherwise than as tenants for life or at will.’”586 Years later, in his 1797 Defence of the
Constitutions, Adams addressed the subject rather poetically: “Countries that increase in population so
rapidly as the States of America did, even during such an impoverishing and destructive war as the last
was, are not to be bound long with silken threads: lions, young or old, will not be bound by cobwebs. - It
would be better for America,” said Adams, “to ring all the changes with the whole set of bells, and go
through all the revolutions of the Grecian states, rather than establish an absolute monarchy among
them, notwithstanding all the great and real improvements made in that kind of government.”587
On the other hand, Adams was a republican who entirely agreed with Sidney, Grotius and others
who did not reject non-absolute monarchy as one way to practice republicanism. Indeed, this is a subject
that, as we know, got Adams in a lot of trouble during his Vice Presidency. As Ryerson observed,
“Students of John Adams’s political thought have long been familiar with the accusation that he favored the
establishment of a monarchy. It was levelled repeatedly by assorted Jeffersonians, Madisonians, and antifederalists from the first appearance of Adams’s Defence in Philadelphia in April 1787 to the time of his
death nearly forty years later, and it is still repeated, from time to time, down to the present day.”588 He
was understood to be a monarchist in some sort of nefarious way, and abusively criticized and mocked for
it, even by close friends.589 But there was nothing new here. It was a lack of understanding of Adams’
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John Adams, “Preface,” Defence, Vol. I, p. vii. A few pages later Adams detailed some of the problems of simple monarchy, which he explained effectively constituted absolute monarchy because it was
not a government of laws, viz., ministers do not know friends from enemies, cabals take place (a wholly
Machiavellian concern), informers and spies destroy trust and “poison freedom,” etc. Id, pp. ix, xviii.
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Ryerson, “’Like a Hare before the Hunters’: John Adams and the Idea of Republican Monarchy,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Third Series, Vol. 107 (1995), pp. 16-29, 16. Ryerson
pointed out that even Abigail suggested it! – that is, suggested that others would think that of John.
It should be noted here, to be blunt, that Jefferson was particularly two-faced. During the very years that
he was corresponding sweetly with Adams, he would write very pejoratively about the second President
to other mutual acquaintances. For example, in a May 28, 1816 letter to John Taylor, Jefferson
unnecessary opined, “You have successfully and completely pulverized Mr. Adams’ system of orders,
and his opening the mantle of republicanism to every government of laws.” Jefferson to Taylor, May 28,
1816, Thomas Jefferson: Writings, pp. 1391-95, 1392.
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“The Republicans retrieved Adams’ Defence from the dustbin and exhibited it as evidence of his
monarchical beliefs.” Ferling, Jefferson v. Adams, p. 89. In one example of many, a Nov. 29, 1793 article
in the Philadelphia American Daily Advertiser styled “A Uniform Federalist,” and reprinted on Dec. 5th in
the Philadelphia National Gazette under the title, “Strictures on Mr. Adam’s Political Character,” Adams
was attacked as a monarchist. The letter suggested that Adams’ experience in Great Britain had corrupted him: “[I]f you wish to persevere in the happy and honorable experiment of governing yourselves; if you
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ideas that drove his rejection, not a new idea. In a 1775 Novanglus letter Adams had stated, “the British
constitution is nothing more nor less than a republic, in which the king is first magistrate. This office being
hereditary, and being possessed of such ample and splendid prerogatives, is no objection to the
government’s being a republic, as long as it is bound by fixed laws, which the people have a voice in
making and a right to defend.”590 The author(s) of the important seventeenth-century pamphlet A Just
Vindication, which likely included Sidney, suggested the same thing. “All Monarchies in the World, that are
not purely Barbarous and Tyrannical, have ever been called Commonwealths.”591
For republicans like Sidney and Adams, the best form of government was not certain, fixed or
permanent.592 What worked in one society might well not work in another; and what might work in one
society at a point in time, e.g., when the people were educated, might not work in another, e.g., when

wish not a king; if you be not prepared to open your purses to pay his ordinary and extraordinary revenues, his church, his armies, his placemen, his pensioners &c. &c. and in short, to defray the expences of
your own slavery; then, abandon Mr. Adams; annihilate his political existence; … stigmatize him as
an apostate from his own political creed; and, what is worse as an apostate from your political creed and
the political creed of your constitution.” This article was a response to a glowing description of Adams
entitled “A Consistent Federalist” dated Oct. 19, 1792 and published in both the Philadelphia Gazette of
the United States on Oct. 31st and the Boston Columbian Centinel on Nov. 17th, in the latter styled “A
Constant Federalist.” Abigail had written to a close family friend – technically, a “cousin-in-law,” Thomas
Welsh, about republishing the favorable article. See “A Uniform Federalist,” discussed in n. 2 of the letter
from Abigail to John, February 1, 1793,” Founders Online, National Archives, last modified June 29, 2017,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-09-02-0225 (9-14-17) [Orig. source: The Adams
Papers, Adams Family Correspondence, Vol. 9, January 1790 – December 1793, ed. C. James Taylor,
Margaret A. Hogan, Karen N. Barzilay, Gregg L. Lint, Hobson Woodward, Mary T. Claffey, Robert F.
Karachuk, and Sara B. Sikes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009, pp. 387–389]; Abigail
Adams to Thomas Welsh, Aug. 25, 1785, Adams Family Correspondence, Vol. 6: Dec. 1784 – Dec. 1785,
Richard Alan Ryerson, ed. (Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 297–299]; Abigail to John, June 16,
1775, Adams Family Correspondence, Vol. 1, Dec. 1761 – May 1776, Lyman H. Butterfield, ed. (Harvard
University Press, 1963), pp. 217–220. See also coincident citations in Wood, The Creation of the
American Republic, p. 582 & n.23, describing Defence as “one of the most deep wrought systems of
political deception that ever was penned by the ingenuity of man.”
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A Just and Modest Vindication, p. 44.
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Wood’s endorsement of historian Franco Venturi’s view that by the eighteenth century, republicanism
“could no longer be reduced to a form of government; it had become ‘a form of life,’ a set of ideals and
beliefs entirely compatible with monarchy,” is incorrect. It was not an eighteenth-century phenomenon.
To thereby dub it “the ideology of the Enlightenment” or simply a way for an eighteenth-century man “to
be interested in antiquity,” minimized and thereby marginalized the theory by eliminating its rich history.
Republicanism was never a form of government – witness the familiar categories of monarchy/aristocracy/democracy and their corrupted version of tyranny/oligarchy/anarchy and the absence of any reference to republic or republicanism. Wood, “Preface to the 1998 Edition,” The Creation of the American
Republic, p. viii.
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they were not. As an anonymous pamphleteer wrote in 1775, “But however perfect and natural a Form of
Government Monarchy of any kind may be, yet it can only be said to be generally best, but not absolutely
and universally so.” This is because, “if the different Forms of Government arose, as we have suppos’d,
from the different circumstances and interests of the People, that are subject to it: And as the interests of
People vary with their circumstances, so the Form of Government may be various, and yet each be best
in its Proper Place, and by consequence one Form of Government may be best for this People, another
for that.”593 The best form of government also was almost always a question of the best available option,
for as Adams famously wrote to Patrick Henry, it was exceedingly rare that men were able to create
government anew:
You and I, my dear Friend, have been sent into life at a time when the greatest lawgivers of
antiquity would have wished to live. How few of the human race have ever enjoyed an
opportunity of making an election of government, more than of air, soil, or climate, for
themselves or their children. When! Before the present epocha, had three millions of people full
power and a fair opportunity to form and establish the happiest and wisest government that
human wisdom can contrive? I hope you will avail yourself and your country of that extensive
learning and indefatigable industry which you possess, to assist her in the formation of the
happiest governments and the best character of a great People.594
In 1659 Sir Henry Vane the Younger said the same thing: “We again have the opportunity to set
up a free state and let us face the situation squarely. Do we or do we not want to take the responsibility
upon ourselves to rule ourselves.” Unfortunately, in that case the outcome was calamitous; Vane was
executed as was Sidney a few years later, along with other committed republican leaders. At the time of
the Glorious Revolution the opportunity was at least partially if not significantly lost, from a republican
point of view, given the degree of prerogative retained by William and Mary. Some patriots and arguably
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An Essay upon Government, Adopted by the Americans, Wherein, the Lawfulness of Revolutions, Are
Demonstrated in a Chain of Consequences from the Fundamental Principles of Society (Phila. 1775), pp.
117-18.
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“III. Thoughts on Government, [April 1776],” PJA Vol. 4, p. 92. Adams similarly wrote to John Penn in
an earlier (March 1776) edition of Thoughts on Government, “It has been the Will of Heaven, that We
should be thrown into Existence at a Period, when the greatest Philosophers and Lawgivers of Antiquity
would have wished to have lived: a Period, when a Coincidence of Circumstances, without Example, has
afforded to thirteen Colonies at once an opportunity, of beginning Government anew from the Foundation
and building as they choose. How few of the human Race, have ever had an opportunity of choosing a
System of Government for themselves and their Children? How few have ever had any Thing more of
Choice in Government, than in Climate?” Adams, “II. To John Penn, [Thoughts on Government ante
March 27, 1776],” PJA Vol. 4, p. 79. Years later Adams made a very similar statement about the
responsibility placed in American leadership that had the opportunity to create a new Constitution. See
“Conclusion,” Defence, Vol. I, pp. 381-82, viz., “we may think of it, in making establishments which will
affect the happiness of an hundred millions of inhabitants at a time, in a period not very distant.”
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republicans, e.g., Halifax, believed this was a better alternative than the continuation of the Stuarts.
Perhaps Sidney would have agreed. But that did not make Britain a republic. Eventually republicanism
emerged in England as Parliament gained strength. Ironically, it was the very strength of Parliament that,
a century later, posed a threat to the British Americans, who were convinced that their English
constitutional rights were meaningless if Parliament could do the things it sought to do in America.595
Adams wrote to Rush, “I also, am as much a Republican as I was in 1775. – I do not ‘consider
hereditary Monarchy or Aristocracy as Rebellion against Nature.’ on the contrary I esteem them both
institutions of admirable Wisdom and exemplary Virtue, in a certain Stage of Society in a great Nation.
The only Institutions that can possibly preserve the Laws and Liberties of the people.” Thus, said Adam,
even though “Our Country is not ripe for it,” in some societies they may become necessary. “I think it
therefore impolitick to cherish prejudices against Institutions which must be kept in view as the Hope of our
Posterity.”596 That is, some day that may be best for America, too. Cherishing prejudices against institutions could only hurt the people, said Adams, with the exception of the institution of absolute monarchy.
Haraszti found it plausible that, “had Adams been obliged to choose between unlimited
democracy and monarchy, ‘he would have accepted the latter without much hesitation.”597 But this is too
vague a statement. What kind of monarchy? And what does “unlimited democracy” mean to Haraszti? If
one reads Adams’ work it is extremely clear that monarchy was never Adams’ preferred form of
government. Mixed government was repeatedly and unequivocally affirmed by Adams as the best way to
preserve republican principles. There simply is “no evidences of secret monarchism in Adams’s
comments; nor could anyone who really knows him have expected any.”598 When Adams told Rush that
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See Speech of Henry Vane the Younger in Parliament, February 1659, Diary of Thomas Burton, ed. J.
T. Rutt, 4 vols. (London 1828), vol. 3, p. 337, cited in Margaret A. Judson, The Political Thought of Sir
Henry Vane the Younger (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), p. 53.
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John Adams to Benjamin Rush, June 9, 1789, Founders Online, National Archives, version of Jan. 18,
2019 [early access doc.], https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-0609 (4-14-19).
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Haraszti, John Adams and the Prophets of Progress, p. 41.
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There is no reason to doubt Adams’ own perspective on this subject. “To the Accusation against me
which you have recorded …, I plead not guilty. – I deny both Charges, I deny an ‘Attachment to
Monarchy’ and I deny that I have ‘changed my Principles since 1776.’” In Thoughts on Government, “I
recommended a Legislature in three independent Branches and to such a Legislature I am Still attached.”
Adams had become more cynical over time. “I owe that awful Experience has concurred with Reading
and Reflection to convince me that Americans are more rapidly disposed to Corruption in Elections, than I
thought they were fourteen years ago.” But Adams cautioned Rush “against a fraudulent Use of the
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he was a mortal and irreconcilable enemy to monarchy, he most assuredly was referring to absolute
monarchy. Constitutional or limited monarchy was always a viable republican option to Adams, the
rational, pragmatic attorney who concurred with Sidney and other republicans that the people of a society
were entitled to opt for limited monarchy if that was their preference – what they considered best for their
people; and if a monarch governed according to the law, limited monarchy could work well. It was one
form of republican government.599 (NB: why is a presidency not a limited monarchy by another name? Is
it the absence of heredity? But neither of these qualities has anything to do with the defining criteria of
republicanism. The only way to maintain that view would be to consider heredity to be inconsistent with
consent because the people were required to consent to their ruler, which would include a reigning
monarch. But what if the people did not want to do that?600)
Adams was consistent about the subject of monarchy throughout his life pace the suggestion of

Words Monarchy and Republick. I am a mortal and irreconcileable Ennemy to Monarchy. I am no Friend
to hereditary limited Monarchy in America. This I know can never be admitted, without an hereditary
Senate to controul it, and an hereditary Nobility or Senate in America I know to be unattainable and
impracticable,” not that he would have been for it, “if it were attainable.” Thus, Adams implored Rush,
“Don’t therefore my Friend misunderstand me and misrepresent me to Posterity. – I am for a Ballance
between the Legislative and Executive Powers and I am for enabling the Executive to be at all times
capable of maintaining the Ballance between the Senate and the House, or in other Words between he
Aristocratical and Democratical Interests.” Adams to Rush, April 18, 1790, Founders Online, National
Archives, version of Jan. 18, 2019 [early access doc.],
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-0915 (4-14-19).
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In addition to Adams’ statements to Rush, see Haraszti, John Adams and the Prophets of Progress,
pp. 39-42.
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One of the books on which Adams wrote extensive commentary, first in 1796 and then in 1812, was
Mary Wollstonecraft’s French Revolution. Adams highly objected to Wollstonecraft’s endorsement of
unicameralism and made notable derisive and sarcastic remarks about Wollstonecraft’s ideas, opposing
her views at every turn, even though ultimately, he recognized her intellectual abilities. One subject on
which Adams commented was Wollstonecraft’s hostility towards hereditary monarchy. For Wollstonecraft
there was nothing redeeming about hereditary privileges or wealth. As Adams observed, “Her enmity to
monarchy and hierarchy is as strong as that of the republicans who beheaded Charles the first.” Adams,
on the other hand, had befriended many members of the French nobility and was unwilling to paint with
such a broad brush. He noted that in history hereditary distinctions were not necessarily the cause of the
abridgment of “rational liberty,” pointing to the ancient Greeks and Romans, not to mention “in all Europe
since their times,” who had been “essential” in providing what liberty the people had. Moreover, said
Adams, “It would be laudable if she would reveal to us any way of getting rid of [monarchy and hierarchy]
but by substituting greater evils, in Europe.” As for the evils of hereditary wealth, Adams referred to the
English barons who “demanded Magna Charta.” Does this mean that Adams favored hereditary
monarchy? Hardly. As usual, Adams was being the attorney that he was, focusing in on the details of
Wollstonecraft’s arguments and nit-picking her “evidence.” Part of the issue was that Adams very rarely
wholly endorsed or rejected anything. But he also was unwilling to find that there were no redeeming
qualities to hereditary privileges. That does not equate, however, with endorsing it as a good alternative in
America. Haraszti, John Adams and the Prophets of Progress, pp. 186-87, 230-31.
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some historians, particularly Ryerson, that (i) Adams became increasingly cynical (true) and negative (but
not with regard to his republican values) later in life, debatable but for our purposes not worth debating;
and that (ii) he moved to the right and became enamored with monarchy and the necessity for a much
more powerful executive than he originally contemplated, whatever title that executive might have. As we
discuss Adams’ unwavering belief in mixed government it will be very clear that he was always
concerned, from a very young age, that a successful government had to be balanced, which required a
strong executive.601 Thus, in his 1776 Thoughts on Government, Adams advocated the necessity of an
executive armed with the negative, viz., the ability to veto proposed new acts of Congress. “This I know
is liable to some Objections,” Adams recognized. “But if he is annually elective, you need not Scruple to
give him a free and independent Exercise of his Judgment, for he will have So great an Affection for the
People, the Representatives, and Council that he would Seldom exercise his Right, except in Cases, the
public Utility of which would soon be manifest.”602
A decade earlier in his Clarendon letters young Adams analogized the nature of a government
constitution to that of the constitution of a human body, or “every kind of machinery.” In all these
instances, “We can never judge of any constitution without considering the end of it.” Here is the mind of
the quintessentially pragmatic, goal-oriented young attorney at work. Thus, “no judgment can be formed
of the human constitution,” for example, “without considering it as productive of life or health or strength.”
The physician was there to promote that end. “[H]ere lies the proper province of the physician,” namely,
“to study his constitution and give him the best advice what and how much he may eat and drink; when
and how long he shall sleep; how far he may walk or ride in a day;” etc., etc., “in order to preserve and
perfect his health, and prolong his life.” Not everything was in the physician’s province, said Adams;
there were certain fundamental and essential parts of the body, “of the human constitution,” that were off
limits to the doctor, “Parts, without which life itself cannot be preserved a moment,” e.g., “Annihilate the
heart, lungs, brains, animal spirits, blood; any one of these, and life will depart at once.” But in
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At the same time, Adams did not go overboard. For example, he was clear that the Executive should
not be armed with those “Badges of slavery called Prerogatives.” Adams, “II. To John Penn, [Thoughts
on Government, ante 27 March 1776]” PJA Vol. 4, p. 82.
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considering how to preserve and protect a human being’s constitution, Adams pondered, “Will the doctor
order vinegar, lemmon juice, barberries and cramberries, to work a cure?” Of course not. “These would
be unconstitutional remedies; calculated to increase the evil, which arose from the want of a balance,” not
to promote balance “between the acid and alkaline ingredients, in his composition.” 603
Obviously a remedy, solution or scheme would be inherently flawed if it prevented or obstructed
rather than promoted the end for which the constitution was designed. In considering how best to protect
a constitution, whether the constitution of the human body, of a clock, or of a government, the constitution
had to be constructed to optimally protect and promote “its end, its use, its designation, drift and scope.”
In the case of government, where “Liberty is its end” and “essential to the public good,” it was necessary
“to preserve the balance and mixture of the government” such that its end, the very purpose of government, “the good of the whole community,” “the public good, the salus populi,” was properly protected. For
it was “the want of a balance” in a government’s constitution – in the case at hand in 1766, the British
constitution – that prevented government from achieving its intended purpose. With respect to
eighteenth-century England, part of that balance was providing sufficient power to the King. The “King is
by the constitution, supreme executor of the laws,” an essential component in “the first grand division of
constitutional powers … into those of legislation and those of execution.”604 It was irrelevant whether you
liked the particular king, or the concept of kingship. Without a sufficiently powerful executive, the purpose
of the British government could not be achieved. As Adams explained much later in A Defence of the
Constitutions, “It is an error to think it is an uncontroulable maxim, that power is always safer lodged in
many hands than in one…. [T]hey are as capable of enslaving the nation, and of acting all manner of
tyranny and oppression, as it is possible for a single person to be… for whichever of the three divisions in
a state is upon the scramble for more power than its own, as one of the three generally is (unless due
care be taken by the other two); upon every new question that arises, they will be sure to decide in favor
of themselves.”605 Emphasizing this point in his Preface to A Defence of the Constitutions, Adams
explained how protection of the people required a strong executive, “If there is one certain truth to be
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collected from the history of all ages, it is this: That the people’s rights and liberties, and the democratical
mixture in a constitution, can never be preserved without a strong executive, or, in other words, without
separating the executive power from the legislative. If the executive power, or any considerable part of it,
is left in the hands either of an aristocratical or a democratical assembly, it will corrupt the legislature as
necessarily as rust corrupts iron, or as arsenic poisons the human body; and when the legislature is
corrupted the people are undone.”606

Democracy hath, therefore, two excesses to avoid;
the spirit of inequality, which leads to aristocracy or monarchy; and the spirit of extreme equality,
which leads to despotic power, as the latter is completed by conquest.
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 607

ii.. Republicanism on Democracy
Today when we talk about the United States’ form of governance we tend to fudge our
characterization of its nature. Often we say that America is a democratic republic. Yet we do not define
what it means to be a republic; and we do not literally mean “democracy” which at its purest or simplest is
direct participation in government decision-making by all citizens, which does not happen in America.
Because of its emphasis on the individual’s role in politics, democracy tends to be understood as
individualistically focused; in contrast, republicanism, with its commitment to the public good, is viewed as
much more communal. 608 Certainly this was the case for civic , the Florentine Renaissance tradition out
of which early modern British and then British-American republicanism emerged. In thinking about the
theory of republicanism, we can see that it appealed to a range of thinkers, some of whose views were
more communally oriented; others more individualistic. Both emphases fit within the umbrella of
republicanism because they all shared common features or endorsements of certain criteria, e.g.,
participatory government and the rest, that define the tradition; but there are different emphases and
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Unsurprisingly, there is another universe of literature beyond the scope of this study on democracy
that includes different definitions of democracy and, particularly, its key features. See, e.g., Richard
Bellamy, “The Republic of Reasons: Public Reasoning, Depoliticization, and Non-Domination,” Legal
Republicanism, Ch. 4, pp. 102-20, 106 (“The three key features of contemporary democratic systems are
regular elections on the basis of one person one vote, majority rule, and a competitive party system.”)
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sometimes idiosyncratic constituencies, such as Harrington’s The Balance.
To address the question of republicanism’s take on democracy, it is well to remind ourselves of
Adams’ 1763 Platonic statement about forms of government which, as he stated forty-four years later,
“has been the Creed of my whole Life and is now March 27 1807 as much approved as it was when it
was written by John Adams.” In his 1763 essay, “All Men would be Tyrants if they could,” Adams wrote,
“No simple Form of Government, can possibly secure Men against the Violences of Power. Simple
Monarchy will soon mould itself into Despotism, Aristocracy will soon commence an Oligarchy, and
Democracy, will soon degenerate into an Anarchy.” 609 In general, Adams probably gave lopsided attention to his description of democracy and its degeneration into anarchy. Indeed, the rest of the paragraph
to which he referred in 1807 was all about the ugly things that happened when Democracy turned into
Anarchy: “such an Anarchy that every Man will do what is right in his own Eyes, and no Mans life or
Property or Reputation or Liberty will be secure and every one of these will soon mould itself into a system of subordination of all the moral Virtues, and Intellectual Abilities, all the Powers of Wealth, Beauty,
Wit, and Science, to the wanton Pleasures, the capricious Will, and the execrable Cruelty of one or a very
few.”610 Adams’ Anarchy sounds very much like Hobbes’ state of nature; neither were palatable.
According to Kindle, there are 239 references to democracy in Defence. Obviously, the subject
was both of interest and importance to Adams. He maintained that, “Democracy, simple democracy,
never had a patron among men of letters.”611 For one thing, “A simple and perfect democracy never yet
existed among men.”612 But even “[d]emocratical mixtures in government,” said Adams, “have lost almost
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all the advocates they ever had out of England and in America.” Oddly, he attributed this to the greed of
men of letters: “Monarchies and aristocracies pay well and applaud liberally. The people have almost
always expected to be served gratis.” It is therefore “no wonder,” said Adams, “that democracies and
democratical mixture are annihilated all over Europe, except on a barren rock, a paltry fen, an
inaccessible mountain, or an impenetrable forest,” each of which specific political circumstance he
detailed.613 Indeed, it was obviously one of Adams’ purposes to prove that governments that people
characterize as democratic in fact are mixed governments; thus, the first major category of republics to
which A Defence is devoted is “Democratical Republics.”614 Among other things, in his summary of
Sidney’s views on the subject in his section on “Mixed Government,” Adams referred to Sidney’s rejection
of unbalanced “simple species” governments, including democracy.615 He also noted, pace Kloppenberg,
that Plato classified democracy as one type of republic, but one in which licentiousness destroys it.616
Adams wholly rejected simple democracy. As he wrote to Mercy Otis Warren, “Despotism,
absolute monarchy, absolute aristocracy, and absolute democracy I have uniformly detested through my
whole life; because I knew that absolute power was tyranny, delirious tyranny wherever it was placed.”617
At the same time, with almost as much vehemence, he maintained that a “democratic branch in the
constitution” was necessary. “There can be no free government without a democratical branch in the
constitution.”618 The major reason Adams felt so strongly about the need for a strong executive, with veto
power, was because, “If there is one certain truth to be collected form the history of all ages, it is this:
That the people’s rights and liberties, and the democratical mixture in a constitution, can never be
preserved without a strong executive.” Thus, Adams did not favor a strong executive in its own right; he
favored it because he thought it was necessary to preserve the democratic component of the legislature
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and, as we shall see, to create balance in government. If the executive power was left entirely in the
hands of the legislature or in the hands of a democratic assembly, “it will corrupt the legislature as
necessarily as rust corrupts iron, or as arsenic poisons the human body; and when the legislature is
corrupted the people are undone.”619 Indeed, the “very name of a republic implies, that the property of the
people should be represented in the legislature, and decide the rule of justice,” citing Cicero.620
Notwithstanding the fact that some republicans, with Jefferson the obvious example of a
republican peer of Adams who articulated a political philosophy that broadly embraced principles of
democracy, we can see from this one quotation that a mainstream republican thinker like Adams was
extremely wary of it. Four factors were at play here. First and foremost, Adams was quite unequivocal
about the fact that, because “men grasp at all,” it was “an error to think it is an uncontroulable maxim, that
power is always safer lodged in many hands than in one.”621 Any place where power was lodged could
become corrupt; people in any entrusted position with governmental authority could abuse power. This
was true in monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. “The fundamental article of my political creed is that
despotism, or unlimited sovereignty, or absolute power, is the same in a majority of a popular assembly,
an aristocratical council, an oligarchical junto, and a single emperor. Equally arbitrary, cruel, bloody, and
in every respect diabolical.”622 The question for Adams always was the inclusion in law of limitations of
power on whatever the favored form of government might be, and the effectiveness of the establishment
of the law.
Second although not paradoxically, as much as Adams admired “the people,” spoke of their hard
work, their ability to be sensible, their commitment to their country, he was personally fearful and
disparaging of the dominance of the people politically, the rise of unscrupulous factions within the people,
and especially public activism by mobs and associated mob mentality, which he associated with
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democracy, and a recklessness he associated with it.623 First, we have to acknowledge that mobs are
scary! And Adams was a middle-class man, brought up among “the people,” but a law-abiding lawyer. He
routinely represented “the people,” in contrast to Jefferson, who was a member of the Virginia slaveowning plantation elite. I.e., Jefferson’s democratic impulses and his views of the people were
substantially “arm-chair” political theory. As many times as we see Adams admiring the industriousness,
or wisdom, or decency of all kinds of “regular” people, he was also aware that “the people” could turn into a
mob very quickly. Adams’ fears were at play, for example, during the 1774 King v. Stewart trial, as he
litigated the events that took place when the rabble invaded the home of Adams’ client, terrified King’s
pregnant wife and five children, and destroyed their property. “I know of nothing that happens in society
which is such a Nursery of Scandal, and Calumny, of obloqui and Defamation as a Mob. Besides it is such
a Gratification to the Envy and Revenge, of the most sordid, base and groveling among the Vulgar, that it
gives them a Triumph and they always become insolent, impudent, and abusive to such a Man.”624
The rioters were trespassers, violating the universally recognized legal adage that, “An Englishman’s dwelling House is his Castle.” Moreover, they did so “in a most outragious manner.” Adams
rhetorically asked, “Is this not a base Affront? No Man who has a Soul, who has the Spirit of a Man in him
can ever after during his whole Life, ever forget such an Indignity, tho he may forgive it.”625 This fear of the
mob poured out in John’s contemporaneous correspondence with Abigail, as well as in his argument to the
jury in the Boston Massacre trials. Writing to Abigail as he participated in the King v. Stewart trial, Adams
said, “I am engaged in a famous Cause: The Cause of King, of Scarborough vs. a Mob, that broke into his
House, and rifled his Papers, and terrifyed him, his Wife, Children and Servants in the Night. The Terror,
and Distress, the Distraction and Horror of this Family cannot be described by Words or painted upon
Canvass. It is enough to move a Statue, to melt an Heart of Stone, to read the Story. …These private

623
There are a number of examples of Adams’ admiration for the people, some of which have already
been referenced. Just to provide one more, in his sixth Novanglus letter Adams noted that even if “the
people being ignorant,” quoting from Locke,” they are very patient, viz., “all the slips of human frailty will
be born by the people, without mutiny and murmur”; and the “power in the people of providing for their
safety anew by a legislative … is the best fence against rebellion and the probablest means to hinder it.”
Novanglus VI, PJA Vol. 2, p. 292. On the “sensible” language, see Novanglus I, id, p. 228.
624

King v. Stewart, Legal Papers of John Adams, Vol. I, pp. 106-40.

625

Id, p. 137.
861

Mobs, I do and will detest.626 In one of the Massacre trials, Adams emphasized that the soldiers were
terrified as they faced an unruly Boston mob. “Would it have been a prudent resolution in them, or in any
body in their situation, to have stood still to see if the sailors would knock their brains out, or not?”627
Calculated decisions by the British government, such as locating a standing army in Boston, fueled this
fire. Not that the worry was limited to Adams or to the Bay. Wealthy New Yorker and fellow founding
father Gouverneur Morris, for example, wrote to John Penn in May 1774 with far greater disdain than
Adams displayed, “The mob begin to think and to reason. Poor reptiles! It is with them a vernal morning;
they are struggling to cast off their winter’s slough, they bask in the sunshine, and ere noon they will bite,
depend upon it. …I see it with fear and trembling, that if the disputes with Great Britain continue, we shall
be under the worst of all possible dominions, we shall be under the domination of a riotous mob.”628
Adams’ visceral reaction to the mob and its ability to quickly become violent related to the third
intellectual and emotional factor that made him wary of democracy, namely, his unqualified commitment
to the rule of law.629 There was a long-established tradition of street violence in the metropole and in the
colonies. This was not only true in Boston, but in many other American cities and towns.630 As an
attorney Adams was an officer of the court; he not only was obligated, but Adams wholeheartedly
believed in the rule of law. In analyzing the issue of the legality of opposition and the use of force in
colonial Massachusetts Bay, Prof. Reid drew the distinction between “lawlessness,” which was “not only
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in violation of constituted law, but was performed either for an irrational purpose or for personal gain or
had a negative or antisocial aim,” and “unlawfulness.” In the latter case an act might have been
impermissible under British “imperial” law, but still have some degree of legitimacy. Reid characterized
Adams’ approval of the Boston Tea Party as falling into this relatively benign grouping.631 In fact, the
issue is even more nuanced than Reid suggested; there probably are three or four categories, not two.
The first is unambiguous lawlessness, mob violence, of which Adams clearly, consistently, and strongly
disapproved; the crowd behavior in the King case falls squarely in this bracket. But pace Reid’s
suggestion, lawlessness need not be irrational, for personal gain, or have a negative or antisocial aim. In
the case of the radical patriots, for example, including almost certainly Adams’ second cousin Sam,
lawlessness often was rational, not for personal gain, and without a negative or antisocial aim. Boston
citizenry’s harassment of customs inspectors is one example out of many in this “lesser lawlessness”
category, viz., lawlessness for a very deliberate, well-thought out and often well-executed political
purpose. Adams could appreciate this behavior; but he remained extremely uncomfortable with it.
Another category in defining the legality of opposition or resistance would be actions taken in
absolute opposition to an “imperial” or British government purpose but implemented through lawful
means, obviously encompassing challenges that utilized the court system and all legitimate legal fora, as
well as penning newspaper articles and conducting other legitimate modes of opposition. Unsurprisingly
Adams was most comfortable functioning in this category; indeed, this was perhaps the only oppositional
method in which Adams could personally participate in support of the patriot cause.632 Adams’
perspective was quintessentially lawyerly. Indeed, in a recent text on the how lawyers “think, argue, and
win,” law professor Joel Trachtman explained the classic vantage point of the attorney. “If it is to be a
government of laws, and if laws are composed of words, then people dealing with government, including
but not limited to lawyers, must be expert at dealing with words.” As this study noted in its Introduction,
“all verbal expression intended to govern future events is, by its nature, incomplete. It is incompletely
specific because it fails to describe every future circumstance. It fails to describe every future
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circumstance because the possible set of future circumstances is infinite. This incompleteness is
endemic to all verbal expression in law, including contracts and statutes. To the ordinary person, this is a
problem; to the lawyer, it is an opportunity for advantage.”633 This was Adams’ consummate perspective,
although it was a perspective that eluded some of the British leaders, e.g., “It is fair to say that Governor
Francis Bernard was one high tory who never understood what whigs were up to. That rebels might be
governed by a legal theory was beyond his imagination.”634 There may even be an additional category
that properly fits somewhere in-between the two ‘levels” of lawlessness, on the one hand, and legitimate
means of opposition on the other, such as when proposed colonial action constituted a clear violation of
existing law, e.g., dumping tea in Boston harbor but, as Adams’ ruminations reflect, might have been the
only viable option.635 Buckling under the Crown’s position simply was not viable; it constituted the
acceptance of, and perhaps even complicity in unconstitutional action.636 Without the option of a
legitimate mode of opposition, creative forms of illegitimate opposition became necessary. Adams was
not personally comfortable functioning in this context; but he clearly understood and accepted it.
One of the reasons John seems to have been useful to the more radical patriots like his cousin
Samuel was precisely because of his stalwart licitidy. Another consequence was that John was able,
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indeed felt the moral obligation, to represent without qualification accused persons that happened to have
a differing political vantage point, e.g., the Boston Massacre defendants. Page Smith considered Adams’
determination to remain independent to be his most salient characteristic.637 It seems reasonable to view
this element of Adams’ personality as part of his overall perspective about both his legal responsibility to
the judiciary and his views on liberty.
Recall Reid’ distinction between lawlessness and unlawfulness. Lawlessness was “not only in
violation of constituted law, but was performed either for an irrational purpose or for personal gain or had
a negative or antisocial aim.” In contrast, unlawfulness was an act might have been impermissible under
British “imperial” law, but still have some degree of legitimacy. Reid believed that this was how Adams
viewed the Boston Massacre. In my own view, Adams was confronted with two unlawful options: obeying
the British, which meant violating fundamental law, or confronting them through this dramatic but
remarkable peaceful albeit confrontational action. No doubt the absence of scary mob activity during the
Tea Party assuaged Adams’ views of this civil disobedience. (This was a brilliant Sam Adams tactic.) But
ready resort to mob violence as a problem-solving solution would have been anathema to Adams.638
Once again, we can only address the very, very tip of this social history iceberg. We know that British
governance became increasingly dysfunctional, leaving a widening chasm in which local populations
functioned without government – what Adams even called “a state of nature.”639
Historians have pursued the issue of how local insurgency and support for a revolution actually
unfolded, a complex question.640 Understanding why the American rebellion did not degenerate into the
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mass executions and destruction of private property associated with the French Revolution, or with many
revolutions since then, is important, but beyond the scope of our inquiry. Structure may be a big part of
the answer. The decision of the Continental Congress to endorse nonimportation, nonconsumption and
nonexportation made it necessary to utilize a local committee structure to implement, which then became
the foundation for “sustaining and strengthening” insurgency.641 The other aspect is one directly
applicable to Adams: moderates tended to be pragmatic, and Adams usually was the most pragmatic of
men.642 Silence or, in Adams’ case, avoidance may have seemed like the best alternative to prevent
descent into anarchy, which we know was of enormous concern to Adams. In any event, by this juncture,
as a Continental Congressional leader, Adams would have been associated with the insurgency without
participating in any street activity. Nevertheless, there were painstaking efforts by the Congress to
succeed in their economic measures, empower localities to take action in accordance with these
measures, and to maintain a dynamic relationship with local committees trying to implement Congress’
mandates – all further efforts to engage in peaceful if not lawful revolutionariness. Clearly, Adams did not
participate in mob violence or other insurrectionist activity beyond serving as counsel to the Sons of
Liberty and individuals, such as Hancock, associated with that activity. “I was solicited to go to the Town
Meeting and harrangue there. This I constantly refused.”643 Direct involvement was not a position with
which Adams would have been comfortable and he cleverly and assiduously avoided it. No doubt his
distaste for mobs would have contributed mightily to his disapproval of seditious behavior, particularly
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mob violence, and to the power of the people institutionalized in a democracy.
Fourth, Adams consistently worried about education and the lack of it received by Joe Citizen. In
Thoughts on Government Adams asserted, “LAWS for the liberal education of youth, especially of the
lower class of people, are so extremely wise and useful, that to a humane and generous mind, no expence for this purpose would be thought extravagant.”644 Education was the bridge between the crowdcum-rabble and the rule of law; it facilitated the absence of mob rule. But again, Adams was a realist.
Education was helpful; it was not a panacea. After all it was in Boston, where the community provided for
universal elementary school education, that royalist agents and sympathizers were burned in effigy, among
other mob action. As John wrote to Sam years later when John was Vice President and Sam was the
Massachusetts Lieutenant-Governor, repeating the refrain about education to which John often returned.
“You agree, that there are undoubtedly principles of political architecture. But, instead of particularizing
any of them, you seem to place all your hopes in the universal, or at least more general, prevalence of
knowledge and benevolence.” John agreed with Sam that “knowledge and benevolence ought to be
promoted as much as possible; but, despairing of ever seeing them sufficiently general for the security of
society, I am for seeking institutions which may supply in some degree the defect.” Speaking theoretically,
John continued, “If there were no ignorance, error, or vice, there would be neither principles nor systems of
civil or political government.” Reflecting on his own views, John stated, “I am not often satisfied with the
opinions of Hume; but in this he seems well founded, that all projects of government, founded in the
supposition or expectation of extraordinary degrees of virtue, are evidently chimerical. Nor do I believe it
possible, humanly speaking, that men should ever be greatly improved in knowledge or benevolence,
without assistance from the principles and system of government.”645
The link between the four factors related to man’s social condition and the nature of democracy is
self-evident: how to trust the people, those folks who readily mob, with the serious business of
governance?646 In his “dialogue” with Bolingbroke via marginalia, Adams (A) had this exchange with the
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British thinker Henry St. John, first Viscount of Bolingbroke (B):
B.: The notion of a perpetual danger to liberty is inseparable from the very notion of
government.
A.: In democracies as well as in mixed governments.
B.: In perfect democracies precautions [against this evil] have been taken in the highest degree;
and yet even there they have not been always effectual.
A.: What can he mean? When and where did he find his perfect democracies?
B.: They were carried very far in the Athenian form of government; yet one of their magistrates
found means to become their tyrant.
A.: Athens was a mixed government as Solon made it. Aristides destroyed the balance. In a
democracy one of their magistrates is always their tyrant. France has from 1789 been more of
a democracy than Athens, and one of their magistrates is now their Emperor. Algernon Sidney
understood this subject better than Bolingbroke.647
Finally, Adams worried about the question of majority will in a democracy, and how to protect the
interests of minorities, viz., the tyranny of the majority. “There was no guarantee that 50 percent plus one
would do right by the rest of society, nor was there any guarantee that they would not ignore the limits
upon their own power enshrined in the constitutional compact.” For Adams, “The need for restraints on
the democratic power grew from the reality that the will of the majority at any moment in time (or even of
the people in general) was not necessarily the true interest of the society or even the majority.”648 This
preoccupation is illustrated in Adams’ long analysis in Volume II of A Defence of the wars among the
Italian city-states. Analyzing events in Siena and the constant strife between Guelph and the Ghibelline
factions, Adams set forth the problem: “[T]he minority is never happy; indeed, they are always oppressed
by the majority, where there is not a separate executive and an independent judicial, whose interest as
well as duty it is to be impartial between them.”649 In thirteenth-century Renaissance Italy, it was like a
pendulum swinging, in which first the Ghibelline party, and then the Guelph, and then back to the
Ghibelline, took control over an Italian city, in this case Siena, “wholly depri[ving]” the other “of any share
in the government,” which then provoked the counterattack. “And this is ever the object of a prevalent
faction or a decided majority, to monopolize the whole government to themselves, by the total exclusion
of the minority; and when possessed of the whole legislative, executive, and judicial, they drive into exile,
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confiscate, behead, and oppress in every way, without control.”650 In Adams’ view, not only did this
foment civil war, it didn’t work. “Arbitrary laws of exclusion and disqualification, and awkward attempts to
expose to popular odium the principal families, made without the least modesty or equity by a popular
majority, will never have weight enough with the people.” The minority “will retain enough influence with
the people, … and being justly irritated and provoked at the injustice done them, will never want a
disposition to attempt dangerous enterprises.”651
In short, there was something inherently unstable about majority rule unless the government
figured out how to minimally satisfy the interests of the minority. After a recital of other Italian city-state
conflicts, in which the “parties of Ghibellines and Guelphs, under the name of Empire and the Church,
sown in the hearts of men by the enemy of the human race, had poisoned Italy,” Adams found that there
was an “essential defect in the constitution of every Italian republic.” There was no balancing of power,
but always a tug of war between two factions. “The parties of rich and poor, of gentlemen and
simplemen, unbalanced by some third power, will always look out for foreign aid, and never be at a loss
for names, pretexts, and distinctions.” Adams pointed out “Whig and Tory, Constitutionalist and
Republican, Anglomane and Francomane, Athenian and Spartan, will serve the purpose as well as
Guelph and Ghibelline.” Presumably majority and minority factions could be another one of these ugly
divisions. “The great desideratum in a government,” said Adams, “is a distinct executive power, of
sufficient strength and weight to compel both these parties, in turn, to submit to the laws.”652
“It is very easy,” said Adams, “to flatter the democratical portion of society, by making such
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distinctions between them and the monarchical and aristocratical.”653 But this is unrealistic and foolhardy.
“[F]lattery is as base an artifice, and as pernicious a vice, when offered to the people, as when given to
the others. There is no reason to believe the one much honester or wiser than the other; they are all of
the same clay, their minds and bodies are alike.” While monarchs and aristocrats may have “more
knowledge and sagacity derived from education,” said Adams, “and more advantages for acquiring
wisdom and virtue” as a result, all are “equally guilty” of “usurping others rights when they are “unlimited
in power: no wise man will trust either with an opportunity; and every judicious legislator will set all three
to watch and controul each other.” Adams placed minority interests in this context. “We may appeal to
every page of history we have hitherto turned over, for proofs irrefragable, that the people when they
have been unchecked, have been as unjust, tyrannical, brutal, barbarous and cruel, as any king or senate
possessed of uncontroulable power: the majority has eternally, and without one exception, usurped over
the rights of the minority.”654 He referred to Marchamont Nedham’s way of putting it: “They naturally
‘move,’ says Nedham, ‘within the circle of domination, as in their proper centre.’” Adams’ blunt, albeit
experienced, observation: “When writers on legislation have recourse to poetry, their images may be
beautiful, but they prove nothing.”655 The truth, said Adams, was much coarser. The “populace, the
rabble, the canaille, move as naturally in the circle of domination, whenever they dare, as the noble or a
king; nay, although it may give pain, truth and experience force us to add, that even the middling people,
when uncontrouled, have moved in the same circle, and have not only tyrannized over all above and all
below, but the majority among themselves has tyrannized over the minority.”656 This is reality. This, said
Adams, “happens universally, when the people in a body, or by a single representative assembly, attempt
to exercise all the powers of government.” Referring, presumably, to Nedham, Adams queried, “How can
this writer say then, that ‘while the government remained untouched in the people’s hands, every
particular man lived safe?’” In fact, he said, “The direct contrary is true. Every man lived safe only while
the Senate remained as a check and balance to the people: the moment that controul was destroyed, no
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man was safe.”657 Reiterating this view in a November 13, 1815 letter to Jefferson, Adams wrote, “The
fund[a]mental Article of my political Creed is, that Despotism, or unlimited Sovereignty, or absolute
Power, is the same in a Majority of a popular Assembly, an Aristocratical Counsel, an Oligarchical Junto,
and a single Emperor. Equally arbitrary, cruel, bloody, and in every respect diabolical.658 There certainly
were republicans who did not share Sidney and Adams’ discomfort with democracy. In addition to the
French revolutionaries, Jefferson and Paine were the most famous.659
Place two guardians of the laws to watch the aristocracy; one, in the shape of a king,
on one side of it; another, in the shape of a democratical assembly, on the other.
John Adams. Defense of the Constitutions660
iii. Bicameralism & Equality
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Adams to Jefferson, Nov. 13, 1815, The Adams-Jefferson Letters, pp. 456-58. In his March 4, 1797
inaugural address, Adams made the following comments of particular relevance today. “In the midst of
these pleasing ideas, we should be unfaithful to ourselves, if we should ever lose sight of the danger to
our liberties, if any thing partial or extraneous should infect the purity of our free, fair, virtuous, and
independent elections.” Sounding the tocsin, Adams continued. “If an election is to be determined by a
majority of a single vote, and that can be procured by a party, through artifice or corruption, the
government may be the choice of a party, for its own ends, not of the nation, for the national good.”
Similarly, “If that solitary suffrage can be obtained by foreign nations, by flattery or menaces; by fraud or
violence; by terror, intrigue, or venality; the government may not be the choice of the American people,
but of foreign nations. It may be foreign nations who govern us, and not we, the people, who govern
ourselves.” This reality must lead “candid men” to “acknowledge, that, in such cases, choice would have
little advantage to boast of over lot or chance.” Inaugural Address of John Adams, March 4, 1797,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/adams.asp (3-5-19).
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Toward Democracy, Prof. Kloppenberg recent magisterial study on democracy, explored the
intellectual history of the development of the concept of democracy, including the vast array of historical
contexts in which the concept developed. The book is very difficult to handle for purposes of
understanding early modern republicanism because, for the most part, Kloppenberg was not talking about
direct democracy, even when he was analyzing political thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth
century, which is what democracy meant to those using the term in Europe and America at that time.
Kloppenberg primarily addressed the subject of representative democracy, i.e., representative
participatory government, which is one form of republicanism. In short, Kloppenberg elided the two
concepts of democracy and republicanism, perhaps with the understandable goal of simply getting away
from the term republicanism, which has provoked so much intellectual controversy. Thus, for example, he
featured Adams substantially, and wrote considerably about Sidney, which is very unusual in studies of
either republicanism or, particularly, democracy. After all, neither thinker or activist embraced what they
understood to be democracy; indeed, they were extremely wary of, if not hostile to it. Meanwhile, the
concept of “republicanism” is not important enough in Kloppenberg’s study to even merit topic recognition
in his Index, and “republican government” is hardly mentioned, not defined, and only addressed in
passing. Kloppenberg’s scholarship is wonderfully extensive and arresting. One must raise the question,
however, whether it comports with historical reality. See Kloppenberg, Toward Democracy.
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Adams’ views on the necessity of bicameralism is simply an extension of his lifelong realism, a
determination to look at the world, the condition of man, and the choices available to him as they really
are, not as one might want them to be. “Without three divisions of power, stationed to watch each other,
and compare each other’s conduct with the laws, it will be impossible that the law should at all times
preserve their authority, and govern all men.”661 Adams’ commitment to bicameralism also reflected a
profound commitment to equality. Adams’ perspective on this subject was constant. In his 1776
Thoughts on Government Adams declared, “A People cannot be long free, and never can be happy,
whose Laws are made, executed and interpreted by one Assembly.”662 Adams provided five reasons why

661

Id.

662
John Adams, “II. To John Penn, Thoughts on Government, ante 27 March 1776],” PJA Vol. 4, pp. 7886, 81. Adams’ first public statement about bicameralism seems to be his Nov. 15, 1775 letter to Richard
Henry Lee, out of which came his Thoughts on Government, written about a half-year later. “Taking
Nature and Experience for my Guide,” said Adams, each colony should have “A Legislative, an Executive
and a judicial Power,” and the legislative power should consist of both “a full and free Representation of
the People” in a “House of Commons,” as well as a Council and a Governor, each of whom should “have
a Negative on all Laws.” Adams to Richard Henry Lee, Nov. 15, 1775, PJA Vol. 3, pp. 307-08. How this
translated to Wood’s characterization of Thoughts on Government is unclear. In Wood’s view, Thoughts
on Government reflected Adams’ assumption “that politics was essentially a struggle between the ruler or
chief magistrate and the people in which the aristocracy sitting in an upper house would act as mediator,”
in contrast to Defence in which, said Woods, Adams had changed his view, and now saw the executive
as “balancer” between the people and the aristocracy. Moreover, Wood claimed, in Thoughts on
Government Adams “had conceived of the aristocracy as constituting the ablest and wisest men of the
state,” whereas later he “saw the aristocratic interest set in opposition to the people’s or the democratic
interest.” Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, p. 579.

There is no shift in view, as suggested by Wood. As Nelson cogently stated, “Several scholars,” citing
Wood, Joyce Appleby and John R. Howe, “have argued that Adams’s political thought underwent a
fundamental shift in the 1780s,” jettisoning “the orthodox republicanism of the early 1770s in favor of a
reactionary and idiosyncratic sort of conservatism. …I am unpersuaded by this argument.” Nelson, The
Royalist Revolution, p. 311 n.46. In 1791, much closer in time to Defence than to Thoughts on
Government, in a letter to Sam Adams, John wrote that, “the nobles have been essential parties in the
preservation of liberty, whenever and wherever it has existed. In Europe, they alone have preserved it
against kings and people, wherever it has been preserved; or, at least, with very little assistance from the
people.” Thus, he posited the role of aristocracy as a balancer. At the same time, in the same letter,
John wrote about how the nobility had “waged everlasting war against the common rights of men,” but
“So have the plebeians; so have the people; so have kings; so has human nature, in every shape and
combination, and so it ever will,” and that, “The multitude, therefore, as well as the nobles, must have a
check,” and to “do justice to the people and to the nobles,… to do justice to both, you must establish an
arbitrator between them,” meaning the magistrate. Thus, pace Wood, in this letter we see Adams
expressly recognizing the balancing role of at least two of the three prongs of tripartite government, the
nobility and the magistrate and, of course, it applied to containing the prerogative power of the magistrate
as well. John to Sam, Oct. 18, 1790, https://democraticthinker.wordpress.com/2010/04/11/samuel-johnadams-on-government%E2%80%94letter-iii/ (3-8-19).
In short, Adams always had tripartite government in mind, recognizing that in the timeframe of Thoughts
on Government the matter at issue was the formation of each state’s government because the national
government was universally seen as a confederation at the time and not a more powerful federal
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this was the case: (i) “A Single Assembly is liable to all the Vices, Follies, and Frailties of an Individual”;
(ii) “A Single Assembly is apt to grow Avaricious,” with predictable consequences; (iii) “A Single Assembly
will become ambitious, and after Some Time will vote itself perpetual”; (iv) “The Executive Power cannot
be well managed by a Representative Assembly for Want of two essential Qualities, secrecy and
Dispatch”; and (v) “Such an assembly is still less qualified to exercise the judicial Power because it is too
numerous, too slow, and generally too little Skill’d in the Laws.” Even if one removed judicial and
executive responsibilities from a single assembly, it still would not work, said Adams, for at least the first
three specified reasons.663 In a letter to Francis Dana a few months later Adams wrote, “The Convention
of Pensilvania has voted for a single Assembly, such is the Force of Habit, and what Surprizes me not a
little is, that the American Philosopher [Franklin], should have So far accommodated himself to the
Customs of his Countrymen as to be a zealous Advocate for it.” Adams’ “bottom-line” was the converse:
“No Country, ever will be long happy, or ever entirely Safe and free, which is thus governed.”664
According to Haraszti, of all of Adams’ books it was Mary Wollstonecraft’s French Revolution in
which Adams scratched marginalia “most profusely.” And it was Wollstonecraft’s argument favoring a
single chamber assembly because of its simplicity that most galled Adams. “The clock would be more
simple if you destroyed all the wheels and left only the weights or the spring, but it would not tell the time
of day. A farmer’s barn would be more simple if without apartments and he turned in all together his
horses, cattle, sheep and hogs: yet his haymows would be wasted and his stock killed and gored.”
Adams’ metaphors continued. “A ship would be more simple without a rudder, with but one mast and one
sail…. The universe would be more simple if it were all in one globe. …The laws would be more simple if
all reduced to one ‘Be it enacted that every man, woman and child shall do their duty.’” In short, Adams
observed, “It is silly to be eternally harping upon simplicity in a form of government. The simplest of all

government, as evolved in the timeframe of Wood’s analysis. But for Adams, in tripartite government,
each part balanced the other two parts, and there is no indication that he saw things any differently when
he reviewed the proposed US Constitution. In general, Adams often expressed wariness about the power
of the people and the power of the aristocracy. It is unclear whether he was less fearful of the power of
the chief magistrate or simply felt that his audience already was sufficiently fearful of executive power in a
post-English civil war and post-George III world, and therefore caution on that front was unnecessary and
perhaps counterproductive. What we can conclude, however, is that all in all, Wood is misreading Adams.
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possible governments is a despotism in one. Simplicity is not the summum bonum.”665
The ne plus ultra of this component of Adams’ political theory was the entire three-volume text of
A Defence of the Constitutions, designed as a legal or evidentiary proof supporting bicameralism as
implemented in most of the constitutions of the states of the United States of America.666 Defence was
motivated in part by what Adams believed to be rampant European ignorance of the American system of
government and its values, and his longstanding opposition to the unicameralism advocated by the
French, particularly by the recently deceased, lauded physiocrat who Adams had known, Minister AnneRobert-Jacques Turgot (1727-1781) and the views Turgot expressed in a 1778 letter to dissenting British
clergyman Richard Price that had been included as an appendix to a Price pamphlet published in 1784.
The conclusion of Adams’ “Preliminary Observations” to Defence, at the beginning of his three-volume
study, continued Adams’ lifelong emphasis on the lessons that men can and should learn from history,
and Adams’ reliance, once again, in stating his case for republicanism, on Algernon Sidney – this time
referencing both Sidney and John Locke. “Shall we suppose then,” said Adams, “that Mr. Turgot
intended, that an assembly of representatives should be chosen by the nation, and vested with all the
powers of government; and that this assembly shall be the centre in which all the authority shall be
collected, and shall be virtually deemed the nation. After long reflection, I have not been able to discover
any other sense in his words, and this was probably his real meaning.” Why was Adams bothering to
rebut Turgot, much less write an opus? “To examine this system in detail may be thought as trifling an
occupation, as the laboured reasonings of Sidney and Locke, to shew the absurdity of Filmar’s
superstitious notions, appeared to Mr. Hume in his enlightened days. Yet the mistakes of great men, and
even the absurdities of fools, when they countenance the prejudices of numbers of people, especially in a
young country, and under new governments, cannot be too confuted.” In short, said Adams, “You will not
then esteem my time or your own mispent, in placing this idea of Mr. Turgot in all its lights; in considering
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Adams’ 1812 comments on Mary Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Men, Haraszti, John
Adams & the Prophets of Progress, pp. 186, 214.
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Scholars have remarked on the misleading title to this three volume opus since it is not about the
constitutions of the united States. But this comment misses the point. The best defense of those
constitutions was a defense of bicameralism.
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the consequences of it; and in collecting a variety of authorities against it.667 Rushed to press in 1787, the
first volume of Defence was spurred to rapid production for a confluence of reasons. Adams noted “the
Disturbances in New England,” viz., what became known as Shay’s Rebellion, although his knowledge
from England of events in Massachusetts was sparse. Importantly Defence was usefully available to the
1787 Constitutional Convention delegates that met in Philadelphia from May to September 1787.668 It lent
“serious weight” to the argument on balanced government at the Constitutional Convention.669 Volume I
was published widely, both as a book and in newspaper installments in extract format in Boston and
elsewhere.670 Within months, by January 1788, a third edition was published in Boston; Volumes II and III
were published in late 1787 and 1789. By April 1788, nine years after leaving America and serving as an
ambassador in France, the Netherlands, and Britain, John and Abigail were on their way home.
Adams’ recognized that Defence was a “Strange Book,” written so quickly that he had been
“obliged to be too inattentive both to Method and the ornaments of Style.” On the other hand, as he
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According to J. M. Porter and R. S. Farnell, Defence was circulated at the Constitutional Convention,
well-read, and influential, e.g., George Washington’s autographed copy of Defence “shows, by the many
marked passages, that it was thoroughly read, particularly the section on “Mixed Governments.” J. M.
Porter and R. S. Farnell, “John Adams and American Constitutionalism,” American Journal of
Jurisprudence, Vol. 21, Issue 1 (Jan. 1976), pp. 20-33, 32 & ns. For a very useful summary of the context
of the 1787 publication of the first volume of the Defence, see Editors’ Note, “Volume I of John Adams’ A
Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America,” PJA, Vol. 18: Dec. 1785Jan. 1787, pp. 544-50; see also R. B. Bernstein, “John Adams: The Life and the Biographers,” pp. 14-16
and citations therein.
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Historian Joyce Appleby tells a fascinating story about Jefferson’s about-face and “conniv[ing]” in first
offering to facilitate Adams having Defence translated into French and then, perhaps after actually
reading the work, letting the project die. Instead, Jefferson watched and possibly facilitated his friends,
including Condorcet and Mazzei, translate and publish a pamphlet by American John Stevens, which
apparently was sent to them by Jefferson’s protégée James Madison. The Stevens pamphlet was highly
critical of Adams’ work. The French translation of Stevens’ pamphlet also included independent culpatory
“animadversions” by the French editors rejecting the substance of Defence and especially of DeLolme’s
earlier, influential, and consonant study of the British constitution. In short, per Appleby, Adams was wellknown to the French public and in 1787 his ideas would have been both influential and have caused
“exquisite embarrassment” because they threatened the unicameral political position of the men who
were leading the effort to change the French governmental system in the very early (pre-revolutionary)
stages of the French Revolution. The publishing of Stevens’ pamphlet instead of Adams’ Defence was
how Condorcet & co. chose to deep-six Adams’ study. Appleby’s emphasis is on Jefferson’s surreptitious
role in this unattractive endeavor. “When a French edition [of Defence] finally appeared in 1792, the translator felt it necessary to apologize for Adams’ bias toward aristocracy.” Joyce Appleby, “The JeffersonAdams Rupture and the First French Translation of John Adams’ Defence,” American Historical Review
73 (Apr. 1967), pp. 1084-91, 1088.
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pointed out in his letter on the subject to his old friend Richard Cranch, to focus on style at a time when
America’s entire emphasis should be on the merits of governance, i.e., on substance, “appears to me like
establishing Manufactures of Lace, Fringe & Embroidery in a Country before there is any of Silk, Velvet or
Cloth.” While Adams was “no Ennemy to Elegance,” he argued, perhaps defensively, that this ought not
to be of any concern to people who have not yet secured the right ideas to protect themselves from illegal
activity, such as that taking place in western Massachusetts. Rather, paraphrasing Tacitus, Adams
maintained that, “Libertatem, Amicitiam, Fidem, præcipua humani Amini bona …are essential to human
Happiness,” i.e., his text embraced Tacitus’ motto to “hold liberty, friendship, and fidelity as the highest
goods of the human soul.”671 In opposition to the glib and worrisomely convincing prose of Turgot,
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There is a huge and very complex story at play here that is far beyond the scope of this study, which
includes multiple threads: the emergence of what was, in effect, the next generation of political activists in
America while members of the first generation, including Franklin, Adams, and a little later Jefferson, were
immersed in European affairs, promoting America’s best interests abroad, and therefore not involved in
US politics; the return of many of the “older generation” from the national to the local scene, either
refocusing their efforts on state (formerly colony) politics or simply retiring, e.g. Hancock; the consequent
change in the makeup of the Congress; and the emergence of political maneuvering for which no one had
much time, energy, or interest at the time of the revolutionary war. Additionally, in this timeframe events
were transpiring in America that had significant impact on the citizenry, such as Shay’s Rebellion. The
new men in Congress were younger, and had a different perspective than the Founders; they may not
have ever even met Franklin, Adams or Jefferson; certainly, their experiences were not comparable.
Note the similarity with Sidney’s experience when he returned to England after being away, ostracized
and living on the European continent for eighteen years, The new generation of parliamentarians knew of
his reputation; they knew he was a revolutionary hero; but they did not know him, and their experiences
and views were markedly different. It is in this context that the next generation of leaders, Alexander
Hamilton for example, arose to such power and influence. Hamilton was born in 1757, more than twenty
years after Adams’ birth. His story is unique given his Caribbean, indigent beginnings. He became Washington’s aide-de-camp in the revolutionary war, and so he was not entirely removed from a revolutionary
mentality. But he did not become a national politician until he was elected to Congress in 1782. He also
became a highly successful New York lawyer and politician. In Congress and thereafter Hamilton aggressively pursued a nationalist agenda, seeking to make constitutional changes that would give the federal
government enormous authority and power, a perspective that was unlikely in a patriot who had felt the
controlling threat of Britain that significantly triggered the American Revolution. While Adams agreed to
some extent (and Jefferson disagreed) with this agenda, it may have been Hamilton’s political acumen,
years later, that caused Adams to lose the presidential reelection in 1800 (and therefore Jefferson to win),
even though Hamilton and Adams were ostensibly on the same “side.” E.g., “Adams ever after blamed
Hamilton for his electoral defeat…. Hamilton and his gang of sycophants had conspired to prevent the
sailing of America’s envoys for three crucial months in the summer and fall of 1799, a sulky and treacherous obstruction that was calculated to forestall a diplomatic settlement until after the election. In the end
they had their way.” Perhaps political events and allegiances would have been different if Adams and/or
Jefferson had been in America during the 1780s and ‘90s; but they were needed elsewhere. Moreover,
Adams, at least, was not a political operator. On the quotation from Adams and Tacitus, see Adams to
Richard Cranch, Jan. 15, 1787, PJA Vol. 18: Dec. 1785-Jan. 1787 (Cambridge, MA & London: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), pp. 542-44 and editors’ n. 4 on Tacitus translation, id,
p. 544. For a mere sampling of the vast literature on these subjects, see Appendix B.
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Adams’ bottom line, colloquially speaking and “reiterated over and over again” in a style of pragmatic
advocacy, was “get real.” The chapters of Defence were stylized as letters. One chapter, ostensibly
about Benjamin Franklin who apparently favored unicameralism, was actually a transparent way to
systematically eviscerated Turgot’s ideas. Once again we have the effective lawyer at work, this time with
the United States as his presumptive client. “Let us now return to Mr. Turgot’s idea of a government
consisting in a single assembly. – He tells us, our republics are ‘founded on the equality of all the citizens,
and therefore “orders” and “equilibriums,” are unnecessary, and occasion disputes.’ But,” said Adams,
“what are we to understand here by equality? Are the citizens to be all of the same age, sex, size,
strength, stature, activity, courage, hardiness, industry, patience, ingenuity, wealth, knowledge, fame, wit,
temperance, constancy and wisdom? Was there, or will there ever be a nation, whose individuals were
all equal, in natural and acquired qualities, in virtues, talents, and riches?” 672 Of course, there is only one
answer to this question: “The answer of all mankind must be in the negative.”673
Adams turned to “the Massachusetts” as proof positive of his point, explaining that he should
have chosen Virginia, the oldest state in the union, or any other state rather than the one in which he was
born; but he did not want to make any “suppositions, which may give offence, a liberty which my neighbours will pardon” – another standard mode of advocacy, utilizing magnanimity and civility to one’s
advantage. Adams’ point was that any state would do; the principles on which he relied were universal.
In Massachusetts, with its bicameral form of government, there was “a moral and political equality of
rights and duties among all individuals” – an inaccuracy, certainly with respect to blacks and women,
albeit a universal inaccurate “oversight.” This recognition of the principles of equality was pro forma - the
views of the Enlightenment and, with respect to male universality anyway, the activist view of his early
idol, James Otis, Jr. In his 1764 Rights of the British Colonies, Otis had argued that, “Gravitation and
attraction have place in the revolution of the planets … so in the moral world the first simple principle is
equality and the power of the whole.”674 As historian T. H. Breen brilliantly argued in a 1998 article, Otis
believed “Equality was a fact of nature.” Furthermore, “God did more than dictate equality. He transferred
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his voice in civil affairs to the people, to all of them. ‘It is therefore originally and ultimately in the people;
and they never did in fact freely, nor can they rightfully make an absolute, unlimited renunciation of this
divine right.”675 For Otis, “God’s divine right to absolute power” did not belong to kings; it belonged to the
people; and all the people. Otis’s forceful defense of universal human equality, a radical egalitarianism,
led him to challenge Locke and what we call Locke’s liberalism, arguing that both women and black
people shared the same right to equality as white men and, accordingly, they should not be placed outside of civil society. Years later Adams rejected wholesale the early constitutions of the Carolinas, which
sanctioned slavery.676 This was a message that was unintentionally lost or deliberately ignored by British
and American whigs, fellow republicans, as well as subsequent scholars – historians and others.
Entangled in this analysis is the American transition, what Breen called “a profound transformation,” from
subject to citizen, from a person who looked up to a master, a “superior,” to a citizen equal to his fellow
citizens without exceptions for heredity, race, or any other reason.677
We do not know what the brilliant lawyer Otis would have thought by 1776; although he lived to
1783, mental illness that began in the 1760s had taken over his mind by the time of the Revolution. But
in 1764 Otis remained attached to Britain, believing that “the members of the House of Commons would
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Adams, Defence, Vol. I, pp. 365-71. On missing this point after substantial discussion of Defence, see,
e.g., Wood, “The Relevance and Irrelevance of John Adams,” The Creation of the American Republic,
Ch. XIV, pp. 567-92. Adams did not take up slavery as a political cause. But he unquestionably found it
abhorrent. See, e.g., Adams to Robert J. Evans, June 8, 1819, John Adams: Writing from the New
Nation 1784-1826, pp. 647-48.
Here, too, Adams had a real problem with Jefferson, “the revolutionary” who “did not wish to see himself
as a despot or tyrant – the names he had called George III. At the same time, he was not about to cease
ownership of the people he enslaved. … [A man who] “created connections on his plantation that
promoted his self-satisfaction. Slavery worked well for the patriarch at all stages of his life, but particularly
in the days after he left public service. It not only provided him with a basic livelihood, though not as good
a one as he could have had; it also allowed him to ‘monopolize … [the] time, talents, and attention’ of
enslaved people in a way that ‘he could not do with the whites in his life.’ There was no real incentive for
him to do anything else, and he was willing to be a ‘prodigy’ only within the confines of the institution.
Slavery bounded his life from cradle to grave.” Gordon-Reed & Onuf, “Most Blessed of the Patriarchs,”
pp. 59, 70. Locke’s views on slavery are also complex. See Appendix B.
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“[O]ther political thinkers have bet heavily on the wrong horse – Hobbes, for example – and still
managed to speak powerfully to later generations. Otis’s reputation as a radical liberal theorist languished largely because he championed universal human rights within a conceptual framework that every
American writer rejected at the moment of the signing of the Declaration of Independence.” Breen,
“Subjecthood and Citizenship,” p. 398.
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eventually come to their collective senses.”678 Ironically, Otis tied the language of subjecthood to the
British constitutional monarch and the rights he guaranteed to his subjects, which enabled Otis to derive
his radical egalitarianism. Breen observed that while the words of the Declaration pronounced the “selfevident truth” that “all men are created equal,” these words were not interpreted Otis’s way, i.e., literally.
The words could have come from the pen of Otis, but of course by 1776 their meaning was changing
rapidly. Jefferson, for example, imagined an independent republic governed by honest yeoman farmers,
white men who owned enough land to preserve their uncorrupted political judgment, all citizens of the
United States proclaimed before the world to be as good as any other white man. This is precisely the
kind of republican rhetoric that Otis had rejected in the early 1760s.679
The man who consistently recognized this separate egalitarian thread in Otis’ radical republicanism was Adams. He found Otis’s intellectual honesty enormously admirable; at the same time, the retired
Adams recalled in 1818, “Young as I was, and ignorant as I was, I shuddered at the doctrine he taught;
and I have all my life shuddered, and still shudder, at the consequences that may be drawn from such
premises.” Breen left us to reach our own conclusions about what this meant, as far as Adams’ views go.
The obvious and probably the overwhelming inference drawn by scholars is that Adams could not tolerate
a truly equal society. But this was not Adams’ point at all. From the beginning, e.g., in late 1765 and
early 1766, writing as the seventeenth-century moderate monarchist Edward Hyde, the first earl of
Clarendon, Adams championed the principle of political equality. “The constitution … stands not on the
supposition that kings are the favourites of heaven; that their power is more divine than the power of the
people, and unlimited but by their own will and discretion.” This was because, as Prof. McIlwain pointed
out, “Discretionary powers are by their very definition not controllable by any law.”680 The constitution,
Adams continued, “is not built on the doctrine that a few nobles or rich common[er]s have a right to inherit
the earth, and all the blessings and pleasures of it: and that the multitude, the million, the populace, the
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vulgar, the mob, the herd and the rabble, as the great always delight to call them, have no rights at all.”
Rather, the constitution “stands upon this principle, that the meanest and lowest of the people, are, by the
unalterable indefeasible laws of God and nature, as well intitled to the benefit of the air to breath, light to
see, food to eat, and clothes to wear, as the nobles or the king.” In sum, “All men are born equal: and the
drift of the British constitution is to preserve as much of this equality, as is compatible with the people’s
security against foreign invasions and domestic usurpation.”681
Years later, “The repugnance of Negro slavery seemed to Adams so obvious as hardly to merit
argument.”682 Adams was one of only two signatories to the Declaration of Independence, the other being
Franklin, who did not own slaves. On the other hand, Adams in no way applied himself towards the
abolition of chattel slavery. It was his son, John Quincy, who did something about it.683 In contrast, John
was willing to defer to the Southern colonies (later, Southern states) to assert their own best interests.684
Thus, in slavery and also in women’s rights, Adams ideas were remarkably egalitarian; on the
other hand, he was not willing to act on them. Certainly, for example, we know that his relationship with
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Adams fears about and discomfort with the institution of slavery are reflected in a telling passage of a
Feb. 3, 1821 letter to Jefferson. “Slavery in this Country I have seen hanging over it like a black cloud for
half a Century. If I were not drunk with enthusiasm as Swedenborg or Westley [whose biographies Adams
reported having just finished}, I might probably say I had seen Armies of Negroes marching and countermarching in the air, shining in Armour. I have been so terrified with this Phenomenon that I constantly
said in former times to the Southern Gentlemen, I cannot comprehend this subject. I must leave it to you.
I will vote for forcing no measure against your judgements. What we are to see, God knows, and I leave
it to him, and his agents in posterity. I have none of the genius of Franklin, to invent a rod to draw from
the cloud its Thunder and lightening.” Adams to Jefferson, Feb. 3, 1821, Adams-Jefferson Letters, p. 571.
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Abigail was unusually “modern.” But in both instances, the treatment of slaves and of women, Adams
uncharacteristically ducked; he did want to use his political capital on the more unusual issue, at the time,
of women’s rights, nor the very incendiary issues of slavery. He did not want to even try to impact the
minds of “Southern Gentlemen.” The subject was acutely sensitive; and Adams did not handle such
matters well. He had a similar perspective about native Americans: “I have always found it as difficult to
satisfy my mind what ought to be the system of conduct of the civilized part of America towards the
Indians as what ought to be that of the Masters towards their African domesticks all possible humanity
consistent with public safety ought to be exercised towards both.”685 We can see in exchanges with
Abigail, too, that John was uncomfortable with the notion of equal rights for women and did not think
America was ready for it.686 In sum, we can fairly educe from this information that the cause of Adams’
“shuddering” was not that people were not entitled to equal treatment under the law, but that in some
instances, society, including John Adams, was not ready to do anything about it. On the matter of equality
in Adams’ republicanism, his issue was not political equality but natural inequality, which Adams believed
had been and would always be true. Denying this was simply putting one’s head in the sand; and this was
a head he was prepared to lift.
Thus, Adams realism prevented him from subscribing to the principle that “all men by nature are
equal.” Indeed, in his view, they most definitely were not. As he said in “Discourses on Davila” and wrote
about repeatedly, “Although among men, all are subject by nature to equal laws of morality, and in society
have a right to equal laws for their government, yet no two men are perfectly equal in person, property,
understanding, activity, and virtue, or ever can be made so by any power less than that which created
them.”687 These were inequalities of great moment to legislators; they had inevitable and enormous
influence. These were inequalities common to all mankind, “Inequalities of Mind and Body” that were “so
established by God Almighty in his constitution of Human Nature that no Art or policy can ever plain them
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down to a Level.” 688
Entitlement to political equality did not correspond to human beings being by nature equal, said
Adams; yet there was no distinction made by political thinkers between political equality and the panoply
of dissimilar human traits that we all observe daily – both assets and liabilities.689 At the same time there
was no such thing as “artificial inequalities of condition,” meaning justifiable hereditary distinctions, titles,
differences in legal status (again, dubiously applied, albeit universally so), etc., etc.690 Adams
nevertheless was unequivocal about the universality of the natural aristocracy that he described: “There is
not a city nor a village, any more than a kingdom or commonwealth, in Europe or America; not a hord,
clan, or tribe, among the negroes of Africa, or the savages of North or South America; nor a private club
in the world, in which such inequalities are not more or less visible.” To deny this natural aristocracy, as
Turgot did, for example, was simply to deny reality. Not only was it foolhardy and perhaps naïve to do so,
but the contrary was necessary, viz., great attention needed to be paid to this truth, “a fact essential to be
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It is in this regard, perhaps most significantly, that Adams disagreed with Jefferson, whose radical
republicanism seemed to embrace the Everyman. On the other hand, pace the Jefferson memorial,
Jefferson owned 800 slaves. The most recent piercing analysis of this glaring inconsistency, if not
hypocrisy is Gordon-Reed & Onuf. “Most Blessed of the Patriarchs. In an Oct. 28, 1813 letter to Adams,
for example, Jefferson explained his view, quite the obverse of Adams’: ‘The natural aristocracy I
consider as the most precious gift of nature for the instruction, the trusts, and government of society.
…May we not even say that that form of government is the best which provides the most effectual for a
pure selection of these natural aristoi into the offices of government? The artificial aristocracy is a
mischievous ingredient in government, and provision should be made to prevent it’s ascendancy.”
Jefferson to Adams, The Adams-Jefferson Letters, pp. 387-92, 388. Adams was very clear that he did
not share Jefferson’s highly divergent treatment in his politics of natural and unnatural aristocracy. “Your
distinction between natural and artificial Aristocracy does not appear to me well founded.” Adams
explained, “Birth and Wealth are conferred on some Men, as imperiously by Nature, as Genius, Strength
or Beauty. The Heir is honours and Riches, and power has often no more merit in procuring these
Advantages, than he has in obtaining an handsome face or an elegant figure.” The influence of the law,
once again, is quite evident in Adams’ perspective. “When Aristocracies, are established by human Laws
and honour Wealth and Power are made hereditary by municipal Laws and political Institutions, then I
acknowledge artificial Aristocracy to commence: but this never commences, till Corruption in Elections
becomes dominant and uncontroulable.” And in any event, “this artificial Aristo-cracy can never last. The
everlasting Envys, Jealousies, Rivalries and quarrells among them, their cruel rapacities upon the poor
ignorant People their followers, compell these to sett up a Caesar, a Demoagogue to be a Monarch and
Master, pour mettre chacun a sa place [“to put each one in his place”].” In sum, Adams concluded, “Here
you have the origin of all artificial Aristocracy, which is the original of all Monarchy.” Adams to Jefferson,
Nov. 15, 1813, The Adams-Jefferson Letters, pp. 397-402, 400.
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considered in the institution of a government.”691
In Defence Adams focused on four types of inequality: (i) wealth; (ii) birth; (iii) inequalities of
merit, talent, virtue, service (e.g., to one’s country), and reputation; and (iv) those limited instances in
which “all these advantages of birth, fortune, and fame are united.” In other work, Adams recognized
natural physical inequalities that created a natural aristocracy, e.g., inequalities of beauty, stature, etc.692
With respect to the inequality of wealth, Adams noted that it might be inherited or made; it resulted in
inequality in property owned. While some had a great deal and others “no property at all,” the truth was
that “all the rest of the society, much the greater number, are possessed of wealth, in all the variety of
degrees, between the extremes.”693 Those with less often depended on those with more, whether for jobs
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Id, pp. 116, 118. As early as 1790, in a letter to his cousin Sam, Adams wrote about the American
natural aristocracy. “By nobles, I mean not peculiarly an hereditary nobility, or any particular modification,
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Adams, Charles Francis Adams, ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1850—56), Vol. 6, pp. 416-20.
692

Adams spelled this out in detail in his 1813 exchange with Jefferson. Indeed, Adams was positively
gleeful about Jefferson’s statement that, “I agree with you that there is a natural aristocracy among men.”
Beelining in on this principle, Adams said, “We are now explicitly agreed, in one important point, viz, that
‘there is a natural Aristocracy among men; the grounds of which are Virtue and Talents.’” At the same
time, Adams remained the proverbial realist. “When I consider the weakness, the folly, the Pride, the
Vanity, the Selfishness, the Artifice, the low craft and meaning cunning, the want of Principle, the Avarice
the unbounded Ambition, the unfeeling Cruelty of a majority of those (in all Nations) who are allowed an
aristocratical influence; and on the other hand, the Stupidity with which the more numerous multitude, not
only become their Dupes, but even love to be Taken in by their Tricks: I feel a stronger disposition to weep
at their destiny, than to laugh at their Folly.” Adams also was not sure that he and Jefferson actually saw
eye-to-eye on the realities of natural aristocracy. “But tho’ We have agreed in one point, in Words, it is not
yet certain that We are perfectly agreed in Sense. Fashion has introduced an indeterminate Use of the
Word “Talents.” Education, Wealth, Strength, Beauty, Stature, Birth, Marriage, graceful Attitudes and
Motions, Gait, Air, Complexion, Physiognomy, are Talents, as well as Genius and Science and learning.
Any one of those Talents, that in fact commands or influences true Votes in Society, gives to the Man who
possesses it, the Character of an Aristocrat, in my Sense of the Word.” In short, “Pick up the first 100
men you meet, and make a Republick. Every Man will have an equal Vote. But when deliberations and
discussions are opened it will be found that 25, by their Talents, Virtues being equal, will be able to carry
50 Votes. Every one of these 25, is an Aristocrat, in my Sense of the Word.” Jefferson to Adams, The
Adams-Jefferson Letters, p. 388; Adams to Jefferson, Nov. 15, 1813, id, pp. 397-98.
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or other necessities. As for inequalities of birth, he emphasized how all men across all ages embraced
their natural heritage, their sense of family identity, honor, duty and spirit. While we “cannot presume that
a man is good or bad, merely because his father was one or the other …. Wise men beget fools, and
honest men knaves; but these instances, although they may be frequent are not general.” In this regard
not only heredity and the “influence of example,” but educational opportunity, which is often familiallylinked, played a significant part.694 As for merit, service, talent, etc., there were those who acquired “the
confidence and affection of their fellow citizens, to such a degree, that the public have settled into a kind
of habit of following their example and taking their advice,” surely an inequality albeit one “naturally”
earned.695 The fourth category – all of the above – simply emphasized the importance of the first three.
The inequality inherent in the nature of man, comfortably recognized and truly powerful because
of its universal recognition, “contains the greatest collection of virtues and abilities in a free government.”
In other words, how foolish to ignore these sources of inequality! Natural aristocracy “is the brightest
ornament and glory of the nation; and may always be made the greatest blessing of society, if it be
judiciously managed in the constitution.” Thus, Adams counseled, recognize this reality and build a
political system that not only accounts for it, but takes advantage of it to promote and stabilize society.696
For if the natural aristocracy is not judiciously managed, said Adams, “it is always the most dangerous;
nay, it may be added, it never fails to be the destruction of the commonwealth.”697 Furthermore, you can’t
kill the natural aristocracy. Men have tried, but the consequence is simply that “another aristocracy
instantly arose, with equal art and influence,” albeit “with less delicacy and discretion, if not principle,”
which “behaved more intolerably than the former.” There is only one answer, said Adams, “one expedient
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Once again, Adams did not invent this idea; he repackaged and folded into his republicanism an
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yet discovered, to avail the society of all the benefits from this body of men” that the society can both
afford, and which is necessary to prevent “the undermining or invading” of “the public liberty.” The answer
is “to throw them all, or at least the most remarkable of them, into one assembly together, in the
legislature; to keep all the executive power entirely out of their hands as a body; to erect a first magistrate
over them, invested with the whole executive authority… and to erect on the other side of them an
impregnable barrier against them, in a house of commons, fairly, fully and adequately representing the
people.”698 For as Adams explained in his Preface to Defence, the “rich, the well-born, and the able,
acquire an influence among the people, that will soon be too much for simple honesty and plain sense, in
a house of representatives. The most illustrious of them must therefore be separated from the mass, and
placed by themselves in a senate; this is, to all honest and useful intents, an ostracism.”699 Once again
we have Adams’ political theory in a nutshell – the necessity of bicameralism and mixed government.
It was in 1790-91, during his Vice Presidency, that Adams wrote the highly controversial, indeed
impolitic newspaper essays that were printed together as “Discourses on Davila,” his last major work on
politics.700 A scathing commentary on the French Revolution, “Discourses on Davila” was an analysis for
which some, including Jefferson, never forgave Adams, and for which he paid a dear political price both
during his presidency, which began in 1797, and in his failure to gain a second term of office in 1800.701
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Over his post-presidency years Adams corresponded profusely, including letters to the press. Adams
likely knew that his correspondence with Jefferson, for example, would become public one day. But
“Discourses on Davila” marked the end of Adams’ career producing detailed studies in the nature of
instructive “how to” books on good governance. I agree with Haraszti that, “it is an interesting coincidence
that [Adams] began his Discourses on Davila, showing the evil effects of unbalanced governments, at
precisely the same time as Burke started his own work,” viz., Reflections on the Revolution in France,
which were published in November of 1790. Haraszti, John Adams & the Prophets of Progress, p. 21.
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Adams was elected President in 1796. In her article, “The Presidential Election of 1796,” in John
Adams and the Founding of the Republic, Richard Alan Ryerson, ed. (Boston: Massachusetts Historical
Society, 2001), pp. 142-67, Joanna B. Freeman focused on the complexity of the 1796 election, a
phenomenon entirely different from what we as modern Americans have come to understand as
presidential politics. The political world was not yet one of party politics, which was largely considered to
be fortunate. The remote nature of the countryside contributed significantly to the difficulty of establishing
any sort of system of political networking. That does not mean, however, that the politics at play was
either unsophisticated or dysfunctional. “Whether they were selecting candidates, electioneering, or
voting in the electoral college, politics were sifting through a spectrum of options and loyalties, balancing
them according to the individual logic of their lives. Such choices were far more complicated than simply
choosing a party to support.” Among other questions were the most fundamental ones: “What sort of
man should fill the executive office, and how was he to be selected?” Today we cannot relate to the fact
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“Discourses on Davila” is an important Adams oeuvre. Diggins described the text, which had first
appeared as a series of essays in the Gazette of the United States from April 1790 to April 1791, “as
much a book in social psychology as political theory.”702 Enrico Caterino Davila was a late-sixteenth/
early-seventeenth century Italian historian and diplomat. His book about the French civil wars, Historia
delle guerre civili de Francia, was written in 1630, and was so popular that over two hundred editions
were published. It is a small world. The English translator of the work was William Aylesbury, a royalist
who returned from Paris to London with the Earl of Leicester, Algernon Sidney’s father, in May 1641.703
Like Machiavelli had done in writing Discourses on Livy, Davila’s book became the pretext for Adams’

that neither Adams nor Jefferson left their home during the election! “In essence, Adams and Jefferson
had literally nothing to do with either their candidacy or campaigns.”
Ferling had a very different view. “Jefferson took charge of organizing the opposition to the Federalists in
Congress. Jefferson cultivated an image of detachment, and many of his foes were led to think of him as
a dreamy, insular utopian. In reality, while he served as secretary of state, and now during his vice
presidency, Jefferson was a meticulous, hands-on politician. His coterie of myrmidons (he characterized
similar men in Hamilton’s orbit as flatterers) gathered and brought him information and gossip. He
devoured newspapers, listened to the Senate oratory, and grew masterful at the art of eliciting dinnertable scuttlebutt. He entertained regularly. …“Through these means,” concluded Ferling, Jefferson “was
unsurpassed in his knowledge of the habits and inclinations of numbers of members of Congress. In
addition, he was peerless at circulating rumor and innuendo and at fleshing out the Republican Party
position. Jefferson also provided assistance – financial and otherwise – to Republican editors and
penmen, including Bache and James Thomson Callender.” Regardless of one’s understanding of the
facts on the ground, it is clear this was a time during which, regardless of your politics, everyone agreed
that at least with respect to appearances, “power-hungry men who placed their own interests above the
common good … were the bane of republics.” Detachment was considered the sine qua non of political
leadership. Freeman, “The Presidential Election of 1796,” John Adams and the Founding of the Republic,
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follow-up to his three-volume Defence, unequivocally and adamantly rejecting centralized, unicameral,
“unbalanced” governmental authority based on his understanding of the human condition – the nature of
man – “the constitution of the human mind” – and how men function in society. Adams rejected the
design of government established by the French revolutionaries and the democratic ideas on which that
design was based. “We are told that our friends, the National Assembly of France, have abolished all
distinctions. But be not deceived, my dear countrymen. Impossibilities cannot be performed.”704
A decade earlier, in 1779, after his first frustrating diplomatic mission to France, Adams wrote to
Benjamin Rush that, “My Principles are not in Fashion.”705 Thirty-three years later, in 1812, reflecting back
on the publication of “Discourses on Davila,” Adams said the same thing, viz., that in publishing the work,
“he had the courage to oppose and publish his own opinions to the universal opinion of America, and,
indeed, of all mankind. Not one man in America then believed him. He knew not one and had not heard of
one since who then believed him.”706 On the other hand, his views certainly did not change. By early 1794
John was writing to Abigail that the French government was “A shambles … called a Republic,” that “St.
Bartholomew’s Days are there said to be the natural and necessary Consequence of such a form of
Government,” harkening back to the massacre witnessed by Algernon Sidney’s great uncle Philip, that “St.
Bartholomew’s Days will endure as long as the form of Government” in France did, and that “if they would
but have read the Discourses on Davila they would have seen all this foretold in plain Language.”707
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John to Abigail, Feb. 10, 1794, My Dearest Friend, p. 357. Note Gordon Wood on the analysis of
François Furet, a preeminent historian of the French Revolution, regarding the difference between
intentions and actions, and the differing views of the more realistic Brissot and the utopian perspective of
Robespierre, during the French Revolution. “Brissot, writes Furet, argued publicly in 1792 that ‘it was
impossible to foresee the turn of events and that human intentions and the course of history were two
separate matters.’” Actually, we know that this was not true, with John Adams, not to mention Edmund
Burke, illustrative. “This ‘kind of historical objectivity, which made it impossible to disregard the possibility –
indeed, in this case, the probability – that evil intentions were at work, was by definition totally alien to
Robespierre’s political universe, in which it was implicitly assumed that intentions are perfectly coherent
with the actions they prompt and the effects they aim at.…In such a universe, action never had unforeseeable consequences, nor was power ever innocent.’” Pace Wood, the difference in views between
Brissot and Robespierre was not “precisely the difference between our modern conception of reality and
that of the American Revolutionaries.” While there may have been idealistic American revolutionaries, e.g.,
perhaps Jefferson, most leaders, e.g., Sam and John Adams, Washington, Franklin, Hancock, etc., etc.,
were realists. The notion that they did not recognize that there could be unforeseeable consequences had
to have been one of the things that drove John Adams, among others, to write so much about possible
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Adams was well aware that people did not understand his ideas about the necessity of a strong
executive to counterbalance power within a bicameral legislature.708 Indeed, Adams was typically
characterized as an apologist for monarchy and for the aristocracy. In 1791, for example, Thomas Paine
had published Rights of Man, with an introductory endorsement by Jefferson that alluded to “the political
heresies which have sprung up among us,” a jab well-understood to be directed at Adams and his
“Discourses on Davila.”709 Reflecting on the matter in 1812, Adams’ defensive albeit correct opinion was
that his ouevre “powerfully operated to destroy his popularity. It was urged as full proof, that he was an
advocate for monarchy, and laboring to introduce a hereditary president in America.”710 Adams’ ideas
about the necessity for balance in government will be addressed shortly. The importance of Discourses
on Davila was less that Adams was saying something new; he was not. Balance had been the subject of
his work for many years. Rather, it was that with this publication Adams prompted a watershed public
dispute among America’s political leadership, with Jefferson strenuously rejecting at least his interpretation of Adams’ views on government, and working, often secretly and even perfidiously, to undermine
Adams’ political success.711 The efforts of Jefferson and others ultimately led to Adams’ failure to be

consequences – to try to minimize the unforeseeable ones. See Gordon Wood, The Idea of America:
Reflections on the Birth of the United States (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), pp. 112 & 354, n.75.
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The tremendous but often unstated irony is of course that Adams was himself a commoner, a handson farmer and lawyer who had advanced himself in many ways but who, nevertheless, did not come from
an elite world. Adams identified with the common man. But it was his view that men in communities
naturally collected themselves into groups, and that there were many kinds of elite groups from which
elite individuals always emerged. In this Adams was not politically advocating; he was being honest, and
reflecting his understanding of the nature of man and society, views that some would consider completely
accurate and realistic. In contrast, the man of the people who unlike Adams and his fellow Federalists
ostensibly favored “the many” over “the few,” Thomas Jefferson was a Virginia aristocratic plantation
owner, a king in his demesne, a gentleman farmer and slaveholder who, in his lifetime, did not manumit
his slaves and, unlike Adams, did not get his hands dirty. See Annette Gordon-Reed and Peter S. Onuf,
“Most Blessed of the Patriarchs: Thomas Jefferson and the Empire of the Imagination (New York &
London: Liveright Pub. Corp. 2016).
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See Gordon Wood’s invaluable Chronology of John Adams’ life, JA Rev. Writings II, pp. 699-726, 717.
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“Discourses on Davila,” The Portable John Adams, p. 338 (Adams’ 1812 introductory comment).
Adams was particularly hurt and “embittered” when his former friends James and Mercy Otis Warren,
Benjamin Rush and Samuel Adams all supported Jefferson for President in 1796. “Chronology,” Wood,
JA Rev. Writings II, p. 718.
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As one author of many concluded, “The Davila essays convinced Jefferson of Adams’ apostasy.”
Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson, p. 50.
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reelected as President in 1800 after his first term of office.712
Having settled the much more well-recognized, albeit variously assessed, aspects of republicanism reflected in Adams’ thought, we turn to the multiple layers of law that inform Adams’ realistic
republican perspective about mankind and its quest for liberty. Law was absolutely central to Adams’
republicanism, a multi-pronged facet of his theory paralleled in Sidney’s work. Both men also steadfastly
emphasized balance as a distinct and essential component of successful republican governance.
Equilibrium, moderation, and toleration are all manifestations of balance and pervade Adams’ thinking.
Both of these constitutive aspects of republicanism require careful scrutiny.

712
Jefferson apologized to Adams for the inclusion of his condemnatory note in Paine’s book, published
in 1791, asserting that it had been published without his permission. Adams accepted Jefferson’s
apology while also denying that he favored hereditary monarchy or aristocracy in America. None of this
formal repartee seems to have had any political impact. The surreptitious and long-term nature of
Jefferson’s opposition to both Adams’ ideas and his presidency is the subject of considerable scholarship.
See Joyce Appleby, “The Jefferson-Adams Rupture and the First French Translation of John Adams’
Defence,” American Historical Review 73 (Apr. 1967), pp. 1084-91; Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson, passim.

Perhaps this is the trait to which Shaw referred when he stated, “Jefferson had been chosen as his
party’s standard bearer as early as 1794 and emerged during Adams’s presidency as a formidable political tactician.” In contrast, Adams was characterized as “the least sophisticated one of all.” Peter Shaw,
The Character of John Adams, p. 247. One of the more scurrilous activities in which Jefferson engaged
was financially supporting and encouraging the publication by the “hatchet job”-producing James Callender of the “toxic” several hundred page pamphlet, The Prospect Before Us, a broadside attack on the
Federalists generally and Adams specifically that hit the street at the critical moment of the 1800 presidential campaign. Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson, pp. 135-37. Added to this condemnation was the
publication of “fifty-four pages of unremitting vilification” entitled Letter from Alexander Hamilton, Concerning the Public Conduct and Character of John Adams, filled with “gross and libelous charges.” Id, p. 140.
The question should be not why Adams lost the 1800 election, but why the election was as close as it
was. In addition to the monographs already referenced, see additional sources in Appendix B, n. 671.
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CHAPTER SIX
The Missing Links: The Law & Balance

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., once said to a class of law students: “Your business as lawyers
is to see the relation between your particular fact and the whole frame of the universe.” …
The narrowness of our concepts of law blocks our vision not only of law but also of history.”
Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution 1

A. The Lynchpin of the Law
In the Introduction to this study we recognized theorist Rawls’ endorsement of the assertions of
attorney Michelman, who maintained that American constitutionalism, “manifested in academic constitutional theory, in the professional practice of lawyers and judges, and in the ordinary self-understanding of
Americans at large,” rested on the premise that Americans were free insofar as they governed themselves, viz., participatory government, a subset of the essentiality of consent. Second, said Rawls,
American constitutionalism rested on the understanding that “the American people are politically free in
that they are governed by laws rather than men.” On this second point Michelman relied on Adams; in
fact, he could have relied on him for both constitutional premises.
There is no theme in Adams’ political thought that resounds with such clarity, power, frequency,
and confidence as the Law. “Although there may be unjust and unequal laws, obedience to which would
be incompatible with liberty; yet no man will contend, that a nation can be free, that is not governed by
fixed laws. All other government than that of permanent known laws, is the government of mere will and
pleasure.”2 This statement was written in 1797 when Adams was in his sixties; but throughout his lifetime
he was unremitting in the conviction that government without laws was no government at all.
Law is stated or alluded to on almost every page of Adams’ work. While often referencing the rule
of law, or positive or particular man-made laws that he was challenging or using, Adams’ concept of law
encompassed the complete, multi-layered legal substructure that undergirded the republicanism des-

1

Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge MA
and London: Harvard University Press, 1983)(“Law and Revolution I”), p. vii.
2

Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Governments of the United States of America, Against The
Attack of M. Turgot, in Three Volumes (Philadelphia: Budd and Bartram, 1797)(repr. Clark, NJ: The
Lawbook Exchange, 2015)(“Defence”), Vol. I, p. 124.
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cribed in Part One as foundational to Sidney’s republicanism. Continuously interspersed within Sidney’s
arguments in Discourses, as well as those of other early modern republicans, are statements that directly
invoke these multiple legal strata, the viscera of which constitute the fundamental structure that underlies
and supports the theory of republicanism. Adams rarely methodologically described what he was doing
as he conveyed his republican ideas; he just did it. In short, we need to appreciate that Adams did not
write as a legal theorist; indeed, he tended to mock those who he considered to be such – utopian
thinkers with impractical notions of governance. For example, in one of numerous marginalia Adams
wrote in Condorcet’s Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind, in response to
Condorcet’s remark that, “Little by little the priests forgot some of the truths hidden behind their allegories,
and at last became themselves the dupes of their own fables,” Adams remarked: “Just as you and yours
have become the dupes of your own atheism and profligacy, your nonsensical notions of liberty, equality,
and fraternity.”3 Adams’ work was what today we might call political “how to” books: how to decide
whether Britain’s actions were just; how to decide whether to revolt; how to go about setting up new
governments. As a result we sometimes have to glean from his analyses the legal framework on which
his political ideas rest. But this framework is no less present because the text is not particularly
methodological; indeed, as efforts to practically guide his people, the legal substructure of Adams’
thought is umbilical and crucial, the major conduit through which Adams’ political ideas were conveyed.
We are fortunate, however, that in at least one instance, in his 1775 third Novanglus essay,

3

Zoltán Haraszti, John Adams & the Prophets of Progress (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1952), p. 245.
Remarks of this type were not personal for Adams. “Yet with all his thunder, Adams was far from being
insensible to Condorcet’s character.” In 1809, he wrote to a friend: ‘I was personally acquainted with M.
Turgot, the Duke de la Rochefoucauld, and Mr. Condorcet. They were amiable, as learned, and as
honest men as any in France.’” Similarly, years later he wrote to Madison, “’I was personally treated with
great kindness by these three great and good men.’” But this appreciation of the man, made Adams’
attacks all the more pungent. “But I lamented and deplored, notwithstanding their profound science and
learning, what appeared to me their blind infatuation to a chimera.’” Adams was inevitably and, certainly
in this case, an ardent advocate, and he disagreed vehemently with Condorcet’s ideas. As an adversary,
everything about Condorcet was therefore almost intuitively up for grabs, for attack. “He finds fault with
almost everything.” Given the following Adams’ synopsis of Turgot, Rochefoucauld and Condorcet’s
ideas, this is hardly surprising: “These three are memorable examples of the profoundest science, most
extensive literature, united with total ignorance and palpable darkness in the science of government, with
dispositions too to equity, humanity, and benevolence toward their country and mankind.” Because of the
complete impracticality of the French philosophes’ ideas, it was clear to Adams that their erudition made
them particularly dangerous. Condorcet, for example, “might and probably did mean well, but his
ignorance and inexperience in the nature of free government, like his friends Turgot’s and
Rochefoucauld’s, ruined his country.” Id, pp. 240-41.
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Adams was quite explicit about the strata of law that pervaded his republican theory. “I would ask by what
law the parliament has authority over America? By the law of GOD in the Old and New Testament, it has
none. By the law of nature and nations, it has none. By the common law of England it has none.” As he
explained, “For the common law, and the authority of parliament founded on it, never extended beyond
the four seas.” Furthermore, “By statute law it has none, for no statute was made before the settlement of
the colonies for this purpose; and the declaratory act made in 1766, was made without our consent, by a
parliament which had no authority beyond the four seas. What religious, moral or political obligation then
are we under, to submit to parliament as a supreme legislative? None at all.”4
Let us consider this multi-layered substructure of law in Adams’ work. The only preliminary comment that bears emphasis is that the entirely legal perspective of Adams, evident in the history of his
experience as a Bay lawyer, a Congressman, a diplomat, and a statesman, must be brought to bear on
our appreciation of Adams’ remarkably unvarying and pervasively legal vantage point. Law informed the
man and his work including, of course, his revolutionary work.5 As the editors of The Adams’ Legal
Papers observed, “the great source of inspiration which shaped and directed his contribution to the
founding of this nation” was “the practice of law and, most of all, … his own profoundly intellectual
approach to the law.”6 In this respect, as did Sidney, Adams embraced historicity, not historicism:
drawing on the past to build a new future, not simply revering the past and adhering to it for its own sake.
As also was the case with respect to Sidney, a comprehensive, cohesive legal framework
undergirded Adams’ republicanism. Whether theoretical, as we are now discussing, or practical – the
solution-oriented, “bottom-line,” pragmatism that Adams invariably displayed– the problem-solving
process always involved law and the very pragmatic consideration of the best lawful solution. Adams
was, after all, the implementor. If we want to look for something astonishingly consistent in a man who

4
Adams, “III. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay,” Feb. 6, 1775 (“Novanglus III”),
The Papers of John Adams (“PJA”), Vol. 2: Dec. 1773-Apr. 1775, pp. 243-56, 51-52.
5

Over a half century ago, Edward (not Richard Alan) Ryerson said, “We must remember he was only
partly a lawyer seeking to perfect social regulation. He was also a revolutionary.” The statement should
be reversed. Adams was wholly a lawyer who was also partly a revolutionary. Edward Ryerson, “On John
Adams,” American Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Autumn, 1954), pp. 253-58, 254.
6

“Introduction,” Legal Papers of John Adams, Vol. I (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1965), p. xciv.
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wrote about his ideas from his twenties to his nineties over the course of very turbulent, complex political
times, this would be it. As was the case with Sidney, we also must preliminarily note that as a realist,
Adams did not find law to be a panacea that would always produce the right result; rather, as he stated,
“[S]uch cases but seldom occur; tho’ it must be confessed, they sometimes do.” On the other hand, the
obverse is not true, for “it seldom happens very seldom indeed, where you know the man who has done
you the injury, that you can get no satisfaction by law.”7 Second, the pervasive use of the term “law” in
Adams’ and other Anglo-Americans’ works reflects its varied usage. Included, however, in this praxis was
the deeper meaning of the Law relied upon by Sidney, viz., lex est mens sine affect, & quasi Deus, “law is
mind without passion and is, as it were, God,” a quotation from Aristotle’s Politics.8 This, of course, is the
famous closing statement of Adams in the Boston Massacre trials. “To use the words of a great and
worthy man, a patriot and a hero, an enlightened friend of mankind, and a martyr to liberty, I mean
Algernon Sidney, who, from his earliest infancy, sought a tranquil retirement under the shadow of the tree
of liberty with his tongue, his pen, and his sword:— ‘The law no passion can disturb. ’Tis void of desire
and fear, lust and anger. ’Tis mens sine affectu, written reason, retaining some measure of the divine
perfection. It does not enjoin that which pleases a weak, frail man, but, without any regard to persons,
commends that which is good, and punishes evil in all, whether rich or poor, high or low.” Appealing to

7

This quotation comes from a letter submitted to the Boston Gazette by Adams, who was twenty-seven at
the time. In it, Adams confronted two other writers who challenged the idea that a lawsuit was the only
means to obtain satisfaction for an injury. Honorable men had other means, i.e., through violence.
Adams’ palaverous response unremittingly challenged “these Gentlemen.” “A flagilation in the dark would
be no reparation of the injury, no example to others, nor have any tendency to reform the subject of it… of
consequence would be no satisfaction at all, … unless he will avow an appetite for mere revenge, which
is not only worse than brutal, but the attribute of Devils. In other words,” said Adams, “taking a severe
revenge upon yourself. – For this would be a trespass and a violation of the peace, for which you would
expose yourself to the resentment of the magistrate, and the action of the party: and would be like
running your sword thro’ your own body, to revenge yourself on another for boxing your ears; or like the
behaviour of the rattlesnake, that will snap and leap and bite at every stick that you put near him, and at
last when provoked beyond all honourable bearing, will fix his sharp and poisonous teeth into his own
body.” Adams, “VIII. ‘U’ to the Boston Gazette,” Sept. 5, 1763, PJA Vol. I: Sept. 1755-Oct. 1773, pp. 8490, 84, 88-89.
Recall the kindred statement of Algernon Sidney: “I confess that no law can be so perfect, to provide
exactly for every case…. Our law may possibly have given away too much from the people, and provided
only insufficient defences of our liberties against the encroachments of bad princes; but none who are not
in judgment and honesty like to our author [Filmer], can propose for a remedy to the evils that proceed
from the error of giving too much, the resignation of all the rest to them.” DCG, III.26.465 (italicized
phrase is from Filmer’s Patriarcha), III.27.475.
8

DCG, II.30.288 & n.4.
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the jury determining the fate of the Boston Massacre soldiers who killed people who had assaulted them,
causing the soldiers to be fearful for their lives, Adams quoted to the jury Sidney’s words that the Law
“’Tis deaf, inexorable inflexible.’” This means, Adams reminded them, that “On the one hand it is
inexorable to the cries and lamentations of the prisoners; on the other it is deaf, deaf as an adder to the
clamours of the populace.”9 He won the case.
As we saw as we considered Sidney’s views, this definition of the Law suggested something
much “bigger” than a collection of particular rules. Recall the statement of Fuller, a legal scholar, that the
law “may be complex and subtle,” but “there is nothing about the notion of law itself that suggests such
qualities. Individual laws, to be sure, may be complicated and forbiddingly so. …But about the notion of
law itself there is no mystery. Everyone knows what it is and why it exists.”10 Adams was not only trained
in law; he was a legal scholar. He certainly appreciated the distinction between “a” law and “the” law, and
the difference between the Latin terms “lex” and “ius.” While laymen, said Cicero, i.e., “the man in the
street,” might think of the law as “a promiscuous heap of statutes,” lawyers do not.11 And the distinction
between lower case law and upper case Law is profound. As Sidney appreciated, the Law is encompassing, conceptual, and compound in character; it spans a “bewildering assortment of heterogeneous items,”
including the rules set forth in laws, but also standards, principles, categories of classification, maxims,
doctrine and ideals. The Law is also all about “the art and technique of interpreting, developing and
applying the applicable, heterogeneous norms in the administration of justice.”12 It embraces within its
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Legal Papers of John Adams, Vol. 3, p. 270.
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Lon L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law (New York: Mentor Books, 1968), pp. 14-15.
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Murphy, “The Lawyer and the Layman,” p. 106; Cicero, The Laws, Book One, §19, Cicero: The
Republic and The Laws, Niall Rudd, tr. (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 103.
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Id, p. 118, citing Cicero’s De Legibus I, vi, 19. In “Cosmopolitan Republicanism and the Rule of Law,”
philosophy and international studies professor James Bohman developed what he called “a more robust
conception of the rule of law.” Bohman was interested in understanding the rule of law as not only instrumental, but as including within it “the right to rights,” which is much more than “a pregiven set of rights.”
Bohman was talking about Law with a capital L, and with the contemporary issue of the entitlement of
people to justice regardless of their citizenship status. “Kant urges that a just political order is based on a
universal ‘right to right’ that applies to all persons. …[T]he right to have rights, is thus the most basic of
the basic human freedoms…. [T]he ‘empire of law’ is not simply the rule by law, but a form of rule in which
a range of normative powers that are required for the exercise of basic freedoms are robustly realized for
persons and citizens.” James Bohman, “Cosmopolitan Republicanism and the Rule of Law,” Legal Republicanism, Samantha Beson and José Luis Martí, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2009), Ch. 2, pp. 6077, 60-64.
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broad reach other activities associated with governance and justice, including appointing officials and
handing down judgments. “Law in action consists of people legislating, adjudicating, administering,
negotiating, and carrying on other legal activities. It is a living process of allocating rights and duties and
thereby resolving conflicts and creating channels of cooperation.”13 It is all about real life – the application
of the law – “not only with the law in books.” Law is about “the realizing” of law.14 Cicero addressed this,
too, in The Laws. When discussing “[t]he nature of law … we are not asking how to frame legally binding
conditions or how to answer this and that question for our clients. Let’s suppose such problems are
important, as indeed they are. They have been handled by many distinguished men in the past. …But in
our present analysis we have to encompass the entire issue of universal justice and law; what we call civil
law will be confined to a small, narrow corner of it. We must clarify the nature of justice, and that has to
be deduced from the nature of man.”15 What is this Law, the Law? Cicero described it as “wisdom.” In
its most profound application, we would call it equity.16 Cicero said that the Greeks emphasized “fairness
in law” and the Romans emphasized “choice.” In his view, “each of these is an essential property of law”
and, as a result, “the origin of justice must be derived from law.” Recall that for Cicero, “law is a force of
nature, the intelligence and reason of a wise man, and the criterion of justice and injustice.”17 And, said
Cicero, “we are born for justice.”18
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Berman, Law and Revolution I, pp. 4-5; see also David Fagelson, Justice as Integrity: Tolerance and
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University of New York Press, 2007); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of
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Berman, Law and Revolution I, p. 4.
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Cicero, The Laws, Book One, §17, in Cicero: The Republic and The Laws, pp. 102-03.
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Equity will be discussed in more detail shortly; but note the following modern British definition: Equity is
“That part of English law originally administered by the Lord Chancellor and later by the Court of Chancery, as distinct from that administered by the courts of common law. The common law did not recognize
certain concepts (e.g. uses and trusts) and its remedies were limited in scope and flexibility, since it relied
primarily on the remedy of damages. … Equity is thus a regulated scheme of legal principles, but new
developments are still possible (“equity is not past the age of child-bearing”): recent examples of its
creativity include the freezing injunction and the search order. Jonathan Law and Elizabeth A. Martin, in A
Dictionary of Law (7 ed.) (Oxford University Press, online January 2009), http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.gc.
cuny.edu/10.1093/acref/9780199551248.001.0001 (10-1-17). For more details about the historical
development of equity, see Appendix B.
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18
Id, Book One, §28, p. 107. For a brief but useful discussion of Hobbes, Adams, and John Austin’s
views about the authority of law, and particularly the modern English embracing of legal positivism, which
has nothing to do with justice, see M. N. S. Sellers, Republican Legal Theory: The History, Constitution
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We tend to take justice for granted. But what is it? Where is it? How does one pinpoint it, and
understand its contours? Beyond the nuts and bolts specified in laws that are different in different
jurisdictions, not to mention nations, there is the universal principle of the Law, a principle with which
British and American law students are imbued, and which includes but goes beyond individual laws. The
English courts of equity, with which Sidney was very familiar as was Adams, embraced the concept of
equity as a means to obtain a just result that the citizenry would understand, appreciate, and accept. This
creates legitimacy. As Cicero suggested, an equity court makes choices, but it does so on the basis of
fundamental fairness. The Law requires such an outcome or its laws would be empty of the meaning on
which conformance to laws depends, namely a fair and reasonable outcome, at least most of the time.
Sellers pointed out that Grotius, Vattel, and others “took it as a given that law should seek justice, and
that justice consists in the rules of social order that best serve the common good of society as a whole.”19
This is what leads us to equity. For if laws did not produce a result that “best serve the common good of
society as a whole,” the Law required that this otherwise occur, in which case it is through principles of
equity that the judiciary accomplishes justice.

Be it remembered, however, that liberty must at all hazards
be supported. We have a right to it, derived from our Maker.
Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law 20
In 1765, John Adams declared the Stamp Act to be
“utterly void, and of no binding Force upon us; for it is
against our Rights as Men, and our Privileges as Englishmen.”
Review, “The Role of Natural Law in the American Revolution” 21

i.

God-made Law: The Natural Law

In the first instance, man was beholden to God. This was a universal principle applicable to men

and Purposes of Law in a Free State (Hampshire, UK & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Ch. 6,
“Republican Authority,” pp. 42-55,
19
Mortimer N. S. Sellers, “The Republican Foundations of International Law,” Legal Republicanism, pp.
187-204, 191. For related sources, see Appendix B.
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Adams, Dissertation 3, PJA Vol. I, p. 120.
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Review, “The Role of Natural Law in the American Revolution,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 108, No. 5
(March 1995), pp. 1202-07, 1202. The review of John Phillip Reid’s Constitutional History of the American
Revolution: The Authority of Law pointed out that Prof. Reid “underestimate[d] the extent to which the
colonists perceived the English constitution as incorporating natural law principles.” Id, p. 1207.
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in all places and times.22 Cicero had said that, “The nature of law must be sought in the nature of man.
Man is a single species which has a share in divine reason and is bound together by a partnership in
justice.”23 Recall Grotius’ famous statement that, “Jupiter has ordained that Fishes, wild Beasts, and
Birds should devour each other, because Justice doth not take place amongst them: But to Men he has
prescribed the Law of Justice, which is the most excellent Thing in the World.”24 Writing in 1760 at age
twenty-four about his ambitious, indeed unparalleled commitment to the study of British law, Saxon,
Danish, Norman, Greek, and Roman history, as well as the civil, feudal, and cannon law, and having no
idea what events and career lay before him, Adams wrote in his Diary, “Now to what higher object, to
what greater Character, can any Mortal aspire, than to be possessed of all this Knowledge, well digested,
and ready at Command, to assist the feeble and Friendless, to discountenance the haughty and lawless,
to procure Redress of Wrongs, the Advancement of Right, to assert and maintain Liberty and Virtue, to
discourage and abolish Tyranny and Vice.”25 Here we see the determination of the young man John in a
Robin Hood fashion pursuing Grotius’ Law of Justice. Moreover, like Sidney, Adams subscribed to the
essentially enlightened view that man distinguished between good and evil, which were “not only declared
in Scripture,” as Sidney said, “but written on the heart of every man,” by “the light of reason,” the law of
man’s nature, “which is good, in as much as it is from God.”26 One could even say that Adams’ pursuit of
a legal career was a novel way to satisfy his father’s ambition that he pursue a commitment to God, for
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Biographers tend to refer to the possibility that Adams might have considered becoming a preacher
simply as a passing predicate to his decision to study law. This is true; but looking at Adams’ career
choice in this way tends to diminish the fact that when he first began considering the profession on which
he would embark, Adams seriously considered becoming a member of the clergy, no doubt largely
influenced by the fact that this was the role John’s father wanted him to assume. But to return to the issue
of natural law, it is important to recognize that for Adams and virtually all British Americans, an
understanding of law necessarily began with God’s law. For more details on Adams’ transition from the
study of theology to that of law, see Appendix B.
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“Law is human Reason,” and the ability to reason was given to man by God.27 In précis, Sidney adopted
Grotius’ hybrid concept of natural law, and Adams did, too.28
Without reiterating the complex development of natural law theory reviewed in Part One, we
know that Cicero, to whom Adams was especially devoted, stated in The Laws, “For law is a force of
nature, the intelligence and reason of a wise man, and the criterion of justice and injustice.” 29 Thus,
said Cicero, it was man’s responsibility to bring “philosophy down from the heavens.”30 Even in a
world in which most men did not participate in politics, man participated in the natural order of life,
the laws of nature.31 Cicero popularized the principle of natural law and the concept of a universal
code of ethics inherent in nature, transcendent in time and place and discernible to man.32
Adams also studied Justinian, and it was the first passage in Justinian’s Digest that defined
private law as ius natural, ius gentium – the law of nations or natural law as applicable to all nations,
and ius proprium or ius civile, the specific law of a society or civil law.33 Recall, too, that Thomas
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JA D&A Vol. I, p. 117.
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Note Adams’ description in his Diary – an entry that may be partially missing – of a statue or picture he
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Cicero, “The Laws,” Cicero, The Republic and The Laws, Book One, ¶19, p. 103.

30

Michael Zuckert, ’Bringing Philosophy down from the Heavens’: Natural Right in the Roman Law,” The
Review of Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter, 1989), pp. 70-85, 79.
31

Recall that Zuckert described Roman jurists’ perception of a hierarchy of law, beginning with the most
“universalistic,” in the form of jus naturale, and then continuing to jus gentium, which “’recedes from’ the
jus naturale in that it applies only to all the human peoples and not to all animal beings as such,” and then
receded again to the jus civile, which is “yet more restricted, for it is the jus belonging only to some
particular people or other.” Id, p. 76. For more details on Zuckert’s analysis of how jurists integrated the
philosophical concept of natural law and Roman law, see Appendix B.
32

Cicero, “The Laws,” in Cicero, The Republic and The Laws, Book One, ¶19, p. 103; see Carl J.
Richards, Greeks and Romans Bearing Gifts, How the Ancients Inspired the Founding Fathers (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, Inc., 2009), p. 10.
33

There are numerous references in Adams’ diary to Justinian’s Institutes, to various commentaries on
Justinian, and simply to Justinian or “Leaves” of Justinian. See, e.g., JA D&A Vol. I: 1755-1770, Oct. 6,
1758, p. 46. Of course, the Institutes was the primer, the introduction to Roman law; in contrast, the
Digest was a compilation of legal ideas, excerpts taken from famous jurists, presented in encyclopedic
form and therefore not something one would sit down and read. One might use the Digest, not read it. In
Adams’ Diary reference is also made to the Corpus Juris Civilis, one part of which was Justinian’s Digest,
along with the Codex, the Institutes, and the Novels. Nevertheless, although looking for a needle in a
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Aquinas (1225-1274) advanced a well-known theory of natural law in the centuries preceding the
Protestant Reformation. Aquinas emphasized ius, “what is just,” and “the just thing itself.”34 The
purpose of natural law was to advance the common good. Adams said so, too. “The Good of the
governed is the End, and Rewards and Punishments are the Means of all Government.”35 For
Aquinas, both natural law and natural right existed in external nature, and included a sense of rightness or fairness, viz., equity. 36 The fifteenth-century English jurist Sir John Fortescue adopted
Aquinas’ reliance on divine reason as the source of law; and we know that Adams was very familiar
with Fortescue although he does not seem to have cited him for this purpose. But Adams relied upon
Fortescue in various contexts, including in his argument on behalf of the defendant that he
represented in both the Preston trial, the lieutenant accused of murder in the Boston Massacre case,
and the subsequent trial of the other accused Boston Massacre soldiers.37 A decade earlier, on Nov.

haystack, I have found no specific reference to the Digest in Adams’ Diary. One reference to the Digest
was identified in Adams’ seventh Novanglus letter: “Can Massachusettensis produce from the whole
history of Rome, or from the Digest, one example of a Sanatus consultum, or a Plebiscitum laying taxes
on a colony.” “VII. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay, March 6, 1775 (“Novanglus
VII”), PJA Vol. 2, p. 312. How familiar Adams was with the Digest we cannot say; however, he obviously
was familiar enough with it to make the sweeping comment that he did in 1775. Note, too, Adams’
conviction, at age twenty-two, albeit stated in the context of his reading of the Institutes, that, “Few of my
Contemporary Beginners, in the Study of the Law, have the Resolution, to aim at much Knowledge in the
Civil Law. Let me therefore distinguish my self from them, by the Study of the Civil Law, in its native
languages, those of Greece and Rome.” JA D&A Vol. I: 1755-1770, Oct. 5, 1758, pp. 44-45. For a good
synopsis of Justinian’s work, see the Introduction to Justinian’s Institutes, Peter Birks and Grant McLeod,
tr. & intro. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
34

Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, pp. 23-26.

35

“Draft of a Newspaper Communication, August? 1770,” JA D&A Vol. I, p. 365.

36

Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western
Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA & London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), p.
232. Prof. Greene maintained that Jefferson and his colleagues’ reliance on natural rights theory in the
Declaration of Independence was a departure from their political work over the prior twelve years.
“Natural rights theory had not been absent from that literature, but it had never been more than
complementary to their principal argument, which rested on law.” Here we can see the consequence of
not viewing natural rights as the product of natural law, which may not have been codified, but was no
less viewed as binding law by its adherents. Not surprisingly, Greene’s perspective also indicated the
absence of an integration of the tiers of law that were at play in the colonists’ republican thought; and the
first layer was natural law and its progeny, natural rights. Greene, The Constitutional Origins of the
American Revolution, p. 185.
37

See the Boston Massacre trial records, JA Legal Papers, Vol. III. Adams also relied on Fortescue in
other contexts, e.g., in several of his published letters in response to General William Brattle, in which
Adams discussed the nature of the common law; and in his argument in the Sewall v. Hancock case
about the sloop called the Liberty and the madeira wine on board. See, e.g. “II. To the Boston Gazette, “
Jan. 18, 1773, PJA Vol. I, p. 261; “V. To the Boston Gazette,” Feb. 1, 1773, id., p. 278.
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26, 1760, Adams wrote in his Diary he had “read a Multitude of Law Books,” “mastered but few.”
Among those listed was “Fortescue.” In short, Adams was very familiar with Fortescue’s concept of
natural law based on divine reason, the purpose of which was to advance equity. John Selden was
another English jurist familiar to Adams and as already discussed, of importance to Sidney, who was
preoccupied with ancient concepts of natural law and the role of equity in a legal system.38
We know that natural law was something the seventeenth-century jurist Grotius most famously
emphasized, arguing that in the state of nature man was still governed by principles of morality and not
solely by self-interest, as Hobbes had averred. For Grotius, the law of nature is “the Rule and Dictate of
Right Reason,” and man can discern whether an action is moral or enjoined by “the Author of Nature,”
God.39 Adams was very familiar with and quoted generously from Grotius.40 We know that he also

38

Adams relied on Selden as his legal authority when he advised his peers about the generally unfamiliar
option of impeaching Chief Justice Oliver, who intended to accept his salary from the Crown, which
Adams argued would create undue influence, and not from the Bay community through its local government. JA D&A Vol. II: 1771-1781, p. 89; JA D&A Vol. IV: Diary 1782-1804 and Autobiography through
1776, pp. 300-01. The Adams Library included Selden’s three-volume Works, with Adams’ autograph in
each volume. See Catalogue of the John Adams Library in the Public Library of the City of Boston
(Boston: The Trustees, 1917), p. 225. On Selden’s interest in natural law and antiquity, see Joseph
Wallace, “Legal Theories and Ancient Practices in John Selden’s Marmora Arundelliana,” Journal of the
History of Ideas, Vol. 72, No. 3 (July 2011), pp. 393-412.
39
Grotius Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, edited and with an Introduction by Richard Tuck,
from the Edition by Jean Barbeyrac (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005). Vol. 1,
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1425#lf1032-01_mnt067 (4-3-19); Neff, Hugo Grotius on the Law of War and
Peace (2012), Bk I, Ch. 1, §10, pp. 29-30.
40
There are many instances, including some very important ones, when Adams relied upon Grotius’
views. For example, Adams quoted Grotius (in Latin) in his Reply of the Bay House of Representatives to
Hutchinson’s First Message, Jan. 26, 1773, which he then translated as, “Whatever is originally in its
Nature wrong, can never be satisfied or made right by Reputation and Use.” He also quoted Otis’
reference to Grotius in his Reply of the Bay House of Representatives to Hutchinson’s Second Message,
March 2, 1773, for the propositions that, “We look upon it to be neither Truth nor Justice that Mother
Cities ought of Necessity and by the Law of Nature to rule over the Colonies.” “Reply of the House to
Hutchinson’s First Message, 26 January 1773,” and “Reply of the House to Hutchinson’s Second
Message, 2 March 1773, PJA, Vol. II, pp. 315-31, 320, PJA Vol. II, pp. 331-46, 335. On Hutchinson’s
fiasco of a debate with Adams and the Bay House of Representatives, see Appendix B, Ch. Five, n. 155.
Again, Adams quoted liberally from Grotius (and Sidney) in his Feb. 27, 1775 Novanglus letter. “VI. To
the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay,” Feb. 27, 1775 (Novanglus VI), PJA Vol. II, pp. 288307. From the beginning of his legal career, Jeremiah Gridley, one of Boston’s leading lawyers, told
Adams he must read “upon the Law of Nature and Nations,” including Grotius and Puffendorf. “You will
do well to do so: they are great Writers. Indeed a Lawyer through his whole Life ought to have some
Book on Ethicks or the Law of Nations always on his Table. They are all Treatises of individual or
national Morality and ought to be the Study of our whole Lives.” Autobiography, JA D&A Vol. III, pp. 20102. Abigail, too, read Grotius, among other theorists. See Abigail Adams to Royall Tyler, July 10, 1784,
https://www.masshist.org/publi cations/apde2/view?id=ADMS-04-05-02-0207 (4-3-19). For a list of
references by John Adams and other family members to Grotius, see https://www.masshist.org/publi
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studied Vattel: “The Idea of M. de Vattell indeed, scowling and frowning, haunted me.”41 Vattel was an
eighteenth-century Swiss jurist who focused on ius gentium, natural law as applicable to all nations. Vattel
was particularly interested is the relationships among the nations of Europe, both the powerful and the not
so powerful, matters of war and peace but also commercial relationships, all of which became of interest
and value to Adams, the diplomat.42 Natural law had been part of the lingua franca of seventeenthcentury England, and relied upon by all sorts of authors discussed in Part One, e.g., Milton in The Tenure
of Kings and Magistrates, James Tyrrell in Patriarcha non Monarcha, and Henry Vane in The Case of the
People of England. As we discussed in connection with Sidney, Locke’s Second Treatise addressed at
length the State of Nature and the Law of Nature.43 In short, natural law was imbibed by the British
Americans as part of their culture and inherited legal world.44
In A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law, for example, young Adams wrote that it was
“God almighty” who had “promulgated from heaven, liberty, peace, and good-will to man!” Indeed, the
“true map of man” created by God included “the dignity of his nature, and the noble rank he holds among
the works of God!” 45 It was man’s responsibility not to belittle or besmirch that dignity or man’s noble rank
in the hierarchy of God’s creations. The way that man accomplished this responsibility was through the

cations/apde2/search/results?words =Grotius&r=& a=&sd=&ed=&t=&s=&vol=&l=&notes=&start=0&
num=10 (4-3-19).
41

JA D&A, Vol. I, Feb. 1, 1763, p. 235.

42

Vattel argued that, “Nations being composed of men naturally free and independent, and who, before
the establishment of civil societies, lived together in the state of nature, … the law of nations is originally
no other than the law of nature applied to nations.” Vattel’s focus was how, then, to accommodate natural
law to a different subject, vs. nations. For more details about Vattel’s natural law ideas, see Appendix B.
43

See Locke, “The Second Treatise,” Two Treatises of Government, Ch. II, “Of the State of Nature,” pp.
269-78.
44
For reasons that are not at all clear, McDonald maintained that the patriots’ reliance on natural law
theory was based on Locke. There were multiple sources, with Sidney among them. See McDonald,
Novus Ordo Seclorum, pp. 60-66.
45

“VI. ‘A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law,’ No. 4, [Oct. 21, 1765], PJA Vol. 1, pp. 123-28,
126. The “inherent and inalienable rights of man to his life, liberty, and property” were the subject of Otis’
famous 1761 speech in the writs of assistance case, the notes of which were written by the fledgling
young lawyer John Adams. In his follow-on Vindication of the House of Representatives of
Massachusetts and Rights of the British Colonies, Otis stated, “Civil government is of God.” See Otis’
pamphlet, Pamphlets of the American Revolution, Vol. I; Zoltán Harastzi, John Adams & the Prophets of
Progress (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964) pp. 42-45.
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exercise of reason. In the first Novanglus letter Adams extolled the “latent spark” of liberty and the
“revolution-principles” that are the product of “elevated rank” that men “hold in the universe as men.”
These principles, said Adams, were “of Aristotle and Plato, of Livy and Cicero, of Sydney, Harrington and
Lock.” And what were these principles? They were the “principles of nature and eternal reason.” Adams
remarked that M, against whom he was writing, “allows” these principles “to be noble, and true, but says
the application of them to particular cases is wild and utopian.” Using his own ability to reason, that gift
from God, Adams remarked, “How they can be in general true, and not applicable to particular cases”?
He could not comprehend. “I thought their being true in general was because, they were applicable to
most particular cases.”46 In his defense of Lieutenant Preston in the Boston Massacre trial, Adams quoted
Sidney for the proposition that, “Law, no Passion can disturb. Tis void of Desire and Fear, Lust and
Anger. Tis Mens Sine affectu, written Reason, retaining Some Measure of divine Perfection.”47 Years later
in Defence, Adams described the “experiment” in which “[t]hirteen governments” were “founded on the
natural authority of the people alone,” as “the first example of governments erected on the simple
principles of nature.” With his usual tongue-in-cheek humor he remarked, “It will never be pretended that
any persons employed in that service had any interviews with the gods, or were in any degree under the
inspiration of heaven, any more than those at work upon ships or houses, or labouring in merchandise or
agriculture,” all of which was, to Adams, God’s work; but “it will for ever be acknowledged that these
governments were contrived merely by the use of reason and the senses.”48
Notwithstanding the hypocrisy embedded in the British American references to taxation without

46
Adams, Novanglus I, PJA Vol. 2, pp. 229-30. “Natural law in the American experience has been tied
from the beginning to the notion we live in a purposeful universe and at least part of that purpose is
accessible to human reason. For Jews and Christians, it is rooted in the idea of man created in the image
of God and is inseparable from that connection.” Sidney A. Pearson, Jr., “Introduction,” Benjamin
Fletcher Wright, Jr., American Interpretations of Natural Law: A Study in the History of Political Thought,
(New Brunswick, NJ & London: Transaction Publishers, 2016) [orig. pub. 1962], p. x.
47

“VII. Adams’ Notes of Authorities for his Argument for the Defense,” Oct. 1770, Rex v. Preston, Legal
Papers of John Adams, Vol. 3, p. 82, citing Sidney’s Discourses. Similarly, Locke averred, “The Freedom
then of Man and Liberty of acting according to his own Will, is grounded on his having Reason, which is
able to instruct him in that Law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to the
freedom of his own will.” Locke, “The Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, Ch. VI, §63, p. 309.
48

In this context Adams also spoke derisively about the “superstitious chimeras of divine rights in princes
and nobles,” questioning why it was not enough that government promote man’s happiness through “the
obedience to the laws,” instead of the necessity of relying on the notion that leaders are “God’s
vicegerents,” viz., vice-regents. Adams, “Preface,” Defence, Vol. I, pp. xii.-xv
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representation as a form of slavery, something of which we are acutely aware today, by means of this
characterization it was easy for fellow colonists to conclude that “consenting to slavery” was “a sacrilegious breach of trust, as offensive in the sight of God as it is derogatory from our own honor or interest
or happiness.” In other words, as a matter of God’s immutable law, the British Americans could not accept
the tax laws passed by the metropole that were to be enforced in the colonies without colonial consent.49
Similarly, in the Braintree Instructions, written by Adams to convey to its Bay legislative representatives
the town’s view on the Stamp Act, Adams stated that Braintree had “a clear Knowledge and a just sense”
of their “Rights and Liberties,” but also recognized that this knowledge came “with Submission to divine
Providence we never can be Slaves.”50 It was man’s unique responsibility to God to resist such
encroachments on freedom.51
Adams shared the overwhelmingly accepted view in colonial America that there were God-given
rights of man that were a part of nature and therefore they were “natural”; and that these rights were protected through natural law. “I say RIGHTS,” said Adams, “for such they have, undoubtedly, antecedent to
all earthly government – Rights that cannot be repealed or restrained by human laws – Rights derived
from the great legislator of the universe.”52 As early as 1763, when Adams was just twenty-seven and
speaking as “U” in a Boston Gazette article, he wrote inspirationally about man’s natural rights. The passage wraps up, even entangles, many aspects of Adams’ republicanism: natural rights, the right to resist,
liberty, the social compact, common law, the wisdom of the ancients and of Christianity. It also is prescient
about events that transpired more than a decade later in America, and eerie with respect to events that
transpired more than two decades later in France. “[T]o preach up non resistance, with the zeal of a
“Fanatick,” would be as extraordinary as to employ … an inquisition, in favour of Liberty of conscience.”
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Adams, “V. ‘A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law,’ No. 3,” Sept. 30, 1765, PJA Vol. I: Sept.
1755-Oct. 1773, pp. 118-23, 120; Editorial Note, “Instructions to Braintree’s Representative concerning
the Stamp Act, ante Sept. 24-Oct. 10, 1765, id, p. 129.
50

Adams, “Braintree Instructions,” Sept. 24, 1765, PJA Vol. I, pp. 129-44.
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Cf. John Paynter, “John Adams’ ‘Hobbism,’” The American Founding and the Social Compact, pp. 23153, 244-46 (the importance of “piety” to Adams as an act, not a principle; to worship God, and give thanks
for his providing the opportunity for people to freely enter into a social compact).
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Adams, “III. ‘A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law,’ No. 1,” Aug. 12, 1765, PJA Vol. I, pp.
111-15, 112.
903

To the contrary, U wrote, his opposition should “leave his own imagination,” and listen to U, in whose
letters “he would … not find a syllable against resistance.” For “[r]esistance to sudden violence, for the
preservation not only of my person, my limbs and life, but of my property, is an indisputable right of nature,
which I never surrendered to the public by the compact of society; and which, perhaps, I could not
surrender if I would.” Here, at this early stage in Adams’ intellectual development, he was already posing
the fundamental question of whether a man can contract away his God-given right to resist tyranny or even
self-defense. “Nor is there any thing in the common law of England … inconsistent with that right – on the
contrary, the dogmas of Plato, the maxims of the Law, and the precepts of Christianity, are precisely
coincident, in relation to this subject.”53
To consider the matter from the individual’s point of view, man had a “dignity” of nature, a “frame”
of human nature given to him by God; there were God-given rights associated with human nature; and
there was a corresponding “law of nature” to protect man and the exercise of his rights.54 Thus, in his
1765 argument before Governor Bernard and the Bay Council seeking the opening of the Massachusetts’
courts, Adams argued that, “There are certain Principles fix’d unalterably in Nature.”55 Man could not
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“VIII. ‘U’ to the Boston Gazette, [5 September 1763], PJA Vol. I, pp. 84-90, 84.
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Adams, “IV. ‘A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law,’ No. 2,” Aug. 19, 1765, PJA Vol. I, pp.
115-18, 116; Adams, “VI. ‘A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law,’ No. 4,” Oct. 21, 1765, PJA
Vol. 1, pp. 123-28, 126-27. Zuckert pointed out that Blackstone believed that “natural rights are the
source of the state of nature.” For Blackstone, the state of nature was a myth within which is the truth
that human beings are naturally free. “A yet more accurate way to put it is to say that the idea of the state
of nature is a way of expressing the fact of natural rights, and is in this sense an inference from natural
rights.” This seems to be very much what Adams is saying here; that is, that liberty is natural and it is a
right that is grounded on the nature of man, not on the state of nature. The fact is, however, that Adams
was not focused on such philosophical or political theory details, which to him were probably esoteric.
What was important, consonant with Adams’ identity as the quintessential lawyer, was the “bottom line,”
viz., that natural rights were immutable; they did not require a government’s consent. Michael Zuckert,
“Social Compact, Common Law, and the American Amalgam: The Contribution of William Blackstone,” in
The American Founding and the Social Compact, pp. 37-73, 56, 67.
55
Josiah Quincy Jr. notes of Adams’ “Argument before Governor Bernard and the Council in Favor of
Opening the Courts,” Dec. 20, 1765, id, pp. 152-53, 152. Twenty-one years later, an edition of the 1786
Providence Gazette & Country Journal reprinted information from a London newspaper on the world
population: “’There are 775,300,000 people in the World. Of these, arbitrary governments command
741,800,000, and the free ones (including 10 million Indians) only 33½ million. Of these few, 12½ million
are subjects or descendants of the British Empire – 1/3 of the freemen of the world. On the whole, slaves
are three and twenty times more numerous than men enjoying, in any tolerable degree, the rights of
human nature.’” The meaning of the term “freedom” was not specified, but Forrest McDonald noted that
there were “at least six implicit and not altogether consistent comments upon the nature and origins of
liberty. The first two are definitions in terms of opposites. Freedom is the opposite of slavery: … all
people are either slaves or freeman. Again, freedom is the opposite of arbitrary rule: it is life under a
government of laws, wherein rulers govern according to known and fixed principles. The other four
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modify those Principles even if he wanted to do so. As we noted in Part One in connection with Sidney’s
embracing of natural law, Grotius believed that the law of nature may be so unchangeable that it is not
even subject to change by God. Two plus two is always four.56 As Otis had declared, the laws of nature
were inherent and inalienable.
Human laws required consent; natural law did not. Speaking as Clarendon to Pym in 1766,
Adams wrote, “But the gallant Struggle … on the Continent of NORTH AMERICA, is founded in
Principles so indisputable, in the Moral Law; in the revealed Law of God.”57 Natural law did not
require consent, and it could not be transgressed. As Sidney had stated, constitutions “cannot be
rightly made, if they are contrary to the universal law of God and nature.”58 When Adams wrote
about the justifiability of resistance to the Stamp Act in his Novanglus letters, he quoted from Grotius,
Sidney, Pufendorf, and Locke not only about man-made law, but also natural law, which was
embodied in universally-applicable law, the law of nations, all of which he called upon in support of
the just nature of their cause.59 In his 1774 “Reply to A Friendly Address to all Reasonable Americans,” Adams stated, “The collective Body of a People never did, and by the eternal Laws of
Morality, as well as the indispensable obligations of the Christian Religion never can delegate, to any
Magistrate or assembly, an absolute, unlimited, and uncontroulable Power over them. …There are
therefore certain fundamental Laws, and certain original Rights, reserved expressly or tacitly, by
every People in their Confederation in Society, and erection of Government.” Adams acknowledged
that the people “constitute” or authorize “what is called a Sovereign or supreme Power, or Supreme
Legislative, to manage their Interests in common Affairs of War and Peace.” However, it is always

comments concern the theoretical origins of liberty. First, freedom originates in natural law, deriving from
‘the rights of human nature.’ Second, it exists in a state of nature. …Third, …the vast majority of
governments illegitimately deny the people their natural right to liberty. And fourth, more than half the
people who live freely … have their liberties by virtue of the English constitutional tradition.” McDonald,
Novus Ordo Seclorum, pp. 9-10.
56

Neff, Hugo Grotius on the Law of War and Peace (2012), Bk I, Ch. 1, §10, pp. 29-30.

57

Adams, “II. The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym,” Jan. 20, 1766, id, pp. 161-64, 163.
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DCG, I.16.49.
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Adams, “VI. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay,” Feb. 27, 1775, (“Novanglus VI”),
PJA Vol. 2, pp.288-307, 289-93. On the complicated and arguably inconsistent ideas of John Locke
about natural law, see Ch. Two.
905

the case that the People “reserve to themselves a Right of judging when the Supream Power
answers the End of its Institution, and when it contravenes it.”60 This outcome of this thought was
expressed in the Declaration of Independence, the document which we view today as the apotheosis
of freedom. The Declaration grounded itself, from its first sentence, in natural law, for it was “the
Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” that both entitled the British Americans “to dissolve the political
bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth,”
what was termed a “separate and equal station.”61
While Adams was most comfortable with more tangible expressions of rights, he had no
reluctance to rely on natural law, and in his work he often did so. In connection with the 1774
argument to impeach judges who accepted crown salaries, for instance, in his typical witty way,
Adams told Judge Trowbridge, whose intellect he admired, that while “I should be very happy if the
Constitution could carry Us safely through all our difficulties,” he felt the need to hedge their bet by
means of “recourse to higher Powers not written.”62 In 1775, when George III and his government
declared the British Americans to be traitors acting outside the British system of law, Adams
observed, “Four hundred thousand people are in a state of nature.”63 Stripped of their man-made
laws, and notwithstanding Adams’ early musings in his Diary about the strictly hypothetical and Fata
Morgana of life in a state of nature, whether one subscribed to Hobbes’ scary version of that state or
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Adams, “Reply to A Friendly Address to All Reasonable Americans,” post-Nov. 17, 1774, PJA Vol. 2,
pp. 194-95.
61

Declaration of Independence, https://www.archives.go/founding-docs/declaration-transcript (4-3-19).

62
JA D&A, Vol. 3, p. 301. Per Forrest McDonald, James Duane of New York and Joseph Galloway of
Pennsylvania “were possibly the ablest students of natural law in Congress,” and they were “strongly
against an appeal to natural law.” McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, p. 57. Note that McDonald
considered there to be three intellectual bases for independence: natural law theory, republicanism, and
eighteenth-century English Opposition theory. But why should we not consider these ideas as substantially merged, and even one-and-the-same? E.g., natural law theory was part of republicanism, and
republicanism was also eighteenth-century English Opposition theory. Id, p. 59.
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Adams, “To a Friend in London,” Jan. 21, 1775, PJA Vol. 2, pp. 214-16, 215. On Aug. 23, 1775,
responding to the Battle of Bunker Hill, George III issued The Proclamation of Rebellion [A Proclamation
for Suppressing Rebellion and Sedition], in which he declared that the American colonies were in a state
of “open and avowed rebellion.” In his Oct. 27, 1775 speech before Parliament the King characterized the
rebellion as a “desperate conspiracy,” and called the Americans in revolt “the unhappy and deluded
multitude.” See www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_disp_textbook.cfm?smtl D =3&psid=4105 &
http://digitalcollections.nyhistory.org/islandora/object/islandora%3A4557#page/1/mode/1up (4-3-19).
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to Grotius, Sidney, and Locke’s milder rendition, the evaporation of the system of law to which
Adams referred, under which the colonists had heretofore functioned, viz., the "danger" the province
was in, "without government or law,” constituted life without man-made law.64 In the absence of
man-made law, the people existed in “a state of nature.”65 In that state there still was law – the moral
law created by God, a fundamental part of the natural order.66

64

In their study, Waldstreicher and Lynd (W&L) place Adams’ natural law argument in historical context.
“The delegates who opposed British regulation of the American colonies’ trade were also those who
wanted to talk about natural rights. It is easy to see why. Many of the delegates on both sides of the
controversy about regulating trade were lawyers. A lawyer will naturally rely on precedent – either particular court decisions or the texts of laws – whenever possible.” Accordingly, “In arguing for the right of
self-determination within a single colony, Americans could rely on English common law and the texts of
the charters granted by Great Britain to the various colonial governments. These precedents were not
conclusive, but at least they were there.” In contrast, “in arguing for the conclusive right of the colonists to
govern the relationships among the colonies and between them and other countries, airtight precedents
were lacking. There were only what Jack P. Greene calls “negotiated authorities.” To assert this right,
one could only turn to the principles of justice itself. This was what the eighteenth century meant by
natural law. W&L, “Free Trade, Sovereignty, and Slavery: Toward an Economic Interpretation of American Independence,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 68, No. 4 (October 2011), pp. 597-630, 613.
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Adams, “III. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay,” Feb. 6, 1775 (“Novanglus III”),
PJA Vol. 2, p. 244.
66
In “The Irrelevance of the Declaration,” Reid argued that the Declaration of Independence was not an
assertion of natural rights, but a statement of English constitutional rights in which the major allegations
against George III repeated claims made by the English parliamentarians against the Stuarts during the
seventeenth century. In arguing against the natural rights interpretation (not to mention words) of the
Declaration, Reid also asserted that Lockean natural rights theory was not embodied in the manifesto. (In
standard form, natural rights theory was attributed by Reid to Locke. While Reid referred to Sidney in this
essay, it was for the purpose of attributing to him a constitutional argument on the right of rebellion, not
because of Sidney’s natural rights assertions.) Reid made the case that a mythology of natural rights
theory reliant on Locke had led scholars away from the constitutional underpinnings of the Declaration,
which was a legal instrument regurgitating constitutional indictments against King George III that had
been charged against the Stuarts in the Petition of Grievances of 1610 (James I) and the 1628 Petition of
Right (Charles I) as well as the post-Stuart rights statement associated with the accession of William and
Mary, the 1689 Bill of Rights. Per Reid, “Reality seems lost along with the irrelevancy of evidence.”
Published in 1981, Reid’s analysis remains cogent today even if one disagrees with some (or all) of it; for
it provides a window into the debate between attorneys and historians about how to approach the history
of legal documents, in this case the Declaration of Independence.

Lawyer Reid argued that, “writers of revolutionary history substitute philosophy or political theory for law
when explaining events.” While occasional historians discussed the Declaration in legal terms, “It is far
more common to encounter writers, including lawyers, saying that the Declaration of Independence
contained no legal arguments, that it was a ‘political, non-constitutional appeal to natural law, no longer
as a part of the British constitution, but as the rights of man in general.’ Put another way, historians
studying the Declaration eschew law to look for its meaning in roots more intellectually fashionable.
Notwithstanding the necessity for clarity in analyses, whether historical or legal (or both), it seems most
likely that the British Americans who wrote about the colonists’ claims against the metropole generally
utilized a scattershot approach or, to put it in more precise legal terms, argued in the alternative in their
statements of grievance against the actions of George III and his ministry. Adams, for example, being the
technical attorney that he was, made the point quite explicitly, viz., if he could make an argument based
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[T]hat several nations have plainly and explicitly made contracts with their magistrates.
… That they are implicit, and to be understood, where they are not plainly expressed.
… That they are not dreams, but real things, and perpetually obliging.
Algernon Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government 67

ii. The Social Contract
Sidney had said that not only was man a creation of God; he was by nature a social animal. God
created men as rational beings who banded together to form societies for their individual and mutual
protection and self-interest. Recall how artfully Sidney had put it. Men should not live like wolves in the
woods, “every man by himself.” No, he should live “together in civil societies.” Men could join a society
“which best pleas’d him.” Societies had the responsibility to create magistrates – leaders – and “frame
such laws as should seem most conducing to their own good, according to the measure of light and
reason they might have.”68 This consensual, contractual relationship, sometimes termed a compact or an
agreement, constituted the second tier of Sidney’s multi-leveled legal conceptual framework, and was
clearly stated and supported by the law of contracts and particularly the ideas of Grotius, as well as those
of monarchomachs Beza and Mornay and more ancient sources on which all of these theorists relied. In
his Second Treatise Locke described the social contract as a “Compact that puts an end to the State of
Nature between Men,” when they agreed “to enter into one Community, and make one Body Politick.”69
While Adams recognized that, “Human Government is more or less perfect, as it approaches
nearer or diverges farther from an Imitation of this perfect Plan of divine and moral Government,” he gave

on constitutional and statutory law, he would rather make it than rely on more loosie-goosey principles of
natural law. Reid effectively recognized this point in stating, with ample primary sources substantiating his
assertion, “that appeals to natural law were almost always coupled to reliance upon some other authority
such as constitutional rights in general, the British constitution, the English constitution, the American
constitutions, the colonial charters, the original contract, magna carta and the bill of rights, or common
law.” All legal arguments were legitimate and sometimes entirely independent from each other. Accordingly, one need not exclude either a natural rights or a constitutional (or for that matter, a statutory) basis
for the claims set forth in the Declaration of Independence and elsewhere. All legitimate legal arguments
were fair game and were employed when they were useful. John Phillip Reid, “The Irrelevance of the
Declaration,” Law in the American Revolution and the Revolution in the Law: A Collection of Review
Essays on American Legal History, Hendrik Hartog, ed. (New York & London: New York University Press,
1981), pp. 46-89, 46-47, 50-51, 54, 79; see also John Phillip Reid, Constitutional History of the American
Revolution: The Authority of Law (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1993).
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DCG, II.32.309, entitled “The Contract Made Between Magistrates, and the Nations that created them,
were real, solemn, and obligatory.”
68

DCG, III.10.373.

69

Locke, “The Second Treatise,” Two Treatises of Government, Ch. II, §14, pp. 276-77.
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precious little attention to the abstraction of an original social contract to which the first men, emerging out
of a state of nature, consented.70 From his and, for that matter, our perspective, this was an inherently
anachronistic concept in which he (or we) would project back in time, and envision in our own way, what
happened before “before time immemorial” – the phrase used to describe the origins of the ancient
unwritten English constitution. In 1764 James Otis described this hypothesizing process in “The Rights of
the British Colonies Asserted and Proved.” “There are others who think when they have got back to old
Magna Carta that they are at the beginning of all things. They imagine themselves on the borders of
chaos (and so indeed in some respects they are), and see creation rising out of the unformed mass or
from nothing. Hence, say they, spring all the rights of men and of citizens.”71 Like Otis, Adams was a
realist. He truly was not interested in such abstractions. Instead, as was his modus operandi, Adams
focused on the concrete. “There are certain Principles fix’d unalterably in Nature.” Thus, we have the first
and deepest layer of law applicable to man, God’s natural law. Once God is out of the picture, at least as
far the formulation of law is concerned, circumstances change. “Convention and Compact are the
Requisites to make any Law obligatory.” Thus, for example, “That the Subject is not bound by Acts, when
He is not represented, is a sound Maxim of the Law, and not pecu[liar] to the British Constitution, but a
Maxim of the antient Roman Law: ‘What concerns All shall be judged of by All.’”72
Magna Carta was viewed by many as a social contract (albeit obviously not the original social
contract) between the English people and their monarch. Sidney stated that a king who violated this
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“Draft of a Newspaper Communication, August? 1770,” JA D&A Vol. I, p. 365.
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Otis preferred to think about constitutional rights from the time of the Glorious Revolution, and the
accession of William and Mary. James Otis, “The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved,”
1764, Pamphlets of the American Revolution 1750-1776, Vol. I: 1750-1765, Bernard Bailyn, ed. (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 408-82, 441. A modern author
described something similar, albeit going much further back in time. “The life that we know, if we listen
closely to its music, announces the evolutionary experience. Natural laws unknown to a Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, despite his inquiring genius, enclose and yet enforce the human adventure. Natural laws –
the shape of the inarguable – while subject today to scientific dispute and denial, must project with
sufficient investigation an affirmation of the eternally Invisible, the shadings of time beyond recollection,
the definitions of experience that neither you nor I may recollect, the gathered wisdom distilled from the
affluent Miocene, compacted by the deprived Pliocene, challenged, frustrated, tempted, rejected by that
harlot, the frivolous Pleistocene, until man came forth.” Robert Ardrey, The Social Contract: A Personal
Inquiry into the Evolutionary Sources of Order and Disorder (New York: Athenium, 1970), p. 408.
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Adams, “Argument before Governor Bernard and the Council in Favor of Opening the Courts,” Dec. 20,
1765, PJA Vol. I, p. 152.
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Great Charter was “an execrable perjur’d person,” meriting rejection by the people.73 As we know from
our study of Sidney, it was primarily Coke and Selden who institutionalized and popularized the importance of Magna Carta, an assertion taken for granted by seventeenth-century British-Americans, including
Adams.74
The most conspicuous recognition that Adams gave to the concept of the social contract, whether
original or not, is contained in his 1779 draft Preamble to Massachusetts’ Constitution. “The end of the
institution, maintenance and administration of government, is to secure the existence of the body-politic;
to protect it; and to furnish the individuals who compose it, with the power of enjoying, in safety and
tranquility, their natural rights, and the blessings of life.” What is the “body-politic? It is “formed by a
voluntary association of individuals: it is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with
each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the
common good.75
While the first voluntary social compact was the consequence of man’s interest in gathering
together and no longer living in the state of nature, what Adams was doing was viewing the adoption in
1780 of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’ Constitution as a new social compact. In so doing, Adams
shifted the locus of the social contract from the ancient one, shrouded in mystery and “time immemorial,”
or if one preferred, from Magna Carta, to the unusual circumstances that all the colonies faced, viz.,
having been ejected from Britain’s empire and the constitutional protections it afforded, they each needed
to form governments anew, which required new social contracts. That this was the concrete social
contract, also referred to by Adams as “the political compact,” on which the people of Massachusetts
could now rely, was reiterated in the Preamble to the new Constitution, along with reliance on God, “the
Great Legislator of the Universe”: “WE, therefore, the delegates of the people of Massachusetts, in
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DCG, III.28..493.
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See generally Colburn, The Lamp of Experience, pp. 43-47. Benjamin Franklin articulated this view in
terms of a contract between the colonists and the British monarch. “Because the mutual ‘consent of [all]
… the contracting parties was required to change the terms of any constitutional contract and because
each of the colonies was founded on the basis of a ‘compact between the King and the people of the
colony who were out of the realm of Great Britain,’ he wrote, ‘there existed nowhere on earth a power to
alter it’ without the colonists’ formal and express Consent.” Greene, The Constitutional Origins of the
American Revolution, p. 127, citing Franklin letters dated Dec. 24, 1770 and Sept. 1, 1773.
75

Preamble, The Massachusetts Constitution, PJA Vol. 8: March 1779-Feb. 1780, pp. 228-71, 237.
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general Convention assembled, for the express and sole purpose of framing a Constitution or Form of
Government to be laid before our Constituents, according to their instructions, acknowledging, with
grateful hearts, the goodness of the Great Legislator of the Universe, in affording to this people, in the
course of His providence an opportunity of entering into an original, explicit, and solemn compact with
each other, deliberately and peaceably, without fraud, violence, or surprize; and of forming a new
Constitution of Civil Government, for themselves and their posterity; …devoutly imploring His direction in
a design so interesting to them and their posterity.”76 The referenced “opportunity” to enter into an
original social contract was then exercised in the remainder of the constitution. After the first Chapter,
which was “A DECLARATION of the RIGHTS of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,”
Chapter II set forth “The Frame of Government,” beginning with the statement, “The people inhabiting the
territory heretofore called the Province of Massachusetts-Bay, do hereby solemnly and mutually agree
with each other, to form themselves into a free, sovereign, and independent body-politic or state, by the
name of THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.”77 A social contract.
In addition to his multi-volume Defence, Adams wrote marginalia on the famous 1778 Turgot
letter, initially confidential but published in 1784 after Turgot died, that was appended to an essay by the
British dissenting clergyman Dr. Richard Price. Turgot’s letter attacked bicameralism. One of Adams’
many responses was the following annotated exchange between the text of Turgot (T) and the marginalia
of Adams (A) about the “social compact”:
T. The clergy are dangerous only when they exist as a distinct body in the state, and think of
themselves as possessing special rights and interests and a religion “established” by law … as
if men had a right to regulate the consciences of others …
A. The rights of conscience are original rights and cannot be alienated; they are the first rights
and prescribe the first duties of man, and should be explicitly reserved out of every social
contract.78
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Preamble, The Massachusetts Constitution, PJA Vol. 8, p. 237.

(emphasis added). Clearly, the “design” was “so interesting” to the people of Massachusetts, for the
Constitution of Massachusetts remains in place today, albeit with over one hundred amendments. On the
“political compact” language, see “I. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay, Jan. 23,
1775, the first Novanglus letter, PJA Vol. 2, p. 230.
77

“Chapter II. The Frame of Government,” The Massachusetts Constitution, PJA Vol. 8, p. 242.
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Adams’ marginalia on Turgot’s 1775 letter, Haraszti, John Adams & the Prophets of Progress, p. 146
(emphasis added).
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In sum, for Adams, the layer of law called the social contract effectively happened three times,
and conceivably could happen more often: first, in some unprovable, unsatisfying way, there was a social
contract in “time immemorial.”79 Then there was Magna Carta. And much later, out of necessity and very
provably, the social contract was the specific, identifiable compact made by the men of each colony that
created a new sovereign entity. These were the American social contracts; they effectively superseded
the original social contract that men logically made as they emerged from that primordial mist that the
very young John Adams found mystifying, the state of nature. The American social contracts superseded
Magna Carta, although it remained as part of the common law on which the state courts relied. We
therefore have a more immediate segueing from the American states’ social contracts to the rule of law
and its constitutional underpinnings that was not necessary in the circumstances Sidney addressed; for in
the latter instance, no new social contract was necessary or appropriate.80 In England, constitutional law
that formed the basis for the rule of law emerged gradually in the centuries after the original social
contract. In contrast, in America, while the second legal tier called the social contract remained a vital
component of the substructure of law on which society relied, it all happened at almost the same time – a
situation unique to the British Americans.
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Michael Zuckert contended that for Blackstone, both the state of nature and the social contract “is not
historical truth” but “moral and philosophical truths”; “it presents the terms in which government must be
thought about.” The compact is “but another way of speaking of … the ‘natural liberty of mankind.’”
Blackstone’s approach, said Zuckert, allowed him to satisfy or at least finesse the three major deficiencies
in social compact theory that critics have identified: social contract thinking is “bad – very bad – history”;
that it is “poor political philosophy”; and that it is “bad philosophy, because it raises its claims in terms of
nature --- it wishes to speak of the ‘natural condition of man’ and of ‘natural rights.’” Michael Zuckert,
“Social Compact, Common Law, and the American Amalgam: The Contribution of William Blackstone,”
The American Founding and the Social Compact, pp. 37-73, 38-39, 56-58, 64-66.
80

Legal historians and others have discussed the social contract in terms of one or more contracts, as
well as an “ongoing” contract, although not in terms of the layers presented here. See, e.g., Reid, “The
Irrelevance of the Declaration,” p. 72 (“When colonial Whigs spoke of contract, it has generally been
assumed they were arguing in a Lockean vein. On rare occasions, perhaps, they were. What is almost
always forgotten or not noticed is that Locke’s writings contained two contracts. One was the social
contract, the most famous theory underpinning Locke’s notions of natural law, the other was the original
contract, not Lockean at all, but a central dogma in English and British constitutional law since time
immemorial.”) Zuckert, “Social Compact, Common Law, and the American Amalgam,” p. 63 (Blackstone
“rejects the state of nature because it is nowhere close to the true historical account of humanity, and
particularly not in accordance with the common law and its rooting in immemorial custom. Yet … custom
expresses ‘the consent of the governed,’ the ground of legitimate authority within the social compact
theory. Indeed, consent is just another way to speak of the social compact: Blackstone understands
custom as itself a version of the social compact, an ongoing rather than once and for all discrete ‘original
contract.’”)
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As Hannah Arendt pointed out in On Revolution, … Adams alone was a constitutionalist
who believed a revolution had no means of enduring without the rule of law.
John Patrick Diggins, The Portable John Adams 81

iii. Rule of law
The most difficult subject to get one’s arms around in early modern Anglo-American republican
theory is the centrality and vitality of the rule of law. The subject is both massive and elusive. This is the
case in both analyses of seventeenth-century English republican thought, discussed in Part One, and
eighteenth-century Anglo-American republicanism. It is particularly true for American history scholars who
view law as written rules, and consider constitutional law to be laws embodied in a written constitution.
Perhaps this contributes to the absence of any systematic treatment of the rule of law in most analyses of
early modern republicanism. The words “rule of law” may be used; thrown out there like a sack of
potatoes. But the meaning of these words remains murky, impenetrable. Pocock, for example, who
wrote insightfully about the origins of English law in The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, did not
appreciate the centrality of the rule of law to early modern Anglo-American republicanism, as evidenced
by its disregard in not only that book, but in his opus The Machiavellian Moment.82 We see in Pocock an
apparent aversion to the merits of the adversarial system.83 In the context of American revolutionary
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John Patrick Diggins, introduction to excerpts from Defence, The Portable John Adams, p. 290.
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Just to take one simple indicia, there is no reference to the rule of law in either book’s index.
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As we discussed in Part One, for Pocock, as for James I, there was only one way to read a statute and
that was literally. But it simply is not the case that legal interpretation is inherently suspect. As Sidney
appreciated, “faults may be found in many statutes, and that the whole body of them is greatly defective,
it will not follow that the compendious way of referring all to the will of the king should be taken. But what
defects soever may be in our law, the disease is not so great to require extreme remedies, and we may
hope for a cheaper cure.” DCG, II.27.474-75. In the United States, we categorize the interpreters of
constitutional law as strict constructionists, original intent subscribers, and those who advocate a broad
construction thereby cultivating a “living” constitution. Another way of analyzing the matter is to pit
“constitutional-legal ‘fundamentality’ (a boon to civilization) against constitutional-legal ‘fundamentalism’
(bad stuff).” In this analysis fundamentalism was defined as “the drive to lock constitutional law onto a set
of normative meanings or understandings that are ‘timeless and unchanging.’” Frank I. Michelman, “A
Civilized Man: Morton Horwitz Struggles with ‘Fundamental Law,” Transformations in American Legal
History: Essays in Honor of Professor Morton J. Horwitz, Vol. II, Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy,
eds. (Harvard University Press, 2010), Ch. 1, pp. 3-12, 5; see Morton J. Horwitz, “The Constitution of
Change: Legal Fundamentality without Fundamentalism,” Harvard Law Review Vol. 107, No. 1 (Nov.
1993), pp. 32-117. Michelman cited Isaiah Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty (and Berlin relied on Joseph
Schumpeter) for the proposition that, “To realize the relative validity of one’s convictions and yet stand for
them unflinchingly, is what distinguishes a civilized man from a barbarian.” Michelman, “A Civilized Man,”
p. 10 & n. 43. One cannot “prove” that one of these ways of analyzing the law is “right” and the others
“wrong.” They are different theories of jurisprudence, i.e., different philosophies about how the law should
be applied; and they are all legitimate. But depending on the theory to which one subscribes, the outcome
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history, this negative perspective is compounded by the analysis of Gordon Wood, whose magisterial The
Creation of the American Republic included extraordinary insights; but on the issue of law, Wood is
muddled; and de-muddling is much more painstaking than muddling.
We must begin with Wood’s sweeping statement that, “By 1776, the emerging logic of separating
principles from government, constitutional from legal, seemed conclusive to some.”84 This language may
well have inspired the statement by law professor and legal historian Prof. William E. Nelson in
Americanization of the Common Law, first published in 1975, that “the imperial crisis of the 1760s arose
because of the bifurcation of English legal and constitutional thought.”85 These are unfortunate phrases
by both scholars, and understandably led to further confusion. W. Nelson’s statement, however, was
clarified when he explained that both the authorities in the metropole and the colonists “had legitimate
readings of common and constitutional law,” indicating that the division he contemplated seemed to be
between common law that emerged out of the ancient constitution but was articulated by judges in court
decisions, creating a body of precedent, versus constitutional law, which W. Nelson saw as encompassing the “ancient,” original legal precepts largely founded in equity and natural law, that protected the
citizenry from an overreaching government. But these are two aspects of the Law, and not, as Wood
seemed to articulate, a disjunction that occurred in 1776 that separated “principles from government” and
“constitutional from legal.” 86

is different. In most disputes the applicable law, constitutional or otherwise, includes ambiguities,
sometimes gaping but often tiny interstitial spaces that invite exegesis. The role of the attorney is to
advocate an interpretation of the law that is in the best interest of her client. The role of the judge is to
decide which interpretation is optimal. The attorney’s advocacy is neither disingenuous nor
misrepresentation. To the contrary, aggressive advocacy is the attorney’s obligation, essential in a
system of law that relies on the marshaling of the best case by attorneys representing different and often
opposing or mutually inconsistent interests before the court. Pushing a law to its logical limit is often just
what such advocacy requires. Pocock was not comfortable with law defined through an adversarial
process that determines what law means. But this is what Anglo-American jurisprudence and the
ratiocination process endemic to it is all about.
84

Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, p. 267. Similarly, Wood stated, “Such a sharp and rigid
dichotomy between custom and statute, unwritten and written law, was thoroughly modern, and came to
correspond in American thought with the distinction between constitutional and legal.” Id, pp. 265-66.
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William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on
Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830 (Athens & London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), p. xiii.
86
Law professor Reid created a different division in British constitutionalism during the American
revolutionary period, but it does not sound like the distinction that either Wood or W. Nelson was making
even though Nelson referred to Reid in his reference to law’s “bifurcation.” In Reid’s view, there were
“two definitions of the British constitution,” one being the ancient constitution that protected rights “from
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Wood’s viewpoint requires painstaking deconstruction. In the first place, one cannot separate
legal from constitutional. It is not a valid dichotomy. ANYTHING THAT IS CONSTITUTIONAL IS
EMBODIED IN LAW. A constitution is a form of law, the most fundamental principles of a nation, it is
true, but no less law for it. This is very evident from our Part One analysis of the ancient constitution.
One can separate unwritten and written law, or separate fundamental, formative, i.e., constitutional law
from statutory or positive law that grows out of or at least is consistent with it. 87 But to suggest that by
1776 the Americans were “separating principles from government, constitutional from legal” is incorrect
and confusing.
Second, it is hyperbole to say that there was legal disorder. Law can be and often is inherently
messy. If the outcome of a case is very clear it is probably not (and should not) go to trial. Accordingly,
litigation and consequent court decisions almost always involve two or more very different vantage points
that are mutually inconsistent, either of which could be the correct understanding of the Law. Moreover,
lawyers are aggressive. The result is that there is a fight going on; not with fisticuffs, but a fight nonetheless. But as we know from Sidney, and Adams shared this view as did Machiavelli, tumults that are open
are not a threat to republican governance. It is when the tumult goes underground that the scary
possibility of conspiracy arises. Hence, the messy business of litigation is useful.
Until courts were shut down on the eve of the American revolution there was a functional judiciary

the arbitrary capriciousness of government power”; the other being “a newer British constitution … of
sovereign command and of arbitrary parliamentary supremacy.” At the First Continental Congress,
James Duane, a lawyer and delegate from New York, had alluded to this dichotomy when he sought to
station American rights “‘above the Reach’ of arbitrary power … [and] parliamentary supremacy.” What
became clear over time was that the colonists would not be able to accomplish this. Reid, Constitutional
History of the American Revolution: The Authority of Rights, pp. 229-30.
87

In his explanation, Wood quoted an anonymous Pennsylvania author who distinguished between
countries that had “truly a Constitution” and those that did not, viewing England as a country that did not.
But the colonial Pennsylvanian’s statement also does not support Wood’s distinction as the former was
alluding to the distinction between a written and an unwritten constitution, which is not what Wood was
saying. Wood’s view seemed to evolve from the following findings about colonial America: (i) “Many of the
English common law forms were present but often with defects and irregularities” which, in Wood’s view,
(ii) “helped to create an atmosphere of permissiveness and uncertainty which,” Wood maintained, (iii) “a
sharp lawyer with a collection of English precedents no one had ever heard of could often turn to
advantage.” Moreover, (iv) “the absence of chancery jurisdiction in many of the colonies,” (v) “added to
the colonists’ legal disorder.” Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, p. 298. In his later work,
Empire of Liberty, Wood reiterated his conception of legal disorder, relying on The Creation of the
American Republic for “a discussion of the confused state of colonial law and the prevalence of judicial
discretion.” Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815 (Oxford &
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 404 n.13.
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operating in each colony, albeit with different strengths and weaknesses, and a growing legal bar that
was tightening its reigns on its own members. There was an overrepresentation of preeminent attorneys
at the Continental Congresses. Adams’ did not faintly praise; in view of his appreciation of many of his
fellow delegates’ abilities, we can be confident that many of these gentlemen, leaders in their respective
colonies, were highly articulate, intelligent, capable and learned legal practitioners. Certainly by the
1780s to 1820s, “judges and other elite members of the legal profession brought coherence to case law.
This process, which is typically associated with Justice Marshall, Joseph Story, and James Kent, in fact
reached more deeply into the legal elites of virtually every one of the new American states.”88 At the time
of the revolutionary war the American system of law was neither in its infancy nor approaching adulthood;
we can think of it as a child, delightfully functional and communication-friendly in some circumstances; in
less orderly control in others. American law was British-American; there was “uniform reception of the
common law in early eighteenth-century America.”89 One of many examples of this fact and BritishAmerican legal bars’ commitment to it is the following Adams statement, made in 1763 when he was only
twenty-seven: “It has been my amusement for many years past,” – given his young age, how many years
could it have been?! – “to examine the systems of all the legislators, ancient and modern, fantastical and
real, and to trace their effects in history upon the felicity of mankind.” Writing anonymously as “U” in the
Boston Gazette, Adams continued, “And the result of this long examination is a settled opinion that the
liberty, the unalienable, indefeasible rights of man, the honor and dignity of human nature, the grandeur
and glory of the public, and the universal happiness of individuals, was never so skillfully and successfully
consulted, as in that most excellent monument of human art, the common law of England.” Adams added
that the common law was a “law that maintains a great superiority, not only to every other system of laws,
martial, or cannon, or civil, but to all officers, and magistrates civil and military, even to majesty itself.90
Once the colonies separated from Britain, each colony had to restate the constitutional under-

88
This coherence was evident in “the publication of judicial opinions, the issuance of a single opinion for
the entire court, the elaboration of a doctrine of judge-made law, the appearance of legal treatises, and
the emergence of new institutions of legal education like the Litchfield and Harvard law schools that
aimed at elaborating a rationalized body out of at least state, if not of national law.” W. Nelson,
Americanization of the Common Law, p. xv.
89

Id, p. xii.
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“VIII. ‘U’ to the Boston Gazette, [5 September 1763], PJA Vol. I, pp. 84-90, 86.
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pinnings of its legal system, of which Adams was acutely conscious and had urged each colony-cumstate to do. In many respects, these new states continued to rely on English common law. No doubt legal
clarity was sought by some in the American colonies, e.g., in Massachusetts by Samuel Adams who, as
Wood pointed out, advocated a “fixed” constitution. But Adams’ cousin was stating his preference for a
written not an unwritten constitution, a common point of view, which is not what Wood was talking
about.91 (Among other reasons, if this was what Wood intended, think how much easier it would have
been to have said so!) Finally, we have Wood’s own words, an acknowledgement, on the subject:
“Although a legally untrained judge, like Associate Justice John Dudley of New Hampshire, could charge
a jury ‘to do justice between the parties not by any quirks of the law out of Coke or Blackstone – books
that I never read and never will –but by common sense as between man and man,’ colonial adjudication
was not simply a matter of applying some kind of crude, untechnical law to achieve common-sense
‘frontier’ justice.” To the contrary, Wood recognized, “There is much evidence to suggest that even as
early as the late seventeenth century in new back-country counties the quality of legal procedures was
remarkably sophisticated; and by the middle of the eighteenth-century, in Massachusetts and New York
at least, colonial jurisprudence approached very closely to that of the English.”92 Wood referenced “the
sophistication of jurisprudence in a frontier county of Maryland at the end of the 17th century,” as well.
In fine, it is implausible that any colonial American attorney would have suggested what Wood
did, viz., that the principles of a constitution could be viewed as distinct from government and law, or that
an unwritten constitution such as Britain’s ancient constitution was any less fundamental, any less law, or
any less binding because it was not written or “fixed.”
The linkage of constitutional change to defective and irregular common law forms, meaning the
writ system of procedure, also deserves consideration. Wood is entirely correct that common law practice
and procedure was complex and user-unfriendly. In 1836 and 1851, Massachusetts, for example,
created a new system of procedure that replaced the old English writ system with one of “generic pleas”
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Reliance on Samuel Adams for a point of law of this type is probably a mistake. Recall young John
Adams’ observation that “[Samuel] Adams I believe has the most thourough Understanding of Liberty,
and her Resources, in the Temper and Character of the People,” but his mastery was “not in the Law and
Constitution.” JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 271 (Dec. 21, 1765).
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“Law and Contracts,” Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, Ch. VII, pp. 259-305, 297.
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for actions in contract, tort, and replevin, which was a vast improvement.93 Yet American procedural law
remained complicated until the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938!94 It is important,
however, to avoid anachronism. For eighteenth-century lawyers, legal process and procedure was their
bread and butter. This was what British lawyers learned at the Inns of Court in London, and what those
American lawyers unable to travel to Britain for their legal education assimilated through their apprenticeship with a practicing attorney, as Adams did. If one reads Adams’ Diary, it is peppered with references
to the English writ system, the necessity to understand which procedures and writs were applicable in
which circumstances, and the pitfalls of filing the wrong writ.95 Indeed, much to his chagrin, Adams lost
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W. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law, pp. 85-86. It was Henry II (Henry Plantagenet), the
great grandson of William the Conqueror, who in the twelfth century instituted a system of royal law in
England that included the writ system. Before then there was no professional judiciary. During Henry II’s
reign, the Court of Common Pleas (civil and criminal matters) and the Court of King’s Bench (felonies and
cases affecting the monarch’s royal person) were created, along with the Exchequer (tax and other
financial matters). These courts were “the first permanent, central, professional royal courts of civil and
criminal jurisdiction in England. …[C]riminal and civil matters that had previously been under local and
feudal jurisdiction and local and feudal law” became subject to royal jurisdiction. Henry instituted a series
of procedural and substantive legal changes, including the “judicialization” of the old executive writ
system. Accused persons now had to appear before an impartial royal tribunal to answer the complaint
against them in lieu of being subject to local jurisdiction. The writ was “designed … to lead to a judicial
proceeding”; it “defined the theory of the plaintiff’s case and established the procedure whereby it was to
be decided.” In so doing it both greatly broadened the power of the king through the royal courts, and
originated English common law (a term of later origin); it also circumscribed royal power. “Glanvill, by
defining royal jurisdiction in terms of writs, limited that jurisdiction. In the nineteenth-century jurist
Frederick Maitland’s words, the rule of writs is the rule of law.” Glanvill’s 1187 Treatise on the Laws and
Customs of the Kingdom of England “systematized most of the fundamental principles of feudal law in
England under the categories of the royal judicial writs that had been issued in the preceding decades.
…Two generations later Glanvill’s concept was carried much further in Bracton’s Treatise on the Laws
and Customs of England.” There were many different types of writs invented to satisfy the principle of law
that “’where there is a wrong, there is a remedy.’” Writs for the breach of property rights (ownership and
possession) included writs of right, novel disseisin, mort d’ancestor and darrein presentment; there were
also writs for monetary debts, writs of detinue for claimed chattels, writs of gage for return of land pledged
as security for a debt not repaid, writs of replevin for recovery of chattels pledged for a fulfilled obligation,
and writs of covenant for breach of a sealed instrument. In the thirteenth century, writs of trespass were
created, the source of modern English and American tort and contract law. “By the year 1300 there were
hundreds of different writs, each of which, in effect, was both an assertion of policy (to protect certain
interests against infringement) and an assertion of royal jurisdiction.” Quite obviously, then, by the
eighteenth century, the writ system would have been a fundamental part of the education of British
attorneys, whether trained at the Inns of Court or under the supervision of a practicing lawyer. Harold J.
Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, Vol. I (Harvard University
Press, 1983)(“Law and Revolution I”), pp. 310-11, 438-53.
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In his Diary Adams often wrote in funny stream of consciousness. In an October 13, 1758 entry, for
instance, when the young Adams was studying law, he described some of the things he was studying - a
range of “Questions,” largely but not exclusively procedural, e.g., ”What is the. true Idea, and Definition of
a Court of Record?” … Are not Justices Warrants confined to criminal matters? May a Warrant be issued
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his first legal case precisely for this reason.96 In fine, however user-unfriendly the writ system is to
twenty-first century lawyers, it was accepted as the way to do business by eighteenth-century ones.
No doubt the law was (and perhaps still is) somewhat impenetrable by non-lawyers, which
contributed to the necessity of hiring a lawyer by those who wanted to file or defend a lawsuit. But this
does not mean that the legal system was one of “defects and irregularities,” as Wood suggested, nor did
it create “an atmosphere of permissiveness and uncertainty.”97 It was (and is) the responsibility and role
of a lawyer both in Britain and America to master and interpret the law, including the writ system, and
including precedents no one had ever heard of, to his client’s advantage. Americans were litigious, too,
which reflected their appreciation of the role of the judiciary. Turning the law to one’s advantage, which
Wood found objectionable, was (and is) not only legitimate, but a lawyer who did not endeavor to do so
would not be acting in the best interests of his client, which could be legal malpractice! This is the very
nature of the adversarial system. In this regard, Wood joined Pocock in his apparent albeit perhaps
subliminal rejection of the nature of our system of law and those who practice it. To suggest, as Wood
did, that it was somehow improper, or created disorder, when an adept, “sharp lawyer” turned precedent
to his client’s advantage, misconceives the practice of law, then and now.98

for a Trespass Quare Clausum fregit?” That week he went into town and ran into a friend, who asked him,
“You dont intend to be a Sage, I suppose,” to which Adams thought (but did not say), “A Sage, no.
Knowledge eno’ to keep out of fire and Water, is all that I aim at.” So much for that goal! JA D&A, Vol. I,
pp. 49, 51-52. On common law in early America, see W. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law, p.
xii (“The main impact of the reception” of the common law in Massachusetts Bay “was to require lawyers
to follow common law rules of procedure and, above all, to use the common law forms of action,” the writ
system, “in presenting their cases for trial.”)
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See The Earliest Diary of John Adams, pp. 82-98; JA D&A, Vol. I, pp. 48-50, 57-58, 62-65.

97
It is true, as law professor William Nelson explained, that the writ system was cumbersome and
distracting, and substantive issues could be “buried in the interstices of procedure.” At the same time, in
colonial America, with the possible exception of New York, “juries routinely determined both law and fact,”
giving to local communities the “ultimate power to determine the province’s substantive law.” Indeed, in
Nelson’s view, this led to “the paradoxical effect of “the uniform reception of the common law in early
eighteenth-century America” of “entrench[ing] power in localities and thereby … legitimat[ing] local
variations in substantive law, all under a rubric of lawyer-mediated procedural uniformity.” W. Nelson,
Americanization of the Common Law, p. xii.
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Wood also alleged that, “Such experience bred among the colonists a profound fear of judicial
independence and discretion.” Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, p. 298; see also Wood,
Empire of Liberty, p. 406 (“By the 1780s many Americans … were beginning to re-evaluate their former
hostility to judicial power and discretion.”) This also reflects a bedrock misunderstanding. One colonial
fear, and a subject about which Adams objurgated, was that Bay judges might be unduly influenced if
their salary was controlled by the Crown. Adams’ wrote about this in his Brattle essays and elsewhere.
There is precious little discussion in the secondary literature about the Brattle essays, some fifty pages of
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Wood made three other statements in his discussion of law in revolutionary America that further
compound the flummoxed nature of this aspect of his analysis. First, he argued that, “Amidst the
confusion and disorder of colonial law, lawyers and judges had really no other basis but reason and
equity for clarifying their law and for justifying the deviations in their jurisprudence from that of the
English.” Wood then laid down his gauntlet: “The problem was: could this emphasis on reason and equity

prose. The most useful discussion of them that I have found is by the editors of the John Adams Papers
in the volume on Adams’ papers in which they appear, with cross-references to his legal papers; there
probably are references to the Brattle essays elsewhere, but without discussion. Recently, for instance,
Ryerson, one of the editors of the John Adams Papers, spent several pages of his recent detailed work
on Adams discussing the Brattle exchange. See Ryerson, John Adams’s Republic, pp. 101-03. In précis,
by 1773 Adams was a powerful legal adversary, and in the Brattle essays he proved, at least to the
Massachusetts Bay public, his exceptional legal ability, including his analytical skill and thoroughness –
the utterly complete preparation and scholarship that underlay his forceful legal arguments. Adams had
become a member of the legal cognoscenti and people knew it. He was blessed with an esemplastic
mind: a man with the ability to pull together diverse and sometimes complex, even arcane legal concepts,
and then to simplify and present them to the public as a unified whole. In this case, for example, Adams
quipped at one point in the Brattle letters that it would have been “music in my ears” if certain authorities
were correct that the ancient constitution protected judges from dismissal in the absence of misbehavior;
but unfortunately, after reviewing ad nauseam Brattle’s legal arguments, Adams concluded that “the
whole stream of law and history is against them.” JA Papers, Vol. I, pp. 263-64.
Adams modestly described the Brattle essays as “a few observations”; in fact, they are a series of
lengthy, erudite letters, legally hyper-technical and, frankly, rather boring (which no doubt contributes to
why scholars do not analyze them), that nevertheless manifest Adams’ deep and rather intimidating
understanding of the British system of law, legal precedent, and legal history. Among the authorities that
Adams cited in this set of essays are Henry de Bracton, Lord Edward Coke, Lord John Holt, Chancellor
John Fortescue, Lord Chief Justice Henry Hobart, and Sir Edward Hale. Adams relied, as well, on
philosopher and legal historian David Hume. He described the origins of common law, including the
Mercian laws, the laws of the West Saxons, and the Danish law, extracted by King Edward the Confessor
into one uniform digest of laws. Adams reviewed the history of the English court system, too, as well as
Acts of Parliament that related to his subject-matter. See JA Papers, Vol. I, pp. 252-309. Adams was
well aware of the fact that the letters might be boring. “To enumerate all the struggles of the people, the
petitions and addresses to Kings, praying that the judges commissions might be granted during good
behaviour … which failed of success … would be too tedious, and indeed I anxiously fear I have been so
already.” Similarly, in his Diary Adams noted, “I have written a tedious Examination of Brattle’s
absurdities.” JA Papers, Vol. I, p. 267; JA D&A, Vol. II (March 4, 1773), p. 77. On the Brattle essays, and
Adams’ strongly held convictions about the necessity to protect judges from corrupting influence, see
Appendix B. Adams and others were advocating judicial independence, particularly from the metropole
and Parliament. In all likelihood there was a tension between the necessary independence of the
judiciary and providing judges with too much discretion so that they effectively were legislating through
decision-making. This is an inherent and deliberate tension in the law, a balancing of power, which
continues today. British history and English legal precedent, particularly the seventeenth-century ship
money legal proceeding – the case involving Charles I’s unilateral imposition of taxes and John Hampden
senior’s unsuccessful opposition to the King – fueled this concern. The Americans, and Adams
specifically, did not want to cede too much power to any branch of government. But this worry about the
judiciary had absolutely nothing to do with a loss of faith in the legal system extant in America, including
what Wood termed “permissiveness,” “uncertainty,” “defects” and “irregularities.” The matter ultimately
was resolved in America in 1803 in Marbury v. Madison, when the Supreme Court made clear that it was
the Court’s responsibility to establish what the law is through its power of judicial review.
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in their law be maintained without judicial discretion?” In an associated footnote Wood also asserted that,
“Because of the scarcity of law books and law reports, American lawyers tended to rely heavily in their
legal education on the medieval and early modern classics of English law, thus accentuating their oldfashioned interpretation of jurisprudence.”99
Addressing Wood’s last point first, the reliance on medieval and early modern English legal by the
American bar had absolutely nothing to do with the scarcity of law books and law reports! Most American
lawyers had access to the law books they needed, although probably very few – e.g., Dickinson, Wilson,
Madison – were even close to legal scholars in the fashion of Adams.100 More importantly, reliance on
medieval and early modern law, i.e., legal precedent, was (and still is) the method by which AngloAmerican law is understood, interpreted, and practiced. A law grounded in common law, which Wood
regarded as an “old-fashioned interpretation of jurisprudence,” was no less relevant than one that was
not. There was nothing “old-fashioned” about it. In law, being newer is not better! Indeed, being newer
tends to be suspect. The entire concept of custom, which was folded into Anglo-American law, suggested
that experience over generations greatly enhanced, if it did not prove, the legitimacy of behavior. The
Anglo-American system of law was (and still is) informed by its “old-fashioned” methodology and
precedent; it is what the practice of law is all about. In fact, one might say that it was thoroughly modern
to rely on ancient legal precedent.
Moreover, the American resort to “reason and equity” had absolutely nothing to do with confusion
or disorder in colonial law and should not be viewed as a last resort option – what Wood characterized as
a situation where “lawyers and judges had really no other basis.” Recall Aristotle and Cicero’s emphasis
on fundamental fairness, and the obligation of counsel to turn to equity if statutory law did not suffice to
promote and protect the interests of one’s client. Basing one’s case on principles of equity was inherently
discretionary, and therefore a bit more dicey; but it was not the product of choice. It was a way to justly
resolve situations in which particular laws did not apply. It was no less legally valid or important. One
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Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, p. 299 n.66.
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See Law and Authority in Colonial America, George Athan Billias, ed., Richard B. Morris, intro. (New
York, Dover Publications, 1965); Law in Colonial Massachusetts 1630-1800: A Conference held 6 and 7
November 1981 by The Colonial Society of Massachusetts (Boston: The Colonial Society of
Mawssachusetts, 1984); Charles Warren, A History of the American Bar (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1913)[repr. Miami, FL: HardPress Pub., undated].
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could not turn to principles of equity without a case that merited this treatment, which generally meant that
fundamental fairness was at play, and that one’s client was being denied something to which he was
reasonably entitled. Pace Wood, the statement from John Dickinson made while he was training at the
Inns of Court and that Wood quoted in support of his viewpoint, viz., “it would be much properer to say
that every court there,” that is, in America, “is a court of equity,” does not support Wood’s thesis. What
Dickinson was saying was that unlike in England, one did not need to go to a separate court, with equitable jurisdiction if one’s client had a case in equity, not that there were no resort to the common law.
Equity often relied on principles of natural law, and could be invoked by the courts to ensure that
where there were gaps in the written law that would lead to injustice, the judiciary had a possible and
legitimate way to remedy the situation. Equitable jurisdiction had been used for centuries in the English
adversarial system to apply England’s ancient constitution to a case at hand. The colonists had no doubt
whatsoever that those same principles should be, but were not being applied to them, with an inequitable,
unjust result. As Prof. Reid explained, the invocation of the ancient constitution had been a practice that
was customary. For example, “People had, by inheritance, a right of property in trial by jury, and the legal
fact of inherited right was proven by unaltered immemorial custom.” With custom establishing the right to
a jury trial, “the Crown could not take it away.”
Everything changed in America when the British denied the right to a jury trial in certain
situations, taking away the customary constitutional protection of this right and turning the right to a jury
trial into something that depended on the “grace and favor” of the sovereign.101 This was a HumptyDumpty that could not be put back on the wall. Even if Parliament restored the right to a jury trial that had
been revoked, the colonists had permanently lost a sense of security about that right and other
constitutionally-protected rights to which they had no doubt they were entitled. “Once Parliament
exercised sovereignty and shattered custom,” viz., acted unconstitutionally, in the colonists’ view, “the
right was not a fundamental secured right in the sense that ‘fundamental secured right’ was understood
by Sir Edward Coke, John Hampden, Algernon Sidney, and American whigs.”102 One could also put this
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John Phillip Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution, Vol. I: The Authority of Rights
(Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), p. 237.
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Id. In his recent monograph Pincus advocated a different perspective, arguing that for the Americans,
the issue was economic policy, not sovereignty. Pincus, The Heart of the Declaration, pp. 106-07, 115-31.
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in the Pettit context of non-domination: that it is not enough to have the “grace and favor” of those in
power; without self-determination, there is no freedom.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that equity in no way equates with idealism. It is a
pragmatic solution to an otherwise insoluble problem, viz., that no system of law can anticipate every
future problem and address it statutorily. As we discussed in connection with Sidney’s republicanism, the
ancient Greeks thought in terms of the ideal state - Plato’s Republic. In the ancient Greek ideal world,
laws were restricting and did not deal with exceptional cases in which application of the law was
inequitable. Plato’s philosopher-king was an idealized ruler, a man who Aristotle remarked should he
“appear among men, godlike rule would and should be gladly conceded to him.”103 Elsewhere we have
cited Cicero, who was Sidney and Adams’ favorite political theorist, to the same effect. Sidney wrote
about this, too. In thinking about the concept of equity, a distinction was drawn in Roman law between
justice and law. “Labour to get distinct Ideas of Law, Right, Wrong, Justice, Equity,” said Adams. “Search
for them in your own mind, in Roman, grecian, french, English Treatises of natural, civil, common, Statute
Law.”104 When he was musing about the best arguments to make in connection with the forced closing of
the Bay courts, Adams wondered if he should argue that the Stamp Act should be waived by the judges
because it was “against natural Equity and the Constitution.”105
In the absence of “reason and equity,” any and every system of law would be unfair – viz.,
inequitable. No system of written law, no matter how brilliant and thorough, can avoid this truism. For no
system of law can anticipate every eventuality, every set of circumstances present in every legal controversy; and the law is required to address every legal grievance. Where there is no express answer in the
law or in legal precedent, judges must interpret and apply the law to the unprecedented circumstances.
This requires the exercise of judgment and discretion; but it is not confusing or disorderly. It is not even
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out of the ordinary.106 Again, every legal decision, whether based on law that is written or unwritten,
constitutional or non-constitutional, equity, reason, or express statutory law, as well as those decisions
rooted in medieval and early modern English law, including the innumerable Anglo-American laws that
were (and are) so rooted – in every one of these instances, a judge had to apply the law, which is what
Adams himself was so talented at doing on behalf of his clients, including the people of Braintree, of
Boston, of the Bay, and of America. That application always required judgment; and the proper resolution
ultimately – the buck stopped – with the judge’s discretion. Among the questions to be addressed were:
(i) which law applied; (ii) how did the law apply; (iii) how could the law be considered not to apply; (iv)
what were the exceptions to the law that had been recognized by other courts; and (v) were there other
exceptions that were express or implied by the law. Etcetera, etcetera.
Judges, indeed, all lawyers, were (and are) pragmatists. Their goal is to achieve outcomes that
come as close to equitability as possible; but the goal is an ideal, not a reality. Enforcing the law in courts
of law, if such enforcement includes not only the interpretation of the law but the law’s constitutional
validity, means that by definition that court’s decision is “a power superior, in its general nature, to that of
the legislature.”107 In 1803, Marbury v. Madison, written by Supreme Court Justice John Marshall who
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Wood harbored a clear misunderstanding that somehow judicial discretion could be avoided if there
was less “emphasis on reason and equity,” presumably meaning more express statutory or positive law.
The fact that Wood maintained that Americans sought a judicial system in which discretion was absent
demonstrates his incognizance of the nature of law. This misguided notion then formed a predicate for
Wood’s view that things soon radically changed in America in the 1780’s with the embracing of the necessity for the intercession of the judgment of the judiciary to balance the power of the legislature. Thus,
Wood stated, “To bring their abiding belief in the intrinsic equitableness of all law into harmony with their
commitment to legislative supremacy, without doing violence to either, became the task of the 1780’s. ...
Somehow the principles of justice and equity that made law what it was to Americans must be enforced in
the ordinary courts, without at the same time conferring ‘upon the judicial department a power superior, in
its general nature, to that of the legislature.’ What was needed in fact was a revolutionary clarification in
the Americans’ understanding of law and of politics.” Here we have another set of propositions grounded
on an interpretation of law that relied on multiple misunderstandings. Pace Wood, it is not possible to
make “all law” intrinsically equitable. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, pp. 304-05.
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Wood relied on the self-serving argument by James Wilson that judicial review did not “by any means
suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power,” and that “It only supposes that the power of
the people is superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in
opposition to that of the people, declared in the constitution, the judges … ought to regulate their
decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not fundamental.” But all of this begs
the question of who decides – an issue to which Adams referred – and in this case, who decided what
“the will of the people” is – not only by any legal standard, a completely vague concept, but one with a
very substantive outcome. As Prof. Lawrence Tribe pointed out, “all judicial decisions ‘inescapably’
involved ‘taking sides. …Judicial authority to determine when to defer to others in constitutional matters is
a procedural form of substantive power; judicial restraint is but another form of judicial activism.’” Laura
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Adams appointed to the Court, rejected the William Blackstone (and others) view of British legal authority
which placed ultimate sovereign authority – where the buck stopped – in the legislature.108 Wood argued
in The Creation of the American Republic that the embracing of a tripartite government, one part of which
was the judiciary, and the separation of powers embodied in the US Constitution, was a radical shift. Yet
this was the very structure of government that Adams had always advocated, as evidenced in his early
“Thoughts on Government” and, later in his life, reemphasized in Defence, both of which (and particularly
the latter) Wood wholly rejected as antiquated and irrelevant.109
Wood’s contention that the adoption of a balanced form of government in the 1780s was a radical
shift relied on the incorrect premise that at the time of the Declaration of Independence there was a
rejection of judicial authority as well as the creation of a loosely confederated republic. Again, there is a
muddling here. It is absolutely true, as Wood observed, that Richard Henry Lee said in 1788 that it was
incredible that,” “the same people, who have just emerged from a long and cruel war in defence of liberty,
should now agree to fix an elective despotism upon themselves and their posterity.”110 This is to say that
the adoption of the US Constitution and its tripartite, bicameral system of government that gave a great
deal of power to the federal government in a way that the Articles of Confederation had clearly abjured,
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was a huge change.111 It is beyond the scope of this study to review the reasons for that change; there
were many.112 But a change in the perception of law was not one of them! Rather, there was, indeed,
recognition that a legislature could be as despotic as a king – a proposition to which Sidney subscribed
more than a century earlier and with which Adams’ wholly and repeatedly concurred. “Despotism,
absolute monarchy, absolute aristocracy, and absolute democracy I have uniformly detested through my
whole life; because I knew that absolute power was tyranny, delirious tyranny wherever it was placed.”113
Jefferson may have argued that, “The introduction of this new principle of representative democracy has
rendered useless almost everything written before on the structure of government,” a statement quoted
by Wood and a view with which he clearly concurred. But that does not make the statement accurate.114
In fact, one can hypothesize that Adams, the historicity devotee who could not possibly embrace the
notion that the past has become irrelevant, would have found the assertion rather arrogant, naïve, and
completely erroneous. The nature of government, as defined by the law, had been and was still governed
by legal precedent, much of which relied on common law and principles of equity and reason, and
therefore “almost everything written before on the structure of government” was still both legally useful
and essential for lawyers and the courts to utilize.
Why this diversion to Wood’s analysis in The Creation of the American Republic, which included
so many insights about the transition from the revolutionary period to the adoption of the United States
Constitution? The reason is because unfortunately, along the way, Wood’s seminal contribution to Ameri-
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Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, July 11, 1807, Correspondence Between John Adams and Mercy
Warren, pp. 321-28, 324-26.
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Note Adams’ view that, “a simply democracy by representation is a contradiction in terms.” Adams,
Defence, Vol. I, p. 26. This explains Adams’ use of the phrase, “democratical republic,” which clearly was
pruned to what we know consider the United States, a democratic republic. See Defence, Vol. I, p. 31.
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can revolutionary scholarship also contributed to the historiographic muddle about the nature of the rule
of law in revolutionary America and beyond. As a result, it confused and denied the importance of Adams’
republicanism not only to the American revolution, but to the creation of the constitutional republic that still
stands, including Adams’ profound reliance on law and the nature of that reliance.115 In sum, pace Wood
and progeny, at the time of the passage of the Constitution Adams’ views remained valid and often
prescient. Following in Sidney’s footsteps, Adams steadfastly held the conviction that the rule of law was
essential to a republic, and that therefore the independent role of the judiciary was a vital part of a tripartite government, which he endorsed. Pace Wood, “Adams, of all people,” did not misunderstand “the
meaning of the Constitution.”116 To the contrary, it was Adams who understood its meaning long before it
was written, and who advocated in favor of a system of this kind most of his life.117 When the Constitution
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Wood’s misguided analysis of Adams continues today. In the week-end Review section of The Wall
Street Journal, Oct. 14-15, 2017, Wood authored an article in anticipation of his forthcoming book,
Friends Divided: John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. The article was entitled, “Founding Liberal,
Founding Conservative.” The failure to appreciate what Adams was all about continues to cause Wood to
misunderstand Adams’ ideas. Jefferson and Adams could not be more different, said Wood – a
reasonable starting point. Jefferson was a “radical,” “progressive” liberal who, consistent with his time,
endorsed “minimal government,” “had a magnanimous view of human nature,” believed that “all men are
created equal (in his case, only all white men),” and that it was “the environment” that caused “the
obvious differences among individuals”; accordingly, Jefferson “put an enormous emphasis on
education.” In contrast, said Wood, Adams was “perhaps the most conservative president we have ever
had” with “a sour and cynical view of human nature,” who was “pessimistic about the future,” and a
“severe critic of the Jeffersonian concept of American exceptionalism. …Americans were just as vicious,
just as sinful, just as corrupt as other nations.” Adams was “the ultimate realist” who believed that “we
were all born unequal and that education couldn't do much about the inherent differences among people.”
Apparently Wood skipped Adams’ 1766 letter, writing as Clarendon to Pym, in which he stated, “All men
are born equal: and the drift of the British constitution is to preserve as much of this equality, as is
compatible with the people’s security against foreign invasions and domestic usurpation.” Once again we
have a muddle here of Adams the man and Adams the thinker; and there is no mention of Adams the
lawyer, which was such a fundamental part of Adams as a man and a thinker. See Adams, “III. The Earl
of Clarendon to William Pym,” PJA Vol. 1: Sept. 1755-Oct. 1773, p. 168. Note, too, in Empire of Liberty,
pp. 406-08, Woods’ continuing thesis that there was a “remarkable transformation” in the American public
perception of the judiciary, stemming largely from a “disillusionment with popular legislative government in
the states.” For further discussion of Wood’s huge change thesis, see Empire of Liberty, Chs. 11 & 12,
pp. 400-68.
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Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, p 567.
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James Madison is known as the “father” or “philosopher” of the United States Constitution. Things
might have been different if Adams and Jefferson were not serving as diplomats in Europe at the time,
given both men’s erudition and stature. Madison was of a younger generation than Adams, born in 1751,
precisely halfway between Adams birth in 1735 and that of his son, John Quincy, in 1767. The matter of
Madison and Adams’ relationship must await another study. We can say that for many years Madison
was tremendously influenced by Jefferson, who was highly critical of Adams. Recognizing that Madison’s
views did change over time, Adams and Madison did have many similar republican views, as well as a
lifelong commitment to “a republican dream” that “defined the meaning” of both of their lives. Historian
Drew McCoy characterized Madison’s republicanism as conservative and reflective of a Burkean spirit, an
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circulated, Adams was in Britain; but we know that he was thrilled with it! No wonder! In large measure,
the Constitution reflected Adams’ republican ideas. As he stated in his 1797 Inaugural Address,
“Employed in the service of my country abroad during the whole course of these transactions, I first saw
the Constitution of the United States in a foreign country. Irritated by no literary altercation, animated by
no public debate, heated by no party animosity, I read it with great satisfaction, as the result of good
heads prompted by good hearts, as an experiment better adapted to the genius, character, situation, and
relations of this nation and country than any which had ever been proposed or suggested.” Adams saw
“In its general principles and great outlines” that the new constitution “was conformable to such a system
of government as I had ever most esteemed, and in some States, my own native State in particular, had
contributed to establish. Claiming a right of suffrage, in common with my fellow-citizens, in the adoption or
rejection of a constitution which was to rule me and my posterity, as well as them and theirs, I did not
hesitate to express my approbation of it on all occasions, in public and in private.” 118
We can now comfortably return to our primary interest here, which is in Adams’ integration of the
concept of rule of law in his theory of republican government. We also have innumerable examples of
Adams’ reliance on the rule of law. For instance, in the second Boston Massacre trial, Adams told the
jury, “I desire not to advance any thing of my own. I chuse to lay down the rules of law, from authorities
which cannot be disputed.”119 As the rule of law was pervasive in Sidney’s republican theory, so, too, it
informed Adams’ republicanism.

interesting description given Burke’s extraordinary praise of John Adams. Adair, Fame and the Founding
Fathers, pp. 29,192; Drew R. McCoy, The Last of. the Fathers: James Madison & the Republican Legacy
(Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. xvi, 61; Darren Staloff, Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson: The Politics
of Enlightenment and the American Founding (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), p. 132. On one
illustration of Jefferson and Madison’s different perspective, in this instance about Shay’s Rebellion, see
Thomas Fleming, The Great Divide: The Conflict Between Washington and Jefferson that Defined a
Nation (Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 2015), pp. 34-35.
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“Inaugural Address of John Adams in the City of Philadelphia, Saturday, March 4, 1797, The Avalon
Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/adams.asp (10-26-17); see Editor’s note, The Adams-Jefferson
Letters: The Complete Correspondence Between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams, Lester
J. Cappon, ed. (Chapel Hill & London: The Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture at
Williamsburg, Virginia, 1987), p. 209. Jefferson considered the new Constitution to be “unquestionably the
wisest ever yet presented to men.” Id, citing a letter from Jefferson to David Humphreys, March 18, 1789.
119

Adams’ Closing Argument, “No. 64, Rex v. Wemms,” JA Legal Papers, Vol. 3, p. 253. There was and
is no distinction made in law between the rules of law and the rule of law. Adams used the expressions
interchangeably.
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Recall our detailed discussion in Part One about the rule of law in seventeenth-century England,
a term of art variously understood. Prof. Murphy’s distinction between “a” law and “the” Law, which was
associated with the distinction between the Latin terms “lex” and “ius,” also applied in eighteenth-century
America. Ius refers to the complex concept that jurists term “the Law,” as well as the body of law, legal
reasoning – including principles of equity – and legal practice. There are both laws, plural, that are
particular normative rules, and then there is the Law, in its entirety, which subsumes the layman’s
understanding of the law as well as a variety of principles and other ideas and ideals sometimes
(although not always) quite conceptual in nature. These values are often founded on tradition. Laymen
tend to think of the law as a collection of discrete laws, whereas lawyers are taught to think of the Law
more conceptually, encompassing standards, principles, categories of classification, maxims, doctrine
and ideals. Principles of equity are a vital component of the Law.120 Lawyers also understand the Law to
be “crucially” all about “the art and technique of interpreting, developing and applying the applicable,
heterogeneous norms in the administration of justice.”121 In short, jurists intend that the laws implement
the Law. As Berman explained, the concept of the Law includes many other practical activities associated
with governance, such as casting votes, issuing orders, appointing officials, handing down judgments,
and the facilitating of voluntary arrangements (negotiated transactions, the outcome of which is often
reflected in a contract, issuing documents and other civil law activities). “Law in action consists of people
legislating, adjudicating, administering, negotiating, and carrying on other legal activities. It is a living
process of allocating rights and duties and thereby resolving conflicts and creating channels of
cooperation.”122
The rule of law refers to the principle that the Law governs men in society and is often
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In Virtue, Commerce, and History, Pocock defined “the laws of a republic” as “the formal structure
within which political nature developed to its inherent end. This is the meaning of Harrington’s dictum,”
said Pocock that, ‘Good orders make evil men good and bad orders make good men evil.’” But Pocock
also indicated, in the same context, that because the laws of a republic were “the lois obeyed by Montesquieu’s vertu politique,” they therefore were “far less regulae juris or modes of conflict resolution” than
they were orders. Why the laws obeyed as a result of Montesquieu’s political virtue could be considered
orders but not modes of conflict resolution is not at all clear. Interestingly, two paragraphs later, Pocock
stated, “the lawyers and not the republicans were the first social historians.” Why lawyers cannot be
republicans and vice versa is also unclear. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History, p. 44.
121

Murphy, “The Lawyer and the Layman,” pp. 111 & 118, citing Cicero’s De Legibus I, vi, 19.
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Berman, Law and Revolution I, pp. 4-5.
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implemented through laws, which are interpreted in the courts by judges. As Murphy so brilliantly put it,
“Interpretation creates law interstitially; it is the mortar of the legal edifice.”123 Respect for the law was an
obvious constituent part of this legal edifice.124 In the Anglo-American legal system, as we discussed in
connection with Sidney’s ideas, when we refer to the common law or what some label “lawyer’s law,” we
are talking about the ideas of jurists in adjudications, as well as juridical views contained in other highly
regarded legal texts such as, from the seventeenth century, Sir Edward Coke’s Institutes. Again, the Law
is both a collection of particular rules – tax codes, inheritance laws, and other rules ad infinitum – as well
as a collection of concepts and aphorisms that are intended to apply principles of justice to life – e.g., a
man should not profit from his own wrongdoing, ignorance of the law is no excuse, the law does not force
a man to do a vain thing, one who acts through another acts himself, and innumerable other legal maxims
that are often imbued with ethical values and frequently relate to matters of fundamental fairness, another
well-worn legal concept. Most maxims have ancient, and usually Roman origins.125 Reid was effectively
making this point when he wrote, “In the eighteenth century, the constitution was not the measure of what
was lawful,” i.e., what particular laws said, “but the standard of what law should be,” viz., the Law.126
Berman alluded to the “meta-law,” the legal science within the Law that reflects what legal scholars say
about legal institutions, commands, and decisions.127 In sum, as we explained in greater detail in Part
One, the Law is more – much more – than just the laws. Obviously, then, if the rule of law is understood
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Id, pp. 113, 117.
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James Wilson, a lawyer who had been a Pennsylvania delegate to the Continental Congress as well
as a drafter of the Constitution, a man “familiar” with Sidney, published pamphlets contributory to the
revolutionary cause, focusing particularly on the rights of Englishmen, including the colonists. Wilson
both “acknowledged the American debt to Anglo-Saxon ancestors,” and recognized that a “characteristic”
of the Anglo-Saxons was “respect for law, tenacity for liberty.” He recognized, too, that it was John
Selden who had written that the great Saxon King Alfred was “the choicest of the chosen.” Colbourn, The
Lamp of Experience, p. 152. Adams imbibed all of this. See id, p. 30 & Ch. V, pp. 100-28 entitled, “John
Adams: Political Scientist as Historian.”
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In the context of criminal law, “denial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness
essential to the very concept of justice.” Lisenba v. California, 314 US 219, 236 (1941); in the civil
context, see Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 US 585 (1991) (form contract forum-selection clauses
are subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness).
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Reid, The Concept of Representation, p. 8. Reid went on to suggest that this is strictly an eighteenthcentury distinction, whereby what was lawful might not be constitutional, and not a twentieth-century
concept. Id, pp. 8-9. Berman and others’ language may be different; but contemporary juridical
understanding, certainly in America, is the same: there are laws and then there is the Law.
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Berman, Law and Revolution I, p. 8.
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to be the rule of (lower-case) law it is something very different from the rule of (upper-case) Law.
To a degree surprising for a non-lawyer, Sidney was particularly well versed on the rule of law.
This depth of understanding is reflected in his republicanism, which is saturated with discussion of the
Law.128 To take one example of many, Sidney stated, “The rule of laws is more powerful than that of
men. This is something very different from commands that are based on the will of one man, both of
which vary as the wind blows, governed by “different interests, humors and passions.”129 The rule of law
protected men from themselves, and provided the opportunity for the creation of a just society. Sidney’s
republicanism required the rule of law because justice could not be achieved without it.130 Adams said the
same thing. In Defence, for example, he approvingly explained how Plato’s “perfect commonwealth”
existed “where the laws govern, and justice is established.”131 The rule of law depends on the Law to
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In the excellent collection of essays in The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe
(Cambridge University Press, 1990), the editor, Anthony Pagden, introduced the book’s prodigious
subject by noting that the essays “cover four of the most important, most easily identifiable languages of
political theory in use in early-modern Europe.” These, he contended, are the languages of political
Aristotelianism and the law of nature, of classical republicanism (which Pagden maintained “stood in
broad opposition” to the language of political Aristotelianism and “the natural law”), of political economy,
and of the science of politics. The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, “Introduction,”
pp. 3-7. It is my contention that the language of the Law, including the rule of law, was an essential –
indeed, perhaps the essential – language of early-modern political theory in Europe. Moreover, as is
already evident, one also could hardly be more in error in saying that early modern republicanism,
whether termed classical or otherwise, “stood in broad opposition” to the language of natural law. It also
should be noted that a brief chapter by cultural historian Günther Lottes in the 2014 compilation English
Revolutionary Republicanism asserted that Sidney relied upon at least four different political languages.
Lottes’ four political languages are not the same as Pagden’s, although there is overlap. Lottes designated biblical language, the language of civic humanism, the natural law tradition, and the language of
constitutional historiography. Lottes’ theory is interesting, albeit different than the proposition that there
are layers of law that tie together the various aspects of Sidney’s republicanism. He also was incorrect
that, “[u]nlike Locke,” Sidney “did not explicitly introduce the contract model,” and that it was not until the
eighteenth century that the “participatory elements of the contractual model gain political weight and
came to inspire a movement for parliamentary reform.” See Günther Lottes, “Language and Content: The
Political Thought of Algernon Sidney between Republicanism and Enlightenment,” Perspectives on
English Revolutionary Republicanism, Gaby Mahlberg & Dirk Wiemann, eds. (Surrey, England: Ashgate,
2013), Ch. 3, pp. 53-61, 58-59.
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DCG, I.1.6, n.2.
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Sidney’s fellow seventeenth-century English republicans, e.g., Locke, agreed. Men enter into society
to protect their property, Locke said, recognizing that Locke’s concept of property was very broad. See
Ch. Two. But “the end why they chuse and authorize a Legislative, is, that there may be Laws made, and
Rules set as Guards and Fences to the Properties of all the Members of a Society.” Locke, “The Second
Treatise,” Two Treatises of Government, Ch. XIX, §222, p. 412.
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Adams, “Letter XXXIII. Ancient Republics, and Opinions of Philosophers. Plato,” Defence of the
Republics, Vol. I, p. 188.
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ensure that society is just; the law without justice denies to men the rule of law, which depends on ideas
that are consistent with right reason and the Law of Nature, and which promote and protect the welfare of
the people.132 Quoting at some length from Sidney, Adams observed that while Filmer might have sought
ancient thinkers in support of absolute monarchy, that “corrupted crew of mercenary rascals … abhor[red]
the dominion of the law, because it curb[ed] their vices.” Instead, Filmer’s “patrons for his absolute monarchy” preferred to make themselves “subservient to the lusts of a man who may nourish” those vices.133
In contrast to Sidney, there is every reason why Adams would have been well-versed in the rule of
law – trained in the Law, self-trained as a judicial scholar, almost two decades as a litigator and practitioner
of Bay law, and an originator and applier of the United States’ wartime, diplomatic, and other early national
law in his role as Continental Congressman, diplomat, and statesman. What quickly becomes self-evident,
however, is that there is complete parity between Sidney and Adams’ understanding of the Law. This is
likely because its genesis, and that of the Anglo-American “rule of law,” is the English ancient constitution,
the source of the common law of medieval England.134 American “national” or federal law in the postConstitution era did not become explicitly grounded on common law (although much common law has
been incorporated by the federal courts) precisely because of the existence of a written constitution; but
state law throughout the country and colonial law before that explicitly incorporated English common law
as foundational.135 We can recall that the ability of jurists to define a part of the Law according to articu-
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The principle that underlay James Bohman’s argument in “Cosmopolitan Republicanism and the Rule
of Law” is the conviction that the law without actual justice, in practice not its apparent presence, denies
to men the rule of law: “Republican freedom demands more of the rule of law than either the formal
requirements of justice as regularity or the constraints and immunities of liberal constitutionalism. Without
these more demanding requirements, the rule of law cannot be constitutive of non-domination, and ‘the
government of laws, not men’ may itself be a form of tyranny and arbitrary rule.” Bohman, “Cosmopolitan
Republicanism and the Rule of Law,” Legal Republicanism, pp. 76-77.
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Adams, “Letter XXVII. Mixed or Composed Governments. Sidney, Page 22, §10,” Defence, Vol. I, p.
151 (emphasis in original).
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In contrast, the rule of law is a concept that has been both modernized and institutionalized in Britain
and in America, which is another source of some confusion. Indeed, as Sandoz pointed out in the
Introduction to The Roots of Liberty, modern Britain went one way, effectively “eclipsing” the concept of
rule of law, whereas the Constitution of the United States of America went another. Editor’s Introduction,
The Roots of Liberty: Magna Carta, Ancient Constitution, and the Anglo-American Tradition of Rule of
Law, Ellis Sandoz, ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1993), pp. 1-31, 3.
135
See R. C. Dale, “The Adoption of the Common Law by the American Colonies,” The American Law
Register (Sept. 1882), pp. 553-73, https://wwwscholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
3029&context=penn_law (8-27-17)(e.g., “it was the common law we adopted and not English decisions,
and we should take the standard of that law, namely, that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody,
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lated ancient customs was one means by which liberties claimed by seventeenth-century Englishmen were
established. It also was a way to effectively challenge the Stuarts’ concept of kingship and law.136 Stuart
kingship was unequivocal that the king made the law, not vice versa; it rested on the concept of a divinelyordained monarch accountable only to God. The Stuarts’ use of their prerogative to assert and maintain
greater political control was a logical consequence of this understanding of kingship. The assertion of liberties grounded in the ancient constitution was the bedrock for challenging the king’s exercise of his prerogative.137 The invocation of the ancient constitution was a control-of-the-law issue at the heart of Parliament’s
continuing confrontation with the Stuarts. In the same fashion, the invocation of the ancient constitution by
British Americans was a control-of-the-law issue at the heart of their confrontation with Parliament.138
When matters arose in the colonies that concerned the rule of law, it was vital to ground this

and should render to every one his due, for our judicial guide.”) See generally “American Initiatives in the
Common Law,” History of the Common Law, John H. Langbein, Renée Lettow Lerner, Bruce P. Smith,
History of the Common Law: The Development of Anglo-American Institutions (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2009), pp. 815-1095; cf. David Thomas Konig, “Legal Fictions and the Rule(s) of Law: The Jeffersonian Critique of Common-Law Adjudication,” The Many Legalities of Early America, Christopher L. Tomlins
& Bruce H. Mann, eds. (Chapel Hill & London: Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, VA, by the University of North Carolina Press, 2001)[unspecified] Ch. 4, pp. 97-117.
136
In explaining Skinner and others’ neo-Roman theory of free states, Shagan explained, “the revolutionary moment of the regicide and its obvious discontinuity with England’s ‘ancient constitution’ is seen as
creating a unique intellectual space for a republican synthesis.” Shagan, The Rule of Moderation, p. 257.
The problem is that the regicide was not an “obvious discontinuity” with the principles embodied in the
doctrine or myth of the ancient constitution; for the latter focused on English liberties, which would
suggest that perhaps Charles I deserved to be executed for the threat he represented to those liberties.
137

Adams’ library was chock full of works related to the ancient constitution, including numerous texts by
Tacitus, Spelman, Coke, Selden, Edward Montagu, Joseph Addison, Paul de Rapin-Thoyras, Lord
Kames, and others. See Appendix B.
138
See Eric Nelson, The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding (Cambridge, MA &
London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), for Nelson’s bold analysis of this parallel.
The Adams’ Library had an extraordinary collection of history tracts, including many works designed to
challenge the Stuart view of history, the king’s prerogative, and related matters. Besides Sidney’s
Discourses, and among other works, there was Catherine Macaulay Graham’s The history of England
from the accession of James I. to the elevation of the House of Hanover, Dalrymple’s Memoirs, James
Burgh’s Political disquisitions, Edmund Ludlow’s three-volume Memoirs, works by Granville Sharpe,
Viscount Bolingbroke’s A collection of political tracts, Gilbert Burnet’s History of his own time, editions of
the weekly Craftsman, and Viscount Molesworth’s An Account of Denmark. See Catalogue of the. James
Adams Library in the Public Library of the City of. Boston (Boston: The Trustees, 1917); “List of Books in
John Adams’s Library in Braintree, June 1790,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-1007 . [This is an Early Access document from The Adams
Papers. It is not an authoritative final version.] (3-2-19). We also know that Jean Louis De Lolme’s
Constitution of England was “a favorite of John Adams,” but it is another text that is not listed in the
Adams Library catalogue. On Adam’s “favorite,” see Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience, p. 40.
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fundamental principle in an irrefutable legal foundation. This is what led to the enormous emphasis by
British Americans on the constitutional basis of their claims. Constitutional references abound in Adams’
work. Just to cite a few examples, the Jan. 26, 1773 reply of the Bay House of Representatives to
Governor Hutchinson’s First Message, drafted by Adams, stated, “we shall at all Times take such
Measures as are consistent with our Constitution and the Rights of the People to promote and maintain
them.”139 In the reply of the Bay House of Representatives to Hutchinson’s Second Message, March 2,
1773, Adams stated, “The Question appears to us to be no other, than Whether we are the Subjects of
absolute unlimited Power, or of a free Government formed on the Principles of the English Constitution.”140
In the earlier “Draft Instructions of Boston to its Representatives in the General Court,” May 8, 1769,
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Adams, “I. Reply of the House to Hutchinson’s First Message,” Jan. 26, 1773, PJA Vol. I, p. 315. In
1773 a public debate took place between the Massachusetts Bay legislature (the General Court), and the
Governor of Massachusetts Bay, Thomas Hutchinson. The debate was a written one, dubbed by legal
scholar John Phillip Reid as “The Briefs of the American Revolution.” Reid pointed out that the legislature
adopted “the emigration theory of rights,” viz., the conviction that the first settlers brought with them to
America the constitutional privileges and rights guaranteed to them as Englishmen. Hutchinson’s view
was 180 degrees divergent. He believed that the settlers “abandoned some” of their English rights and
privileges given the fact that they also had adopted “a duty of obedience to the imperial government
centered in London, including subjection to the supremacy of parliament.” For Hutchinson there was no
other way; sovereignty had to reside in one person or institution, and that institution was Parliament. As
he (foolishly) said in the first brief in the debate, “I know of no Line that can be drawn between the
Supreme Authority of Parliament and the total Independence of the Colonies.” The responses of
substance to Hutchinson’s argument, those of the Bay House of Representatives, were “most likely … the
joint effort” of Joseph Hawley, an “outstanding trial lawyer,” Samuel Adams, and John Adams. But the
“greater share of credit for its success as a constitutional argument, however, must be accorded to John
Adams.” Perhaps the first draft was written by Samuel. But Hawley wanted to beef up the document,
and insisted on enlisting John’s help. In Reid’s view, “The law that is argued is simply beyond the
capability of Samuel Adams.” John Philip Reid, The Briefs of the American Revolution: Constitutional
Arguments between Thomas Hutchinson, Governor of Massachusetts Bay, and James Bowdoin for the
Council and John Adams for the House of Representatives (New York & London: New York University
Press, 1981), pp. 1-14, 9, 20 & 46. See Appendix B, Ch. Five, n. 155.
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Adams, “III. Reply of the House to Hutchinson’s Second Message,” March 2, 1773, PJA Vol. I, p. 344.
Debating the issue of whether the American colonies were within the “realm” of England, the colonists
contended that, “We have brought the first American Charters into View … to show … that the
fundamental Laws of the English Constitution should be the certain and established Rule of Legislation, to
which the Laws to be made in the several Colonies were to be as nearly as conveniently might be,
conformable or similar, which was the true Intent and Import of the Words, ‘not repugnant to the Laws of
England,’ ‘consonant to Reason,’ and other variant Expressions in the different Charters.” Adams, “I.
Reply of the House to Hutchinson’s First Message,” Jan. 26, 1773, p. 318. Adams maintained that James
I and Charles I both declared “that America was not annexed to the Realm”; consequently, “If then the
Colonies were not annexed to the Realm, at the Time when their Charters were granted, they never could
be afterwards, without their own special Consent, which has never been had, or even asked. If they are
not now annexed to the Realm, they are not a Part of the Kingdom, and consequently not subject to the
Legislative Authority of the Kingdom. For no Country, by the Common Law was subject to the Laws or to
the Parliament, but the Realm of England.” “The Answer of the House,” Reid, The Briefs of the American
Revolution, pp. 45-73, 59 (emphasis in original).
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constitutional language also abounds, e.g., “Another Object of great ‹‹Consequence to this Province›› … is
a ‹‹daring›› flagrant Attack upon our Constitution,” not only to deprive the Bay citizenry “of our Charter
Liberties privileges and Immunities, but the rights of British subjects derivd to us from the Constitution and
the rights of Men derived to us from the laws and Nature of God and Nature.”141 In Adams’ unpublished
Reply to A Friendly Address to All Reasonable Americans, Nov. 17, 1774, he maintained that the American
colonies sought “a full Restoration and a firm Establishment of their ancient Constitutions.”142 In
Novanglus III, Adams wrote, in February 1775, “When the people give way, their deceivers, betrayers and
destroyers press upon them so fast that there is no resisting afterwards. The nature of this encroachment
upon [the] American constitution is such, as to grow every day more and more encroaching. Like a
cancer, it easts faster and faster every hour.”143 After much discussion of natural law, tumults, Sidney,
Pufendorf, Locke, Grotius, and others, in Novanglus VI Adams stated that “the danger to America” was
that the Tea Act was “an attack upon a fundamental principle of the Constitution, and upon that
supposition was resisted, after multitudes of petitions to no purpose, and because there was no tribunal in
the Constitution, from whence redress could have been obtained.”144
Innumerable illustrations exist (as do bountiful scholarly books and articles) that affirm the
veritable fixation by Adams’ (and other patriots) on the English Constitution.145 That Constitution
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Adams, Novanglus III, id, p. 255.
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Adams, “VI. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts bay,” Feb. 27, 1775 (“Novanglus VI”),
id, p. 296.
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Forrest McDonald effectively made this point regarding the views of the delegates who, about a
decade later, attended the constitutional convention in 1787. Adams was abroad and not in attendance.
McDonald believed that there were four “sets of considerations” that guided the delegates. The first was
protection: guarding the citizenry’s “lives, liberty, and property.” The second was “the commitment to
republicanism,” albeit without agreement as to what republicanism meant, and McDonald, too, provided
various types of republicanism (civic humanism republicanism; Lockean natural law and natural rights
republicanism; pragmatic republicanism; and how communitarianism versus individualism fit in to
republicanism; also, puritan and agrarian republicanism). According to McDonald, “Republican liberty
was totalitarian: one was free to do that, and only that, which was in the interest of the public, the liberty
of the individual being subsumed in the freedom or independence of his political community.” He cited
Adams in support of this view (which is incorrect). Another consideration guiding the constitutional
convention delegates was political theory. Finally, there was the delegates’ consideration of history,
including “history as legacy, which means mainly English political institutions and the common law as
received and adapted selectively by the thirteen American political societies.” McDonald, Novus Ordo
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embodied the historic “time immemorial” understanding between the English people and their monarchs,
including the British Americans, an oral (unwritten) understanding that had been reaffirmed, in part, in
written form in fundamental English legal documents such as Magna Carta and, importantly, recorded for
posterity in written decisions by the English courts that also reflected the works of famous English jurists.
This body of law constituted the agreed-upon parameters of governance to which the English people and
their monarchs consented.
In his book on the ancient constitution, Prof. Pocock was fixated on the mythical nature of the
ancient constitution. He was right. What Pocock did not seem to appreciate was that it didn’t matter. As
long as there had been a meeting of the minds, there was an agreement –effectively a social contract –
between the English people and their monarchs that they would be governed by principles that came out
of this ancient past. Those principles were affirmed and embodied in the decisions of the English courts
and in written laws well before the Americans were debating the subject; indeed, considerably before
Sidney was doing so. Regardless of its “unreal” genesis, the ancient constitution was quite real. It was a
legal reality. The common law was then reflected in judicial opinions that described ancient law,
considered “customary” law. Certainly, it was the law on which the English had been accustomed to rely
for centuries, and was deemed legally binding by English jurists. Sometimes it was then incorporated into
new, written laws – statutes that reflected and might also update English common law.146
Again, unlike the United States, England had no written constitution. It was this body of wellunderstood customary, oral law that collectively constituted the fundamental parameters of the contract –
a social contract – between the English people and their monarch, and which was known as the ancient
Constitution and its progeny, the common law. This law had binding effect. To provide a cogent example,

Seclorum, pp. viii, 3-7, 70-71. A systematic assessment of these factors would further elucidate the
range of views that legitimately fit within the republican umbrella (or not), with some thinkers advocating
ideas that were more community-oriented, e.g., Adams, whereas others’ views were more individualistic,
e.g., Jefferson. But these ideas were neither as extreme nor as inconsistent as McDonald’s comments
suggested. Most (but not all) republicans were pragmatic, and modulated their views to accommodate
political circumstances, often overlapping in shared ideas and divergent components to their theory.
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The collection of essays in The Roots of Liberty are the product of a symposium designed to revisit
Pocock’s conclusions about the ancient law. As the editor noted, there is no question that “the common law
mind is alive and well in this period,” referring to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and that there
was a powerful “Anglo American tradition of liberty through rule of law.” Sandoz, “Editor’s Introduction,” The
Roots of Liberty, pp. 28-31.
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it was because of this body of law that England was a limited and not an absolute monarchy, for the king
was as bound by the ancient constitution and common law as were his subjects. The unwritten constitutional or, perhaps more precisely, constituting law defined how England was required to be governed. It
included not only the rights specified over the course of centuries of history, but the legal principles on
which those rights were based, which were considered to be part of the ancient constitution and the
common law as set forth by many famous jurists, especially Sir Edward Coke, the foremost sixteenthcentury constitutional scholar whose role in fashioning the common law was emphasized in connection
with Sidney’s ideas.
Whenever Adams wrote about his theory of government his most frequent statement was that
republicanism required that the people be governed by laws, not by men. The republic as understood by
the republican John Adams (as opposed to miscellaneous other definitions of a republic that we have
sought to avoid!) required that legally binding laws and legal principles govern society. In his early work
“Thoughts on Government,” for example, Adams maintained, that “the very definition of a Republic, is ‘an
Empire of Laws, and not of men,” relying first in his list of sources on Algernon Sidney. A “republic is the
best of governments” and “that form of government which is best contrived to secure an impartial and
exact execution of the laws, is the best of republics.” 147 Early on in a Novanglus essay Adams stated, if
“Aristotle, Livy, and Harrington, knew what a republic was,” and we could certainly add Cicero and Sidney
to a list with which Adams would have been completely comfortable, “the British constitution is much more
like a republic than an empire.” Why? Adams explained that these political thinkers defined “a republic to
be a government of laws, and not of men.148 England was such a place. This definition was reiterated
throughout his work. In Defence Adams reviewed various definitions of a republic, settling on his life-long
perspective, “the true, and only true definition of a republic,” which was “a government, in which all men,
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Adams stated, “In my early Youth, the Works of Sidney, Harrington, Lock, Milton, Nedham, Neville,
Burnet, Hoadley, were put into my Hands; and the miserable Situation of our Country, for fifteen Years
past, has frequently reminded me of their Principles and Reasonings. They have convinced me that there
is no good Government but what is Republican. The British Constitution itself is Republican, for I know of
no better Definition of a Republic than this, that it is an Empire of Laws and not of Men.” Adams, “I. To
William Hooper,” [Thoughts on Government, ante March 27, 1776],” PJA Vol. 4, pp. 73-78, 74. This
statement, or something very close to it, is in all editions of “Thoughts on Government”; see, e.g., “III.
Thoughts on Government,” April 1776, id, p. 87.
148

Novanglus VII, PJA Vol. 2, p. 314 (emphasis in original).
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rich and poor, magistrates and subjects, officers and people, masters and servants, the first citizen and
the last, are equally subject to the laws.”149 A closely related but more precise thought was expressed by
Adams in the same treatise when he stated, “an empire of laws is a characteristic of a free republic only.”
Here we see how Adams’ analysis developed so that he now distinguished his concept of a republic from
some of the (idiosyncratic) definitions of other thinkers (particularly the French philosophes). In short,
some republics – or forms of government deemed a republic, anyway – were free and others were not.
An empire of laws was the characteristic of the free kind, and that which was applicable in a free republic
“should never be applied to republics in general,” e.g., the republic that Turgot envisioned.150 In the
Massachusetts Constitution Adams also described the creation of the state’s republican, tripartite
government as a design “to the end that it might be a government of laws and not of men.”151
What did it mean to have a government of laws and not of men? What Adams sought to institutionalize, as Sidney had emphasized, was the limiting of legal discretion, of that infamous prerogative
exercised by those who served in government, whether the chief magistrate (King, President, Governor)
or other men vested with government authority. For example, in opposing Turgot’s unicameralism,
Adams had argued that a single assembly “will gradually form the house and the nation into a system of
subordination and dependence to themselves, and govern all at their discretion.”152 Three decades earlier
he analogized the action of the governor of Massachusetts Bay to that of James I, whose “formidable
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Adams, Defence, Vol. III, pp. 159-60.
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Adams, Defence, Vol. I, p. 87. Here Adams made an interesting distinction between free and unfree
republics, two forms of government, emphasizing the importance of distinguishing between republics,
which can be unfree, and republicanism, which advocates only free republics, viz., a government of laws
and not of men.
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“Chapter II. The Frame of Government,” The Massachusetts Constitution, PJA Vol. 8, p. 242. In
perhaps the most famous Supreme Court decision ever handed down, Justice Marshall stated, “The very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. …[Ours
has been] emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve
this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.” Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137-80, 163 (1803).
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Adams, Defence, Vol. I, p. 380 (emphasis added).
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attack on the freedom of elections … aimed at demolishing the constitution, and at stretching prerogative
beyond its just bounds,” thereby “abridging the constitutional rights and liberties of the nation.”153
As a matter of law if a magistrate was permitted to exercise his judgment unbounded by the Law
that delimited it, then that magistrate was “above” the Law, not subject to it. What that meant was not
only that an unscrupulous or evil magistrate could inflict great harm but, of critical importance, that it
would be legal to do so! It was this coopting of the Law that was so anathema to Adams and to lawyers
generally. It also was execrable to Algernon Sidney, who said exactly the same thing: “The kings of
England cannot change the laws. …’Tis not therefore the king that makes the law, but the law that makes
the king.” He explained this point in the title to this section of Discourses: “Laws are not made by Kings,
not because they are busied in greater matters than doing Justice, but because Nations will be governed
by Rule, and not Arbitrarily.”154
The Law was the people’s most vital line of defense. Like Sidney, Adams focused on the danger
of arbitrary government. The citizenry could not protect itself from anyone excluded from the Law’s
purpose and control. As Sidney had argued, an ostensible rule of law that was inapplicable to a chief
magistrate simply was not the rule of law at all – that is, not the rule of the Law.155 There were really two
means by which a people could protect itself from the government that it created. First, it could establish
laws that also governed the governors; this is an essential component of the rule of law. The rule of law
was the foundation for Adams’ comfort-level as a “legal revolutionary.” He was convinced that it was the
British not the Americans who were behaving illegally, outside the scope of the rule of the law and therefore in flagrant violation of it. It also explains the frequent success of the rebellious colonists against the
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As Halifax had cautioned, “The King is the life of the. Law, and cannot have a Prerogative that is
mortal to it.” “Political Thoughts and Reflections,” Halifax: Complete Works, J. P. Kenyon, ed. & intro.
(Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 205. See Adams, “X. Governor Winthrop to Governor
Bradford,” Feb. 9, 1767 and ”Xi. Governor Winthrop to Governor Bradford,” Feb. 16, 1767, PJA Vol. 1:
Sept. 1755-Oct. 1773, pp. 198-211 (emphasis added). In his sermon Unlimited Submission, Reverend
Jonathan Mayhew, displaying his republicanism, similarly said, “as soon as the prince sets himself up
above law, he loses the king in the tyrant.” Unlimited Submission (Boston, Jan. 1750),
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N05197.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext (9-2-17).
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E.g., Sidney, DCG, II.6.403 (“‘tis no more ridiculous to set him above the law, who is what he is by the
law, than to expect the observation of the law that enjoin the preservation of the lands, liberties, goods
and lives of the people, from one who by fraud or violence makes himself master of all, that he may be
restrain’d by no law, and what he is by subverting all law.”)
939

metropole, for their fights were often legal, and the British Americans usually had at least as good an
argument if not a better one than that of their government. This resulted, for example, in the embarrassment of many in Parliament over the revenue acts and the rescinding of all those statutes but the Tea Act,
which was inconsequential yet had the same legal and psychological import as any of the navigation acts
and hence was opposed in the provinces – in this almost unique instance, in truly extra-legal “tea party”
fashion but, given the lack of legal recourse, by means that even the stodgy Adams appreciated.156
This also explains why Adams and other capable attorneys were on the front lines of the American revolution; for this was a war of words – legal words. For this reason, over time, John became
increasingly important and Sam less so, although this also had to do with the fact that the new nation
needed its own laws – model treatises, rules for the navy, etc., etc. – that largely required lawyers to
fashion. The revolution began and ended as a legal challenge. One can focus on particular skirmishes,
such as the intense fight over whether the colonies were within or without the realm, and whether they
were or were not a British dominion; whether, as a matter of law, it was legitimate for the Bay judges to be
paid their salary by the Crown rather than the colonial government; or the terms of a peace treaty that
would provide the Americans with access to the Newfoundland fisheries. But the ideological war was
over the applicable Law in British America. When it came time to physically fight, Adams nominated
George Washington to lead that war. But when Adams said that the revolution began long before the
Declaration of Independence because it began much earlier in the hearts and minds of the people, the
reason that it did so was because Adams and other writers, many of them lawyers, provided law-bound
“fighting words,” laying down a gauntlet that corresponded with the feelings of their people – the
intellectual and emotional foundation for legitimate opposition to the metropole. While the war of words
evolved into a military one, legal language remained vital in many contexts, for instance in America’s
efforts – Adams’ efforts – during the war to obtain international recognition of the united States as an
independent nation.
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Recall Adams’ statement to his friend that , “It is in vain, it is delirium it is frenzy to think of dragooning
three millions of English people out of their liberties, at the distance of 3000 miles.” Adams, “To a Friend
in London,” Jan. 21, 1775, PJA Vol. 2, pp. 214-16, 215; W&L, “Free Trade, Sovereignty, and Slavery,” p.
630. Parliament was obnoxiously constraining the colonists, and doing so “in their face,” It was this threat
to self-determination in often small, everyday ways, and not to the colonists’ pocketbooks, that Adams
and other attorneys sought to “convert” into effective legal grievances.
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Returning to the means by which a people could protect itself from the government that it created,
in addition to establishing laws that governed the governors – the rule of law – the second legal
mechanism for doing so applied to those mushy areas of law in which magistrates or governors of all
kinds necessarily had to have some discretion, e.g., where judgment calls were inherently part of the
process of governing. In these instances, institutionalized and legal mechanisms of accountability
provided the other important means of protecting the people. It was (and is) impossible to entirely
eliminate governmental discretion. How, then, could one contain it? The answer was accountability.
This was why, for example, Adams fought so hard to have Bay judges paid by the people of Massachusetts and not by the Crown; for that was the only way to ensure their accountability to the colonial
citizenry. Similarly, the appeal of one-year terms of office for government officials was that a short term of
office was a legal means of accountability, another feature of the rule of law: the ballot box determined
whether the people believed that an official had behaved in their best interest or had used his discretion
improperly (or unwisely).157 Adams and fellow attorneys were like hounds with their nose to the ground,
smelling where legal battles were necessary and appropriate to protect the efficacy of the rule of law in
America. Increasing the stakes as far as the necessity for the rule of law and not the rule of men was
Adams’ view of human nature, which led him to believe that all human beings were subject to corruption
and, consequently, the more power one had at one’s disposal the more potentially adverse the
consequences of that corruption (and arguably the more tempting it was to be corrupt in the first place).
Other parallels in the analyses of Sidney and Adams further emphasize their mutual reliance on
the rule of law as a vital tier in the legal underbelly of republicanism, but also their reasoning for doing so.
In addition to the enumeration of the ancient Constitution and Magna Carta as grounds for their conviction
that the British, including British Americans, were entitled to be governed pursuant to the rule of law, like
Sidney, Adams invoked Bracton, Fortescue, Coke, and Selden in support of the meaning and applicability
of the rule of law. “King Alfred who began to reign in 871, … the great founder of the laws of England,
with the advice of his wise men, collected out of the laws … such as were the best, … and therefore very
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Again, in the context of contemporary politics, this is why political scientist Richard Bellamy argued
that “regular elections on the basis of one person one vote” was one of three key features of democratic
systems. Richard Bellamy, “The Republic of Reasons,” Legal Republicanism, pp. 102-20, 106.
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properly called them, the common law of England…. And it is from this origin that our common law judges
fetch that excellent usage of determining causes, according to the settled and established rules of law….
Edward the confessor was afterwards but the restorer of the common law, … Magna Charta was founded on them.”158 The most obvious place to find Adams’ references to English common law scholars was
in his legal work. The Editors of Adams’ Legal Papers suggested that with his study of “Justinian,
Vinnius, Bracton, Coke, Bolingbroke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau … came the appreciation of law as
politics, law as philosophy, and law as jurisprudence,” which then “so colored Adams’ later approach to
the problems of his time.”159 Adams’ familiarity with legal scholarship is reflected in the catalogue of the
Adams’ Library.160 He frequently cited Coke and, as he stated, sometimes relied on Bracton, Fortescue
and, with less frequency, Selden. 161
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Adams, “V. To the Boston Gazette,” Feb. 1, 1773, PJA Vol. 1: Sept. 1755-Oct. 1773, p. 278.
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“Introduction,” Legal Papers of John Adams, Vol. 2, p. lxxxiv. I am doubtful that Rousseau belongs on
this list. Adams hated Rousseau’s ideas. There are many illustrations of this; here is just one: “Savages
are happier than citizens, and brutes are happier than savages! Volià the sum of J. J. Rousseau’s
philosophy! A poor atonement for such poisonous stuff is made by all the divinity of his eloquence. His
panegyrics on nature, on savages and beasts: his philippics against arts, sciences, society and civilization
contributed, however, to make Europe uneasy under their religion and government and promoted the
revolution that it began.” He also railed against the Abbé de Mably. See Haraszti, John Adams & the
Prophets of Progress, p. 84, Ch. V, Rousseau and the Man of Nature & Ch. VII, The Communism of the
Abbé de Mably.”
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Adams owned the John Selden’s Opera omnia, or complete works, Coke’s Institutes and other works,
and reports of select cases and opinions of Sir John Fortescue, as well as his major work, De laudibus
legume Angliæ. Catalogue of the John Adams Library, pp. 9, 54, 95, 225. Surprisingly, there is no
catalogue entry for Bracton; but we know Adams was familiar with his work as he cited to it and relied
upon it – possibly another example of books owned but missing from the Adams Library catalogue.
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One handy indicia of Adams’ reliance on Coke are the many references to “Coke, Sir Edward” in the
Index to PJA, Vols. I and 2. See PJA, Vol. 2, p. 441. For a handful of specific references, see,
e.g.,Novanglus VIII & IX, PJA Vol. 2, pp. 327-55; ; see generally “Coke, Sir Edward,” Index, Legal Papers
of John Adams, Vol. 3, p. 377; “Adams’ Copy of the Information and Draft of his Argument,” in Adam’s
handwriting, in the case of Sewell v. Hancock, in which Adams is described in a footnote as following
“Coke’s rendition of Bracton’s version of a statute.” Legal Papers of John Adams, Vol. 2, p. 200; Adams’
replies to General Brattle’s support of the payment of judges’ salaries by the Crown, in which Adams cited
Bracton, Coke and Fortescue, among others, including Adams, “I. To the Boston Gazette,” and “II. To the
Boston Gazette,” January 11 and 18, 1773 (1st and 2nd Brattle letters), PJA Vol. 1: Sept. 1755-Oct. 1773,
pp. 256-68 (references to Bracton, Fortescue, Coke and others). Adams famously cited Fortescue’s De
Laudibus Legum Angliæ in Rex v. Preston, the Boston Massacre trial of the officer in charge of the
soldiers who fired at the Boston crowd. The Adams’ version of the Fortescue statement was, “Indeed one
would rather much rather than twenty guilty Persons, Should escape the Punishment of Death, than that
one innocent Person Should be condemned and suffer capitally.” “Adams’ Notes of Authorities for his
Argument for the Defense,” Rex v. Preston, Legal Papers of John Adams, Vol. III, p. 82. No. 64, Rex. V.
Wemms, LA Legal Papers, Vol. III, p. 250. As Adams’ colloquially put it, “I am no more of a lawyer than
Massachusettensis, but have taken his advice, and conversed with many lawyers upon our subject, some
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In fine, to understand the rule of law in mainstream republican thought, to which both Adams and
Sidney were devoted, one must embrace the distinction between laws and the Law. As will become
evident, this allowed for the exercise of equitable remedies to legal controversies among the citizenry that
were not amenable to just resolution through statutory law. 162

The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” Although the amount and quality of process that our precedents
have recognized as “due” under the Clause has changed considerably since the founding …
it remains the case that no process is due if one is not deprived of “life, liberty, or property.”
Justice Scalia, US Supreme Court, 2015163

iv. Legal process and procedure
While legal process and procedure was not a dominant aspect of Sidney’s treatment of law, it
indisputably was a predominant aspect of Adams’ focus. As the great legal implementor, Adams’ was an
expert on the bread and butter grind of an attorney working within the Anglo-American system of law on
behalf of his clients, which meant the application of legal processes and procedures. Adams’ preeminent
client became the American people. He intimately understood from his legal practice and intense
scholarly pursuits the mechanisms by which the Law was implemented, viz., via the legal process and
the procedures of the judicial system created to access, utilize, and appeal from that process. Accordingly, as with Sidney, discussion of the entire fabric of law that informed Adams’ republicanism would be
materially incomplete without including what Sidney aptly referred to as “the administration of justice.”164
Sidney defined justice as “the law of the land, as far as it is sanction recta, jubens honesta,
prohibens contraria,” referring to Cicero’s famous statement in Second Philippic that justice was a “right
sanction, commanding honest deeds, forbidding the contrary.”165 Adams agreed. In Defence, he
explained that “[a]s all the ages of the world have not produced a greater statesman and philosopher

honest, some dishonest, some living, some dead, and am willing to lay before you what I have learned
from all of them.” Novanglus IX, PJA Vol. 2, p. 351.
162

For details about the dramatically different schools of thought in legal history on how the law operated
in America, see Appendix B.
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united in the same character” than Cicero, we should turn to Cicero for advice; and the ancient Roman
favored three branches of government because of “a reason that is unchangeable; the laws, which are
the only possible rule, measure, and security of justice, can be sure of protection, for any course of time,
in no other form of government.”166 Stated another way, Adams maintained that mixed government was
the form of government best able to prevent, manage and remedy tumults. This was accomplished “by
doing justice to all men on all occasions, to the minority as well as majority; and by forcing all men,
majority as well as minority, to be contented with it.”167 Once again, we are talking about creating stability
in government, and legitimizing a government through acceptance of its actions and policies; this
happens by the fair implementation of the law, which treats people, minorities and majorities, equally as a
matter of law and not as a matter of discretion or prerogative.
There are distinct vital components to the administration of justice. Underlying all of them is the
concept of fairness. Fairness is essential to legitimacy. In A Defence, for example, Adams took on
Marchamont Nedham's assertion that in a pure democracy in which majority will ruled, “All determinations
being carried by common consent, every man’s particular interest must needs be fairly provided for
against the arbitrary disposition of others.” Adams’ repost was, “A majority would be found to agree to
destroy the rights and interests of the minority. …If common consent means unanimous consent, there
might be some plausibility in this: but, as unanimity is impossible, and common consent means the vote
of the majority, it is self-evident that the latter are at the mercy of the former; and the government of the
latter being unbalanced by any equal force, interest, passion or power, is as real a tyranny as the
sovereignty of an hereditary senate, or thirty tyrants, or a single despot.”168
We might ask, what precisely is wrong with “an unlimited, uncontroulable prerogative over others,
without their consent?”169 Indeed, what is wrong with taxation without representation, e.g., without the
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colonists’ consent? We have established that the British metropole’s actions offended the American
people and their customary way of living. But the legal problem was fundamental fairness and its political
antithesis, arbitrary rule. In Defence, Adams provided innumerable illustrations of this principle from
history: (i) In ancient Rome, “The senate acted an arbitrary and reprehensible part, when they thought to
continue Lucius Quinctius in the consulship longer than the time limited by law. By violating the law, they
became tyrants, and their act was void. The gallant man acted only the part of a good citizen, in refusing
to set a precedent so prejudicial to the roman constitution;”170 (ii) Sallust related how in its early history
ancient Rome under their kings was weak. As it became “easy and safe, the nobles began to envy the
kings, and to form continual conspiracies against their authority, thrones, and lives.” The consequence
was that kings had to either “give up all their authority into the hands of a haughty and aspiring senate, or
assert a more decisive and arbitrary power than the constitution allowed them.”171 (iii) “Cinna, Sylla,
Marius, and the rest of that succeeding gang, down to Cæsar, used the people’s favor to obtain a
continuation of power in their own hands; and then, having saddled the people with a new standing form
of their own, they immediately rooted up the people’s liberty and property by arbitrary sentences of death,
proscriptions, fines, and confiscations.”172 Etcetera, etcetera. In précis, the legally-established right to
participate in government, embodied in substantive and procedural laws, including the right to vote, was
the first component of the legal process that staved off arbitrary governance.
The trial process also was an essential means by which society ensured that justice prevailed,
and we know from Adams’ legal work that he embraced the adversarial process with gusto. In the Boston
Massacre trial, when Adams was asked to represent Preston, the military lieutenant in charge, Preston’s
ally who had come to recruit Adams said (per Adams’ later recollection), ““as God Almighty is my Judge, I
believe him an innocent Man.” Adams’ reply was, “‘that must be ascertained by his Tryal, and if he thinks
he cannot have a fair Tryal of that Issue without my Assistance, without hesitation, he shall have it.’” 173
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Recall Sidney’s statement that, “none can be exempted from the penalties of [the laws that aim at the
publick good], otherwise than by approved innocence, which cannot appear without a trial.”174 We do not
have to repeatedly quote Adams on this point; he lived it. But the legal concept of fundamental fairness
applied in legal contexts that did not involve a trial. For example, when Adams was asked by his fellow
Continental Congressmen how to go about instituting governments, his reply was, “‘By Conventions of
Representatives, freely, fairly, and proportionably chosen.’”175
An uncorrupted judiciary was an additional vital component of a legitimate legal process, and one
on which Sidney dwelt; indeed, it was the petard that hoisted him: a kangaroo court that issued a death
sentence. Before the American Revolution we know that Adams was very preoccupied with the
legitimacy of the Massachusetts’ judiciary. Recall Adams’ public debate with William Brattle, in which he
analytically outflanked Brattle over the matter of the authority of the Crown to pay judges’ salaries and the
related matter of whether miscreant judges could be dismissed at will. Adams described this possibility as
a “horrid fragment of the feudal despotism” that created “sordid, nauseaous and impious adulations to
superiours” and a “dependent state of mind.”176 Efforts by the metropole to directly pay Bay salaries were
in Adams’ view a threat to “the Liberties of the Country.”177 Justice required that the judges not be paid by
the Crown and therefore not be unduly influenced; rather, their compensation had to come from the Bay
citizenry to whom the judges should be accountable since their decisions impacted that colony’s public.
This was fair. The independence of the judiciary was an essential feature of a fair and legitimate judicial
system as well as a vital component of Adams’ commitment to balance of power within government, to be
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“VII. To the Boston Gazette,” (7th Brattle essay), Feb. 15, 1773, & “VIII. To the Boston Gazette,” (8th
Brattle essay), Feb. 22, 1773, PJA, Vol. I, pp. 294, 302, 306. The 1773 Brattle letters revealed Adams’
amazing breadth of legal knowledge and perspective, from King Alfred – called Magnus Juris Anglicani
Conditor because he was the ninth century “great founder of the laws of England” – to the advice of
Alfred’s “wise men, collected out of the laws of Ina, Offa, and Æthelbert; the roles of Edward the
Confessor and William the Conqueror vis-à-vis English common law; Magna Charta; English statutory
law; and, of course, the commentaries of Blackstone and the judicial wisdom of Coke, Fortescue, various
Chief Justices of England, and others. See Appendix B, Ch. Six n. 100.
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Autobiography, JA D&A, Vol. III, p. 298.
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discussed shortly.178

178
One of Adams’ most significant actions as a public figure, although he would not have known that, and
taken after his electoral defeat in his second run for office but before the end of his presidency, was
Adams’ nomination of John Marshall to the Supreme Court. Paul, Without Precedent; John Marshall and
His Times, pp. 3, 252-61. It was the Marshall Court that decided Marbury v. Madison, the case that
enunciated the constitutional doctrine of judicial review, the height of judicial independence, namely, that
it was the role of the Supreme Court to exercise legal oversight on matters of constitutional significance,
enshrining the balance of power between the federal legislature and the judiciary. Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). Otis had flirted with this concept in the writs of assistance case,
much to Adams’ fascination. Otis’ constitutional argument in the writs of assistance case, citing to the
famous 1610 judicial opinion by Sir Edward Coke in Bonham’s Case, challenged the doctrine of absolute
parliamentary sovereignty that the illustrious jurist Sir Edmund Blackstone recognized in 1765 when he
said, in his Commentaries, “if the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no power that can control it.” I Blackstone, Commentaries *91, cited in JA Legal Papers,
Vol. 2, p. 117 & n.32. To the contrary, Otis argued that legislative power was not absolute but was
tempered by principles of natural law, equity and the British constitution. JA Legal Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 11920. We cannot definitively say, beyond Bonham’s Case, what the precedent was for Otis’ writs of
assistance oral argument. Adams’ “despicable notes” of the oral argument referenced Bonham’s Case
but, beyond that, simply note Otis saying, “This Writ is against the fundamental Principles of Law” and “An
Act against the Constitution is void: an Act against natural Equity is void.” We do know that in Otis’
pamphlet, “The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved,” reliance was placed on Magna
Carta, Grotius, Pufendorf, Rousseau, and particularly Locke, see, e.g., James Otis, Jr., “The Rights or the
British Colonies Asserted and Proved,” Boston, 1764, Pamphlet 7, Pamphlets of the American Revolution
1750-1776, Vol. I, Bernard Bailyn, ed. (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1965), pp. 419-98, 434. (Note Bailyn’s remark, however, that besides Milton, The “American Revolutionary writers referred with similar respect if with less understanding to the more systematic writing of
Harrington and to that of the like-minded Henry Neville; above all, they referred to the doctrines of
Algernon Sidney.” Id, p. 29 (emphasis added).) Adams stated in his March 29, 1817 letter to Tudor that
Otis had relied on the same arguments and authorities in the writs of assistance oral argument and his
pamphlet. JA Legal Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 119-20 n.41, 125 & 127-28. It was up to the judiciary to enforce
these “principles of the law.” Adams’ Abstract, JA Legal Papers, Vol. 2, p. 144.

Unlike the subsequently established United States legislature that Chief Justice John Marshall made clear
in Marbury v. Madison was bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the constitutionality of a
statute, Otis had acknowledged that in England Parliament was supreme. Still, Parliament was not error
proof; and it was the judiciary’s responsibility to advise the legislature of its error. In the writs of
assistance case, precisely to confront “all such instruments of slavery” and “villainy” such as writs of
assistance, viewed as “the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and
the fundamental principles of the constitution, that ever was found in an English law-book,” Otis argued
that the judiciary must genteelly encourage Parliament to avoid being arbitrary, which it was neither
constitutionally designed nor did it intend to be. JA Legal Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 120-22. Of course, this is
very different from the American concept of judicial supremacy.
On James Otis, see James Otis, Collected Political Writings of James Otis, Richard Samuelson, ed. &
intro. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 2015); Bernard Bailyn “Introduction” and text of “Pamphlet 7: James
Otis, “The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved,” Boston, 1764, Pamphlets of the American
Revolution, Vol. I: 1750-1765, pp. 408-82; Bernard Bailyn, “Introduction,” and text of Pamphlet 11: James
Otis, “A Vindication of The British Colonies,” Boston, 1765, id, pp. 545-79; Timothy H. Breen, “Subjecthood and Citizenship: The Context of James Otis’s Radical Critique of John Locke,” New England
Quarterly 71, 3 (Sept. 1998), pp. 378-403; Joseph R. Frese, “James Otis and Writs of Assistance,” New
England Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Dec. 1957), pp. 496-508. On the writs of assistance case, see JA
Legal Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 106-47; Smith, John Adams, Vol. I (1735-1784), pp. 51-56; Smith, The Writs of
Assistance Case, passim; Mann, “A Great Case Makes Law Not Revolution,” Law in the American
Revolution and the Revolution in Law, pp. 3-19. On judicial review, see Robert J. Steinfeld, “The Early
Anti-majoritarian Rationale for Judicial Review,” Transformations in American Legal History – Law,
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Prevention of the obstruction of justice also required the safeguard of trial by a jury of one’s
peers, an element of the judicial process that was never an issue in America until the Crown endeavored
to try criminal Admiralty cases before judges and without juries. Adams’ “Instructions to Braintree’s
Representative Concerning the Stamp Act,” written in1765, cried out most alarmingly at the extension of
the power of the Admiralty courts, a jurisdiction before which Adams tried a number of high profile cases,
including Sewell v. Hancock, in which John Hancock’s ship, the Liberty, was seized and Hancock was
charged a huge fine for smuggling Madeira wine on board his ship to avoid taxes. Admiralty law was a
vital part of legal practice in Boston and throughout England generally. This provision of the Stamp Act
raised another matter of judicial process Adams opposed with all his legal acumen. In lieu of a jury by his
peers, a man charged under Admiralty law would now be judged by a solitary judge, without a jury, and
with a built-in bias against the accused because of the “pecuniary Temptation” to find against the
defendant, for which the judge would be financially rewarded by means of a sizable commission.179
Adams protested, “What can be wanting, after this, but a weak or wicked Man for a Judge, to render Us
the most sordid and forlorn of Slaves.”180 In Adams’ view this aspect of the Stamp Act was “directly
repugnant to the Great Charter itself.”181 As Sidney stated, “whether such matters are ordinary or
extraordinary, the decision is and ought to be placed where there is most wisdom and stability, and where
passion and private interest does least prevail to the obstruction of justice. …[T]his is done in England by
judges and juries.”182
Recall our treatment of this matter vis-à-vis Sidney, and the fact that in addition to the legallyestablished right to participate in government, and the necessity of uncorrupted judges and of jury trials, a
legitimate and fair judicial process required what today we term substantive and procedural due process,
indisputably anachronistic terms but the ideas of which fully apply. Substantive due process relates to a

Ideology, and Methods: Essays in Honor of Morton J. Horwitz, Vol. II, Daniel W. Hamilton and Alfred L.
Brophy eds. (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press, 2010), Ch. 10, pp. 143-64.
179

“Instructions to Braintree’s Representative Concerning the Stamp Act,” Sept. 24, 1765, in John Adams
Revolutionary Writings 1755-1775, pp. 125-28, 126-27.
180

Id, p. 127.

181
Id. In 1768, the Vice Admiralty Court Act created additional Admiralty Courts in America, including one
in Boston. Cases related to the high seas would be tried in an admiralty court without a jury.
182

Sidney, DCG, III.42.557.
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law’s content, and whether that content appropriately or inappropriately broadens government authority
“on the merits,” viz., because it contributes to the common good and justice and therefore is legitimate; or
not. In contrast, procedural due process relates to the fairness of the process by which the law is made
and enforced.183 With respect to procedural due process, Sidney pointed out that in ancient Rome a
citizen could not be put to death without being heard in public; at least in a capital case, there was a right
to publicly defend oneself. Sidney relied on “the Great Charter,” which “having been confirmed by more
than thirty parliaments,” was the foundation for Englishmen’s entitlement to justice.184 Magna Carta’s
provision of legal rights of which Englishmen could not be deprived concerned the fairness of state action
that adversely affected the people. The broadest of such Magna Carta provisos was that, “No freeman
shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will We proceed
against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land,” and “To no
one will We sell, to no one will We deny or delay, right or justice.”185 Coke defined these rights guaranteed
by Magna Carta as “due process of law,” designed to prohibit arbitrary arrest, imprisonment or other legal
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See, e.g., Mortimer N. S. Sellers, “The Republican Foundations of International Law, Legal
Republicanism, pp. 187-204, 202. As law professors Abrams and Garrett recently explained, “Due
process cases involving deprivation of access to a right, whether it is access to courts, voting, marriage, or
welfare, or the fair trial rights just discussed, commonly consider multiple types of procedural barriers to
the underlying constitutionally cognizable interest in life, liberty, or property.” The concept of “notice” is
one such important due process right. “For example, when examining procedural due process claims
challenging denial of welfare benefits, courts conduct a cost-benefit balancing test under Mathews v.
Eldridge and examine a range of features relating to the notice and opportunity to be heard provided by
the agency regarding planned termination of benefits.” In a case like Mathews, the lack of a right to a
pretermination of benefits hearing was found constitutional due to the presence of notice and plaintiffs
ability to challenge the pending decision through submissions to the agency. On the other hand, “in a case
like Goldberg v. Kelly, the cumulative lack of notice detailing the reasons for the termination of benefits and
hearing procedures including a right to counsel, a right to impartial adjudication by a neutral decisionmaker, and a right to cross-examine witnesses, caused the Court to find the entire process to have been
violative of due process..” In short, a due process analysis is holistic. “When conducting a due process
analysis, the entire process is examined, with the court asking whether it is fundamentally fair, or whether it
satisfies the distinctive Mathews balancing test.” Kerry Abrams and Brandon L. Garrett, “Cumulative
Constitutional Rights,” Boston University Law Review, Vol. 97, Issue 4 (July 2017), pp. 1309-55,1323.
There is a literature on the due process clause. For a general discussion of due process in addition to the
Supreme Court’s discussion in Kerry v. Din, see “Due Process Clause,” The Heritage Guide to The
Constitution (Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation & Regnery Pub., 2005), pp. 337-41.
184

See, e.g., DCG, III.14.394, III.27.474.
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Magna Carta, 1 E. Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, Ch. 29, p. 45
(1797). In another section, Sidney correctly stated, according to the Great Charter, Judgments are
passed by equals: no man can be imprison’d, disseiz’d of his freehold, depriv’d of life or limb, unless by
the sentence of his peers, … judicia fiunt per pares.” DCG, III.26.467 and ns. 4 & 5.
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process or procedure.186 This is fundamental procedural due process.187
Sidney was wary of contemporary difficulties with legal procedure, particularly the tendency for
the legal process to be so arcane that no one but the most versed barrister could understand or apply the
rules. “[I]n many places, and particularly in England, the laws are so many, that the number of them has
introduced an uncertainty and confusion which is both dangerous and troublesome.” The intention of
English law was “just and good”; but its complexity can “serve for a pretence to justify almost any
judgment.”188 On more than one occasion Sidney noted that, “No law made by man can be perfect.” But
where there are deficiencies, every nation must have the power to correct it. (In this regard, the power to
correct the law should reside in the same hands as those who made it – e.g., by means of parliamentary
participation, if not control.)189
We have already discussed the importance of equity in implementing the rule of law. Equity was
part of legal process and procedure, both in England, with separate equity courts, and in America, where
equity was part of the court’s general jurisdiction. Legal process and procedure had to be capable of
adapting to allow for the equitable resolution of a legal matter; sometimes this required the wisdom,
finesse and good will of a judge to accomplish. One needs to recognize, too, that what might be viewed
as equitable in one society, or in one century within a society, might well not be viewed as equitable in
another. That fact leads one to question whether it is counterfactual to view the emerging political ideas
of the revolutionary period as liberalism versus republicanism or, as previously discussed in the context of
Wood’s perspective, with a liberal balance favoring individual interests in contrast to a republican balance
favoring communal interests. In a society in which the “public good” and the “welfare of the people” was
broadly if not universally considered to be in the individual’s best interest, these are not correct antipodes.
Liberalism was a form of republicanism that placed more emphasis on the individual; but it did not discard
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See Sandoz, “Editor’s Introduction,” The Roots of Liberty, p. 25.
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In 2015, Justice Scalia reiterated this point. “The Due Process Clause has its origin in Magna Carta.”
Kerry v. Din, 576 US 856 (2015) (opinion of J. Scalia; citations omitted).
188
DCG, III.26.465-66. Sidney appeared to express some layman’s confusion with regard to the concept
of legal precedent, reacting to Coke and other jurists’ analysis of the common law. Said Sidney, “Axioms
are not rightly grounded upon judged cases, but cases are to be judged according to axioms.”
189

DCG, III.21.451; see also id,
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notions of communal interest. For the Americans, the contrast was vivid between what was in the public
good, which was in the individual’s best interest, and corrupt government in which favoritism, patronage,
and elitism was rampant. These forms of corruption had been even more institutionalized in seventeenthcentury England. The important point for our purposes, however, is that the tiers of law that infused Sidney’s republicanism similarly informed the ideas of Adams, the great American legal implementor. Layers
of law – natural, contract, rule, and process/procedure – were fundamental to maintaining a free society.

Let me now ask Marchamont Nedham, or any advocate for his system.
Do you believe that the people, unbalanced, ever will avoid to confer
a continuance of power on their favourites? Do you believe they
ever did in any age or country? The answer must be in the negative.”
Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions190
For progressives, ‘fairness’ trumps everything; for conservatives, ‘freedom.’
Balancing either against anything else is a moral violation – but, as luck would have it,
the need never arises. If you’re a progressive, you can raise tax rates without discouraging effort,
and mandate higher wages without reducing the demand for labor. If you’re a conservative,
you can cut taxes w/o harming essential public services, and roll back regulation w/o putting anybody
at risk. If centrists didn’t always try to be polite, I’d call this aversion to trade-offs infantile.
Thomas Friedman, The Washington Post 191

B. Balance and its Political Consequences
Having established the importance of balance in Sidney’s work it should come as no surprise that
balance is a fundamental part of Adams’ political thought.192 It is often mentioned as something that
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Adams, “Letter VI. The right Constitution of a Commonwealth, examined,” Defence, Vol. III, p. 399.
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Thomas L. Friedman, op-ed editorial, The Washington Post, June 17, 2015, p. A25 (agreeing with
Clive Crook, a Bloomberg View columnist).
192

Without weighing in on their various other views about Adams, note the thesis of historians Stanley
Elkins and Eric McKitrick that, “It may be unfair, but not extravagantly so, to say that what Adams came
out with after all his theorizing was one idea, and that was the idea of ‘balance.’ … The dogma of
‘balance,’ … had always been there in some form, from the very beginning to the very end.” Government
had to be designed to control man’s passions and encourage virtue, Adams believed, and this “could only
be accomplished through balancing each of the powers of government against the others, and basing
government itself on the impartial rule of law.” It was personal – “the deepest requirement of Adams’s
very being” – although I would certainly quibble with the authors’ statement that it was “not a way of
prudent moderation, not a matter of fine calibrations and adjustments … not the calm equilibrium we
ordinarily associate with balances and balancing.” For it was all of those things. But in government, the
authors’ recognized, Adams had written (actually scribbled to himself on the margins of a book) that,
“Power must be opposed to power, force to force, strength to strength, interest to interest, as well as
reason to reason, eloquence to eloquence, and passion to passion.’” Elkins an McKitrck quote another
secondary source, but the origin of this language is in Adams’ most profuse marginalia, in any of his
books, which was in Mary Wollstonecraft’s Historical and Moral View of the Origin and Progress of the
French Revolution, which Adams first read in 1796 and re-read in 1812. Haraszti, John Adams and the
Prophets of Progress, pp. 184-86, 219.) Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The
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Adams emphasized; but it is a mystery why it has not been treated as a constituent part of his political
platform as well as an essential part of early modern republicanism.193 The momentousness of balance
and equilibrium informs Adams and fellow republicans’ ideas vis-à-vis both good government and the
well-being of individuals.194 There were many legitimate ways to structure government; there were many
different types of republics; and there was an “infinite variety of mixed governments.”195 Adams expressly
quoted Sidney on this subject: “[T]he variety of forms, between mere democracy and absolute monarchy,
is almost infinite.”196 But no republic, whatever its design, could succeed unless it was balanced. That’s
why balance is integral to republican governance; the latter requires the former.
The language of “moderation,” “toleration,” and “balance,” as well as expressions like “want of
due restraint” and “equilibrium,” punctuated Adams’ prose, and they are concepts to which Adams
returned with uncommon frequency.197 Adams also used the expression “over-balance,” referring to out-

Early American Republic, 1788-1800 (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 534-37.
Elkins and McKitrich recognized, too, that the infamous trouble that Adams caused himself by proposing
a lofty title for President Washington, which was another effort to utilize this method of recognition to
harness the passion for distinction and in so doing, engender public respect for the new national
government – another balancing act. Id, p. 536. All in all, here is another instance, however, where
Adams’ emphasis on balance is not integrated into his republicanism.
193
The one exception to this sidelining of balance in Adams’ republicanism is J. M. Porter and R. S.
Farnell essay, written over forty years ago, entitled, “John Adams and American Constitutionalism,” The
American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 21, Issue 1 (Jan. 1976), pp. 20-33, in which balance is viewed as
essential to Adams’ constitutionalism. Indeed, in Porter and Farnell’s view, “the first and most important
theme in all of Adams’ constitutional writings was his defense of the principle of balance in the political
process and structure.” Id, p. 29. We need not weigh in on whether balance is Adams’ “first and most
important theme,” as there is plenty of competition (e.g., liberty, consent, etc. etc.), in order to recognize
that it was an organic component of early modern Anglo-American republicanism.
194

For example, in 1788, from Paris, Jefferson wrote to South Carolinian leader Ralph Izard, “Happy for
us that abuses have not yet become patrimonies, and that every description of interest is in favor of
rational & moderate government.” As far as religion goes, Jefferson was always a champion of toleration
– freedom of conscience. “It behoves every man who values liberty of conscience for himself, to resist
invasions of it in the case of others.” Jefferson to Ralph Izard, July 17, 1788, John R. Kaminski and
Jonathan M. Reid, eds., Adams and Jefferson: Contrasting Aspirations and Anxieties From the Founding
(Madison, WI: The Center for the Study of the American Constitution by Parallel Press, 2013), p. 41.
Jefferson to. Dr. Benjamin Rush, April 22, 1803, Thomas Jefferson Writings, Merrill D. Peterson, ed.
(United States: The Library of America, 2011), p. 1123.
195

Adams to Taylor, April 15, 1814, The Portable John Adams, p. 407.
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Adams, “Letter XXVII. Mixed or Composed Governments,” Defence, p. 149 (quoting Sidney, II.16.167).
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Not surprisingly, like the Sidney Library, the Adams Library was chocked full of Tacitus, Lipsius and
Grotius works, including those on toleration. Texts abound as well on religious toleration in the context of the
French Huguenots and the Dutch war of independence. This is also unsurprising given the fact that both men
spent years in both Catholic France and the relatively very tolerant Dutch Republic. See Appendix B.
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of-kilter balance or disequilibrium.198 He was indefatigable in his endorsement of and insistence on the
concept. Adams was very familiar with these principles through his study of the classics; the ideas also
were emphasized by early modernists like Sidney and others.199 Indeed, commitment to the value of
man’s “perfections and imperfections,” which included the non-absolute and the moderate, resonated
throughout Adams’ writing and was integral to his very pragmatic understanding of man, which was the
starting place for his republicanism.200 Conversely, the lack of balance – extremism and utopianism – was

198

See, e.g., Adams, “Letter XXIX. Ancient Republics, and Opinions of Philosophers,” Defence, Vol. I, p.
164.
199

Moderation was one of the four cardinal Platonic virtues set forth in the Republic, along with wisdom,
courage and justice. “Courage is the excellence of the spirited part, wisdom belongs to the rational part,
and moderation is the consent of all three about who should rule and who should obey. Justice, thus,
turns out to be the overall unifying quality of the soul.” In his later work the Laws, Plato emphasized the
need for legislators to act in accordance with citizens’ best balance of pleasure and pain; this leads to
human happiness. Education should “provide the right habituation (ethos) concerning the measure of
pleasure and pain,” viz. ”the necessary inner equilibrium in the good citizen,” anticipating “the Aristotelian
conception of the moral virtues as the right mean between excess and deficiency.” Plato’s confidence in
“the power of due measure,” expressed in the Laws, ‘finally culminates in the famous maxim that God is
the measure of all things.’ In our view, it is God who is preeminently the ‘measure of all things’, much
more so than any man, as they say. So if you want to recommend yourself to someone of this character,
you must do your level best to make your own character reflect his, and on this principle the moderate
man is God’s friend, being like him, whereas the immoderate and unjust man is not like him and is his
enemy; and the same reasoning applies to the other vices too.” Dorothea Frede, “Plato’s Ethics: An
Overview,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 ed.), pp. 9, 21, 23, 49-50 (emphasis
added), http://plato.stanford. edu/archives/win2016/entries/plato-ethics/ (9-14-17). In his early dialogue
Charmides, which explored the nature of moderation, Plato maintained that “there are two disparate
elements commonly associated with that virtue [courage], namely a certain calmness of temper on the
one hand … and self-knowledge on the other.” Needless to say, Plato’s works were in the Adams’
Library. Catalogue of the John Adams Library in the Public Library of the City of Boston (Boston, MA:
1917), pp. 195-96. Adams stated that, “Plato has sufficiently asserted the honour of the laws, and the
necessity of proper guardians of them; but has no where delineated the various orders of guardians and
the necessity of a balance between them: he has, nevertheless, given us premises from when the
absolute necessity of such orders and equipoises may be inferred; he has shewn how naturally every
simple species of government degenerates.” Adams, “Letter XXXIV,” Defence, Vol. I, p. 209.
Then there was Montesquieu, on whom Adams and his peers relied, who said, “DEMOCRATIC and
aristocratic states are not in their own nature free. Political liberty is to be found only in moderate
governments; and even in these it is not always found. It is there only when there is no abuse of power:
but constant experience shews us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his
authority as far as it will go. Is it not strange, though true, to say that virtue itself has need of limits? To
prevent this abuse, it is necessary, from the very nature of things, power should be a check to power.”
Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Complete Works, Vol. 1, The Spirit of Laws [1748],
The Online Library of Liberty A Project Of Liberty Fund, Inc., http://oll.libertyfund.org (9-14-17), p. 210.
This was very much Adams’ view. The English early modern republicans, including Sidney, who
advocated moderation are discussed in Ch. Four.
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Adams to Taylor, undated, The Portable John Adams, p. 409.
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politically dangerous, in his view.201 In talking about the republic of Geneva, for example, Adams referred
to “the fatal effects of an imperfect balance.”202 The obvious political example of extremism was absolute
monarchy; no power balanced the power of the monarch. Adams made this point many times, e.g., in A
Defence discussing and quoting from Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws: “There would be an end of
every thing (tout feroit perdu) were the same man, or the same body, whether of princes, of the nobles, or
of the people, to exercise those three powers; that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and that of judging the crimes or differences of individuals.”203 In Discourses on Davila Adams
stated, quite simply, that, “A balance, with all its difficulty, must be preserved, or liberty is lost forever.”204
Adams rejected utopian thinking, which was dangerous for the same reason.205 The concept of
perfect government was naïve. “A simple and perfect democracy never yet existed among men”;
therefore, designing a government that was either based on or sought perfection was doomed to failure,
which could lead to anarchy.206 As much as Adams recognized Harrington’s work for various assertions,
including the armchair philosopher’s appreciation of the power that accompanied property ownership, one
never finds Adams admiring Harrington’s goal, that of creating a utopian republic. Even setting aside the
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In one of his marginalia exchanges with Bolingbroke, Adams wrote:
B. Generally speaking … as public liberty is more exposed under mixed governments than
under perfect democracies, so is it more exposed under limited monarchies than under any
other form of mixed government.
A. This [is] absolutely erroneous.
Haraszti, John Adams & the Prophets of Progress, pp. 56-57.
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Adams, “Letter XVII, The Republic of St. Gall [which includes a discussion of Geneva], Defence, Vol. I,
p. 53.
203

Adams, “Letter XXVIII. Mixed Governments,” on Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, Defence, Vol. I, p.
154. Perhaps tactlessly Adams also remarked that “Montesquieu borrowed the best part of his book from
Machiavel, without acknowledging the quotation,” and while “Machiavel was the first who revived the
ancient politics; the best part of his writings he translated almost literally from Plato and Aristotle, without
acknowledging the obligation and the worst of the sentiments, even in his Prince, he translated from Aristotle, without throwing upon him the reproach.” Meanwhile, he noted that Milton, Harrington and Sidney
“were intimately acquainted with the ancients, and with Machiavel. They were followed by Locke, Hoadley, &c.”” Adams, “Letter XLIX. Ancient Aristocratical Republics,” Defence, Vol. I, p. 325. Again, we have
a chain of thought about republican ideas that goes back to the ancients and forward by way of
Machiavelli.
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Adams, “Postscript,” Discourses on Davila, The Portable John Adams, p. 393.
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Cf. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, p. 47 (“Republicanism meant more for Americans
than simply the elimination of a king and the institution of an elective system. It added a moral dimension,
a utopian depth, to the political separation from England.”)
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Adams, “Preliminary Observations,” Defence, Vol. I, p. 7.
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lack of opportunity for individual participation in Harrington’s republic to which Adams would have
completely objected, the notion of changing the very nature of society, as Harrington sought to do, must
have seemed outlandish to Adams. Adams would have scoffed at the idea of creating a fixed republic,
what Pocock termed the “ideal state,” e.g., the institution of thirty “orders” to specify the conduct of all
aspects of government from the most general and profound to the most particularized and trivial.207
Harrington’s notion of an “immortal” commonwealth that could not be “disturbed” undoubtedly would have
seemed absurd; and perhaps even more so the notion of “distributing the exercise of intelligence.” Not
only did Harrington’s utopia inhibit freedom; it was completely unrealistic. Whether one believed in a
Polybian world that necessarily meant that monarchy degenerated into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy,
and democracy into anarchy, change was inevitable, e.g., Adams’ quoted Machiavelli for the proposition,
“All republics, especially such as are not well constituted, undergo frequent changes in their laws and
manner of government,” even though Machiavelli also maintained that “real liberty and true obedience”
tended to “preserve constancy in government.”208 Thus, Adams consistently abjured the unconditional,
the unlimited, the “perfect,” and the absolute; indeed, the immoderate was incompatible with man’s
imperfect nature and, accordingly, with his well-being.209
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Pocock, “Introduction,” Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, p. xxi & id, pp. 118-19.
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Adams, “Italian Republics of the Middle Age,” April 19, 1787, Defence, Vol. II, p. 81. Wood
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Wood contended that Adams promoted the theme of an ideal republic, asserting that the Americans
“put together a conception of the ideal republican society … that they would have to have if they would
sustain their new republics.” In support of this proposition Wood relied on a phrase by Adams in
“Thoughts on Government” that such an ideal society would be “filled, said John Adams, with ‘all great,
manly, and warlike virtues.’” Id, p. 53, citing “Thoughts on Government.” Wood has it wrong here.
“Thoughts on Government” was anything but a conception of the ideal republic. To the contrary, its
purpose was to facilely enable the colonies to create new and real not ideal republican governments, and
to do so in a straightforward, pragmatic manner. As Wood later recognized, quoting from a letter by
Samuel Adams to Samuel Cooper in April 1776, having “Governments set up by the people in every
Colony, … and I am inclind to think it will be soon, the Colonies will feel their Independence.” Samuel
Adams to Samuel Cooper, Apr. 30, 1776, Harry Alonzo Cushing, ed., Writings of Samuel Adams, Vol. III.
1773-1777, (New York & London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1907), p. 283; see Wood, The Creation of the
American Republic, pp. 129-30. In the paragraph in question, in providing a framework for a new
republican form of government in the colonies, Adams was endorsing sumptuary laws. His reasons were
to promote “the happiness of the people,” to increase revenue through frugality, and to encourage virtue
through the avoidance of “vanities, levities, and fopperies.” At best this is an example of earnest idealism;
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In our discussion of balance in Sidney’s work, Cicero was the proper starting point; and for
Cicero, the political goal was maintenance of the republic. But Cicero began by focusing on the individual,
not governance. An individual’s honor required “order and due measure”; the consequent equilibrium or
balance was reflected in one’s ideas and actions, which depended on “underlying moderation and selfcontrol.”210 We now can appreciate that Cicero’s ideas were as important to Adams as they were to
Sidney, and that balancing one’s passionate nature was the starting point for both republicans’ political
ideas; as Ellis put it, “balanced constitutions in state and self.”211 Also, both Sidney and Adams by
temperament were similar; while they were rational, pragmatic thinkers, sometimes they were hotheaded. No doubt this fiery personality – these were men who could be “set on fire” – made their views
on how to temper man’s passions intensely autobiographical, viz., how they could and should moderate
their own passions in order to satisfy their real self-interest.212 But self-control, rationality, a moderate
disposition, and balancing one’s emotional and rational nature were clearly Ciceronian goals to which
both men aspired, personally and for their countrymen.213
One route to appreciating Adam’s pervasive treatment of balance is through the integration of
three Adams’ oeuvres preoccupied with the subject: Defence, the three-volume treatise written and

but it is not the endorsement or promotion of “the ideal” republican society, a concept far afield from
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Especially as a younger man Adams’ frequent exhorted himself to study hard and therefore to control
his passions. See, e.g., Adams’ statement in The Earliest Diary of John Adams, p. 77 that, “there is
another [Motive], no less powerful than either, which is the active Acquisition of Knowledge, in a peaceful,
undisturbed Retirement. Here I should moderate my Passions, regulate my Desires, increase my
Veneration of Virtue, and Resolution to pursue it, here I should range the whole material and Intellectual
World, as far as human Powers can comprehend it, in silent Contemplation.” There are many other such
lectures Adams gave to himself, as well as related criticisms. Recall, too, John’s comment to his cousin
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published between 1786 and 1787; Discourse on Davila, written and published in 1789 (which Thompson
characterized as the fourth volume of Defence); and the 1789 and 1814 Adams correspondence with two
fellow-lawyers and leaders, Roger Sherman of Connecticut and John Taylor of Virginia.214 Sherman was
a Founder and constitutional Framer; Taylor was a champion of Jeffersonian democracy, a Virginia
politician and US Senator.215 When Diggins included the Sherman and Taylor letters in The Portable
John Adams he explained that Adams’ exchange with these two men afforded him “the opportunity to
clarify and refine the thoughts that had appeared in the Defence as dense and almost impenetrable.”216
Effort is focused here on making Defence a little less dense and impenetrable; perhaps more userfriendly. Additional insight from Davila and the Sherman and Taylor correspondence will round out our
understanding of the essentiality of balance to Adams’ republican thought.
Davila was devoted to the subject of man’s nature and its impact on behavior, particularly political
behavior, providing the evidentiary linkage between the nature of man and the form of government.217
“As nature intended them for society, she has furnished them with passions, appetites, and propensities,
as well as a variety of faculties. …There is none among them more essential or remarkable, than the
passion for distinction. A desire to be observed, considers, esteemed, praised, beloved, and admired by
his fellows. …No exertion of his reason, no effort of his will, can wholly divest him of it.”218 Man’s
competitive and ambitious nature readily disturbed an individual’s balance; the form of government could
compensate for this tendency. In Davila Adams emphasized that, “The desire of the esteem of others is
as real a want of nature as hunger.” As scholars have put it and something that seems a self-evident
proposition today, the drive for distinction “was a constant motivating force” in the political realm.219 Men
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might be motivated “to constant exertions of beneficence” to satisfy their desire for recognition and, in this
regard, “men of all sorts, even those who have the least of reason, virtue, or benevolence, are chained
down to an incessant servitude” to their fellow man.” On the other hand, the drive for distinction on the
public stage of politics could make men selfish, self-aggrandizing, and poisonous to the body politic.220
On this aspect of humankind as well as others, Davila focused acutely on man’s nature and propensity
towards imbalance, at odds with the necessity to achieve “that balance of passions and interests, which
alone can give authority to reason from which results all the security to liberty and the rights of man.”221
In his “Postscript” to Davila Adams shifted his focus to the latter part of this equation, the form of
government that promoted and protected liberty and the rights of man. He wrote, “It has been said, that it
is extremely difficult to preserve a balance [in government]. This is no more than to say that it is extremely
difficult to preserve liberty. To this truth all ages and nations attest. …A balance, with all its difficulty, must
be preserved, or liberty is lost forever.”222 Reflecting his perennial realism, Adams added, “Perhaps a
perfect balance, if it ever existed, has not been long maintained in its perfection; yet, such a balance as
has been sufficient to liberty, has been supported in some nations for many centuries together; and we
must come as near as we can to a perfect equilibrium, or all is lost.” The type of balance that Adams had in
mind was quite specific: “If the people have not understanding and public virtue enough, and will not be
persuaded of the necessity of supporting an independent executive authority, an independent senate, and
an independent judiciary power, as well as an independent house of representatives, all pretentions to a
balance are lost, and with them all hopes of security to our dearest interests, all hopes of liberty.” 223
Defence was the defense of balanced government. In three copious volumes Adams reviewed
and analyzed republics and republican thinkers ancient and modern with an eye towards how actual
republics had worked (or not) in various historical contexts, how they were organized, their effectiveness
(or not) in protecting the values they espoused and, particularly, the extent to which they were successful
in balancing political power within the society. Defence has consistently received substantial “bad press”
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from scholars.224 But as some scholars have suggested, the problem is the reader’s expectations, not the
work itself. It is not surprising that those who misconstrue Defence as a rigorous philosophical treatise or
other scholarly text are disappointed. In contrast, McCullough characterized it correctly as a lawyer’s brief;
it was actually a handbook for lawyers.225 Adams distilled the scholarship extant. Much of the text
consisted of crib notes and lengthy quotations from an array of sources that others, particularly lawyers,
would find useful to use in a legal brief in support of principles of balance in government.226 Adams
prepared it while serving as ambassador to the Court of St. James, once again stepping into the role of
apical educator. He was extremely concerned about the impact on his countrymen of the French and,
particularly, Turgot and his ideas on governance.227 While the gods would govern themselves “democratically,” the question, declared Adams, was “whether it is practicable to govern men in this way.”228 Adams
was well aware of the impending United States constitutional convention, and the extraordinary opportunity
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Ryerson maintained that, “The second and third volumes of the Defence of the Constitutions were a
sharp contrast to the first. It is unclear exactly when or why Adams decided to write them.” As discussed
in the text above, the answer seems quite straightforward, and the method smacks of the background
work necessary to prepare a complicated legal brief – an analysis that makes the arguments and lays out
the evidence. You would need this kind of evidence, there would be lengthy quotations, in order to
present a legal proof; and this is provided in Defence, particularly volumes two and three. As to the
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for Americans to create their federal government anew. No one else took responsibility for the formidable
task of challenging Turgot’s flawed thinking; some supported it. Adams considered a rebuttal with supporting authorities imperative, as he had felt many years before when he wrote his Novanglus essays.
In Defence’s Preliminary Observations, Adams explained why a detailed response was necessary.
Turgot and associated thinkers “had all experience in public affairs,” not to mention “ample information in
the nature of man, the necessities of society, and the science of government.” In short, they were credible.
Moreover, “There had been, from the beginning of the revolution in America, a party in every state, who
have entertained sentiments similar to these of Mr. Turgot,” i.e., his ideas had appeal.229 Turgot & Co. were
critical of the American state constitutions, an immediate affront to Adams since most of these founding
documents were highly influenced by “Thoughts on Government.” But the matter was far, far more politically
vital than personal. Adams believed that Turgot’s concept of republican governance could crush America
by up-ending the stability of the government, providing an opportunity for corruption to run rampant and for
the people to reject the confederacy. In the name of unity, government would not reflect the diversity of the
citizenry; rather, it would be completely dominated by an assembly that, in its discretion, represented the
nebulous, indeterminate, potentially faction-capturable, and therefore dangerous “will” of the people.
Adams saw Turgot’s ideas as a recipe for imbalance; and imbalance was a recipe for disaster.230 “Americans, beware!”231 As Adams later described medieval Florence, if the United States adopted Turgot’s ideas
it would be a republic which “became every day more abject and pusillanimous.”232
Turgot stated that the American state constitutions were fashioned after the English government
structure “without any particular motive,” i.e., they were just copy-cats.233 He was correct on the first point;
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completely wrong on the second. The English government structure was made up of a house of commons,
lords, and a king. In Turgot’s view, “Instead of collecting all authority into one centre, that of the nation,”
whatever that means, the Americans mistakenly “endeavour to balance these different powers, as if this
equilibrium, which in England may be a necessary check to the enormous influence of royalty, could be of
any use in republics founded upon the equality of all citizens, and as if establishing different orders of men
was not a source of divisions and disputes.”234 In short, Turgot opposed the republican concept of the
institution of balance of power in government and, particularly, a bicameral legislature. “Shall we suppose
then, that Mr. Turgot intended, that an assembly of representatives should be chosen by the nation and
vested with all the powers of government; …and shall be virtually deemed the nation,” which was “probably
his real meaning”?235 The answer was yes, and the remainder of the three volumes of Defence was
designed as an evidentiary refutation of this supposition.
There were no shortcuts possible to defeat Turgot; Adams had to present absolute proof of
Turgot’s erroneous, unrealistic thinking. For example, “different orders of men” were not being
“established” via a bicameral legislature, as Turgot claimed. Adams believed that these orders were a fact,
a given in every society on earth, and they always would be. Accordingly, putting “the natural aristocracy
in a single assembly” was dangerous.236 To pretend that a natural aristocracy did not exist was to put
one’s head in the sand; and if they were included in a single assembly government, the natural aristocracy
would dominate and control the people’s representatives.237 As Adams profusely articulated in an 1814
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majority, as tyrannically as any sovereignty was ever exercised by kings or nobles.” Accordingly, “if a
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letter to John Taylor of Caroline (still Virginia), “whenever I use the word aristocrat, I mean a citizen who
can command or govern two votes or more in society, whether by his virtues, his talents, his learning, his
loquacity, his taciturnity, his frankness, his reserve, his face, figure, eloquence, grace, air, attitude,
movements, wealth, birth, art, address, intrigue, good fellowship, drunknnes, debaiuchery, fraud, perjury,
violence, treachery, pyrrhonism, design, or atheism; for by every one of these instruments have votes been
obtained and will be obtained.”238 Adams could not contain himself, as he was wont to foolishly not do. “I
will be bolder still, Mr. Taylor. Would Washington have ever been commander of the revolutionary army or
president of the United States, if he had not married the rich widow of Mr. Curtis? Would Jefferson ever
have been president of the United States if he had not married the daughter of Mr. Wales?”239 In a much
more delicate voice, when Adams wrote to Jefferson, the former in London and the latter in Paris, “You are
afraid of the one – I, of the few. We agree perfectly that the many should have a full fair and perfect
Representation. – You are Apprehensive of Monarchy; I, of Aristocracy. I wold therefore have given more
Power to the President and less to the Senate.”240
Of course, saying so was not the same thing as proving why his perspective was sensible. This
was the lawyer’s bread and butter, and history was Adams’ evidentiary material. The epigraph at the
beginning of Volume III of Defence invoked a statement by Samuel Johnson from an essay entitled, “The
difficulty of forming confederacies”; Adams was alluding to Turgot’s quixotic ratiocination and what must
have been seemed to Adams, unmitigated naiveté. “Some philosophers have been foolish enough to
imagine, that improvements might be made in the system of the universe, by a different arrangement of the
orbs of heaven; and politicians, equally ignorant, and equally presumptuous, may easily be led to suppose,
that the happiness of our world would be promoted by a different tendency of the human mind.”241
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Epigraphs were not enough. “To examine this system in detail may be thought as trifling an
occupation, as the laboured reasonings of Sidney and Locke, to shew the absurdity of Filmar’s superstitious notions, appeared to Mr. Hume in his enlightened days.” So much for Hume!242 Adams, attorney-atlaw, knew that no approach but comprehensiveness would put Turgot’s ideas to bed; and he knew that law
work such as this was tedious. But the devil invariably was in the detail; rarely was there any other way to
win a case. “Yet the mistakes of great men, and even the absurdities of fools, when they countenance the
prejudices of numbers of people, especially in a young country, and under new governments, cannot be
too fully confuted.” Accordingly, neither the reader nor his own time was wasted in this exercise. “You will
not then esteem my time or your own misspent, in placing this idea of Mr. Turgot in all its lights; in
considering the consequences of it; and in collecting a variety of authorities against it.”243
Notwithstanding suggestions to the contrary, the organization of Defence was neither random nor
casual. Following a very useful summarizing Preface and Preliminary Observations, Adams moved on to
thoroughly consider “democratical,” “aristocratical” and “monarchical” republics, followed by ancient republics and the opinions of philosophers, ancient and modern. There was one short subsection of Volume I
explicitly on “Mixed Governments” in which there were three chapters (termed letters) devoted, respectively, to Machiavelli, Sidney, and Montesquieu. Locke was separately addressed in the concluding chapter
of Volume I, along with Milton and Hume, but that chapter was a scathing attack on some of the ideas of

Ash-ley Cooper (1671-1713), Third Earl of Shaftesbury, student of John Locke, and grandson of the Earl
familiar to us as Locke’s patron, empha-sized the nature of Adams’ subject-matter vis-à-vis Turgot’s
approach. “As for us Englishmen, thank heaven, we have a better sense of government, delivered to us
from our ancestors. We have the notion of a public, and a constitution; how a legislative and how an
executive is moulded. We understand weight and measure in this kind, and can reason justly on the
balance of power and property. The maxims we draw from hence are as evident as those of
mathematics. Our increasing knowledge shews us every day more and more what common sense is in
politics.” Adams, Epigraph, Defence, Vol. II, unpaginated.
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the proposition that such governments were, “Compositions the most despicable, both for style and
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these three thinkers; in the case of Locke, Adams impugned his design of the government of Carolina, to
be discussed shortly. Volume II of Defence was entirely in the weeds, the minutia of the medieval Italian
republics. Florence and Machiavelli (again) were featured. Adams’ observed, “every page of their history is
against our author’s system,” i.e., against unicameralism.244 Volume III picked up where Volume II left off,
continuing to examine the Italian republics. Finally, Adams turned to England and “The right Constitution
of a Commonwealth, examined,” at least, ostensibly. For the preponderance of this lengthy Letter VI of
Volume III, which takes up about three-fifths of the 500-page volume, is about ancient Rome not England,
from which Adams drew an array of lessons learned and analogies to the English commonwealth, a
parallel Sidney often drew. “These examples all show that the natural principles of the English constitution
were constantly at work among the Roman people: that nature herself was constantly calling out for two
masters to controul the senate, one in a king or single person possessed of the executive power, and the
other in an equal representation of the people possessed of a negative on all the laws.”245
Adams’ method in Defence is standard lawyer fare. Most arguments began with a statement of
the opposing argument and a rebuttal on the merits or substantive grounds raised. This argument was
followed by the traditional, additional argument in which a lawyer posits, or assumes arguendo – that is,
for the sake of argument – that his opponent is correct on the merits of the case – and the facts and inferences drawn therefrom – but still, nevertheless, is incorrect in his analysis, such as in the application of
the law. For instance, Adams opposed the contention that, “That form of government … must needs to
be the most excellent, and the people’s liberty most secured, where governors are least exposed to the
baits and snares of luxury.” What this actually meant, said Adams, was that, “the people’s liberty” was
“most secure where the people are poorest.” In fact, he averred, poverty or riches had nothing to do with
the form of government; the factual assertion was patently wrong.246 Moreover, “[i]f mankind must be
voluntarily poor in order to be free,” Adams avowed, “it is too late in the age of the world to preach liberty.”
In short, not only was the assertion untrue, it was entirely self-defeating. In the modern, commercial age,
there was no route to liberty if this was the case. “But if,” Adams continued, “that is the best form of
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government, where governors are least exposed to the baits and snares of luxury,” i.e., even if this
erroneous assertion was correct, the solution posed – unicameralism – was “the worst of all possible
forms.”247 Here were arguments in the alternative and assumptions arguendo; readers could “pick their
poison,” as far as which argument they found most compelling. But they all worked.248
Front and center in Adams’ recognition of England as a country that had made repeated efforts to
improve upon government was his attack on the ideas of the peripatetic Marchamont Nedham. Recall that
Nedham was the English journalist and political author who “swung both ways.” The mercurial Nedham
was “a man of dapper conscience and dexterity extraordinaire” who a contemporary described as “transcendently gifted in opprobrious and treasonable Droll.”249 Nedham “remodeled” his politics 180 degrees
repeatedly, displaying “a dexterous faculty of creeping into the breech of every Rising Power.”250 In the
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refashion itself as it thought fit’. Moreover, she noted, ‘a right of resistance was ultimately beyond history
to natural or divine right, exercised by the community beyond the framework of the constitution.”
Greenberg did not disagree with the basic categorization, but disagreed with deeming history/law/
constitutional contractarianism as conservative versus natural law/reason/philosophical contractarianism
as radical. Aside from the fact that natural law is a vital component, an organic part of analyzing the Law,
a part of which is constitutional and a part of which is contractual, perhaps it is my perspective as an
attorney-historian that allows for the use of all of these arguments – if necessary, in the alternative –
insofar as they are helpful to a political advocate, which is precisely how Sidney, Adams and other
republicans functioned. But this bifurcation makes absolutely no sense to me, and it is most assuredly
not one incorporated in mainstream early modern Anglo-American republicanism. Perhaps such a
categorization is a consequence of the effort to locate Locke’s republican thought, given his eschewal of
historical argument? See Janelle Greenberg, “The Confessor’s Laws and the Radical Face of the Ancient
Constitution,” The English Historical Review, Vol. 104, No. 412 (July 1989), pp. 611-37, 612.
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first supported Cromwell and the Roundheads in the newsbook (the term for the first newspapers)
Mercurius Britannicus (1643-46), pivoted and edited the Cavalier newsbook Mercurius Pragmaticus
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context of his advocacy of the Commonwealth, Nedham had argued that, “this commonwealth ever thriv’d
best when the people had most power, and used most moderation.”251 Of importance to Adams, however,
was that in advocating “government by the people,” Nedham was a unicameralist. Adams was convinced
that, “Mr. Turgot’s idea of a commonwealth, in which all authority is to be collected into one centre, and
that centre the nation, is supposed to be precisely the project of Marchamont Nedham.” In short, Adams
suggested, Turgot “probably derived” his ideas from Nedham’s book, The Excellency of a Free State.
Moreover, this book was not only “a valuable morsel of antiquity well known in America,” but it had “many
partisans.” Accordingly, soft-peddling the matter, Adams asserted that Nedham’s book and the ideas he
advocated “may be worth while to examine.” This was “especially” the case because The Excellency of a
Free State “contain[ed] every semblance of argument which can possibly be urged in favour of the
system” of Mr. Turgot, viz., unicameralism.252
In Volume III of Defence Adams emphasized that Americans should “make collections” of all the
British political authors who wrote on government, “both for curiosity and use.” This was something that
Adams did.253 He divided English history into three periods, as far as when “principles of government
have been anxiously studied and very valuable productions published.” Those three periods were the
Reformation, “as early as the writings of Machiavel himself,” the Interregnum including “the whole interval
between 1640 and 1660,” and the 1688 Revolution. First and second on Adams’ list of authors “produced”
in the third period were Sidney and Locke (noting that Sidney’s work had been written earlier!). Before
eviscerating Nedham’s unicameralism, once again in a classically advocative move, Adams endeavored
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to mollify his audience by empathizing with Nedham and rationalizing his views: “There is one indispensable rule to be observed in the perusal of all of them [the writings in the three historical periods identified]; and that is, to consider the period in which they were written, the circumstances of the times, and
the personal character as well as the political situation of the writer” (all of which, it should be noted, is the
contextual method adopted in this study). Per Adams, this “precaution” deserved “particular attention” in
examining Nedham’s work, which had been printed first in his Cromwell rag, Mercurius Politicus, and then
reprinted in 1656 as The Excellency of a free State, or the right “Constitution of a Commonwealth.”
Adams explained how by this time, most people, including the general populace, were “desirous of the
restoration of the exiled royal family.” Indeed, there were many writers who were “explicitly espous[ing]
the cause of simple monarchy and absolute power: among whom was Hobbes, a man however unhappy
in his temper, or detestable for his principles, equal in genius and learning to any of his contemporaries.”
In short, Hobbes was persuasive. Other authors ridiculed the republican principle that “laws, and not
men, should govern.” In this historical context, said Adams, “writers on the side of liberty thought
themselves obliged to consider what was then practicable, not abstractedly what was the best.” Surely
this is the optimal way to view Nedham’s inconstancy! Men such as Nedham, and Adams explicitly
included Milton here, “felt the necessity of leaving the monarchical and aristocratical orders out of their
schemes of government, because all the friends of those orders were their enemies, and of addressing
themselves wholly to the democratical party, because they alone were their friends.” Articulated in the
most empathetic terms, what Adams was saying as he introduced his wholesale attack on unicameralism
was that Nedham’s endorsement of the doctrine, which constituted the basis for Turgot’s position, was no
more than political expediency; “at least there appears no other hypothesis on which to account for the
crude conceptions of Milton and Nedham.”254
Volume III of Defence auspiciously closed with the Report of the [Constitutional] Convention at
Philadelphia, Sept. 17, 1787, viz., the not-yet-ratified United States Constitution which, while it “cannot be
supposed to reach the ideas of perfection of any one” state, Adams joyfully described as a “plan” that
was, “without all partiality or prejudice, if not the greatest exertion of human understanding, the greatest
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single effort of national deliberation that the world has ever seen.”255 By the time Adams was ready to
publish the third volume of Defence the Americans had done what Adams considered to be necessary,
with some influence from him, and rejected Turgot’s belief in “collecting all authority into one centre, that
of the nation.”256 Overall, the US Constitution achieved Adams’ goal, viz., that, “Power must be opposed
to power, force to force, strength to strength, interest to interest, as well as reason to reason, eloquence
to eloquence, and passion to passion.”257
In Defence Adams actually defined a successful republic in terms of balance and equilibrium. The
exhaustive survey of republics across time and space, along with Adams’ consideration of the views of
numerous political thinkers, established that there was only one country that had endeavored to implement
a government structure in which the balance of power was structurally designed and instituted to create
equilibrium between the powers naturally arising and vying with each other for political power and
dominance: “We have seen no government, in which is a distinct separation of the legislative from the
executive power, and of the judicial from both, or in which any attempt has been made to balance these
powers with one another, or to form an equilibrium between the one, the few, and the many, for the
purpose of enacting and executing equal laws, by common consent, for the general interest, excepting in
England.”258 Scholars such as Ryerson rightfully have emphasized “the one, the few, and the many,” viz.,
the divisions extant in society that compete for political power. Ryerson’s emphasis, what he called his
study’s “larger thesis,” was Adams’ development and expounding of “an extraordinarily expansive view of
executive authority” and of the relationship of the executive to aristocratic and democratic forces.”
Ryerson emphasized political philosophers and historians who, he believed, influenced Adams, citing
Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli and Harrington (but not Sidney, of course).259 Without signing up for Ryerson’s
conviction that Adams had “an extraordinarily expansive view of executive authority,” there is no doubt that
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he considered it essential that the executive serve as part of the balance of power within government. In
that sense, executive power was a sina qua non, what Adams called the “great desideratum” for balanced
government. That “distinct executive power” had to be “of sufficient strength and weight” to compel
competing parties “to submit to the laws” -- returning again to the legitimacy of law as the “bottom-line” of
Adams’ republicanism. Recall, too, Adams’ phrase in Defence that, “it is the laws alone that really love the
country.”260 Important to the efficacy of a “distinct executive power” was the executive’s authority to veto
legislation – “giving each division a power to defend itself by a negative.”261 In illustrating the competing
parties or factions to which he referred, Adams was all-inclusive: Whig and Tory in England, Constitutionalist and Republican in America (England too), Anglomane and Francomane in America, Athenian and
Spartan in ancient Greece. All these contesting interests would “serve the purpose as well as [the] Guelph
and Ghibelline” factions of medieval Italy, to show the necessity for an executive that could handle powerful competing political forces.262 Conversely, Adams stated in Discourses on Davila, “if the common people
are advised to aim at collecting the whole sovereignty in single national assemblies, as they are by the
Duke de la Rouchefoucauld and the Marquis of Condorcet; or at the abolition of the regal executive
authority; or at a division of the executive power as they are by a posthumous publication of the Abbé de
Mably, they will fail of their desired liberty.” The sovereignty exercised by a majority would be exercised
just as “tyrannically” and “arbitrarily” as any despot, or by a king or noblemen.263
Notwithstanding Ryerson’s important work on the one, the few, and the many, the necessity to
balance the components of republican government and what that actually meant in practice has received
scant attention.264 American political boilerplate relies on Adams’ “two balances.” First, “the balance of
power between the executive and legislative powers,” i.e., between the chief magistrate (king, president,
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leader) and the law-making power (Congress, Parliament); the third prong of this balance of power via
power’s separation was an independent judiciary. Adams called this the “three equipollent branches”265
Second, there was, as Adams put it, “that other balance which is in the legislature – between the one, the
few, and the many,” the need for a “lower” legislature (House of Representatives, Commons), to balance
an “upper,” “aristocratical” legislature (Senate, Lords), viz., bicameralism.266 All of these features prevented power from being exclusively held by one person or body, i.e., constituted different aspects of “mixing”
government.267
The three-volume excogitation of Defence was devoted to understanding the multiple meanings
and manifestations of balance necessary for individuals to personally function well and for a community to
build and maintain a successful republic.268 “Men should endeavor at a balance of affections and
appetites, under the monarchy of reason and conscience, within, as well as at a balance of power
without. If they surrender the guidance for any course of time to any one passion, they may depend upon
finding it, in the end, a usurping, domineering, cruel tyrant.” In Adams’ view, men “were intended by
nature to live together in society, and in this way to restrain one another, and in general they are a very
good kind of creatures; but they know each other’s imbecility so well, that they ought never to lead one
another into temptation.” In the absence of balance, an individual’s “passion that is long indulged and
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continually gratified becomes mad; it is a species of delirium; it should not be called guilt, but insanity.”269
We therefore must segue from the balance required in government to the natural lack of balance
in man, and the need to steady our own nature through both our personal actions and how we govern
ourselves. In order to figure out what form of governance is best “the first inquiry should be, what kind of
beings men are?”270 We have previously discussed both Adams and Sidney’s views about man’s nature.
We know that Sidney’s characterization of man reflected a kind of moderation in itself, a perspective that
we can contrast with other early modernists, most notably Hobbes, who viewed man as only susceptible
to his own passions, which then wholly controlled man’s sense of self-interest.271 Adams may have been
a little more pessimistic or cynical than Sidney, but he was no Hobbes: in general, he could be gloomy
about man’s ability to resist the dominance of his own passions and thereby control his own behavior –
hence the necessity for law, about which Sidney wholeheartedly agreed – and yet optimistic about the
common man’s good sense, even wisdom, in making judgments about politics. For example, describing
his community in 1765, Adams stated, “It has been observed, that we are all of us lawyers, divines,
politicians, and philosophers. And I have good authorities to say, that all candid foreigners who have
passed through this country, and conversed freely with all sorts of people here, will allow, that they have
never seen so much knowledge and civility among the common people in any part of the world.”272
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At the same time, Adams was realistic and sometimes even crass about humankind. In Defence
he trenchantly remarked, “If we should extend our candour so far as to own that the majority of men are
generally under the dominion of benevolence and good intentions, yet it must be confessed that a vast
majority frequently transgress; and, what is more directly to the point, not only a majority, but almost all,
confine their benevolence to their families, relations, personal friends, parish, village, city, count, province,
and that very few indeed extend it impartially to the whole community.273 The odds were that collectively,
the citizenry usually behaved patiently and moderately. This was largely dependent on the satisfaction of
the populace with its opportunity to participate in government; in the absence of this opportunity, men
grew resentful, angry and dangerous. In that sense, events like Shays’ rebellion in Western Massachusetts were signals to leadership that the system was somehow awry. It was in this context that years
before Shay’s rebellion Adams fretted about the mob, that impassioned collection of individuals that could
quickly become irrational, unpredictable and treacherous.
One of Adams’ early cases, King v. Stewart, concerned trespass by townspeople into the home
and store of the plaintiff, Richard King, who lived in Scarsborough, Maine. The mob terrorized King’s
pregnant wife and five children and destroyed their property. The town folk had gathered for several
reasons: many owed Mr. King money; they resented his claim for compensation for disbursements he
had made on behalf of the parish while serving as town treasurer; and, notably, they suspected that King
was a prospective Stamp Act officer – an appointed position that provoked enormous animus in all the
American colonies. During the trial Adams wrote to Abigail that he was “engaged in a famous Cause:
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The Cause of King, of Scarborough vs. a Mob, that broke into his House, and rifled his Papers, and
terrifyed him, his Wife, Children and Servants in the Night. The Terror, and Distress, the Distraction and
Horror of this Family cannot be described by Words or painted upon Canvass. It is enough to move a
Statue, to melt an Heart of Stone, to read the Story…. These private Mobs, I do and will detest.” Turning
into the instructive political thinker, Adams explained, “If Popular Commotions can be justifyed, in
Opposition to Attacks upon the Constitution, it can be only when Fundamentals are invaded, nor then
unless for absolute Necessity and with great Caution. But these Tarrings and Featherings, these
breaking open Houses by rude and insolent Rabbles, in Resentment for private Wrongs or in pursuance
of private Prejudices and Passions, must be discountenanced, cannot be even excused upon any
Principle which can be entertained by a good Citizen – a worthy Member of Society.”274 What turns a
mean-spirited enemy into a real troublemaker, however, is when he not only incites hatred, but
encourages abuse and violence. “Besides every one of the Persons who is concerned in such an
Outrage has a Number of Friends… These therefore instantly join the Cry. ...In short, said Adams, ”I know
of nothing that happens in society which is such a Nursery of Scandal, and Calumny, of obloqui and
Defamation as a Mob. Besides it is such a Gratification to the Envy and Revenge, of the most sordid,
base and groveling among the Vulgar, that it gives them a Triumph and they always become insolent,
impudent, and abusive to such a Man.” “Appl[ied]” to Mr. King, “those Rioters” who broke into the Kings’
house were trespassers who violated the well-recognized rule that, “An Englishmans dwelling House is
his Castle,” and did so “in a most outragious manner.” If the jury were to deprive King of the “Protection”
of his home, it would be to “treat him not like an Englishman not like a Freeman but like a Slave – like a
miserable Turk, or Tartar.” Adams continued, “Is this not a base Affront? No Man who has a Soul, who
has the Spirit of a Man in him can ever after during his whole Life, ever forget such an Indignity, tho he
may forgive it.” 275
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Still, Adams recognized that no government was perfect. He believed that in a participatory
society the judgment of the people was often, if not usually sound. As he said years later in a letter to his
intellectual adversary John Taylor, in which he chastised Edmund Burke for his phrase, “swinish
multitude,” Adams confrontationally asked, “Whom do you,” Burke, “mean by your ‘multitude’? The
multitude, in your country, means the people of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and all the rest of your
dominions. The multitude, in this country, means the people of the United States. The multitude means
mankind.”276 The whole seemed to be greater than the sum of the parts – although, again, in his more
pessimistic moments Adams was less sanguine.277 Accordingly, Adams believed that over-indulging the
passions created men who were out of control in society, “mad” men who exhibited “a species of
delirium,” or “insanity.”278 This propensity to madness had to be controlled. In the first instance the
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passions had to be held in check by the individual; but one could not rely on a man’s successful selfcontrol and therefore this was perhaps the most important responsibility of government. “But all men, as
well as republican writers, must agree, that there can be no uninterrupted enjoyment of liberty, nor any
good government, in society, without laws, or where standing laws do not govern. ….The great question
there is, What combination of powers in society, or what form of government, will compel the formation of
good and equal laws. …The controversy between Mr. Turgot and me is – whether a single assembly of
representatives be this form.”279
Because of the vulnerability of men to corruption and the intensity of man’s passion, it was
essential that men “restrain one another,” and certainly not “lead one another into temptation.” Sidney and
Adams believed that once man stepped out into society, his personal liberty was consensually constrained
in order for people to live peaceably with each other. This moderation of liberty was paralleled by moderation in externalities as well.280 The converse was also true: The absence of moderation fanned out destructively into all aspects of life. Greed was a lack of acquisitional moderation, for example, the corruption
of the legitimate desire for economic improvement. Economic management therefore required balance –
not “The balance” of land advocated by Harrington, which we will revisit shortly, but the sharing of economic prosperity and, as a result, the promotion of the balance of trade and commercial opportunity
necessary to avoid tyranny.281 Adams provided an example applicable to a mixed monarchy: [A]n army is
a beast that has a great belly, and must be fed; …But if the property of the nobility, stocked with their
tenants and retainers, be the pasture of that beast, the ox knows his master’s crib; and it is impossible for
a king, in such a constitution, to reign otherwise than by covenant; or, if he breaks it, it is words that come
to blows.” Adams noted, “Aristotle is full of this balance.”282 The senate thus provided another component
of balance, serving not only the guardians of property, the security to which they were entitled, and “a
distinct personage to manage the whole executive power,” but also “a repository of the national traditions
of public maxims, customs and manners,” and “guardians of the public purse.” The senate were “control-
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lers” of kings and ministers, on the one side, and the people’s representatives on the other.283 At the same
time, essential to Adams’ balance of power was the participation of the people through their representative
assembly. “There can be no free government without a democratical branch of the constitution.”284
Recognizing that “insanity” was in the nature of man, Adams also flipped the issue, considering
not only government’s oversight of the people but the people’s oversight of government. After all, men in
government were people, too, and were driven by their passions as much as any man. As Adams wrote
in Discourses on Davila, “Nature speaks the same language to the hearts of Princes, as to those of other
men.”285 And “who would trust his life, liberty, and property to a madman or an assembly of them?”286
Recall that Sidney said the very same thing. Adams devoted a Defence chapter (stylized as a letter) to
Jonathan Swift of Gulliver’s Travels’ fame, who also wrote A Discourse of the Contests and Dissensions
between the Nobles and the Commons in Athens and Rome (1701). Swift “observe[d], that the best
legislators of all ages agree in this, that the absolute power, which originally is in the whole body, is a trust
too great to be committed to any one man or assembly; and therefore, in their several institutions of
government, power in the last resort, was placed by them in balance, among the one, the few, and the
many; and it will be an eternal rule in politics, among every free people, that there is a balance of power
to be held by every state within itself.”287
Thus, balance – and, in this instance, imbalance – was relevant not only to the impact of government on its citizenry collectively and individually; it also was relevant to that impact on rulers. When a
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human being is given absolute power such as a ruler acquired in an absolute monarchy, it was invariably
corrupting. “When a favourable conjuncture has presented, some of the most intrigueing and powerful
citizens have conceived the design of enslaving their country, and building their own greatness on its ruins.
Philip and Alexander, are examples of this in Greece – Caesar in Rome – Charles the fifth in Spain –
Lewis the eleventh in France – and ten thousand others.”288 The man given the opportunity to exercise
absolute power was corruptively enabled; his very human, flawed nature was unable to check itself and
therefore an absolute ruler became a despot. This wasn’t the case with all monarchies. Indeed, Adams
began Defence with recognition that in Europe, over time, “the courts of princes” had “in some degree”
adopted the “checks and balances of republican governments.”289 Why? “[I]n every republic, in the
smallest and most popular, in the larger and more aristocratical, as well as the largest and most
monarchical, we have observed a multitude of curious and ingenious inventions to balance, in their turn, all
those powers, to check the passions peculiar to them, and to controul them from rushing into those
exorbitancies to which they are most addicted – the Americans will then be no longer censured for
endeavouring to introduce an equilibrium, which is much more profoundly meditated, and much more
effectual for the protection of the laws, than any we have seen, except in England: -- we may even
question whether that is an exception.”290
To the extent that the common man needed to be balanced in his thinking and in his actions,
magistrates all the more so. The maintenance of balance was especially important for leadership. “[T]he
work of a magistrate, especially if he be the supreme, is the highest, noblest, and most difficult that can
be committed to the charge of a man,” said Sidney. Accordingly, “a more excellent virtue” was prescribed
to be worthy of the responsibilities of leadership, viz., “a proportion of wisdom, moderation of spirit, and
justice is requir’d in a supreme magistrate.” 291 This was a tall order given man’s inclination to allow his
passions to rule and therefore to be too easily subject to corruption. Indeed, both Sidney and Adams
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knew that the perfect man did not exist; as Adams put it, “It is weakness rather than wickedness which
renders men unfit to be trusted with unlimited power.”292 Of course, the more virtuous a leader the better.
Leaders provided for “the public good,” asserted Sidney and Adams, through the use of reason; but it was
too much to expect that leaders necessarily would exhibit selflessness and moderation, which men did
not come by naturally. “But perhaps it might be more exactly true and natural to say, that the king, the
aristocracy, and the people, as soon as ever they felt themselves secure in the possession of their power,
would begin to abuse it.”293 Once again, we are talking about balance. Adams sought a strong executive
separate from the legislature not because he favored monarchy! Rather, he wanted to prevent a monarch
or other executive from “corrupt[ing] the legislature” as “rust corrupts iron.”294 For Adams even more than
for Sidney, no matter how talented or virtuous the first magistrate, “There can be, in the nature of things,
no balance without three powers,” referring to a bicameral legislature and an executive authority.295
Like most authors, including Sidney and Adams, we have bandied about the term balance; but
what exactly is it? Moreover, going beyond the balanced behavior most beneficial to the individual, what
is balance of power? One hundred pages into Defence Adams defined these concepts. “The true
meaning of a balance of power is best conceived by considering what the nature of a balance is. It
supposes three things: first, the part which is held, together with the hand that holds it; and then the two
scales, with whatever is weighed therein.” Furthermore, “In a state within itself, the balance must be held
by a third hand, who is dealing the remaining power, with the utmost exactness into the several scales.
The balance may be held by the weakest, who by his address, removing from either scale, and adding his
own, may keep the scales duly poised.” For “when the balance is broken by mighty weights falling into
either scale, the power will never continue long, in equal division, between the two remaining parties; but,
till the balance is fixed anew, will run entirely into one.”296
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Balance, then, is the equipoise created by the inclusion of a third interest, possibly even the
weakest interest in decision making, which keeps the two sides of a scale in check so that one does not
outweigh the other. Balance of power is the application of this principle to governance. Because of “the
corruptibility of every species of simple government, by which I mean a power without a check,” the “utility
and necessity of different orders of men, and of an equilibrium of powers and privileges” is manifest.297
Recall the OED definition of balance: as a noun it means equilibrium or equipoise; as a verb it means the
process of achieving that. These concepts were embraced by Adams and Sidney with tantamount
intensity – a real fierceness.298 As we have seen, this concept of balance, and its application to the
individual and to political society, is entirely different from “The balance” contemplated by Harrington.
Here we have one of those very meaningful instances in which language is used in more than one way so
that it is easy to become confused about what is intended. Indeed, in this case, it has resulted in the
conflating of very significant differences between Harrington’s republicanism and that of others, including
Adams.
Recall that in Part One we reviewed the fact that, in striking contrast to the traditional Polybian
concept of balance utilized by Sidney and fellow republicans and summarized by Adams in Defence,
Harrington’s Oceana has an idiosyncratic meaning of “The balance.”299 Harrington’s republic is not only
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utopian but, as Scott pointed out, Harrington used conventional republican terms, including (but not limited
to) balance, in a decidedly unconventional way.300 Harrington’s "The balance” was all about real property,
and the belief that it was the responsibility of government to tightly control wealth by maintaining an "equal
Agrarian," an economic mandate that Harrington considered vital to the creation of his utopia. As part of
the "fundamental laws of Oceana" Harrington therefore required that land must be inherited equally by
male heirs and, moreover, than no man would be allowed to inherit land that generated more than two
thousand pounds in revenue so that “the balance proposed …. can never alter.”301 Recall that Harrington’s
protégé Neville also argued for an equal agrarian: “Force or fraud may alter a government; but it is
property that must found and eternize it.”302 While Adams empathized with the concept of economic
equality, forcing it in this way was another thing, and somehow eternally preventing change was not
something Adams would have taken seriously. In short, Harrington’s “The balance” had absolutely nothing
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to do with the concept of balance embraced by Adams and his republican antecedents, e.g., Sidney.303
Recall, as well, that Scott concluded that “behind the fashionable form of classical republican language
what we find in Oceana is a work of Hobbesian moral philosophy.” Whether or not Oceana is Hobbesian,
it is most definitely idiosyncratic; its “The balance” is autocratic, and entirely distinguishable from the nature
of balance that is part of mainstream early modern republicanism.304 As previously stated, I concur with
Scott that Oceana is “a deliberate subversion of classical republicanism,” which evolved into essentially
standard early modern republican thought, whether we are talking about the ideas of Sidney or Adams.305
Roger Sherman of Connecticut viewed Adams’ ideas with great suspicion – as “making the case for
monarchy in the guise of the executive branch.” Sherman advocated decentralization in government,
including a weak magistrate.306 In his July 1789 rejoinder to Sherman, Adams professorially observed that
republics “have been divided into three species, monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical republics.”
He continued, “England is a republic, a monarchical republic it is true, but a republic still; because the
sovereignty, which is the legislative [law-making] power is vested in more than one man; it is equally
divided, indeed, between the one, the few, and the many, or in other words, between the natural division of
mankind in society.”307 In a second letter written a day later Adams explained that without the ability of
Britain’s monarch to exercise a veto, “the negative,” the monarchical republic of Britain “could not preserve
the balance of power between the executive and the legislative powers.” Neither could it maintain “the
other balance which is in the legislature – between the one, the few, and the many” – i.e., separation of

303
Scholars like to short-circuit this distinction, among others. By noting that Adams cited and referenced
Harrington from time to time, they elide very significant differences in their republicanism. In Defence, for
example, Adams referred to Harrington. But his point talking about balance was to endorse Harrington’s
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powers within the legislature through a bicameral legislature that also involved the king in making laws.308
Indeed, Adams argued, without balance, a divided sovereignty “is always at war, and consequently has no
laws.” Waxing a bit poetic he continued, “Longitude, and the philosopher’s stone, have not been sought
with more earnestness by philosophers than a guardian of the laws has been studied by legislators from
Plato to Montesquieu; but every project has been found to be no better than committing the lamb to the
custody of the wolf, except that one which is called a balance of power.”309
Diggins described John Taylor of Caroline as both “an important political philosopher and Adams’s
leading antagonist.” After following Adams’ works for twenty years, Taylor “finally, in 1814 wrote a
rebuttal, titled An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the Government of the United States,” which
was a direct reply to Adams’s Defence as well as to Alexander Hamilton and James Madison’s Federalist
Papers.” By 1814, however, Hamilton had died in a duel and Madison “had recanted much of the
Federalist and become a Jeffersonian Virginian as the fourth president of the United States.”310 That left
the retired, elderly Adams to confute Taylor, which he did in prolix fashion, writing thirty-one letters in
reply.311 Taylor had tried to tar Adams as a common advocate of absolute monarchy, coupling his ideas
with those espoused by Robert Filmer! Adams would have nothing of it. “The association of ‘Mr. Adams
with Filmer’ … may excite a smile! I give you full credit, Mr. Taylor, for the wit and shrewdness of this
remark. It is droll and good-humoured.” The problem with the statement, said Adams, is that, “if ever
policy was in diametrical opposition to Filmer, it is that of the United States. If ever writings were opposed
to his principles, Mr. Adams’s are so opposed. They are as much so as those of Sidney or Locke”!!!
Adams repeated his long-held view – “My opinion is, and always has been” – that “absolute power
intoxicates alike despots, monarchs, aristocrats, and democrats, and jacobins, and sans culottes.”312
Turning to Defence, Adams noted, “the object of the whole of the three volumes” was the rebuttal of the
“solemn opinion of M. Turgot.” Pace Turgot and Taylor’s views, the people of Massachusetts, New York,
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and Maryland “were not reprehensible for endeavouring to balance those different powers” of government, for “not ‘collecting all authority into one centre, that of the nation,’ which is what Turgot had urged;
that “an equilibrium of those ‘different powers’ was indispensably necessary to guard and defend the
rights, liberties, and happiness of the people against the deleterious, contagious, and pestilential effects
of those passions of vanity, pride, ambition, envy, rage, lust, and cruelty, which domineer more or less in
every government that has NO BALANCE or an imperfect BALANCE.”313 Imbalance manifested itself in
other ways, too. “The more you educate, without a balance in the government, the more aristocratical will
the people and the government be.”314
How, then, does one go about achieving Adams’ “balance of affections and appetites, under the
monarchy of reason and conscience, within, as well as at a balance of power without”? These are
integrated thoughts, balance within and balance without. They impact each other and Adams often wrote
about them in conjunction.315 First and foremost in balance “without” is the necessity of mixed government, the multitude of “curious and ingenious inventions to balance” to which Adams referred, “to check
the passions peculiar to them, and to controul them from rushing into those exorbitancies to which they
are most addicted.”316
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Having emphasized mixed government repeatedly, we will just touch on it again in the context of
balance. Here we go full circle, appreciating the interconnectivity of the components of Adams’
republicanism, beginning with mixed government. In 1763, when he was twenty-seven, Adams was
already writing about balance “without,” or external balance: “No simple Form of Government can possibly
secure Men against the Violences of Power.”317 Mixed government was the solution to the concentration
of power; it was the first of Adams’ two balances, dividing authority among the executive, legislative and
judicial authorities – separation of power. Simple forms of government necessarily lacked balance; and
the absence of a balanced government was dangerous. This view was straight out of Polybius, adopted
by Cicero, agreed upon by Machiavelli, and advocated by Sidney.318 Adams never changed his opinion
on the subject. In Defence he quoted Sidney on the subject: “there never was a good government in the
world, that did not consist of the three simple species of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.”319
When Adams was seventy-two, after the knowledge about people that he gained practicing law,
after the great debates and other work in which he was involved in the Continental Congress, after
fighting politically, by legal words and actions, for Independence, after serving for a decade as a diplomat
in Europe, after grappling with Congress in his capacity as Vice President and then battling his own
Cabinet and party when he became President of the United States, after all of this and everything he
learned from it, as we mentioned in connection with republicanism’s take on democracy, in his retirement
Adam scribbled on the 1763 essay at the very text quoted above, “This last Paragraph has been the
Creed of my whole Life and is now March 27, 1807 as much approved as it was when it was written by
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John Adams.”320 As he had told Mercy Otis Warren in the same timeframe, “My opinion of the British
Constitution was formed long before I had any thing to do in public life, more than twenty years before I
ever saw the British Island…. long before the Stamp Act in 1764 and 1765…. I have never exhibited or
entertained but one opinion of monarchy in any part of my life.”
The opinion from which Adams had never deviated was that, “Despotism, absolute monarchy,
absolute aristocracy, and absolute democracy I have uniformly detested through my whole life; because I
knew that absolute power was tyranny, delirious tyranny wherever it was placed.” Absolute power
inherently, necessarily was unbalanced. The solution to this reality was mixed government. “A mixed
government is the only one that can preserve liberty.”321 As Adams said in the 1760s, he said in the 1770s.
In “Thoughts on Government,” again discussing mixed government, Adams observed, “If you compare a
Country where such a Government prevails with the Regions of Domination whether monarchical, or Aristocratical, you will think yourself in Arcadia or Elisium.”322 Indeed, “These Colonies, under such forms of
government, and in such a union, would be unconquerable by all the Monarchies of Europe.”323 In Adams’
view, “Simple Monarchy,” meaning unchecked or absolute monarchy, would “soon mould itself into Des-
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independence from Britain. Even if Adams’ recollections, decades later, are embellished, the logic of the
arguments would have been natural for him to think at the time. This included a concern about moral
laxity from the absence of rule of law; the consequent danger of insurrection; the adverse impact on
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the enemy unless and until American colonial governments were declared independent; the unwillingness
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independent of Britain; indeed, other nations could not take America seriously unless and until there was
no possibility of reconciliation with Britain; the continued oaths of allegiance taken by many of the
colonists, commitments to God that were taken very seriously but had now become meaningless and,
indeed, often patently untrue; and the fact that the patriots could not take over and use America’s natural
resources to oppose the powerful British military without “the Powers of Government.” Adams presented
these arguments to Congress, which he believed then “began to hear me with more Patience, and some
began to ask me civil questions.” Autobiography, JA D&A Vol. III, p. 355.
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potism.”324 In his early work A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law, Adams reminded his
audience, “In the earliest ages of the world, absolute monarchy seems to have been the universal form of
government. Kings, and a few of their great counsellors and captains, exercised a cruel tyranny over the
people who held a rank in the scale of intelligence, in those days, but little higher than the camels and
elephants, that carried them and their engines to war.” 325 But as Adams said in Defence, quoting Montesquieu this time, “Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and
executive powers.” For where “[t]he whole body is here united in one body; and though there is no external pomp that indicates a despotic sway, yet the people feel the effects of it every moment.”326
Here we have extremism on both sides: the extreme, indeed total power of the ruler; and the
extreme, indeed total ignorance and powerlessness of the people. Both sides needed to cede their
extremism. Adams believed that through education, some of the medieval European citizenry gained “a
general knowledge and sensibility,” the impact of which was “to shake off, all the limitations of their
power.”327 He wrote about the fact that while “first Planters of these Colonies,” meaning the admittedly
religiously “enthusiastical” Puritans, “were very far from being enemies to monarchy … they saw clearly,
that popular powers must be placed as a guard, a countroul, a ballance to the powers of the monarch and
the priest, in every government, or else.” Dramatically, Adams emphasized that in the absence of this
balance, the government “would soon become the man of sin, the whore of Babylon, the mystery of
iniquity, a great and detestable system of fraud, violence, and usurpation.”328 Much later, in Discourse on
Davila, he similarly exclaimed, “Cold will still freeze, and fire will never cease to burn; disease and vice
will continue to disorder, and death to terrify mankind. Emulation next to self-preservation will forever be
the great spring of human actions, and the balance of a well-ordered government will alone be able to
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prevent that emulation from degenerating into dangerous ambition, irregular rivalries, destructive factions,
wasting seditions, and bloody, civil wars.”329
Scholars have argued that based on Defence and Discourses on Davila, Adams’ leaned much
more towards monarchy, presumably limited monarchy, after living in Europe and, particularly, England,
having become much more jaundiced about America and its people’s ability to become corrupt. This is a
misreading. Adams had always understood human weakness, and he drew no distinction between
people living in America, Europe, or anywhere else. There are innumerable examples; but to recall one,
in a February 1772 Diary entry when Adams was in his thirties, he wrote, ““We see every Day, that our
Imaginations are so strong and our Reason so weak, the Charms of Wealth and Power are so
enchanting, and the Belief of future Punishments so faint, that Men find Ways to persuade themselves, to
believe any Absurdity, to submit to any Prostitution, rather than forego their Wishes and Desires. Their
Reason becomes at last an eloquent Advocate on the Side of their Passions, and they bring themselves
to believe that black is white, that Vice is Virtue, that Folly is Wisdom and Eternity a Moment.”330
As hard as Adams was about people’s foibles and self-centeredness, he also always recognized
that most people had common sense and therefore did not pursue potentially self-destructive acts unless
truly provoked to do so. As he continued to explain in his second Boston Massacre closing argument,
“the aptitude of the people to mutinies, seditions, tumults and insurrections, is in direct proportion to the
despotism of the government.” Despotism! Invoking here a word dear to the heart of every Englishman,
including the British Americans, Adams continued: “In governments compleatly despotic, i.e., where the
will of one man, is the only law, this disposition is most prevalent.” It was less so in Aristocracies, Adams
perspicaciously advised. But it was in “mixed Monarchies” that tumults and mutinies were least likely –
“less than either of the former” – and “in compleat Republick’s the least of all.” Adams explained that a
mixed monarchy could be a republic, that is, could embrace the republican principles that he espoused.
Adams also explained that when he spoke of a “compleat Republick,” this could well be “under the same
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form of government as in a limited monarchy.”331 In sum, pace those scholars who believe Adams’
political views changed, at least as of 1770 and probably earlier should one educe it, Adams embraced
mixed, limited (not absolute), constitutional (rule-of-law) monarchy, and recognized that this form of
government certainly could be republican. This point of view is proclaimed frequently and continuously in
Adams’ writing, and constituted the primary purpose of his later work – to convince Americans of the
merits of mixed government – when he felt that America’s mixed state and federal governments were
threatened by the events in France, and the advocacy of the ideas of Turgot and others.332 Adams’ threevolume Defence, Discourses on Davila, and the political essays that he wrote to his colleagues, Sherman
and Taylor, all resonate with this theme. In Defence, Adams not only heartily embraced mixed
government with each of the many republics in history that he described and assessed; he also
castigated those thinkers who did not agree. For example, he maintained that “our author,” referring to
Nedham, has reasons that were “not sufficient” for rejecting mixed government. Indeed, said Adams, “if
the nation,” meaning Britain, “had been dealt with more candidly, openly, and boldly, by him, and Milton,
and others, a better settlement might have obtained,” referring to the failed efforts of the parliamentarians
to negotiate a satisfactory settlement with Charles I at the end of the English revolution. “But it is plain
that Milton, Nedham, and even Harrington, wrote in shackles.”333 These were mental shackles, as when
he described Nedham’s analysis as providing “Not one check, not the least restraint, no appearance of
balance or controul, is once mentioned or thought of.”334 Like Sidney, Adams always consistently
recognized that the people were free to choose something other than mixed government, e.g., “Our
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author has no more right to call his project ‘the people’s form,’ any more than Montesquieu, Blackstone,
and DeLolme, have to call their admired system by that endearing appellation: both are the people’s form,
if the people adopt, choose, and prefer them; and neither, if they do not. The people have liberty to make
use of that reason and understanding God hath given them, in choosing governors, and providing for their
safety in government.”335 It simply was Adams’ view that in the absence of mental “shackles,” “American
common people are too enlightened, it is hoped, ever to fall into such an hypocritical snare; the
gentlemen, too, it is hoped, are too enlightened, as well as too equitable, ever to attempt such a
measure.”336 Instead, the people would want a stable government that promoted liberty, which meant that
they would opt for mixed government.
Without regurgitating the importance of law in republican governance, one can see how the
elements of republican theory were integrated and reinforced each other. For the primary way an
established society balanced the different and often conflicting interests of its members was through the
law and the legal process. As Coke famously said in the context of the ship money case, “Now as justice
hath a sword, so it hath a balance.”337 For Sidney, Adams and fellow early modern republicans, the
importance of balance and related concepts is that they, too, promoted the rule of law; and the rule of law
protected freedom. From early on, Adams envisioned government as a vehicle to enforce the law while
concomitantly channeling and coping with potentially destructive behaviors of the citizenry. As he told the
Boston Massacre jury in 1770, “The law, in all vicissitudes of government, fluctuations of the passions, or
flights of enthusiasm, will preserve a steady undeviating course; it will not bend to the uncertain wishes,
imaginations, and wanton tempers of men.”338 Adams always believed that this process meant managing
people as they really are, not as we might want them to be. Thus, in the Boston Massacre trial, Adams
also acknowledged the “continual vicissitudes of human beings,” and that “even in the mildest
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government, the people are liable to run into riots and tumults.”339 Adams was funny about it: “There are
Church-quakes and state-quakes, in the moral and political world, as well as earthquakes, storms and
tempests in the physical.”340
One of the three essential legs on which tripartite government rested, was the judiciary. This was
a new way of looking at balance, as the American system deviated from the British in this regard. By
erecting tribunals to register the laws and exercise judicial power, Adams explained how even in some
European monarchies “a controul has been established over ministers of state, and the royal councils,
which approaches, in some degree, to the spirit of republics.” The result was that property was generally
secure and personal liberty “seldom” invaded. Citizens’ petitions and remonstrations were “indulg[ed]…
until by habit they were regarded as rights.” Add to this the fact that in Europe, “The press has great
influence, even where it is not expressly tolerated,” and you have the development of a freer society than
exists under absolute monarchy: “Commerce begins to thrive,” etc.
The effectiveness of the judiciary was wholly dependent on the law. Once again Adams’ turned
to Cicero, who in both De Officiis and De Legibus spoke about the first institution of kings in Rome, and
“how they were at first left to govern at their own discretion without laws.” This meant that “their wills and
their words were law,” and that the making and executing of the law was in “one and the same hands.”
The consequence was, “Nothing but injustice, and injustice without remedy, till the people were taught by
necessity to ordain laws, as rules whereby they ought to govern.” This changed when assemblies met to
make laws to which the kings were bound, and “for which they were accountable.”341
We can also appreciate how bicameralism was a sub-part of Adams’ concept of mixed
government. To balance the power of the few and the many, i.e., the elite or the natural aristocracy, on
the one hand, and the people on the other, a bicameral legislature was necessary. It was another
essential means of achieving balance in government; for it was not “wisest to leave all the Powers of
Legislation in this single Body.” The purpose of Defence, if one needed to reduce the three volumes to
one point, was to rebut Turgot’s conviction that unicameralism was necessary to have an effective
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republic. Adams completely disagreed. In the absence of bicameralism in ancient Germany, just to take
one of innumerable Adams examples, “Wide spread miseries and final slavery of almost all mankind” was
the consequence.342 Defence was Adams’ painstakingly effort to, once again, educate his people about
many of those flawed regimes. As he had said decades before in “Thoughts on Government,” “a People
cannot be long happy or free, whose Laws are made only by one Assembly.”343 In the Preface to
Defence, Adams had similarly stated, “It is become a kind of fashion among writers, to admit, as a maxim,
that if you could be always sure of a wise, active, and virtuous prince, monarchy would be the best of
governments. But this is so far from being admissible, that it will for ever remain true, that a free
government has a great advantage over a simple monarchy.” This is true even when a country is
governed by royalty. “The best and wisest prince, by means of a freer communication with his people,
and the greater opportunities to collect the best advice from the best of his subjects, would have an
immense advantage in a free state more than in a monarchy.” There also was value in the elite’s point of
view “A senate consisting of all that is most noble, wealthy, and able in the nation, with a right to counsel
the crown at all times, is a check to ministers, and a security against abuses, that a body of nobles who
never meet, and have no such right, can never accomplish.” But, of course, the people’s assembly was
essential. “Another assembly, composed of representatives chosen by the people in all parts, gives the
whole nation free access, and communicates all the wants, knowledge, projects, and wishes of the
nation, to government; excites an emulation of all classes, removes complaints, redresses grievances,
affords opportunities of exertion to genius though in obscurity, and gives full scope to all the faculties of
man; opens a passage for every speculation to the legislature, to administration, and to the public: it gives
an universal energy to the human character, in every part of the state, which never can be obtained in a
monarchy.” If this is not a proclamation of bicameralism and, importantly, a rejection of absolute
monarchy, nothing would be.344
In short, Adams the honest realist recognized the advantages and disadvantages of every system
of government, and appreciated that there were ways to introduce balance and moderation even in
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monarchies so that “they would approach as near to the character of governments of laws and not of
men, as their nature will probably admit of.”345 The one exception was that this was impossible in an
absolute monarchy. Sidney agreed. One of the fundamental reasons Sidney was unconditionally
opposed to absolute monarchy was because, “of all things under the sun, there is none more mutable or
unstable than absolute monarchy.”346
Simple aristocracy fared little better – it became oligarchy, a political reality that was anything but
balanced. Adams wrote in his seventh Novanglus letter in March 1775 that, “if parliament is to be our
supreme legislature, we shall be under a compleat oligarchy or aristocracy, not the British constitution,
which this writer himself defines as a mixture of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. For King, lords
and commons, will constitute one great oligarchy, as they stand related to America, as much as the
Decimvirs did in Rome. With this difference for the worse, that our rulers are to be three thousand miles
off.” Adams explained why he reached this conclusion. “The definition of an oligarchy, is a government
by a number of grandees, over whom the people have no controul.” For example, “The states of Holland
were once chosen by the people frequently. Then chosen for life. Now they are not chosen by the people
at all. …Is not this depriving the Hollandrs of a free constitution, and subjecting them to an aristocracy or
oligarchy?” Why would this not be the case for America? “Will not the government of America be like it?
Will not representatives be chosen for them by others, whom they never saw nor heard of?”347
As with monarchy, Adams acknowledged that in some political situations the nobility could have a
useful, balancing influence on government. There were instances in which in certain monarchies the
aristocracy “support it still more by checking its ministers, and preventing them from running into abuses
of power, and wanton despotism.” Sidney said the very same thing in describing the historic role of the
nobility in England; after all, it was the role that his family had played. Indeed, this was one area in which
Sidney’s views were more strongly held than Adams. This also was Montesquieu’s concept of the
responsibility of the aristocracy. At the same time, Adams believed that if you left “the nobles to
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themselves, … they would overturn every monarchy in Europe, in a few years, and erect aristocracies.”348
In his Defence description of Machiavelli’s ideas, for example, Adams reflected on a statement by the
Italian republican. “‘The commonwealth,’ says Machiavel, ‘being settled upon this bottom, might have
continued quiet and happy, if the nobility could have been content to confine themselves within the
bounds of that moderation which is requisite in all republican governments.” Adams could not really
abide this way of thinking. It just frustrated him, because he could not countenance idealized political
analyses. Indeed, in another context and after thorough consideration, Adams rejected Montesquieu’s
concept of democracy “and its principle of virtue, equality, frugality, &c. according to his definitions of
them,” because they were “mere figments of the brain, and delusive imaginations”! This same irascibility
is reflected in Adams’ ruminations about Machiavelli’s statement. “It is impossible to read these grave
reflections of Machiavel and Nedham, so often repeated, with patience. It would be as wise to say, that
the nation might be quiet and happy under a despot or monarch, if the despot or monarch, and his
ministers and minions, could be content and moderate; or that the commonwealth might be happy under
an oligarchy or simple aristocracy, if all concerned in government could be content and moderate. When
we know human nature to be utterly incapable of this content, why should we suppose it?” 349 Machiavelli
went on to explain how “the behaviour of the nobility was quite the contrary,” that “they thought to
domineer over the whole city. What then?” His answer: “Why, they ought to have separated the nobles
from the commons, and made each independent of the other. Mixed together, in equal halves, the nobles
will for ever tyrannize.”350 Stated another way, “governments the best ordered and balanced have been
most beloved.”351
This was why, in fashioning government for America, Adams believed that the best way to handle
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aristocrats would be to take the “most illustrious of them” and “separate[] them from the mass,” placing
them in a senate, which is “to all honest and useful intents, an ostracism.”352 While America did not have
an aristocratic class, Adams was convinced that there would always be a natural aristocracy in every
society, America being no exception. As Ryerson pointed out, “Adams insisted that their new republic
had, and would always have, just as many shifting alliances of wealthy, talented, and graspingly ambitious men, whether well-born or self-made, as any republic that had ever existed, and this, for him, was
aristocracy.”353 Adams pointed to the “modern aristocracies” of Holland, Venice, Berne, “&c.” Like
European monarchies, modern aristocracies had “tempered themselves with innumerable multitudes of
checks, by which they have given a great degree of stability to that form of government.” Balance moderated aristocracies, too. A free republic enjoyed greater liberty; life was enjoyed more. Indeed, modern
aristocracies were “perhaps more capable of profound sagacity.” In short, they had their admirable attributes. Adams cautioned against expecting perfection, or demanding too much at once. “We shall learn to
prize the checks and balances of a free government, and even those of the modern aristocracies, if we
recollect the miseries of Greece which arose from their ignorance of them. The only balance attempted
against the ancient kings was a body of nobles; and the consequences were perpetual alterations of
rebellion and tyranny, and butcheries of thousands upon every revolution from one to the other.”354
Finally, on the subject of aristocracies, Adams saved some of his most choice rhetoric for John
Locke and the founding documents prepared for the colony of South Carolina: “Chimerical systems of
legislation are neither new nor uncommon, even among men of the most resplendent genius and
extensive learning. It would not be too bold to say, that some parts of Plato and Sir Thomas Moore, are
as wild as the ravings of Bedlam.” Note that in the case of Plato and Moore, like Harrington, we are
talking about utopian republics. But turning his attention to Locke, Adams continued, “A philosopher may
be perfect master of Descartes and Leibnitz, may pursue his own inquiries into metaphysics to any length
you please, may enter into the inmost recesses of the human mind, and make the noblest discoveries for
the benefit of his species; nay, he may defend the principles of liberty and the rights of mankind, with
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great abilities and success; and after all, when called upon to produce a plan of legislation, he may
astonish the world with a signal absurdity.” What merited this mocking? “Mr. Locke, in 1663, was
employed to trace out a plan of legislation for Carolina; and he gave the whole authority, executive and
legislative, to the eight proprietors… and their heirs.” Not only did this constitute pure oligarchy, failing
the mixed monarchy standard, but Locke endeavored to institute a class of nobility in America! “This new
oligarchical sovereignty created at once three orders of nobility; barons, with twelve thousand acres of
land; caciques, with twenty-four thousand, &c.; and landgraves, with eighty thousand.” Nothing could
have been more at odds with the forms of government that were gradually being introduced in the British
American colonies. “Who did this legislator think would live under his government?” asked Adams. “He
should have first created a new species of beings to govern, before he instituted such a government.”355
Given the timing of A Defense and Discourse on Davila, it is not surprising that Adams’ most lurid
remarks concerned the demise of the French monarchy and its replacement with the French Revolution
and its outcome. Again, Adams characterized these events in terms of the absence of balance that
accompanied the changes in the form of government: “When the kings were abolished, the aristocracies
tyrannized; and then no balance was attempted but between aristocracy and democracy. This, in the
nature of things, could be no balance at all, and therefore the pendulum was forever on the swing.” The
consequence was disaster. Once again Adams pointed to ancient Greece and the lesson Thucydides
taught: “It is impossible to read in Thucidydes, … in his account of the factions and confusions throughout
all Greece, which were introduced by this want of an equilibrium, without horror… Every kind of death,
every dreadful act, was perpetuated. Fathers slew their children; some were dragged from altars, some

355

Adams, “Letter LIV, Locke, Milton, and Hume,” Defence, Vol. I, p. 365. Locke’s proposed
extraordinarily broad set of rules tend to place him proximate to the idiosyncratic Harrington tightlycontrolled and utopian society, and therefore far removed from the much more laissez-fare perspective of
Sidney and Adams. Locke suggested that there be a “wise, godlike original founder,” seemingly a man
like Locke. “But Locke’s ambitions as founder extend far beyond the framing of governmental
constitutions. Alongside or anterior to the constituting of governments, Locke proposes a comprehensive
redesign of the opinion-forming and character-forming institutions of civil society – the families, schools,
and churches – and thereby seeks to effect a comprehensive moral reformation to prepare human
societies for the rights and responsibilities of self-government.” Political scientist Peter Myers pointed to
Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, Letter Concerning Toleration, and On the Reasonableness of Christianity as evidence of
Locke’s comprehensive reformation. Peter C. Myers, “Locke on the Social Compact: An Overview,” Ch.1,
The American Founding and the Social Compact, Ronald J. Pestritto & Thomas G. West (Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books, 2003), pp. 1-35, 13.
995

were butchered at them; numbers, immersed in temples, were starved. The contagion spread… Such
things ever will be, says Thucidydes, so long as human nature continues the same.”356 Surely this was
how Adams saw modern France, with the priests dragged through the streets, jailed and executed, along
with unacceptable “citizens.” Discourses on Davila is testament to this perspective. Had Thucydides
known “a balance of three powers” – legislative, executive, and judiciary – he would not have pronounced
the distemper so incurable, but would have added – so long as parties in cities remained unbalanced.”357
Turning to America, Adams warned, “Without three orders, and an effectual balance between them, in
every American constitution, it must be destined to frequent unavoidable revolutions: if they are delayed a
few years, they must come, in time.”358
That takes us to democracy. Like simple or unchecked monarchy and aristocracy, simple or
unchecked democracy was also a mistake to Adams: The unfettered ability in a democracy for individuals
to be narcissistic, egocentric, inward not outward looking, and self-indulgent would cause democracy to
“degenerate into an Anarchy.” Thus, Adams maintained, “Freedom produces magnanimity and courage;
but there is no freedom nor justice in a simple democracy for any but the majority.”359 Indeed, “a simple
democracy is as dangerous as a simple aristocracy.”360 Adams also said that “simple democracy, never
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had a patron among men of letters.” The reason for this last remark was practical and funny: “Monarchies
and aristocracies pay well and applaud liberally,” that is, pay their men of letters well. In contrast, “The
people have almost always expected to be served gratis… and their applauses and adorations are bestowed too often on artifices and tricks, on hypocrisy and superstition, on flattery, bribes, and largesses.”361
In short, the factual problem in a democracy was that the people were uneducated and gullible:
“the multitude has always been credulous.”362 This didn’t mean that if the people wanted democracy they
couldn’t have it. For as we know, the liberty that republicans sought demanded real choice. “[O]ur
ancestors, when they emigrated, having obtained permission of the king to come here, and being never
commanded to return into the realm, had a clear right to have erected in this wilderness a British
constitution, or a perfect democracy, or any other form of government they saw fit.”363 But the dangers
inherent in simple democracy clearly and consistently worried, even terrified Adams. Recall that the
moderate seventeenth-century English republican Halifax had the same fear, reflected in his statement in
Political Thoughts and Reflections that, “The angry Buzz of a Multitude is one of the bloodiest Noises in
the World.”364 As Halifax elaborated in The Character of a Trimmer: “Our Trimmer therefore dreads a
general discontent, because he thinketh it differeth from a rebellion only as a spotted fever doth from the
plague, the same species under a lower degree of malignity.”365 The rest of the paragraph in the essay
that Adams wrote as a young man and to which he referred in 1807 was all about the ugly things that
happened when Democracy turned into Anarchy: “such an Anarchy that every Man will do what is right in
his own Eyes, and no Mans life or Property or Reputation or Liberty will be secure and every one of these
will soon mould itself into a system of subordination of all the moral Virtues, and Intellectual Abilities, all
the Powers of Wealth, Beauty, Wit, and Science, to the wanton Pleasures, the capricious Will, and the

monarchy.” If this is not a proclamation of bicameralism and, importantly, a rejection of absolute
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execrable Cruelty of one or a very few.”366 Adams’ Anarchy, which evolved from Democracy, sounded
very much like Hobbes’ state of nature; neither were palatable.
We can therefore understand why Adams’ answer was tripartite, mixed government with a bicameral legislature and a strong executive. As scholars have emphasized, the idea of a strong executive was
scary for the British Americans who had recently escaped from the clutches of the “strong executive” one
who ruled Britain. Adams was not trying to reinstate monarchism. But he had good reasons for insisting
on a strong executive. ”[T]hree branches of power have an unalterable foundation in nature; that they
exist in every society natural and artificial; and that if all of them are not acknowledged in any constitution
of government, it will be found to be imperfect, unstable, and soon enslaved.”. Accordingly, he said, “the
legislative and executive authorities are naturally distinct; and that liberty and the laws depend entirely on
a separation of them in the frame of government: that the legislative power is naturally and necessarily
sovereign and supreme over the executive; and therefore that the latter must be made an essential
branch of the former, even with a negative, or it will not be able to defend itself, but will be soon invaded,
undermined, attacked, or in some way or other totally ruined and annihilated by the former.”367
A tripartite government structure that was not entirely dominated by one of its branches
established the requisite balance of power. To manage the aristocratic elements in society, the legislature
should be bicameral. The lower assembly represented and was accessible to the people. At the same
time, “the people’s rights and liberties, and the democratical mixture in a constitution, can never be
preserved without a strong executive, or, in other words, without separating the executive power from the
legislative.”368 The need for an independent judiciary was unquestionable; indeed, this had been the
issue that Adams had argued repeatedly in Massachusetts Bay when the salaries of the judges and other
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matters came to a head. But the third leg of tripartitism, a strong executive, was also essential. “Among
every people, and in every species of republicans, we have constantly found a first magistrate, a head, a
chief, under various denominations indeed, and with different degrees of authority.” There are no
examples to the contrary; this was the natural order of things. Thus, said Adams, “we may fairly
conclude, that the body politic cannot subsist without one, any more than the animal body without a
head.”369
Going full circle, and quoting at length from Cicero, Adams emphasized tripartite governance and
its relationship to the law, “As all the ages of the world have not produced a greater statesman and
philosopher united in the same character, his authority should have great weight. His decided opinion in
favour of three branches is founded on a reason that is unchangeable; the laws, which are the only
possible rule, measure and security of justice, can be sure of protection, for any course of time, in no
other form of government: and the very name of a republic implies, that the property of the people should
be represented in the legislature, and decide the rule of justice.”370 Again, “where all these circumstances
take place, it is unnecessary to add, that the laws alone can govern.”371
Adams often turned to metaphor, and he did this in connection with his emphasis on balance. For
example, the statement in his twenties about confiding enormous power in neither the bramble nor the
cedar is all about balance: the need to check power, which implied that moderation, temperate, balanced
power was much safer, and therefore more successful than unbridled power.372 As Clarendon, in 1766,
Adams wrote about the role of the doctor, whose remedies would be faulty if they created a “want of a
balance, between the acid and alkaline ingredients” in a patient. “Similar observations may be made with
equal propriety concerning every kind of machinery.” As we previously considered in conjunction with
Adams’ definition of a constitution, he used the metaphor of a clock and its constitution, and the need for
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various parts of the clock to work, not just the domination of one part, to understand the vital importance
of balance.373 “Clarendon” also wrote about voting, trials by jury, the need for not just a legislature but an
executive, all of which are “essential and fundamental” components of “the constitution” designed to
protect the English “subject’s liberty”; and, after all, the British Americans were subjects. These measures
were designed “to preserve the balance and mixture of the government,” which, in turn, would prevent
government from “running into an oligarchy or aristocracy; as the lords and commons are to prevent its
becoming an absolute monarchy.”374
In The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, Bailyn said that if the theory of balance, “a
stable equilibrium of poised forces,” was “evident and unanimously agreed on” among those who had
studied and endorsed the British constitutional system – although interestingly Bailyn did not flag
“balance” as an element of governance that was a constituent part of republican theory – “the mechanics
of its operation were not.” The historic understanding of society was that there were three social orders
or estates: royalty, nobility and commons. There was an appreciation for the balance of power within governments in such societies; but this was done in England in a different way than contemplated in America.
As we know from our review of Sidney’s world, England was a class society. In contrast, America had no
royalty or nobility, “no hereditary titles, honours, offices, or distinctions,” although Adams expounded at
length about the natural aristocracy that existed everywhere; but there were no legal orders of society in
America.375 Also, in England the legislative branch of government referred to “the whole of government
as well as the lawmaking branch.” There was no division in the British constitution into legislative,
executive and judicial authority – what came to be known in America as separation of powers.376 Without
yet labeling it as such, as early as 1766, in a reply to Philanthrop, Misanthrop a/k/a Adams stated, “I knew
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and concieved [in] my soul, that the Legislative and Executive Powers ought to be kept asunder – that all
Law, and all History, and common sense are in favour of this.”377 This is why, in his view, Britain needed
to modify its Commons so that representation was valid, authentic, proportional and frequently chosen,
this would enable “the people [to] take care of the balance, and especially their part of it.”378
Perhaps most importantly, the insight that Adams had was that balance was always necessary to
safeguard republican government. Some republicans assumed that power would be weakened and
therefore held in check by situating it in a large body of people – a legislature, such as the French national assembly, or a simple democracy; but Adams was always convinced that this assumption was patently
wrong. “It is error to think it is an uncontroulable maxim, that power is always safer lodged in many hands
than in one…. [T]hey are as capable of enslaving the nation, and of acting all manner of tyranny and
oppression, as it is possible for a single person to be.”379 Again, Adams consistently cautioned about the
danger of the masses: “An usurping populace is its own dupe, a mere under-worker, and a purchaser in
trust for some single tyrant, whose state and power they advance to their own ruin, with as blind an
instinct, as those worms that die with weaving magnificient habits for beings of a superior order.”380
Establishing an equilibrium, a proper balance, was indeed delicate. “In order to preserve a
balance in a mixed state, the limits of power deposited with each party, ought to be ascertained and
generally known.” When this didn’t happen, a destabilized regime could result: “the defect of this is the
cause of those struggles in a state, about prerogative and liberty; about encroachments of the few upon
the rights of the many, and of the many upon the privileges of the few,” etc. etc.381 This is what held
Adams to the task, through all of the onslaughts and personal slights that his sensitive character endured.
“I think a free Government is necessarily a complicated Piece of Machinery, the nice and exact
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Adjustment of whose Springs Wheels and Weights are not yet well comprehended by the Artists of the
Age and still less by the People.”382 The establishment of successful republican governance was the
challenge of a lifetime for a man, and quite self-consciously, for Adams.
Finally, it is important to recognize that for his time, and consistent with his general views about
balance and moderation, Adams was a very tolerant man. While not a feminist, we have already noted
Adams’ appreciation of Abigail’s intellectual and other capabilities, and his remarkable, frequent and lifelong reliance on her judgment and common sense. While in Adams’ view women did not yet belong in
the political arena, he treated the women around him with respect and, certainly, toleration. Adams
always disapproved of slavery, never owned a slave, lauded Otis for his very early stand against slavery,
was uncomfortable with Jefferson’s slave-owning lifestyle, and railed against fellow republican thinkers,
and specifically Locke, for his endorsement of slavery.
On the religious front Adams was one century further removed from the religious wars that had so
terrorized Europeans, and that drove Sidney to advocate toleration of religious differences.383 Adams also
was on a continent and in a colony-cum-state in which his ancestors and other Englishmen had
immigrated to escape the intolerance of Europe and freely practice their religion. As we have discussed,
Adams was not interested in staking out a religious position in his works on government. On the other
hand, like Sidney, Adams certainly was not opposed to religion. To the contrary, like Sidney he repeatedly
sang its praise. He also considered religion essential to the community. The Bay constitution, which
today is the “oldest functioning written constitution in the English-speaking world,” was largely the product
of John Adams’ drafting.384 The Preamble “acknowledge[d], with grateful hearts, the goodness of the
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Great Legislator of the Universe.”385 The “Declaration of Rights,” Chapter 1, began with a statement about
freedom and then, in Article II, stated, “It is the duty of all men in society, publicly, and at states seasons,
to worship the SUPREME BEING, the great creator and preserver of the universe.” A commitment to
religious toleration followed: “And no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty,
or estate, for worshiping GOD in the manner most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for
his religious profession or sentiments, provided he doth not disturb public peace, or obstruct others in
their religious worship.” Like Sidney and Halifax, Adams considered religion to be personal. At the same
time, like Sidney and Halifax, he exulted in the existence of a God who made man subject to his passions
but, also naturally gregarious, rational, able to assess the legitimacy of his government, capable of considering and even prioritizing the rights and interests of others over his own, and able to tolerate religious
differences.386 Sidney had said that, God gave “to all” the “same law of truth and justice.”387 Indeed, it is in
reliance on God that Sidney concluded, “a civil society is composed of equals.”388 Recounting in his
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beautiful biography about Adams, Passionate Sage, an anecdote told by the young Josiah Quincy IV,
grandson of Adams’ friend, Josiah Quincy, Jr., who was Adams’ co-counsel in the Boston Massacre trials,
Joseph Ellis wrote, “Then there was the time a group of young men gathered at the Adams homestead to
debate the strengths and weaknesses of the several Christian sects; they were shocked to hear the old
sage complain about the intolerance of all Christians, then advocate ‘the old Roman system of permitting
every man to worship how and what he pleased.’ When one of the young men observed that this was
paganism, Adams agreed that it was, and laughed heartily.”389
Beyond positing the existence of a provident God, religious matters were, for Adams, private.
Recall that when he was twenty, Adams wrote in his diary, ““Where do we find a precept in the Gospel
requiring Ecclesiastical Synods? Convocations? Council? Decrees? Creeds? Confessions? Oaths?
Subscriptions? And whole cart-loads of other trumpery that we find religion encumbered with in these
days?”390 A few years later he stated, “Every Man has in Politicks as well as in Religion, a Right to think
and speak and Act for himself.”391 In this regard, he was also like Sidney, although Sidney was the more
remarkable for having this view. While Sidney noted that Filmer was preoccupied with disproving two wellknown Catholic thinkers, Bellarmine and Suarez, “I shall leave their followers to defend their quarrel: My
work is to seek after truth.”392 As noted in Part One, in contrast to most seventeenth-century political texts,
Discourses neither pursued nor staked out a position on religious issues.393 Religious doctrines, practices,
disputes, and related matters of faith simply were not discussed. While there was notable religious
intolerance within many of the colonies, including the Massachusetts Bay, when it came time for the
colonies to confederate, tolerating each other’s religious differences was essential to create and then
safeguard the union. Adams recognized this and, accordingly, he advocated religious toleration. “Ask me
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not, then, whether I am a Catholic or Protestant, Calvinist or Arminian. As far as they are Christians, I
wish to be a fellow-disciple with them all.”394 Indeed, in one of innumerable criticisms of the Marquis de
Condorset, “the youngest and the last of the philosophes.”395 Adams remarked, “But there was no genius
among the Hebrews? None among the Christians, nor Mahometans? I understand you, Condorcet. It is
atheistical genius alone that you would honor or tolerate.”396
Well into their senescence Adams and Jefferson wrote to each other about the importance of
religious toleration. Indeed, in one of his last letters to Jefferson, Adams addressed the subject. “A law
was made in the latter end of the last century … substituting fine and imprisonment upon all those
blasphemers upon any book of the old Testament or new. Now what free inquiry when a writer must
surely encounter the risk of fine or imprisonment for adducing any argument for investigation into the
divine authority of these books? Who would run the risk…?” Adams had gone full circle, returning to his
youthful disdain for any thought-control mentality by organized religion. At eighty-nine, Adams was quite
adamant about the rights of free expression. Moreover, he said, treatises should rise or fall on their own
merits. “Books that cannot bear examination certainly ought not to be established as divine inspiration by
penal laws.” Furthermore, he viewed this punitive approach as foolhardy from a religious perspective.
“The substance and essence of Christianity as I understand it is eternal and unchangeable and will bear
examination forever but it has been mixed with extraneous ingredients, which I think will not bear
examination and they ought to be separated.”397 Like Sidney, this was an aspect of Adams’ ideas that
was a logical outgrowth of his republican belief in the necessity of balance in the individual and in society.
It was necessary for the design of government to encourage toleration, and both reflect and legally
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protect free expression, among other individual freedoms.
Finally, religious toleration is one of two subjects on which liberals necessarily stumble in
discussing Locke. For Locke’s avowed belief in equality simply cannot be reconciled with his participation
in the drafting of a Constitution for South Carolina that recognized and promoted slavery. Indeed, such a
view on slavery was inconsistent with virtually all of the early modern republicans. Yet Locke had taken
this position, working with his employer and intellectual colleague Shaftesbury while also writing several
important tracts that advocated toleration, including A Letter Concerning Toleration, The Reasonableness
of Christianity, as Delivered in the Scriptures and Two Treatises of Government. There is also the matter
of toleration of Catholicism, about which, as mentioned in Part One, scholars disagree. Nevertheless, we
can affirm that Locke did not believe that Catholics could be in entrusted with political authority.398 This
would also seem to fly in the face of republicanism and the endorsement of political equality. While Locke
was not the only republican with this latter view, and while intolerance of Catholics was probably well
understood in post-Bloody Mary England, the conspicuous deviations from toleration in the case of both
Catholics and African Americans distinguishes Locke’s republicanism from the ideas of Sidney and
Adams.399
We can conclude our discussion of Adams’ endorsement of balance, moderation and toleration
with the same thought that rang true in our consideration of Sidney’s ideas on this subject. The real
question is not whether Adams’ ideas were informed by concepts of balance, moderation and toleration,
but how could his political ideas possibly have excluded the lessons learned from past and contemporary
events, generations of family experiences, and the commitment to principles of balance, moderation and
toleration that flowed from this history? Imposing religious beliefs on people with which they disagree,
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and therefore to which they would not consent, was flatly inconsistent with the principles of freedom that
Adams’ republicanism required and on which his political ideas were based. Toleration was therefore
essential. So too was moderation and, particularly, balance. For without balance, a republic could not
stand. “If John Adams could be said to have had one political aspiration above all others, it was to teach
his fellow countrymen the truth about balanced government and its fruits for the just life of a free human
being.” 400 Sidney believed the same thing.401 One must add that Adams also strove to ensure that his
countrymen understood the importance of the Law as guarantor of the American republican way of life.
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FINAL REFLECTIONS
Remodeling Anglo-American Republicanism

Edmund Burke was not one to bandy compliments lightly. Nonetheless,
when told that George Washington was the greatest living man,
his answer was remarkably direct. “I thought so too,” replied the
famed philosopher-statesman, “till I knew John Adams.”
Darren Staloff, Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson: The Politics of the Enlightenment 1

Volatile, complex, national, international and, in the case of Sidney, family history were deeply
entangled in the identifies of Algernon Sidney and John Adams, and the ways in which their political ideas
were the product of this history. No wonder it is difficult to do justice to Sidney, Adams and their ideas –
from Hotspur to John Alden, from Marston Moor to Lexington and Concord, from the failed English
Commonwealth to the successful creation of the United States of America, from Cromwell, Charles II, and
the papal cardinalate to George III, Jefferson, and Louis XVI. It is an intimidating array. But it is
important to at least impressionistically understand that these were the worlds into which Sidney and
Adams were born, and in which they developed into the determined republican advocates that they were.
Combined with their extraordinary learning, it certainly is evident why their writing was so historicallyminded. We have here neither armchair philosophers nor typical politicians. Sidney and Adams were that
rare bird that was both. They were well aware that they were living in momentous times; they sought to
make their country free. Both wondered if they would be remembered by posterity and if so, how; both
tended to be skeptical about their own legacy. They were very honorable men, driven by their sense of
political purpose. How similar they were! And yet how different their personal outcomes notwithstanding
kindred republican ideas that they cherished and passed on, including from one man to the other.
John Adams lived a very long life. While Algernon Sidney did not live until dotage, he survived
into his sixties – somewhat remarkable when you consider the world into which he was born and the
perilous life that he led. Sidney was a young English officer engaged in bloody uprisings in Ireland,
coming of age at the beginning of the English Civil War with its horribly steep fatality rate, serving as a
parliamentary soldier and seriously injured in battle; an aristocrat albeit a second son, born into a world of
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wealth and power but without wealth or position of his own, a world of shifting political alliances and
political quick sand in which many a politician did not survive; a life-long bachelor, without the support of a
spouse or the sedentary calm of family life that Adams enjoyed, other than brief respites when he was
able to be at Penshurst, his ancestral home; a fleeting and very successful opportunity at political
leadership and diplomacy, quickly followed by isolation and an eighteen-year exile, cast away from family
love and duty, forbidden to return to the country he was born and bred to publicly serve and perhaps lead;
and finally, upon his return to England when his father lay dying, still a patriot, political activist, and
possibly a revolutionary in an exceedingly dangerous political world. Sidney was the recipient of a deep,
broad humanist education gained through his father’s teaching, the circles in which he travelled, and his
autodidactic nature, and facilitated by access as a young man to the vast Sidney Library. The family had
very high expectations of Algernon driven by his capabilities and the family legacy of intellectualism and
leadership. Sidney’s upbringing and heritage was also cosmopolitan, one that emphasized travel,
languages, learning other European cultures, and that in his family had focused particularly on
international Protestantism, the Huguenot movement, and religious oppression on the Continent. There
also existed a multi-generational family commitment to republican values – self-determination! notwithstanding the Sidney/Percy very noble blood, and the danger often inherent in advocating such
views, including during the Restoration.
Part of the influence and legacy of humanism and the family tradition of writing, reflected in but
not limited to the work of the famous Essex Circle that had been significantly made up of Sidney/Percy
family members several generations before Sidney was born, was the emphasis on both toleration and
moderation, combined with a Tacitean sense of limitation and political realism. Literary flair was another
Essex Circle legacy. The family history of resistance to absolute monarchs – “an order of men … to
restrain exhorbitances” – as well as a commitment to international Protestantism, were subjects of pride
that also could be millstones: an unusual number of family members were executed or died in war
clinging to such ideas, fighting for their political and religious rights or often those of others, serving as
protectors of the English and other European peoples in the face of potentially overreaching monarchs.
Members of the Sidney/Percy family had strategically positioned themselves so that invariably, someone
in the family was allied with the monarch, whoever that might be. Whether this came from a recognizable
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diversity of political views within the family – consider Sidney and his brothers – or was purely sensible
family politics we do not know. It was probably both. The opportunity and duty to lead, a many-centuries
long family tradition, and to behave as a Ciceronian leader – virtuous and wise – was a responsibility
taken seriously. This identity was emblazoned on Sidney’s consciousness through the legacy of his
successful family members, particularly Sir Philip but also Philip’s brother Robert, Algernon’s grandfather,
as well as from his Northumberland family heroes and martyrs. Add to this the monarchomach influence,
strongly advocating the right to rebel against tyrannical rule, which the family’s interest in Tacitean
scholarship further emphasized, and the role members of Sidney’s family, including his father, played
fighting the oppressive, persecuting Catholic Spaniards in the increasingly Protestant Low Countries, and
we can recognize important roots and strands of republicanism that would have come automatically to
Sidney; they were part of who he was.
How did the noble Englishman and the middle class provincial end up politically at the same
place? As different in certain ways as their backgrounds were, and recognizing the world had changed in
the century and as a result of the large pond between them, there are unexpected factual parallels. Both
men were temperamental. Both were also thinking men, and committed writers. It is silly and inconsistent
with both men’s intellectual integrity to conclude, as occasional critics do, that any behavior of theirs of
any significance was motivated by anything other than careful reflection. Adams was a bibliophile. Sidney
lacked funds and was removed from his homeland; he had no opportunity to seriously collect books. But
he certainly loved them, and he was gifted with the use of an extraordinary family library, at least in the
years he was in England. We also know Sidney studied seriously and probably wrote, too, while stranded
on the Continent, e.g., during his years in Italy among the Papal elite.
Like Sidney, Adams came of age at the very beginning of a civil war. As young adults both men
faced a political fork in the road – as it turns out, the most profound fork that they would confront in their
lifetime. They had little life experience. What they had were the values they had been taught, the
education they had received, and the influence of those around them. Fellow patriots, both Sidney and
Adams served their country for all the years that they were permitted to do so, with Adams obviously
having much greater opportunity than did Sidney. We cannot pinpoint what would have made a man a
royalist rather than a parliamentarian in seventeenth-century England, or a loyalist rather than a patriot in
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eighteenth-century Anglo-America. But we can see that Sidney and Adams came out of their unique
tumble of influences very closely aligned in their thinking, their behavior, and their commitment to
advocate political self-determination and republican governance. In Sidney’s case this meant opposition
to the tyrannical monarchy of the Stuarts. In Adams’ case, after unsuccessful efforts to protect their Godgiven rights and English-given constitutional rights, it meant going to war against the tyranny of the British
Parliament, to which the Hanoverian king had deferred.
Like Sidney, Adams was highly educated – much more so than we are today; indeed, more than
most of us can comprehend. The importance of this cannot be gainsaid, which explains the emphatic
statements on the subject by Sidney, Adams, and other republicans. Ironically, it could go the other way,
too. Tyrrell explained that he felt compelled to write and publish Patriarcha non Monarcha in opposition to
Filmer’s Patriarcha because he was worried that the minds of university students would be polluted and
easily swayed by reading Filmer. Adams was the first in his family to attend Harvard. His legal education
far surpassed not only his fellow colonial attorneys, but certainly Algernon’s legal knowledge and
experience, although Sidney did pick up a surprising amount of law from the family library and his
reading, wherever he might have been. A serious read of Cicero’s works alone would have given Sidney
that, and we know from the impressive legal library within the family library, and especially the profuse
legal references in Discourses, that Sidney read much, much more law than that. He also learned the
Law first hand in his role as designated representative of the family in complicated (and tiresome) legal
matters. While nowhere near as well read as Sidney at an early age, Adams made up for it over time,
pursuing an intense self-education. Adams had no live role model, as far as intellectual pursuits were
concerned, which Sidney had, although Adams enormously admired Otis’ legal advocacy and flair. Like
Machiavelli, Adams seemed to talk to, or at least engage with the ancients.2 He also had an extraordinary commitment to scholarship throughout his lifetime, soaking himself in a vast array of information and
ideas from the large library that he built, particularly in matters related to the Law, and interacting with the
authors he read, as Harszti brilliantly showed us. Adams gained valuable street-smart wisdom, too, which

2
Abigail apologized to her friend Mercy Otis Warren for her husband’s failure to correspond, attributing it
to John’s involvement with his texts, being “so much engaged in travelling through the Itallian Republicks.” Abigail to Mercy Warren, London, May 14, 1787, Warren-Adams Letters, Vol. 2 (London: Forgotten
Books, 2015), pp. 287-91, 290-91. No doubt Adams was working intensely on his three-volume Defence.
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Jefferson, for example, seems to have lacked, which contributed to Adams’ pragmatism and ability to
interact with most everyone, a skill that tends to be overlooked that was largely a product of Adams’
lengthy legal career in which he represented people in all walks of life. Both Sidney and Adams were
steeped in history and political thought. Both men studied the nature of government intensively, beyond
their peers, and reflected on the consequences of flawed, corrupt and, particularly, arbitrary government.
Unlike Sidney, Adams’s family was middle-class. As had Sidney, from his family Adams had very
strong convictions about how a man should lead his life. Their respective sense of public service was
different because their historical contexts were different: the provincial environment of the Adams family
versus the lofty social, political, and economic heights in which the Sidney/Percys lived, viz., the relatively
simple world of colonial Anglo-America in comparison to the sophisticated, complex, power-related milieu
of the early modern English high nobility that routinely rubbed shoulders with (and in the case of the
Sidneys, sometimes educated) kings and queens and princes. But both men were all about Ciceronian
public service. Adams grew up watching his father fill all sorts of thankless civic roles in their small town
of Braintree, in Massachusetts Bay. In that eighteenth-century colony, political involvement through the
ubiquitous town meeting was the responsibility and right of most adult men, just as public service was a
mantle of obligation automatically assumed by Sidney/Percy family members, with Sir Philip the family,
indeed England’s icon. Add to these two pictures the fact that Sidney fell from grace, although he seems
to have lived, at least sometimes, among the Continental elite, albeit with little funds of his own; meanwhile, Adams shed his provincialism as a result of his nine-year sojourn in Europe, hobnobbing with
noblemen and kings while pursuing diplomatic goals on behalf of his fledgling country. In short, a century
apart, and beginning from very different places, their experiences coalesced over their lifetimes.
For Sidney, religion was personal. Indeed, Discourses’ silence on the subject is deafening. While
references to God abound, discussion of religious views is absent. Sidney did not believe that the state
should meddle in people’s private thoughts, particularly religious ones. He was, after all, the descendent
of the man, Sir Phillip, who hid in the English embassy in Paris during the persecution of the Huguenots in
what became known as the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. Perhaps as a result of the intolerance
Adams witnessed among the clergy in his home town when he was an impressionable youth, and adding
to that the humanist thought that he imbibed, Adams too was a tolerant man. As he told a friend,
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“Episcopal bigotry, intrigue, intolerance, and persecution” would make for “ a comedy equal to any of
Molière or Shakespeare, if corruption, prostitution, and dupery can compose a comedy”!3 Like Sidney,
Adams was convinced that matters of conscience were private, and certainly not political fodder. “Every
Man has in Politicks as well as in Religion, a Right to think and speak and Act for himself.”4
Sidney was illegally executed for ideas pulled from an unpublished, and likely never to be
published manuscript, his Discourses, a republican manifesto. Adams became President of the United
States. We certainly cannot distinguish these outcomes on the basis of the political ideas of these men;
for they had the same ideas. Yet their trajectories could not have been more obverse – ultimate tragedy
and ultimate success. Indeed, it would seem much more likely that Sidney would have become a
parliamentary leader and a minister than that John Adams from Braintree, Mass. would become
America’s chief magistrate. Whenever one places the years in which Discourses was written, and it
seems likely that it was over many years, and while Discourses unequivocally proclaimed the right of a
people to rebel against a tyrant, this is bread-and-butter republicanism – note the Declaration of
Independence language, “That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it
is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on
such principles and organizing its power in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
Safety and Happiness.” This was one of Sidney and Adams’ shared mantras. But there is no evidence to
suggest that Discourses was written to topple Charles II, which was the high crime for which Sidney paid
the ultimate price; in contrast, Adams was a declared revolutionary. Self-evidently, Sidney was a
threatening figure; indeed, Charles II conveyed this message to the French ambassador when Sidney
was living in France. Perhaps he was viewed as dangerous for the same reasons for which he might
have been a treasure for his country –leadership abilities, commitment to a core set of political
convictions that he could articulately voice, pedigree, strength of character, intellect, patriotism, work
ethic. Threatened with cabals, the king was determined to kill him. All of these qualities, along with

3
Adams to Jedidiah Morse, Dec. 2, 1815, The Works of John Adams, Vol. 10 (Letters 1811-1825,
Indexes) [1854], p. 187, http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/adams-the-works-of-john-adams-vol-10-letters1811-1825-indexes (10-3-16).
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Sidney’s proven heroism in war and diplomatic achievements on behalf of Britain, made no difference.5
Unlike Adams’ situation, there is no correspondence between Sidney’s advocacy of republican
ideas generally (not only on the matter of rebellion), on the one hand, and his opportunity to implement
those ideas on the other. In this regard, to answer a question raised at the beginning of this study, there
was not something about Sidney’s ideas that meaningfully contributed to the divergent outcomes of
Sidney and Adams’ lives. Context was everything. Setting aside Sidney’s activities on the Continent and
after he finally returned to England, given that we really do not know the extent of his involvement in
political resistance and, in any event, whatever it was, it was unsuccessful, during the Interregnum Sidney
was one of a group of English leaders who hoped, tried, and failed to put in place a strong republic. In
truth, the military got in the way. Adams was part of a similar group, but it experienced quite the opposite
outcome. Sidney opposed the grasping for absolute power in which the Stuarts engaged, just as he
opposed Cromwell’s usurpation of power. Adams shared this intense hostility to absolutism. Sidney did
not oppose constitutional monarchy, likely because of his unequivocal view that a people should choose
the form of government best suited to them.6 Adams agreed, although he was unjustly pilloried,
particularly by Jefferson, for supposedly being a monarchist.
Notwithstanding their similitude of ideas, Adams story could not have evolved more differently
than did Sidney’s. Adams’ republican thought, along with his eloquence, hard work, knowledge of the
Law, and leadership within the colloquy of colonial and then state leaders who were often lawyers,
propelled him to the top of Bay political activity, at least of the legal sort (noting that he avoided such
dubiously legal activities as the Boston Tea Party), when Massachusetts was at the forefront of America’s
opposition to the policies of the metropole, beginning with Otis and the Writs of Assistance case. From
there, in addition to defending Hancock in a case brought by the Crown because of alleged (and very
likely) rum smuggling to avoid taxes, Adams became a force in the evolution of the American revolution.

5
It is tempting to conclude that Sidney was writing autobiographically when he stated, ”The Athenians did
banish some worthy men, and put others to death. …The temporary banishment which they call ostracism,
was without hurt or dishonour, never accounted as a punishment, nor intended for any other end, than to
put a stop to the too eminent greatness of a man, that might prove dangerous to the city; and some excellent persons who fell under it, were soon recalled and brought home with glory.” DCG, II.18.177.
6
To take one statement of innumerable, Sidney said, “a few or many may join together, and frame
smaller or greater societies, so those societies may institute such an order or form of government as best
pleases themselves.” DCG, II.20.192.
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Showing his confidence in the Anglo-American adversarial system, and notwithstanding the personal cost
of doing so, Adams represented the accused killers in the Boston Massacre trial and obtained either an
acquittal or light punishment for all the British soldiers, including the officer in charge. Adams served as a
delegate to the Continental Congress, continuing his own legal work when he could. Ultimately he had to
give up private practice; but he never gave up the Law, nor did the Law inform his character, capabilities,
and ideas any less. Adams’ work changed, and yet it remained quintessentially legal; it’s just that his
client became America, not particular Americans. Whether he was advocating for independence, drafting
the Bay constitution, recommending to colonial leadership how their respective state constitutions should
be formulated, or seeking Dutch loans in support of the new united States, Adams utilized his formidable
legal training, skill, and knowledge. He was the armchair implementor bar none of the revolution, a
soldier of the pen and the Law, the man who put into words the ideas that had filled the pages of
pamphlets for many years, including his own, and then created critical documents the new nation
required. Adams was the man who made revolution lawful. To complete the story, we know that after
years as an ambassador, Adams became Washington’s vice president and then assumed the presidency.
With the obvious caveat concerning matters of authenticity and, particularly, John Toland’s role in
editing Discourses and other important early modern English republican works, we can readily identify the
political ideas to which Sidney and Adams clung – the ideas central to early modern Anglo-American
thought. Not all republicans viewed these ideas in exactly the same way. Some emphasized one
component of the theory more than another. Some republican thinkers were fairly out-of-the-box,
particularly Harrington and his utopian, “immortal” commonwealth. Some had ideas that were a bit more
extreme, sometimes termed radical republicanism, including Jefferson, Paine, and perhaps Milton. The
views of some republicans were quite similar to those of our protagonists, such as Halifax, Locke, and
Vane. But in the case of Sidney and Adams there is remarkable congruency.
That congruency was not accidental. In his eighties Adams wrote admiringly of Sidney’s
Discourses. As often as he had read it and fumbled over it in his youth and over the years since then, it
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still “excite[d] fresh admiration.”7 Along with many compatriots, Adams continued the early modern
English republican tradition that had crossed the Atlantic to Anglo-America, linking the political ideas in
the colonies to the many centuries of European republican thought, beginning particularly with Cicero,
reflected in Machiavelli’s republicanism, and advocated by other important thinkers across time and place
– millennia and civilizations. Sidney and Adams’ republicanism was part of a continuum, a set of political
ideas that had motivated men to form, maintain, change, and rebel against governments for centuries. In
addition to well-recognized components of the theory, law and balance were critical elements of Sidney
and Adams’ political thought; yet these ideas have largely escaped the attention of scholars. Sidney and
Adams did not remodel republicanism; we must remodel our understanding of it. Today republicanism is
the elephant in the room, as evidenced by its recent morphing into “democracy” in Kloppenberg’s
magisterial study, Toward Democracy.8 No doubt the impetus for squeezing out the term republicanism
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Kloppenberg introduced his text as intellectual history, a “story of ideas in history,” and a “history of
democracy” focusing on “Those who wrote pivotal texts” in European and American thought from the
sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries. “This book traces the rise of democracy in European and
American thought.” Kloppenberg referenced a host of political thinkers, including Franklin, Jefferson, and
Adams in America, and Milton, Sidney, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Robespierre, and Wollstonecraft in
Europe – a motley crew. One can see Kloppenberg’s eliding of “republicanism” into democracy over and
over again. Just to take one example of many is Kloppenberg’s description of Montesquieu’s chef
d’oeuvre, The Spirit of the Laws, 1748, a 1777 French edition of which is in the Adams Library, a thinker
on whose ideas Adams relied and sometimes distinguished from his own. Kloppenberg stated, “As [the
third earl of] Shaftesbury said of benevolence, civic virtue is, in Montesquieu’s words, ‘a sensation, and
not a consequence of acquired knowledge, a sensation that may be felt by the meanest as well as by the
highest person in the state.’ Without it democracy cannot survive. ‘A love of the republic in a democracy
is a love of democracy,’ which means that everyone must embrace equality.” Kloppenberg, Toward
Democracy, p. 200. The problem is that In the paragraph Kloppenberg is quoting from The Spirit of the
Laws, Montesquieu is talking about virtue “in a republic,” not in a democracy. Charles de Secondat Baron
de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Amazon Digital Services, e-artnow, 2019)[Kindle ed.], at 1786 of
17293. Not that Montesquieu did not also address democracy. Indeed, Kloppenberg summed up
Montesquieu’s political ideas with the following statement: “Montesquieu’s ideal form of republican
government combined aspects of mixed monarchy with representative democracy.” Indeed, representative democracy was one part of mixed monarchy. The concept, by way of Aristotle, Polybius, and Cicero,
recognized the three “good” forms of government – monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy – and advocated their mixture as the best means of establishing a stable government; but what cannot be elided is
that Montesquieu sought a stable mixed monarchy governed by republican principles. On the Adams
Library entry, see Catalogue of the John Adams library in the. Public library of the city of Boston (Boston:
The Trustees, 1917), p. 171, https://archive.org/details/ catalogueofjohna00bost/page170 (3-15-19).
Toward Democracy is a brilliant work, but as is evident here and throughout this study, it seems neither
true to the history, political thought, or law that is at issue in republican political thought, nor analytically
clarifying to elide the concepts of republicanism and democracy. To provide another illustration of many,
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and its history is largely an effort to avoid more divisive scholarship across a number of disciplines that
has gone on for many years. Perhaps it is also an effort to “speak modernity” in today’s crazy political
world. Using the term “republicanism” in public discourse as an approach to good governance adds an
entirely other layer of confusion beyond the profuse academic sort in a world in which divisive party
politics uses this and other monikers, e.g., democracy, very differently than Cicero, Sidney, Adams, and
their peers did. But we need not, nor should we resort to this slight-of-hand, and throw the proverbial
baby out with the bath water.
We can integrate republicanism into current parlance, which is what it was understood to be by its
advocates and opponents over many centuries. After all, the United States Constitution, Article III,
Section 4, guarantees “to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.” What does that
mean? Doesn’t this statement alone make it important, even necessary, to understand republicanism and
not subsume it, somehow, under the concept of democracy? The goal of this study has been to provide
clarity, remove obfuscation, and systematically analyze so as to create a meaningful republican umbrella
under which the array of ideas properly considered republican can coalesce. This includes Lockean
liberalism, and different forms of democratic republicanism, the nature of both of which are only obscured
if we exclude them from the rubric of republicanism. It just creates false dichotomies.

Kloppenberg stated, “Beginning in the spring of 1775 … a growing number of Americans for and against
independence saw clearly that the colonists’ plan for government, like those advanced by both Paine and
Adams, were blueprints for democracy.” Toward Democracy, p. 328. The associated note, p. 766, n. 43,
continued the argument, asserting that “Paine, Adams, and most of their contemporaries agreed that
representative democracy was the only appropriate and workable form of government.” This would have
been a double whammy for Adams, who considered Paine to have been an extraordinarily impassioned
but shallow political thinker, with potentially dangerous views to which he demurred, and therefore the
linkage to Paine would have been rejected by Adams. As John wrote to Abigail in March 1776 in
response to her query as to what John thought of Common Sense, “all agree there is a great deal of good
sense, delivered inn a clear, simple, concise and nervous Style. …But his Notions and Plans of
Continental Government are not much applauded. Indeed this Writer has a better Hand at pulling down
than building.” John continued, “[A]ltho I could not have written any Thing in so many and striking a style,
I flatter myself I should have made a more respectable Figure as an Architect.” Furthermore, the words or
notion of a blueprint for democracy, or that America sought to establish a representative democracy, is
not the language of Adams but of Jefferson. See, e.g., “Thomas Jefferson to Isaac H. Tiffany, 26 August
1816,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Jefferson/03-10-02-0234 . [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Retirement
Series, vol. 10, May 1816 to 18 January 1817, J. Jefferson Looney, ed. (Princeton University Press,
2013), p. 349.] (It is interesting to compare Kloppenberg’s views of the Left and the Right with those
expressed in 2015 by The Washington Post’s Thomas Friedman, quoted in Ch. Six (beginning of discussion of Balance). On John’s letter to Abigail, March 19, 1776, see My Dearest Friend: Letters of Abigail and
John Adams, Margaret A. Hogan and C. James Taylor, eds., Joseph J. Ellis, forewd. (Cambridge, MA &
London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), p. 107.
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Early modern Anglo-American republicanism includes a wide bandwidth of ideas; nevertheless, a
political theory is clearly distinguishable, with certain requisite parameters. The historiography, however,
is muddled, largely because the basket of ideas that have been ascribed to Anglo-American republicanism is materially incomplete. Our understanding of the tradition is therefore incorrect, which has led to
other consequences, including continuing confusion over the relationship between early modern
republicanism and liberalism, and a layering of misconception upon misconception about republicanism
from the unwitting adoption by some scholars of the misapprehensions of others. Reestablishing ideas
that are essential components of mainstream Anglo-American republicanism, and defining a reasonable
midpoint among the range of ideas that fall within the republican bandwidth is an important step in both
achieving intellectual transparency and coherence, and in clearly defining the early modern AngloAmerican republican tradition. The political ideas of Algernon Sidney and John Adams in their respective
factious seventeenth and eighteenth-century worlds, articulated by each man thoroughly and over time,
are ideal theorist-activists through whom we have sought to accomplish this purpose.
In finally considering Sidney and Adams’ republican views, it is sensible to begin where we
ended our detailed analyses, namely with the concepts of law and balance. Early modern AngloAmerican republicanism incorporated not only political components that scholars have frequently
analyzed; it also insisted that law played a multivalent and dominant role in republican government. There
is nothing vague about this complex component of republicanism; it is pervasive in Sidney and Adams’
work. Law is made up of four constituent parts, layers of law, each distinct, that collectively, in multiple
ways, effectuate republican government. In contrast to what Murphy called “a promiscuous heap of
statutes,” the Law encompasses much more than the laws. Cicero recognized, “we have to encompass
the entire issue of universal justice and law” in order to implement republicanism, of which civil law is but
a small part.9 Laws are particular, pragmatic, contingent, normative rules. Far beyond a nation’s laws
there is the Law, singular in its entirety, incorporating the layman’s understanding of law as well as
principles, ideas, and ideals that are essential to a just society. This includes big-picture, conceptual
principles and the application of ethical norms such as fundamental fairness, to specific legal contexts.

9
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The Law also incorporates the practice and system of law, and its myriad details. For Sidney and other
republicans, and going back to Plato and Aristotle, law was mens sine affect, & quasi Deus, "mind without
passion and is, at it were, God,” something far bigger than “a promiscuous heap of statutes.”
The Law, layers of law that constituted the underbelly of the social order, was an integral part of
the republican theory that Sidney, Adams, and their fellow republicans articulated, and to the extent they
were able, implemented. Each element of this multi-tiered aggregation of components of the Law
reinforced the others. The failure to take into account the legal substructure of republican theory and its
many manifestations is a failure to understand republicanism. “Good government is an empire of laws,”
said Adams. Indeed, said Sidney, governments not ruled by law “have ever gone under the odious title of
tyrannies.”10 As Sidney poignantly said in Discourses, while we learn from our study of the past, “The
sanction therefore that deserves the name of a law, … derives not of its excellency from antiquity, or from
the dignity of the legislators, but from an intrinsick equity and justice.” What is considered “just” is not the
same in every society; it is contingent, with different cultures across time and space having distinct and
often divergent views of what constitutes a just solution to a problem. “We must look for another rule of
our obedience,” said Sidney, “and shall find that to be the law.” 11 All republican governments seek justice;
and universally, “there can be no peace, where there is no justice,” nor is there justice without the Law.12
Natural law, God-made law that reflected divine law, was fundamental to both seventeenthcentury England and eighteenth-century Anglo-America, and it was the first of the four layers of law on
which republican theory was built. In Discourses Sidney innumerably referred to “the laws of God and
man.” So, too, did his seventeenth-century fellow republicans. Milton, whose republicanism was
particularly religiously-infused, stated, “No man who knows ought, can be so stupid to deny that all men
naturally were borne free, being the image and resemblance of God himself, and were by privilege above
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Adams, Defence, PJA p. 327; Adams, “Thoughts on Government,” PJA p. 235; DCG, II.1.79..

11
DCG, III.11.381. Sidney and Adams would have agreed with the author of the Ninth Dialogue of Court
Maxims that, “Commonwealths or civil societies are constituted for the attaining of justice,” and that the
“links of these societies” are the laws. Court Maxims, p. 122.
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all the creatures.”13 The transatlantic journey of republicanism from England to America brought with it
this foundation of natural law, which was automatically or, one might say, naturally assimilated by the
British Americans. God created the world and brought man into it with certain “unalienable rights,” as
Jefferson put it. Equality was one such fundamental principle of natural law. The laws of nature were
immutable, irrevocable, universal truths; they were the core values, protected by the Law, with which man
was endowed. Natural law was what was right, what was just. It was the way in which mankind was able
to participate in the eternal Law. Notwithstanding its emphasis on God, this was actually a pre-Christian
concept, one articulated by Cicero: “For law is a force of nature, the intelligence and reason of a wise
man, and the criterion of justice and injustice.”14 Man’s effort to create a just civil society required the
promotion and protection of rights that emanated from natural law. Men had entered individual societies
from “time immemorial,” as the common law put it, because of both man’s inherently social nature and the
unattractiveness of a pre-societal, primitive world – of “man in a state of nature,” as it was imagined –
frighteningly by Hobbes, less unpleasantly by others including Sidney, Adams, and Locke. Natural law
was part of the lingua franca of seventeenth-century England and the Continent, with Grotius a natural
law thinker who had particular impact.
From natural law the republicans derived certain God-given natural, human rights that were
antecedent to the social contract, a second tier of law. Men wanted to live together; and they needed
each other to thrive. They also needed to agree to the rules by which they would coexist. In order to
create a safe social world, people entered into a contract, an agreement, a covenant that set forth the
bases on which they had formed a community. John Quincy Adams observed that the Mayflower
Compact was “perhaps the only instance, in human history” in which all of the men in a community, in this
case Plymouth Colony, were parties to a social contract.15 John Quincy was talking about a physical
document that we could actually see. The existence of such contracts throughout time, express or
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See John Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates Proving That It Is Lawful and Hath been held so
Through All Ages for Any who have the Power to call to Account a Tyrant or Wicked King (1650)(EEBO
Editions, Proquest Reprint, 2010), p. 38.
14
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Commemoration of the First Landing of Our Ancestors (Boston: Russell and Cutler, 1802), p. 12.
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implied, was a component of his and other republicans’ concept of the Law. Englishman Marchamont
Nedham spoke about men who entered into society forming a “mutual Compact.”16 Written or customary,
express or implied, even real or imagined, a social contract bound people to each other and the people to
its leaders.17 It also was a manifestation of their consent to the terms of a contract, including a specific
form of government. If there was no popular consent, a government ruled by force – conquest,
usurpation, all in all, tyranny – and it therefore was illegitimate. For Sidney and other republicans, social
contracts were “implicit” if not “express,” and “they were not dreams, but real things.”18 The social
contract was the contingent outcome of limitations adopted by a society that were placed on the rights
that flowed from natural law. The social contract legitimized both the society and the rules it chose to live
by. For most republicans but not all (Nedham being an exception), the social contract defined limitations
on natural law; however, to the extent natural law was not limited by the social contract, the people were
entitled to the rights with which they were endowed in the state of nature. In sum, the social contract was
man’s first step in the creation of a lawful society. It stood in stark contrast to monarchic claims of dynastic
legitimacy through divine right.
The third stratum of law on which republicanism relied was the rule of law. While scholars
frequently toss the term around and occasionally grapple with its meaning, rule of law is rarely defined. It
is best understood as the means by which arbitrary rule, the bogeyman of republicanism, was prevented.
It was not the case that man’s freedom could not be curtailed in society; it was, both by the terms of the
original social contract and by subsequent law that balanced the interests of the individual against those
of society. Locke stated this very clearly in his “Second Treatise.” Freedom was not “what Sir. R. F. tells
us.” It was not license. Rather, “Freedom of men under Government, is to have a standing Rule to live
by, common to every one of that Society, and made by the Legislative Power. … A Liberty to follow my
own Will in all things, where the Rule prescribes not, and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain,
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unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man.”19 The rule of law safeguarded the social contract by
implementing the Law in its many manifestations, and doing so in a just matter. This included the
implementation of individual laws, rules, and requirements that a government enacted; but it also included
the protection of overriding values to which a society was committed. Fundamental legal tenets that
governed a society might be contained in a written constitution, or legal norms and practices might
originate in customary practice over time. In some nations, law was synthesized into a code of law such
as Justinian’s Code. But this was not the case in England. At least in the first instance, English jurists
sought to establish what the law was. Their process was complex. But its purpose was to understand
fundamental principles of the English Law and norms and practices from the past, and then to consider
their applicability to early modern English society. The English concept of the ancient constitution was
the product of this effort to determine what the Law was, and thereby effectuate the rule of law.
Unsurprisingly, uncodified English law became the subject of intense juridical scrutiny in England over the
centuries, leading to a vast common law virtually impossible for a layman to penetrate.
Moreover, the definition of a tyrannical king became a leader who placed himself above the Law;
that is, outside the Law. This was at the heart of Sidney, Locke, and Tyrrell’s discourse against Filmer. It
was impossible to have rule of law in Filmer’s patriarchal, “Adamite” society. The notion that the monarch
was above the law meant that, in fact, there was no rule of law. The related assertion was absurd, said
the republicans, that we should take Filmer on his word that while the law did not bind kings, they would
rule by it anyway. Anyone who submitted to an arbitrary system of governance such as this, said the
republican realists, was a fool and a slave, voluntarily giving up political freedom. There may be no
metaphor more frequently used by Anglo-American republicans than slavery, the antithesis of freedom.
Precedent – reliance on how things had been done and worked in society over many years –
became the legal method of identifying what the Law was. Before liberties could be constrained there had
to be a very good reason for doing so, an overriding benefit to society. Again, this was a matter of
judgment; and it was contingent. In different societies, the answer came out differently. Even in the
same society, things changed. The use of precedent and lawyerly debate about just what that precedent
was in England was constitutive to and at the heart of the Anglo-American adversarial system. Pace
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those who have criticized precedent as a distortion of history, and the establishment of precedent and
reliance on it as flawed, precedent never was intended to be, and still is not “objective” historical fact,
although one certainly could query whether there is such a thing. By definition history is a re-creation.
The difference in legal practice is that one’s biases in formulating that re-creation are on the table from
the beginning, at the get-go – the role of the attorney is to represent the best interests of his client, and
advocate interpretations of the Law and precedent accordingly. This is every lawyer’s intended bias.
Indeed, it is his obligation; failure to do so constitutes malpractice. The factfinder and decision-maker,
whether judge, jury, or both, can evaluate the facts – the evidence – and the applicability of the Law –
with this very open bias in mind. Machiavelli would have said, and no doubt Sidney and Adams would
have agreed, that It is unstated biases that are dangerous, just as hidden cabals were the nemesis of
government, as evidenced by the unsuccessful cabals in Charles II’s England and the successful cabal in
George III’s America. Going underground prevented the effective functioning of the rule of law. Moreover,
“truth” can be viewed from very different perspectives and, for that reason, the same circumstances can
be multiple truths. As Franklin said, if the Americans lost the war, they would not only have been rebels;
they would have been traitors.
In sum, the rule of law was (and is) a commitment to live by the Law. It specified methods by
which law was implemented in a society, and incorporated the values, priorities, and compromises that a
society sought to implement in accordance with. its social contract. The system of positive law – that
pesky “primitive heap of statutes,” what most people identify as laws, also effectuated the Law. Lawyers
were (and are) educated to view the rule of law as contingent, normative rules that legislatures enact, as
well as the conceptual goals of society that the Law is relied upon to honor. While somewhat ephemeral
and adaptable over time, the Law encompasses the entire legal universe. The rule of law enshrines the
concept that in a just society, no one is above the Law. A society governed by the rule of law does not
permit anyone who is part of that society to ignore the set of rules that the society has adopted. To do so
is to break the law. As Sidney wrote to his father at the beginning of the Restoration when he was in
Copenhagen and false accusations were being leveled against him, “Where is the law or rule, to which
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such pleadings should be reduced, by which such controversies should be determined?”20 As Adams
persuasively stated to one of the Boston Massacre juries, he was not there to advance his own interest;
“I chuse to lay down the rules of law, from authorities which cannot be disputed.”21
Sidney, Adams and other republicans’ fourth layer of law was the process and procedure
necessary to effectuate the rule of law. This went with the territory. Rule of law, and fairness in the
implementation of the law, were meaningless unless there was a legal process with which to implement
and protect it, and procedures that governed that legal process. Magna Carta’s provision of the right to a
trial by one’s peers, a jury, is one example of it. Lawyers like Adams who practiced law had to
understand how legal process and procedure was applicable to each and every legal representation that
they assumed in order to represent his clients in the best way possible; to fight for their interests through
the legal process. Consequently, Adams was positively drenched in the details of the law. He was a
master. As we noted earlier, the jurist Maitland emphasized that the rule of law was the rule of writs; it
also was the life of the eighteenth-century lawyer. Sidney was not a lawyer; but that did not stop him from
incorporating law continuously into his republican ideas. Perhaps it was because he had studied a great
deal of law, turning to Bracton, Selden, and other juridical scholars in Discourses; he also had first-hand
experience with English legal practice from family legal wrangling for which he was responsible. Ironically,
Sidney was existentially impacted by the English legal process, for he died as a result of the corruption of
the judicial process. Not only did Sidney not have a jury of his peers, to which he was entitled when
arrested and tried for high treason; he was found guilty by the ruse of Judge Jeffries’ use of pages of
Sidney’s Discourses manuscript as a second “witness” against him because two witnesses were
necessary to convict for high treason, and the prosecution lacked a second real (i.e., human) witness.22
Early modern Anglo-American republicanism relied on four distinct legal strata to protect and
defend the form of government that a society instituted. Law enabled men to live in accordance with the
terms of a society’s social contract and its laws and legal values, manifest in the precepts of the Law that
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were endemic to that society, which might include the implementation of principles of equity, for example,
not embodied in any particular law, but which reflected concepts to which the rule of law was committed,
such as fundamental fairness and equality under the law. These multiple layers of law informed
republicanism. They gave each society it’s particular character; they stabilized the society, rejecting the
exercise of arbitrary power by any authority; and they suffused that society with both inspiration,
sometimes reflected in patriotism and dedication to public service, certainly the case with Sidney and
Adams. The multi-tiered system of law also girdled political risk, promoting and protecting the survival and
thriving of a republican community and its fundamental values.
Turning from the Law to the second critical component of republican government that has not
been understood or appreciated, as far as the manner in which it was relied upon by early modern
republicans, balance in its multiple manifestations throughout government and society was an additional
critical component of Anglo-American republicanism. Notwithstanding the occasional bandying about of
the language of balance by some scholars, particularly in the context of mixed government, it remains
outside the parameters used to define republicanism. This Is a mistake.23 Preliminarily, it Is surprising
that neither Sidney nor Adams emphasized the balance that is very much part of the Law. Nevertheless,
both men relied on it; they just took it for granted. There is balance, for instance, between advocates
arguing opposing viewpoints in the Anglo-American adversarial system. Arriving at the “Truth,” capital T,
an express goal of Sidney and Adams as well as Cicero centuries earlier, is intended to be the outcome
of that legal process, or at least arrive at a close approximation of the Truth, which is the best that human
beings can do.24 Sidney stated, law must be “founded upon that eternal principle of reason and truth, from
whence the rule of justice which is sacred and pure ought to be deduced.”25 Indeed, Sidney stated, “My
work is to seek after truth.”26 Recall Halifax’s poignant reflections in “The Character of a Trimmer”: “Our
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Trimmer adoreth the goddess truth, though in all ages she hath been scurvily used, as well as those that
worshipped her.”27 In the paper delivered to the sheriff on the scaffold, Sidney poignantly wrote, “we live
in an age that maketh truth pass for treason.”28 Adams talked about truth, too. “Consider that the
government is intended to set bounds to passions which nature has not limited; and to assist reason,
conscience, justice, and truth, in controlling interests, which, without it, would be as unjust as
uncontrollable.”
Positive law and equity were another pair of offsetting or balanced components of the legal
system,. To comply with law requires “notice” – we must know what the law is. As Sidney stated, “I
cannot know how to obey, unless I know in what, and to whom.”29 That’s an important value of positive
law. But sometimes enforcing positive law does not lead to a just result. That’s the purpose of equity,
which fills the gaps, the interstices, of positive law. There also is the balance between the role of a judge
and the role of a jury, subjects of particular interest in early modern England and America, e.g., when
Britain removed the right to trial by jury in admiralty cases in the colonies. This juxtaposition has not
always been defined the same way. A jury is considered to be the trier of facts that applies the law to the
idiosyncratic circumstances of a particular case. The judge enunciates what that law is; she also rules
over the legal process so that it is fair – something Sidney’s judge obviously failed to do. Justice requires
sufficient legal specificity so that the citizenry knows what is expected of it. But that specificity is
balanced against the need for at least some flexibility in the legal system to address unanticipated
circumstances that arise and are unaddressed or unsatisfactorily resolved in positive law. This is very
much a part of what fundamental fairness has always meant, and it goes back at least to Magna Carta.
In the American system of law we entrust this discretion to the judiciary. The whole notion of the King’s
prerogative in early modern England was very much a battle over where discretionary decision-making
authority and flexibility should rest in government, particularly between the monarch and Parliament; but
there were also battles over the power of the judiciary. As Eric Nelson so persuasively argued, the
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colonists’ repeated efforts to motivate King George to defy his Parliament and respond favorably to the
colonists’ cries about the denial of their English rights was an effort to strengthen the prerogative of the
monarchy as against the control of the Law by Parliament.30 In the early United States republic, in
Marbury v. Madison, Justice Marshall decided the matter in favor of the judiciary. The early seventeenthcentury Ship Money case was not only a struggle over the right to consent to taxation; it was a legal
struggle over prerogative, executive discretionary power. Of course In England, the real issue was often
the corrupt use of prerogative – precisely what republicanism was designed to thwart.
Law is one of a variety of contexts it which it probably would have been impossible to implement
republican governance – to attain justice – without the inclusion of all sorts of balancing parameters that
protected the political values to which a society was committed. Beyond balance in the legal system,
which was taken for granted in Anglo-American society, with its centuries-old system of law, republican
thinkers used the language of balance and its derivatives, moderation and toleration, in a variety of ways
directed at keeping the ship of state steady and afloat. When republicans spoke of balance they were
often referring to the Aristotelian/Polybian concept of mixed government which certainly is one kind of
balance. Sidney, for example, said that, “of all things under the sun, there is none more mutable or
unstable than absolute monarchy.” In contrast, he professed veneration for government that was “mixed,
regulated by law, and directed to the publick good.”31 There are additional ways in which Anglo-American
republicanism fostered the institution of governmental structure and practice so as to effectuate
equipoise, equivalency, symmetry – in short, facilitate not only fairness, but prevent any one power center
or component of government from overpowering or otherwise making dysfunctional or ineffectual another.
Adams stated, “The essence of a free government consists in an effectual control of rivalries … an
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equilibrium of power.” The alternative, he said, was despotism.32 Balance also was accomplished
through policy-making, e.g., tolerant religious policies and laws. Halifax asked, why do angry men rail
against moderation? It was self-evident to republicans, particularly Halifax, Sidney, and Adams, that
without balance, governments were likely to topple. Republicans were convinced that it would be
extremely difficult if not impossible without balance to achieve the goals to which a republican governments aspired, including affording the people the opportunity for political self-determination, basing
government on the consent of the governed (the collective form of self-determination), achieving equality
under the law, creating a safe, secure, durable society, and protecting government by means of actions
and rules establishing to the people’s satisfaction that their government was not arbitrary, consequently it
was legitimate, and the people were free. Balance was associated with stability as well, which was
associated with liberty. “Liberty produceth Virtue, Order and Stability,” said Sidney.33 This avoided,
although nothing could ever entirely eliminate, the citizenry’s felt need to rebel. Balance was similarly
vital to the individual and to man’s social world, offsetting man’s natural passions that wreaked havoc with
rational decision-making and social stability. Notwithstanding civil disturbances in New England in 1782,
for example, John, at The Hague, wrote to Abigail, in Braintree, “I rely upon the honesty and Sobriety as
well as good sense of the People. These Qualities will over-awe the passions of individuals and preserve
a steady administration of the laws,” said Adams.34 In précis, balance informed the nature of republican
governance.
A facet of balance that obsessed Adams was bicameralism, which he viewed as a critical
safeguard in the structure of the legislature, particularly as he witnessed the unfolding of the French
Revolution and the ideas of some of the philosophes, most particularly those of M. Turgot. In
seventeenth-century England, republicans disagreed on this element of republican theory. In one of his
lesser-known publications, Pour enclouer le canon, published in May 1659, Harrington rejected a
bicameral legislature. Nedham agreed with him. Harrington argued that bicameralism would prevent the
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people from being free. In his utopia, Harrington included a form of bicameralism, but one that did not
function freely; it was subject to extraordinary strictures. Perhaps this is why Harrington was attractive to
Jefferson and others who favored unicameralism notwithstanding the remarkable level of control
Harrington sought to legally impose on people in his concept of republican governance. Sidney, Halifax,
and Locke all embraced bicameralism but in general, because of his enormous emphasis on the choice of
the people, Sidney certainly did not have the almost visceral hostility to unicameralism that Adams did. In
fact, on this issue Sidney was probably a little closer to Jefferson because of the unique contribution that
the nobility in England had historically played. Consider the role of his family! For Sidney this was not
entitlement; it was civic responsibility; the nobility had been the cement that maintained the union.35
Accordingly, they were obliged to use the privileged education they received to give back to the state,
participate in governance, and enable men less able, if not unable, to defend their own interests. But
Sidney’s solution was not to over-balance the role of the aristocracy. Indeed, he recognized that time had
changed; there were new elites who no longer felt the sense of duty that was fundamental to at least
some of the ancient nobility. Sidney’s focus therefore shifted to mixed monarchy and its role in balancing
power. Adams told Jefferson he was fearful of the “aristocracy,” by which he meant people who were
elite for whatever reason they succeeded in being so; this was what he termed the “natural” aristocracy,
people with a special status in society, with not only privileges and protections, but the ability to influence
others because of something other than their ideas. American society provided no legally protected class
such as the Old World had relied upon and codified to protect the aristocracy’s privileges. But for Adams,
elites existed in every society. It was unavoidable. Wealth and “position” might create an elite status; but
there were many other possible bases, some “natural” and others contrived or “unnatural.” Adams
described Jefferson and Washington’s height – something about which he no doubt was sensitive! – as a
natural, aristocratic feature, part of the demeanor that “elevated” some men above others. In this regard
Adams was very different from Jefferson, who idealized the common man while, at the same time,
remaining surprisingly oligarchic in his Montesquieu-like promotion of a special, more powerful role in
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governance for “true” aristocrats, a view Adams entirely rejected. Unlike Jefferson, Adams saw no basis
for distinguishing among the many reasons, natural and unnatural, that people obtained aristocratic
status. The purpose of bicameralism was to juxtapose or balance (and also isolate) the elite in one house
of the legislature against the legislative house of the people, duly represented. This would help create
political equilibrium and prevent what otherwise would likely be the natural dominance of the aristocracy.
At the same time, the aristocracy might curb the tyranny of the majority over the minority.
As for the traditionally recognized elements of mainstream republicanism we can set aside
certain scholarly suggestions. First, neither Sidney nor Adams saw himself as fighting for democracy!
Democracy meant the control of government decision-making by the people, not shared power, not
moderated power, and not power that protected everyone not just the majority. To the contrary, it was
mixed government that was fundamental to republican thought, along with mainstream republicanism’s
advocacy of bicameralism, as safeguards to prevent the tyranny of the elite, the populace, or any other
potential power center in government. Democracy was seen as thwarting, not fostering balanced
governance.36
At the same time, opposition to all forms of monarchy also was not an element of Sidney or
Adams’ republican theory or of the views of most republicans. This can be confusing because sometimes
textual references to monarchy actually are referring to absolute monarchy; one must turn to context, and
thereby penetrate beyond the term “monarchy,” which was used casually. For example, if the
seventeenth-century English republicans opposed all monarchy, how could those men who sought to
remove Charles II, or James II from the throne want a different king? Yet many republicans did. How
could Otis and other Americans who advocated republican ideas have tried for so long to empower the
English monarch? How could Americans of the new United States have wanted a chief executive at all, a
magistrate, which is what a president is?37
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Second, we also can set aside anti-commercialism. While it may not have been until Adam Smith
that economics became analytically understood, it was experientially well understood by just about
everyone in seventeenth and eighteenth-century England and America (not to mention the Dutch Golden
Age, the Italian Renaissance, and indeed, perhaps from time immemorial). People had to make a living!
Recall the commentary of the sixteenth-century mainland European who was astounded at the overwhelmingly commercial nature of London. In England the many trade wars with the Dutch, with whom the
English were religiously allied, also proves the point. Moreover, the strategic importance of trade gained
“unprecedented levels of attention” in mid-seventeenth-century England.38 Those who came to America
for religious freedom also recognized the importance of trade to their well-being, and their behavior
certainly suggested the more trade the better, as evidenced by the rapid growth of colonial ports. Note,
too, the proviso in the Declaration of Independence castigating King George “For cutting off our Trade
with all parts of the world.” This was drafted by the radical republican Jefferson and adopted by a host of
other American republicans. It was vital to republican thought to structure government so that it could
resist corruption, including but not limited to financial corruption. The exercise of arbitrary power, the
nemesis of all republican thinkers, was driven by corrupt designs, either for more wealth, more power, or
both. “The nations which have been overturned arbitrarily, have always suffer’d the same plagues. …We
need no other proof of this than what we have seen in our own country,” said Sidney.39 This was precisely what republican governance were designed to stymie. But successful commerce was applauded,
and certainly not viewed as inherently corrupt. Think of Sidney and Penn and Locke’s relationship with
the extremely successful merchant Benjamin Furly. Scholars sometimes characterize commerce as
inconsistent with virtue, and therefore have concluded that republican thinkers disapproved of commerce.
Obviously, this is not the case. Again, it was not commerce that republicans rejected; it was corruption in
whatever form it took. Corruption – whether it was greed, or manifested in another way – polluted men’s
thinking and created challenges to any political system. Neither Sidney nor Adams thought they could
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eliminate corruption – a naïve proposition. One goal of a republican system of government was to
discourage it, and include within the system methods for addressing it. As Sidney said, “those who
manage free governments ought always to the utmost of their power to oppose corruption.”40 In sum, the
notion that Sidney, Adams, or most any other early modern Anglo-American republican abjured
commerce is daffy. These men lived in a highly commercial age, in which England’s trade exploded while
the international marketplace boomed, and the opportunity for financial security by many people previously denied the opportunity boomed with it. Consider the British Americans who argued about liberty, selfdetermination, choice, and other republican values in an effort to gain relief from what they perceived to
be illegal taxation on colonial trade. In short, anti-commercialism was not viewed as beneficial in any way
to anyone in America at the time. More to the point, it was unrealistic; it was an idea, at most, of utopian
(or, depending on your vantage point, dystopian) thinking, which almost all republicans rejected.
In addition to the role that law and balance played in republican theory, there are well-recognized
features of successful republican governance embraced by Sidney and Adams that many scholars have
analyzed, albeit variously defined and understood. Those include the following concepts: realism,
including an appreciation of but not detrimental reliance on virtue; liberty; the enormous importance of
consent (individual and communal); and the unimportance of the form of government. The most
important aspects of Sidney and Adams’ realism is that they rejected utopian thinking, and they were
particularly realistic about the nature of man – his strengths, foibles, and dangerous proclivities. Both
men were acutely aware, indeed introspective about the fact that man was fundamentally flawed. But
gifted by God with the ability to think and to speak, man had the capacity to be rational.41 Man also could
be extraordinary – compassionate, loving, self-sacrificing, honorable. Think Sir Philip. At the same time,
man’s passions were ever-present and they sometimes overshadowed rational thinking. “Every man has
passions; few know how to moderate, and no one can wholly extinguish them,” said Sidney.42 One other
point related to Adams’ sense of realism is worth noting here. Some scholars and even (former) friends

40

Id, II.25.252.

41
“Man being a rational creature, nothing can be universally natural to him, that is not rational.” DCG,
I.16.51.
42

DCG, II.24.234; similarly, see Adams, “Discourses on Davila,” The Portable John Adams, pp. 337-94,
382.
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of Adams maintained that his ideas significantly changed over time. Of course, there was some
evolution in his thinking; but this was largely pragmatic and not value-laden; rather it was the response to
changed circumstances. Thus, for example, Adams was unable to forgive Jefferson for years; eventually
he did. But the notion that Adams’ political views materially changed is implausible, both on the merits –
when you study his work – and because it entirely ignores the frankness of the man.43 Even if you qualify
this with Adams’ sense of pride, if he took the comment that he had changed defensively, it would make
no sense for Adams to have stated near the end of his life, as he did, if this were not the case, that his
political views had remained the same from the time he was a young attorney. Not only was this
inconsistent with Adams’ personality, it was inconsistent with his values. Adams was not a self-deluding
man. To the contrary, all of his life he had tended to exaggerate his failings and weaknesses, not deny
them. As an early Adams biographer wrote, Adams was “the most realistic statesman of his generation in
America.” This does not readily square with the notion that Adams was unrealistic about the nature of his
own political views. 44 Much more likely is that some friends and scholars simply did not understand his
views, particularly the vital distinction in republican thought between limited or constitutional monarchy
and absolute monarchy. Adams was not a man who would have been reluctant to state what he thought!
If his views had changed, he would not only have said so, but he would have said why. Like Sidney,
Adams considered it irresponsible not to not be realistic and pragmatic. Pragmatism also was very much
a part of Adams’ legal training and experience; as it was (and is) for attorneys generally - a “brass tacks,”
“bottom-line” way of thinking that informed Adams’ life and work, including his political thought. Like

43

Francis Adams, John’s grandson and editor of The Works of John Adams, concluded, “From first to last,
from the year 1775, before the Declaration of Independence, down to the year 1793, when the present
constitution had become fully established, the principles upon which [John Adams] acted and counselled
remain substantially the same.” “Preface,” The Works of John Adams, Vol. 4, Charles Francis Adams, ed.
(Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1851), p. 181. In his study of the second President and his
marginal notes in over a hundred books in which Adams carried out “a real dialogue” with the author,
Harastzi concluded that Charles Francis “was right.” Harastzi, John Adams & the Prophets of Progress, p.
27, citing Works, Vol. IV, p. 181. Bailyn recognized a certain flexibility in the ideas of the American
revolutionaries; but he did not think that those ideas changed over time; to the contrary, he maintained
that they were resilient “in the face of changing demands and circumstances.” He did say that Adams’
ideas “were adaptable.” Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, p. vi. Finally, my own
reading of Adams’ political works and substantial correspondence does not suggest any significant
change in his republican ideas.
44

Gilbert Chinard, Honest John Adams (Boston, 1933), pp. ix, xi.
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everyone else, Sidney and Adams matured; and their circumstances certainly changed. But the
fundamental republican principles did not change that drove both men to commit – or in the case of
Sidney, long to commit - their lives to their country, and to steadfastly advocate the principles of
republican governance to which they were wholeheartedly committed.
As for virtue, both men applauded it, and sought to live virtuously; but neither man was naïve
enough to consider virtue to be a reliable commodity on which to base any system of. government.
Sidney said wryly, if men were always virtuous, we would not need laws to promote and protect government.45 Similarly, while both men agreed that it was inexpressibly valuable to have virtuous leaders and
citizens, one would be foolhardy to design a system of government that depended on such virtuosity.
Pace all of the scholarship on this subject, virtue was an important part of Sidney and Adams’ value system; but it was not the lynchpin of their political theory. To the contrary, what was exceptional about their
way of thinking was that both men sought to develop a system of governance that did not necessitate
virtue, or at least relied on it to the least extent possible while as realists they also understood that the
utter absence of virtue in a society, a dystopian notion, would likely make any system of government fail.
Republicanism is all about liberty. For Adams and Sidney freedom was both the assertion of
one’s best interests – self-determination – and the prevention of their inhibition: Obsta Principiis, “Nip the
shoots of arbitrary power in the bud.” Both men utilized history to convince their audience of the path that
they could legitimately follow, with Adams particularly, but Sidney, too, making the case for legal means
to protect and promote freedom. “Suffer me to introduce here, a little history,” said Adams.46 Sidney
didn’t ask; he just did it. Both men wrote about the ancients, Biblical precedent, the Huguenot opposition
to religious oppression, the courageous Dutch, and many, many other historical contexts over millennia.
Governments were instituted “to obtain justice, and … the preservation of liberty,” said Sidney.47 Most
people are little versed in matters of state; nevertheless, said Massachusettensis in 1772, there was a

45
DCG, III.1.325. As Sidney also noted, “we find no place in the world where the inhabitants do not enter
into some kind of society or government to restraint it; and to say that all men desire liberty without
restraint, and yet that all do restrain it, is ridiculous. The truth is, man is hereunto led by reason which is
his nature. Everyone sees they cannot well live asunder, nor many together, without some rule to which
all must submit.” DCG, II.20.192.
46

Novanglus V, PJA Vol. 2, p. 279.

47

DCG, III.25.460.
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“latent spark” in man “capable of being kindled into a flame“ that the “disaffected” provoked. Novanglus,
a/k/a Adams, hijacked the metaphor.48 “What is this ‘latent spark’?” he asked. It is the love of liberty,
given to man by God. Sidney had used the same metaphor: "When a magistrate ... sets up an interest ...
in himself, repugnant to the good of the public ... [t]his creates a most fierce and irreconcilable enmity.
…When men's spirits are thus prepared, a small matter sets them on fire."49 Sidney and Adams were
men set on fire.
Typical among his compatriots, Adams always provided a ringing endorsement of liberty as the goal
of republicanism. While liberty was variously defined by republicans and scholars who have written about it,
Adams’ views, and those of many other republicans, echoed Sidney’s endorsement of self-determination as
the essence of liberty. Admittedly, this was not a term of art of the times; but both men embraced a concept
of liberty beyond the scholars’ “negative” notion of freedom from interference. For it was not just actual
interference that was a problem; the possibility of interference, in the Pettit sense, was a threat to freedom.
Consistent with the goal of liberty, Adams asserted late in life, for example, that, “The fund[a]mental Article
of my political Creed is, that Despotism, or unlimited Sovereignty, or absolute Power, is the same in a
Majority of a popular Assembly, an Aristocratical Counsel, an Oligarchical Junto, and a single Emperor.
Equally arbitrary, cruel, bloody, and in every respect diabolical.”50 In short, any sole concentration of power
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Massachusettensis III, JA Rev. Writings I, pp. 340-49, 341.

49

DCG, III.19.433.

50
Adams to Jefferson, Nov. 13, 1815, id, p. 456. The subject of sovereignty deserves a great deal more
attention, but will be summarily (and hopefully efficiently) addressed here. As evidenced in statements
quoted throughout this study, Adams believed that sovereignty originated in the people, but that when
they created government, the people delegated their sovereignty to the legislature, unless they clearly did
not or, in the case of certain natural rights, could not. Summarizing Wood’s view, Ryerson began his
recent study of Adams with the proposition, “Adams saw the major branches of any free government,
whether in Europe or America, as representing distinct and timeless aspects of human societies, and
therefore in some sense dividing the sovereignty of the whole society between them.” In contrast, said
Ryerson, “his countrymen were coming to see every institution of government, and every officeholder, as
an agent of an essentially undivided society, the whole people, who alone possessed and exercised all
sovereignty.” In Wood’s view, which Ryerson seemed to adopt, this made Adams constitutional thought
“irrelevant.” Ryerson, John Adams’s Republic, pp. 1-2. Ryerson’s emphasis was on “the process by
which John Adams moved to the very center of American constitutional thought.” Id, p. 2. All of these
statements overstate positions taken – once again, the perspective is black and white, not in the realistic
realm of greys – thereby creating a polarity that, in fact, did not exist. Several comments are critical.
First, Adams was always in the center; he did not move. Second, Adams was intentionally marginalized
by Jefferson and Jeffersonians because his ideas were difficult to rebut, not because they were irrelevant.
They were universal ideas and, in that regard, inherently relevant. The popular Jefferson may have
viewed the people as the caisson of sovereignty, but it cannot be denied that regardless of what kind of
legislature one believed was best, and Jefferson supported the French embracing of unicameralism

1035

could not possibly be consistent with the liberty of the people; for in such circumstances the people would
be unable to overcome or even challenge that power should it be exercised improperly. Sidney said the
same thing. Adams was also consistently concerned about the interest of the minority, and ensuring that all
people’s liberty was protected.51 The majority was a potentially dangerous faction, too.52
Without revisiting the scholarly debate on whether we are talking about Greek or Roman, liberty
from or liberty to, etcetera, etcetera, what both Sidney and Adams were about, as were republicans
generally, was the Pettit view of liberty as non-domination, which may be more readily understood as selfdetermination. The most essential element of liberty was having the freedom to be able to consent or
deny one’s consent to decisions that affected you. In March and May 1776 correspondence with her
husband, Portia, a/k/a Abigail Adams, whose intellect and wisdom has been almost entirely outside the
scope of this study, famously and presciently told John to “Remember the Ladies” in the “New Code of
Laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to make,” and don’t “put unlimited power into the hands
of the Husbands. Remember all Men would be tyrants if they could.” About a month later she wrote
again on the subject. “I cannot say that I think you very generous to the Ladies, for whilst you are
proclaiming peace and good will to Men, Emancipating all Nations, you insist upon retaining an absolute
power over wives. But you must remember that Arbitrary power, is like most other things which are very
hard, very liable to be broken.” While Abigail may have been teasing John, noting that women have it in
their power “not only to free ourselves but to subdue our Masters,” there was indisputable truth in her

which Adams opposed with all his being, sovereignty was delegated by the people to the legislature
except in very specific instances – absolute monarchy, or where the sovereign state was tiny and direct
democracy was possible. There is no dispute about this. Jefferson’s pitch about “an essentially undivided
society, the whole people, who alone possessed and exercised all sovereignty,” was useful propaganda;
and it was Jefferson (not Adams) who believed in the rule of the “natural” aristocracy, a “natural” elite, not
in the rule of the people! Furthermore, Adams did not think that “the major branches of any free government … were timeless” or he would not have railed against what he saw as the threat of unicamerallism,
among other things. While the people could rise up and change their form of government, and both
Adams and Jefferson agreed about this, in a functioning government, the legislature was the epicenter of
sovereignty. It is true that in Adams’ view, governmental power had to be disjoined and protected in order
to ensure its effective and untrammeled exercise in all necessary ways. To sustain an uncorrupted
government, even a powerful legislature required limits to remain free – that’s what Marbury v. Madison
was all about.
51
See Adams, “Letter VI. The right Constitution of a Commonwealth, examined,” Defence, Vol. III, pp.
218-19; see also id, pp. 214-15 on the subject of the oppression of the minority by the majority.
52

Adams, Defence, Vol. III, p. 287. Adams, ever the realist and egalitarian, also recognized that an
aristocracy was a faction, too – “a private partial interest.” Id, p. 286.
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commentary.53 In the absence of. self-determination people were subject to arbitrary power, and that is
the antithesis of liberty. Sidney and Adams both believed that men in society, not only rulers or
aristocrats but the people, were entitled to consent to their form of government, and much of what
followed in their theory of governance stemmed from this belief. Popular sovereignty was all about how
power originated in the people, who delegate it to those responsible for it in their system of government.
Anglo-American republicanism embraced popular sovereignty. In the absence of consent, the people
were entitled to rebel. In theory, and in the lore of ancient Greece, democracy was a form of government
that guaranteed the participation of all of its citizens, and hence their consent. But realists that they were,
both Sydney and Adams concluded that this ancient Greek concept of democracy was myth, and that
certainly in sophisticated (early) modern society, it was an impossibility.
Importantly, mob rule was not the same thing as the participation of the people. Adams was
more familiar than he wanted to be with mob rule having served in at least two cases, King v. Stewart and
the Boston Massacre trials, in which the mob was part of the litigation; and there were many other
instances in this time frame throughout the colonies when mobs took to the streets.54 By definition mob
rule was understood as the outcome of uncontrolled and often destructive passions, whether they were
legitimately or illegitimately provoked. Mob rule did not constitute rational decision-making, which was
fundamental to legitimate rule. Sidney railed against the mob murder of De Witt. Haraszti recorded
something else of which Adams no doubt became well aware in the 1790s. The duc de la Rochefoucauld,
who had favored reform in the France of Louis XVI, was an “earnest patriot” who took part in the French
Revolution. But Rochefoucauld opposed the Jacobins by the summer of 1792, and was stoned to death
by a mob in the presence of his wife and mother.55 Mob rule was scary. At best, it was ultra vires action –
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Abigail to John, March 31 & May. 7, 1776, My Dearest Friend, pp. 110, 116.

54

See the classic work by Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the.
Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776 (New York & London: W. W. Norton & Co.
1991).
55

Haraszti, John Adams & the Prophets of Progress, Ch. VIII, n.1, p. 326. “When the Americans came to
their moment of truth, to the revolution that ushered in their novus ordo seclorum, … they acted in remarkably conservative or, perhaps better put, preservative ways. Unlike the French,” said Zuckert, “who saw
the need for a wholly new legal code to accompany their revolution, the Americans preserved the inherited legal order, and with it most of the fabric of inherited society.” In Zuckert’s view, this was “precisely
because they had come to see their natural rights/social compact political philosophy to be deeply
congruent with their rights under the common law.” In short, American success, in contrast to French
failure, was because of their reliance on the “American amalgam.” Zuckert astutely recognized that law
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action taken beyond established legal authority. It was not a legitimate part of republican governance.
Because both Sidney and Adams felt that consent was the overriding principle that should guide
the formation of government, they did not think it appropriate to require or specify a particular form of
government. Once again, Harrington was very much the outlier. But for almost all republicans, the people
had a choice to make. That does not mean that Sidney and Adams had no opinions of their own. “But the
wisest, best, and far the greatest part of mankind, rejecting these simple species, did form governments
mixed or composed of the three,” said Sidney.56 Adams agreed. Both favored mixed government. But
neither insisted that because they favorited it everyone else was obliged to do the same! The only form of
government that would not allow for consent was absolute monarchy. Accordingly, absolute monarchy,
not monarchy generally, was the one form of governance that Sidney and Adams rejected. In theory the
people could pick absolute monarchy, but Sidney commented to the effect that it was surrendering to the
unnatural, depraved part of man to do so.57 Nevertheless, they both maintained unequivocally and
repeatedly that the form of government was entirely the choice of the people.
Finally, one would think that notoriety (Sidney’s execution) would have as much staying power as
success (Adams presidency). Why didn’t it? Whig revisionist history was the nail in the coffin of the
proper analysis of Sidney’s republican ideas. Sidney was problematic for the Whigs. His legacy to the
world was uncertain. Whigs knew that Sidney considered the Orange dynasty to be power-hungry; he had
written about it.58 William of Orange was responsible for the savage murder of Johan De Witt, for which

was a vital part of the American revolutionaries’ thought. In. fact, it was all about republicanism. Accordingly, preservation of the “inherited legal order” preoccupied Adams and others; or perhaps more accurately,
avoiding the breakdown of order was something about which the Americans were highly attuned . Note
that the Americans did have to decide how to implement the Law once they were no longer British. But
Zuckert’s analysis fused distinct ideas that this study has endeavored to explain and systematize as part
of the English and then the American concept of republican governance. On the other hand, it is not
necessary to attribute the American perspective totally to the preservation of “the inherited legal order.”
There were other vital components and goals. Also, pace Zuckert’s suggestion, the American “amalgam”
was not something new. Zuckert, “Social Compact, Common Law, and the American Amalgam,” p. 42.
56

DCG, I.10.31.

57

Id, II.19.189.

58

DCG, II.22.207-08. Ch. 6 of Jonathan Scott’s two-volume intellectual biography of Sidney dwells on
this issue. As he stated, “For it is above all in face of the. Perception of William of Orange as the saviour
of English liberties, that Sidney’s own opposite perception – of no less than ‘irreconcileable contrariety’
between the two – is difficult to recover.” Moreover, “The same goes for the remark of his close friend
John Hampden jnr in mid 1680, when informed of an Anglo-Dutch [government] league: ‘This will be
turned against us … I am afraid this will fool the Parliament … we shall have the Prince of Orange with an
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Sidney grieved. De Witt had been the hope of Dutch republicans and international Protestantism. He was
the shining light that was snuffed out by the Orange powerhouse. With the death of DeWitt and his
brother, the Low Countries’ republican experiment came to an end. We do not know whether Sidney
would have reconciled himself to the “glorious” revolution for which the Whigs were entirely responsible,
and their invitation to the De Witt killer William and his wife Mary Stuart to invade England.59 Again, we
can refer to the statement of the French Ambassador to the Netherlands that Sidney had told him that “the
Prince of Orange, as the opponent of liberty in Holland, would be the opponent of liberty in America.”60
The concessions that Parliament made to William III would have been very difficult for Sidney to stomach.
Would he have railed against a parliamentary compromise that at least partially abandoned the republican
ideas he spent his life advocating? Would he have seen William and Mary’s ascent to the English throne
as “glorious” at all? Certainly it is possible that Sidney would have been persuaded by Halifax and others
that this was England’s best option, creating a Protestant constitutional monarchy, a mixed government,
and stabilizing Parliament’s power, notwithstanding the fact that the monarchy retained very substantial
prerogative powers. But just this last point could have been a nonstarter for Sidney. After all, the extensive
nature of the king’s prerogative had been at the heart of the English Civil War; it was one of the problems
that republican-inclined Englishmen had strenuously opposed, at least from the time of the Ship Money
case in the early seventeenth-century.
The pragmatist Sidney had been angry at Ludlow’s inability to deal with the Dutch because of
their complicity in the arrest and subsequent execution of regicides hiding in the Low Countries. He felt

army here.” Which is exactly what happened. Scott II, pp. 106-07. Scott found that for these men and
others who agreed with them, “the events of 1688-9 were not a victory, but a shattering (and permanent)
defeat.” It was “a second Restoration; not a second revolution.” Id, p. 107. As Scott put it, “No subject
caused Sidney’s whig admirers more pain than his involvement with the European dimension of this
crisis.” Id, p. 104. The only difficulty I have with Scott’s argument is my uncertainty about the extent to
which he relied on Court Maxims which, as I have indicated elsewhere, is unlikely to be Sidney’s work.
See Charnoff, “A Second Look at the Question of Who Authored Court Maxims,” 8-20-18 (unpub.).
59

We cannot fail to mention, one last time, the family multiple, adverse interests: William of Orange’s
invasion of England with the support of English leadership was very significant credited to the work of
Sidney’s brother Henry, who was an English diplomat at The Hague and very close to William of Orange.
60

One nineteenth-century author wrote that Sidney opposed Cromwell and Charles I for the same
reason, “They were both despots.” And he disagreed with Shaftesbury because “he viewed with alarm
the interests and ambitions of the Prince of Orange.” Sidney, Memoirs of the Sidney Family, p. 186;
D’Avaux, Negociations de Monsieur le Comte d’Avaux, en Holland, depuis 1679, jusq’ en 1684, toml. i.
p.8, in Meadley, Memoirs of Algernon Sidney, pp. 338-39.

1039

holding a grudge was impractical, even foolhardy. So perhaps Sidney would have accepted the rule of
William and Mary as England’s best option; or, at least, an acceptable option. We do not know.61 What
we do know is that the views he left behind in Discourses, first published in 1698, fifteen years after his
execution, would have troubled the Whigs, perhaps embarrassed them, and troubled the monarch even
more. After all, Sidney was the man who had apparently urged De Witt to invade England and
Scotland!62 Whig history’s answer was to label Sidney a Whig martyr, which he was not, and shelve his
treatise. Admittedly, adopting or even lauding Sidney’s actual views would have been difficult for Whig
historians to do – to lionize a man who considered the Orange family to be predatory and had the
audacity to not hide his views; a man whose book prominently featured the right to rebel against
tyrannical rule. Adding substance to the image of Sidney also would not have sat well with William III,
who was autocratically inclined.63 Whig historians’ mission was to show how the good guys overcame the
bad guys in the Glorious Revolution, consistent with the notion of the progress of history. The Whigs had
reconciled themselves to a new monarchic dynasty. As a Whig martyr executed by the Stuarts it was easy
to push aside his inconvenient ideas. They may have been viewed as irrelevant to kingly rule, although in
fact they were not; and they could have been viewed as subversive. One fascinating glimpse of a cheeky
picture of Sidney that post-dates the effective toppling of the Stuarts is the following ditty, a 1689 ballad
that was written as a dialogue between the ghosts of William Lord Russell and Algernon Sidney:
RUSS: Such monstrous villains King William does choose,
Which even the devil himself would refuse.
SID: To prefer them (my friend) is a reasonable thing,
For, had they not been rogues, he had never been king.
RUSS: Why then we are still little better than slaves.
We have changed our King, but kept all his knaves.
61

In a 1980 article, Mark Goldie explored the alliances and rifts within the “whig” world from the time of
the Glorious Revolution to about 1695, i.e., after Sidney’s execution and before the emergence of John
Toland and others deemed “radical” whigs and the coincident publishing of Sidney’s Discourses, Ludlow’s
Memoirs, Milton’s Works, and Harrington’s Oceana (1697-1700). While Goldie was not focused on
Sidney, he provided a nuanced picture of the range of “whig” views, from those “trimming” to those
considered “radical,” and the significantly different perceptions about whether the events of 1688-89 were
“glorious” or “inglorious.” Unsurprisingly, a pivotal figure here was John Wildman. See Mark Goldie, “The
Roots of True Whiggism 1688-94,” History of Political Thought, Vol. 1, Issue 2 (1980), pp. 195-236.
62

Scott I, p. 175.
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Adding to the difficulty in analyzing the matter is the fact that secondary sources’ attribution of Court
Maxims to Sidney skews analyses of Sidney’s views on William of Orange. See, e.g., Martin van
Gelderen, “In Defence of William III: Eric Walten and the Justification of the Glorious Revolution,”
Redefining William III: The. Impact of the King-Stadholder in International Context, Esther Mijers & David.
Onnekink, eds. (London & New York: Routledge, 2016), Ch. 8, pp. 143-56.
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Ballad, A Dialogue between the Ghosts of Russell and Sidney (1689)64

The resurrection and study of Sidney’s republican ideas did not occur until the emergence of his
American audience over half a century later. In fairness, reading Sidney was challenging; much more so
than reading Locke. Discourses was an unfinished manuscript. It was long. It may have been fixed up (at
the very least) by Toland so that it could be published; but it was still a difficult read. Not only was the
treatise repetitive, which one could blame on Filmer as Sidney simply tracked Filmer’s Patriarcha in
Discourses; but that didn’t help. It also was chocked full of historical precedent on virtually every page that
was utterly absent from Locke’s work, a much easier read. Sidney’s extraordinary exegesis constituted a
commentary on the meaning and significance of events from ancient Greek, Roman and Biblical time to
current history. Each historical illustration pulled in a great deal of information and drama, requiring the
reader to invoke his own humanist studies to even understand what Sidney was talking about, and then to
distill the significance of the historical parallels Sidney drew over and over again in his discourse on
republican government. Why bother, particularly in a country that was very tired of political conflict?
It is modernity’s loss. The tremendous importance of the Law to republican theory, as well as
principles of balance, including moderation and religious toleration, have not been sufficiently understood,
and Sidney’s treatise is a powerhouse on these subjects if you muster the fortitude to tackle it. Locke’s
writing, in contrast, is leaner; it is also coy and dry. Sidney’s writing (and personality) was quite the opposite. There is no mistaking the man’s passion, what his ideas were, and what he stood for. For instance, it
is neither accidental nor incidental that the word “law” or a derivative (lawful, legal etc.), justice, constitution, statutes, but predominantly law, appears on over eighty percent of the 578 pages of Discourses – by
my count on 463 pages!65 Sidney’s diminishment undoubtedly contributed to posterity’s misunderstanding,

64

Ballad, A Dialogue between the Ghosts of Russell and Sidney (1689) in Plain English: Or an Inquiry
Concerning the Real and Pretended Friends to the English Monarchy (1690), ST; Vol. II, pp. 79-94, cited in
Goldie, “The Roots of True Whiggism 1688-94,” p. 222. Perhaps because the Whigs had in hand the work
of John Locke, who returned to England in the ship carrying Mary Stuart, resort to Sidney’s work was even
less likely. Locke was an academic and a philosopher whose ideas about how people perceived and
learned were the mainstay of his influence and fame. But of course he also wrote Two Treatises, a double
rebuttal to Filmer (two treatises) and a statement of republican principles that can be characterized as a
much briefer, calmer, unimpassioned version of Discourses. It was Locke who became the spokesman
for the ideas of the 1689 Revolution.
65

This is my casual count, using West’s edition of Discourses. The pages without the word law, etc., are
virtually all reviewing particular historical events. As to the use of history to support his theory, you would
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at least since the twentieth-century, of the nature of early modern Anglo-American republicanism.
Perhaps we can change course. This was not a confusion that the American revolutionaries had.
Contrary to some scholarship, the essential ideas of republican political theory have remained remarkably
consistent and persuasive from the time of Cicero, and the American colonists made substantial use of
them. It is a broad republican umbrella within which belong a number of thinkers, including many men
characterized as “liberal.”66 While there are differences among them, the theory has defined parameters
that are clear, consistent, and useful, still today, in understanding how government should be designed to
most effectively promote the political interests and rights of the people. Sidney and Adams were articulate
representatives of the republican tradition, men who lived the lives they preached, and enable us to appreciate the ideas they promoted in the name of freedom. For Sidney, Adams, and fellow travelers, republicanism was grounded in the design of government and emphatically in the Law and legal framework that
protected the people.67 Adams repeatedly sought to teach Americans what good governance was all
about. In his legal study of the history of canon and feudal law as a very young man Adams was
unequivocal about man’s right to liberty and to knowledge, the latter of which included “a right, an
indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible divine right to that most dreaded, and envied kind of knowledge, I
mean of the characters and conduct of their rulers.”68 As he wrote his friend, “May every human being, -man, woman, and child, -- be as well informed as possible!”69 There is still room to learn.

be hard pressed to find even one page of Discourses in which one, often numerous historical references,
and sometimes detailed discussion of those references appear.
66

If Jefferson was ”a man intent on making hard-edged divisions between himself and his opponents,”
whose democratic republicanism was as radical as Joyce Appleby suggested, “not look[ing] to the past
for wisdom,” “not yearn[ing] for a government of balanced estates in a society of stable relationships,” “not
celebrat[ing] participation in the polis,” instead focusing on “an image of the society” that he “hoped to
bring into existence,” viz., a utopian, ephemeral “dream,” as Adams put it, then arguably Jefferson was
not a republican. See Joyce Appleby, “Republicanism in Old and New Contexts,” The William and Mary
Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Jan. 1986), pp.20-34, 24-25, which cited Adams’ letter to Jefferson, AdamsJefferson Letters, Aug. 9, 1816; compare Lance Banning, “Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and
Classical Ideas din the New American Republic. The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 43. No. 1 (Jan.
1986), pp. 3-19.
67

Cf. Wood, The Creation of the Republic, pp. 48-49 (the republicanism to which Adams and others
subscribed was founded on a republic that “represented not so much the formal structure of a
government as it did its spirit.”)
68
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Appendix B
Supplemental Notes

Lawyers have a love-hate relationship with footnotes. We fear
that our reliance on footnotes shows up the lack of poetry
in our souls. We fear that our reliance on footnotes means that
we lack our own voices or bases for our statements:
everything has to come from somewhere else.
And yet, there is something beautifully liberal, even selfless,
about this requirement to support every assertion
in our reasoned argument. The underlying principle seems to be
that none of us is entitled, in the liberal world of law, to impose
his evaluation on others. Instead, we must lead the other,
by mustering and displaying information, by anchoring our arguments
in precedents, laws, and facts, ineluctably but voluntarily, to come to
the same conclusion. …Footnotes are the “put up or shut up” response
to the critical epistemological question in any argument: how do you know?
Joel P. Trachtman, The Tools of Argument: How the Best Lawyers Think, Argue, and Win 1

Introduction
n. 6: In “Most Blessed of the Patriarchs” the authors explained, “Jefferson’s education in Europe taught
him both how to transgress the boundaries that were central to his idealized construction of American
domesticity and how to secure his privacy by projecting a dignified, self-protective ‘demeanour’ that
somehow seemed ‘natural.’ He successfully cultivated the kind of ‘manners’ that enabled his aristocratic
and enlightened European friends to distance themselves from the sordid realities of old regime France.
….[A man whose] ‘affability’ precluded ‘familiarity.’ … Charming and friendly, Jefferson could nevertheless
preserve a distance between himself and those who were not in his family.” Jefferson “condemned the
artificiality of European social life in theory, even as he emulated it in practice. Manners provided him
with a protective shield. The ‘real’ Jefferson remained hidden from view. He employed this shield for the
rest of his life, not always to good effect.” The “H” word (hypocrisy) is avoided, but the implications are
clear: “The way Jefferson pursued his own happiness in Paris – whether or not he indulged his ‘bad
passions’ – had little apparent connection with his prescriptions for his young countrymen. … The antitype
of the good republican was the predatory ‘politician,’ the man who made a living out of politics at the
expense of productive fellow citizens. This was in fact a reasonably accurate description of Jefferson
himself.” This predatory conduct manifested itself particularly in the 1790s “era of intense partisan
rancor,” when “Jefferson’s Franco-American persona grew so polarizing. The conflict-averse gentleman
from Virginia became a lightning rod for political conflict.” Adams clearly felt the brunt of Jefferson’s
polarizing persona. Most notably, however, was the unavoidable applicability of the “H” word to the
matter of Jefferson and slavery. Jefferson’s “sentimental conception of the nation did not include the
people he enslaved…. Jefferson, setting his and the new nation’s sights on promoting the progress of
civilization, was no leveler. Quite to the contrary…. Good manners had an equalizing effect, … yet they
simultaneously reinforced social distinctions: the ‘condescending’ slave owner, looking down from his
horse, and the ‘negro’ – probably a slave – looking up at a member of the master class.” The authors’
remarks about Jefferson and religion are surprising. “In later life he appears to have embarked upon a
genuine spiritual quest, which he managed to keep hidden even from his immediate family…. There is
little wonder that Jefferson had no interest in allowing his skepticism about the miracles portrayed in the
Bible and his lack of belief in the divinity of Jesus to become topics of conversation. He was not an
atheist, but how to explain to the general public his unorthodox beliefs.” Overall, Jefferson’s
1

Joel P. Trachtman, The Tools of Argument: How the Best Lawyers Think, Argue, and Win (North
Charleston, SC: CreateSpace independente Publishing Platform, 2013), p. 125.
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secretiveness can be explained in part by his craving for approval. “‘It is a charming thing,’ he once wrote
to his first three grandchildren, ‘to be loved by everybody’ – and he was serious. Of course, there was no
way to even approach the state of being universally loved without often misleading people about one’s
thought and feelings, hiding them or misrepresenting them to head off potential conflict.” Gordon-Reed &
Onuf, “Most Blessed of the Patriarchs,” pp. 41, 48, 113, 162-63, 191, 232, 244-45, 273, 276, 302.
n. 12: In his 1839 Jubilee speech, JQA stated that England had dared “to tax the people of the colonies
without their consent,” JQA said. The consequence was “Resistance, instantaneous, unconcerted,
sympathetic, inflexible resistance like an electric shock startled and roused the people of all the English
colonies on this continent.” In JQA’s view, this was “the first signal of the North American Union. The
struggle was for chartered rights – for English liberties – for the cause of Algernon Sidney and John
Hambden – for trial by jury – the Habeas Corpus and Magna Charta.” What was the British response?
“But the English lawyers had decided that Parliament was omnipotent – and Parliament in their
omnipotence, instead of trial by jury and the Habeas Corpus, enacted admiralty courts in England to try
Americans for offences charged against them as committed in America – instead of the privileges of
Magna Charta, nullified the charter itself of Massachusetts Bay; shut up the port of Boston; sent armies
and navies to keep the peace, and teach the colonies that John Hambden was a rebel, and Algernon
Sidney a traitor.” Surely JQA was making the assumption in 1839, anyway, that the republican ideas
embraced by Sidney and Hampden were well understood by his audience, the “Fellow-Citizens and
Brethren, Associates of the New York Historical Society.” This would not be true today. See Thomas
Jefferson to Mason Locke Weems, Dec. 13, 1804, Founders Online, National Archives, last modified
June 13, 2018, http://founders.archives.gov/ documents/ Jefferson/99-01-02-0824 (10-28-18) [Early
Access document from The Papers of Thomas Jefferson; not an authoritative final version]; John Quincy
Adams, A Discourse Delivered at the Request of the New York Historical Society, in the City of New York,
on Tuesday, the 30th of April 1839; Being the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Inauguration of George
Washington as President of the United States, on Thursday the 30th of April, 1789 (New York: Samuel
Colman, 1839), FAU/Weiner Collection, pp. 8-9. For a discussion of Jefferson’s reliance on Sidney in
drafting The Declaration of Independence, see Edward Dumbauld, “Algernon Sidney on Public Right,”
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Journal, Vol. 10, Issue 2 (1987), pp. 317-38.
n.14: “The Beardian paradigm organized American history around a restless sea of conflicting material
interests.” Daniel T. Rodgers, “Republicanism: The Career of a Concept,” Journal of American History
Vol.79, No. 1 (June 1992), pp. 11-38, 12-19; Gordon Wood, The Idea of America: Reflections on the Birth
of the United States (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), p. 41; cf. Robert McGuire and Robert Ohsfeldt,
“Economic Interests and the American Constitution: A Quantitative Rehabilitation of Charles A. Beard,”
Journal of Economic History 44 (June 1984), pp. 509-19.
In The Idea of America, Wood reflected on the necessity to go beyond so-called Tory explanations of the
American revolution, which were grounded on material determinism, a prime example of which is Charles
Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1913)[repr. New York: Free Press, 1986]. Wood cited to a 1935 edition. He also advocated
the need to transcend the so-called neo-Whig explanations, which echoed the analyses of nineteenthcentury historians who simply bought wholesale into the statements of motivation articulated by the
colonists, with the result that the neo-Whigs inevitably concluded “that what happened was what was
consciously desired or planned.” Wood, The Idea of America, p. 41.
Instead, Wood maintained that what American revolutionaries said, as well as the conditions pursuant to
which they acted, were both necessary analytical elements of the causes of the American Revolution. As
the title of his original article suggested, the historian must get beyond the duality or “false dichotomy” of
rhetoric and reality. “Propaganda could never move men to revolution. No popular leader, as John
Adams put it, has ever been able ‘to persuade a large people, for any length of time together, to think
themselves wronged, injured, and oppressed, unless they really were, and saw and felt it to be so.’ The
ideas had relevance; the sense of oppression and injury … was nonetheless real. It was indeed the
meaningfulness of the connection between what the Americans said and what they felt that gave the
ideas their propulsive force and their overwhelming persuasiveness.” Id, pp. 12-13 and 52, citing Adams’
Novanglus I, Jan. 23, 1775, PJA Vol. 2, Dec. 1773-April 1775 , p. 229; see also T. H. Breen, American
Insurgents, American Patriots: The Revolution of the People (New York: Hill & Wang, 2010); James T.
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Kloppenberg, Towards Democracy: The Struggle for Self-Rule in European and American Thought
(Oxford University Press, 2016).
n. 47: Fundamental is the avoidance of what Skinner termed “mythologies,” interpretations that reflect the
ideas and biases of the reader rather than the intent of the author. Among his recommendations: (a) there
is no need to “arrive” at a unified interpretation if the message is not there; in addition, if the author does
not say something, he probably did not mean to do so (the mythology of coherence); and (b) no agent
can be described as meaning something which he could never accept as a correct description of what he
meant (the mythology of parochialism). Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of
Ideas,” History and Theory, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1969), pp. 3-53. “One might contrast Skinner’s scholastic view
of interpretation with the hermeneutic perspective, which suggests that our situatedness as interpreters
means that we can never wholly transcend a present perspective – hence, our job is to ‘actualize’ the
past rather than to reproduce it ‘as it really was.’” Prof. Richard Wolin, Marginalia, Charnoff unpublished
paper, “Machiavellian Un-Moments,” 5-17-10. In an article on the role of a judge who applies law by both
pronouncing a sentence on a guilty defendant and through his words creates violent acts against that
defendant, Cover identified the interrelationship between the “long tradition of work elaborating on
Aristotle’s fundamental insight into the nature of deliberation,” Dworkin’s legal theory, hermeneutics, and
Gadamer’s positing “the unity of all hermeneutics, all interpretative activity,” which is “never divorced from
ethics.” Per Cover, “The practice of legal interpretation by the judge is no different from any other
hermeneutic exercise. It exemplifies the mutually and reflexively constructive effects of text, of prior
under-standing of text (tradition), of present application and understanding-as-applied, and of future
commitment.” Robert M. Cover, “Violence and the Word,” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 95, No. 8, Charles
L. Black, Jr. Festschrift (Jul. 1986), pp. 1601-29, 1601-02 n.2, 1610-11 n. 24.
Skinner has been prolific, often focusing his republican analyses on Machiavelli. On the Cambridge
School and contextual history, see “What is conceptual history?” Concepta, International Research
School in Conceptual History and Political Thought, ,http://www.concepta-net.org/conceptual_history, 124-18; Rhodri Lewis, “Review-Article: Historians, Critics and Historicists,” English Historical Review, Vol.
125, No. 513 (April 2010), pp. 370-82. On the Skinner/Pocock methodology and critiques by political
theorists, see Peter L. Janssen, “Political Thought as Traditionary Action: The Critical Response to
Skinner and Pocock,” History and Theory, Vol. 24, No. 2 (May 1985), pp. 115-46; “Review: Skinner and
Pocock in Context: Early Modern Political Thought Today,” History and Theory, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Feb.
2009), pp. 113-21; João Feres Júnior, “Taking Text Seriously: Remarks on the Methodology of the History
of Political Thought,” Contributions to the History of Concepts, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2008), pp. 57-80. For a
particularly blistering view of John Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment, see Cesare Vasoli, “The
Machiavellian Moment: A Grand Ideological Synthesis, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 49, No. 4
(Dec. 1977), pp. 661-70. For Pocock’s reprise to friends and foes, see “The Machiavellian Moment
Revisited: A Study in History and Ideology,” The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Mar. 1981),
pp. 49-72.
n. 53: The first of the three methods White mapped out for analyzing legal history began is ”concerned
with establishing connections between the policy outcomes reached by legal decision-makers and social
and economic trends in American history.” The example provided is reminiscent of Beard’s analysis of
what motivated the members of the Constitutional Convention, who had their own economic axes to grind
which, in Beard’s view, controlled their decision-making. Note that Beard’s analysis focused on the
motivation behind the framing of the Constitution, not the formation of the Republic, i.e., the American
revolution. See Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution. White stated, “the ‘mirror of
society’ perspective can appear intuitively attractive. If one finds, for example, a trend in late nineteenthcentury judicial decisions in industrial accident cases towards limiting the scope of employer liability for
on-the-job accidents suffered by employees, it seems natural to ask whether there were more such
accidents in the late nineteenth century, and whether the judges who wrote decisions limiting employer
liability might, because of their social and educational backgrounds, have been sympathetic to the owners
of railroads or factories rather than their employees.” White, Law in American History, Volume I, p. 8.
The foremost example of this type of legal history is the work of Lawrence M. Friedman, who in the third
edition of A History of American Law (New York: Touchstone, 2005), p. xii (emphasis added), set forth his
approach: “The basic premise of this book is this: Despite a strong dash of history and idiosyncrasy, the
strongest ingredient in American law, at any given time, is the present – current emotions, real economic
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interests, and concrete political groups.” Friedman explained. “It may seem a curious beginning to a book
of history to downgrade the historical element of law. But this is not really a paradox. The history of law
has meaning only if we assume that at any given time the vital portion is new and changing, form
following function, not function following form. History of law is not – or should not be – a search for
fossils, but a study of social development, unfolding through time.”
White did not subscribe to this methodology, or to a second perspective suggestive of Pocock’s method,
which focused on “the distinctive structures of thought, modes of analysis, and linguistic formulations that
have been consistently associated with the Anglo-American legal profession.” In the latter view, legal
decisions should be understood as “driven largely by intraprofessional criteria, such as fidelity to
authoritative legal texts or established judicial doctrine, that track extralegal currents in the larger culture
only sporadically and imperfectly.” White, Law in American History, Volume I, p. 7.
White’s chosen approach, the third perspective, considered “the role of law and legal institutions in their
historical settings,” which “offers the most fruitful vantage point for investigation.” We might call this
method contextual legal history. One of the benefits of this perspective is that, “it allows historians to read
legal materials from the past simultaneously as intraprofessional documents and historical artifacts.”
Judicial opinions are both historical and legal documents. In the latter capacity, they resolve a specific
dispute. But they “are also products of their historical moments. As such they are time-bound, even
though … they have the capacity to endure beyond the context in which they were created.” The
(profound) example White provided is the Constitution, which Justice John Marshall described as
“adaptive to the various crises of human affairs.” In White’s view, which I share, Marshall “did not mean
by that statement that the Constitution was intended constantly to change. On the contrary, he meant
that it was intended to endure.” White’s goal was “to explore the simultaneous effect of historical themes
on law and law on those themes.” Id, pp. 9-10.
n. 58: See, e.g., Carl J. Richard, Greeks & Romans Bearing Gifts: How the Ancients Inspired the
Founding Fathers (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009); Wood, The Creation of the American
Republic, 1776-1787; Joyce Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination
(Harvard University Press, 1992); Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision
of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (University of Chicago Press, 1990); Vernon
Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, Vol. One: The Colonial Mind, 1620-1800 (New
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1927).
n. 59: Most recently see Richard Alan Ryerson, John Adams’s Republic: The One, the Few, and the
Many (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016); Luke Mayville, John Adams and the Fear of
American Oligarchy (Princeton & Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2016). See also Darren Staloff,
Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson: The Politics of Enlightenment and the American Founding (New York: Hill
and Wang, 2005); John Adams and the Founding of the Republic, Richard Alan Ryerson, ed. (Boston:
The Massachusetts Historical Society and Northern University Press, 2001); Richard A. Samuelson,
Review, “John Adams and the Founding of the Republic,” Review of Books, The William and Mary
Quarterly, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Jan. 2002), pp. 315-18; C. Bradley Thompson, John Adams and the Spirit of
Liberty (Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas Press, 1998); John Diggins, The Lost Soul of American
Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism (University of Chicago Press, 1986);
Joseph J. Ellis, Passionate Sage: The Character and Legacy of John Adams (New York & London: W. W.
Norton & Co., 1993). Other important works include James Grant, John Adams: Party of One (New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005); David McCullough, John Adams (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001)
and Richard A. Samuelson, “Mr. Independence: John Adams by David McCullough,” Books in Review,
Commentary (Sept 2001), pp. 75-77 ; John Howe, The Changing Political Thought of John Adams
(Princeton University Press, 1966); and Catherine Drinker Bowen, John Adams and the American
Revolution (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1950).
n. 60: See, e.g., John Locke: A Letter Concerning Toleration and Other Writings, ed. & intro. Mark Goldie
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2010); Daniel Carey, Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson: Contesting
Diversity in the Enlightenment and Beyond (Ideas in Context) (Cambridge University Press, 2006);
Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke’s Political Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Steven M. Dworetz, The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism, and the
American Revolution (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990); Richard Ashcraft Revolutionary
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Politics & Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (Princeton University Press, 1986); Peter Laslett,
“Introduction,” John Locke’s Two Treatises on Government, Peter Laslett, ed. (Cambridge University
Press, 1960, 1963 & New York: Mentor, 1965); Vera Chappell, The Cambridge Companion to Locke
(Cambridge Companions to Philosophy), (Cambridge University Press, 1994); Republicanism, Liberty,
and Commercial Society, 1649-1776, David Wootton, ed. (Stanford University Press, 1994); Joyce
Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (Harvard University Press, 1992);
Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics and John Locke’s “Two Treatises of Government,” (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1986); Richard Ashcraft, “Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of
Government: Radicalism and Lockean Political Theory,” Political Studies/Theory Vol. 8 (1980), pp. 42985; Maurice Cranston, John Locke: A Biography (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1985)[1st
pub. 1957]; John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of
the Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, 1969).
n. 69: “Historians and philosophers of history have been assessing the impact of print for some 500
years. And they have always found the job complicated.” Beginning with the Benedictine abbot
Johannes Trithemius, Anthony Grafton described how generations of scholars have “wrestled with the
subject,” including Erasmus, Martin Luther and Jean Bodin, members of the Annales French school of
historiography led by Lucien Febvre, Marshall McLuhan and Water Ong, S. J., and of late, Roger
Chartier, Robert Darnton, Carlo Ginzburg and Grafton himself. “In the 1970s and 1980s, finally, a new
history of the book exploded into print, drawing contributions from scholars in many nations and falling
into many styles. …No one did more to make this new field take shape than Elizabeth L. Eisenstein,
whose massive two-volume survey The Printing Press as an Agent of Change was first published by
Cambridge University Press in 1979.” Eisenstein’s book “provoked widespread debate. It also helped to
inspire a generation of younger scholars to integrate the history of books and readers into the study of
intellectual and cultural history – a generational change that is currently reshaping the historiography of
all three movements that Eisenstein examined.” Grafton also recognized Adrian Johns: “No one has
done so more systematically, or in a more dramatic way. …Johns devoted his massive Nature of the
Book to reconstructing the world of early modern English printers and authors.” Anthony Grafton,
“Introduction,” AHR Forum, “How Revolutionary Was the Print Revolution?” The American Historical
Review, Vol. 107, No. 1 (Feb. 2002), pp. 84-86; see also related articles by Eisenstein and Johns, id, pp.
87-128. Without significantly diverting to the history of the book in connection with Sidney, it will become
evident in Ch. Two that the reliability of the texts with which posterity is left, and the role of the publisher
in early modern England, are elements in the puzzle of correctly understanding Sidney’s republicanism.
n. 70: Major works on reading and printing in early modern England include Adrian Johns, The Nature of
the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making (University of Chicago Press, 2000); Elizabeth L.
Eisenstadt, The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Lucien
Febvre and Henri-Jean Martin, The Coming of the Book: The Impact of Printing, 1450-1800 (London &
New York City: Verso, 2010); Joad Raymond, Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain
(Cambridge University Press, 2006). On reading in early modern America, see A History of the Book in
America, Vol. 1: The Colonial Book in the Atlantic World, Hugh Amory & David D. Hall, eds. (Chapel Hill,
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), & Vol. 2: An Extensive Republic: Print, Culture, and
Society in the New Nation, 1790-1840, Robert A. Gross & Mary Kelley, eds. (Chapel Hill, NC: University
of North Carolina Press, 2010); E. Jennifer Monaghan, Learning to Read and Write in Colonial America
(Studies in Print Culture and the History of the Book) (Amherst & Boston: University of Massachusetts
Press, 2005). For a wonderful collect-ion amassed by newspaper archivist Todd Andrik of primary
sources with accompanying scholarship that shows us what people were reading in American
revolutionary war town newspapers, broadsheets, and pamphlet literature, see Reporting the
Revolutionary War: Before It Was History, It Was News (Naperville, ILL: Sourcebooks, 2012).
n. 76: Among the historical figures to whom Machiavelli turned were, Moses, Alexander the Great, and
the maritime republic of Ragusa (id, p. 20); Cicero (id, p. 30 & elsewhere); Marius, the Gracchi and Julius
Caesar, who Machiavelli considered “responsible for the destruction of republican liberty in Rome” (id, p.
32 & explanatory note, p. 363); the ancient Gauls (fourth century BCE)(id, p. 41 et seq); Cornelius Scipio
Africanus, ancient Roman conqueror of Hannibal and Carthage (235-183 BCE) (id, p. 48); Agesilaus II,
king of Sparta (444-360 BCE), Timoleon, a ruler of Syracuse (c. 411-337 BCE), Dion of Syracuse (408354 BCE); Nabis, Spartan tyrant (d. 192 BCE); Phalaris, tyrant of the ancient Greek city of Agrigentum in
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the sixth century BCE (id, p. 48); Dante’s Divine Comedy (id, p. 52); Justin’s Histories, an early history
text for children in Machiavelli’s Florentine republic (id, p. 64 & note, p. 372); Plutarch (id, p. 74 & elsewhere); and the list goes on and on. Again, one can appreciate how the reading of Cicero and Machiavelli might be a very different experience if one’s education included the study of the vast number and
range of texts to which they refer. This recognition applies to the reading of Sidney and Adams as well.
n. 98: For studies that rely on particular classical republican sources to support a precise view of the roots
of early modern republicanism, see, e.g., Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought,
2 Vols. (Cambridge University Press, 2008 & 2012 [orig. pub. 1997 & 1978]; Markku Peltonen, Classical
Humanism and Republicanism in English Political Thought, 1570-1640 (Cambridge University Press,
1995); Republicanism I; Jonathan Scott, Commonwealth Principles, Republican Writing of the English
Revolution (Cambridge University Press 2004); Norberto Bobbio and Maurizio Viroli, The Idea of the
Republic (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003); Isaac Kramnick, Republicanism & Bourgeois Radicalism :
Political Ideology in Late Eighteenth-Century England and America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1990); Joyce Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (Harvard University
Press, 1992); Liberty & American Experience in the Eighteenth Century, David Womersley, ed.
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2006). There is also the body of work by Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood,
and James. T. Kloppenberg.
n. 128: Contemporary interpretations of republicanism include:
•

The Pocock/Skinner interpretation (Cambridge School), called “classical,” founded on classical
republicanism (of ancient Rome or Greece or both, depending on the scholar), fostered and
influenced by the civic humanist tradition of the Renaissance, and reappearing in the contexts of the
English Civil War and the American Revolution. As Vickie B. Sullivan stated, “Pocock emphasizes this
Aristotelian element in his characterization of ‘civic humanism’ that flowed through Machiavelli to the
American founders.” Vickie Sullivan, “Muted and Manifest English Machiavellianism,” Machiavelli’s
Liberal Republican Legacy, Paul A. Rahe, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 58-86, 59 n.2.
For scholarship on the Cambridge School, see n. 44. For a discussion of the Skinner/Pocock
methodology and reasonable and unreasonable critiques of it by political theorists, see Peter L.
Janssen, “Political Thought as Traditionary Action: The Critical Response to Skinner and Pocock,”
History and Theory, Vol. 24, No. 2 (May 1985), pp. 115-46. For a particularly blistering review of The
Machiavellian Moment, see Cesare Vasoli, “The Machiavellian Moment: A Grand Ideological
Synthesis, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Dec. 1977), pp. 661-70. For Pocock’s
reprise to friends and foe, see “The Machiavellian Moment Revisited: A Study in History and
Ideology,” The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 53, No. 1 (March 1981), pp. 49-72.

•

The traditional analysis of liberal theorists, epitomized by John Rawls, who was described by one
scholar as not considering republicanism to be in “fundamental opposition” to political liberalism.
John W. Maynor, Republicanism in the Modern World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), Ch. 4,
“Without Regret: The Comprehensive Nature of Nondomination.” See, e.g., John Rawls, Political
Liberalism: Expanded [2nd] Edition (Columbia Classics in Philosophy)(New York: Columbia University
Press, 2005).

•

The Leo Straussians, conservatives rejecting of liberalism. Strauss’ book on Machiavelli begins with
the proposition that Machiavelli was an evil political thinker. Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli
(The University of Chicago Press, 1978). Strauss equated the republicanism that Machiavelli
introduced to the world with man lowering his goals, emphasizing political institutions instead of
individual character. Catherine and Michael Zuckert, The Truth About Leo Strauss, Political
Philosophy and American Democracy (The University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 64. For the
Straussians, Machiavelli is “the key turning point that leads to modern political philosophy, and
Machiavelli’s sin was to speak esoteric truths openly. He [Strauss] told all within hearing that there is
no certain God who punishes wrongdoing; the essence of Machiavellianism is that one can get away
with things.” Id.

•

The Straussian revisionism of Paul A. Raye and associated scholars, who reject the trajectory posited
by Pocock/Skinner, instead viewing Machiavelli as the leading Renaissance political theorist who
repudiated classical republicanism and advocated what they term “liberal” republicanism. See, e.g.,
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Paul Rahe, “Antiquity Surpassed: The Repudiation of Classical Republicanism,” Republicanism,
Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776, pp. 233-69; the collection of essays edited by Rahe in
Machiavelli’s Liberal Republican Legacy.
n. 131: For studies about Florence, Machiavelli, civic humanism, and the crises of the late-fifteenth and
early sixteenth-century see Hans Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and
Republican Liberty in an Age of Classicism and Tyranny, 2 vols. (Princeton University Press, 1955)[2nd
ed., 2000]; Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy (Charleston, SC: Bibliobazaar,
2006); Peter Burke, The Italian Renaissance: Culture and Society in Italy (Princeton University Press,
2000); Sebastian De Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell (New York: Vintage Books, 1994); Ferguson, The
Renaissance in Historical Thought; Eugenio Garin, Italian Humanism: Philosophy and Civic Life in the
Renaissance, (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); Renaissance Civic Humanism, James Hankins, ed.
(Cambridge University Press, 2003); Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic
and Humanist Strain, Rev. Ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1961); Lauro Martines, The Social World of
the Florentine Humanists (Princeton University Press, 1963); John M. Najemy, A History of Florence
1200-1575 (Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2007); Charles Nauert, Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2006); Tim Parks, Medici Money, Banking, Metaphysics, and
Art in Fifteenth-Century Florence (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005); Viroli, Niccolò’s Smile.
n. 158: While it was common for young Renaissance men to study elsewhere, Machiavelli came from a
family of attorneys, talented rhetoricians, who were trained in Florence. The years in which Machiavelli
would have had any formal legal training are often called the “lost” years because of the absence of either
records by Bernardo or others of Machiavelli’s whereabouts. See, e.g. Paul Oppenheimer, “The Lost
Years,” Machiavelli: A Life Beyond Ideology (London & New York: Continuum International Publishing
Group, 2011), Ch. 7, pp. 51-61. Machiavelli’s father Bernardo was a jurist as were several eminent
extended family members. Indeed, Bernardo’s second cousin Girolamo d’Agnolo Machiavelli was “a
prominent political figure in the fifties and belonged to the most outspoken critics of Cosimo de’ Medici’s
politics with their clearly oligarchic leanings.” Girolamo “taught Law at the university of Florence.” It
would be surprising if he left Florence, either for law school or any other school, rather than attending the
Florentine Academy that was his family alma mater. But we do not know. Bernardo kept a diary, a libro
di ricordi, which served to strengthen family memory and secure the transition of property from one
generation to the next. It was not an introspective work; Bernardo wrote about every-day life, domestic
affairs, and judicious housekeeping – governare or buon governo – a concept his son used forty years
later when talking about how a prince should govern. But the diary is completely apolitical, which
distinguishes this ricordanza from many of the period. It also included details about legal dispute
settlements, which is unusual. Sebastian de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell (New York: Vintage Books,
1989), p. 5; Catherine Atkinson, Debts, Dowries, Donkeys, the Diary of Niccolò Machiavelli’s Father,
Messer Bernardo, in Quattrocento Florence, (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002), pp. 38-40, 53-55, 6988, 97-101, 137-48.
Bernardo was a member of the powerful Florentine lawyers’ guild; and he owned a number of very
expensive legal texts of canon and civil law that would have been the core texts of a legal education,
including key volumes of the Corpus Juris Civilis, and Gratian’s Decretum, one of the most important (and
expensive!) works on canon law. Half of his relatively modest library was made up of law texts; humanist
books comprised the other half. Bernardo also borrowed many important legal and humanist books, and
was actively engaged in intellectual circles within Florence, agreeing to compile an index for Livy’s
Roman history in exchange for obtaining a free copy of the book – the way that Machiavelli imbibed Livy
early on, the stepping off point for his Discorsi. There is an issue about whether Machiavelli’s father
actually practiced law, although we know that at a minimum he sometimes functioned as what we would
today call an arbitrator or mediator; and Machiavelli’s very pragmatic, “bottom line,” goal-oriented way of
analyzing issues indeed is very lawyerly.
One of the reasons that we know about the professional reputation of Machiavelli‘s father is because the
great humanist Florentine chancellor Bartolomeo Scala greatly admired Bernardo’s legal mind as
evidenced from his appearance in Scala’s 1483 De Legibus et judiciis dialogus, Dialogue on Laws and
Legal Judgment, published when Machiavelli was fourteen. From Scala’s work it is evident that
“Bernardo Machiavelli was regarded as a recognized and expert authority on legal matters.” The book
was dedicated to Scala’s patron, Lorenzo de’ Medici. The staged dialogue takes place between Scala in
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his splendid palazzo and the jurist Bernardo Machiavelli. Scala was a man of high standing in Florence
and was well acquainted with eminent humanists in the Medici circle; indeed, he was one. He shared
with Bernardo a modest background relative to the likes of the Medici, although Bernardo’s background
was more highbrow than Scala’s. Both were trained as attorneys and “probably” studied law in Florence
together. Both shared interests in humanist studies. Bernardo was also introduced in Scala’s Dialogue
as “a person known about town.” In short, “he must have possessed a certain amount of authority to be
able to effectively promote Scala’s interests.” Id, pp. 151-52. Clearly, the two men were friends, and
clearly Scala had high regard for Bernardo’s legal knowledge. In the Dialogue Scala praised Bernardo’s
excellent memory and his learning. The subject of the Dialogue was “the role played by laws in society,
and the relationship between legislation and contemporary practices of jurisdiction in Florence.” It posited
the question, “to what extent law can and should be instrumentalised”? In this “age-old debate …’The
traditional, idealistic view of law as the embodiment of reason and justice is upheld by Bernardo
Machiavelli, the practising lawyer, the pragmatic view of law by the empiricist Scala.’” Id, pp. 149-50,
citing Alison Brown, Bartolomeo Scala, Chancellor of Florence, 1430-1497: The Humanist as Bureaucrat
(Princeton University Press, 1979, pp. 288ff. Scala’s positivist argument could have been used to
sanction the increasing influence of the Medici and the adjustment of laws to their desires. Scala needed
a foil; that was Bernardo’s role, described by an English translator of the Dialogue as “the republican
position.” But Bernardo also harshly criticized current legal practices in Florence: “the lawyers’ hairsplitting sophistry, their speeches which were designed to conceal the truth rather than reveal it, and their
pomposity.” In the text Scala called Bernardo “amicus et familiaris meus,” which coincided with the nature
of their actual friendship. Id, pp. 149-52.
n. 161: For the scholarship on Renaissance jurisprudence and legal humanism, see particularly Mark D.
Walters, “Legal Humanism and Law-as-Integrity,” The Cambridge Law Journal Vol. 67, No. (July 2008),
pp. 352-75; Lauro Martines, Lawyers and Statecraft in Renaissance Florence (Princeton University Press.
1968); Donald R. Kelley, Renaissance Humanism (Boston: Twayne Publishers. 1991); Kelley, “Vera
Philosophia”; Kelley, “History, English Law and the Renaissance,” Past & Present, No. 65 (Nov. 1974),
pp. 24-51; Kelley, “Legal Humanism and their Sense of History,” Studies in the Renaissance, Vol. 13
(1966), pp. 184-99; Lawrin Armstrong and Julius Kirshner, The Politics of Law in Late Medieval and
Renaissance Italy (Toronto University Press, 2011); Politics, Ideology and the Law in Early Modern
Europe: Essays in Honor of J. H. M. Salmon, Adrianna E. Bakos, ed. (University of Rochester Press,
1994); Brian Tierney, Religion, Law and the Growth of Constitutional Thought 1150-1650 (Cambridge
University Press, 1982; Ian Maclean, Interpretation and Meaning in the Renaissance: The Case of Law
(Ideas in Context) (Cambridge University Press. 2005) [1st ed. 1992] ; Rosamund J Mitchell, "English
Law Students at Bologna in the Fifteenth Century," The English Historical Review 51 (1936), pp. 270-87.
n. 165: See also Wyger R. E. Velema, “’That a Republic is Better than a Monarchy’: Anti-monarchism in
Early Modern Dutch Political Thought,” Republicanism I, pp. 9-25; Martin Van Gelderen, "The
Machiavellian Moment and the Dutch Revolt: the Rise of Neo-stoicism and Dutch Republicanism,"
Machiavelli and Republicanism, pp. 205-23; Eco Haitsma Mulier, “The language of seventeenth-century
republicanism in the. United Provinces: Dutch or European?” The Languages of Political. Theory in EarlyModern Europe, Anthony Pagden, ed. Cambridge University Press1990), pp. 179-95; Cicely V.
Wedgwood, William the Silent: William of Nassau, Prince of Orange, 1533–1584 (W. W. Norton & Co.,
1968) [1st pub. 1944]; K. W. Swart, William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572-84, R. P.
Fagel, M.E.H.N. Mount & H.F.K. Van Nierp, eds., J.C. Grayson, tr., Alastair Duke & Jonathan I. Israel,
intros. (London & New York: Routledge, 2016)[1st pub. 1994].
n. 192: In “Comparing and Generalizing, historian Peter Baldwin stated, “Much of what bothers historians
about generalizations at this altitude is what exactly they are after. Generalizations that seek the essence
of the matter in vitro, such as Nolte’s definition of fascism or Patterson’s of slavery, attempt Platonically to
construct an ideal form of what exists only in imperfect fragments on Earth. If so, then what is the
relationship between the ideal form – generic fascism, say – and the really existing fascisms of history?”
In fact, “The real ones will only partly embody the essential attributes identified in the ideal form,
becoming thus examples of something ‘higher.’” Because “[g]eneric fascism has never existed and the
question is what purpose such a construct serves…. While not actually gaining more empirical knowledge
of any individual cases, we would know more about them in a conceptual sense, to the extent that we
now recognized them as members of a larger class of events.” Accordingly, “the relationship between the
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individual cases and the general one is problematic.” Indeed, said Baldwin, historians are Wittgensteinians if they view the social sciences as “Platonic in their search for essences and ideal forms that explain
the commonality of the phenomena that in other respects are different…. They are content to point out
family resemblances among phenomena that are related without thereby invoking any particular
Smithness to account for that charmingly lopsided grin sported by so many of the really existing Smiths,
while also not denying family membership to those with straight mouths.” “Comparing and Generalizing,”
Comparison and History, pp. 1-22, 13-14.
n. 212: On ancient constitutionalism, see Petra Dogner and Martin Loughlin, The Twilight of
Constitutionalism? (Oxford Constitution-al Theory) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); John H.
Langbein, Renée Lettow Lerner, and Bruce P. Smith, History of the Common Law (New York: Aspen
Publishers, 2009); Alexander S. Rosenthal, Crown under Law: Richard Hooker, John Locke, and the
Ascent of Modern Constitutionalism (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008); Stanley Chodorow, Law
Libraries and the Formation of the Legal Profession in the Late Middle Ages (Austin, TX: Jamail Center of
Legal Research, 2007); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, "The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir
Edward Coke's British Jurisprudence," Law and History Review 21 (Fall 2003), pp. 439-82; Athanasios
Moulakis, “Realist constitutionalism,” Renaissance Civic Humanism, James Hankins, ed. (Cambridge
University Press, 2003), pp. 200-22; Scott Gordon, Controlling the State, Constitutionalism from Ancient
Athens to Today (Harvard University Press, 2002); J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History,
4th ed. (London: Buttersworths, 2002); Janelle Greenberg, The Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution.
St. Edward’s “Laws” in Early Modern Political Thought (The University of Cambridge, 2001); T. R. S.
Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Oxford University
Press, 1995); Ellis Sandoz, ed., The Roots of Liberty: Magna Carta, Ancient Constitution, and the AngloAmerican Tradition of Rule of Law (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 1993); Ian Maclean, Interpretation and
Meaning in the Renaissance: The Case of Law (Cambridge University Press, 1992); M. T. Clanchy,
"Remembering the Past and the Good Old Law," History 55 (new series, 1970), pp. 165-76; Arthur R.
Hogue, Origins of the Common Law (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1986)[orig. pub. 1966]; The Great
Charter: Four Essays on Magna Carta and the History of our Liberty, Erwin N. Griswold, intro. (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1965); Margaret Atwood Judson, The Crisis of the Constitution: An Essay in
Constitutional and Political Thought in England 1603-1645 (No. Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
1949); Mark A. Thomson, A Constitutional History of England 1642 to 1801 (London: Methuen & Co.
1938); Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, Clint Rossiter,
1955 pref. notes (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2007) [orig. pub. Harvard Law Review 42 (1928-1929)];
Cyril Ransome, Rise of Constitutional Government in England (Lexington, KY, 2014)[orig. ed. 1907];
Hannis Taylor, The Origin and Growth of the English Constitution (Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press
by H. O. Houghton & Co., 1898); Jean Louis De Lolme, The Constitution of England, David Lieberman,
ed. & intro. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2007)[orig. ed. In French, 1771].
On American constitutionalism, see Gary L. McDowell, The Language of Law and the Foundations of
American Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press. 2010); Jack P. Greene, The Constitutional
Origins of the American Revolution (New Histories of American Law)(Cambridge University Press. 2010);
Steven Kautz, Arthur Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman, The Supreme Court and the
Idea of Constitutionalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); Mary Sarah Bilder, The
Transatlantic Constitution: Colonial Legal Culture and the Empire (Cambridge MA & London: Harvard
University Press, 2004); James Reist Stoner, Jr., Common Law & Liberal Theory: Coke, Hobbes, and the
Origins of American Constitutionalism (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 1992); David A. J.
Richards, Foundations of American Constitutionalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Donald
Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press.
1988); Barbara A. Black, “The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists,” 124 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 1186-98 (1976); Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Foundations of American
Constitutionalism (New York: Fawcett Publications. 1966); McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum; Symposium, “Roads not Taken: Undercurrents of Republican Thinking in Modern Constitutional Theory,” 84
Northwestern Law Review (1989); J. M. Porter and R. S. Farnell, "John Adams and American
Constitutionalism," American Journal of Jurisprudence 21 (1976), pp. 32-33; Edward S. Corwin, The
“Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2008) [orig.
pub. Harvard Law Review 42 (1928-1929)]. See also Daniel N. Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire: New
York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664-1830, Studies in Legal
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History (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Barry Alan Shain , The Nature of
Rights at the American Founding and Beyond (Constitutionalism and Democracy) (Charlottesville, VA:
University of Virginia Press, 2007); America and Constitutionalism, Johnathan O'Neill & Gary L.
McDowell, eds. (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006); Jamail Zainaldin, Law and Jurisprudence in
American History, 6th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West, 2006); Kermit L. Hall, Paul Finkelman, and James W. Ely
Jr., American Legal History: Cases and Materials, 3d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Jack
P. Greene, "From the Perspective of Law: Context and Legitimacy in the Origins of the American
Revolution," South Atlantic Quarterly 85 (1986), pp. 56-77; Cass R. Sunstein, "Naked Preferences and
the Constitution," 84 Columbia Law Review 1689-1732 (1984); Thomas C. Grey, "Origins of the Unwritten
Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought," Stanford Law Review 30 (1978), pp.
843-93; A. E. Dick Howard, The Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America
(Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1968); M. J. C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of
Powers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); cf. Scott, Review, The English Historical Review, Vol. 112, No.
448 (Sept. 1997), pp. 949-51, 949 (“republican constitutional architecture” was “a fundamental feature” of
English republicanism, advanced particularly by Blair Worden, is “incorrect”; it was not “constitutionalist in
orientation (the extreme exception of James Harrington proving the rule.”
n. 213: See Charles Howard McIlwain, "The English Common Law, Barrier Against Absolutism,"
American Historical Re-view 49 (1943), pp. 23-31; Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Indianapolis,
IN: Liberty Fund, Inc. 2010)[orig. pub. 1940]; The American Revolution: A Constitutional Interpretation
(New York: Great Seal Books, Cornell University Press, 1961)[orig. pub. 1923]; High Court of Parliament
and Its Supremacy (Hamden, CN: 1962)[orig. pub. 1910]. See also Essays in History and Political
Theory in Honor of Charles Howard McIlwain, Carl F. Wittke, ed. (Harvard University Press, 1936). For a
summary of the onslaught of McIlwain critiques, see Black, The Constitution of Empire.
n. 214: For John Phillip Reid’s work, see The Ancient Constitution and the Origins of Anglo-American
Liberty (DeKalb, IL: No. Illinois University Press, 2005); Rule of Law; "The Jurisprudence of Liberty: The
Ancient Constitution in the Legal Historiography of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," The
Roots of Liberty: Magna Carta, Ancient Constitution, and the Anglo-American Tradition of Rule of Law,
Ellis Sandoz, ed. (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1993), pp. 147-23; "Law and History,"
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 27 (Nov. 1993), pp. 193-223; Constitutional History of the American
Revolution: The Authority of Law: Vol. 4 (Madison, WI, University of Wisconsin Press, 1993);
Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority to Legislate: Vol. 3 (Madison, WI:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1991); The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American
Revolution; Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority to Tax: Vol. 2 (Madison, WI:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority of
Rights: Vol. 1 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986); The Briefs of the American Revolution,
John Phillip Reid, ed. (New York and London. 1981); "In the Taught Tradition: The Meaning of Law in
Massachusetts Bay Two Hundred Years Ago," Suffolk University Law Review 14 (Summer 1980), pp.
931-74; "In Legitimate Stirps: The Concept of 'Arbitrary,' the Supremacy of the Parliament and the
Coming of the American Revolution," Hofstra Law Review 5 (1977), pp. 459-99; In a Defiant Stance: The
Conditions of Law in Massachusetts Bay, the Irish Comparison, and the Coming of the American
Revolution (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2002); 'In Our Contracted Sphere': The
Constitutional Contract, the Stamp Act Crisis, and the Coming of the American Revolution," Columbia
Law Review 76 (1976), pp. 21-47; "In Accordance with Usage: The Authority of Custom, the Stamp Act
Debate, and the Coming of the American Revolution," Fordham Law Review 45 (1976), pp. 335-68; see
also Law as Culture and Culture as Law: Essays in Honor of John Phillip Reid, Hartoz Hendrik & William
E. Nelson, eds. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2000).
For M. N. S. Sellers, see Republican Legal Theory: The History, Constitution, and Purposes of Law in a
Free State (New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2003); The Sacred Fire of Liberty: Republicanism, Liberalism
and the Law (New York University Press, 1998); American Republicanism (New York University Press.
1994).
n. 216: On the development of the American legal system and bar, see Daniel R. Coquillette and Bruce
A. Kimball, On the Battlefield of Merit: Harvard Law School, the First Century (Cambridge, MA & London:
Harvard University Press, 2015); Charles Warren, A History of the American Bar (Cambridge University
Press, 2013), [orig. pub. 1911]; Law in Colonial Massachusetts 1630-1800 (Boston: The Colonial Society
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of Massachusetts, distr. by the University Press of Virginia, 1984); John M. Murrin, "The Legal
Transformation: The Bench and Bar of Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts," Stanley N. Katz & John M.
Murrin, eds. Colonial America: Essays in Politics and Social Development (New York. 1983); Law in the
American Revolution and the Revolution in the Law: A Collection of Review Essays on American Legal
History, Hendrik Hartog, ed. (New York & London: New York University Press, 1981); Joseph H. Smith,
“An Independent Judiciary: The Colonial Background,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 124,
No. 5 (May 1976), pp. 1104-56. On early American legal history generally, see Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr.: The Common Law, G. Edward White, Intro. (Cambridge, MA & London: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 2009); Pestritto, Ronald J. & Thomas G. West, eds., The American Founding
and the Social Compact (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003); James Maldoon, “Discovery, Grant,
Charter, Conquest, or Purchase: John Adams on the Legal Basis for English Possession of North
America,” Christopher L. Tomlins, ed., The Many Legalities of Early America (Chapel Hill, NC: University
of North Carolina Press. 2001), pp. 25-46; Paul Samuel Reinsch, English Common Law in the Early
American Colonies, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1899); Richard B. Morris, “Legalism
versus Revolutionary Doctrine in New England,” Essays in the History of Early American Law, David H.
Flaherty, ed. (Chapel Hill. 1969); Samuel Eliot Morison, “The Struggle Over the Adoption of the
Constitution of Mass, 1780,” Proceedings of the Mass Historical Society 50 (1917), pp. 353-412. On John
Adams’ ideas about the law, see Richard Samuelson, "John Adams and the Republic of Laws,” History of
American Political Thought, Bryan-Paul Frost & Jeffrey Sikkenga, eds. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2003), Ch. 6, pp. 114-31; Robert J. Taylor, "John Adams: Legalist as Revolutionist." 89 Proceedings of
the Massachusetts Historical Society, Third Series, Vol. 89 (1977), pp. 55-71; On the extension of English
law to the colonies, see Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution; Black, “The Constitution of Empire”;
Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law; Joseph Henry Smith, Appeals to
the Privy Council from the American Plantations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), Ch. VIII,
“The Privy Council and the Extension of English Law,” pp. 464-522; Charles F. Mullett, "Coke and the
American Revolution," Economica 12 (Nov. 1932), pp. 457-71; George Chalmers, The Opinions of
Eminent Lawyers, on Various Points of English Jurisprudence , Chiefly Concerning the Colonies,
Fisheries, and Commerce of Great Britain (Burlington. VT: C. Goodrich and Company, 1858)[2003 repr.;
orig. pub. In 2 vols., 1814], p. viii (“the most complete and authentic record we possess of the current of
legal opinion in England upon the relations between that country and her American colonies”)
n. 218: For scholarship on legal theory, history and famous legal cases, see, e.g., Catherine Drinker
Bowen, The Lion and the Throne: The Life and Times of Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634) (Boston &
Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1957); Paul Christianson, "John Selden, the Five Knights' Case, and
Discretionary Imprisonment in Early Stuart England," Criminal Justice History 6 (1985), pp. 65-87;
Christopher Collier, "The Historians Versus the Lawyers: James Madison, James Hutson, and the
Doctrine of Original Intent," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 112 (Jan. 1988), pp. 13744; Charles Edwards, “The Law of Nature in the Thought of Hugo Grotius,” The Journal of Politics, Vol.
32, No. 4 (Nov., 1970), pp. 784-807; Kenneth Fincham, "The Judges' Decision on Ship Money in
February 1637: The Reaction in Kent," Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 57 (1984), pp. 23032; Matthew Hale, "Reflections by the Ltd. Chiefe Justice Hale on Mr. Hobbes His Dialogue of the Lawe,"
Law Quarterly Review 37 (July 1921), pp. 285-303; Robert W. Gordon, “Reason, Authority, and
Imagination: The Jurisprudence of Sir Edward Coke," Perez Zogorin, ed., Culture and Politics from
Puritanism to the Enlightenment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 25-66; Theodore
Plucknett, "Bonham's Case and Judicial Review," 40 Harvard Law Review 30 (1926). Daniel S.
Hulsebosch, “Edward Coke and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward Coke’s British Jurisprudence,” Law
and History Review 21 (2003), pp. 439-82; James Reist Stoner, Jr., Common Law & Liberal Theory:
Coke, Hobbes, and the Origins of American Constitutionalism (Lawrence, KA: Uni-versity Press of
Kansas. 1992); J. H. Hexter, "Thomas Hobbes and the Law." Cornell Law Review 65 (1980), pp. 471-90.
PART ONE
Chapter One
n. 21: In 1500 London was far smaller than the two largest European cities, Constantinople and Naples,
which each had over 400,000 inhabitants. There were about 35,000 people in London. By 1550 the
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London population had more than tripled to 120,000, and by the mid-1670s it was approximately 500,000.
Indeed, by 1650, London had probably overtaken Paris as the most populated city in Western Europe. In
1684, the year after Algernon Sidney was executed, London’s population was estimated at 527,000; by
1715 it had grown to 630,000, by 1760 to about 740,000 and, by 1800, when “the first reliable modern
census was taken,” to over a million. Growth continued. “In 1815 London was already the largest city in
the world, but by 1860 it had grown three-fold to reach 3,188,485 souls.”
In general, the growth of London’s population in the sixteenth century kept pace with England’s total
population, and London had about two to three percent of the total population. After 1600, the latter
population mushroomed so that over ten percent of the people resided there until that trend changed in
the second half of the eighteenth century. This coincided with scientific and agronomic advances that
produced significant increases in crop yields. Overall, the English population by 1541 was 2.8 million, a
“substantial increase” over the population of the prior century. It crossed the 4 million mark by the end of
the sixteenth century, and reached 5.3 million by the 1640s. Unsurprisingly given the Civil Wars and
subsequent instability in the country, the population was about 5 million in the 1680s notwithstanding
reasons for growth, including the rapid increase in food and raw materials imported to London. Just to
provide a few data points, about ten percent of the male population died in the Civil Wars, there was
massive homelessness, many villages were pillaged at least once and often repeatedly. Some villages
dis-appeared. After steady growth in the eighteenth century, England’s population reached about 15
million by 1800.
Houston and Pincus’s thesis in A Nation Transformed is that the late seventeenth century marks the
transition in England from early modernity to modernity, “with large scale transformations … both large
and fairly rapid.” With-out staking out a position on this modernity thesis, it is clear that trade had become
of enormous importance to the Crown and to the London economy in Elizabethan England, if not earlier.
An indication of its national importance is evident by the prominence placed on international trade and
England’s “Manufacture of cloth” in Cromwell’s 1654 speech to his new Parliament. Moreover, while
agriculture had been the mainstay of the English economy for centuries, by 1700 agriculture was
increasingly commercialized and accounted for forty percent (or less) of the gross national product, with
industry and trade now constituting thirty-three percent of the GNP. In a 1668 letter to his sister
Henrietta, Duchess of New Orleans, Charles II wrote, “it will be dangerous to me at home to make an
intire league [with France], till first the great and principale interest of this nation be secured, which is
trade.”
See “A Population History of London,” The Proceedings of the Old Bailey, https://www.oldbailey
online.org/ static/Population-history-of-london.jsp (9-7-18); D. B. Grigg, Population Growth and Agrarian
Change: An Historical Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 95; Peter Turchin & Sergey A.
Nefedov, Secular Cycles (Princeton University Press, 2009), Ch. 3, “Early Modern England: The TudorStuart Cycle (1485-1730),” pp. 81-110, 81, 89, 91-93; Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, p. 127; Thomas
Platter’s Travels in England, 1599, tr. & ed. C. Williams (London, 1937), pp. 153-59, 166-67, 199, 201,
cited in Sources and Debates in English History 1485-1714, 2nd ed., Newton Key & Robert Bucholz, eds.
(West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) at p. 98; Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 85, citing A. L. Beier
and Roger Finlay, London 1500-1700: The Making of the Metropolis (London 1986), pp. 1-5, 39; cf.
“Introduction,” A Nation Transformed: England after the Restoration, Alan Houston & Steve Pincus, eds.
(Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 10-11 (London at “nearly 600,000” by 1700); Plumb, The Growth
of Political Stability in England 1675-1725, p.3 n.1 (“The question of the seventeenth-century population
of England is a highly debatable topic, and will probably remain so, owing to shortage of statistical data.”)
For an informative discussion on trade in Tudor England, see G. R. Elton, England Under the Tudors
(London & New York: Methuen, 1985), Ch. IX, “England During the Price Revolution,” §3, “Industry and
Trade,” pp. 238-51; see Charles II to Henrietta, Sept. 2, 1668, Julia Cartwright, Madame, A Life of
Henrietta, Daughter of Charles I and Duchess of Orleans (London: Seeley and Co., 1900) [Palala Press,
undated] pp. 270-71. On Cromwell’s speech and his emphasis on England’s economy and trade, see
Oliver Cromwell, His Highnesse the Lord Protector's Speech to the Parliament in the Painted Chamber.
The one on Munday the 4th of September; The other on Tuesday the 12. Of September, 1654. Taken by
One who Stood very near him, and Published to prevent mistakes (London: T.R. & E.M., 1654), pp. 1820.
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n. 29: In the early fifth century, “under the guise of a commentary on a work of Cicero’s,” Macrobius
stated, “Since, from the Supreme God Mind arises, and from Mind, Soul, and since this in turn creates all
subsequent things and fills them all with life, and since this single radiance illumines all and is reflected in
each, as a single face might be reflected in many mirrors placed in a series; and since all things follow in
the continuous succession, degenerating in sequence to the very bottom of the series, the attentive
observer will discover a connection of parts, from the Supreme God down to the last dregs of things,
mutually linked together and without a break. And this is Homer’s golden chain, which God, he says,
bade hang down from heaven to earth.” The hierarchical social structure was similarly spelled out in Sir
Thomas Smith’s famous composition, De Republica Anglorum, written in 1565. Smith was a diplomat and
the first regius professor of civil law at Cambridge. The concept of a chain of being was reiterated by Sir
William Temple, a seventeenth-century English diplomat and friend of the Sidney family. Temple “wrote
privately as a young man of ‘that eternall order and series of thinges, which though it soone leaves us at a
loss, yet mounts up the linkes of a continued chaine the end of which is the hand of its maker.’” Arthur O.
Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (New Brunswick & London:
Transaction Publishers, 2009) [orig. pub. 1936], pp. 2, 63; drawing, “The Great Chain of Being,” Diego
Valadés, Rhetorica Christiana, 1579, located in the British Library and reprinted in Sources and Debates
in English History 1485-1714, p. 3; Richard Faber, The Brave Courtier Sir William Temple (London: Faber
and Faber Ltd, 1983), p. 135; Bowen, The Lion and the Throne, p. 30.
n. 49: The Library of the Sidneys of Penshurst Place circa 1665 introduced, printed and, in some cases,
annotated the entries contained in a bound manuscript catalogue of books that was written largely in the
handwriting of Gilbert Spencer, secretary and steward of the Sidney family in the 1650s through the
1670s. The last entry in the catalogue was in late 1664 or possibly early 1665. Spencer wrote most of the
catalogue in the 1652 to ’53 timeframe from a handwritten list, an inventory taker’s schedule, or perhaps
a bundle of alphabetized slips; it does not appear to have been based on a review of the books
themselves. There are 4,927 catalogue entries; 871 additional entries were added over the following
twelve years, resulting in 5,798 entries. After various calculations for duplicate entries, grouped entries
and other corrections, the editors of The Library of the Sidneys concluded that there were about 4,800
physical volumes rep-resented in this catalogue and about 4,500 separately published titles. “By the
standards of the time, the Penshurst library was thus a remarkably substantial one. Even so, the
catalogue does not list every book to be found at Penshurst Place in the mid-seventeenth century.” The
Library of the Sidneys, pp. 6-8, 12-13. With regard to James I’s work, the catalogue lists Basilikon Doron,
but not The True law of Free Monarchies. Not surprisingly, and for a variety of complex reasons, the
editors recognized that their catalogue is incomplete. In particular, it is inconceivable that Algernon
Sidney and his father had not read, and likely owned a copy of this latter text by James Stuart. Algernon,
for example, referred to Filmer’s reliance on The True Law of Free Monarchy. Indeed, Thomas West, the
editor of Discourses, pointed out places in this text where Sidney challenged Filmer statements taken
directly from The True law of Free Monarchies. See DCG, II.27.265 n.9, III.4.339 n.1, III.15.398 n.1,
III.15.401 n.8, III.46.572-73.
n. 59: There were at least eight distinct but overlapping religious interests in later seventeenth-century
Ireland: the native, Gaelic Irish; the Old English descendants of the original Anglo-Norman settlers, most
of whom were attached to the pre-Reformation (Catholic) Church; the New English, who were Church of
Englanders; Scottish settlers; members of the Catholic Church; members of the Protestant Church;
Protestant nonconformists; and representatives of the Crown. In 1672, about two-thirds of the 1.7 million
people in Ireland were Catholic, and the “nation of Ireland” was typically understood by contemporaries to
mean the Irish Catholics. The remainder of the Irish population was divided roughly into thirds: members
of the Church of England, Scottish Presbyterians, and other Protestant dissenters. In contrast, in
England, with a population over three times the size of Ireland’s, about 5.47 million in 1656, there was
less diversity. Church of England members predominated; there were various forms of nonconformism
(with Presbyterians, Independents, Baptists and Quakers the largest categories); and there were
Catholics, by this time the smallest religious minority representing only 1.2 percent of the population.
Catholics lived predominantly in regions of the northwest, midwest, and certain metropolitan areas,
particularly London. The official number of Protestant nonconformists, five percent, is a significant
underestimate as this figure only recognizes extreme forms of nonconformism. A less severe standard
would include those who divided their time between the Church of England and conventicles.
Nonconformists were geographically and sociologically widespread, although certain areas of the country
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had a much higher nonconformist population, including London. Finally, with a population of about 1.23
million in 1691, Scotland was linguistically and culturally divided between Gaelic-speaking Highlanders,
and English-speaking Lowlanders. The Protestant majority was divided between Presbyterians,
particularly in the south and west, and Episcopalians, predominant in the north. There also was a small
Scottish Catholic minority, albeit less than two percent of the population, who lived overwhelmingly in the
remote Scottish Highlands and Islands. Harris, Restoration: Charles II and His Kingdoms, pp. 28-32.
Throughout this study, I have avoided use of the words “Anglican” and “Anglicanism.” Anglicanism is a
nineteenth-century term. The much earlier term Ecclesia Anglicana referred to the medieval (Catholic)
English Church. Henry VIII became “legislatively acknowledged” as the supreme head of Anglicana
ecclesia, which was the Church of England. Nascent Anglicanism emerged during Edward VI’s reign with
Thomas Cranmer’s influence, including the authorization of an English vernacular Bible and the
publication of the Book of Common Prayer as the vernacular liturgy for common worship. But it is
simplest where practicable to avoid anachronism, and therefore I utilize the expression, “Church of
Englanders.” See Frederica Harris Thompsett, “Anglicanism,” Historical Dictionary of Stuart England, pp.
15-16.
n. 60: Francis, the Duke of Guise, and his brother Charles, the cardinal of Lorraine, became the principal
advisors to their nephew, French King Francis II, when he became king in 1559 after the unexpected
death of his father, Henry II, whose wife was Catherine de Medici. Francis’s wife was Mary Queen of
Scots; both were Catholic; her mother was a Guise. The Guise family was not only Catholic but ardently
so, and strongly opposed the influence of the House of Bourbon, which was “Protestant-leaning” (and
Henry, King of Navarre, was a Bourbon). As intolerant Catholics increasingly dominated the French
monarchy, the persecution of French Protestants steadily increased, and only with the unexpected death
of Francis II did Protestant Louis of Bourbon, the Prince of Condé and Henry of Navarre’s uncle, avoid
execution for conspiracy. Catherine became regent for her younger son, the heir Charles IX, and
endeavored without success to moderate the Guise policy of persecuting the Huguenots. The consequence was that both sides became increasingly aggressive, confrontational and provocative, leading to
a massacre of Huguenot worshippers in the town of Vassy, east of Paris, in 1562. This immediately led to
the withdrawal of Condé from court, his seizure of the town of Orléans, and ultimately, religious civil war.
There were eight French civil wars, during one of which the infamous St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre
took place, before a more stable peace was achieved in 1598 through an edict of toleration, the Edict of
Nantes. “Introduction: Saint Bartholomew’s Day and the Problem of Religious Violence,” The Saint
Bartholomew’s Day Massacre: A Brief History with Documents, Barbara B. Diefendorf, ed. (Boston & New
York, Bedford/St. Martins, 2009), pp. 10-32, 71-72.
n. 70: There are so many studies of the period that it would be futile to try to list them all. Among my
favorites are Christopher Hill’s classic study, The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the
English Revolution (London: Penguin History, 1984), a compelling account of the social impact of the
English Civil War, and Jonathan Scott’s England’s Troubles, a detailed account of the complexity of
seventeenth-century English history and its political ramifications in the broader context of European
affairs. Worden’s multiple works on the Interregnum are indispensable, e.g., God’s Instruments: Political
Conduct in the England of Oliver Cromwell (Oxford University Press, 2012) and Literature and Politics in
Cromwellian England: John Milton, Andrew Marvell, Marchamont Nedham (Oxford University Press,
2009). For a recent and very detailed portrayal of the war itself, see Michael Braddick, God’s Fury
England’s Fire, A New History of the English Civil Wars (London: Penguin, 2008). Tim Harris’s work,
Rebellion: Britain’s First Stuart Kings (Oxford University Press, 2014), captures the years immediately
preceding the war. Lawrence Stone’s The Causes of The English Revolution 1529-1642 (London and
New York: Routledge, 2005) remains a brilliant and succinct classic.
n. 77: William de Perci arrived in England in the eleventh century. The family came from the village of
Percy-en-Auge, which is in the Basse-Normandie region of northwest France, about 150 miles from Paris
and not too far from Le Havre. “Until relatively recently, Percy was thought to be a ‘Companion of the
Conqueror’ – one of those magnates who personally accompanied Duke William of Normandy across the
Channel in 1066, which implies the Companion’s aristocratic status and blood-kinship to the duke in the
‘Old Country’. Every Anglo-Norman family worth its salt later jostled for inclusion in the list.” In fact, de
Perci was not one of the original and very limited number of Companions. But he did indeed accompany
William of Normandy to England on a return visit in December 1067. It is important to realize, however,
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that William, dubbed the Conqueror, was not in 1066, “master of all he surveyed. The Conquest was not a
revolution, but an evolution.” William de Perci (anglicized to Percy) participated in that process,
conquering the Franks. De Perci, along with other warriors accompanying William, hoped to become a
baron in the new northern empire, with “a free hand to make their names fighting the Scots and ‘pacifying’
the nordanhymbri.” Alexander Rose, Kings in the North: The House of Percy in British History (London:
Phoenix, 2002), pp. 26-27; cf. “Sir Henry Sidney,” Dictionary of National Biography, Sidney Lee, ed. (New
York: The MacMillan Co., London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1898)(“DNB”), Vol. LIV, p. 210 (Sir William
Sidney was chamberlain to Henry II, with whom he came from Anjou, and that he also accompanied
Thomas, Lord Darcy, in 1511 into Spain as a volunteer against the Moors). On the conquering Normans,
see David Bates, The Normans and Empire: The Ford Lectures Delivered in the University of Oxford
during Hilary Term 2010 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
n. 106: On the subject of the monarchomach’s reliance on Roman law, Giesey explained, “We should
not be surprised at the prevalence of Roman law notions in the Monarchomachs. Beza and Mornay – or
Languet, if you will – not to mention Calvin himself, were educated in the Roman Law, while Hotman was
a famous scholar and teacher of it. If the proposition that Calvinist constitutional theorists utilized Roman
Law confuses modern scholars because they know that some Roman Law dicta had become stock
phrases of absolutism, then they are falling for the old canard of English political historians who decree
Roman law is antitheti-cal to their own law and thus to true liberty.” Giesey, “The monarchomach
triumvirs: Hotman, Beza and Mornay,” p. 53. Giesey turns to Hotman as a case-in-point. To understand
the case of Hotman is to set things aright. He composed one of the most popular anti-Roman Law tracts
of all time, the Antitribonian; but yet he ranks as one of the greatest scholars and teachers of Roman Law
of his century.” Id. Thus, explained Giesey, in the Antitribonian, Hotman “was decrying the ‘Byzantine’
character of Tibonian’s compilation of the Corpus Juris Civilis as a perversion of the original Roman Law,
and maintaining that the direct application of any part of Roman public law (at least) in France was
improper; as a scholar and professor, however, he could glorify specific laws of the Roman Republic
(known principally through the study of literature and history) as well as esteem any version of the Roman
Law for its embodiment of the general principles of natural equity.” Id. In short, said Giesey, “to ignore or
dismiss the Huguenot writers’ use of Roman Law is to affront their intelligence or their integrity.” Id. On
the “incorrigible legal-mindedness” of the monarchomachs, see Donald Kelley, François Hotman: A
Revolutionary’s Ordeal (Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 240; Lee, “Private Law Models for Public
Law Concepts,” p. 373.
n. 113: “Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, Duke of Alba, had been sent to the Netherlands by Philip II with
10,000 men in 1567 to deal with the rebellious heretics.” After massacring many thousands of Dutchmen,
sacking various cities, and executing Dutch leaders, the Duke of Alva, as he was known to the Dutch,
was a terrifying figure. In 1581, Philip II declared William of Orange an outlaw. The Dutch response was
to effectively depose Philip as their lawful king. They accomplished this very simply, with the 1581
adoption of the Act of Abjuration by the States General of the United Provinces. Foreshadowing language utilized in the British colonies before and during the American Revolution, the Act declared Philip to
be “forfeited of his sovereignty over the provinces.” It further stated that the Dutch were “despairing of all
means of reconciliation and left without any other remedies and help”; further, that this action was “in
conformity with the law of nature and for the protection of our own rights and those of our fellow
countrymen.” The Dutch also sought to secure the “privileges, traditional customs and liberties,” of life
and honor, not only for themselves and their families, but for their descendants “so that they should not
fall into Spanish slavery.” For many non-Dutch Protestants, including Walsingham, the war in the
Netherlands was an extension of the multi-faceted Reformation; for others, including Queen Elizabeth, it
may have been viewed as a matter of balance of power. Act of Abjuration, Texts Concerning the Revolt
of the Netherlands, E. H. Kossmann and A. F. Mellink, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 225,
cited in Van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, p. 1; Roger Kuin, “Sir Philip Sidney and
World War Zero: Implications of the Dutch Revolt,” Sidney Journal, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2012), pp. 33-55, 35
n.10, 38, 40-41; Black, The Reign of Elizabeth 1558-1603, Ch. IX, “Elizabeth and the Netherlands 157586,” pp. 333-71; Van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, pp. 30-31, 271; see also
Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II (New Haven, CN & London: Yale University Press,
1998), p. 127 & n.
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n. 146: To consider the matter of Devereux and Elizabeth summarily, “In truth, Essex was a deeply
flawed character, lacking the substance that Robert Dudley had had, even as a young man.” David
Loades, Elizabeth I (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), p. 259; see also A Sidney Chronology, p.
120. Historian John Guy commented that, “Essex took the chivalric model of Sir Philip Sidney to excess.”
Guy, Tudor England, p. 440. Perhaps an overly harsh judgment, one scholar opined that Elizabeth
“brought the Essex rising upon herself.” Her decision to decline to renew Essex’s lease of the customs
on sweet wines portended financial ruin for Essex, provoking him to undertake a “desperate ploy,” an
uprising against the Queen. Of course, the nonrenewal of a privilege is not generally considered a
reason, much less grounds, for treason. Haigh, Elizabeth I, pp. 107-08. Another interpretation viewed
Essex as a desperate man who “had lost all respect for his sovereign, believing her to be the virtual
prisoner of Cecil and his friends. He had also convinced himself that he stood at the head of a great
following.” Loades, Elizabeth I, p. 277. See generally De Lisle, After Elizabeth, pp. 31-37.
n. 148: First and foremost, Sir Robert spent a great deal of time interacting with the Dutch, travelling on
multiple occasions to The Hague and throughout the Low Countries, and communicating intelligence to
the monarch’s Privy Council. He also traveled on other diplomatic missions, such as to France in 1593
on an embassy to the French King Henri IV, who had recently converted to Catholicism; he met again
with Henri in 1596 when the French king sought Elizabeth’s assistance to retake Calais. Sir Robert was
also sent (with Henry Wriothesley, the 3rd Earl of Southampton and a relative of the Sidneys) to meet and
escort the French ambassador to the newly crowned James I. He was one of the four English
ambassadors appointed by James to escort Frederick V, the Elector Palatine of the Rhine and his bride,
King James’ daughter Elizabeth, to Bohemia; Sir Robert’s brother Philip had been a friend of Frederick
V’s great-uncle, John Casimer, both of whom embraced a reformed international Protestantism. He also
was one of four barons that were the first Englishmen ennobled by James Stuart, three of whom had
been Essex men. While Sir Robert served for many years as the Governor of Flushing, the Dutch port
that England controlled, he was mostly away from the more professionally rewarding work at Elizabeth’s
Court. Later, he spent significant time at Court serving, for example, as Surveyor-General of Queen
Anne’s revenues, and as a member of her Privy Council. In one of his many letters to his wife in these
years, following the wisdom of his father Henry who had always told Robert to listen to what his older
brother Philip had to say about what to read and what to do when he traveled abroad, Sir Robert
expressed “his low opinion of university men as tutors since they have seen so little of the world.” On a
separate note, Sir Robert also made a significant donation for Sir Thomas Bodley’s new library at Oxford.
For a biography of the 1st Earl of Leicester, see Millicent V. Hay, The Life of Robert Sidney, Earl of
Leicester (1563-1626) (Cranbury, NJ, London & Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1984); de Lisle,
After Elizabeth, p. 187; Skretkowicz, “Shakespeare, Henri IV, and the Tyranny of Royal Style,” p 189.
n. 182: The kingdom of the United Provinces had a vacant throne because the King of Spain had been
driven out but had not been replaced. In his absence, and pending the appointment of a new monarch
(which was seriously considered for the first fifty years of the republic’s existence), government was
divided between the old royal governors of the seven provinces, the Statholders, and the old
representative assemblies for the provinces, the Estates. The assemblies sent delegates to an Estates
General of the Union at The Hague, while most of the provinces had come to appoint the same man as
their Stadholder, the Prince of Orange.” The result, says Tuck, was that the United Provinces “possessed
both a monarchical and a republican element in its constitution, though the constitutional basis for the
powers of the different elements was far from clear.” Another consequence of this form of governance
was that military authority was exercised by the Statholder, who was the commander-in-chief of the
republic’s armies, whereas the power to tax and control finances rested with the Estates. Significantly, a
religious-political division paralleled the United Provinces’ form of governance: “the Calvinist Church and
its ministry looked to the princes of the House of Orange to secure its power over the population, while
other more heterodox religious groups looked to the oligarchical urban rulers for their protection.” Richard
Tuck, “Introduction,” Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Richard Tuck, ed. & intro., from the
Jean Barbeyrac ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), Vol. 1, p. 10, http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1425
(10-28-14).
n. 203: Among those subjects and texts of particular value to Sidney was the knowledge of Greek and
Holy Scriptures; Aristotle’s Ethics, Cicero and Plutarch; on soldiery, Languet in French and Machiavel in
Italian; on history, Philip Melanchthon, Justin, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Diodorus Siculus,
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Quintus Curtius, Polybius, Livy, Dionysius, Sallust, Caesar, Dion, Tacitus, and then the Emperor’s lives by
Henricus Stephanus, Zonarus and Nicetas, Procopius, Paulus Aemilius for France, Polydore for England,
the English Chronicle by Holinshed, Froissart and Anguerard of Montstrelet in old French, Philippe de
Commines and then Guicciardini. Philip Sidney also told his friend that, since the knowledge of one’s self
“ought to be most precious,” first and foremost, said Philip, you should know the Holy Scriptures. Next,
above all else and for the same purpose, you should study Tully’s Offices, that is, Cicero’s On Duty. An
English translation of Cicero’s Three bookes of duties by Nicholas Grimald, was first published in 1556,
and went through numerous editions thereafter with Latin and English text side-by-side. Sir Philip Sidney:
The Major Works, Katherine Duncan-Jones, ed. (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp.
287-90, 397-99; see also Andrew Strycharski, “Pedagogical Affect in the Early Sidney-Languet
Correspondence,” Sidney Journal 28:1 (2010); see generally Edward Chaney, The Evolution of the Grand
Tour: Anglo-Italian Cultural Relations since the Renaissance (London: Frank Cass, 1998); James M.
Osborn, Young Philip Sidney, 1572-77 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972); Edward Berry, The
Making of Sir Philip Sidney (University of Toronto Press, 1998).
n. 209: Perhaps the most salient point that Sir Philip made to his younger brother Robert was that
everything is relative. As a “logician,” and Robert was good in mathematics, Philip commented that his
younger brother should know that things stood “in the predicament of relation; you cannot know England
unless you compare it with other places any more than “a man can know the swiftness of his horse
without seeing him well matched.” Accordingly, from travel, one can appreciate “the mixed and correlative
knowledge of things.”
Philip cited Homer: Qui multos hominum mores cognovits et urbes, “who knew many customs and cities
of men.” But when Homer spoke of “mores,” he did not mean “how to look or put off one’s cap,” although
no doubt behavior is different in different places: “the English behaviour is best in England, and the
Italians’ in Italy.” Rather, what Homer was driving at was moral philosophy, “the true discerning of men’s
minds, both in virtues, passions and vices.” Philip admitted that part of this understanding, of cognivit
urbes, the knowledge of cities, is understanding the religions, policies, laws, child rearing methods,
discipline for war and peace, and other practices that make life place in different places. But discernment
also meant gaining the knowledge of those things “which are in them-selves either simply good, or simply
evil.” Philip Sidney, “Your assured loving brother,” to Robert Sidney, undated but likely May 1578, Sir
Philip Sidney The Major Works, pp. 284-87, 397. There is probably no better description of the benefits
of cosmopolitanism. On Robert Sidney’s unremitting note taking, see Shephard, “The Political Commonplace Books of Sir Robert Sidney,” Sidney Journal, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2003), pp. 1-30; more generally see
Millicent V. Hay, The Life of Robert Sidney: Earl of Leicester (1563-1626) (Cranbury, NJ & London:
Associated University Presses, 1984)
n. 280: The House of Commons’ charges against Laud were, in sum, “That he hath trayterously endeavoured to subvert the fundamentall Lawes and Government of this Kingdome of England, and instead
thereof to introduce an Arbitrary and tyrannicall Government against Law; and to that end, hath wickedly
and traitorously advised his Majesty, that hee might at his owne will, and pleasure, leavie, and take mony
of his Subjects, without their consent in Parliament; and this hee affirmed was warrantable by the Law of
God. Pym’s commentary on the charges against Laud are particularly reminiscent of the American
colonies’ charges against Commons a century later. “These Crimes (my Lords) are various in their
Nature, haynous in their qualitie, and universall in their Extent. If you examine them Theologically, as
they stand in opposition to the Trueth of God, …. If you examine them Morally, as they stand in opposition
to the light of Nature, to right reason, and the principles of humane society, you will then perceive pride
without any moderation.” He continued, “If they be examined (my Lords) by Legall Rules in a Civill way,
as they stand in opposition to the Publique good, and to the Lawes of the Land, He will be found to be a
Traytour against his Majesties Crowne, an Incendiary against the Peace of the State; he will be found to
be the highest, the boldest, the most impudent oppressour, that ever was an oppressour both of King and
People.” Articles of the Commons, contained in The Speech or Declaration of John Pym, Esquire, to the
Lords of the Upper House, upon the delivery of the Articles of the Commons assembled in Parliament,
against William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, in maintenance of their Accusation, whereby he stands
charged of High Treason, Together with a true Copy of the said Articles (London: Ralph Mabb, 1641), at
the Florida Atlantic University (FAU)/Weiner Collection, pp. 2, 22-23.
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n. 300: As one pamphleteer observed, “The King raises force, and the parliament, and both for securing
the Kingdom; and yet such is the nature of these preparations, as they appeare with no lesse danger then
security, and we feare we may perish by the meanes that preserves us: Like the patient who tooke so
much on the Cordiall, till he made his remedy his disease.” “Raptim Scripta,” Some Observations
Concerning Jealousies between King and Parliament, With their causes and cures (London: John
Rothwell, 1642), FAU/Weiner Collection, p. 5. It should be noted, too, that before there was a war of
bodies there was a war of words, with a profusion of pamphlets, including declarations by Parliament and
Charles’ responses. Thus, for example, in His Majesties Answer, To a Booke, intituled, The Declaration,
or Remonstrance of the Lords and Commons, of the 19. Of Ma. 1642 (York & London, 1642),
FAU/Weiner Collection, p. 2, the King began, “If We could be weary of taking any paines for the
satisfaction of Our People, and to undeceive them of those specious mischievous Infusions, which are
dayly instilled into them, to shake and corrupt their loyalty and affection to Us and Our Government, after
so full and ample Declaration of our Selfe and Intentions, and so faire and satisfactory answers to all such
matters as have beene objected to Us by a major part present of both Houses of Parliament, We might
well give over this labour of our Pen, and sit still, till it shall please God so to enlighten the Affections and
Understandings of Our good Subjects on Our behalfe (which We doubt not but that in his good time he
will doe) that they may see our sufferings are their sufferings.”
n. 301: English Arminianism was opposed to strict Calvinism and, particularly, to Puritanism. It was a
form of Protestantism that was associated with the teachings of Jacobus Arminius, a sixteenth-century
Dutch Protestant theologian. Arminianism prioritized ceremonies over preaching, and denied the doctrine
of predestination, both of which explain why many of its critics associated Arminianism with Catholicism.
Arminians believed that God did not have the exclusive choice of which men were elect; rather, God
determined eligibility, and then those designated could “refuse” the election by living wickedly. Neff,
“introduction,” Hugo Grotius On the Law of War and Peace (2012), pp. xvii-xviii. According to one
historian, James “never gave them [the Arminian clergy] real power within the Church.” Harris, Rebellion,
p. 94. At the same time, Harris recognized that James promoted Arminians within the Church hierarchy by
suggesting that he was not an opponent of Arminianism. It seems most likely that James simply sought
to remain in control of ecclesiastical policy and not allow himself to become subject to one Church faction.
It also is important to realize that in seventeenth-century England, the term Arminianism was often used
interchangeably with Laudianism, which is not unreasonable given the fact that Archbishop Laud agreed
with Arminian ideas (whether or not he was an avowed Arminian). In fact Laud and Charles I shared “a
vision for reform” of the Church of England, which is why Charles gave Laud the power that he had. Their
religious convictions were anti-Calvinist, “believing that the Calvinist doctrine of predestination
encouraged the view that the ‘elect’ could sin and still attain salvation and was thus tantamount to
antinomianism.” An emphasis on the beauty of holiness, the importance of the clergy, the significance of
the sacraments – all of these features were shared by Arminianism and Laudianism – as well as by
Charles I. Indeed, one can view these ideas as part of a Church of England tradition within the
Elizabethan and Jacobean Church to improve the estate of the Church and to exalt episcopacy. Id, pp.
97-99, 302; see generally id, pp. 299-315.
n. 304: In the gossipy 1643 pamphlet The Condition of the State of England, the charge was made that
the raising up of Somerset by Charles I “drowned the dignity of the best of the Nobilitie, and eminencie of
such as were more excellent.” Baronial resentment combined with strenuous opposition to the growing
influence of the Anglican clergy, as well as disapproval of “the subversion of the ‘subjects liberties’ more
generally.” The Five Yeares of King James, or, The condition of the state of England, and the relationship
it had to other Provinces, Written by Sr Foulk Greville, late Lord Brook [attributed to Arthur Wilson, 15951652,] (London, W.R., 1643), pp. 8, https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A67903.0001.001?rgn=main;view
=fulltext (3-25-18); Adamson, The Noble Revolt, p. 31. Once again, one cannot overemphasize the linkage between poetry, prose, politics and the Sidney/Percy family. The Condition of the State of England
has as its averred author Fulke Greville, Sir Philip Sidney’s closest friend who wrote poetry that touched
on matters of politics, Greville actually died in 1628, well before this pamphlet was written. The putative
author was Arthur Wilson (1595-1652), a minor playwright, historian, and steward to several important
parlementarians. Adamson, The Noble Revolt, p. 542 n.86. One of these men was Robert Devereux, 3rd
Earl of Essex (1565-1601), first commander of the Parliamentarian army, and son of the executed 2nd Earl
of the same name and Frances Walsingham, Sir Philip’s widow, who was Philip and Robert Sidney’s
cousin. The other was Ambrose Dudley, 3rd Earl of Warwick, elder brother of Robert Dudley, Earl of
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Leicester, and son of John Dudley, 1st Duke of Northumberland, great-grandfather of Algernon Sidney’s
father (Sir Henry Sidney married Dudley’s daughter Mary) and executed proponent of the queenship of
Lady Jane Grey, the duke’s daughter-in-law. “Arthur Wilson (England; 1596-1652),” Chalmers Biography,
vol. 32 (1812) , p. 164, http://words.fromoldbooks.org/ Chalmers-Biography/w/ wilson-arthur.html (3-2518).
n. 314: At Marston Moor, “Once men succumbed to fear the truly terrible time began. Sir Arthur Trevor, a
survivor, recalled the horror of being routed at Marston Moor; ‘In the fire, smoke and confusion of the day
I knew not for my soul whither to incline. The runaways on both sides were so many, so breathless, so
speechless, and so full of fears that I should not have taken them for men.’ Only 100 of 2,000 infantry
survived.” Charles Carlton, “The Impact of the Fighting,” The Impact of the English Civil War, pp. 17-31,
27-28. See generally Barbara Donagen, “The casualties of war: treatment of the dead and wounded in
the English Civil War,” Soldiers, Writers and Statesmen of the English Revolution, ed. Ian Gentles, John
Morrill and Blair Worden (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 129. n.46; Scott I, pp. 83-85; Hill, The
Century of Revolution, p. 111; report of the Earl of Northumberland to Parliament, July 10, 1644, William
Cobbett, The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803, Vol. 3
(comprising the period from the Battle of Edge-Hill, in October 1642, to the Meeting of the Parliament
begun at Westminster, April the 25th, 1660, commonly called the Convention Parliament, which was sitting
at the return of Charles the Second, in the month of May following and which voted his Restoration; and
comprising the period from the restoration of Charles the Second, in 1660, to the Revolution, in 1688)
(London: T. C. Hansard, 1803 & 1808), at cols. 277-78; online at
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015087740349;view=1up;seq=177 (1-3-18).
n. 334: Many of the leaders of the middle group in the Commons and Lords in the 1645-48 timeframe had
earlier been part of the Independent Party, particularly Fiennes and Evelyn, but also Pierrepoint and Crew.
These affiliations were outgrowths of John Pym and Oliver St. John’s prior “middle group” that had distinguished itself from the peace and war parties, the latter of which had been led by Henry Maarten, Arthur
Haselrig, and the young Sir Henry Vane. (Scott commented that Sidney stood easily with Vane, Whitelocke, Strickland and Howard, middle group participants, but often against “men like Marten,” who Scott
described as “irreverent, irreligious, and anti-aristocratic,” whereas he considered Sidney to be “moralistic”
and “imperious.” All of these characterizations may be exaggerated. The split is more logically between
Henry Marten and Henry Vane, Jr., the latter of whom was a very religious man.) Vane was a fifth member
of Commons in attendance at the peace talks with Charles I on the Isle of Wight, along with two other
middle groupers from Commons. Although he was generally more radical, Vane had voted with the middle
group in favor of negotiations with the king on several occasions in 1648. Pearl speculated that these
“royal” Independents might, in fact, “have brought about a constitutional settlement under the monarchy if a
revolutionary tide and a Scottish tempest had not driven them to set sail under radical command.”
One can also see the failure of the middle group to find a viable compromise as a critical lesson in
Algernon Sidney’s learning curve about the practical viability of a constitutional monarchy in Stuart
England. Overall, it seems clear that in the mid- to late-1640s, the middle group, supported by Cromwell
and Ireton, was pivotal; it is also clear that there were varying perceptions of where the middle group
stood, politically. One “percipient pamphleteer” distinguished between the moderate men among the
Independents, on the one hand, and their “radical allies,” as well as the Congregationalists, on the other.
The former were labelled “royal” Independents; the latter dubbed the “real” Independents. In contrast, the
Leveller author of the 1648 tract, Westminster Projects: Or, the Mystery of the Iniquity of Derby-House
Discovered, distinguished between “the ‘Royal’ Presbyterians and Independents who would bring back
the king on any terms provided they secured their personal safety and private advancement, and the
‘Real’ Presbyterians and Independents who would have the king first secure ‘Religion, Law and
Liberties’.” Northumberland (Algernon’s uncle), Warwick, Saye, Cromwell, Ireton, and the two Vanes (Sir
Henry Vane the Younger and his father, also Henry Vane) were cited as examples of the first (corrupt)
group of parliamentarians. From his speech in the House of Lords, apparently Sidney’s cousin Philip
Herbert, 4th Earl of Pembroke and son of Mary Sidney, Sir. Philip’s sister, also fell into this category.
See Scott I, pp. 89, 93-96; Valerie Pearl, “The ‘Royal Independents’ in the English Civil War,”
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 5th ser., v. 18 (1968), pp. 69-96, 74 and n.2, citing
Marchamont Nedham, Mercurius Pragmaticus, No. 25, 29 Feb.7 Mar. 1648 (pages unnumbered) and
Marchamont Nedham, The Case of the Kingdome Stated (London, 1647), p. 10; The Earl of Pembroke’s
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Speech in the House of Peers, When the Seven Lords were accused of High-Treason (1648), FAU/
Weiner Collection (“am (for ought I know) as great an Independent as any of ye all. …Consider we are
but a few Lords left, come, let’s love, and be kind to one another: The Cavaliers quarrell’d among
themselves, beat one another and lost all.”); Underdown, Pride’s Purge, pp. 71, 85, 89, 104-05.
n. 339: Per Underdown, “The divine right of Presbytery, important as it might be to members of the
[Westminster] Assembly and elders of London parishes, was for all that only peripheral to the new
deepening political conflict. In the conflict, the survival of the Independent party, and above all the role of
the middle group, were the critical factors.” Thus, emphasized Underdown, the pivotal issue was politics,
not religion. “As long as the middle group held together, as long as it retained its ties with the Army
grandees, so long could the potentially revolutionary threat posed by the radicals and their militant allies
among the junior officers and the other ranks, together with the sectarian congregations, be contained.”
In order to hold together, the middle group had to find a way to reach a settlement with the King. “So long
was it possible to envisage a settlement which, while fulfilling the aims for which Parliament had gone to
war, fell short of revolution. So long in fact could the tension between the two sides of the parliamentarian movement – its radical religious idealism and its conservative constitutionalism – be resolved. But
should anything happen to disturb the alliance the Independent party would be destroyed. The Army and
the radicals would be out of control, and the result would be revolution.” Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p.
75. As Parliament’s website states more generally, “Divisions developed within Parliament between the
Presbyterians who wanted to end the war quickly and were willing to negotiate with Charles I, and the
Independents who wanted a vigorous prosecution of the war to force their terms on a defeated King.
These names originally derived from disagreements about how the Church should be organized – the
Presbyterians wishing to see a church ruled by ‘elders’ enforcing strict doctrine and the Independents
arguing for toleration towards non-conformist congregations.” “Presbyterians, Independents and the New
Model Army,” The Civil War, https://www.parliament.uk/ about/livingheritage/evolutionofparliament/parliamentaryauthority/civilwar/overview/presbyterians/ (1-3-18).
n. 358: One of the more detailed of the drama of Pride’s Purge is by Isaac D’Israeli (1766-1848), Jewish
merchant, literator, and father of Benjamin D’Israeli, in his popular, anecdotal Curiosities of Literature.
“Our RUMP passed through three stages in its political progress. Preparatory to the trial of the sovereign,
the antimonarchical party constituted the minority in ‘the Long Parliament:’ the very byename by which
this parliament is recognised seemed a grievance to an impatient people, vacillating with chimerical
projects of government, and now accustomed to pull down all existing institutions, from a wild indefinite
notion of political equality. Such was the temper of the times, that an act of the most violent injustice,
openly performed, served only as the jest of the day, a jest which has passed into history.” Turning to the
ejection of MPs from and reconstitution of Parliament, D’Israeli commented, “The forcible expulsion of two
hundred of their brother members, by those who afterwards were saluted as ‘The Rump,’ was called
‘Pride’s Purge,’ from the activity of a colonel of that name, a military adventurer, who was only the blind
and brutal instrument of his party; for when he stood at the door of the Commons, holding a paper with
the names of the members, he did not personally know one! And his ‘Purge’ might have operated a quite
opposite effect,” said D’Israeli, “administered by his own unskilful hand, had not Lord Grey of Groby, and
the doorkeeper—worthy dispersers of a British senate! — pointed out the obnoxious members, on whom
our colonel laid his hand, and sent off by his men to be detained, if a bold member, or to be deterred from
sitting in the house, if a frightened one. This colonel had been a drayman.” The result was that the
“contemptible knot of the Commons, reduced to fifty or sixty confederates, which assembled after his
‘Purge,’ were called ‘Colonel Pride’s Drayhorses!’ It was this Rump which voted the death of the
sovereign, and abolished the regal office, and the house of peers—as ‘unnecessary, burdensome, and
dangerous!’ Every office in parliament seemed ‘dangerous’ but that of the ‘Custodes libertatis Angliæ,’ the
keepers of the liberties of England! or rather ‘the gaolers!’ ‘The legislative half-quarter of the House of
Commons!’ indignantly exclaims [purged MP] Clement Walker—the ‘Montagne’ of the French
revolutionists!” Isaac D’Israeli, A Second Series of Curiosities of Literature: consisting of researches in
literary, biographical, and political history, of critical and philosophical inquiries, and of secret history
(1823), http://www.spamula.net/col/archives/2006/05/the_rump_1.html (7-14-14) (pub. by Ulan Press,
2012); see also Ludlow Memoirs, Vol. I, pp. 352-60.
n. 385: The republican Johan Dewitt “entered office in a time of war. In the balance of power between
England and the Dutch Republic, the Dutch had the larger trading empire while England had more military
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might. English ships had been harassing Dutch trading and shipping vessels for several years when in
1652 war broke out. …The redoubling of trade [in the Low Countries] translated as well into cultural
advances. …The number of bookshops in Amsterdam at this time has been estimated at a staggering
four hundred, and at one point the city had roughly a hundred publishers. …[I]n the seventeenth century
one-half of all books published in the entire world were published in the Dutch provinces.” Shorto, Amsterdam, p. 176. The First Anglo-Dutch War took place between 1652 and 1654, a sea war that is
generally considered a conflict over trade, which began with English Navy attacks on Dutch merchant
ships. The English believed, correctly, that the Dutch had profited from turmoil in England during the civil
war. Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 713-26. “The war was ruinous for both sides. For the Dutch, their
global shipping network was all but strangled. In Amsterdam, merchants toted up their losses. Th herring
fleet was decimated; in all, they figure 1,200 Dutch vessels had been taken or destroyed. Johan De Witt
stepped into this quagmire and negotiated a treaty with Oliver Cromwell.” Shorto, Amsterdam, pp. 17677. Less convincing is historian Steve Pincus’s assertion that the English motivation to provoke war was
not primarily trade, or economic interests, “but because the Orangist and pro-Stuart party in the United
Provinces was still strong – despite the government’s republican form – and opposed a close alliance with
a nation that had killed its king. Consequently, the English came to consider the Dutch as both bad
Protestants and bad republicans and devised the Navigation Act as revenge against the Dutch.” Steve
Pincus, Protestantism and Patriotism: ideologies and the making of English foreign policy, 1650-1668
(Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 27-50; see Jonathan Israel review, The Historical Journal, Vol.
40, No. 4 (Dec. 1997), pp. 1117-21. “Shorto’s perspective seems more plausible. “Despite their obvious
nationalistic differences, DeWitt and Cromwell had a common desire; to keep the House of Orange out of
power. As far as Cromwell was concerned, the present Willem of Orange – the son of the Willem who
had died following his attempted storming of Amsterdam in 1650, and the latest in the line that stretched
back to William the Silent – was a threat, for he was the grandson of Charles I, the man Cromwell had
recently ordered decapitated. For De Witt, the same Prince of Orange was even more of a threat: to his
government, yes, but also to the very idea of republican government.” Shorto noted that in 1653, the fact
that “the person in question was three years old was a mere detail to both men. Orangist forces within
the Dutch provinces were already lined up behind the young Willem III. The boldness and cunning in the
treaty consisted in a so-called secret annex, which was not published with the full treaty. According to it,
the Dutch agreed that Willem III would never be named stadholder, or hereditary monarchy…. Thus,
Holland’s republican leader colluded with the English enemy to dupe his opponents in other provinces so
as to block the ascendancy of a new hereditary leader in his home province.” Shorto, Amsterdam, p. 177.
On the “discourse of trade,” and Englishmen’s concerns about matters of ethics related particularly to
international commerce, see Thomas Leng, “Commercial Conflict and Regulation in the Discourse of
Trade in Seventeenth-Century England, The Historical Journal, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Dec. 2005), pp. 933-54.
For another overview of the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century, see Maarten Prak, The Dutch
Republic in the Seventeenth Century (Cam-bridge University Press, 2005). Unfortunately, Shorto’s book
on Amsterdam is not properly footnoted; nevertheless, it is marvelous!
n. 416: Cromwell became actively involved in the Baltic conflict in the 1657-58 timeframe because of the
dominance of Sweden in the region. Under the leadership of Charles X Gustav (or Gustavus), whose
character and abilities Sidney praised, Sweden had attacked Poland, defeated Denmark, and
“overshadow[ed] everyone else,” thereby threatening the balance of power, contrary to the interests of the
Dutch. Anglo-Swedish collusion in this earlier timeframe exerted “brutal pressure” on “a defeated and
almost defenceless Denmark,” with King Frederick III at the helm. Jonathan Israel, Review, The Historical
Journal, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Dec. 1997), p. 1119; Blackburne, Algernon Sidney: A Review, pp. 66-77.
Parliament’s instructions to its envoys were “to repair to the Kings of Denmark and Sweden, and to let
them know ‘that the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England, having a deep sense of the present
wars which are fallen out betwixt them and their kingdoms, and of the consequences which must now
follow thereupon to themselves, their allies, and the Protestant cause, and also in respect of the freedom
of navigation and commerce in those parts,’ had thought fit to offer its services of mediation. Alexander
Charles Ewald, The Life and Times of the Hon. Algernon Sydney 1622-1683, Vol. I (Lexington, KY:
Elibron Classics repro., 2006), pp. 220-21, citing “Instructions for Edward Montague, General of the Fleet;
Algernon Sydney, a member of Parliament and of the Council of State, appointed by authority of
Parliament; Sir Robert Honeywood, Knt., a member of the said Council of State; and Thomas Boone, a
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member of Parliament, commissioners, Plenipotentiaries to the Kings of Sweden and Denmark,” in State
Papers, Denmark, 1641-1659, No. 13.
Masson provided an interesting and complementary account about the position of the new government
with respect to foreign relations. England’s goal was ostensibly simple. “It was to withdraw, as speedily
as possible, from all foreign entangelements.” Accordingly, “No longer now could Charles Gustavus of
Sweden calculate on help from England. Montague’s Fleet, indeed, was still in the Baltic; Meadows was
re-commissioned as envoy-in-ordinary to the Kings of Denmark and Sweden; envoys from Sweden had
audiences in London; and at length, early in July, the importance of the Baltic business was fully
recognised by the dispatch of Algernon Sidney and Sir Robert Honeywood, two of the members of the
Council of State, and Mr. Boone, a member of the House, to act as plenipotentiaries with Montague for
the settlement of the differences between Sweden and Denmark and between Sweden and the Dutch.”
The government’s instructions “were to compel the Swedish King to a pacification, and to co-operate with
the Dutch and the Danes in that interest.” Meanwhile, with regard to the Dutch, the English were to
exhibit “ the most studious care for a friendly intercourse.” At the same time, “There was no revival now
of that imperious project of the old Commonwealth Government for a union of the two Republics which
had alarmed the Dutch and led to the great naval war with them. It was enough that the English should
mind their own affairs, and the Dutch theirs.” Masson, The Life of John Milton, Volume 5 (of 7), 16541660, Book III, Ch. 1 §1, Part 12.
n. 432: Church of Englanders wanted to restore the old Church and Book of Common Prayer service.
The Presbyterians argued for limited episcopacy, with some concessions to Puritan reformists. The result
was a “narrow and intolerant episcopalian Church … backed up by a severe penal code – known to
history, somewhat misleadingly, as the Clarendon Code, after Charles’s leading minister of the period
1660-67, the first Earl of Clarendon – designed to guarantee an Anglican monopoly of office-holding,
worship and education.” Harris, Restoration, pp. 52-53. The Clarendon Code was actually a group of
separate statutes that inhibited religious practice. The Corporation Act required municipal officers to take
communion in the Church of England and to abjure the presbyterian Solemn League and Covenant;
nonconformists were excluded from public office. The Act of Uniformity required the use of the Book of
Common Prayer; many clergymen were forced to resign from serving their communities, losing their
livelihoods in the process. The Conventicle Act forbade more than five people not of the same household
to worship together outside of the Church of England. The Five Mile Act forbade nonconformist ministers
from coming within five miles of incorporated towns from which they had been expelled and from
teaching, further jeopardizing their livelihood. Greaves argued persuasively that the activity of the radical
underground throughout the early 1660s had the unfortunate effect of hardening more moderate and
certainly Church of England views, which both intensified the persecution of nonconformists and ensured
passage of the Clarendon Act statutes. See 13 Cha. II. St. 2 c. 1; 13 & 14 Car 2 c 4; 16 Charles II c. 4;
17 Charles II c. 2: 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the well Governing and Regulating of Corporations',
Statutes of the Realm: volume 5: 1628-80 (1819), pp. 321-323. URL: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/
report.aspx?compid=47300; 'Charles II, 1662: An Act for the Uniformity of Publique Prayers and
Administrac[i]on of Sacraments & other Rites & Ceremonies and for establishing the Form of making
ordaining and consecrating Bishops Preists and Deacons in the Church of England.', Statutes of the
Realm: volume 5: 1628-80 (1819), pp. 364-370. URL: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx
?compid=47307; ‘Charles II, 1664: An Act to prevent and suppresse seditious Conventicles.', Statutes of
the Realm: volume 5: 1628-80 (1819), pp. 516-520. URL: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx
?compid=47357; 1'Charles II, 1665: An Act for restraining Non-Conformists from inhabiting in
Corporations.', Statutes of the Realm: volume 5: 1628-80 (1819), pp. 575. URL: http://www.britishhistory.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=47375 (all accessed May 18, 2014); Greaves, Deliver Us From Evil,
e.g., pp. 192-94,201-02, 296.http://www.british-history.ac.uk/ report. aspx ?compid=47307; ‘Charles II,
1664: An Act to prevent and suppresse seditious Conventicles.', Statutes of the Realm: volume 5: 162880 (1819), pp. 516-520. URL: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=47357; 1'Charles II,
1665: An Act for restraining Non-Conformists from inhabiting in Corporations.', Statutes of the Realm:
volume 5: 1628-80 (1819), pp. 575. URL: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=47375 (all
accessed May 18, 2014); Greaves, Deliver Us From Evil, e.g., pp. 192-94,201-02, 296.
n. 480: By 1590, there were very different political outcomes in the northern and southern provinces of
the Low Countries. or the north, 1588 represented a turning point, under the leadership of pensionary
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Oldenbarnevelt of Holland and the stadholdership of Maurice of Naussau, William of Orange’s son. The
northern Dutch Republic was “a confederation of almost autonomous provinces and towns” that was
federalized through the States-General, the responsibilities of which were largely in areas of foreign policy
and diplomacy. Because of the dominance of the towns, the Republic’s ruling elite was composed largely
of town leaders. Popular sovereignty was acclaimed, but political participation tended to rest on the
Dutch urban aristocracy, who could afford to attend the endless negotiations of the States-General. At
the head of each province in the Republic was a pensionary, who typically was a full-time professional
jurist. Holland’s pensionary was often de facto political head of the Republic because of Holland’s
dominance within the provinces. Oldenbarnevelt is a good example of this on both counts. There was
also usually a military commander, the stadholder, although the precise functions of the stadholder
varied, was not precisely defined, and was “neither fish nor fowl.” Traditionally, the stadholder held office
in a number of provinces and was a member of the Orange-Nassau family.
In contrast to this participatory political system, the outcome of the Dutch revolt for the southern provinces
was very different. The theater of war had largely been in the south, which was overcome by the
reconquering forces of Alexander Farnese and Philip II. The southern provinces became centralized as
the Spanish (and later the Austrian) Netherlands under the control of the Habsburgs. There was
“massive” emigration to the northern provinces, a veritable “brain drain.” The Catholic Church regained its
exclusive religious status, in contrast to the general policy of religious toleration in the north. In sum,
“[t]he Burgundian Netherlands were no more.” Van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt,
pp. 56-61; for a much more detailed account, see Israel, The Dutch Republic, Part I, “The Making of the
Republic, 1477-1588” and Part II, “The Early Golden Age, 1588-1647,” pp. 9-591.
n. 495: Nineteenth-century historian John Richard Green similarly described Sir William as a moderate
patriot. “Temple returned [to England from The Hague] with a plan of administration which, fruitless as it
directly proved, is of great importance as marking the silent change which was passing over the English
constitution. Like many men of his own time he was equally alarmed at the power both of the crown and
of the parliament. In moments of national excitement the power of the houses seemed irresistible. They
had overthrown Clarendon. They had overthrown Clifford and the cabal. They had just overthrown
Danby. But, though they were strong enough in the end to punish ill government, they showed no power
of securing good government, or of permanently influencing the policy of the crown.” Indeed, Charles
had proven stronger and more politically astute than those trying to reduce his prerogative. “For nineteen
years, in fact, with a Parliament always sitting, Charles had had it all his own way. He had made war
against the will of the nation, and he had refused to make war when the nation demanded it. While every
Englishman hated France, he had made England a mere dependency of the French King.”
Temple’s proposed solution to Charles II’s dominance and intransigence was a reorganization of the
King’s Council, dubbed Sir William Temple’s council, with Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Earl of
Shaftesbury, at its head. The intent was for this reorganization “to furnish a check on mere personal
government which parliament was unable to supply. For this purpose he proposed that the Cabala or
Cabinet, as it was now becoming the fashion to term the confidential committee of the Council, should be
abolished. The Council itself was restricted to thirty members, and their joint income was not to fall below
£300.000, a sum little less than what was estimated as the income of the whole House of Commons.”
Temple, who became a Council member, believed that, “A body of great nobles and proprietors, not too
numerous for secret deliberation and wealthy enough to counterbalance either the Commons or the
Crown, would form … a barrier against the violence and aggression of the one power, and a check on the
mere despotism of the other” – classic balance-of-power theory. John Richard Green, A Short History of
the English People (London: Macmillan and Co. 1882), pp. 638-39; Dalrymple, Memoirs, Vol. I, pp. 26364. The intent was to establish “a new council of such a constitution as might … give ease and quiet both
to the King and his people.” Introduction, Of Charles the Second by the Honourable Henry Sidney,
(Afterwards Earl of Romney) including his Correspondence with The Countess of Sunderland … , Vol. I
(London: Henry Colburn, 1843), p. xcix (quoting Temple’s memoirs).
But Charles and James, the Duke of York and next in line to the throne, did not like Sir William’s very
good relationship with the Prince of Orange, who held Temple in high esteem e.g., the Prince and Sir
William corresponded after the latter was recalled to England. Forever suspicious, the Stuarts worried
that Temple sought to confound their determination to maintain the Stuart succession. For example, as
reflected in a March 1680 letter from Sunderland to Henry Sidney, who became the subsequent emissary
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to The Hague after Temple, Sunderland wrote that James feared that Orange “took all his measures from
Sir William Temple, who he looks upon as a Republican, and who the King is likewise unsatisfied with,” a
misguided suggestion.” Id, pp. 49-50, 55; see Earl of Sunderland to Mr. [Henry] Sidney, March 1, 1680,
Of Charles the Second, p. 293; Diary of Henry Sidney, Nov. 1, 1679, id, pp. 176-77.
n. 529: In his lengthy poem The First Anniversary of the Government under O.C., published in 1655,
Marvell asserted that other monarchs should join with Cromwell in destroying the Catholic Church,
“’Which shrinking to her Roman Den impure,/Gnashes her Goary teeth; nor there secure.’ Indeed, this
poem, with its apocalyptic overtones, is the first sample of the virulent anti-Catholicism which will become
central to Marvell’s post-Restoration politics. He approaches the prophecy that Cromwell is the harbinger
of the Millennium.” Unlike Sidney, Marvell did not fight in the English Civil War, although he was twentyone when the war broke out. Instead, he traveled in Europe, although there is no definitive evidence as to
what he was doing there; he probably served as a tutor and, some contend, was not “merely avoiding the
war.” His “Horatian Ode upon Cromwel’s Return from Ire-land,” “provocatively equivocal,” was both “a
straightforward encomium of Cromwell” and “an ironic deprecation.” Written in 1650, a year before
Hobbes published Leviathan, Marvell shared Hobbes’ view that “power is essentially its own justification.”
“Andrew Marvell, 1621-1678,” Poetry Foundation, https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poets/ andrewmarvell (9-14-18). With Cromwell’s first Parliament in January 1659 and almost continuously until
Marvell’s death in 1678, he was an MP, and for reasons that are not clear was able to avoid punishment
when Charles II was “restored.” Indeed, he may have “helped convince Charles II’s government not to
execute John Milton for his anti-monarchist writings and activities.” In contrast to Marvell’s views, Milton’s
political perspective changed “from an intense but ambivalent admiration of Cromwell to an unambivalent
and no less intense rejection of him.” Worden, Literature and Politics in Cromwellian England, p. 11; see
Nigel Smith, Andrew Marvell: The Chameleon (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2010), pp.
154-55; Clement Fatovic, “The Anti-Catholic Roots of Liberal and Republican Conceptions of Freedom in
English Political Thought, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Jan. 2005), pp. 37-58, 45.
n. 552: The direct source for the finding that James discussed his desire to convert to Catholicism with his
brother, the King, is an account from James, which obviously could be self-serving; however, it is
supported by substantial indirect evidence, including a meeting in 1669 among James Duke of York, the
King, Lords Arundel and Arlington, and Sir Thomas Clifford, all Catholics; correspondence between
Colbert and Louis XIV; and various correspondence concerning the purpose of the Declaration of
Indulgence from both the French and English kings’ vantage points, including its interpretation by Louis
XIV as a measure to facilitate the acceptance by Englishmen of Charles’ Catholicism since he was
tolerating many of their forms of nonconformity. Interestingly, one small piece of this evidence is the
transcript of a conversation between Marshal Turenne, the great French military commander, and the
exiled Algernon Sidney, which took place at Versailles in August 1670. Sidney conveyed the view that
King Charles had little to fear from the English Presbyterians and Independents, who hated the Church of
Englanders more than they hated the Catholics. Accordingly, Charles “would be able to depend upon
their fidelity.” Jonathan Scott, “England’s Houdini: Charles II’s escape from Worcester as a metaphor for
his reign,” Liberty, Authority, Formality, Ch. 4, pp. 67-86, 71-76; correspondence from Du Roy a Colbert,
29 July 1670 (translated by Scott); see also Scott II, pp. 42-43, on Charles II’s secret negotiations and
agreement with Louis XIV.
n. 588: Booth testified that according to Shaftesbury, the Crown “had order’d the Parliament should meet
at Oxford, and not at this Metropolis at London, where they might go on without fear of being over-awed:
that this was an intention to awe the Parliament. But he [Shaftesbury] said, himself and divers Noble
Lords, and Members of ther House of Commons had considered themselves and their own safety, and
that they judg’d it dangerous to go to Oxford, where they were sure the Guards, the Retinue of the Court,
and the Assistance of the Scholars (which usually incline to the Crown) might so over-awe the
Parliament, that they might not so freely proceed in a way for the publick Good as they intended; and
therefore he and others had consider’d with themselves, that it were fit for them to have Guards and send
them thither; and to this purpose he had establisht a matter of fifteen men, persons of Quality, that he
believed would have men along with them.” According to Booth, among those who Shaftesbury
considered to be dangerous, “Evil Counsellors” of the King,” were Clarendon, Hyde and Halifax. Booth
said that should there be any confrontation, they would “not only purge the Guards … of all the Papists
and Tories, and such as were against the Protestant Religion, and the Establisht Laws of the Land, …
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and repel that Force by a greater Force, but also take those Lords by Violence from the King, and bring
the King to London, to the chief Metropolitan City, where those things should be establish, which they
design’d for their safety in these two respects, for the preserving the Protestant Religion, and likewise for
the keeping and defending us safe from Arbitrary Power and Government.” Booth was asked to be one of
Shaftesbury’s guards. Similarly, another witness, John Smith, recalled a conversation with Shaftesbury in
which the latter said, “my Lord said there was great preparations made, and a great many gather’d
together upon the Road between London and Oxford. My Lord, said I, what is the meaning of that? Any
body may see, say’s he, that is only to terrifie the Parliament to comply with the King’s desire, which I am
sure the Parliament never will, for we are as resolute now as ever; and more resolute, for we see clearly
what the King Aims at, and that is to bring in Popery… and if we oppose the King, as we may do, for it
hath been done in former times, the whole Nation is to stand by us, and as I said when I was in the
Tower, I would dye, before I would ever bring I Popery or any thing of that Nature.” We can see here the
difference between Shaftesbury’s angry, even paranoid perspective, and the much more level-headed
views of Sidney. See Booth and Smith testimony, Shaftesbury Trial, pp. 21, 26.
n. 632: As Mark Goldie brilliantly established, there was sound reason for Penn’s allegiance to James II
by some whig nonconformists. After the “brutal onslaught” against the whigs during the late years of
Charles II’s reign, including Sidney’s execution, and notwithstanding James II’s initial continuance of the
persecution of anyone who he considered an enemy and opponent to his kingship, James’ discretionary
Indulgence Declaration caused the ouster from offices and privileged placements of many tories and the
surprising opportunity for whigs, including some of Locke’s dearest friends, to obtain these advantages.
Indeed, James’ clever move split the whigs, some of whom prioritized their anti-Catholicism, others of
whom prioritized financial and social success, and yet others who sought some sort of compromise by
which their nonconforming religious views could be protected without endorsing Catholicism. Penn is one
example of many. His religious priorities led him to work assiduously on behalf of James II to persuade
rebellious, and mostly nonconformist Englishmen who had sought refuge in the Netherlands that it was
safe to return home. Ironically, James’ toleration was part of the story of Monmouth’s failure. Goldie
showed how some of Locke’s closest West Country friends did not support Monmouth but stood by
James; that allegiance later kept them out of the Convention Parliament, having only belatedly
“scramble[d] aboard William of Orange’s revolution.” Indeed, the entire complexity of alignments during
James’ rule in the later 1680s was upended when William invaded. Parliament did pass the 1688
Toleration Act but did not overturn the Test Act. But whigs who were James’ men were on the outs. In
sum, James II wanted religious toleration for Catholics; one way that he tried to accomplish this was by
“shatter[ing] … Anglican hegemony” and embracing religious toleration for nonconformists (who were
then deemed “whig collaborators.”) For the fascinating story of the efforts by James II to make an
accommodation with disserters and whigs in order to foster the advantage of English Catholics and,
accordingly, to lure home Englishmen who had been involved directly or indirectly in various conspiracies
to end the Stuart monarchy, see Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, Ch. 10, “Keeping the Faith,” pp. 467520. On Penn’s role, see pp. 517-20. For Mark Goldie’s very different take on these issues, see “John
Locke’s Circle and James II,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Sept. 1992), pp. 557-86, 557-60.
Goldie established that pace Ashcraft’s perspective, “implacable hostility” was “not the only possible
response to James by [Locke’s] circle of whig friends.” As Goldie advised, “James II’s whigs were not
naïve, nor an insignificant handful, nor were they ‘turncoats’ and ‘collaborators’, and in considering them it
is historically inappropriate to persist with the Manichean idiom of a totalitarian Stuart Babylon confronted
by revolutionary whig purity.” Id, p. 559.
n. 637: Grey began his Secret History with the identification of a “discourse” among Monmouth,
Shaftsbury, Russell and Grey, noticeably not Sidney, and clearly aggressively led by Shaftesbury, in the
aftermath of Parliament’s decision not to pass a bill of exclusion (for which, it should be noted, Halifax
deserves primary credit), focused on the best way to prevent James from succeeding Charles II. Grey,
Secret History, p. 1. While their veracity is uncertain and, no doubt, inconsistent, the assertions are of
relevance and perhaps even importance. Among them are the following:
(i)

Shaftesbury significantly miscalculated in management of this cabal, at times bordering on
hysteria in his effort to expeditiously foment rebellion, e.g., by the end of October 1682, “the
Duke of Monmouth told me Lord Shaftsbury would undo us all.” Id, p. 27.

(ii)

Monmouth, Lord Russell, Sir Thomas Armstrong and Grey were heavily involved in this cabal,
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but there also were many secondary figures, including additional members of the aristocracy
(but excluding Sidney) See, e.g., id, pp. 4, 10, 16.
(iii)

Separate meetings took place that Grey, Armstrong, Monmouth and Russell attended with
Colonel Rumsey, Thomas Shephard and Robert Ferguson, men who were later accused of
the plot to murder the king at Rye House; and Shephard turned state’s evidence, testifying at
Sidney’s trial as to his handwriting. Other statements indicate separate meetings between
Shaftesbury and Ferguson, and Shaftesbury and Rumsey. Id, p. 28.

(iv)

An effort was made to involve Whig leader [Edmund] Montague, “who could bring in Sir
William Jones with him [Sidney’s co-author of Vindication and a prominent jurist and MP],”
during the Oxford Parliament; before anything could result from it, the king surprised the
Opposition by dissolving Parliament Id, p. 13.

(v)

It was at this juncture that Shaftesbury and co-conspirators began planning “an insurrection.”
Id, p. 16.

(vi)

Russell hesitated, delaying the planned insurrection because he did not think that they were
ready. Id, p. 22.

(vii)

Shaftesbury sought to duplicitously conceal Russell’s hesitation from Monmouth so that he
would proceed. Id, pp. 23-24.

(viii)

A Declaration of purpose, proffered and perhaps prepared by Ferguson, “began with some
account of the ends of government in general, and then enumerated the many grievances
and oppressions (as he called them) which the nation lay under, and the several arbitrary
steps the king had made (so was the expression) in order to absoluteness.” The Declaration
also “declared the cause of our taking up of arms was to redress those grievances, and to
deliver the king from the evil counsels of those about him, who advised him to such actions,
as tended to the destruction of the government: and the consideration of all things therein
mentioned was referred to the wisdom of a parliament, which was required speedily to be
called.” Finally, said Grey, the Declaration “concluded with a solemn protestation that the
insurrectionaries did not intend the least hurt to the king, nor make any considerable
alteration in the government, but “drew our swords to support it, and to preserve the royal
person of the king.” Id, pp. 39-40.

(ix)

Shortly thereafter, when the rebellion was delayed, Shaftesbury fled, accompanied by
Ferguson. Id, pp. 40-41.

(x)

By February, 1683, a new insurrection was underway, about which Grey was advised by
Monmouth, who told him that the new group included Essex, Howard, Russell, Hampden,
Algernon Sidney and himself, along with various other gentlemen,. Id, p. 42.

(xi)

Monmouth feared that Essex, Sidney and Hampden “intended a commonwealth, which could
not be without destruction of the king.” Id.

(xii)

Sidney acceded to the majority view that the insurrection should be under the direction of “our
General,” viz., Monmouth, rather than his preference, which was a small Council of civil
leadership. Id, pp. 56-58.

(xiii)

Sidney had not opposed what also seemed to be the consensus, viz., that they were mounting
an insurrection against the king’s advisors, not the king or the government. Id, p. 40.

(xiv)

Sidney had observed, however, that, “he had heard, when wise men drew their swords against
their King, they laid aside the thoughts of treating with him; but he would talk no more of that
matter since were all of one mind.” Id, p. 56.

(xv)

At a meeting at Monmouth’s, Russell told Grey that, “they had agreed upon a Declaration,
which would be to our minds, and that my lord of Essex and colonel Sidney had undertaken to
draw it.” Id, p. 59.

(xvi)

Rumsey turned king’s evidence, as did Sheppard. Id, pp. 62, 64.
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(xvii)

Grey escaped from imprisonment and made his way to Cleve in June 1683, before the
executions of the alleged Rye House plotters. Id, pp. 65,68.

(xviii)

Ferguson went to Cleve and spoke to Grey about persuading Monmouth to meet with him and
others about a rising in Scotland. Id, pp. 70-71.

(xix)

Grey also was in contact with Wildman, who he thought “most likely” to be in touch with
Monmouth. Id, p.70.

(xx)

Grey remained in direct contact with Ferguson, who Grey thought was involved in fomenting
“an imaginary rebellion of his own brain,” id, p. 72; (xxi) Armstrong and Grey were seized in
Leyden; Grey escaped (again). Id, p. 74.

(xxi)

Monmouth pursued his own interests, alienating Grey. Id, pp. 75-80.

(xxii)

In June 1685, Grey participated in Monmouth’s rebellion, was caught, wrote his confession,
and escaped punishment, apparently turning states evidence (which one wonders if he did or,
alternatively, if he was a royal spy throughout these episodes). Id, pp. 84-124.

(xxiii)

Aside from Grey’s suspicious conspiratorial role, there are other issues about his character.
The ODNB article about Grey by Richard Greaves noted Grey’s further notoriety for his
scandalous personal life, e.g., his trial for abducting his sister-in-law, with whom he was
having an affair, and Monmouth’s accusation of Grey’s cowardice during the Monmouth
invasion. Earlier, in March 1679, Grey also met regularly with Shaftesbury and Titus Oates,
the infamous prevaricating exposer of the Popish Plot.

See Richard L. Greaves, “Grey, Ford, earl of Tankerville (bap. 1655, d. 1701), ODNB, online edn, May
2009 http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128
-e-11531 (9-9-14); see also “Grey, Forde, Earle of Tankerville (d. 1701), DNB, Vol. XXIII, Leslie Stephen
and Sidney Lee, eds. (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1890), pp. 182-83, https://archive.org/details/
dictionaryofnati23stepuoft (9-15-18). On Grey’s account, see generally Scott II, pp. 286-91.
n. 667: In Lionel Glassey’s recent survey of the historiographic characterization of the 1688 Revolution,
including its frequent characterization as “glorious,” Glassey rightly concluded that no one moniker is
entirely correct or entirely wrong. The Revolution of 1688-89 can also, in some ways, be characterized as
“bloodless,” “conservative,” “reluctant,” “accidental,” “sensible,” “aristocratic,” “éite,” “respectable,”
“bourgeois,” “popular,” “whig,” “moral,” and “modern.” Of greatest importance for purposes of our analysis,
Glassey recognized that, “those admired aspects of the Revolution, ‘moderation’ and ‘compromise’,
amounted to the fudging of principles of importance to seventeenth-century persons of integrity and
intelligence such as Milton, Locke and Algernon Sidney: republicanism, liberty, puritanism. These
principles were, through the eighteenth century, swept under the carpet. The Revolution was not
‘sensible’; it was ‘sanitized’.” I do not think Locke fits into this category; after all, he came across the sea
with William and Mary. Milton was long gone. And Sidney would not have focused and probably not
cared about puritanism. But the issues of liberty and corruption would have dominated his thinking about
the invasion of the Orange dynasty. Lionel K. J. Glassey, “In Search of the Mot Juste: Characterization of
the Revolution of 1688-89,” Tim Harris & Stephen Taylor, eds., The Final Crisis of the Stuart Monarchy:
The Revolutions of 1688-91 in their British, Atlantic and European Contexts (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK:
The Bolydell Press, 2013), pp. 1-32, 12 (emphasis added). Cf. Nelson, The Royalist Revolution, p. 2
(“The American Revolution, unlike the two seventeenth-century English revolutions and the French
Revolution was – for a great many of its protagonists – a revolution against a legislature, not against a
king. It was, indeed, a rebellion in favor of royal power.”)
Chapter Two
n. 10: Laudian policy, supported by the King, also rested on a fear of “religious license and sectarianism”
that was associated with “spiritual anarchy.” Combined with the fact that the King was married to a
Catholic (Henrietta Maria), and that therefore there was “Catholic influence” at Court, “the popishness of
Laudianism was associated with an actual Catholic influence,” which “could become the basis of a
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conspiracy theory.” Laudianism was also associated with “an extensive view of the royal prerogative,”
and “a fear of clerical authority.” Laud , who was hand-picked by King Charles, “exercised near-total
control of the church,” and “would neither brook opposition nor shrink from a challenge.” Those who
opposed him in print were severely and humiliatingly punished. Many critics voluntarily exiled themselves
abroad. It was also during Laud’s ascendancy that the “first great wave of emigration to New England
took place.”
Laud was impeached in December 1641, imprisoned in the Tower of London, treated poorly in a “slow
march to the scaffold,” and finally executed in January 1645. “[R]evenge was sought on Canterbury in
the cause of God.” Matters such as the “origins of religious and other truths,” and the “relationship
between religious and secular authority” were not new. “What was remarkable about England in the
1640s was the depth and extent of their public discuss-ion, the urgency with which they imposed
themselves…. Rival claims and rival accounts of the same event,” such as Laud’s contested trial and
execution, “created a problem of authority: the authority of truth-claims.” Michael Braddick, God’s Fury,
England’s Fire: A New History of the English Civil Wars (London: Penguin Books, 2009), pp. 22-23, 79,
119, 134, 146, 325, 459; Kishlansky, A Monarchy Transformed, pp. 128-29.
n. 25: Sections I and II of the Solemn League and Covenant stated: (1) That we shall sincerely, really,
and constantly, through the grace of GOD, endeavor, in our several places and callings, the preservation
of the reformed religion in the Church of Scotland, in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government,
against our common enemies; the reformation of religion in the kingdoms of England and Ireland, in
doctrine, worship, discipline, and government, according to the Word of GOD, and the example of the
best reformed Churches; and shall endeavour to bring the Churches of GOD in the three kingdoms to the
nearest conjunction and uniformity in religion, Confession of Faith, Form of Church Government, Director
for Worship and Catechising; that we, and our posterity after us, may, as brethren, live in faith and love,
and the Lord may delight to dwell in the midst of us; and (2) That we shall, in like manner, without respect
of persons, endeavour the extirpation of Popery, Prelacy (that is, Church government by archbishops,
bishops, their chancellors and commissioners, deans, deans and chapters, archdeacons, and all other
ecclesiastical officers depending on that hierarchy), superstition, heresy, schism, profaneness, and
whatsoever shall be found contrary to sound doctrine and the power of Godliness; lest we partake in
other men's sins, and thereby be in danger to receive of their plagues; and that the Lord may be one, and
his name one, in the three kingdoms. The Solemn League and Covenant for Reformation and Defence of
Religion, the Honour and Happiness of the King, and the Peace and Safety of the Three Kingdoms of
Scotland, England, and Ireland, 1643-44, http://www.covenanter.org/Westminster/solemnleague.htm (418-14).
n. 36: David Allen, “Political Clubs in Restoration London,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Sept.,
1976), pp. 561-80; R. Ashcraft, R. and M. Goldsmith, “Locke, Revolution Principles and the Formation of
Whig Ideology,” Historical Journal 26 (1983), pp 773-800; Maurice Ashley, John Wildman: Plotter and
Postmaster: A Study of the English Republican Movement in The Seventeenth Century (Whitefish, MT:
Kessinger Publishing, LLC. 2008)[orig. publ. 1947]; Sarah Barber, A Revolutionary Rogue: Henry Marten
and the English Republic (Phoenix Mill: Sutton Publishing. 2000); D. Bradburn, “The Origin of a Species:
The Making of Whig Political Thought,” Book Review, https://networks.h-net.org/node/16821/reviews/
18802/bradburn-ward-politics-liberty-england-and-revolutionary-america (5-10-19); S. Burgess, “A Matter
of Context: Radicalism and the English Revolution” in M. Caricchio and G. Tarantino, eds. Cromohs
Virtual Seminars. Recent Historiographical Trends of the British Studies (17th & 18th Centuries), 2006-7,
pp. 1-4, www.cromohs.unifi.it/seminari/burgess_radicalism.html (accessed Dec 1 2009); Gary S. De
Krey, “Radicals, reformers and republicans: academic language and political discourse in Restoration
London,” A Nation Transformed: England after the Restoration, Alan Houston & Steve Pinus, ed.
(Cambridge University Press, 2011), Ch. 3, pp. 71-99; "Revolution Redivivus: 1688-1689 and the Radical
Tradition in Seventeenth-Century London Politics," The Revolution of 1688-1689, L. Schwoerer, ed.
(Cambridge University Press, 1992); Mark Goldie, "The Roots of True Whiggism 1688-1694," History of
Political Thought 1:2 (1980); Richard L. Greaves, "Radicals, Rights, and Revolution: British
Nonconformity and Roots of the American Experience," Church History, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 1992), pp.
151-68; Richard L. Greaves, Deliver us from Evil: the Radical Underground in Britain, 1660-1663 (New
York & Oxford, 1986); Richard Greaves & R. Zaller, Biographical Dictionary of British Radicals in The
Seventeenth Century. 3 vols. (Brighton. 1982-1984); J. Greenberg, The Radical Face of the Ancient
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Constitution. St. Edward’s “Laws” in Early Modern Political Thought (2001); Jonathan Harris, “The
Grecian coffee house and political debate in London 1688-1714,” London Journal 25 (2000), pp. 1-13;
Mark Knights, "Petitioning and the Political Theorists: John Locke, Algernon Sidney and London's
'Monster' Petition of 1680," Past and Present 138 (Feb. 1993), pp. 94-111; Mark Knights, Politics and
Opinion in Crisis, 1678-81 (Cambridge University Press, 1994); Gary de Krey, “Rethinking the
Restoration: dissenting cases for conscience, 1667-1672,” Historical Journal 38 (1995), pp. 53-83; Steve
Pincus, “Coffee Politicians Does Create”: Coffeehouses and Restoration Political Culture, Journal of
Modern History 67 (1995), pp. 806-34; John Salmon, “Algernon Sidney and the Rye House Plot," History
Today, 4:10 (1954); W. A. Speck, Reluctant Revolutionaries: Englishmen and the Revolution of 1688-89
(Oxford University Press, 1990); W. A. Speck, "'So meerly humane': theories of resistance in earlymodern Europe in Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Annabel Brett, James Tully
with Holly Hamilton-Bleakley, eds. (Cambridge University Press. 2006), pp. 149-70; James Walker, “The
English Exiles in Holland During the Reigns of Charles II and James II,” Transactions of the Royal
Historical Society, 4th Ser., 30 (1948), pp. 111-25; Blair Worden, “Republicanism, Regicide and Republic:
The English Experience,” Republicanism, a Shared European Heritage. Quentin Skinner & Martin von
Gelderen. eds. Vol. 1, Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge
University Press, 2002), pp. 307-327; Melinda S. Zook, "Early Whig Ideology, Ancient Constitutionalism,
and the Reverend Samuel Johnson," Journal of British Studies 32 (April 1993), pp. 139-65.
n. 69: Arthur Annesley, Earl of Anglesey, was another aristocratic political author and an attorney.
Among other things, he wrote a brochure published in 1683 under the name William Atwood, entitled “A
letter of remarkes upon Jovian.” Annesley was responding to George Hickes’ An answer to Julian the
Apostate which, in turn, was a response to Samuel Johnson’s Julian the Apostate, which attacked the
Duke of York. Hickes had argued that Christians under Julian had recognized the duty of passive
obedience. Anglesey disagreed, arguing that notwithstanding the king’s prerogative, Englishmen were
entitled to challenge ministers or officers who influenced the king to act “without, or contrary to the
Authority of his Laws.” The English king did not have absolute power; but even an emperor who “has
Absolute Power over his Subjects Lives and Estates, has to do what he pleases with particular Persons,
he has not thereby right to enslave the whole People, by altering the Constitution of the Government from
a Civil into a Tyrannical Dominion.” A letter of remarkes upon Jovian by “William Atwood” (London, 1683;
reprint from the collections of the University of California Libraries), passim. Not surprisingly given his
legal training, Anglesey also criticized Hickes partial quotations of Bracton, Fleta and Fortescue, and the
incorrect distinction drawn between so-called Imperial Laws and Political Laws. See Rebecca Kathern
Hayes-Steuck, “Emerging from the Shadows, The Life and Career of Arthur Annesley, Earl of Anglesey
(1615-1686),” unpublished dissertation dated 7-28-2005, Florida State University.
n. 139: Argyll testified that Shaftesbury was not only the chairman of the committee of the House of Lords
that prosecuted the inquiry, he also took control, “superceding the Government, who wished to conduct it,
he took the whole management into his own hands. He was always at his post, receiving informations,
granting warrants for searches and arrests, examining and committing prisoners, and issuing instructions
to officers, informers, and gaolers.” Recognizing that this description “no doubt is overcoloured,” Traill is
convinced that “it surely must be nearer the truth than the account of those biographers who make
Shaftesbury suddenly retire into the background….” After reviewing the activities of Parliament in
connection with the Popish Plot, Traill had no doubts about Shaftesbury being “an active participator” in
presenting the Popish Plot as a legitimate conspiracy. As to “what, if any, extent was he a believer in it,”
determining “how much truth there was in the whirlwind of rumors is not easy.” But precisely because
Shaftesbury was in a position to know the facts, it is extremely difficult to conclude that Shaftesbury
suffered from “honest delusion as to the more alarming part of Oates’s story.” On the other hand, part of
Traill’s analysis is based on the conviction that Shaftesbury was privy to the secret provisions of the
Treaty of Dover and, particularly, Charles II’s agreement to publicly proclaim his Catholicism. If
Shaftesbury knew this, which the weight of evidence today suggests he did not, then he obviously knew
that there was a plot to establish Catholicism in England; the catch was that the originators of the plot
were Charles II and Louis XIV! As to the second element of the Popish Plot, which was to assassinate
Charles, Traill contends that it was “so utterly inconsistent with certain facts involved in the former that it
could not possibly be true.” Trail concludes that Shaftesbury may have suspected that Oates’s
inflammatory charges were“ founded on a belated discovery of the secret provisions of Dover…. When,
then, the informer asked the world to believe in an assassination plot as part and parcel of the conspiracy
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against Protestantism, Shaftesbury must have known that he was lying.” Traill, Shaftesbury (the first
earl), pp. 129-34.
n. 165: Not surprisingly, Bethel criticized Cromwell for usurping the authority of the Long Parliament. But
most of his pamphlet was devoted to an explanation of why “this late Tyrant, or Protector, (as some calls
him),” was responsible for the destruction of England’s status within Europe as the kingdom that had
“arrived at the highest pitch of Trade, Wealth, and Honour, that it, in any Age, ever yet knew.” Cromwell
was extraordinarily fortunate to be able to begin his “Time” in these circumstances, “upon the greatest
advantages imaginable”; but he then utterly squandered them. Whether it was out of ignorance or
willfulness, Bethel did not definitively say; but he was quite clear that Cromwell was responsible for
England’s changed, adverse economic circumstances and the nation’s lesser prestige in Europe.
Specifically, Bethel slammed Cromwell for throwing away the advantage that England had gained from its
victory over the Dutch: “he neglected all our golden opportunities, misimproved the Victory God had given
us over the United Netherlands, making peace … so soon as ever things came into his hands, upon
equal tearms with them.” Second, contrary to England’s interest, Cromwell “made an unjust Warr with
Spain, and an impollitick League with France, bringing the first thereby under, and making the latter too
great for Christendome.” In so doing, Cromwell not only disadvantaged the Protestants of France, but he
“broke the balance betwixt the two Crowns of Spain, and France, which his Predecessors the Long
Parliament, had always wisely preserved.” Overall, by “indiscreet neglecting of Trade, and choosing Warr
when he was in Peace, did he miss the true Interest of England, as by his ill-founded designs, he did the
Interest of the Reformed Religion.” Bethel focused, as well, on Cromwell’s misguided Baltic policy which,
“if his death had not given them that succeeded him, the Long Parliament, an opportunity of prudently
preventing it,” an achievement in which Sidney played a crucial role, he would have created a “dangerous
design” for England as a result of his failure to understand “the importance of the Baltick Sea to this
Nation.” Bethel also lambasted Cromwell for the oppression and injustice of “Oliver’s Time,” including the
imprisonment of Sir Henry Vane for his publication of The Healing Question. Slingsby Bethel, The World’s
Mistake in Oliver Cromwell, Or, A Short Political Discourse Shewing that Cromwell’s Mal-Administration,
During His Four Years and Nine Moneths Pretended Protectorship, Layed The Foundation Of Our
Present Condition In The Decay Of Trade (London, 1668)(EEBO edition, reproduced from the original in
the Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery), pp. 3-4, 6, 8, 13; see also Gary S. DeKrey, London and
the Restoration 1659-1683 (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 106-07, 192-98, 314-15.
n. 199: Unlike Locke’s improbable role in Shaftesbury’s secretive political activities after exclusion failed,
it is very clear that Locke contributed very significantly to the 1669 creation of the Fundamental
Constitutions. Proof positive is the Carolina Proprietors’ endorsement of his obtaining, in 1671, “the
hereditary noble rank of landgrave of Carolina, in ‘recognition of ‘his great prudence, learning and industry
both in settling the form of government and in placing colonies on the Ashley River,’” as stated in his
landgrave patent. The Fundamental Constitutions were subsequently materially amended. “Where was
Locke during this flurry of renewed activity” between late May and mid-August 1682 when the
Fundamental Constitutions were “thoroughly … overhauled”? Armitage carefully established that “he was
“on hand for consultation during the revision that produced a new version of the Fundamental
Constitutions dated August 17, 1682, nine days after he left London.” Locke’s handwriting is all over the
summer 1682 revisions! So, too, is the editing of an unknown drafter as well as that of Proprietor Sir
Peter Colleton, a former parliamentary Whig, Exclusionist, “and absentee owner of one of the largest
slave plantations on Barbados.” These three men “seem to have scrutinized every provision of the
January 1682 Fundamental Constitutions before amending or replacing more than a quarter of the
existing articles.” In short, Locke was a very interested and involved party in the continued amending of
the Fundamental Constitutions at the same time as he wrote, per Armitage, his Two Treatises chapter on
property with its many references to the vacant land of America, the “wild Indian” and the “planter,” and in
which Locke famously stated, “in the beginning all the World was America.”
The issue of the Fundamental Constitutions is important in its use (or not) by historians as an indicia of
Locke’s views on slavery. In his Second Treatise Locke defined slavery as a consequence of just war. In
Ch. IV, “Of Slavery,” Locke stated that man was naturally free, and that freedom can only be curtailed by
consent. In Locke’s view man lacked the power by compact or consent to enslave himself. Slavery, then,
was “the State of War continued, between a lawful Conquerour, and a Captive.” The Second Treatise,
Laslett, ed., Ch. IV, pp. 283-85. An unjust prosecutor of war “forfeit[s]” his right to freedom; in this case
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the conqueror has legitimate “purely Despotical” power. Id, Ch. XVI, p. 387. For once a compact is made
between slave and slave-owner, “the State of War and Slavery ceases.” Slavery, then, is the punishment
for all those who fight on the side of an unjust aggressor. Apparently, this is how Locke saw the African
slave or, if he did not, there is no way to explain the inconsistency between Locke’s role generally vis-àvis colonial slavery and, specifically, vis-à-vis the Fundamental Constitutions, and his position on slavery
in the Second Treatise. At the time of the amendment of Fundamental Constitutions, the earlier-drafted
Two Treatises’ Ch. IV “Of Slavery” provisions on slaveholders’ “absolute arbitrary Power, over the Lives,
Liberties and Persons of his Slaves and their Posterities” was not eliminated, nor were the comparable
slavery provisions in the Fundamental Constitutions, which remained in deliberate full force and effect.
Holly Brewer’s recent article flies in the face of Armitage’s finding. See David Armitage, “John Locke,
Carolina, and the ‘Two Treatises of Government,’” Political Theory, Vol. 32, No. 5 (Oct. 2004), pp. 602-27,
604, 608, 612-19; Holly Brewer, “Slavery, Sovereignty, and ‘Inheritable Blood’: Reconsidering John Locke
and the Origins of American Slavery,” American Historical Review (Oct. 2017), pp. 1038-78.
The complexity of this duality, including Locke’s reliance on and exceptions to the ideas of Grotius, is the
subject of Farr’s analyses. In eighteenth and nineteenth century America, the Fundamental Constitutions
were described as Locke’s drafting of “Shaftesbury’s principles” that were “consonant to the feelings of
the great metaphysician him-self,” a “tissue of absurdities” that was entirely impractical. Farr concluded,
“In the end, the reception of Locke on new world slavery records a history of contradictions, as if a mirror
to those found in his texts and life. One feature of this reception history, however, fits the argument of
this essay: no one thought Locke succeeded in justifying slavery in America. Revolutionaries and
abolitionists ignored or invented apologies for his theory and practice in relation to slavery.” Farr, “Locke,
Natural Law, and New World Slavery,” pp. 514-16.
n. 300: Roger L’Estrange is probably the most well-known, prolific and ardent popular royalist author of
the Restoration, as well as a publisher and petitioner. He was also a confusing writer, described by a
contemporary as a man with a commission “to say White is Black, and Black is White.” Mark Knights,
“Roger L’Estrange, Printed Petitions and the Problem of Intentionality,” ch. 6 in Liberty, Authority,
Formality, pp. 113-30, 125, citing Anon., A Dialogue between a Monkey in the old Bayly and an Ape in
High Holbourn (n.d.), p.2. L’Estrange was the licensing agent in chief of the Company of Stationers, the
English agency that licensed books before publications. He was “half fanatic, half politician, half hack
writer, in fact half in many respects and whole only in the resulting contradictions of purpose and
performance. On one point he was strong – a desire to suppress unlicensed printing.” Undoubtedly,
L’Estrange was good at his job, leading Charles II’s successful efforts to reinstate censorship, as
evidenced by the act of 1662, designed, in one bishop’s words, to “cut off one of the schismatic’s and
rebels’ best prop[s] and engine[s], the press, by securing and fencing it from bold, impudent pens.” Henry
Neville and Worthington Chauncey Ford, The Isle of Pines: An Essay in Bibliography (Boston, MA: Dodo
Press, 2010)(1st publication, 1920), p. 2; Greaves, Deliver Us From Evil, pp. 216-25.
n. 325: Among the instances of Sidney’s invoking God in his correspondence are the following: (i) Aug.
30, 1660 letter from Sidney to Leicester (from Hamburgh): (a) “I call to remembrance as exactly as I can,
all my actions relating to our civill distempers, I cannot finde one, that I can look upon as a breach of the
rules of justice or honour; this is my strength, and, I thank God, by this I enjoy very serene thoughts.” (b)
“God that gives me inward peace in my outward troubles, doth knowe, that I doe in my hart choose an
innocent, quiet retirement, before any place unto which I could hope to raise myself by thoes actions
which they condemne.” (c) “I cannot helpe it if I judge amisse; I did not make myself, nor can I correct the
defects of my own creation. I walk in the light God hath given me; if it be dimme or uncertaine, I must
beare the penalty of my errors: I hope to doe it with patience, and that noe burden shall be very grievous
to me, except sinne and shame. God keep me from thoes evils, and in all things else, dispose of me
according to his pleasure.” (ii) Sept. 21, 1660 letter from Sidney to Leicester (rom Augsburgh): (a) “But
whatsoever my fortune is, I hope I shall shewe unto your lordship I am not capable of base compliance
with fortune, in relation to any person whateer, nor an indecent action; and before I swerve from this rule,
I hope God will put an end unto my life.” (b) “God’s will be done, I must beare my condition as well as I
can. (iii) Undated letter, identified as between 1664 and 1677, from Sidney to Benjamin Furly: (a) “I have
receaved thy letter, and rejoice in its contents: I hope it is from the Lord.” (b) “I lived almost three years,
seldome much disturbed, but in the end I found, that it was an ill grounded peace that I enjoyed, and
could have no rest in my owne spirite, because I lived only to myself, and was in no ways usefull unto
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God’s people, my countrey, and the world.” (c) “I desire you and all our friends to seeke God for me,
praying him to defend me from outward enemyes, but more especially from thoes that are within me; and
that he would give me such a steady knowledge of truth, as I may be constantly directed in seeking that
which is truly good.” (iii) Note that Sidney writes about God in the same way as his father who, in an
Aug. 30, 1660 letter to Sidney states, “And now I am again upon the point of retiring to m poor habitation,
having for myself no other dessein, than to pass the small remainder of my dayes, innocently and quietly,
and, if it please God, to be gathered in peace to m fathers.” See Appendix to Meadley, Memoirs of
Algernon Sydney, passim.
Chapter Three
n. 9: Note that the only part of Republic available in the sixteenth through the eighteenth century was the
separately transcribed Dream of Scipio, which was Book 6 of Republic, and therefore not this definition in
Book 1; the rest of the text was not discovered until 1820. But in Dream of Scipio, Cicero emphasized the
necessity for man to “Respect justice and do your duty,” which was “important” vis-à-vis parents and
relatives but “paramount in the case of one’s country.” Id, p. 89 [R. 6. 16]. In The Laws, which was
available in early modern Europe, Cicero said, “it is agreed, of course, that laws were devised to ensure
the safety of citizens, the security of states, and the peaceful happy life of human beings.” Cicero also
referred to his earlier Republic definition of res publica when he stated that it is man’s “business, then, to
maintain and preserve the constitution of that state which Scipio in those six books proved to be the best.
All the laws must be framed to fit that kind of community.” This description of man’s responsibility
dovetailed with Cicero’s earlier definition of res publica. Laws, pp. 104 [L. 1. 20] & 125 [L. 2. 11].
n. 14: See, e.g., Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli, a Short History (Oxford University Press, 2000) (repr. from
1981 pub.), pp. 60-61 (for Machiavelli and the classical republican tradition, liberty is essential to a
republic, and that liberty is not possible in a monarchy; consequently, a republic cannot be a monarchy,
republicanism cannot survive in a monarchy, and a monarchy cannot be republic); cf. Skinner, “Prehumanist origins of republican ideas,” “The republican ideal of political liberty,” Machiavelli and
Republicanism, pp. 140-41 (Machiavelli “makes a sharp distinction between the freedom of republics and
the slavery imposed not merely by tyrants but even by the best kings and princes.”). In Liberty Before
Liberalism, Skinner clarified (or obfuscated?) his chosen terminology by noting that while he previously
had “spoken not of the neo-roman but the republican theory of liberty … this usage now seems to me
liable to mislead.” Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, p. 11 n.31. As Mahlberg pointed out, this definition
“needs revision.” Pursuant to Skinner’s definition, which was also Zera Fink’s definition, “not even …
Aristotle, Livy or Machiavelli could be called ‘republicans.’” These political thinkers “allowed for monarchy
under certain circumstances and rejected it only in its corrupted form as tyranny. … Republican features
could be accommodated within a monarchical framework.” Mahlberg, Henry Neville and English
republican culture in the seventeenth century, Dreaming of another game (Manchester University Press,
2009), pp. 8-9.
n. 17: “[S]ome of those who have written about republics declare that in each of them is one of the three
forms of government, which they call principality, aristocracy, and democracy. Discorsi, BI, Ch2, 23
(emphasis added). Machiavelli suggested, however, that the better way to consider republics was to use
the framework of “six kinds of government” defined by “many, wiser men,” three of which are “very bad,”
and three of which are “good in themselves but so easily corruptible that they also come to be
pernicious.” Id. The three good forms of government were those already mentioned (principality,
aristocracy and democracy); the three pernicious ones were the corrupted versions of the first three:
tyranny, the government of the few (sometimes termed oligarchy), and anarchy. “The principality easily
becomes tyrannical; aristocracy quite easily becomes the government of the few; and democracy without
difficulty turns into anarchy.” Id, B1, Ch2, 23-24. As Skinner pointed out, the three good forms of
government were recognized by the Romans and analyzed by the Florentines before the Renaissance.
Skinner, “Pre-humanist origins of republican ideas,” Machiavelli and Republicanism, ed. Gisela Bock,
Quentin Skinner & Maurizio Viroli (Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.133, referencing Latini’s Li Livres
dou Trésor (Berkeley, CA, 1948), p. 211. Accordingly, one can categorically say that, contrary to
Skinner’s conviction, for Machiavelli a republic was not a particular form of government. Cf. David
Wootton, “Introduction, The Republican Tradition: From Commonwealth to Common Sense,”
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Republicanism, Liberty and Commercial Society, pp. 1-41, 5 (“For Machiavelli, empires and monarchies
are not republics.”). Wootton also analyzed John Adams’ use of the term, which he called “polysemic,”
viz., susceptible to many possible meanings or interpretations. Id, p. 7.
In a very long passage in Defence, Adams expounded on the nature of republics and how they have been
understood. “But of all the words, in all languages, perhaps there has been none so much abused in tis
way as the words republic, commonwealth, and popular state. In the Rerum Publicarum Collectio, of
which there are fifty and odd volumes, and many of them very incorrect, France, Spain and and Portugal,
the four great empires, the Babylonian, Persian, Greek, and Roman, and even the Ottoman, are all
denominated republics. If, indeed, a republic signifies nothing but public affairs, it is equally applicable to
all nations; and every kind of government, despotisms, monarchies, aristocracies, democracies, and
every possible or imaginable composition of them, are all republics: there is, no. doubt, a public good and
evil, a common wealth and a common impoverishment, in all of them.” Adams continued. “Others define
a republic to be a government of more than one: this will exclude only the despotisms; for a monarchy
administered by laws, requires at least magistrates to register them, and consequently more than one
person in the government. Some comprehend under the term only aristocracies and democracies, and
mixtures of these, without any distinct executive power.” Now we get to Adams’ perspective. “Others
again, more rationally, define a republic to signify only a government, in which all men, rich and poor,
magistrates and subjects, officers and people, masters and servants, the first citizen and the last, are
equally subject to the laws. This indeed appears to be the true, and only true definition of a republic.” He
turns to etymology.”The word res, every one knows, signified in the Roman language, wealth, riches,
property; the word publicus, quasi populicus, and per Sync. pôplicus, signified public, common, belonging
to the people; res publica therefore was publica res, the wealth, riches, or property of the people. Res
populi, and the original meaning of the word republic, could be no other than a government in which the
property of the people predominated and governed: and it had more relation to property than liberty: it
signified a government, in which the property of the public, or people, and of every one of them, was
secured and protected by law. This idea, indeed, implies liberty;l because property cannot be secure,
unless the. man. Be at liberty to acquire, use, or part with it, at his discretion, and unless he have his
personal liberty of life and limb, motion and rest, for that purpose: it implies, moreover, that the property
and liberty of all men, not merely of a majority, should be safe; for the people, or public, comprehends.
More than a majority, it comprehends all and. every individual: and the property of every citizen is a part
of the public property, as each citizen is a part of the public, people, or community. The property,
therefore, of every man has a share in government, and is more powerful than any citizen, or party of
citizens; it is governed only by the law.” The statement goes on, discussing how Marchamont Nedham
and others use republic to mean a representative democracy. Indeed, this is what Kloppenberg has done
in Toward Democracy. Adams, Defence, Vol. III, pp. 158-61.
n.18: Plato did not use the word, republic. In The Republic, Plato’s word of choice in talking about
governance of the Greek city-state was politeia, which was translated into Latin as respublica, indicating
the nature of the city-state or Greek polis. The original meaning has been described as closer to “society”
or “the state” than to “republic.” In contrast, Pocock translated politeia as “constitution,” referring to the
formal distribution of decision-making authority within a process in which all citizens participate. See,
e.g., "republic," The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations, 4th ed., Garrett
Brown, Iain McLean & Alistair McMillan, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2018), http://oxfordindex.oup.
com.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/abstract/10.1093/acref/9780199670840.013.1155?rskey=pC651Y&result=4
(1-13-19); Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p.70. The matter becomes more complicated, however; in
his book on the English ancient constitution, Pocock recognized that the term “constitution” is an
anachronism as applied to medieval English history, and that “constitution” was used interchangeably,
presumably in early modern England, with the term, “government.” Holt pointed out that in the
seventeenth century the term “constitution” referred to “the mode in which a state is constituted,” and was
used in connection with the Biblical state of Israel, not England. J. C. Holt, “The Ancient Constitution in
Medieval England,” Sandoz, ed., The Roots of Liberty, pp. 32-33. Returning to the word republic, Plato
wrote about The Republic, but the form of governance in the ancient Greek polis, including Plato’s
Athens, involved “the direct, unmediated, participatory character of political action…. The citizens were
the polis.” Life in an ancient Greek polis was what we would call a direct democracy, at least for those
who were citizens of the polis, which of course excluded large classes of people, including women and
slaves. At the same time, there was no civil society other than the polis, and there was no concept of the
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sovereignty of law as we know it. There also were no recognized individual or natural rights of man.
Carledge, “Greek Political Thought: The Historical Context,” The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman
Political Thought, pp. 17-18. In short, the Greek meaning of “republic” is not the source of early modern
English advocacy of republicanism. Cf. Eric Nelson, The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought (Harvard
University Press, 2004).
n. 40: Cicero also said, “Of all these possibilities, none is more calculated to secure and to retain
influence than winning affection, and none is more repugnant than being feared.” Cicero, On Obligations,
Book 2, ¶23, p. 61. This was a clear point of departure for the Florentine republican Machiavelli, albeit
one that in my own view has been overplayed. Machiavelli is famous for his advice to a Medici prince not
to value truth and goodness more than political success. While Machiavelli very much agreed with Cicero
that “the perception and awareness of what is true” is essential to a leader, in The Prince Machiavelli did
not precisely state, “it is better to be feared than loved,” although even if he had, his point is that what is
most important for a leader is to remain in power so that he can accomplish his goals for his people; while
everyone always wants to be loved, sometimes you need to be feared in order to remain in power. In fact,
what Machiavelli said is that, “it is much safer to be feared than to be loved.” On the other hand, there is
no doubt that for the Florentine, if the goals of political leadership could be achieved while also maintaining all elements of one’s virtue, all the better. See, e.g., Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, Peter Bondanella, tr. & ed., Maurizio Viroli, intro. (Oxford University Press, 2008), Ch. XVII, pp. 57-59. It is not clear
whether this materially distinguishes Machiavelli from Cicero, who advocated the destruction of a tyrant
but also argued, “nothing can be honourable unless it is beneficial, nor beneficial unless it is honourable.”
E. M. Atkins, “Cicero,” The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, pp. 507-08.
n. 44: “Our Trimmer adoreth the goddess truth, though in all ages she hath been scurvily used, as well as
those that worshipped her. It is of late become such a ruining virtue, that mankind seemeth to be agreed
to commend and avoid it; yet the want of practice which repealeth all other laws hath no influence upon
the law of truth, because it hath a root in Heaven, and an intrinsic value in itself, that can never be
impaired.” Truth showed “her greatness in this, that her enemies, even when they are successful, are
ashamed to own it; nothing but powerful truth hath the prerogative of triumphing, not only after victory, but
in spite of it, and to put conquest itself out of countenance.” As for truth, “She may be kept under and
suppressed, but her dignity still remaineth with her, even when she is in chains; falsehood, with all her
impudence, hath not enough to speak ill of her before her face.” Halifax’s flowery description continued.
“Such majesty she carrieth about her that her most prosperous enemies are fain to whisper their treason;
all the power upon earth can never extinguish her; she hath lived in all ages; and let the mistakes of
prevailing authority, christen any opposition to it and what name they please [she] makes it not only an
ugly and unmannerly, but a dangerous thing to persist.” Moreover, Truth “hath lived very retiredly indeed,
nay sometimes so buried, that only some few of the discerning part of mankind could have a glimpse of
her; with all that she hath eternity in her, she knoweth not how to die; and from the darkest clouds that
can shade and cover her, she breaketh from time to time with triumph for her friends, and terror to her
enemies.” “The Character of a Trimmer,” Halifax Complete Works, J. P. Kenyon, edit. & intro. (Middlesex,
UK: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 101-02.
n. 59: Early modern republican utopias include James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana and A
System of Politics, John Pocock, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1992) and Henry Neville, The Isle of
Pines (1668; Bibliolife Reprint, 2008). As English professor James Holstun reminded us, in the utopian
The Isle of Pines, “Henry Neville’s Restoration proto-robinsonade,” was intended as a “republican critique
of Filmer’s patriarchal theory” in which Neville argued that “social chaos results from relying on the natural
authority of fathers apart from artificial and contractual civil law,” as evidenced in “the degeneration of
George Pine’s fecund shipwrecked descendants.” James Holstun, “Introduction,” Pamphlet Wars: Prose
in the English Revolution (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1992), p. 9. Sir Henry Vane’s biographer
characterized Vane as “deeply interested in ideal constitutions.” Violet A. Rowe, Sir Henry Vane the
Younger: A Study in Political and Administrative History (London: Athlone Press, 1970), p. 217-18, n. 5.
Vane wrote a reply to Harrington’s Oceana entitled, A Needful Corrective or Ballance in Popular
Government [n.d., no printer or publisher given, Bodleian Library and referenced by Rowe at p. 227 &
n.3]. There is also Thomas More’s much earlier Utopia (1516) that addressed early sixteenth-century
social issues, and Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis (1627), which focused on England’s difficulties in the
pursuit of science. See “Introduction,” Three Early Modern Utopias: Utopia, New Atlantis and The Isle of
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Pines, Oxford World’s Classics, Susan Bruce, ed. (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. ix-xiii. Cf. the
rejection by the northern humanists (Erasmus and More) of the values of the Italian Renaissance civic
humanists, Nelson, “Utopia through Italian Eyes,” passim.
n. 61: Nineteenth-century historian David Masson wrote a lengthy, extraordinarily detailed but fascinating
account of Harrington, his ideas, and the Rota Club. “Of the varieties of political theorists glanced at by
Ludlow the most famous at this time were the Harringtonians or Rota-men. … Their chief or founder was
James Harrington, quite a different person from the "Sir James Harrington" now of the Council of State.
He was the "Mr. James Harrington" who had been one of the grooms of the bedchamber to Charles I. in
his captivity at Holmby and in the Isle of Wight (Vol. III. p. 700).” Masson believed that, even then,
Harrington “had been a political idealist of a certain Republican fashion, and it had been part of the King's
amusement in his captivity to hold discourses with him and draw out his views.” After the King’s
execution, Harrington cherished “very affectionate recollections of his Majesty personally,” Harrington “
lived for some years among his books, writing verses, translating Virgil's Eclogues, and dreaming
dreams.” Harrington “prosecut[ed] those speculations in the science of politics which had fascinated him
since his student days at Oxford. He read Histories; he studied and digested the political writings of
Aristotle, Plato, Macchiavelli, Bacon, Hobbes, and others; he added observations of his own, collected
during his extensive travels in France, Germany, and Italy; he admired highly the constitution of the
Venetian Republic, and derived hints from it; and, altogether, the result was that he came forth from his
seclusion with a more perfect theory and ideal of a body-politic, as he believed, than had yet been
explained to the world”. Harrington “convinced himself "that no government is of so accidental or arbitrary
an institution as people are apt to imagine, there being in societies natural causes producing their
necessary effects, as well as in the earth or the air"; and one of these natural causes he had discovered
in the great principle or axiom "that Empire follows the Balance of Property."
According to Masson, Harrington attributed England’s “troubles” “not so much to faults in the governors or
in the governed as to a change in the balance of property, dating from the reign of Henry VII., which had
gradually shifted the weight of affairs from the King and Lords to the Commons. He believed that “all
could be put right by adopting a true model.” By definition we are now in Pocock’s paradigm universe. “It
must not be an arbitrary monarchy, or a mixed monarchy, or a mere democracy as vulgarly understood,
or any other of the make-shift constitutions of the past, but something worthy of being called a Free and
Equal Commonwealth, and yet conserving what was genuine and natural in rank or aristocracy. The basis
must be a systematic classification of the community in accordance with facts and needs, and the
arrangements such as to give full liberty to all, while distributing power among all in such ways and
proportions as to keep the balance eternally even and make factions and contests impossible. “ Masson
recognized the issue on which I have focused in discussing Harrington, which is that “These
arrangements, as he had schemed them out, were to be very numerous and complicated, every kind of
social assemblage or activity, from the most local and parochial to the most general and national, having
an exact machinery provided for it; but two all-pervading principles were to be election by Ballot and
rotation of Eligibility.”
Turning to Oceana, Masson noted that “Harrington's ideal had been set forth in a thin folio volume,
entitled The Commonwealth of Oceana, published in 1656, and dedicated to Cromwell. The book was in
the form of a political romance, with high-flown dialogues, and a very fantastic nomenclature for his
proposed dignities and institutions, throwing the whole into the air of poetic or literary whimsy.” This
“whimsy” included “an elaborate exposition of the system and process of the Ballot. Though too fantastic
for direct effect, the book had been a good deal talked of, and had procured for the author not only a
considerable reputation, but also some following of disciples. One of these,” said Masson, who became
an “intimate friend, was the Republican free-thinker Henry Neville.” There also were “some criticisms by
opponents, Royalist and Republican; in answer to which Harrington, in 1658, had published a second
treatise, called The Prerogative of Popular Government, re-interpreting and vindicating the doctrines of
the Oceana, but more in a style of direct dissertation.
By this time, explained Masson, “The Harringtonians were … pretty numerous. Besides Neville there were
perhaps six or eight of them among the Rumpers themselves. Why, then, should there not be an effort to
impregnate the "Good Old Cause," sadly in need of new impregnation of some kind, with a few of the
essential Harringtonian principles?” Neville tried unsuccessfully to do this by petitioning Parliament. “The
answer of the House, through the Speaker, had been most gracious. They perceived that this was a
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petition "without any private ends and only for public interest"; and they assured the petitioners that the
business to which the petition referred, viz. the settlement of a Constitution for the Commonwealth, was
one in which the House intended "to go forward." There is nothing in the Journals to indicate the nature of
the petition; but it had been drawn up by Harrington and may be read in his Works. It abjured, in the
strongest terms, Kingship or Single-Person Sovereignty in any form, and particularly "the interest of the
late King's son"; but it represented the existing state of things as chaotic, and urged the adoption of a
definite Constitution for England, the legislative part of which should consist of two Parliamentary Houses,
both to be elected by the whole body of the People. One was to contain about 300 members, and was to
have the power of debating and propounding laws; the other was to be much larger, and was to pass or
reject the laws so propounded. Great stress was laid on Rotation in the elections to both.” The governors
must sometimes be the governed; accordingly, “they proposed that annually a third part of each of the
two Houses should wheel out of the House, not to be re-eligible for a considerable period, and their
places to be taken by newly elected members. Thus every third year the stuff of each House would be
entirely changed.” Apparently the Harringtonians were “Not content with petitioning Parliament,” and so
they disseminated their ideas vigorously through the press, with Harrington writing several pamphlets,
along with his disciples. “But this was not all.” It was at this juncture that the Harringtonians “set up their
famous debating club, called The Rota. ‘In 1659, in the beginning of Michaelmas term,’ says Anthony
Wood, ‘they had every night a meeting at the then Turk's Head in the New Palace Yard at Westminster
(the next house to the stairs where people take water), called Miles's coffee-house—to which place their
disciples and virtuosi would commonly then repair: and their discourses about Government and of
ordering of a Commonwealth were the most ingenious and smart that ever were heard, for the arguments
in the Parliament House were but flat to those. This gang had a balloting box, and balloted how things
should be carried, by way of tentamens; which being not used or known in England before upon this
account, the room every evening was very full.” Besides Harrington and Neville, among the motley crew
of regular attendees were various merchants, a physician, divines, and soldiers, and notably John
Wildman. “The soldiers who commonly were there, as auditors and spectators, would have kicked them
down stairs; but Harrington's moderation and persuasion hindered them. The doctrine was very taking,
and the more because as to human foresight there was no possibility of the King's return.” According to
Masson, “The greatest of the Parliament men hated this design of rotation and ballotting, as being against
their power. Eight or ten were for it." For “five months the Rota Club was to be one of the busiest and
most attractive institutions in London, yielding more amusement of an intellectual kind than any such
meetings as those of the few physicists left in London to be the nucleus of the future Royal Society. It is
worthy of remark that Harrington and the chief Harringtonians looked with contempt on these physical
philosophers. What were their occupations over drugs, water-tubs, and the viscera of frogs, compared
with great researches into human nature and plans for the government of states? Dr. William Petty, who
belonged to both bodies, seems to have taken pleasure in troubling the Rota with his doubts and
interrogatives.” David Masson, The Life of John Milton, Volume 5 (of 7), 1654-1660, Book III, Ch. 1, §2,
Part 13, “The Anarchy, Stage I.: or the Restored Rump: May 25, 1859 [sic]-Oct. 13, 1659,” at (12-7-16).
n. 66: “There is a deeper reason why Oceana is not a utopia in More’s, Bacon’s or Campanella’s sense.
It does not portray a no-place or outopia, an imaginary is-land in unknown seas, but a fictionalized yet
instantly recognizable England.” Consequently, “What is being idealized is not a commonwealth isolated
from the history of mankind, but the immediate present or imminent future which Harrington presents
England as occupying in history as he understands it.” To distinguish the nature of Harrington’s Oceana
from utopias, Pocock derived the term occasione. “Oceana is not a utopia so much as an occasione, a
moment of revolutionary opportunity at which old historical forms have destroyed themselves and there is
a chance to construct new forms immune from the contingencies of history (known as fortuna).”
Harrington therefore “employed fiction to show what might be done, and satire because of the chances
that it might not be done. At a deeper level, he was less a founder of the genre of historical utopia or
futuristics than an important figure in the history of revolutionary theory; he does not use the modern term
revolution, but it has come to denote a moment of historical exhaustion and opportunity, and this he
explicitly does describe.” Pocock, “Introduction,” Harrington, Oceana, p. xvii (emphasis added).
n. 87: For examples of Sidney’s use of history, see, e.g., DCG II.26.260-261 (description of self-rule by
various Renaissance Italian city-states); II.28.274-276 (illustrations from ancient Greece and Rome,
medieval Italy and the league of Cambray, early modern Portugal and the Hapsburg empire, the Catholics
and Huguenots in early modern France, and the seventeenth-century English wars in Scotland, Ireland
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and at sea, on the impact of fighting for one’s own interests versus those of others); III.8.361-366 (on
Christ, the Hebrew Kings, the Pharisees, Nebuchadnezzar, and the Romans). For examples of summary
accounts, see, e.g., I.3.15 (identifying men “who delivered their countries from such plagues were thought
to have something of divine in them,” including Pelopidas, Epaminondas, Thrasbyulus, Harmodius,
Aristogiton, Philopoemen, Lucius Brutus, Publius Valerius, Marcus Brutus, C. Cassius, M. Cato, “with a
multitude of others amongst the ancient heathens”;) II.22.207 (reference to “the horrid domestick and
foreign wars, that distracted Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Flanders, England, Scotland, Poland,
Denmark, Sweden, Hungary, Transylvania, Muscovy, Turkey, Africa, and other places”); III.13.388 (string
citation to Germanicus, Corbulo, Valerius Asiaticus, Thrasea, Soranus, Helvidius Priscus, Julius Agricola,
“and other excellent men,” versus Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, Nero, Sejanus, Macro, Tigellinus “and
other villains like to them”)
n. 89: In “The Second Treatise” Locke referred his audience to other experts on the subject: “I could send
my readers to Bracton, Fortescue, and the Author of the Mirrour, and others; Writers, who cannot be
suspected to be ignorant of our Government, or Enemies of it.” In his book on education, Locke
emphasized that a gentleman should study the English constitution, “the ancient books of the common
law.” But apparently Locke had neither read nor owned these texts – “a fact which bears on his
indifference to constitutional history and constitutional development,” e.g., “he had no relevant title by
Coke, Spelman, Bracton, Petyt or Brady, nor the Mirror, Fleta, the Modus Tenendi”; he “sent his readers’
to a group of writers, whose works he did not own and evidently had never read.” John Locke, “Second
Treatise,” Two Treatises on Government, §240 & n., p. 426, & Laslett, “Introduction” id, pp. 76-78 & 77.
N. ¶; John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, R. H. Quick, ed. (Cambridge University Press,
1892), pp. 159-61. In contrast to Locke, Sidney clearly had read and relied on many books on the law,
including texts by Bracton, Fortescue, and Coke, as well as by Spelman (the scholar most expert on the
introduction of feudalism in England by the Normans versus the ancient Germanic system of land tenure
utilized by the Saxons); Sidney discussed the ancient constitution at length in Discourses. With the
Sidney Library he had access to an extraordinary collection of legal texts and frequently referenced
important primary law sources such as Magna Carta and the Laws of King Edward (the latter in William
Lambarde, Archaionomia, published in 1644, “in a volume with Bede’s Ecclesiastical History” that is listed
in the Sidney Library catalogue.) On the Laws of King Edward, see DCG, III.29.492 n.30. On the Sidney
Library catalogue, see The Library of the Sidneys of Penshurst Place Circa 1665, Germaine Warkentin,
Joseph L. Black, and William R. Bowen, eds. (Toronto, CA, Buffalo, NY & London: University of Toronto
Press, 2013); see also Trevor Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual
Origins of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1965) [repr.
1998], pp. 5-6; cf. Martyn P. Thompson, “Significant Silences in Locke’s Two Treatises of Government:
Constitutional History, Contract and Law,” Historical Journal 31 (1987), pp. 275-94.
n. 95: Pocock’s work suggests a very unusual, and arguably a love-hate relationship with the law and its
practitioners. The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law was the product of his dissertation and,
obviously, it focused intensely on English law. But Pocock sometimes spoke derogatorily about English
law and some of its most renown lawyers, tending to view them as non-intellectuals, rote thinkers,
uncreative. In this first book Pocock wrote of lawyers “and legally educated laymen,” who were
“hamstrung by the ‘common-law mind’ with its insistence on customs that were immemorial, unwritten,
founded on usage and hardly to be altered by legislation.” Id, p. 260. He also pejoratively referred to
Coke’s “delusion,” having “shown himself ready to apply this doctrine to history with a high degree of
literalness and actually discover law and parliament in an age before the first written records, on the
grounds that they were ancient custom.” Id, p. 233. In Virtue, Commerce, and History, Pocock stated
that, “It begins to look, however, as if the characteristic tendency of jurisprudence,” discussing primarily
Montesquieu in this context, “was to lower the level of participation and deny the premise that man is by
nature political.” Indeed, said Pocock, “One might argue that this is because of the overwhelming
preoccupation of the jurist with that which can be distributed, with things and rights…. [S]ince law is of the
empire rather than the republic, its attention is fixed on commercium rather than politicum.” In the next
paragraph, he similarly stated that, “I am interested in the possibility that jurisprudence can be said to be
predominantly social, concerned with the administration of things and with human relations conducted
through the mediation of things, as opposed to a civic vocabulary of the purely political, concerned with
the unmediated person relations entailed by equality and by ruling and being ruled.” J. G. A. Pocock,
Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge University Press, 1995 [first ed., 1985], pp. 43-44. Reid
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pointed to Pocock’s perspective in “Robert Brady, 1627-1700: A Cambridge Historian of the Restoration,”
Cambridge Historical Journal 10 (1951), p. 190. In that article Pocock stated, “Every Englishman who
thought about the constitution thought it in some degree as a lawyer, and Coke’s doctrines merely stated
with the force of genius the lawyer’s view of history.” I could not agree more with Reid’s response: “Our
question may well be whether there was a lawyer’s view of history. Perhaps it was not the view or theory
of history but the use – the lawyer’s use of history, or forensic history – that was what gave the ancient
constitution significance.” Reid, “The Jurisprudence of Liberty,” The Roots of Liberty, p. 193.
n. 120: In De Oratore, Cicero moved away from, in his view, impractical rhetoricians’ techniques and
Greek rhetorical theory, and focused instead on the requisite personal skills of a talented orator. The
“ideal orator is a master of all forms of verb al communication, not just oral (speeches) but also written
(e.g., historiography and philosophy). And in turn, the fully developed skills of the ideal orator must
necessarily be based on knowledge, and this should include universal philosophical knowledge.” Cicero
focused particularly on the role of rhetoric in political decision-making by Rome’s Senate, and other
Roman assemblies, as well as rhetoric’s importance in criminal and civil trials, which often had political
import. Id, pp. 3-5. Oratory was a political value that was endorsed by the Renaissance civic humanists,
from Bruni to Machiavelli. As Renaissance philosophy scholar Lodi Nauta explained, Renaissance
humanism rejected technical discourse or specialized terminology and gave primacy to ordinary common
speech, “fully in line with the classical ideal of the orator, a man full of wisdom and endowed with the best
linguistic skills, who dedicates his rhetorical training to the public cause. The orator must teach, delight
and persuade, and this can only be done by employing the accepted usage, not the idiom of philosophers
or other theoreticians. …Language is primarily a means for communication, for persuasion.” Lodi Nauta,
“Lorenzo Valla and the rise of humanist dialectic,” The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy, James Hankins, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 193-210, 196. Whether directly from
Cicero or by way of the Florentines, the importance of rhetoric was recognized by early modern men.
See Gordon Batho, “The Education of a Stuart Nobleman,” British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 5,
No. 2 (May 1957), pp. 131-43, 134-35, 140 (describing the humanist education and upbringing that Henry
Percy, the Ninth Earl of Northumberland, insisted his son Algernon Percy, tenth Earl of Northumberland
(1602-68) and Sidney’s uncle, received, with the purpose of public serve in mind; this included, early on,
“the importance of the vernacular,” and then, while at Cambridge, “rhetoric the first year, dialectics the
second and philosophy the third, with the works of Aristotle, Pliny and Plato as set books”). Indeed,
rhetoric blew up in seventeenth-century England, with “Babel,” often a metaphor for the press but also for
the “wordy feat” called the English Revolution, fomented by the mushrooming public sphere, and the
associated war of words and diversity of partisan tongues in both high-brow and low-brow publications –
“over 22,0000 pamphlets, sermons, newsbooks, speeches, broadside ballads and other emphera
published between 1640 and 1661 – surpassing even the output of the continental presses over 100
years later during the French Revolution.” Holstun, Pamphlet Wars, pp. 16-18.
n. 128: Gordon Schochet argued that Filmer’s notion of patriarchalism was a consequence of the fact that
at that time, “the household represented the source of governmental authority,” and became “the basis of
an absolutist theory of political obligation.” Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer, p. 3, citing Gordon Schochet,
Patriarchalism in Political Thought. The Authoritarian Family and Political Speculation and Attitudes
Especially in Seventeenth-Century England (Oxford: Basic Books, 1975), p. 268. For Schochet these
ideas became outmoded, particularly with the so-called Lockean paradigm; as a result, they simply faded
away. Cuttica sought to overturn Schochet’s well-established view of English patriarchalism. “Schochet
failed to see patriarchalism in relation to cultural meanings, metaphorical references, gendered paradigms
permeating the broader intellectual context of early modern England and Europe. He ignored that
treatises like Patriarcha participated in the multiple process of image-construction that the Stuart
monarchy set up through cultural aesthetic, moral mediums to convey various politico-ideological
messages.” In addition, said Cuttica, “Schochet neglected patriarchalism’s role as a political language
employed both to depict a distinct sketch of monarchy and to counterattack rival political paradigms.
Patriarchalism entailed a stringent configuration of power that promoted a specific form of absolutism. It
also provided a thorough model for the method of government and set forth a fully-fledged account of
sovereign-ty.” In fin, “patriarchalism was more than the codification of archaic beliefs failing to succeed in
the theatre of ideas when confronted by the typhoon of modern philosophy, empirical science, and social
change.” Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer, p. 4; cf. Jeffrey M. Nelson, review of Schochet’s Patriarchalism in
Political Thought, Political Theory, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Nov. 1976), pp. 512-15.
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n. 132: In contrast, in the 1579 lectures of James Morice, an Elizabethan lawyer and “reader” at the
Middle Temple, the view was expressed that while the sovereign king made laws, he did so while
consulting with the people. Moreover, it was not true that the king was “above” the law. “ It is a comon
Sayinge amonge many that the Kinge by his Prerogatyve is above the laws. … But to say that the Kinge
is so a Emperor over his Lawes and Actes of Parliament (bycawse he hath power to make them), as that
he is not bound to governe by the same but at his will and pleasure, is an Oppinyon altogeather repugnt
to the wise and politicke State of govnment established in this Realme, wch placeth the Royal Majestie of
The Kynge as the Leiutenant of Almightie God in the Reverent Throne of Justice and true Iudgment. [It
is] Contrarye to the Rule of Equytie and common reason wch sayeth [that laws] beinge made by so grave
a Counsell, uppon so greate deliberacion and by the Common Consent of all [should be followed by the
king.” Christopher W. Brooks, “The Place of Magna Carta and the Ancient Constitution in SixteenthCentury English Legal Thought,” The Roots of Liberty, Ch. 2, pp. 75-114, 93 (language corrections
omitted); see also Hogue, Origins of the Common Law, for a detailed description of the evolution of
English law, and the tug-of-war between those who believed that the king was subject to the law and who
therefore sought to limit the king’s prerogative and those who maintained that the king was above the
law, had absolute power, was subject to no human limitations, and was answerable only to God.
n. 139: While Cuttica initially proferred a good case that Filmer might have been agitated by the decidedly
provocative claims of parliamentarian Thomas Scott, at the end of this proof Cuttica acknowledged that
there is no evidence that Filmer was directly addressing or responding to Scott’s work (or vice versa);
moreover, Scott’s work “does not predominantly focus on political doctrines.” These admissions must be
combined with the fact that is unclear whether Filmer even read Scott’s work, although Cuttica’s specfiic
language suggested that he did not! Cuttica, Filmer, pp. 55-65, incl. n.39 on p. 79, which quotes David
Underdown, A Freeborn People: Politics and the Nation in Seventeenth-Century England (Oxford
University Press, 1996), p. 44. Cuttica rightfully called out Gordon Schochet and James Daly, earlier
scholars of English patriarchalism and Filmer, for their failure to discover the fact that the non-publication
of Patriarcha was not due to Filmer’s indifference or satisfaction with its personal use or circulation in
manuscript form. To the contrary, Filmer’s application for a license to publish the work was rejected,
apparently directly by the King. Once again, however, Cuttica’s engagement in wholesale speculation as
to why this happened is unconvincingly. Id, p. 154 n.1 & Ch. 5 generally. On Scott, the “best known as
well as the most prolific pamphleteer” of the 1620s, including his famous first pamphlet Vox populi,
published in 1621, see “Thomas Scott: virtue, liberty and the ‘mixed Government,’ Markku Peltonen,
Classical humanism and republicanism in English political thought 1570-1640 (Cambridge University
Press, 2004), Ch. 5, pp. 229-70, 231.
n. 142: The Great Tew Circle flourished from 1633 to 1639. It was a private think-tank of sorts, a group of
theologians, philosophers, and poets who met to discuss ideas without constraint at the estate of Lucius
Cary, the second Viscount Falkland, located in the village of Tew in Oxfordshire. Many of the members of
the Great Tew Circle were active, some prominently so, in English politics before and after the civil war;
most were conservative aristocrats who fought for Charles I during the war. Great Tew men’s views were
diverse. What united them was a confidence in rationalism and a commitment to free and impartial
inquiry. Henry Parker’s “Observations Upon Some of His Majesties Late Answers and Express”, 1642,
was a rebuttal of views expressed by “intellectuals centred on Falkland’s house at Great Tew,” and
particularly Lords Falkland, Culpeper and Clarendon, as well as the views of the King. See editor’s
preface to Parker’s tract, Revolutionary Prose of the English Civil War, Howard Erskine-Hill & Graham
Storey, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 35. In addition to those already mentioned, the Great
Tew Circle included Thomas Hobbes, John Hales, Sidney Godolphin, Ben Jonson, John Selden, and
Gilbert Sheldon (later Archbishop of Caterbury). See Frederick C. Beiser, “The Great Tew Circle,” The
Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the Early English Enlightenment (Princeton
University Press, 1996), Ch. 3, pp. 84-133.
n. 155: Filmer’s request for a license to publish Patriarcha was turned down by the king’s secretary,
Georg Rudolph Weckherlin, after Filmer had submitted it to King Charles for approval. Cuttica’s valiant
effort to explain why this happened is ultimately unpersuasive, as evidenced by Cuttica’s rhetoric on the
subject, e.g., “it is plausible to infer….” See Cuttica, Filmer, Ch. 5, “The issue of Patriarcha’s nonpublication.” In his book Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, Burgess argued that absolute
monarchism and King James’ patriarchalism were not inconsistent with the notion of non-enforceable
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limitations on the absolute monarchist. In contrast, Filmer’s patriarchalism manifestly was inconsistent
with any limitations on the king, non-enforceable or otherwise. According to Burgess, historians of the
1640s usually have made “two crucial assumptions, both of which are anachronistic.” The first
assumption was that, “it is inconsistent to say that a monarch is limited if those limitations cannot be
enforced by human agency. And, secondly, there was the assumption that, again in the last resort,
forcible resistance constituted the only viable means of limitation in seventeenth-century politics.” Per
Burgess, together these two assumptions “conflate the separate issues of limitation and resistance.
Limited kings can only be the rulers of subjects who possess some sort of right of resistance in extremis.
All kings must be either limited (and resistible), or unlimited (and irresistible).” However, “each of the two
key assumptions is wrong: the first because it simply discounts the fact that royal self-limitation, including
the oath to govern legally made before God in the coronation service, was perfectly feasible in a world
where divine punishment for sin was an accepted fact of life; and the second because, in England, at
least, resistance was not the only form of effective limitation.” It will become clear that the foundation of
Burgess’ contention is implausible, viz., that, until the Ship Money case in 1637, Englishmen were so
naïve, or it was “neither apparent nor important,” such that they were unaware of the “loopholes hidden in
this position,” namely, that even though the king’s power was theoretically limited, there was still “no
earthly forum in which his transgression of the limits on him could be legally judged.” Burgess, Absolute
Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, pp. 19, p. 25.
n. 239: Not surprisingly, in describing the qualification of people who had adhered to this Cause, Vane
stated that there were those who, “in the general, distinguished themselves and been made known, by a
forwardness to assist and owe the publique welfare and good of the Nation, for the attaining and
preserving the just rights and liberties thereof….” Id, p. 8. He also spoke in terms of “common right and
freedom,” man’s “common good and benefit,” and “the reuniting of all good men as one man in a happy
union of their spirits, prayers and counsels to resist all common danger and opposition, which by devils or
men may be raised against them.” For Vane, there was always a personal, religious dimension to life.
Men came together and freely associated, thereby forming a group “which is far more than a mere
collection of separate individuals.” Each man is linked to God, and through God to his fellow man, by
which they become “knit together as one man,” a phrase from Judges 20:11 that Vane frequently invoked.
This group is “harmonious,” bound together by its “concern for the public welfare, by their respect for the
spiritual freedom of each individual man, and by their dedication to a common cause.” Judson, The
Political Thought of Henry Vane, pp. 25-28, citing A Needful Corrective, pp. 3-4, and The Retired Man’s
Meditations, pp. 385, 395.
n. 246: From Politics to Reason of State is a complex analysis by Maurizio Viroli, professor of political
theory and a Machiavelli scholar, of Italian political thinkers and language from 1250 to 1650, with
significant emphasis on Machiavelli. “In the story of the transition from politics to reason of state,” Viroli
was confident that, “the central place belongs to Niccolò Machiavelli.” By using the word politico in talking
about the art of the state, Viroli explained that Machiavelli helped “preserve the conventional republican
meaning of politics.” Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State: the Acquisition and Transformation
of the Language of Politics, 1250-1650 (Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 6, 126. According to
Viroli, reason of state was forged by Giovanni Botero in the late sixteenth century, following in the
footsteps of its introduction by Guicciardini in his Dialogo del reggimento di Firenze. Viroli saw the writers
of politics as idealists, “rhetoricians who deliberately produced eulogistic definitions of politics,” whereas
those who wrote about the art of the state and reason of state were realists, “describing actual political
life.” Id, pp. 2, 4, 6, 252-56. Included in the first category were Brunetto Latini, Dante Alighieri, and Baldus
of Ubaldis among many others. Dante was Latini’s pupil, and he “expanded the concept of politics as the
art of ruling in justice into the art of founding and preserving right political constitutions.” Id, p. 8. Baldus
viewed politics as the art of the city, continuing the Roman tradition of civic philosophy. This led to civic
humanism, the height, the “moments of glory,” of the language of politics, and the ideas of Coluccio
Salutati, for whom Machiavelli worked, as well as later humanists such as Leon Battista Alberti and
Poggio Bracciolini. Viroli’s thesis pivoted around the distinction between politics as the art of preserving
the respublica, “a community of individuals living together in justice,” and politics as “the art of the state,”
of preserving the state and the power of those controlling it, “for instance the stato of the Medici.” He
believed that the state, stato, and the republic, respublica, were “used in some instances as mutually
exclusive concepts.” At the same time, Viroli allowed that in real life the concepts can overlap. “Just as
republics were also states, politics, at times, overlapped with the art of the state.” Machiavelli and
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Guicciardini, the Italian Renaissance’s “most perceptive theorists,” recognized that a ruler must be
prepared to use both the art of good government – politics, I presume – and the art of the state. Id, pp. 23, 5. In considering Machiavelli’s ideas in The Prince, Viroli reminded us that he “wrote The Prince to
convince the dedicatee of the book that he knew well the art of the state, even if he had served the
republic.” In this context, The Prince was both a “continuation and a reinterpretation of the Quattrocento
art of the state.” Machiavelli was fighting two opposing ideologies and political opponents: civic humanists, to whom “he opposed, like others before him, the compelling rules of the art of the state,” and the
pragmatic advisers of the Medici, to whom he presented “his own interpretation of the art designed to
instruct a prince aiming at great things.” In short, Machiavelli sought to walk perhaps an impossibly thin
line. He “never described the art of the state as politics, nor the prince concerned with preserving or
imposing his state as a political man.” Id, 153-54. Rather, he sought to obscure the distinction between
politics and reason of state. The Prince was an example of the art of the state; and looking at
Machiavelli’s body of work, he was “one of the most robust defenders of the notion of politics as art of the
republic.” Id, p. 9.
While the lynchpin of Viroli’s thesis was the carefully drawn distinction between the terms “politics” and
“reason of state,” I am not persuaded that this was a distinction made or intended at the time, or that this
language usage had anything to do with the changing face of Renaissance politics. Viroli brilliantly
parsed the language of the writers on whom he relied; but little, if any, attention was paid to their
particular historical context (with the one exception of his chapter on Machiavelli). Phrases and words are
plucked out of innumerable works and compared, a flawed albeit mightily impressive methodology. But as
a statement of what happened, of history, it is terribly unclear. Viroli himself observed, as has Nederman,
that similar words can have entirely different meanings in different contexts, e.g., the Middle Ages
“maintained some relics of the classical language of politics”; but when that classical language was
“inserted” into a new intellectual context, it was “almost unrecognizable.” Fishing words out of a vast array
of works is an invitation for confusion, if not error. Id, p. 11.
n. 253: According to historian Vittor Ivo Comparato, the concept of prudence was at the center of the
effort in sixteenth-century Italy after the international wars that had taken place there to maintain the civil
ideal, including both the importance of political involvement and the value of civil virtue. Paolo Paruta’s
dialogue Della perfezione della vita politica, published in Venice in 1572 and part of the Sidney Library,
epitomizes this effort. Paruta challenged the moral and political premises of “the meandering neostoicism
of the late Renaissance, which suggested that the wise man should lead a life apart from the world and
eschew political involvement.” This was not a surprising perspective on the sixteenth-century Italian
peninsula, made up of city-states that had been overrun or threatened by foreign invaders, and where
political power was frequently inaccessible to the people. Notwithstanding these circumstances, Paruta
assertively maintained that, “there is no virtuous behaviour which does not include the duty of civil life.”
Civil life – political involvement, not withdrawal – was a necessary part of moral philosophy, from which
one derived a political philosophy, including determining the political system that was best for one’s citystate. To accomplish this analysis required consideration of matters of interest and prudence. Paruta’s
argument will have a familiar ring as we consider Sidney’s ideas, e.g., Paruta maintained that, “the prince
of state does not make decisions without having listened to the opinions of his councilors. A good will is
not enough; it needs to be informed by reason. Reason, for its part, serves to moderate and direct the
‘appetites,’ which form part of human nature. In this way, one reaches a state of ‘quiet.’” This is not the
quiet of the contemplative life. Prudence does not direct man’s actions toward personal happiness, but
towards civil happiness. “Republican political philosophy rejects the opposition of passions and reason,
opinion and knowledge, custom and virtue, which was the theoretical foundation for the decision of the
wise man,” the obvious example being Plato, “to separate himself from civil life.” In sixteenth-century
Italy, Paruta had maintained that the progress of reason led men to select an aristocratic republic – he
was, after all, from Venice – “characterized by the sovereignty of law and by the government of the best.”
Vittor Ivo Comparato, “From the Crisis of Civil Culture to the Neapolitan Republic of 1647: Republicanism
in Italy between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage,
Vol. I, Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe, Martin van Gelderen & Quentin
Skinner, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 169-93, 170-72; The Library of the Sidneys of
Penshurst Place Circa 1665, p. 276.
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n. 255: Nedham provided a host of historical circumstances in which reason of state was used to justify
all sorts of unjust and immoral actions by rulers, e.g., by Pharaoh against the Israelites, by Solomon in
pardoning Adonijah and then putting him to death, by Borgia “to justifie all his Villanies,” and continuing to
England, with many examples ending with James I. “After this, it was wicked Reason of State, that
continued Monarchy, and brought in a Scotch-man upon us. This was James, who was so great an
Admirer of Reason of State, that he adopted it for its own Darling, by the name of King-craft: and his
Motto, No Bishop, no King, shewed, that he prefer’d Reason of State, before the Interest of Religion.”
Indeed, it was “the same Reason of State, put in practice by his son Charles, for the ruine of Religion and
Liberty, by a bloudy war, the whole Family hath been brought to a sad destruction.” Id, p. 107-09; cf.
Steve Pincus, “Neither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism: Commercial Society and the
Defenders of the English Commonwealth,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 103, No. 3 (June 1998),
pp. 705-36 (“Marchamont Nedham had long understood that the key to understanding politics was
comprehending interest,” citing Nedham’s Case of the Kingdom States, Interest Will Not Lie, p. 3, and
The Case States between England and the United Provinces in this Present Juncture (London, 1652), p.
23); compare William Prynne, A Brief Necessary Vindication of the Old and New Secluded Members from
the False Malicious Calumnies; Of the Fundamental Rights, Liberties, Privileges, Government, Interest of
the Freemen, Parliaments, People of England, from the late avowed Subversions 1. Of John Rogers, in
his-christian Concertation with Mr. Prynne, and others. 2. Of M: Nedham, in his Interest will not lie
(London: Edward Thomas, 1659), FSU/ Weiner Collection, “Wherein the true Good Old Cause is
asserted, the false routed, The old secluded Members cleared from all pretended breach of trust; The old
Parliament proved to be totally dissolved by the Kings death … Ch. Stewart not sworn to Popery, as
Nedham slanders him; The restitution of our Hereditary King and Kingly Government, not an Utopian
Republike, evidenced beyond contradiction to be Englands true Interest both as Men and Christians; and
the only way to peace, safety, settlement.”)
n. 257: In a pamphlet on England’s true interest vis-à-vis the Dutch, the nonconformist Joseph Hill stated,
“in the affairs of the world, interest is preferred above all relations; the whole world turning upon the hinge
of self-interest.” [Joseph Hill], The Interest of these United Provinces. Being a defence of the Zeelanders
Choice Together with severall Remarkes upon the present, and Conjectures on ... especially as relating
to this Republic (Amsterdam 1673), discussed by Spurr in England in the 1670S: ‘This Masquerading
Age,’ p. 118 and 314 n.6. This idea had been bandying about England for a long time. As the
Presbyterian divine Charles Herle said in 1655, “The word interest is a word of late much come into use
among us.” In 1649 the radical John Warr maintained that, “In every Commonwealth the interest of the
people is the true and proper interest of that Commonwealth.” Charles Herle, Wisdomes Tripos, 2 Vols .
(London, 1655), p. 169; J. W. [John Warr], The Priviliedges of the People (London , 1649), p. 5.
Pincus suggested that the intention of Warr and Herle was to say that promoting the interest, not the
virtue of the people, is in the best interest of the country. But virtue is not addressed by these
pamphleteers! See Pincus, “Neither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism,” p. 729. In
1659 an anonymous pamphleteer wrote, “It is the common interest of the Nation to be secure, that
they may without disturbance, worship God according to their consciences, while they destroy not
the Doctrines or life of Christianity.” He identified many more aspects to the common interest,
including extirpating Popery, defending Property, easing taxes, and advancing trade. For trade, said
the Englishman, “is the very life and spirits of a Common-wealth; it makes the complexion of a
people lively and pleasant: When it flourisheth, you may observe a general Jubille. Break the Neck
for Trade, and you break the Heart of a Common-wealth, and make it fit to be ridden by every Tyrant
and usurper.” Moreover, common interest required the maintenance and vindication of Parliament’s
authority, as well as “settlement, … because a house, or Kingdom divided cannot stand.” The Grand
Concernments of England, pp. 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 20, 32.
n. 275: Locke, for example, also defined liberty in terms of property; however, Locke’s concept of
property is exceedingly broad, far beyond material possessions and including “Lives, Liberties and
Estates,” which Locke stated he would call “by the general Name, Property.” Locke, “Second Treatise,”
Two Treatises, §123, p. 350. This is not a definition that Sidney used. When Sidney discussed liberty as
a condition of nature, he stated that “the felicity of man” is not “in an exemption from the laws of God but
in a most perfect conformity to them.” Accordingly, “they who most precisely adhere to the laws of God,
are least solicitous concerning the commands of men, unless they are well grounded.” DCG, I.2.9. This
suggests that liberty is not a property right but a gift from God that only God can value – viz., it is not
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tradeable. In the context of later discussion about liberty consisting “only in being subject to no man’s
will,” Sidney stated that property “is an appendage of liberty; and ‘tis as impossible for a man to have a
right to lands or goods, if he has no liberty, and enjoys his life only at the pleasure of another, as it is to
enjoy either when he is deprived of them.” Id, III.16.402-03. Sidney was defining property, at least in this
instance, as material possessions. As one scholar explained in the context of John Adams, the “chief
manifestations of justice are liberty and property,” that is, the right to do what we want (viz., those things
that “shall in no way concern the general welfare”), and the right to have things we want (“to use at his
pleasure the things which he possesses, the acquirement of which has been conformable to the nature of
things and to the general utility”). Francis Newton Thorpe, “The Political Ideas of John Adams,” The
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1920), pp. 1-46, 6. This still leaves open
the question of whether defining property as a sub-set of liberty makes liberty something that a man necessarily can trade. With respect to Locke’s concept of property, the answer was no – men are not free to
trade their own liberty, e.g., enslave themselves. Locke, “Second Treatise,” Two Treatises, §23, p. 284.
n. 289: See Quentin Skinner, “The Idea of Negative Liberty: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives,”
Philosophy in History, Richard Rotty, J. B. Schneewin & Quentin Skinner, eds. (Cambridge University
Press, 1984); Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 1997); Quentin
Skinner, “A Third Concept of Liberty,” Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. 117 (2002), pp. 237-68;
Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford University
Press; new ed., Berlin 2002), pp. 121-34; "Machiavelli's Discorsi and the Pre-humanist Origins of Republican Ideas," & “The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty,” Machiavelli and Republicanism (Cambridge
University Press, 1993), 121-42, 293-309; W. R. Newell, “How Original is Machiavelli?: A Consideration
of Skinner’s Interpretation of Virtue and Fortune,” Political Theory, Vol. 15, Issue 4 (Nov., 1987), pp. 61234; Benjamin Straumann, “Is Modern Liberty Ancient? Roman Remedies and Natural Rights in Hugo
Grotius’s Early Works on Natural Law,” Law and History Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 2009), pp. 5585;see generally Ian Carter, “Positive and Negative Liberty,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Stanford University Press, 1969 (Spr. 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives / spr2012/entries/libertypositive-negative/; M. M. Goldsmith, “Liberty, Virtue, and the Rule of Law, 1689-1770,” Republicanism,
Liberty and Commercial Society, pp. 197-232, 445 n.1; cf. Eric Nelson, “Liberty: One Concept Too
Many?,” Political Theory 33 (2005), pp. 58-78; G. Lang, “Invigilating Republican Liberty,” Philosophical
Quarterly Vol. 62, No. 247 (April 2012), pp. 273-93.
n. 292: In the case of Polish republicanism, for example, “republican ideology rejected delegation of
power”; indeed, “legislative power which was too autonomous was held to endanger liberty.” Anna
Grzeskowiak-Krwawicz, “Anti-monarchism in Polish Republicanism in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries,” Republicanism, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, pp. 43-59, 52. Similarly, in an article primarily about Rousseau,
Kant and Machiavelli, the author stated that for Rousseau, in a free society “a government of the people
by the people,’ must be founded on rules of conduct and an ordering of relationships….” which
constituted “institutionalized morality.” Werner Maihofer, “Ethos of the republic and the reality of politics,”
Machiavelli and Republicanism, Ch. 14, pp. 283-92, 288. The issue of control is particularly conspicuous
in the ideas of the French revolutionary republicans, such as Sieyès and Debry. See, e.g., Richard Whatmore, Republicanism and the French Revolution, an Intellectual History of Jean-Baptiste Say’s Political
Economy (Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 97; Andrew Jainchill, Reimagining Politics after the Terror,
the Republican Origins of French Liberalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 62-67.
n. 299: There are several fundamental sources of confusion in the Besson and Marti collection. To begin
with Besson and Martí’s introduction, there is a willingness, indeed a comfort, with the creation of multiple
types of republicanism. What the editors termed “legal republicanism” is one; but also identified were civic
republicanism, Aristotelian republicanism, neo-Roman republicanism, neo-Athenian republican-ism,
socialist republicanism, communitarian republicanism, liberal republicanism, cosmopolitan republicanism,
constitutional republicanism, modern republicanism, and contemporary republicanism. There is also a
political theory dubbed “neo-republicanism.” Id, pp. 5-12. Beware of Cicero’s words in The Laws, written
over two thousand years ago: “[L]egal experts, whether to cause confusion and so give the appearance of
having a wider and deeper know-ledge than they do, or (more probably) through their incompetence at
putting the subject across (for an art is not just a matter of knowing something; it is also a matter of
communication) often endlessly subdivide a thing which is based on a single idea.” Cicero, The Laws,
Book Two, §47, Cicero: The Republic and The Laws, p. 141.
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n. 331: To bolster England’s commercial power the first Navigation Act of 1651 was passed. Commerce
was highly competitive, which had advantages and disadvantages. The Leveller Gerald Winstanley found
this anathema; his solution was “to outlaw commerce itself.” But Winstanley was an outlier; his views
were very much those of a small minority. Most viewed commerce as “a hallmark of the civilized world,
promoting communication as well as exchange.” International trade became an increasingly large part of
the picture – “that great link of humane society, that golden chain, which unites all nations.” It also was “a
kind of warfare.” Id, pp. 937-38. English competition with the Dutch, which repeatedly broke out into
military warfare, was keen. To promote and best regulate commerce, an expert Council of Trade was
established in 1650. “The connection between republicanism and commerce was highlighted by many of
the [Commonwealth] regime’s defenders, for whom the Dutch Republic,” and particularly Amsterdam,
“served as the model of a commercial society, to be emulated through social as well as commercial
policies.” Id, p. 942. The Navigation Act was focused particularly on trade with England’s colonies.
“Above all, the Navigation Act sought to create an insulated trading system which would be covered by
English law, allowing commercial growth whilst retaining independence, and thus securing sovereignty
over English trade.” Id, p. 945. Its purpose also was “to rescue the nation from a dangerous condition of
dependency” on the Dutch.” Id, p. 948. As Leng established, “the seventeenth-century discourse of trade
resembles a very modern discourse, that of globalization.” Id, p. 954.
n. 356: Richard Baxter (1615-1691) was a Puritan divine and prolific writer. “[D]isillusioned by both sides
in the Civil War. In 1660 he welcomed Charles II back,” and “preached in London until ejected after the
Act of Uniformity (1662).” Baxter was the “outstanding personality among the dissenters of 1662,” and
“was imprisoned on several occasions for preach-ing without license. Having helped overthrow James II,
he welcomed William and Mary.” Revd Dr William M. Marshall, “Baxter, Richard (1615-91),” The Oxford
Companion to British History, John Cannon, ed. (Oxford University Press, 2009 Online Version),
http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/view/10.1093/acref /97801995
67638.001.0001/acref-9780199567638-e-380?rskey=hx1g9V&result=8 (9-1-14)
n. 360: 1 Samuel 8 in the 1611 King James edition of the Bible states, in part:
Then all the Elders of Israel gathered themselues together, and came to Samuel vnto Ramah,
And said vnto him, Behold, thou art olde, and thy sonnes walke not in thy wayes: now make vs a
King to iudge vs, like all the nations.
¶ But the thing displeased Samuel, when they said, Giue vs a King to iudge vs: and Samuel prayed
vnto the Lord.
And the Lord said vnto Samuel, Hearken vnto the voyce of the people in all that they say vnto thee:
for they haue not reiected thee, but they haue reiected mee, that I should not reigne ouer
them...
And hee sayd, This will be the maner of the king that shall reigne ouer you: Hee will take your
sonnes, and appoint them for himselfe for his charets, and to bee his horsemen, and some
shall runne before his charets.
... And he will take your daughters …
And he will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your oliue-yards, euen the best of them, and
giue them to his seruants.
…
And ye shall cry out in that day, because of your king which ye shall haue chosen you; and the
Lord will not heare you in that day.
¶ Neuerthelesse, the people refused to obey the voyce of Samuel; and they said, Nay, but we will
haue a King ouer vs:
That we also may be like all the nations, and that our King may iudge vs, and goe out before vs,
and fight our battels.
James certainly was not the only royalist who relied upon 1 Samuel 8. For example Hobbes’ friend Jasper
Mayne maintained that, “when the Jews sought a king, they ‘divested themselves of two of the greatest
Immunities which can belong to Freemen, Liberty of Person, and propriety of Estates.” James I, The True
Law of Free Monarchies, pp. 61-62 (emphasis added); see Burgess, “Royalism and Liberty of
Conscience,” p. 19. For the 1611 edition of the King James Bible, see http://www.kingjames
bibleonline.org/1611_1-Samuel-Chapter-8/ (5-12-15). Mayne’s work, The difference about church
government ended (R.L. f. Leake, 1646) is in the Sidney Library. The Library of the Sidneys of Penshurst
Place Circa 1665, p. 115. For additional discussion of the import of 1 Samuel 8, see Charnoff, “A Second
Look at the Question of Who Authored Court Maxims.”
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n. 363: Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) was a renown sixteenth/seventeenth- century Catholic scholastic
who some interpreted as an advocate of a social contract theory that logically precluded absolutism. “The
right to self-rule of the political community has the same origin as the political community itself: consent.”
Christopher Shields and Daniel Schwartz, “Francisco Suárez,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Winter 2016 ed.), p. 35, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/suarez/ (7-28-18). Suárez’s
contemporary Cardinal Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621) was the Jesuit scholar who had warned Galileo not
to teach or defend Copernican theory. At the same time Bellarmine accepted absolutism, albeit not as a
matter of divine right. He maintained that, “In a commonwealth all men are born naturally free;
consequently, the people themselves, immediately and directly, hold the political power so long as they
have not transferred this power to some king or ruler.” In short, kings became absolute through a social
contract, not divine right. Filmer said that, “This tenet was first hatched in the schools and hath been
fostered by all succeeding papists.” Rev. Fr. John Clement Rager, S.T.D. [Doctor of Sacred Theology],
“The Political Philosophy of St. Robert Bellarmine: An Examination of Cardinal Saint Robert Bellarmine’s
Defense of Popular Government and the Influence of his Political Theory upon the American Declaration of
Independence” (Indianapolis, IN, 1926; repr. 2017), p. 3, http://www.hedgeschool.com/Book_
Content/07_Civics_Content/07_ Civics_Content_Bellarmine.pdf (7-28-18), citing “In terrena Republica
nascuntur omnes homines naturaliter liberi ac proinde potestatem politicam immediate ipse populus habet,
donee eam in regem aliquem non transtulerit.” Cardinal Bellarmine, De Clericis, Ch. VII and Robert Filmer,
Patriarcha, Ch. 1; see also Peter Machamer, “Galileo Galilei,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Summer 2017 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/galileo/ (7-28-18), pp.3, 19-22.
n. 420: According to Machiavelli, “Those who are set up in a city as the guardians of its liberty cannot
receive a more useful and necessary authority than the power to indict citizens before the people or some
magistrate or council when they commit any kind of offence against free government. …Thus, there is
nothing that makes a republic so stable and steady as organizing it in such a way that the variability of
those humours that agitate the republic has a means of release that is instituted by the laws.” Describing
a conflict among the ancient Romans, Machiavelli continued, “This occurrence shows, as we have said
above, how useful and necessary it is for a republic to have laws that afford to the masses the opportunity
of giving vent to the hatred they may have conceived against any citizens; for if there exist no legal
means for this, they will resort to illegal ones, which beyond doubt produce much worse effects.”
Machiavelli, Discorsi, B1, Ch7, 38; see also B1, Ch5, 31.
n. 465: Thomas West, the editor of Discourses, suggested that Sidney was referring or quoting the thirdcentury Roman jurist Ulpian, in ad legem Juliam et Papiam, Book 13, and the viewpoint of the late fourthcentury emperor Theodosius I, as referenced in the sixth-century codification of Roman law, The
Institutes of Justinian (London: Longman, Green, 1948), proem, p. 1. I am doubtful that Justinian’s Code
is the reference to which Sidney referred. The closest statement in the Proem (Preface) to Justinian’s
Code that is related to this matter is the following: “The supreme protection of the state resting upon two
props, arms and the laws, and insuring its vitality through these sources, the fortunate Roman race has
brought it about that it is preeminent above all nations and that it has dominated all in the past, as, with
the aid of a propitious God, it will do in the future. Arms and laws have always flourished by the reciprocal
help of each other; military affairs are safeguarded by the laws, as the laws themselves are maintained by
the protection of the arms.” In the first paragraph of the Proem Justinian identified TheodosIus, among
others, as the emperor who codified the law, which Justinian sought to integrate into one clearly
understood code.
A much more likely, indeed, the virtually certain reference by Sidney was to Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, or
Defense of Liberty Against Tyrants, which was labeled as a text authored by “Junius Brutus,” but which is
attributed to the Huguenot leaders Philippe Duplessis-Mornay (1549-1623) and Hubert Languet (15181581), with whom Sidney was not only extremely familiar, but directly connected through the association of
his great uncle, Sir Philip. This famous right-of-resistance text was first published in 1579, and in English in
1581 (in Amsterdam). As is noted in the online edition of Vindiciae, the authors of "the Judgment and
Decree of the university of Oxford, Passed in their Convocation, July 21, 1683, against Certain Pernicious
Books and damnable Doctrines," and included Vindiciae contra Tyrannos among those contemporary
books to be burnt for including the proposition "That if lawful governors become tyrants, or govern
otherwise than by the laws of God and man [as] they ought to do, they forfeit the right they had unto their
government.” Another Vindiciae statement is almost identical to Sidney’s statement in Discourses: “Now,
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although some citizens say, that by decree of the senate, the emperor Augustus was declared to be
exempt from obedience to laws; yet, notwithstanding, Theodosius, and all the other good and reasonable
emperors, have professed that they were bound to the laws, lest what had been extorted by violence,
might be acknowledged and received instead of law.” Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, “Question Three:
Whether it is lawful to resist a prince who oppresses or ruins a public state,” the subsection entitled, “Kings
receive laws from the people.” www.constitution.org/vct/vindiciae.htm, and
www.constitution.org/vct/vindiciae3f.htm, 1-24-14.
n. 496: Agothocles was the late fourth-century BCE Greek tyrant of Syracuse; Dionysius was the fourthcentury BCE Greek tyrant of Heraclea; Phalaris was the celebrated cruel and inhuman sixth-century Greek
tyrant of Sicily, to whom Aristotle referred in Politics; Phaereus was probably Phalaecus, a tyrant of the
ancient Greek city of Ambracia; Pisistratus was the sixth-century BCE rival of Solon and tyrant of Athens;
Nabis was the Spartan tyrant referred to by Polybius and Livy; and Machanidas was the early secondcentury BCE tyrant of Lacedaemon. Nabis, for example, “destroyed the last remains of the old Spartan
nobles; drove into banishment all men eminent for wealth or ancestral glory; and distributed their property
and wives among the chief men of those who remained, or among his own mercenary soldiers.” Polybius,
Histories, Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, tr. (London & New York: Macmillan, 1889; reprint Bloomington, 1962),
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc= Plb.+13. 6&redirect =true (3-21-14). See generally
Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, Vol. I, William Smith, ed. (Boston: Little Brown,
1870), http://quod.lib. umich.edu/m/moa/acl3129.0001.001/78?page=root;rgn=full+text;size=100;view
=image;q1= Agathocles (3-21 -14) (“Agathocles”); id, Vol. II, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/moa/ACL3129.
0002.001/894?rgn= full+text;view=image; q1=Machanidas (3-21-14)(“Machanidas”); id. (“Nabis”); id, Vol.
III, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/ m/moa/acl3129.0003.001/ 241?rgn=full+text;view=image;q1=Phalaecus (321-14)(“Phalaecus); id (“Phalaris” and “Peisistratus”).
n. 573: Petrarch is considered the father of humanism; he sought to revive the wisdom and learning of the
ancients, sparking the Italian Renaissance. But Petrarch was an advocate of the viva contemplativa for
the man of learning. In contrast, the Florentine Chancellor Colucci Salutati and his protégé Leonardo Bruni
strongly advocated the viva activa as not only the right way to live, but also the responsibility of the
educated citizen. Their view harked back to the ideas of Cicero. On Petrarch, see Hanan Yoran,
“Florentine Civic Humanism and the Emergence of Modern Ide-ology,” History and Theory 46 (Oct. 2007),
pp. 326-44; Eugene Garin, Italian Humanism, Philosophy and Civic Life in the Renaissance (New York:
Harper & Rowe, 1965), esp. Ch. 1; Charles Trinkaus, “In Our Image and Likeness,” Humanity and Divinity
in Italian Humanist Thought, Vol. I (The University of Chicago, 1970), Ch. 1, pp. 3-50; see also Rocco
Montano, “Italian Humanism: Dante and Petrarch,” Italica, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Summer 1973), pp. 205-21, 21321. For a general understanding of the development of civic humanism, in addition to the Yoran article,
see Renaissance Civic Humanism, James Hankins, ed. (Cambridge University Press. 2003); Mark
Jurdjevik, “Hedgehogs & Foxes: The Present and Future of Italian Renaissance Intellectual History,” Past
and Present, No. 195 (May 2007), pp. 241-68.
n. 597: Eric Nelson argued at great length about how ancient republican values embraced the advocacy
of the redistribution of land exemplified by the (unsuccessful) efforts of the Gracchi. See Nelson, The
Greek Tradition in Republican Thought, passim. Nelson seemed to set Cicero entirely aside, as far as the
early modernists are concerned, for Nelson acknowledged that Cicero was known as the “greatest
ancient opponent” of the Gracchi. Id, Ch. 2, p. 57. Without going into the details of Cicero’s oratories, for
example, as historian Michael Grant explained, Cicero displayed “hostility to reforming tribunes such as
the Gracchi – whose activities led, he felt, to subversive demands for land distribution and debt
cancellation (he was the first man to stress, articulately, the crucial role of private property, which he
believed it to be the primary task of the government to safeguard.). …While Cicero believed in freedom,
he did not believe in equality; excessive democratic liberty, he felt, meant that dignitas was not given its
due, …dignitas represent[ing] a man of worth’s capacity to express his best qualities in the hierarchical
environment which such tranquility [in the state] would provide.” Introduction, Cicero on Government,
Michael Grant, Intro. & tr. (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 4 & ns.1 & 2.
Nelson sought to avoid the issue of Cicero and his ideas by basing his thesis on the assertion that it was
in sixteenth-century Florence, not during the quattrocento that is the typical focus of Renaissance civic
humanism, in which republican ideas turned away from their ancient Roman roots, veering back to
ancient Greek concepts, including the redistribution of wealth. In particular Nelson focused on what was
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known as the orti oricellari, a garden in Florence owned by Bernardo Rucellai, a leading Florentine
aristocrat, in which debates took place among the leading intellectuals and cognoscenti, including
Machiavelli, in the early years of the sixteenth-century. These were men who were very concerned about
the survivability of the Florentine regime of the Gonfaloniere Piero Soderini – a regime that, in fact, did not
survive, which led to Machiavelli’s post-government career as a political writer. Our primary source of
information about the orti oricellari comes from historian, diplomat, and aristocrat Francesco Guicciardini,
who wrote about the group as a part of his history of the divisive factional Florentine politics of the time.
According to Nelson, at these garden meetings different attitudes towards wealth and property emerged,
citing Guicciardini as a proponent of the elimination of excessive wealth.
In my own view Nelson misconstrued Guicciardini, who may well have seen “true glory” diverted by
excessive wealth and the corruption that went with it in Florence. But it is highly unlikely that Guicciardini,
who was an enormously wealthy man, was somehow advocating a redistribution of property in the manner
of the Gracchi and their agrarian laws. Yes, it was easy for the wealthy aristocrat Guicciardini to advocate
a greater emphasis among, and greater rewards to the upwardly climbing for the exercise of virtue –
consider Edward Kennedy in the Senate; but certainly not such advocacy to the exclusion of wealth,
including its pursuit. It is much more likely, for example, that Guicciardini was challenging the highly
political, oligarchic preferences of his garden host, Bernardo Rucellai. Moreover, as Nelson recognized,
Guicciardini remained committed to a Roman, not a Greek theory of justice in a republic that its advocates
argued should be led by the wisest, most virtuous man or men, to whom all others should listen; a concept
of republic that largely embraced the vita contemplativa, not the vita activa. On his argument about the
sixteenth-century Florentines, see particularly Nelson, The Greek Tradition, Ch. 2 & p. 24.
The expert on the orti oricellari is Renaissance scholar Felix Gilbert, who pointed out, for example, that
Guicciardini, in his storia d’Italia, made the “most striking statement of the transformation of Lorenzo il
Magnifico from tyrant into ideal prince” as a result of Florence’s experience with the crazy priest-political
figure, Savonarola. In storia d’Italia, Guicciardini hardly seemed like a man who would have favored the
equal redistribution of all property, and who would have deplored the accumulation of wealth. Furthermore, Storia d’Italia praised Venice as a successful aristocratic republic in contrast to Rome, which was
negatively seen as a democracy – again, hardly a basis for the suggestion that the English early modern
republicans rejected wealth and favored an equal agrarian and ancient Greek political concepts of
republicanism on the basis of an adoption of the ideas Guicciardini expressed in the orti oricellari.
On the orti oricellari, see the brilliant article by Felix Gilbert, “Bernardo Rucellai and the Orti Oricellari: A
Study on the Origin of Modern Political Thought,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, Vol. 12
(1949), pp. 101-31. Interestingly, Worden analogized Harrington’s Rota Club to the discussions that took
place among Machiavelli and his friends in the Oricellari Gardens. Worden, “’Oceana’: Origins and
Aftermath,” Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, p. 137. Indeed, both constituted a circle of
the intelligentsia without political power – the early modern version of our Washington DC think tanks.
n. 611: Oxford economic and social historian Paul Slack observed that what we had by the seventeenth
century in England was “a transition from a traditional ‘economy of salvation, scarcity and morality to an
economy aiming at happiness on earth, relative plenty and utility.’” Indeed, “There is no doubt that
England’s wealth was increasing across the century, and increasing in per capita terms after 1650. One
estimate suggests that the gross domestic product (GDP) rose by 60 per cent between 1600 and 1700”
and “the increase may have been larger than that. …[T]he new consumer habits of the landed elite and
Londoners before 1640 spread outwards and downwards.” Paul Slack, “Material progress and the
challenge of affluence in seventeenth-century England,” Economic History Review, Vol. 62, No. 3 (2009),
pp. 576-603, 577-78. Slack recognized the economic parallels to Renaissance Italy and the Low
Countries. “Comparators could certainly be found elsewhere; earlier in Renaissance Italy, and later in
several other countries, not to mention the peculiar embarrassment of riches in seventeenth-century
Holland.” Slack, “Material progress,” p. 577, relying on Steven Schama, Embarrassment of Riches: An
Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age (1987), pp. 290-371; C. K. Killerby, Sumptuary laws in
Italy, 1200-1500 (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 9-60; Mark Jurdjevic, “Virtue, Commerce, and the
Enduring Florentine Republican Moment: Reintegrating Italy into the Atlantic Republican Debate,” Journal
of the History of Ideas Vol. 62, No. 4 (Oct. 2001), pp. 721-43. One of the things apparent to Slack is that
notwithstanding inevitable bumps along the economic road, by the seventeenth century England’s
economy was experiencing enormous commercial growth, diversification, and the consequent potential for
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the significant sharing of wealth. Thus, “it was more common after 1640 to trace the rise and progress of
English trade from the Reformation, which had removed the restraints of ‘Popery’, or from the early years
of Elizabeth, when overseas commerce looked to new markets, and to identify hard evidence of it from
1600 or soon after.” E.g., there were late-sixteenth/early-seventeenth-century authors and pamphleteers,
including Daniel Defoe and Charles Davenant, who concerned themselves with the ethical implications of
an affluent society. Underlying their preoccupation was economic prosperity. “For Charles Davenant, ‘the
natural progress’ of English trade since 1600 explained ‘the progress of our growing wealth’. It had allowed
‘all the different ranks of men’ to ‘live at their ease’, and good political management with an eye to ‘the
ease and happiness’ of the people would ensure that the trend continued ‘for the future’.” Similarly,
“Daniel Defoe agreed that the growth of commerce since Queen Elizabeth’s time,” and Elizabeth ruled
from 1558 to 1603, “had made the country wealthy and ‘the people happy’, improved land, and boosted
employment and the domestic consumption that underpinned it. By some providence ‘no doubt’, ‘the
growing prosperity of this nation’ in [Defoe’s] lifetime had enabled even the labouring poor to live
comfortably and plentifully’.” Id, p. 576. For an analysis of one important exchange of ideas in the
economic pamphlet literature in seventeenth-century England, see Edward J. Harpham, “Class,
Commerce, and the State: Economic Discourse and Lockean Liberalism in the Seventeenth Century,” The
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Dec. 1985), pp. 565-82.
Chapter Four
n. 4: At the time Holmes made this statement in 1897, he was delivering an address at the dedication of
the new hall of the Boston University School of Law, and he was a member of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts. Holmes’ statement continued: “History must be a part of the study, because without it
we cannot know the precise scope of rules which it is our business to know. It is a part of the rational
study, because it is the first step toward an enlightened skepticism, that is, toward a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of those rules. When you get the dragon out of his cave on the plain and in the daylight you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength. But to get him out is only the
first step. The next step is either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal.” In the same
article Holmes opined, “Everywhere the basis of principle is tradition, to such an extent that we even are
in danger of making the role of history more important than it is.” He went on to encourage lawyers to
study economics and jurisprudence, which when he “look[ed] at it, is simply law in its most generalized
part. …One mark of a great lawyer is that he sees the application of the broadest rules.” Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., “The Path of the Law,” 10 Harv. Law Rev. No. 8, pp. 457-78, 469, 472, 474 (1897).
n. 23: At the time Holmes made this statement in 1897, he was delivering an address at the dedication of
the new hall of the Boston University School of Law, and he was a member of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts. Holmes’ statement continued: “History must be a part of the study, because without it
we cannot know the precise scope of rules which it is our business to know. It is a part of the rational
study, because it is the first step toward an enlightened skepticism, that is, toward a deliberate
reconsideration of the worth of those rules. When you get the dragon out of his cave on the plain and in
the daylight you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength. But to get him out is
only the first step. The next step is either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal.” Later
in the same article, Holmes opined, “Everywhere the basis of principle is tradition, to such an extent that
we even are in danger of making the role of history more important than it is.” He went on to encourage
lawyers to study economics and jurisprudence, which when he “look[ed] at it, is simply law in its most
generalized part…. One mark of a great lawyer is that he sees the application of the broadest rules.”
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “The Path of the Law,” 10 Harv. Law Rev. No. 8, pp. 457-78, 469, 472, 474
(1897).
n. 44: Pufendorf was another theorist who influenced many early modern Anglo-American republicans. A
German jurist born in Saxony in 1632, Pufendorf wrote about natural law as well as man’s rights and
responsibilities under the law of nature. Pufendorf defined the laws of nature very pragmatically as the
rules of man’s Fellowship, “which are the Laws of Human Society, whereby Men are directed how to
render themselves useful Members thereof, and without which it falls to pieces.” In our context it is
important to recognize that it is not clear that Sidney ever read Pufendorf’s natural law oeuvre, De officio
hominis et civis (1673), which did not appear in English translation until 1691, eight years after Sidney
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was executed. It is not referenced in Discourses, for example, and it could not have appeared in the
Sidney Library catalogue, the end date of which is 1665. Samuel von Pufendorf, The Whole Duty of Man
According to the Law of Nature, Andrew Tooke, tr., Ian Hunter and David Saunders, ed. With Two
Discourses and a Commentary by Jean Barbeyrac [1707], David Saunders, tr. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty
Fund, 2003), [orig. pub. In Latin, 1673, in English, 1691], www.https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/888 (2-7-19),
E-Book pdf, §VIII , p. 38.
What makes the matter more complex is that Pufendorf’s original work was changed in translation such
that Sidney may not have appreciated the original Latin edition, even if he had read it. As originally
written Pufendorf emphasized German absolutism, which was modified in the English translation to parliamentarianism, and included secular and statist ideas that the late seventeenth-century English translators
modified to “retain some continuity between civil duties and religious morality – enough at least to remind
citizens of a Law higher than the civil law and to remind the sovereign power of its responsibility to protect
the natural rights of citizens.” Per the Liberty Fund editors, “Those reminders, though suited to the ‘polite’
post-Hobbesian world of early-eighteenth-century London, had not been at all germane to Pufendorf’s
original intention and text.” Id, Introduction, p. 7.
n. 49: Medieval historian Brian Tierney’s central contention was that “theories of natural rights did not
emerge as an aberrational feature of Western political and legal thought at some late date, but rather
comprised an integral part of Western intellectual life from the birth of universities and the revival of legal
studies in the twelfth century.” Charles J. Reid, Jr., “The Medieval Origins of the Western Natural Rights
Tradition: The Achievement of Brian Tierney,” 83 Cornell Law Review 437-63, 440 (1998). Tierney's
substantial body of work established that “an essential organic unity connects the canonists of the twelfth
century with the Franciscans, the conciliarists, the Spanish scholastics, and Hugo Grotius. As a consequence, our own thought about natural rights and human rights is not traceable, historically, to some
supposed seventeenth- or eighteenth-century rupture between ‘medieval’ and ‘early modern’ forms of
thought.” Id, pp. 460-63. While Tierney emphasized the medievalists’ influence on Grotius, De iure belli ac
pacis also drew “on several of Cicero’s philosophical works, but above all on De officiis,” On Obligations.
P. G. Walsh, “Introduction,” in Cicero, On Obligations, p. xliv. See Benjamin Straumann, “Is Modern
Liberty Ancient? Roman Remedies and Natural Rights in Hugo Grotius’s Early Works on Natural Law,”
Law and History Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 2009), pp. 55-85; “‘Ancient Caesarian Lawyers’ in a State
of Nature: Roman Tradition and Natural Rights in Hugo Grotius’s De iure praedae.” Political Theory, Vol.
34, No. 3 (June, 2006), pp. 328-50; Charles Edwards, “The Law of Nature in the Thought of Hugo
Grotius,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Nov., 1970), pp. 784-807; Thomas Mautner, “Grotius and
the Skeptics,” Journal of the History of Ideas (2005), pp. 577-601; A. S. Brett, "Natural Right and Civil
Community: The Civil Philosophy of Hugo Grotius," Historical Journal 45:1 (2002); Knud Haakonssen;
“Hugo Grotius and the History of Political Thought.” Political Theory 13 (May 1985), pp. 239-65; R. W.
Lee, “Annual Lecture on a Master Mind: Hugo Grotius.” 16 Proc. Brit. Acad. 219 (1930); Boutros BoutrosGhali, “A Grotian Moment,” 18 Fordham International Law Journal 1609 (1995); Jon Miller, "Hugo
Grotius", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/grotius/ (6-11-14); Richard Tuck, “Introduction,” Hugo
Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed., from the ed. by Jean Barbeyrac (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,
2005), Vol. 1, also at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1425 (10-28-14).
n. 52: According to political theorist Knud Haakonssen, “The central point is that Grotius, in extension of
and undoubtedly inspired by various scholastic thinkers, particularly the Spanish neo-Thomists,
transformed the concept of ius as it is found in Roman law and in Aquinas. Instead of being something
that an action or state of affairs or a category of these is when it is in accordance with law (in casu,
natural law), ius is seen by Grotius as something that a person has. The concept becomes ‘subjectivized,’
centered on the person: It is a power the person has, as such it is also called a moral quality of the
person.” Knud Haakonssen, “Hugo Grotius and the History of Political Thought,” Political Theory, Vol. 13,
No. 2 (May, 1985), pp. 239-65, 241. In contrast, as a right, jus is a power, privilege, faculty, or demand
inherent in one person and incident upon another; or a capacity residing in one person of controlling, with
the assent and assistance of the state, the actions of another. The same ambiguity is present in the
words “droit,” “recht,” and “right.” The Latin word jure is the science of law, and what we call jurisprudence
was the art of bringing about a just society through the application of laws. See generally “jus,” Oxford
English Dictionary Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.gc.
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cuny.edu/search?searchType=dictionary&q=jus &_searchBtn=Search, (3-18-14); “What is Jus,” Black’s
Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd ed., http://thelawdictionary. org/jus/ (2-20-14). On the
other hand, Neff was emphatic that Grotius’ concept of “rights” is the “narrow kind” rather than the modern
civil-libertarian version. “The narrow meaning refers, more specifically, to the ability to obtain something
from someone else, or to perform some kind of task. …Rights in the narrow sense are therefore intimately
connected with duties – when one person (such as a creditor) has a right, some other person (i.e., a
debtor) must be under a corresponding duty.” Neff, LWP, p. xxvii.
Gratian himself gave ius naturale an objective definition in the opening words of the Decretum, stating:
"'Natural law (ius) is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel by which each is commanded to do to
another what he wants done to himself and forbidden to do to another what he does not want done to
himself.'" In short, ius is the Golden Rule. “Gratian subsequently offered other, competing objective
definitions for the term ius naturale, but never attempted to reconcile these with each other or with the
meaning he obviously preferred.” Reid, “The Medieval Origins of the Western Natural Rights Tradition:
The Achievement of Brian Tierney,” p. 443. This ecclesiastic history is further complicated by varying
definitions of jus over time, particularly with regard to whether jus was a subjective or objective concept –
i.e., focused on individual rights or the common good. Id, p. 461. As an earlier scholar explained,
“Grotius knew how to unite to the same extent the authority of reason combined with that of experience;
his is the fruitful alliance of philosophy and history, which has so profoundly impressed the modern
political world.” Sir William Rattigan, “Great Jurists of the World. IV. Hugo Grotius,” p. 77.
n. 146: A thorough but assuredly incomplete list of the scholarship on the rule of law includes Paul
Gowder, The Rule of Law in the Real World (Cambridge University Press, 2016); Tom Bingham, The Rule
of Law (London: Penguin Global, 2011); Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory
(Cambridge University Press, 2010); Herman Belz, Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law in America
(Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2009); James Bernard Murphy, “The Lawyer and the
Layman: Two Perspectives on the Rule of Law,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Winter, 2006), pp.
101-31; John Philip Reid, Rule of Law: The Jurisprudence of Liberty in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries. (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press. 2004); James S. Hart, Jr., The Rule of Law
1603-1660 (Harlow, England, UK: Pearson Longman, 2003); Joseph Raz, "The Rule of Law and Its
Virtue," Law Quarterly Review 93 (1977), pp. 195-211; Robert H. Fallon, Jr. "'The Rule of Law' as a
Concept in Constitutional Discourse," Columbia Law Review 97 (Jan. 1997), pp. 1-56; The Rule of Law:
Nomos XXXVI, Ian Shapiro, ed. (New York & London: New York University Press, 1994); The Roots of
Liberty: Magna Carta, Ancient Constitution, and the Anglo-American Tradition of Rule of Law, Ellis
Sandoz, ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1993); Judith Shklar, "Political Theory and the Rule of Law,"
Political Thought and Political Thinkers, Stanley Hoffman, ed. (Chicago University Press,1988) pp. 21-37;
R. A. Humphreys, "The Rule of Law and the American Revolution," Law Quarterly Review 52 (1937), pp.
80-98. See also Sebastián Urbina, Legal Method and the Rule of Law (New York: Springer. 2002); Guri
Ademi, "Legal Intimations: Michael Oakeshott and the Rule of Law," Wisconsin Law Review (1993), pp.
839-96; Daniel A. Farber, "The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of
Law," Vanderbilt Law Review 45 (1992), pp. 533-59; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, "The Role of Reason in the
Rule of Law," University of Chicago Law Review 56 (1989), pp. 779-809; Frederick Schauer, "Rules, the
Rule of Law, and the Constitution," Constitutional Commentary 6 (1989), pp. 69-85; Geoffrey de Q Walker, The Rule of Law: Foundation of Constitutional Democracy (Carlton, VICT: Melbourne University
Press. 1988); G. R. Elton, "The Rule of Law in Sixteenth-Century England," Tudor Men and Institutions:
Studies in English Law and Government, Arthur J. Slavin, ed. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press. 1972), pp. 265-94; Stanley Diamond, "The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom," The Rule of
Law, Robert P. Wolff, ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1971), pp. 115-44; Revolution and the Rule of
Law, Edward Kent, ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 30-45; William H. Dunham, Jr.,
"Regal Power and the Rule of Law: a Tudor Paradox," Journal of British Studies, Vol. 3 (1964), pp. 24-56.
n. 149: The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (2 ed.) describes the rule of law as, “A system of
governmental behaviour and authority that is constrained by law and the respect for law, in contrast to
despotic rule. States respecting the rule of law typically divide the powers of government among separate
branches; entrench civil liberties (notably, due process of law and equal protection of the law) behind
constitutional walls; and provide for the orderly transfer of political power through fair elections. All
versions of political liberalism stress the importance of the rule of law. Elements of the idea are at least as
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old as Pericles' Funeral Oration (431 bc). As a modern technical term, ‘rule of law’ was brought to
prominence by A. V. Dicey in An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London, 1885).”
“Rule of law,” in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (2 ed.), Ted Honderich, ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy. gc.cuny.edu/ view/10.1093/acref/9780
19926 4797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-2236?rskey= Irzjor&result=2 (3-31-14). A text book on
The English Legal System states, “The ‘rule of law’ represents a symbolic ideal against which proponents
of widely divergent political persuasions measure and criticise the shortcomings of contemporary State
practice. This varied recourse to the rule of law is, of course, only possible because of the lack of
precision in the actual meaning of the concept.” Gary Slapper and David Kelly, The English Legal
System, 9th ed. (London & New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009), p. 17.
n. 226: Milton similarly stated, “And to him that shall consider well why among free persons, one man by
civill right should beare authority and jurisdiction over another, no other end or reason can be imaginable.
These for a while governed well, and with much equitie decided all things at their owne arbitrement; till
the temptation of such a power, left absolute in thir hands, perverted them at length to injustice and
partialitie.” Law, said Milton, was the product of tis mistake. “Then did they, who now by trial had found
the danger and inconveniences of committing arbitrary power to any, invent laws either framed or
consented to by all; that should confine and limit the authority of whom they chose to govern them: that so
man, of whose failing they had proof, might no more rule over them, but law and reason, abstracted as
much as might be from personal errors and frailties.” John Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates,
p. 38. Sidney – and John Adams -- were much less pessimistic about the resort to law than was Milton.
So was Wildman. [John Wildman], The Leveller, in Ashley, John Wildman, p. 137. Other republicans
were less analytical, and simply ranted against arbitrary government. See, e.g., Court Maxims, p. 63 (“All
such laws and cautions seems to show to me that kings are such wild beasts as will break all chains that
can be put upon them. The only means, therefore, of enjoying safety and preserving liberty is by
destroying them, or having none at all”); [the Earl of Shaftesbury and/or possibly (although I doubt it) John
Locke], “A Letter from a Person of Quality to His Friend in the Country (1675)(“I shall conclude … [t]hat
the design is to declare us first into another Government more Absolute, and Arbitrary, then the Oath of
Allegience, or old Law knew; and then make us swear unto it …. Archbishop Laud was the first Founder
of this Device; … If so, I am sure they are the most dangerous sort of Men alive to our English
Government, and it is the first thing to be looke into, and strictly examin’d by our Parliaments; ‘tis the
leaven that corrupts the whole lump,” etc. etc.)
n. 286: Van Gelderen described the Batavian myth, which seems to have “come up” at the end of the
fifteenth century, and which “gained momentum through sixteenth-century humanism, largely due to the
rediscovery of Tacitus’ Germania,” a familiar foundation. Grotius, for example, “took great pains to show
the antiquity of the free Hollandish republic,” which had “always” been governed by the aristocratic
leaders, the ottimati, in the Dutch States. According to Grotius, “for more than seventeen hundred years
the Batavians, now called Hollanders, have used the same government, of which the higher power has
been and still is with the States,” which sought to preserve a “free self-governing people willing to do the
utmost to retain its liberty.” Van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, pp. 206-07, relying
in part on Hugo Grotius’ Treatise of the Antiquity of the Bataian now Hollandish Republic, 1610. Another
rendition of this argument is in the 1573 treatise Francogallia by the French Huguenot Francois Hotman,
on whom Sidney relied. Hotman “argued that the French monarchy was a constitutional one, with representative bodies rendering both advice and consent. Like the English Anglo-Saxonists of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, he used this historical argument to criticize absolutist tendencies in the
monarchy of his time. He did not, however, develop a theory that the monarchy was legally bound by the
historical experience which he recounted – only that as a moral and political matter it ought to follow the
ancient examples.” Berman, “Origins of Historical Jurisprudence,” p. 1663, n. 28; DCG, III.33.511,
II.30.292-95.
n. 499: Waldron was convinced that between the time Locke began writing about toleration (actually,
intolerance) in 1659, followed by various letters and essays on the subject which led to his Letter
Concerning Toleration, published (anonymously) in 1689, Locke’s views did a 180. In Waldron’s view, by
1689 – in the context of the Glorious Revolution and the “de jure exclusion of Catholics from English
public life in the 1689 settlement” - Locke was “not prepared to say that papists as such may not be
tolerated,” but rather that “certain specific political doctrines may not be tolerated.” Waldron, God, Locke,
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and Equality, pp. 218-26. This view is intriguing but not persuasive, for several reasons. As Waldron
recognized and grappled with, regardless of how you come out on his views on Catholicism, Locke
indisputably rejected tolerance of atheists. “I suspect Locke would say something similar: atheists are a
menace precisely because the integrity of the social and political structure is not independent of what
ordinary people think.” While Locke may have ruled out the “forcible imposition of beliefs,” he did not rule
out “atheist organizations crushed and atheists excluded from common and public life.” Id, pp. 233, 235.
Additionally, given the fact that Locke published so much of his work very late, even on death’s door, he
had ample opportunity to edit so as to be very clear that he believed in religious tolerance of Catholics
and atheists. Waldron stated, “There was no particular reason for Locke to talk in code about the refusal
of toleration to Catholics [or to atheists] if that is what he believed.” Id, p. 222. But the same thing is true
in reverse! There was no reason why Locke could not have stated very clearly that full toleration of
Catholics and atheists was essential. He did not do so. At best, Locke’s views were opaque.
More compelling is Goldie’s argument that Locke’s issue was antinomianism, not Catholicism. “Given the
powerful nature of Locke’s case for religious tolerance, it comes as a shock that, near the close of the
Letter, he excludes atheists and Catholics from toleration.” Atheists were rejected because they did not
fear divine punishment. Catholics were rejected because their first allegiance was to the pope not their
homeland, and because of Rome’s view that “faith need not be kept with heretics,” i.e., “when Catholics
deal with heretics” they did not need to be honest or keep their promises. Goldie argued, therefore, that
the correct characterization of Locke’s perspective was antinomian: “moral laws are trumped by the
superiority of religious ‘truth,’” which put religion “in collision with reason and natural law” – an invitation to
anarchy, about which we know Locke was particularly fearful (and which explains his early intolerant
views, following the Civil War and Locke’s felt need to instill the magistrate with authority to impose a
national religion). Goldie, “Introduction,” John Locke: A Letter Concerning Toleration and Other Writings,
pp. xviii-xx. In short, Locke certainly could have modified his writing to reflect a belated but unqualified
tolerance. He did not do so. In addition, the literature abounds with the recognition that Shaftesbury, who
significantly influenced Locke, was virulently intolerant of Catholics, consistently described as such by
scholars including Locke biographer Maurice Cranston, who stated, “Ashley is remembered as one of the
most passionate anti-Catholics in English history.” Indeed, said Cranston, “Locke himself had always
been opposed to the toleration of [Catholic] recusants.” Beginning in 1659 and in subsequent early
correspondence, in his 1667 essay on toleration, and “in his Epistola de tolerantia – in all these
documents Locke declared that it would be wrong to grant liberty to Papists.” Maurice Cranston, John
Locke: A Biography (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1985)[1st pub. 1957], pp. 129-30.
Then there is Ashcraft’s conclusion, which was that Locke’s “mainstream” anti-Catholic opinion was that
“not only” was “force employed against Catholics … a justifiable political policy … but also, and
inconsistently with the presuppositions of his own general argument, … that the application of force even
carried with it the prospect that Catholics would abandon their religious beliefs and join the ranks of
Protestantism.” Ashcraft attributed the ability of the very intellectual Locke to “tolerate such a glaring
inconsistency” to “a deep-seated hatred and fear of the doctrine [of Catholicism] and its advocates.”
Ashcraft saw the virtual obsession of Shaftesbury to exclude the Catholic Duke of York from the line of
succession, supported by Locke, as telling evidence of “an attitude so deeply held that no reasoned
argument against it – certainly none ever encountered by Locke in his lifetime – could overrule” it.
Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, p. 100-01. In fin, at most the jury is out.
n. 501: Milton strenuously advocated freedom of conscience; but he also did not extent that freedom to
Catholics or Jews. Don M. Wolfe, “Limits of Miltonic Toleration,” The Journal of English and Germanic
Philology, Vol. 60, No. 4, Milton Studies in Honor of Harris Francis Fletcher (Oct., 1961), pp. 834-46. In
1656, in A Healing Question, Sir Henry Vane divided the “good old cause” into two parts: the natural right
of a people to select those who will govern them in the public interest, and the natural right of “a more
heavenly and excellent object,” namely, the right of every individual to practice his faith and conscience
as he sees fit. Henry Vane, A Healing Question pp. 4-5. Vane, after all, in his early twenties in
Massachusetts, had championed the right of even the eccentric Mrs. Hutchinson to be tolerated. Even
Vane, however, did not plead for Catholic conscience, although he attempted to protect Catholics from
persecution. Wolfe, “Limits of Miltonic Toleration,” pp. 839-40. Andrew Marvell wrote that, “men ought to
enjoy the same Propriety and Protection in their Consciences which they have in their Lives, Liberties,
and Estates,” although he railed against popery and arbitrary government. Andrew Marvell, The Growth
of Popery and Arbitrary Government. More particularly, from the long Prorogation of November 1675, p.
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33. Slingsby Bethel addressed the necessity for liberty of conscience. In The Interest of Princes and
States (London: John Wickins, 1680), pp. 2, 30-31, Bethel said, “Trade must be the principal Interest of
England,” and that, “Liberty of Conscience to all Protestant Non-Conformists, is the true Interest of King
and Kingdom, in that it is absolutely and indispensably necessary, for raising the value of Land, which at
present is miserably mean and low, and advancing the Trade and Wealth of the Kingdom. Edmund
Ludlow, the Cromwellian Puritan regicide exiled in Switzerland, strongly endorsed religious toleration in A
Voyce From the Watch Tower. Ludlow favored “complete religious toleration” and “total separation of
church from state,” arguing that intolerance was “’the cause of all the confusions and disorders that are in
the civill governments of the world.’” At the same time, Ludlow’s millenarianism was tempered by the
belief that “’the Lord’s tyme is not yet come’” and that, therefore, “’there is more of the bitter cup behind
for his people to drinke of.’” Worden, “Introduction,” A Voyce From the Watch Tower, pp. 7, 11.
Meanwhile, Houston argued that Ludlow’s “religious-based ethic of conscience and Sidney’s flexible
consequentialism is striking and points to a radical divergence in their conceptions of republicanism. For
the religious Ludlow, an English republic was to be the new Zion, and hence its origins had to be free of
all human corruption; for the earthly Sidney, it was to be a nation free of corrupt Stuart monarchs, and any
steps necessary to achieve that end were accept-able.” Houston, Algernon Sidney, p. 41. Houston ‘s
comparison rings true to some extent; but his characterizations of Sidney’s views are incorrect.
n. 505: Thomas D. Wilson, The Ashley Cooper Plan: The Founding of Carolina and the Origins of
Southern Political Culture (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2016), pp. 1-2
(“Anthony Ashley Cooper was one of several English visionaries to see America as a blank slate for
launching a utopian colony. …Ashley Cooper, later the 1st Earl of Shaftesbury, planned Carolina as an
idealized reinvention of traditional English society – which he knew as Gothic society – where order was
maintained, prosperity attained, and liberty ensured through a balance of landowning interests and class
interdependence. The plan established a social hierarchy sometimes characterized as neofeudalistic. It
anticipated the necessity of toiling classes at its base, even slavery, but it did not contemplate full
dependence on an enslaved labor force and the emergence of a slave society. The notorious
dependence on chattel slavery in Carolina arose later at the instigation of Caribbean plantation owners,
who were among the earliest settlers. Under Ashley Cooper’s constitution, he and his seven associates
and their descendants would form a permanent class of Carolina nobility, sharing power with an elected
parliament. …The role of Carolina’s first city planner, Ashley Cooper’s protégé, John Locke, is also of
continuing significance. …The concept of a model civil society was first implanted in the English mind by
Thomas More, the statesman, philosopher, and author who published Utopia (the first use of the term) in
1516. …The political theorist James Harrington had the most direct influence on colonial plans, including
the Ashley Cooper Plan. Harrington published The Commonwealth of Oceana in 1656, in which he laid
out a model constitution for a commonwealth.”
PART TWO
Chapter Five
n.1: In the 1774 will of Josiah Quincy (1744-1775), close friend of John Adams, fellow attorney, cousin of
Abigail, and son of the Braintree leader enormously admired by Adams who “held the office of Speaker of
the House of Representatives longer than any other person,” the statement was made, “after enumerating
various legacies and tokens of remembrance to his friends and relations,” that, “I give to my son, when he
shall arrive to the age of fifteen years, Algernon Sidney’s works, John Locke’s works, Lord Bacon’s works,
Gordon’s Tacitus, and Cato’s Letters. May the spirit of Liberty rest upon him!” Memoir of the Life of
Josiah Quincy, Junior, of Massachusetts Bay, 1744-1775, by his Son, Josiah Quincy, 3rd Edition, Eliza
Susan Quincy, ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, & Company, 1875, p. 289.
n. 21: The Body of Liberties included provisions on the equality of “[e]very person within this jurisdiction,
whether inhabitants or foreigners,” to “enjoy the same justice and law”; the protection of individual
property; the freedom of every man, whether an inhabitant or a foreigner, “free or not free,” to attend any
public Court, Counsel, or Town meeting, and to ask questions, either orally or in writing; the right of civil
litigants to elect, by mutual consent, to have a jury trial or to be tried “by the Bench”; a double jeopardy
provision; a rejection of “inhumane Barbarous or cruel” punishment; protections for married and single
women as well as servants; and an animal protection law. The emphasis in the Body of Liberties on law,
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liberty, and political participation was a product of the organization of Puritan worship. The New England
Puritans were Congregationalists; they believed that church governance should be entirely local so that
all religious authority began and ended with the individual congregation. There was the anticipation that
ministers and leaders from various congregations would share knowledge, and help and educate each
other’s congregations. But Congregationalists rejected “any formal institutions with external power over
the local congregation.” Bruce C. Daniels, New England Nation: The Country the Puritans Built (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 31-32, 58-60. On the Body of Liberties, see http://www.mass.gov/
anf/research-and-tech/legal-and-legislative-resources/body-of-liberties.html (12-12-14).
n. 23: Although historians dispute the matter, it seems likely that the processes for religious and political
decision-making in seventeenth-century Massachusetts Bay were more than parallel; they were
conjoined. “The historical reality is that the seventeenth-century New England Puritan ministers
controlled the civil magistrates, especially (but not exclusively) in Massachusetts Bay. Governor John
Winthrop, the most famous Massachusetts Bay governor … recorded numerous examples of such
influence and control. The Journal of John Winthrop, 1630-1649, [citations omitted] …. As Roger
Williams noted, “the Magistrate is but the Ministers Cane through which the Clergy speaks ….” The
Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody: By Mr Cottons endevour to wash it white in the Blood of the Lambe…
(London, 1652), 131 (italics in original).” Furthermore, “the electoral franchise in Massachusetts Bay was
limited to male church members who demonstrated that they were ‘visible saints,’ i.e., that they had been
predestined to salvation. This electorate was controlled by the religious ministers. For further discussion,
including additional details and documentation, see Alan E. Johnson, The First American Founder: Roger
Williams and Freedom of Conscience (Pittsburgh, PA: Philosophia Publications, 2015), Chs. 2, 6 & App
B; Michael P. Zuckert, “Natural Rights and Protestant Politics,” in Protestantism and the American
Founding, ed. Thomas S. Engeman and Michael P. Zuckert (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 2004), 23-39, 45, 52-54, 66-67.” Alan Johnson, “Topic: America: A Christian Nation,” discussion
post in AHA Members’ Forum, Jan. 25, 2016, http://communities.historians.org/communities/communityhome/digestviewer/viewthread?MID= 8770&GroupId=391&tab=digestviewer&UserKey=7281d9cd-1339413f-b2d5-be8e21e7a482&sKey=FCA 13A152923482FB563 (1-26-2016).
n. 25: According to John Quincy, part of the reason for the felt necessity for the Compact was the prior
experiences of the Mayflower Separatists, who had witnessed divisive political divisions in the
Netherlands. They had lived in Leyden, a Dutch university town in which political matters were openly
debated and, accordingly, were exposed to the same dissensions that “undoubt-edly” were the source of
the fundamental principles of government in “the immortal work of Grotius, upon the rights of war and
peace,” first published “very shortly after the departure of our forefathers from Leyden.” John Quincy
Adams, An Oration, Delivered at Plymouth, December 22, 1802, pp. 19-20. In short, disembarking from
the Mayflower in 1620 the Pilgrims brought with them Grotius’ principles of natural law on which Sidney
had relied, and the conviction that through the legal mechanism of a social contract they would govern
themselves equitably. These men swore in the presence of God and each other that they thereby
“covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil body politic, for our better ordering and preservation,
and…to enact, constitute, and frame such just and equal laws, ordinances, acts, constitutions, offices from
time to time, as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the general good of the colony: unto which
we promise all due submission and obedience.” In addition to the Mayflower Compact itself, see Plimouth
Plantation website, at plimoth. org/learn/just-kids/homework-help/mayflower-and-mayflower-compact (1212-14); William Bradford, Of Plymouth Plantation, Samuel Morison, ed. (New York: Random House, 1981),
pp. 75-76. John Alden, John Adams’ great-great-grandfather, was the last male survivor, i.e., he lived the
longest, among those who signed the Mayflower Compact.
n. 26: Smith stated that as late as October 1783, after America had won its independence from Britain,
when Adams made his way across the English Channel to visit England for the first time he was absorbed
by his connection to the (former) metropole: “Adams was like a small boy going to a fair. All his life
England, loved and feared, hated and admired, had obsessed him. She was his second mother, his
preceptress. He was going back to the home of his race. The feeling was visceral – a dull kind of ache in
the bowels, an ache made up of dread and anticipation. He was going to a mother he had never seen,
only dreamed and read of, a proud, capricious, perhaps indifferent mother to whom he was an ungrateful
and rebellious son.” While a beautiful description, it seems particularly fanciful and even wrong. Page
Smith, John Adams, Vol. I, 1735-1784 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962), pp. 581-82.
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The literature on Britain as an empire includes Jack P. Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional
Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States 1607-1788 (New York &
London: W.W. North and Co., 1990); Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World
Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2004); Daniel J. Hulsebosch,
Constituting Empire: New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 16641830 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Lawrence James, The Rise and
Fall of the British Empire (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1994); Owen Stanwood, The Empire Reformed:
English America in the Age of the Glorious Revolution (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2011).
n. 31: While ambassador to Britain, Adams attended three different church services on one Sunday: “In
London he was partial to the preaching of Joseph Priestley at the Essex Street Chapel, London’s first
avowedly Unitarian church. But John Adams was no sectarian. While touring the English countryside
one Sunday in 1787, he would participate in an ecumenical triple-header: Episcopal services in the
morning, Presbyterian in the afternoon, and Baptist in the evening.” Grant, John Adams: Party of One, p.
318. He was baptized in the new Puritan meetinghouse in Braintree in which his father served as deacon
and Reverend John Hancock presided during most of Adams’ childhood, attending two services every
Sunday, morning and afternoon. (John Hancock, the minister’s son, was a friend and one year younger
than John Adams.) Smith, John Adams, Vol. I (1735-1784), pp. 5, 9. Deacon Adams, who “was fond of
reading” and had “set [his] heart” on Adams attending college, had in mind that his obviously very bright
son, the oldest of three, would receive a liberal arts education and become a preacher, as Adams’ great
uncle on his mother’s side had been. Autobiography, JA D&A, Vol. III, pp. 257-63. As a child young John
had avoided his studies, preferring to play outdoors, which seems to have been a product of both his age
and a boring and "indolent" teacher. But approaching his teens Adams academically excelled, learning
Latin, mathematics, and natural philosophy although, in his much later opinion, he insufficiently studied
"the Classicks." Id, p. 262. “Most conspicuous in the writings of the Revolutionary period was the heritage
of classical antiquity. Knowledge of classical authors was universal among colonists with any degree of
education and references to them and their works abound in the literature.” Bailyn, The Ideological
Origins of the American Revolution, p. 23. Through Adams' exposure to men visiting with Deacon John,
the future president saw what he considered to be "a Spirit of Dogmatism and Bigotry in Clergy and
Laity." In his book on John Adams’ political ideas, C. Bradley Thompson described the context, disturbing
to Adams, of the 1749 meetings that took place in his Braintree home over the controversial views of the
town’s Congregational minister Lemuel Briant. See C. Bradley Thompson, John Adams and the Spirit of
Liberty (Lawrence, KN: University Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 6-7. Knowing his own nature, including
the fact that he was highly opinionated, Adams sensibly concluded that this likely meant that he would
"never get a Parish, or getting it must soon leave it" because, as he said, "Very strong doubts arose in my
mind, whether I was made for a Pulpit at such times." Autobiography, JA D&A, Vol. III, p. 262. Indeed,
laying bare the detachment, if not ambivalence that he felt about the business, as opposed to the
observance of religion, the young John Adams remarked in an August 29, 1756 letter to his friend,
Richard Cranch, “The frightful Engines of Ecclesiastical Councils, of diabolical Malice and Calvinistical
good nature never failed to terrify me exceedingly whenever I thought of Preaching.” Letter from John
Adams to Richard Cranch, Aug. 29, 1756, in JA Rev. Writings I, p. 26. How deliciously ironic that in his
teens the man who would not only one day be the leading politician in America but serve in the most
sensitive diplomatic positions, determined not to become a preacher because he lacked the requisite
diplomatic skills. "I perceived very clearly ... that the Study of Theology and the pursuit of it as a
Profession would involve me in endless Altercations and make my Life miserable, without any prospect of
doing any good to my fellow Men." Autobiography, JA D&A, Vol. III, p. 262. Much later in life, on one
aspect of the business of religion in his home town, Adams had much more pejorative things to say: “The
anecdotes which I could relate as an eye and an ear-witness, would be innumerable. This north precinct
of the large and ancient town of Braintree, now called Quincy, in which I was born and bred, and in which
my father, grandfather, great-grandfather, and great-great-grandfather, lived, died, and lie buried, was a
very focus of Episcopal bigotry, intrigue, intolerance, and persecution. I could introduce here a dramatis
personæ of names, which I will not now commit to paper, and entertain you with plots and intrigues, which
would compose a comedy equal to any of Molière or Shakespeare, if corruption, prostitution, and dupery
can compose a comedy.” John Adams to Jedidiah Morse, Dec. 2, 1815, in John Adams, The Works of
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John Adams, vol. 10 (Letters 1811-1825, Indexes) [1854], p. 187, at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/adamsthe-works-of-john-adams-vol-10-letters-1811-1825-indexes (10-3-16). “Where,” for example, he asks
early on in his Diary, “do we find a precept in the Gospel requiring Ecclesiastical Synods? Convocations?
Council? Decrees? Creeds? Confessions? Oaths? Subscriptions? And whole cart-loads of other trumpery
that we find religion encumbered with in these days?” JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 8 (Feb. 18, 1756). The
theological dispute within the Braintree community that Adams’ father tried unsuccessfully to mediate
seems to have been at the heart of Adams’ distress. Ryerson characterized John Adams around this time
as a young man who was “just then in the process of abandoning the tenets of Calvinism. But he found
deism as distasteful as his old faith.” Instead, Adams was becoming “a true son of the Enlightenment,”
and “would occupy a middle position between Trinitarian orthodoxy and skeptical Deism – an increasingly
common stance in eastern Massachusetts.” Ryerson, John Adams’ Republic, pp. 30-31. When he was
in his eighties, Adams’ recollection of his decision not to be a preacher was a little different. He
remembered Reverend John Shaw of Bridgewater visiting his father during Adams college years, who
offered well-intentioned advice to Adams. “‘Young man, I suppose, you are intended for the ministry. I
advise you to begin your studies in this profession by gaining a complete knowledge of Willard’s body of
Divinity. You will then be prepared to study the Bible and other good books.’” Adams mind “rebelled
against any profession which recommended to be prepared for in such fashion, ‘and he from that
moment, determined not to study it, if such an irrational course was necessary to succeed.’” Donald H.
Stewart and George P.Clark, “Misanthrope or Humanitarian? John Adams in Retirement,” The New
England Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 (June 1955), pp. 216-36, 228-29, relying on the Memoirs of Dr. John
Pierce, not published in full. Pierce was pastor of the Congregational Church in Brookline,
Massachusetts for over fifty years, was in his twenties when he met Adams, who was in his sixties.
Pierce developed a friendship with Adams and he visited with him from that time until Adams’ death over
thirty years later. Id, pp. 216-17. This was not a rejection of religious observance or spirituality, which was
always a part of Adams’ life. To the contrary, throughout his life Adams affirmed religious commitment
while, at the same time, eschewing religious intolerance:
The Christian religion, as I understand it, is the brightness of the glory and the express portrait of the
character of the eternal, self-existent, independent, benevolent, all-powerful and all-merciful Creator,
Preserver, and Father of the universe; the first good, first perfect, and first fair. It will last as long as the
world. Neither savage nor civilized man, without a revelation, could ever have discovered or invented it.
Ask me not, then, whether I am a Catholic or Protestant, Calvinist or Arminian. As far as they are
Christians, I wish to be a fellow-disciple with them all…. Indeed, in his correspondence Adams remarked
that it was religion that had “preserved this race of Adamses in all their ramifications, in such numbers,
health, peace, comfort, and mediocrity.” Without religion, Adams risibly speculated that the Adamses
“would have been rakes, fops, sots, gamblers, starved with hunger, frozen with cold, scalped by Indians,
&c., &c., &c., been melted away and disappeared….” Adams to Rush, Jan. 21, 1810 and July 19, 1812, in
The Spur of Fame, p. 261.
n. 56: In another challenge to the Crown by Otis that followed soon after Petition of Lechmere, the
charismatic advocate went out of his way to raise the specter of Sidney’s republicanism and then set it
aside, interestingly in favor of Locke’s ideas, which by the eighteenth-century “seemed mainstream and,
therefore, not particularly threatening to the men who ran the state.” But this fact can be easily
misunderstood. But Otis was not minimizing Sidney’s influence! The emphasis was deliberate – a legal
strategy. As Otis explained in his 1762 petition entitled Vindication of the Conduct of the House of
Representatives of the Province of the Massachusetts-Bay, he used Locke rhetorically to avoid
suggestions of leveling or sedition that would have created “an outcry” by association with “Col. Algernon
Sidney, or other British martyrs.” James Otis, Esq., Vindication of the Conduct of the House of
Representatives of the Province of the Massachusetts-Bay, 1762, in Collected Political Writings of James
Otis, Richard Samuelson, ed. & intro. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2015), pp. 75-112, 88; see Adams
to Jefferson, Nov. 15, 1813, The Adams-Jefferson Letters, p. 424; for information on the writs of
assistance case, see Editorial Note, Adams Minutes of the Argument, and other documents in 44. Petition
of Lechmere (Argument on Writs of Assistance), Adams Legal Papers, Vol. 2, pp.106-47. Nevertheless,
“the martyr’s name,” viz., Sidney, “did appear in Otis’s text, and he left the strong impression that he
sympathized with the views of Sidney,” who he described as a radical late- seventeenth-century
republican writer “executed for advocating popular resistance to the Stuart monarchy.” At the same time,
“almost immediately Otis deftly backed away from Sidney, stating artfully that in the political environment
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in which he found himself, Locke was as good a source as any. … Unlike the famed British martyrs,
Locke was safe for published discourse in Boston; he represented genius, solid religion, and the Glorious
Revolution.” Breen, “Subjecthood and Citizenship,” p. 384-85, n. 11. In this article Breen goes on to
explain Otis’ theory of the origins of government, which in its embracing of equality went “beyond Locke
or Harrington,” social contract and property, retreat[ing] into the language of seventeenth-century Reform
Protestantism.” Id, p. 385.Whether or not Otis agreed with Sidney, we certainly can say that the
intellectual elite, including Otis, Adams, and Jefferson among others, appreciated Sidney’s importance,
both his ideas and his political action, in a way that Whig history, along with subsequent historiography
and political theory, has erased.
Another example of the eighteenth-century British-American appreciation of Sidney is reflected in the
Feb. 28, 1774 will of Josiah Quincy (1744-1775), who was Adams’ close friend, a fellow attorney, and son
of the Braintree leader who John enormously admired, the man who was Abigail’s cousin and “held the
office of Speaker of the House of Representatives longer than any other person.” In Josiah Quincy’s will,
the statement was made, “after enumerating various legacies and tokens of remembrance to his friends
and relations,” that, “I give to my son, when he shall arrive to the age of fifteen years, Algernon Sidney’s
works, John Locke’s works, Lord Bacon’s works, Gordon’s Tacitus, and Cato’s Letters. May the spirit of
Liberty rest upon him!” It was a small world: Adams was one of the executors of Quincy’s will. Memoir of
the Life of Josiah Quincy, Junior, of Massachusetts Bay, 1744-1775, by his Son, Josiah Quincy, Third
Edition, Eliza Susan Quincy, ed (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1875), p. 289.
n. 70: Ryerson does not indicate the sources from which he drew the conclusions that it was not until “a
littler later” than “the 1760s and early 1770s” that Adams “became immersed in this older literature,” and
“read the political and constitutional writings of the Romans Livy and Cicero, and of Polybius, a Greek
historian living in Rome, and finally studied the most celebrated political texts of Aristotle and Plato.” .
We know that Cicero was Adams’ daily fare from the time he was a teenager. In 1776 he recalled in a
letter to his former clerk, William Tudor, now serving in the army, that he “recollected” something from
Polybius, suggesting that he had read it considerably before that. There is a reference on page two of
Volume I of Adams’ Diary, dated January 17, 1756, to Plato. While the Diary editors comment on how the
passage “remains a puzzle” because it is not an accurate quotation from Plato, it nevertheless
establishes that Adams either was reading Plato at the time, or had read the ancient Greek philosopher
before then. Adams does not refer to Aristotle in his Diary, although the principle most vital to Adams,
repeatedly utilized in his work, e.g., in his Novanglus letters, the draft of the Massachusetts Constitution
and Defence of the Constitutions, as discussed in detail in Chapter Five, is the Aristotelian political
concept “of a government of laws and not of men.” We also know that the standard education before
university and no doubt at Harvard would have included a steep exposure to Aristotle. All in all,
Ryerson’s suggestion that it was not until relatively late in his intellectual development that Adams was
exposed to classical political thought seems misplaced. See Richard Alan Ryerson, “A John Adams
Paradox: Provincial Lawyer, cosmopolitan Reader, Ardent Nationalist,” in The Libraries, Leadership, &
Legacy of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, Robert C. Baron and Conrad Edick Wright, eds (Golden,
CO: Fulcrum Publishing and the Massachusetts Historical Society, 2010), pp. 179-205, 188-89; see JA
D&A, Vol. I, p. 2; editors’ note, The Massachusetts Constitution, PJA Vol. 8: March 1779-Feb. 1780, p.
264 n.37.
n. 74: James. M. Farrell, “New England’s Cicero: John Adams and the Rhetoric of Conspiracy,”
Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Third Series, Vol. 104 (1992), pp. 55-72; James M.
Farrell, "John Adams's Autobiography: The Ciceronian Paradigm and the Quest for Fame," New England
Quarterly 62 (1978), pp. 505-28; Stephen Botein, “Cicero as Role Model for Early American Lawyers: A
Case Study in Classical ‘Influence’,” The Classical Journal 72 (1977-78) Vol. 72, pp. 313-21; see also
Garrett Lysford, “Cicero and Adams: Architects of the Founding,” The Sunoikisis Undergraduate
Research Journal, Vol. 4 (Dec. 7, 2013), http://wp.chs.harvard.edu/surs/2013 /12/07/cicero-and-adams/
(2-28-17); Carl J. Richard, Greeks & Romans Bearing Gifts: How the Ancients Inspired the Founding
Fathers (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, Inc., 2009); Carl J. Richard, Why We’re All
Romans: The Roman Contribution to the Western World. (Lanham, MD, 2010); Caroline Winterer, The
Culture of Classicism: Ancient Greece and Rome in American Intellectual Life 1780-1910 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); M. N. S. Sellers, American Republicanism: Roman Ideology in
the United States Constitution (New York University Press. 1994); Norman Fierling, Moral Philosophy at
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Seventeenth-Century Harvard: A Discipline in Tension (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1981).
n. 76: Cicero references continue throughout Adams’ writing. For example, ten days after his appointment
as president of the Board of War and Ordnance created by Congress on June 12, 1776 to raise troops
and supplies for the Continental Army, Adams wrote to Nathanael Greene, the youngest major general in
the Confederate army. Greene commanded forces in Boston after the British evacuation. The basic
purpose of the letter was to notify Greene of the resolution establishing the Board of War and Ordnance.
But in addition Adams took the occasion to advise Greene that, “I learned, long ago, from one of the
greatest Statesmen, this World ever produced, Tully, neither to adventure upon rash Attempt from too
much Confidence, nor to despair of success in a great Design from the appearance of Difficulties.” John
Adams to Nathanael Greene, June 22, 1776, in John Adams Revolutionary Writings 1775-1783 (“JA Rev.
Writings II”), p. 83.
Over thirty years later in his three-volume A Defence of the Constitutions published in 1787 and 1788
Adams maintained that “all the ages of the world have not produced a greater statesman and philosopher
united than Cicero,” and accordingly, “his authority should have great weight.” Decades later, in a letter
to his friend Benjamin Rush, Adams remarked, “Letters! What shall I say of letters? Pliny’s are too
studied and too elegant. Cicero’s are the only ones of perfect simplicity, confidence, and familiarity.”
John Adams to Benjamin Rush, Dec. 27, 1812, The Spur of Fame, p. 289. At the end of their lives
Adams and Jefferson were still discussing the merits of Cicero. The Adams-Jefferson Letters, pp. 351,
382, 433, 438, 549, 575-76.
One could divert much further on Adams’ pervasive reliance on the famous Roman advocate, whose
texts form the cornerstone of the Adams Library. Regardless of whether one agrees with the view of
some scholars that Cicero was a model that Adams consciously and closely adopted as he pursued a
legal and then public career, there is no question that Adams’ ideas and perspective about life are
informed by those of Cicero. Professor James Farrell, for example, in “‘Syren Tully’ and the Young John
Adams,” The Classical Journal, Vol. 87, No. 4 (Apr.-May, 1992), pp. 373-90, 373, asserted that Adams
“made a conscious effort to model his own public life after Cicero’s glorious career.” To substantiate this
conclusion Farrell relied on a statement made by Adams in an 1809 letter to his old friend Benjamin
Rush. See John Adams to Benjamin Rush, April 12, 1809, in The Spur of Fame: Dialogues of John
Adams and Benjamin Rush, 1805-1813, John A. Shutz and Douglass Adair, eds (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty
Fund, 1966), p. 155. But the Adams letter does not suggest that Adams modeled his public life after
Cicero. It does suggest, as do innumerable other letters and compositions he authored, that Adams
greatly admired Cicero, freely quoted from his work, and in various instances found it useful to refer to
Cicero’s ideas, behavior or circumstances. The notion, however, that Adams “made a conscious effort to
model his own public life after Cicero” seems far too contrived to fit Adams’ generally pragmatic, albeit
juridical approach to his work as a public servant. In this particular, thorny illustration, the letter from Rush
that prompted Adams’ comment stated that Adams “might have quoted Job as well as St. Paul as a
precedent” when Adams had written previously about Cicero, utilizing him, in Rush’s words, “as a
precedent for a man’s doing justice to his services to his country.” See exchange between Rush and
Adams on Cicero, letters of March 23, April 1 and April 12, 1809, id, pp. 149-55; Rush’s statement is on p.
155. Indeed, in the earlier letter in question, Adams had spoken about the injustice to which Cicero was
subject “for his most virtuous and glorious actions,” something with which the elderly, sometimes
cantankerous Adams clearly identified. At the same time, after receiving Rush’s letter that referred to
Job, with a twinkle in his eye Adams replied that in addition to Cicero, he “might have quoted Job as well
as St. Paul as a precedent; but as I mix religion with politics as little as possible, I chose to confine myself
to Cicero.” Id, p.155. Note, too, that Adams earlier, March 23rd letter to Rush began by endorsing a view
articulated by a man who lived in an entirely different era than ancient Rome or the Biblical times of Job
or St. Paul, namely, Algernon Sidney! Adams stated: “I agree with Sidney as quoted in your favor of the
13th, that civil war is preferable to slavery….” Id, p. 149.
Perhaps it goes without saying that Adams certainly was not unique in his reliance on, and admiration for
Cicero. For example, his former student William Tudor, in an August 29, 1774, letter to Adams, quoted
“Tully” back to Adams. In this instance, Cicero was being recited for the proposition that, “Men resemble
the gods in nothing so much as in doing good to their fellow creatures,” (albeit in Latin), as an adage to
cheer on Adams and his fellow delegates to the Continental Congress. John Adams to William Tudor,
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Aug. 4, 1774, and William Tudor to John Adams, Aug. 29, 1774, Papers of John Adams (“PJA”), Vol. 2:
Dec. 1773-April 1775, Series III: General Correspondence and Other Papers of the Adams Statesmen,
The Adams Papers, Robert J. Taylor, ed. (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1977), pp. 125-27, 134.
n. 83: A 2010 American Antiquarian Society website on American colonial libraries had a more complex
assessment that reflects Jefferson’s aristocratic personal environment. “So great was Jefferson’s love of
books that he amassed not just one library but four, two of which he housed in his suite of rooms devoted
to learning at the beloved home he called Monticello. Jefferson’s first library consisted of a cherry
bookcase filled with fewer than fifty books on law, history, travel, geography, and religion, which he
inherited from his father. Over time he added books of his own to this collection.” This collection was
situated at “his father’s Shadwell house,” which “burned to the ground in 1770.” Of course, “Jefferson
was devastated by the loss of his books. Soon, however, Monticello was built—and with it a library that
included a Book Room, Book Room Annex, Portico, Cabinet, and Bedchamber, each of which were
created to give Jefferson opportunities to read, write, and experiment in a manner conducive to such
gentlemanly acts.” In short, Jefferson designed varous rooms in his small mansion at Monticello to house
particular books. “After the British burned the Congressional Library during the War of 1812, Jefferson
sold this library—6,487 volumes in all—to Congress. But never one to abide a house bereft of books,
Jefferson once again began acquiring books to restock his empty shelves.” Jefferson’s “so-called
Retirement Library contained a respectable 940 volumes that he was devoted to until his death in 1826.”
To further establish his bibliophilic personality, “Jefferson also had one more library squirreled away at his
mountain retreat, Poplar Forest, in the Virginia hinterland. This library housed nearly 1,000 volumes.”
When you add all of this up, it seems that, “All told, Jefferson bought between 9,000 and 10,000 volumes
in his lifetime and created one of the finest personal libraries of the early Republic.” “A Place of Reading,
Personal Libraries: Jefferson,” An AAS Online Exhibition,
http://www.americanantiquarian.org/Exhibitions/Reading/jefferson.htm (9-3-17)
n. 87 (The Adams Library): With the admitted qualification of the inevitability of leaving out texts of
importance, the only way to gain a real sense of the depth of Adams learning is to sample the range of
works in the Adams collection. My focus is on classics, history, literature, philosophy, and particularly
government, politics and law, which together substantially form the foundation for Adams’ intellectual
development, his ideas, and his body of work. The information contained in the following description of
the contents of the Adams Library comes from Catalogue of the John Adams Library in the Public Library
of the City of Boston (Boston: Published by the Trustees, 1917).
Religion is the subject conspicuously absent here and for good reason. Adams’ was well-read with
respect to religion, certainly pondered over the subject, and his library included many books on religion;
but Adams’ overall view was expressed in his Diary when he turned from a career in the church to one in
the law. “The Study and Practice of Law, I am sure does not dissolve the obligations of morality or of
Religion…. But all of the Provision[s] that he has for the Gratification of our senses… are much inferior to
the Provision, the wonderful Provision that he has made for the gratification of our nobler Powers of
Intelligence and Reason. He has given us Reason, to find out the Truth.” JA D&A, Vol. I, p.43 (Aug. 22,
1756) (suggested omission omitted).
The Classics
In considering Adams’ classical collection, Cicero must come first. But virtually all the other great classical
writers were there as well, including works by and about Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, Horace, Seutonius,
Thucydides, Epictetus, Pythagorus, Herodotus, Hippocrates, Homer, Lucretius, Ovid, Plutarch, Seneca,
Sophocles, Tacitus, Virgil, and Xenophon. For example, the collection included a nine-volume set entitled,
Bibliothèque des anciens philosophes and, of course, many works by individual ancient authors. Adams’
familiarity with the classics is indisputable. At twenty-four, for example, he noted, “Read 2 Odes in
Horace.” JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 131 (June 1, 1760). It stuck; in a letter to a 1775 Massachusetts friend Adams
quoted from Horace while serving in the Continental Congress. “Dulce, et decorum est pro Patria mori,”
typically translated as, It is sweet and glorious to die for one’s country.” Letter from John Adams to Josiah
Quincy, July 29, 1775, in JA Rev. Writings II, p. 16. In this letter to Josiah Quincy Jr.’s father, Adams
spoke of the loss of Quincy and Warren, “two characters as great, in proportion to their age, as any that I
have ever known in America. Our country mourns the loss of both…. They were both my intimate
friends…and the loss of them has wounded me too deeply to be easily healed.” Again, writing in Greek in
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his Diary, Adams reflected his early study of Pythagoras: “Let me practice the Rule of Pythagoras to the
effect that a man should not sleep without reviewing his daily tasks three times to appreciate what he has
omitted, what he has achieved, and what remains unfinished” – an anecdote that, years later, he
bemusedly commented was, “Wise but very difficult.” Id, P. 174 & n. 1 (Nov. 26, 1760). In 1777, in
correspondence with the ten-year-old John Quincy, Adams urged the boy to study war, “[a]s the War in
which your Country is engaged will probably hereafter attract your Attention.” Accordingly, Adams advised,
“There is no History, perhaps, better to this usefull Purpose than that of Thucidides, an Author, of whom I
hope you will make yourself perfect Master, in original Language, which is Greek, the most perfect of all
human Languages.” John Adams to John Quincy Adams, Aug. 11, 1777, in JA Rev. Writings II, p. 142.
One could document Adams’ classical knowledge ad nauseum. Note that the Adams Library also included
commentaries on the classics. For example, Adams “owned three books by the most popular French
Tacitist of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Amelot de La Houssaye (1631-1706),
among them an English translation of Amelot’s La Morale de Tacite. De La Flaterie (Paris, 1686), The
Modern Courtier, or, The Morals of Tacitus upon Flattery, Paraphas’d and illustrated with observations by
Amelot de la Houssaye (London, 1687).” Soll, “J.G.A. Pocock’s Atlantic Republicanism Thesis Revisited:
The Case of John Adams’ Tacitism,” Republic of Letters: A Journal for the Study of Knowledge, Politics,
and the Arts, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (Dec. 01, 2010), pp. 21- 37, 32, arcade.stanford.edu/rofl_issue/volume-2
issue-1.
History
Famous history books, particularly political history, are particularly plentiful in Adams’ collection, including
ancient, medieval and modern histories. While Adams’ writing is not quite as mightily chock-full of
references to historical events as was Sidney’s, such references abound, e.g., “There never was a
greater self deceiver than Oliver Cromwell.” – a perception with which Sidney would have heartily agreed.
John Adams to an Unknown Correspondent, Apr. 27, 1777, in JA Rev Writings II, p. 137. In one of his
more cynical moments, Adams reflected his knowledge of classical history: “Caesar, by destroying the
Roman Republic, made himself perpetual Dictator. Hutchinson by countenancing and supporting a
System of Corruption and all Tyranny, has made himself Governor [of Massachusetts] – and the mad
Idolatry of the People, always the surest Instruments of their own Servitude, laid prostrate at the Feet of
both.” Id, Vol. II, p. 35 (June 13, 1771). Other examples: Adams referred to Epaminondas in a letter to
Nathanael Greene. Epaminondas was a “Greek statesman and general…[who] led the Theban forces
that defeated a much larger Sparta army at Leuctra in 371 BCE; he was said to possess a pure and noble
character.” “Chronology,” JA Rev. Writings II, pp. 133 and 751.These references are not limited to
Adams’ Diary. In a letter to Henry Knox, for example, Adams observed, “The Policy of Rome, in carrying
their Arms to Carthage, while Hannibal was at the Gates of their Capital, was wise and justified by the
Event, and would deserve Imitation if We could march into the country of our Enemies. But possessed as
they are of the Dominion of the Sea, it is not easy for Us to reach them. Yet it is possible that a bold
attempt might succeed.” John Adams to Henry Knox, June 2, 1776, JA Rev. Writings II, p. 76.
According to Ryerson, Bolingbroke’s essays were “a logical starting point” for Adams, including
Bolingbroke’s advocacy of the study of history as the means to learn political philosophy by example.
Ryerson, John Adams’s Republic, pp. 32-33. Haraszti also emphasized Bolingbroke, devoting a chapter
to Adams’ saturation by Bolingbroke’s theories. At the same time, as Haraszti recognized, Adams
recorded in his Autobiography, in response to Edmund Burke’s query “who ever read him through?,” that
he had read Bolingbroke “through” by 1758 and several times subsequently. “But I confess, without much
good or harm. His ideas of the English constitution are correct, and his political writings are worth
something; but, in a great part of them, there is more of faction than of truth.” “Autobiography of John
Adams, JA D&A, Vol. 3: Diary 1782-1804, Autobiography Part One to October 1776, p. 264; Haraszti,
John Adams and the Prophets of Progress, p. 54, citing The Works of John Adams Vol. I, p. 41.
The Adams collection included histories of most (if not all) European states and cities, Grotius’ 1655
Historia Gotthorvm, Vandalorvm, & Langobardorvm, Renaissance histories such as Leonardo Bruni’s
Historiarum Florentinarum, Machiavelli’s Florentine histories (and other works), as well as Francesco
Guicciardini’s La historia d’Italia. Of course, there are many books on colonial America, such as
Massachusetts Bay Governor Thomas Pownall’s The administration of the colonies, as well as A
Memorial, Most Humbly Addressed to the Sovereigns of Europe, upon the Present State of Affairs,
Between the Old and New World, an abstruse text Adams took it upon himself to “translate,” i.e., abridge,
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in 1780, while he was a diplomat in Europe. See “To the President of Congress, No. 49,” Apr. 19, 1780,
PJA Vol. 9: March 1780-July 1780, pp. 164-96, 164. Adams also owned William Robert’s four volume
History of America in French, which he read in July 1779 while at sea en route to France. JA D&A, Vol. I,
p. 398 (July 16, 1779). Unsurprisingly, the history collection was particularly focused on Britain, with such
works as Sir George Bromely’s A collection of original royal letters, written by Charles the First and
Second, James the Second, &c., Gilbert Burnet’s History of his own time, James Tyrrell’s The general
history of England, both ecclesiastical and civil, William Camden’s The history or annals of England,
during the whole life and reign of Elizabeth late Queen thereof (and the same for James I), Dalrymple’s
Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland, Daniel Defoe’s The history of the union between England and
Scotland, Works by Sir William Temple, Edmund Ludlow’s Memoirs, Catharine Macaulay Graham’s The
history of England from the accession of James I. to the elevation of the House of Hanover, and David
Hume’s The history of England, from the invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688. French
history was also featured – to be expected given the length of time Adams spent as a diplomat in Paris.
Among other works the collection included Memoirs of Maximilian de Bethune, Duke of Sully, prime
minister to Henry the Great and Histoire des guerres civiles de France, sous les règnes de François II.,
Charles IX., Henry III. & Henry IV. There were also works on the reigns of Louis XIV and Louis XV. Then
there was a smattering of other histories, e.g., Pierre Francois Xavier de Charlevoix’s The history of
Paraguay, Alexander Gordon’s The lives of Pope Alexander VI. And his son Caesar Borgia, Histoire du
Prince d’Orange et de Nassau, etc. and John de Witt’s The true interest and political maxims of the
republic of Holland and West-Friesland, 1702.
Literature
Literature was less prevalent in the Adams library but it certainly was there. There were works by and
about Milton, Shakespeare, Edmund Spenser, Jonathan Swift, and Fontenelle. The collection also
included Samuel Johnson’s The lives of the most eminent English poets, enlightenment works by
Voltaire, Diderot, d’Alembert, Rousseau and others, plays by Molière, Montaigne’s Essais, books by
Montesquieu, Alexander Pope’s Works, and Oeuvres by Rabelais, Jean Racine and François Fénelon.
Adams also had a French edition of Cervantes’ Quixote. In his 20s Adams recorded that he “Read 100
Pages in [Montesquieu’s] the Spirit of Laws.” Id, Vol. I, p. 142 (June 27, 1760).
About three weeks later, he noted, “I began Popes Homer, last Saturday Night was a Week, and last
night, which was Monday night I finished it. Thus I found that in seven days I could have easily read the 6
Volumes.” Id, p. 152 (Aug. 19, 1760). Again, “I learn’d to write Letters of Pope and Swift &c. I should not
have wrote a Letter with so much Correctness as I can, if I had not read and imitated them.” Id, p. 84
(Apr. 8, 1759). After arriving in Paris in 1778 Adams reported, “Here I saw a little Book of Fenelons,
which I never saw before –.” Adams wrote to his wife from Paris in December 1778, “Have you ever read
J. J. Rousseau. If not, read him.”John to Abigail, Dec. 2, 1778, JA Rev. Writings II , p. 174.
In a September 5, 1783 letter to his friend Elbridge Gerry, then serving in Congress, Adams explained the
difficulty that he and his fellow ministers to France were having with Benjamin Franklin because of the
latter’s relationship with, and deference to the French Foreign Minister Comte Charles Gravier de
Vergennes. Adams’ relationship with Franklin both changed over time and was very complicated. In
setting forth his conviction that, “if you [Congress] chain Us together treat Us impartially. Support Us, or
call Us home,” Adams paraphrased a statement by Voltaire from Essai sur les moeurs, part of the Adams’
collection as he owned a thirty-seven volume set of Voltaire’s Oeuvres: “‘Rome, n’a pas accoutumé des
Rois a une telle Audace.’ Kings ought not to be indulged in Such Impertin-ance.” Adams then expanded
upon Voltaire’s point: “Republicks Should be jealous of the Influence of Kings, and cannot be too delicate
in the perfect freedom of their own Elections.” John Adams to Elbridge Gerry, Sept. 5, 1783, JA Rev.
Writings II, pp. 586-88.
Political philosophy/Governance/Political history
There was a miscellany of early modern philosophical works in the collection, including John Locke’s
Works, Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, Claude Adrien
Helvétius’ A treatise on man, his intellectual faculties and his education, Antoine Legrand on René
Descartes, works by Lipsius, and Hobbes’ Moral and political works. In fact in the letter to John Quincy
referred to previously, Adams recommended “the Works of Mr. Hobbes,” which contained “a great deal of
mischievous Philosophy,” but also included “a learned and exact Translation of Thucidides.” John to John
Quincy, Aug. 11, 1777, JA Rev. Writings II, , p. 143.In his thirties Adams jotted down the fact that a friend
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“brought with him, Utopia, or the happy Republic, a Philosophical Romance, by Sir Thos More, translated
by Bp. Burnet…. The Translation, I think, is better than mine, which is by another Hand.” Editors of
Adams’ Diary note that no copy of More’s Utopia has been found in Adams’ collection --- proof positive
that the library catalogue, as big as it is, is incomplete. JA D&A, Vol. II, p. 51 & n.2 (Nov. 10, 1771).
The subjects of government, politics and law overlap. In a 1775 letter, in a very Machiavelli-like comment
Adams stated, “Politicks are the Science of human Happiness and War the Art of Security it.” It is not
surprising that Adams consequently observed that, “I would fain therefore have both perfectly
understood.” Adams to William Tudor, Nov. 14, 1775, JA Rev. Writings II, pp. 32-33. Once again, we see
a particularly impressive collection of works on British government and politics, especially texts from the
politically intense seventeenth century. This included, notably, Algernon Sidney’s Discourses Concerning
Government. When he began reading Sidney we do not know; but at age thirty-four Adams noted in his
Diary on a Saturday night, “At my Office reading Sidney.” JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 347 (Dec. 23, 1769). We also
know that he returned to Sidney much later in life, and that he referenced him from time to time. The
Adams-Jefferson Letters, Adams to Jefferson, Sept. 18, 1823, p. 598. Adams referred to Sidney a
number of times in his correspondence and writing, including in a statement from Thought on
Government that ends with one of Adams’ most famous lines: “A man must be indifferent to the sneers of
modern Englishmen to mention in their company the names of Sidney, Harrington, Locke, Milton,
Nedham, Neville, Burnet, and Hoadley. No small fortitude is necessary to confess that one has read
them. The wretched condition of this country, however, for ten or fifteen years past, has frequently
reminded me of their principles and reasonings. They will convince any candid mind, that there is no
good government but what is Republican.” Adams, “III. Thoughts on Government,” April 1775, PJA Vol.
IV: Feb.-Aug.1775, p. 86-93, 87. Bailyn pointed out a series of string citations by Jonathan Mayhew
(once), Josiah Quincy Jr. (once) and John Adams (twice) in which Sidney is the first authority cited for
“the root principles of good government.” Other authorities referenced are Locke, Harrington, Milton,
Nedham, Neville, Burnet, Hoadley, Trenchard, Gordon, Plato. Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution, p. 45.
The Adams collection included A Complete collection of state-trials, and proceedings for high-treason and
other crimes and misdemeanours; from the reign of King Richard II. To the reign of King George II, 3rd
edition, which contains the transcript of Algernon Sidney’s trial for treason. Also included in his collection
of English political thought is George Savile, 1st Marquis of Halifax’s Miscellanies, James Harrington’s The
Oceana and other works. With an account of his life by John Toland, Edward Hyde, 1st Earl of
Clarendon’s The history of the rebellion and civil wars in England, begun in the year 1641…, Marchamont
Needham’s The excellencie of a free state, and Henry Neville’s Plato redivivus: or, a dialogue concerning
government. More contemporaneous from Adams’ point of view is Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingboke’s
A collection of political tracts (from which he quoted in a letter to a friend), Trenchard and Gordon’s Cato’s
Letters, Viscount Robert Molesworth’s An account of Denmark, as it was in the year 1662 and James
Burgh’s three-volume Political disquisitions: or, an enquiry into public errors, defects, and abuses. Adams
quoted from Henry St. John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke’s Reflections on Exile: “Why should I grieve, -when grieving I must bear./ And take with guilt, -- what guiltless I might share?” John Adams to Josiah
Quincy, July 29, 1775, in JA Rev. Writings II, p. 16. There are biographical works, such as the six-volume
Biographia Britannica: or, the lives of the most eminent persons who have flourished in Great Britain and
Ireland. On the American front, Adams of course had Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, as well as
George Chalmers’ Political annals of the present United Colonies, from their settlement to the peace of
1763, works by Richard Champion on the political and commercial relationship between Great Britain and
America, William Cobbett’s History of the American Jacobins, commonly denominated Democrats, 1746,
and a host of detailed records from the Continental Congress. There were other important political and
governmental works in the Adams Library: Jean Bodin’s The six bookes of a commonweale, Samuel
Pufendorf’s Of the law of nature and nations, Cardinal Richelieu’s Testament politique, Henri, 1er Duc de
Rohan’s Divers politique discourses…made at several times upon several…occasions…. Now render’d
into English. and many other words, a text entitled, Sketches of the natural, civil, and political state of
Swisser-land, Giovanni Botero’s Della ragione di stato, libri dieci, Federico Bonaventura’s Della ragion di
stato et della prvdenza politica libri qvatro, and works by the economist François Quesnay.
Diplomacy
Diplomacy – both in term of the exercise of it in history and the art itself – may not have been a subject of
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his collection until Adams was appointed as a commissioner to France (along with Benjamin Franklin and
Arthur Lee, and replacing the controversial Silas Deane) in late 1777, but it clearly became a
preoccupation reflected in his library. Among the diplomatic studies Adams collected were Memoires de
Jean Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Torcy, D. Chauvet’s The conduct of the government of France towards
the republic of Geneva, works by Condillac on French political and diplomatic matters, Jean de Witt’s
Lettres et négociations, and Jean d’Avaux’s Négociations de Monsieur le Cote d’Avaux en Holland, depuis
1679, jusqu’en 1688. On Adams’ books on diplomacy, see particularly Adams’s Autobiography, in JA
D&A, Vol. IV, p. 146 n.9. Adams explained this focus. “I had long since determined to look at France, with
a steady Eye and obtain as much Information as I could of her Manners, Institutions and History: but there
was another branch of Enquiry in which all America at this time was compleatly uninformed, I mean the
Negotiations and Dispatches of Ambassadors. The Powers of Europe in general have kept the Letters
and Memorials of their Ambassadors locked up in the Cabinetts of their Courts: very few of them have ever
been collected and published. The Policy of France has been different. There are extant more
Publications of their negotiations, than of all the rest of Europe.” Adams went on to describe the variety of
books on diplomacy that he had therefore purchased, as well as those he had already read in America,
such as Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattell and others. Interestingly, Adams’ focused in his Diary on one of these
texts, Pierre Jeannin’s four-volume Les négociations de M. le Présient Jeannin, part of the family library at
the Adams National Historic Site in Quincy (formerly Braintree), not in the Adams collection. In a July
1779 Diary entry Adams commented that he was reading Jeannin’s book, and noted that Jeannin was
Henry IV’s ambassador to The Hague at the beginning of the seventeenth century, “and is reputed one of
the ablest and faithfullest Ambassadors that France ever had.” Adams was “pleased with this Work, as
well because of the Similitude between the Circumstances of the united Provinces at this Time and those
of the united States at present, as on account of the Wisdom, the Prudence, and Discretion and Integrity of
the Minister.” Id, Vol. II, p. 398 (July 16, 1779).Last but not least, the diplomatic collection included treaty
compendiums and copies of treaties of all sorts, such as a 1772 work entitled, A Collection of all the
treaties of peace, alliance, and commerce between Great-Britain and other powers, from the Revolution in
1688, to the present time.
Law
This takes us to the law books. One finds a university-level law library at Adams’ fingertips. The library
included works on constitutional and other legal matters by or about the major English jurists Sir Edward
Coke, including his Institutes, Sir John Fortescue, Sir Matthew Hale, John Selden’s Opera omnia, and Sir
William Blackstone’s Commentaries in several editions, as well as case compilations of various kinds
including Roger Acherley’s 1727 The Britannic constitution: or, the fundamental form of government in
Britain. “If, for Coke, Littleton’s Tenures is ‘the ornament of the common law, and the most perfect and
absolute work that ever was written in any human science,’ Fortescue’s De Laudibus Legum Angliae
(written during 1468-1471) he finds to be of such ‘weight and worthiness’ that it should be ‘written in
letters of gold.’” Sandoz, “Editor’s Introduction,” The Roots of Liberty, p. 7. Adams’ frequently noted his
victories and defeats in wrestling with these works, e.g., “I have been interrupted from Reading this
Institute ever since Feby. Amidst the Dissipations of Business, Pleasure, Conversation, Intrigue, Party &c.
what mortal can give Attention to an old latin Institute of the Cannon Law?” Id, p. 218 (June 20, 1761).
Analyzing the question of the role of Massachusetts’ assembly during the crises following the Boston Tea
Party, Adams observed, “The House of Representatives are the Tryers of the Facts and their Vote
Impeaching is equivalent to a Bill of Indictment, and their Vote demanding Judgment is equivalent to a
Verdict of a Jury, according to Selden.” Id, p. 89 (March 2, 1774). There was Van Muyden’s translation of
Justinian’s Code, a subject of Adams’ early legal studies before he owned the books himself and an
essential part of the self-study substitute for attendance at law school, of which there were none in
America at this juncture, e.g., “Translated 2 Leaves more of Justinian,” and “Justinians Institutes I have
read, thro, in Latin with Vinnis’s perpetual Notes, Van Muydens tractatio Instittutionum Justiniani, I read
thro, and translated, mostly into English, from the same language. Id, Vol. I, pp. 46, 174 (Oct. 6, 1758
and Nov. 26, 1760). The collection included a twenty-three volume set of Charles Viner’s A general
abridgement of law and equity alphabetically digested under proper titles, 1741-51, as well as a fivevolume treatise by Matthew Bacon entitled, A new abridgement of the law. By a gentleman of the Middle
Temple. There were treatises on the English and continental European legal systems, Great Britain’s
statutes including of course Magna Carta, and various debates of the Houses of Parliament and the Privy
Council. There were books on church law, e.g., Richard Burn’s Ecclesiastical law and John Cowell’s
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Institutiones juris Anglicani, 1676. Also in the collection were Sir Thomas de Littleton’s fifteenth-century
Tenures in English, often characterized as the first text on English property law.
Admiralty law was well represented, not at all surprising considering the salience of matters on the high
seas in a port like Boston and New England generally, and the consequent importance of admiralty law
for the members of the Massachusetts Bay bar. Adams’ legal papers display his practice of admiralty law
and involvement in the most sensational admiralty cases that were tried in the Bay in the 1760s and ’70s.
The “Instruction to Braintree’s Representative Concerning the Stamp Act,” written by Adams in 1765,
enounced: “But the most grievous Innovation of all, is the alarming Extension of the Power of Courts of
Admiralty.” “Instructions to Braintree’s Representative concerning the Stamp Act,” in John Adams
Revolutionary Writings 1755-1775 (“JA Rev. Writings I”), p. 126. Adams’ admiralty collection included
John Godollphin’s A view of the admiral jurisdiction, Samuel Venner’s The British merchants assistant: or
a complete view of the British customs…together with an abstract of all the laws, now in force, relating to
the customs, 1766, and Richard Zouche’s The jurisdiction of the admiralty of England asserted, 1686.
Books on the nitty-gritty of the practice of law were also a part of the Adams Library, e.g., Henry
Swinburne’s A treatise of testaments and last wills, books of common pleas – the forms used to instigate
legal proceedings under the archaic rules of English common law, and treatises on English evidentiary law
(again, before he owned the text Adams noted in his Diary, “Read Gilbert.” Years later Adams recounted,
“At Boston – bought Gilberts Law of Evidence.”) There also were compilations of English case law from the
variety of English courts (Kings-Bench, Common-Bench, Court of Exchequer, etc.), including Granville
Sharpe’s An account of the constitutional English polity of congregational courts, and William Style’s
Practical Register … Consisting of rules, orders, … concerning the practice of the common law in the
courts at Westminster. Particularly the Kings Bench. On the Gilbert quotes, see JA D&A, Vol. I, pp. 48, 317
(Oct. 13, 1758, July 29, 1766). Jackson made the interesting suggestion that the customary way that law
books were printed, with wide margins for both printed marginalia indicating precedents and applicable
statutes, and leaving space for a lawyer to add his own marginalia, “reinforced” Adams’ inclination to write
in his books. H. J. Jackson, “John Adams’s Marginalia, Then and Now,” The Libraries, Leadership, &
Legacy of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, pp. 59-79, 68.
On the theoretical side there were books on the history of law and on jurisprudence, including Cesare
Beccaria’s On Crime and Punishment in Italian and English (the latter a gift from Adams to his son
Thomas in 1800), John Reeves’ History of the English law, from the time of the Saxons, to the end of the
reign of Philip and Mary, Daines Barrington’s Observations upon the statutes, chiefly the more ancient,
from Magna Charta to the twenty-first of James the First, Sir Geoffrey Gilbert’s An historical review of the
Court of Exchequer, and of the King’s revenues, there answered and The history and practice of the High
Court of Chancery, as well as Henry Home, Lord Kames’ Historical law-tracts. Just to provide one
example of Adams’ use of these materials, in the second installment published in 1765 in the Boston
Gazette of A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law, Adams noted, “Lord Kaim’s, a Scottish writer
of great reputation, whose authority in this case ought to have the more weight as his countrymen have
not the most worthy ideas of liberty,” recognized that the feudal law did not allow for sound government.
“Kaim’s says, “‘A constitution so contradictory to all the principles which govern mankind, can never be
brought about, one should imagine, but by foreign conquest or native usurpations.” John Adams, “A
Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law No. II,” Boston Gazette, August 19, 1765, in JA Rev.
Writings I, pp. 120-21.
Adams’ library also contained celebrated jurisprudential treatises, including Grotius’ The rights of war and
peace, in three books…, Johan Gottlieb Heineccius’s A methodological system of universal law: or, the
laws of nature and nations, Jean Domat’s Les loix civiles dan leur ordre naturel; le droit public, et Legum
delectus, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui’s Principles of natural law, Frederik Willem von Pestel’s Fundamental
juris-prudentiae naturalis, and Jean Pierre Brissot de Warville’s Théorie des loix criminelles. In his
Autobiography Adams referred to his reliance on some of these texts in connection with his purchase of
books and continuing self-education in 1778 after he arrived in France, e.g., Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattell
“&c.” Autobiography, JA D&A, Vol. IV, p. 146 (July 8, 1778). Of course there were collections from a
panoply of Massachusetts Bay courts, commissions, and legislative bodies, as well as legal texts about
other colonies, e.g., The laws of the Province of Pennsylvania.
Reference books
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One cannot close an effort to fill out the large shadow projected by the bare form of a massive library
such as the Adams collection without mentioning the fact that the Adams Library included a host of
dictionaries – e.g., geographic, trade and commerce, chemical, historic, diplomatic, legal, Latin, Greek,
French, Dutch, Spanish, Italian, Dutch-French, German-Latin, etc., etc. -- as well as thesauruses,
almanacs and grammar books to facilitate both reading the books in the collection. We know that Adams
and his family also used some of these reference books to study foreign languages, e.g., en route to
France in 1779 Adams bought a two-volume Spanish dictionary when the ship became too leaky and the
Adams disembarked in Spain. “Chronology,” in John Adams Revolutionary Writings 1775-1783, p. 711.
Beth Prindle contends that Adams amassed “a sizeable number of works by authors with whom he
passionately disagreed. In part, this appears to be an extension of his former occupation as lawyer;
Adams adopted a ‘Know thine enemy’ approach to his studies.” Prindle flags, particularly, “works by
eighteenth-century Enlightenment Europe idealists.” I agree and disagree. Knowing one’s opposition
(not necessary an enemy) is fundamental to the practice of law; after all, how else can one win a case?
But the breadth of books in the Adams library belie the notion that Adams limited his collection in any way
to authors with whom he disagreed. At the same time, he would not have excluded such books; indeed,
as Prindle suggests, Adams’ instincts would have gone the other way. Beth Prindle, Thought, Care, and
Money: John Adams Assembles His Library,” The Libraries, Leadership, & Legacy of John Adams and
Thomas Jefferson, pp. 3-19, Robert C. Baron and Conrad Edick Wright, eds. Golden, CO: Fulcrum
Publishing and the Massachusetts Historical Society. 2010. pp. 3- 19, 13.
*******
For Adams, the self-conscious determination to develop himself both personally and professionally was
affirmed time after time over many years in virtually everything he wrote, from his Diary and
Autobiography to his correspondence, and in his essays, books, articles and legal documents. Once
again we can view Adams through a Ciceronian prism, for many centuries before the Renaissance
humanists it was Cicero who maintained that to be “cultivated and fit for an active role in public life”
required “the sort of learning that would produce a vir virtutis, a complete man.” James Gordley, The
Jurists: A Critical History (Oxford University Press, 2013), relying upon Quentin Skinner, “The
Renaissance,” The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 88, 110-11.
At the ripe old age of twenty-four, Adams echoed this value in a letter to his young friend Jonathan
Sewell. “Tis impossible to judge with much Praecision of the true Motives and Qualities of human Actions
or the Propriety of Rules contrived to govern them, without considering with like Attention, all the
Passions, Appettites, Affecions in Nature from which they flow. An intimate Knowledge therefore of the
intellectual and moral World is the sole foundation on which a stable structure of Knowledge can be
erected.” JA D&A, Vol. I, pp. 123-24 (extract of a letter to Jonathan Sewall, Oct. 1759). Adams and
Sewell became lawyers together, as Adams noted in his January 1, 1819 Preface to a new edition of
Novanglus and Massachusettensis; or Political Essays, Published in the Years 1774 and 1775, On the
Principal Points of Controversy, Between Great Britain and Her Colonies. The Former by John Adams,
Late President of the United States; the Latter by Jonathan Sewall, Then King’s Attorney General of the
Province of Massachusetts Bay (Boston: Hews & Goss, 1819), FAU/Weiner Collection, pp. iii-vii. Sewall
“spent his evenings” during 1757 and 1758 with Adams in James Putnam’s office, “a gentleman of great
acuteness of mind, and very extensive and successful in practise, and an able lawyer; in whose family I
boarded and under whose auspices I studied law.” Sewall and Adams then “lived together, frequently
slept in the same chamber, and not seldom, in the same bed.” In was in this very formative context that,
“Here commenced, between Mr. Sewall and me, a personal friendship, which continued, with none but
political interruptions, till his death.” Adams described Sewall as “then a patriot; his sentiments were
purely American.” Adams and Sewell both “constantly applied for advice in any difficulty” to James Otis,
“who took a kind notice of us both.” While Adams turned left when Sewall turned right, the latter moving
to England in 1775, in 1819 Adams described Sewall as a lifelong friend who “always lamented the
conduct of Great Britain towards America.” Adams then reviewed the knowledge that one should have,
emphasizing law: British laws, Saxon, Danish, Norman as well as Greek and Roman History on which
British law is based, and civil, feudal and cannon law. There also was the necessity for eloquence, which
led Adams to emphasize poets, orators of ancient and modern times, principles of grammar and rhetoric,
and classical authors. In fact, Adams’ description here was incomplete; for we know that Adams routinely
relied upon history and politics, for example, as a foundation for his arguments.
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In sum, purchasing books and building a library were much more than a hobby for Adams. The pursuit of
a superlative library bespeaks the development of Adams’ character, skill and knowledge as an attorney
and as a political thinker, moralist, diplomat, and committed public servant. From the beginning Adams
preached to himself about apposite role of knowledge, which in combination with virtue and experience
inured to the benefit of the practice of law: “Consider what figure is fittest for you to make. Consider what
Profession you have chosen? The Law. What Rule and Method must I observe to make a figure to be
useful, and respectable in that Station. Ask this Question upon every Occasion, of what Use to the
Lawyer? of what use at the Bar – [to have?] perfection of Knowledge in Theory or Expertness in Practice,
or Eloquence at Bar? Let my Views concenter, and terminate in one focus, in one Point, a great, useful,
virtuous Lawyer.” JA D&A, Vol. I, p. 106 (Summer 1759). After Adams’ sixteen-year legal career (1758 to
1774) evolved into a political (1774-1778) one, and then a diplomatic role (1778 to 1788), American
political events consumed his time (1788 to 1801). As time wore on Adams wrote more about visiting
libraries – the libraries of the universities that became Yale, Columbia, and Princeton – than of using
them.
Adams kept this commitment to study; indeed, he surpassed it. Although it cannot be precisely defined
and no doubt varied, we can safely conclude that the time Adams was able to devote to life-long selfstudy was enormous by today’s standards. After Adams’ sixteen-year legal career (1758 to 1774) evolved
into a diplomatic one (1774 to 1788), and then American political events consumed his time (1788 to
1801), Adams wrote more about visiting libraries – the libraries of the universities that became Yale,
Columbia, and Princeton – than of using them. While it is most conspicuous in Volume I of his
Diary,1755-1770, or for that matter in The Earliest Diary of John Adams, there are references to books
and to Adams’ commitment to self-study throughout his accounts of his life. As Adams commented in
May 1773 at age 38, “But I was not sent into this World to spend my days in Sports, Diversions and
Pleasures. I was born for Business; for both Activity and Study. I have little Appetite, or Relish for any
Think else.” Adams’ visited libraries at the future Yale, Columbia, and Princeton. In connection with legal
work in the Court of Admiralty, for instance, Adams comments about research he was doing on the nature
of appeals during the civil law, and his “look into” Calvin’s Lexicon Title Appellatio and Provocatio, Ayliff,
and Domat. Not all his reading was on the law. Apparently Adams also routinely read sermons, especially
on the sabbath: “This last [Dr. Clark’s sermons] I took for my Sabbath Day Book, and read the Sermon on
the Fundamentals of Christianity…. Read also another Sermon on the Reward of Justice….” JA D&A, Vol.
II, p. 82 (May 24, 1773); id, p. 56 (Feb. 10, 1772); id, p. 30 (June 9, 1771).
As the quotations that follow reflect, Adam also often read history and philosophy. At times his studies
were diverted by necessity, e.g., he undertook learning French thoroughly and properly in 1778 when he
became one of the American diplomats in Paris. The breadth of subject matter and the extent of his
reading reflects Adams’ polymathy although unquestionably, the professional emphasis is consistently on
legal scholarship and its impact on his work and experience. For example, within a small subportion of
Adams’ Diary covering the rather busy year of 1779, the following references were made in the context of
Adams’ expense account showing multiple purchases from Paris booksellers (most specifics of which are
not provided): Adams referred to Almanach royal, année M. DCC. LXXVIII, anonymously published
Considérations sur le gouvernement ancient et present de la France, 1765, by René Louis, Marquis
d’Argenson, a Courier de l’Europe subscription, and Abbey d’Olivets’ French translation of Demosthenes’
Phillippics). He “assisted [his] Son,” John Quincy Adams, “in translating Cicero’s first Phillippick against
Cataline.” Id, pp. 344, 362. He talked about “reading Don Quixot,” Id, p. 375.Adams indicated he was
reading “Litterature, and Eloquence ancient and modern, Demosthenes, Cicero, the Poets, Historians,
Philosophers. The English, Bacon, Newton &c. Milton &c,” as well as “Bolinbroke …the greatest Orator
that England ever produced.” Id, p. 386. He recorded that, “Since I have been in this Ship I have read
Robertsons History of America in 4 Volumes, in French, and four Volumes of the Observateur Anglois.”
Id, p. 398. He commented on how Franklin was “another Voltaire and Hume.” Adams explained that,
“Finding that I must reside some Weeks in Spain, either waiting for a Frigate or travelling through the
Kingdom, I determined to acquire the Language, to which Purpose, I went to a Bookseller and purchased
Sobrino’s Dictionary in three Volumes in Quarto, and the Grammatica Castellana, which is an excellent
Spanish Grammar, in their own Tongue, and also a Latin grammar in Spanish.” Id. p. 407. There is also
Adams’ recurring fascination with science, e.g., the frequent discussion among Adams, Franklin and
Jefferson of “aerostatic experiments,” with Adams’ interest reflected in his colored drawing, “Bon Voyage,”
of the “Nouveau Globe Aérostatique inventée par M[essieu]rs. Charles et Robert; enlevé devant la
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Famille Royale le lundi Ier. Décembre 1783, à I. heure 40. Minutes.”
n. 109: In 1759 Adams wrote, “You may get more by studying Town meeting, and Training Days, than
you can by reading Justinian and all his voluminous and heavy Commentators.” He reminded himself,
“Mix with the Croud in a Tavern, in the Meeting House or the Training Field, and grow popular by your
agreeable assistance in the Tittle tattle of the Hour, never think of the deep hidden Principles of natural,
civil, or common Law, for thoughts like these will give you a gloomy Countenance and a stiff Behaviour.”
Id, p. 96 (Spring, 1759). This same awareness of his surroundings, and the value of gaining insight from
the wisdom of everyday people, reappears years later in Adams’ Diary. In France in 1779 Adams
observed, “In Travelling the best Way is to dine and sup at the Taverns, with the Company, avec les
autres as they express it. You meet here, a vast Variety of Company, which is decent, and after a few
Coups du Vin, their tongues run very fast and you learn more of the Language the Manners, the
Customs, Laws, Politicks, Arts, &c. in this Way, perhaps than in any other. You should preserve your
Dignity, talk little, listen much, not be very familiar with any in particular, for there are Sharpers, Gamblers,
Quack Doctors, Strolling Comediens, in short People of all Characters, assembled at these Dinners and
Suppers, and without Caution, you may be taken into Parties of Pleasure and Diversion that will cost you
very dear.” JA D&A, Vol. II, p. 361 (Apr. 22, 1779). He gained an appreciation for the difficulties of
everyday people. “I find that as much knowledge in my Profession is to be acquired by Conversing with
common People about the Division of Estates, Proceedings of Judge of Probate, Cases that they have
heard as Jurors, Witnesses, Parties, as is to be acquired by Books.” In an 1807 letter to Benjamin Rush,
Adams recalled how, more than thirty years earlier, in 1773, when he was “on a journey to some of our
circuit courts in Massachusetts,” he stopped at a tavern and listened to an exchange among five men –
“substantial yeomen of the neighborhood” – engaged in a “lively conversation about politics.” John
Adams to Benjamin Rush, May 21, 1807, in The Spur of Fame, p. 95.
n. 116: As Reverend Jonathan Mayhew stated, “Tyranny brings ignorance and brutality along with it. It
degrades men from their just rank, into the class of brutes. It damps their spirits. It suppresses arts. It
extinguishes every spark of noble ardor and generosity in the breasts of those who are enslaved by it. It
makes naturally-strong and great minds, feeble and little; and triumphs over the ruins of virtue and
humanity.” In Mayhew’s view, this was “true of tyranny in every shape. There can be nothing great and
good, where its influence reaches. For which reason it becomes every friend to truth and human kind;
every lover of God and the christian religion, to bear a part in opposing this hateful monster.” A
DISCOURSE CONCERNING Unlimited Submission AND Non-Resistance TO THE HIGHER POWERS:
With some REFLECTIONS on the RESISTANCE made to King CHARLES I. AND ON THE Anniversary
of his Death: In which the MYSTERIOUS Doctrine of that Prince's Saintship and Martyrdom is
UNRIDDLED: The Substance of which was delivered in a SERMON preached in the West MeetingHouse in Boston the LORD'S DAY after the 30th of January 1749/50. Published at the Request of the
Hearers. By JONATHAN MAYHEW, A. M. Pastor of the West Church in Boston,
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N05197.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext (2-21-19).
n. 123: The Seven Years War took place from 1755 to 1764 on both the European and American
continent. In America a contingent of British militia led by George Washington ambushed a small
Canadian French force in the Ohio River valley in 1754, a precursor event of this War, which left Britain
with £130 million in debt, nearly doubling the nation’s debt as of 1754. In addition, British Prime Minister
George Grenville, who had previously served as chancellor of the Exchequer, well knew that the cost of
maintaining government officials and troops in the American colonies had escalated fivefold between
1748 and 1763, from seventy to three-hundred-and-fifty thousand pounds. Standiford, Desperate Sons,
p. 7. For an interesting presentation of the motivation for and impact of the Stamp Act, see id, pp. 1-107.
(ch.1-12). On George Washington’s escapade in the Ohio River valley, see, e.g., “Wilderness Mission,”
chapter 3 of Ron Chernow, Washington: A Life (New York: The Penguin Press, 2010), pp. 29-38.
n. 127: Following the lead of the Virginia House of Burgesses (and the legendary erudition of Patrick
Henry), representative assemblies in Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, South
Carolina and Massachusetts Bay sent letters or resolutions of protest to King George III in opposition to
the Stamp Act. Among other provisions, the Virginia Resolves unequivocally stated that Virginia’s
legislature had “the only and exclusive Right and Power to lay Taxes and Impositions upon the
inhabitants of this Colony,” and that vesting such power in anyone else “has a manifest Tendency to
destroy British as well as AMERICAN FREEDOM.” One complete published text of the Resolution of
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Virginia’s House of Burgesses is in Morgan and Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis, pp. 99-100. This edition
of the Resolution was published in the Maryland Gazette. The number of resolutions passed by the
House of Burgesses is not the same (five) as the number of resolutions published in various colonial
newspapers (five to seven). See Morgan and Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis, Ch. Seven, “Resolution,”
pp. 92-121. In Massachusetts Bay and elsewhere popular resistance to use of the loathsome stamps
included the hanging in effigy of men who had signed up to be stamp distributors as well as other acts of
coercion designed to at least forestall if not prevent the implementation of the new law.
n. 133: The Sons of Liberty“ were not the most prominent citizens of Boston, nor were they the men who
did most of the talking against the Stamp Act. In general they were artisans and shopkeepers, and they
shunned publicity.” This was also a tough group that had no compunction about roughing up their
neighbors for the cause. It was in these circumstances, for example, that an effigy of Andrew Oliver, the
Secretary of Massachusetts Bay who had just become Boston’s newly appointed stamp master, was
hung from the big elm on Boston Common that later was dubbed the “liberty tree.” The homes of both
Thomas Hutchinson, then Lieutenant Governor, and Oliver, Hutchinson’s brother-in-law (the nepotism of
which did not escape Adams’ angry pen), were severely damaged. As much as he abhorred the Stamp
Act Adams was not happy; he deplored the “blind, undistinguishing Rage of the Rabble,” the instrument of
“irreparable Injustice”– a theme that reverberates in his writings. JA D&A, Vol. I, pp. 259-61; Ryerson,
John Adams’s Republic, p. 49. Neither Samuel Adams nor Otis were members of the Loyal Nine; but they
were two of the men who “did most of the talking” in local politics and, in all likelihood, much of the
significant organizing. Morgan and Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis, pp. 127-28; see also Standiford,
Desperate Sons, Ch. (6), “Unleashed,” pp. 44-55, and 116. Scholars have suggested but cannot prove
that leaders of the Assembly, viz., Otis, Samuel Adams and others, were involved in the “treasonable
activities which the Loyal Nine envisaged,” but were extremely careful about displaying their association
to the public. John Adams was much further removed from The Loyal Nine and the Sons of Liberty than
Samuel and Otis were. John’s January 15, 1766 reflections demonstrate this fact: “Spent the Evening
with the Sons of Liberty, at their own Apartment in Hanover Square, near the Tree of Liberty. It is a
Compting Room in Chase & Speakmans Distillery. A very small Room it is.” A variety of craftsmen and
workers were there, and he “was very civilly and respectfully treated, by all Present.” It is clear from this
Diary entry that John was a fish out of water – unfamiliar with the group and not quite expecting the
politesse that he experienced. He also was not familiar with how the organization, made up largely of
working class folk, functioned; indeed, his comments suggest that he was expecting something more
scandalous than he experienced: “We had Punch, Wine, Pipes and Tobacco, Bisquit and Cheese -- &c. I
heard nothing but such Conversation as passes at all Clubbs among Gentlemen about the Times. No
Plotts, no Machinations. They Chose a Committee to make Preparations for grand Rejoicings upon the
Arrival of the News of a Repeal of the Stamp Act, and I heard afterwards they are to have such
Illuminations, Bonfires, Piramids, Obelisks, such grand Exhibitions, and such Fireworks, as were never
before seen in America. – I wish they mayn’t be disappointed.”
We also have a record of John Adams attending one major function held by the Sons of Liberty over three
years later, in 1769. Adams’ Aug. 14, 1769 Diary entry amusingly described that Sons of Liberty event.
‘Dined with 350 Sons of Liberty at Robinsons, the Sign of Liberty Tree in Dorchester. We had two Tables
laid in the open Field by the Barn, with between 300 and 400 Plates, and an Arning of Sail Cloth
overhead, and should have spent a most agreable Day had not the Rain made some Abatement in our
Pleasures. Mr. Dickinson the Farmers Brother, and Mr. Reed the Secretary of New Jersey were there,
both cool, reserved and guarded all day.” Reflecting on the day’s events, Adams commented, “This is
cultivating the Sensations of Freedom. There was a large Collection of good Company. Otis and Adams
are politick, in promoting these Festivals, for they tinge the Minds of the People, they impregnate them
with the sentiments of Liberty. They render the People fond of their Leaders in the Cause, and averse
and bitter against all opposers.” Showing his starch shirt, Adams remarked, too, “ To the Honour of the
Sons, I did not see one Person intoxicated, or near it. Between 4 and 5 O clock, the Carriages were all
got ready and the Company rode off in Process, Mr. Hancock first in his Charriot.” JA D&A, Vol. I, pp.
294, 341 (Jan. 15, 1766 and Aug. 14, 1769). Other comments in his Diary on the world in which Adams
found himself link the public and the private man, and well evince the mood of the times. Still, Adams
remained the intellectual self-critic. “How great is my Loss, in neglecting to keep a regular Journal,
through the last Spring, Summer, and Fall.” Adams had a compelling reason. “The Year 1765 has been
the most remarkable Year of my Life. That enormous Engine, fabricated by the british Parliament, for
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battering down all the Rights and Liberties of America, I mean the Stamp Act, has raised and spread, thro
the whole Continent, a Spirit that will be recorded to our Honour, with all future Generations. In every
Colony, from Georgia to New Hampshire inclusively, the Stamp Distributors and Inspectors have been
compelled by the unconquerable Rage of the People, to renounce their office”. Adams recognized the
politicization of the citizens of Massachusetts Bay. “The People, even to the lowest Ranks, have become
more attentive to their Liberties, ore inquisitive about them, and more determined to defend them, than
they were ever before known or had occasion to be. Innumerable have been the Monuments of Wit,
Humour, Sense, Learning, Spirit, Patriotism, and Heroism, erected in the several Colonies and Provinces,
in the Course of this Year. Our Presses have groaned, our Pulpits have thundred, our Legislatures have
resolved, our Towns have voted, The Crown Officers have every where trembled, and all their little Tools
and Creatures, been afraid to Speak and ashamed to be seen.” Id, p. 263 (Dec. 18, 1769). One example
of what Adams reported about the American consensus on the unacceptability of the Stamp Act is the
fact that In New York, “nearly one-third of the city’s population turned out to escort the convoy of stamps
to their own hall,” thereby “yielding up” the stamps that would be held but not utilized, which “also
suggests that there was great accord across all social lines.” Another example is that twelve colonies’
stamp collectors had resigned their post by mid-November. Standiford, Desperate Sons, pp. 82, 84.
n. 141: Gridley, Otis and Adams met with the Governor and Council. As to that Council, it, too, was
subject to a tug of war between the interests of the Crown and the divergent interests of the colonists. As
Governor Bernard explained in 1769, “In the Province of Massachuset’s Bay … the appointment of the
Council is left to the people, to be made by annual election; and yet the Royal Governor, in all Acts of
prerogative, is subject to the controul of the Democratical Council. This solecism in policy has been as
hurtful in practice as it is absurd in theory, and it is the true cause of the extreme imbecility of the power of
the crown in this government, at times when the exertion of it is most wanted.” Bernard’s conclusion: “I
would give it as my Opinion that if He [the king] cannot secure to himself the Appointment of the Council,
it is not worth while to keep that of the Governor. For it would be better that Mass Bay should be a
complete Republic like Connecticut than to remain with so few Ingredients of royalty in it as shall be
insufficient to maintain the real royal Character.”
n. 155: On the eve of the advent of the American Revolution, thirty-eight-year-old Adams was at the
beginning of his professional prime and the Massachusetts Bay citizenry was well aware of his legal
talent. Adams was smart, learned, percipient and indefatigable; he worked exceptionally hard; he fought
for his clients; and he could and did express his ideas effectively and forcefully, both orally and in writing.
The “common law analysis process … can be an intellectual marathon: grinding analytical persistence is
often rewarded with victory.” Trachtman, The Tools of Argument, p. 116. Adams had become a truly
formidable adversary – a force to be reckoned with. He also was a man who was well-aware of the
powerful impact of the unfolding events in New England. In a March 4, 1773 Diary entry he commented,
“It is thus that little Incidents produce great Events. I have never known a Period, in which the Seeds of
great Events have been so plentifully sown as this Winter…. The Court of Inquisition at Rhode Island, the
Judges Salaries, the Massachusetts Bay Town Meetings, General Brattles Folly, all conspired in a
remarkable, a wonderfull Manner.” JA D&A, Vol. II (March 4, 1773), p. 78. The Court of Inquisition at
Rhode Island, dubbed as such by Samuel Adams in an article published initially in the Dec. 26, 1772
Providence Gazette under his known pen name, Americanus, concerned the convening of a special
commission charged by the King to find, indict and send to England for trial (and execution) those
involved in the burning of the Gaspée, a British schooner assigned the task of catching merchant ships
smuggling goods to avoid British taxes. Samuel’s article began, “To be, or not to be, that's the question;
whether our unalienable rights and privileges are any longer worth contending for, is now to be
determined. Permit me, my countrymen, to beseech you to attend to your alarming situation.” It was in
the context of this confrontation that Samuel Adams proposed an inter-colonial system of Committees of
Correspondence. The suggestion was actually written by Samuel Adams in an April 10, 1773 letter to
Richard Henry Lee of Virginia in which Samuel discussed the fracas over the Gaspée:
The Friends of Liberty in this Town have lately made a successful Attempt to obtain the explicit
political Sentiments of a great Number of the Towns in this Province; and the Number is daily
increasing. The very Attempt was alarming to the Adversaries; and the happy Effects of it are
mortifying to them. I would propose it for your Consideration, Whether the Establishment of
Committees of Correspondence among the several Towns in every Colony, would not tend to
promote that General Union, upon which the Security of the whole depends….
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The most enormous Stride in erecting what may properly be called a Court of Inquisition in
America, is sufficient to excite Indignation even in the Breast the least capable of feeling. I am
expecting an authentick Copy of that Commission, which I shall send to you by the first
opportunity after I shall have receivd it. The Letter from the new Secretary of State to the
Governor of Rhode Island, which
possibly you may have seen in the News papers, may be depended upon as genuine. I receivd
it from a Gentleman of the Council in that Colony, who took it from the Original. I wish the
Assembly of that little Colony had acted with more firmness than they have done; but as the
Court of Enquiry is adjournd, they may possibly have another Tryal.
The Samuel Adams letter is available online in the Gaspee Virtual Archives under the heading,
“Correspondence to and from Sam Adams on the Gaspee Incident,”
http://gaspee.org/SamAdams.html#Adams_to_Sessions2Jan1773 (1-10-17).
Returning to 1773, Hutchinson knew that the provision in the Massachusetts Bay charter that authorized
the province to make “such Laws as are not repugnant to the Laws of England,” was a standard phrase
that appeared in parallel founding documents of other colonies. It was on this legal language that
Hutchinson and others relied for the principle that Parliament had an unlimited power to pass laws
governing Britain’s American colonies. This principle was then reinforced by the 1766 Declaratory Act,
the stated purpose of which was to better secure “the dependency of his majesty’s dominions in America
upon the crown and parliament of Great Britain,” probably the source of the Hutchinson letter’s
“dependance” language. The Declaratory Act reserved to “parliament assembled,” viz., the tripartite king
in Parliament – Lords, Commons, and the monarch, “full power and authority to make laws …to bind the
colonies and people of America, subjects of the crown of Great Britain, in all cases whatsoever.” The
Declaratory Act (March 18, 1766), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/declaratory_act_1766.asp (74-16); see Danby Pickering, Great Britain The statutes at large ... [from 1225 to 1867] (Cambridge, ENG:
Benthem, for C. Bathhurst ; London, 1762-1869). The fact that the people of the Bay were not
represented in Parliament was the consequence and cost of its founding members’ decision to cross the
pond and live far from the metropole. The lack of representation was not a denial of any constitutional or
common law rights held by the British colonists. Furthermore, since Parliament reigned supreme, the Bay
legislature could not possibly be an independent governing body. That would be unconstitutional, for
there could not be two independent legislative bodies in one state; one body had to be supreme, and that
was Parliament. The Bay’s response, drafted by Adams, was that the House of Commons was
“assuming and exercising Power inconsistent with the Freedom of the Constitution to give and grant the
Property of the Colonists”; it also was “appropriat[ing]” their property, viz., their money in the form of
taxes, “without their Consent.” “Reply of the House to Hutchinson’s First Message,” Jan. 26, 1773, in JA
Papers, Vol. I: Sept.r 1755-Oct. 1773, p. 315; Editorial Note, id, pp. 309-15.
Consent was an essential component of a free people. It was the quiddity of liberty; that is to say, it was
part of the inherent nature of freedom, and therefore it was impossible to be free without it. British
Americans had been talking about consent at least since Otis, that “flame of Fire,” who asked in 1762, Can
there be any liberty where property is taken away without consent? Eleven years later, the question
remained the same.
Hutchinson had asked for it and he got it: a full, responsive legal disquisition on the relationship between
the metropole and both the Bay specifically and the provinces generally, with an emphasis on whether the
colonies were intended to each have their own legislative body or were to be governed by Parliament and
the laws it enacted. Two lengthy submittals by the Bay House of Representatives analyzed the legal
underpinnings of the founding of the British American colonies, particularly Massachusetts Bay. Both
submittals bear the heavy imprint of John Adams, with the editors of the Adams Papers speculating that
since Hawley was not on the second committee it was probably Samuel who brought John back into the
process of drafting the second Bay response. See JA Papers, Vol. I: Sept. 1755-Oct.1773, pp. xx.
Philadelphia lawyer Joseph Reed was another prominent revolutionary leader. He served under George
Washington in 1775 and was adjutant general of the Army in 1776. He then served as a delegate to the
Continental Congress in 1778 and became president of the supreme executive council of Pennsylvania
from 1778 to 1781. In a letter from Reed to Thomas Cushing, reported by Josiah Quincy in his
publication of the Memoirs of his father, Reed (and Quincy in a note to the letter) speak with veneration
about the response of the House “refuting the argument of the Governor” in the “most remarkable
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[controversy] preceding the Revolution.” Said Reed, “on your discussion of that important question, ‘How
far the Parliament is the supreme authority of the Colonies?’ In short, to comprise it in a few words, your
Assembly have gained immortal honour, not only from their nervous and manly strain of reasoning, but
from that cool and dispassionate temper they manifested on so trying an occasion. It is a subject of great
inquiry here, who is the original draughtsman of these masterly compositions. He is honoured, though
unknown, and his memory will be dear not only to the present, but future generations.” Joseph Reed to
Thomas Cushing, May 1773, in Memoirs of the Life of Josiah Quincy, Jr., of Massachusetts Bay, 17441775, By his Son, Josiah Quincy, p. 113 & n.1.
There are two sides to every coin/story. In a book published in London in 1883 by NAME, the greatgrandson of Governor Hutchinson entitled The Diary and Letters of Thomas Hutchinson, Esq. (London:
Sampson Low, Marston, Searle Rivington, 1883), pp. 19-21, the author presented the perspective of the
metropole at the time:
Thus, the Congress at Philadelphia complained of the repressive measures that the English
Government had laid upon them, but they did not say that these measures had followed the
riots, tumults, and acts of violence with which the Colonies, and especially the city of Boston,
had been full for ten years or more….
There is no better mode of establishing the accuracy of historical assertions than that of
instituting a comparison of dates, and in this instance a comparison of dates shows that most of
these restrictive measures were imposed after the commission of the acts of free-and-easyism
which they were intended to curb; as after the beginning of insubordination in Governor
Pownall’s time; after numerous acts of open resistance to constitutional authority during
Governor Bernard’s administration; after the town riots, and the attack on Mr. Secretary Andrew
Oliver’s house in 1765; after the destruction of the house and furniture of Lieutenant-Governor
Thomas Hutchinson, a short time subsequently; after the well-known cases of smuggling on an
extensive scale by some of the leading merchants of Massachusetts, in defiance of the
Commissioners of the Customs; after the riotous meeting when the unfortunate seaman was
seized, tarred, and feathered, and shamefully maltreated in 1769; after the attack by the mob on
Richardson’s house, when he fired and killed a boy in the crowd; after the unprovoked pelting
and clubbing the sentry on duty and soldiers at the Guard House, when they shot down several
of their assailants; after the purloining and printing the private letters of the King’s
representatives, in order to raise the fury of the people against them; after the tumult, and
tarring and feathering of John Malcome in January, 1774; and after the destruction of three
hundred and forty-two chests of tea, by throwing them into Boston harbour. Thus the
punishments followed the offences, for there can be no punishment where there is no offence.
Sometimes, however, serious disputes originate in such small beginnings, that it is hard to fix
the exact point at which they took their rise. In passing from extreme white to extreme black,
who shall say where “the beginning of the black” begins? So it often is with a quarrel. At last
the Americans misunderstanding had passed all reasoning upon, and then there was nothing
left but the ultima ratio regum.
For a sympathetic portrayal of Adams’ personal and professional development while attending the
Continental Congress, see Karen N. Barzilay, “John Adams in the Continental Congress,” A Companion to
John Adams and John Quincy Adams, David Waldstreicher, ed. (LOCA: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2013),
pp. 78- 101, 78 (“Scholars have almost universally agreed that, whatever his weaknesses as a diplomat or
president, as a congressman he was highly effective – brilliant, even – and made an invaluable
contribution to the eventual success of the American Revolution.”).
n. 204: In Mayhew’s sermon, A discourse concerning unlimited submission, the preacher had supported
England’s execution of Charles I, who Mayhew described as “a lawless tyrant” not a monarch. In this
sermon, twenty-six years before the Declaration of Independence, Mayhew proclaimed, “For a nation thus
abused to arise unanimously and resist their prince, even to the dethroning him, is not criminal, but a
reasonable way of vindicating their liberties and just rights: it is making use of the means, and the only
means, which God has put into their power for mutual and self defence.” Adams described Mayhew as a
“transcendent genius,” and recalled that Mayhew’s 1750 sermon “was read by everybody; celebrated by
friends, and abused by enemies.” (It was in an 1818 letter from Adams to Niles that Adams opined that
the Americans most responsible in the early 1760s for America’s “awakening and revival” were Otis,
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Oxenbridge Thacher, Samuel Adams, John Hancock, and Jonathan Mayhew.) See Mayhew, Unlimited
Submission, Boston, 1750, https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N05197.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext
(9-2-17), included in the Catalogue of the Adams Library at p. 165, and discussed in Colbourne, The
Lamp of Experience, pp. 71-80. For the Adams’ quotations see John Adams to Hezekiah Niles, editor of
The Weekly Register, Quincy, Mass., Feb. 13, 1818, Novanglus and Massachusettensis; or Political
Essays, Published in the Years 1774 and 1775, On the Principal Points of Controversy, Between Great
Britain and Her Colonies. The Former by John Adams, Late President of the United States; the Latter by
Jonathan Sewall, Then King’s Attorney General of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, to which are
added a number of Letters, lately Written by President Adams, to the Honourable William Tudor; some of
which were never before published (Boston: Hews & Goss, 1819), pp. 233-38. On Mayhew generally see
Clinton Rossiter, “The Life and Mind of Jonathan Mayhew,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 7 (1950),
pp. 531-58. The quotation from Mayhew is on pp. 552-53.
According to Colbourne, Mayhew was particularly attached to the ideas of Sidney. Colbourne, The Lamp
of Experience, p. 72. Perhaps this explains why, in his string citation of authorities in support of liberty,
after referencing the ancients – Plato, Demosthenes and Cicero – Mayhew relied upon “Sidney and
Milton, Locke and Hoadley, among the moderns.” Mayhew also was the link to Thomas Hollis and the
provision of numerous political tracts to Harvard as well as the issuance of new editions of important
works, including Sidney’s Discourses. Colbourne, The Lamp of Experience, p. 76; Rossiter, “The Life and
Mind of Jonathan Mayhew,” p. 553.
n. 239: Many scholars have critiqued Adams’ view that the Americans did not owe allegiance to Parliament based on his analysis of the law and the history of British American colonization. Adams argued that
because the American colonies were not part of the British “empire,” “realm” or “kingdom,” the most that
could be said is that their legal obligations to Britain related to the colonies’ relationship with the king. For
both a thorough and cogent analysis of the subject and an overview of the scholarly literature, see Eric
Nelson, The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding (Cambridge, MA & London,
ENG: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014). Indeed, in Adams’ view, the relationship
was not with the office of the king – the Crown – but with the person of the king. This is the weakest part
of Adams’ thesis. Novanglus No. VIII may be the most evident display of this weakness. There were three
answers discussed among the colonists as to why “dependence on the king alone was sufficient
protection for liberty. They were protected by natural law, which existed before government; by the British
Constitution, itself based on natural law with accretions from Magna Carta and English laws passed to
confirm the principles of the great charter; and by their own charters.” Ultimately, as historian Robert J.
Taylor observed, the colonial legislatures were not afraid of the royal prerogative because in the past they
had been successful controlling the king’s spokesmen in the colonies, viz., the royal governors. Perhaps
use of the prerogative was the most practicable option at this juncture: they were less afraid of the royal
prerogative than they were of Parliament. See Robert J. Taylor, "John Adams: Legalist as Revolutionist."
Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Third Series, Vol. 89 (1977), pp. 55-71, 63-64.
Accordingly, why would he bother with it? There are three reasons. First, M persuasively and
oppositionally raised the subject. See Massachusettensis No. V and Massachusettensis No. VI, John
Adams Revolutionary Writings 1755-1775 (“JA Rev. Writings I”), pp. 363-69 at 366, 369-77 at 370.
Second, as Adams stated, the Crown was generally thought of at the time as “involv[ing] in it an house of
lords and a house of commons.” Adams had carefully argued that the provinces owed no allegiance to
Parliament. If he accepted that their relationship was with the Crown, he would have been defeating his
own argument. When William and Mary came to the throne in the Glorious Revolution, in addition to the
king and queen’s recognition of the rights of Englishmen, both the Bill of Rights and the coronation oath
recognized that the monarchs had to comply with the laws passed by Parliament, viz., “That the pretended Power of Suspending of Laws or the Execution of Laws by Regall Authority without Consent of Parlyament is illegall.” Bill of Rights, 1688 Chapter 2 1 William and Mary Sess 2 c 2, http://www.legislation.
gov.uk/aep/WillandMarSess2/1/2 (1-21-17)(Bill of Rights); http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutesrealm/vol6/pp56-57 (1-21-17)(coronation oath). While it was a centuries-old England tradition that the
monarch consulted with the two houses of Parliament (conciliarism), the late seventeenth-century
obligation to comply with Parliamentary law resulted in the creation of the British constitutional monarchy.
The monarch was no longer above the law, capable of changing it at will; rather, the combined power of
the monarch and Parliament, an amalgamated sovereignty termed “the king-in-Parliament,” became the
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lawful legislative power of the Kingdom and the “Crown” of Great Britain. See, e.g., the analysis by Larry
May, jurisprudential scholar and professor (PhD in philosophy, JD in law) in Limiting Leviathan: Hobbes
on Law and International Affairs (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 3, 146-53;
https://law.vanderbilt.edu/bio/larry-may (1-21-17).
Third, Adams argued that the Americans did not owe allegiance to Parliament because the king as a
person, in this case “his majesty king George the third, whom God preserve,” was a party with whom one
could interact, e.g., with whom the colonies could contract or negotiate, a fact that was very important to
Adams’ analysis and proposed solution to the crisis. Adams, Novanglus No. VII, JA Papers, Vol. 2, pp.
307-27, 320-21. In analyzing the relationship of the colonies to the metropole, “[t]he question is not,” said
Adams, “whether the authority of parliament extends to the colonies in any case; for it is admitted by the
whigs that it does in that of commerce:” Rather, he emphasized that the question is,” whether it extends
in all cases.” Id, pp. 307. A dull distinction, one might opine, but a legally important one; for the expression “all cases” was the language of the Declaratory Act pursuant to which Parliament could tax anything
and everything that it wanted to in its colonies. “Parliament "had hath, and of right ought to have, full
power and authority to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the colonies and
people of America ... in all cases whatsoever." The Declaratory Act of 1766, 6 Geo 3 c 12. M commented
on the dullness of the subject matter: “Permit me to request your attention to this subject a little longer; I
assure you it is as interesting and important, as it is dry and unentertaining” – whatever that means.
Leonard, Massachusettensis No. VI, JA Rev. Writings I, pp. 369-77, 371. Adams explained why this
question existed in the first place, and he rightfully placed the blame on the metropole. Looking at colonial
history it was clear that the British did not anticipate how successful the colonies would be, and therefore
how much control (total, Adams feared,) that Parliament claimed and would seek to exercise over them:
“That Britain has been imprudent enough to let Colonies be planted, untill they are become numerous and
important, without ever having wisdom enough to concert a plan for their government, consistent with her
own welfare.” Adams, Novanglus No. VII, PJA, Vol. 2, p. 315.
Reviewing the terminology, Adams argued that the colonies could not possibly be part of the British
empire because Britain did not have an empire which, by definition, “is a despotism, and an emperor a
despot, bound by no law or limitation … it is a stretch of tyranny beyond absolute monarchy.” Id, p. 314;
similarly, in Novanglus III, Adams stated, “the terms, ‘British Empire’ are not the language of the common
law, but the language of news papers and political pamphlets.” Id, p. 422.
Adams pointed out that in the language of English law, the description given to Britain was not that of an
empire but most often that of a “kingdom.” This term was used by Sir Edward Coke in the famous 1608
proceeding, Calvin’s Case, which focused on the legal issue of ligeantia or ligeance – the feudal concept
that we would call allegiance, fidelity, or loyalty of a subject to his king, in this case the fidelity of a British
man born in Scotland. Calvin’s Case (1608) 7 Coke Report [Co Rep] 1a, 77 ER 377, available at
http://www.commonlii.org/int/cases/EngR/1572/64.pdf (1-21-17). Thus, for example, Coke stated, “Every
man is either alienigena, an alien born, or subditu, a subject born.” 7 Coke Report 17 a, 77 ER p. 397.
The terms “kingdom,” “realm,” and “dominion” all had geographic significance. By 1608 Britain included
three kingdoms. England was one. Scotland and Ireland were the other two. Originally Scotland and
Ireland had been separate kingdoms; but they were now all part of Britain. Coke considered the
differences in these mergers, for Ireland was clearly a conquered country which raised a set of issues of
its own.
Coke’s description of one of the determinations by the Lords of the Privy Council on appeal to the King in
Council from the plantations, viz., the colonies, is very interesting. One would have thought that the first
proviso would have captured everyone’s attention in America in the 1750s (id, p. 398):
1st. That if there be a new and uninhabited country found out by English subjects, as the law is
the birthright of every subject, so wherever they go, they carry their law with them, and therefore
such new found country is to be governed by the laws of England, though after such country is
inhabiter by the English, Acts of Parliament made in England, without naming the foreign
plantations, will not bind them; for which reason it has been determined that the Statute of
Frauds and Perjuries, which requires three witnesses, and that these should subscribe in the
testator's presence in the case of a devise of a. land, does not bind Barbadoes: but that
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2ndly. Where the King of England conquers a country, it is a different consideration; for there
the conqueror, by saving the lives of the people conquered, gains a right and- property in such
people, in consequence of which he may impose upon them what law be pleases: but
3dly. Until such laws given by the conquering prince, the laws and customs of the conquered
country shall hold place, unless where these are contrary to our religion, or enact any thing that
is malum in se, or are silent; for in all such cases the laws of the conquering Country shall
prevail. 2 Peere Williams, 75. et Vid. Collett v Lord Keith, 2 East 260. Blankard v Galdy, 4 Mod.
225. SC.2 Salk. 411. Attorney-General v. Stewart, 2 Meriv. 159.
In his tenth Novanglus letter Adams stated, “But thus much is certain, that none of these principles take
place, in the case of America. She never was conquered by Britain. She never consented to be a state
dependent upon, or subordinate to the British parliament, excepting only in the regulation of her
commerce: and therefore the reasonings of British writers, upon the case of Ireland, are not applicable to
the case of the colonies, any more than those upon the case of Wales.” Adams, Novanglus X, PJA, Vol.
2: Dec. 1773-April 1775, p. 362.
In the case of Scotland, however, which is where Calvin was born, while the people of each kingdom bore
allegiance to a separate set of laws and customs, from ancient time part of Scotland had been “within the
power and ligeance of the King of England,” and when Calvin was born the people in both kingdoms bore
allegiance to the same king, James I of Scotland who became James VI of England. Coke therefore
concluded that Calvin was entitled to bring an action for property within “the realm,” viz., the kingdom of
England. Coke used the words “kingdom” and “realm” interchangeably, e.g., a man who was not a peer of
the kingdom of England was “not any peer, or of the nobility of this realm.” Calvin’s Case, 7 Coke Report
16 b, 77 ER p. 395. In contrast, before the kingdom of Ireland merged with England, that territory was
part of the king’s dominions but was not part of the realm: “Next followeth Ireland, which originally came
to the Kings of England by Conquest: ....That Ireland is a dominion separate and divided from England, it
is evident from our books. …It [is] a distinct dominion. …Ireland was out of the realm of England.”
Drawing on these distinctions, Adams maintained that the American colonies were not part of, but sat
three thousand miles away from any of the three British kingdoms of England, Scotland and Ireland.
Accordingly, America was not part of any or all those kingdoms or realms. Rather, like Ireland, it was “a
distinct dominion.” Reid’s monograph In a Defiant Stance systematically compared the relationship
between Britain and Ireland versus Britain and the American colonies, pointing out that while there were
parallels, the treatment by the British of the Irish Catholics was almost always much harsher than their
treatment of the Americans.
Reviewing the law, Adams found that the precise question, a legal one, as to how to define the role of the
metropole vis-à-vis the American colonies was not answered by any British law – common law, constitutional law or otherwise. How, then, had it worked up until then? “America has all along consented, still
consents, and ever will consent, that parliament being the most powerful legislature in the dominions,
should regulate the trade of the dominions.” Adams, Novanglus VII, PJA,Vol. 2 Dec. 1773-April 1775, p.
307. Adams made the same assertion in Novanglus III: “There “is a defect in what [M] calls the British
empire – and how shall this defect be supplied? It cannot be supplied consistently with reason, justice,
policy, morality, or humanity, without the consent of the colonies, and some new plan of connection.
…But there is no need of any other power than that of regulating trade, and this the colonies ever have
been and will be ready and willing to concede to her. But she will never obtain from America any further
concession while she exists.” As to why Britain protected and defended the colonies, Adams answer was
simple: “for her own interest, because all the profits of our trade centered in her lap.” Adams, Novanglus
III, id., p. 251.Given the silence of the law, what had happened over time, said Adams, was that the
American colonies had voluntarily, either through compact or consent or both, agreed to allow Parliament
to regulate trade on the high seas. “This is founding the authority of parliament to regulate our trade, upon
compact and consent of the colonies, not upon any principle of common or statute law, not upon any
original principle of the English constitution, not upon the principle that parlia-ment is the supream and
sovereign legislature over them in all cases whatsoever,” again, referencing the language of the
Declaratory Act. Adams elaborated on this point at great length, discussing in detail the history of Virginia
and Massachusetts Bay, and concluding that, “Thus, it appears, that the ancient Massachusettensians
and Virginians, had precisely the same sense of the authority of parliament, viz. that it had none at all:

1119

and the same sense of the necessity, that by the voluntary act of the colonies, their free chearful consent,
it should be allowed the power of regulating trade.” Adams, Novanglus VII, id, p. 319.
Adams mocked the British and their devotee, M – a standard tool in the advocacy toolbox to minimize the
impact of one’s opponent’s argument. In his view the British could not possibly want what M seemed to
be asking for – a “supream legislature coextensive with …the whole British dominions” that would be
based “upon the general principles of the English constitution, an equal mixture of monarchy, aristocracy
and democracy,” which was what M had argued (or, at least, how Adams characterized it). Id, p. 309; see
Leonard, Massachusettensis No. V, JA Rev Writings I, p. 366. By 1775, Britain’s dominions were vast.
“The constitution requires that every foot of land should be represented, in the third estate, the
democratical branch of the government.” Thus, Adams suggested, M was advocating that the people on
“every foot” of this land should be represented in a “supream legis-lature” based on “the general
principles of the English constitution,” including the “democratical branch,” i.e., the House of Commons.
One certainly can debate this point, as various scholars have, not only in terms of what M intended but
also given the fact that not everyone in England, much less elsewhere within the British “realm,”
consented to their government, viz., participated in parliamentary elections. At the same time, Adams
was quite right that to omit “millions of acres in America,” and the associated “many thousands of wealthy
landholders” not to mention various other people, was a lack of representa-tion of an entirely different
order of magnitude.”?] [‘? Adams, Novanglus VII, PJA, Vol. 2, pp. 310-11.
Adams’ argument echoed the sentiment expressed in a pamphlet first published anonymously in London
in 1769 and then republished two years later in Connecticut with the author’s byline. That author was
Edward Bancroft, a British American living in London in 1769 who was a friend of Benjamin Franklin (who
lived in London for eighteen years, primarily working as agent on behalf of several of the colonies, including Massachusetts Bay). Years later Bancroft befriended Adams when Bancroft was secretary to the
American plenipotentiaries to Louis XVI; in that capacity, however, and unbeknownst to the Americans,
Bancroft was simultaneously serving as a British spy. But in 1769 in his pamphlet published
anonymously in London, Bancroft asserted that just “because Britons, residing here, are but unequally or
imperfectly represented, shall Britons, residing in America be wholly unrepresented?” As Bancroft
emphatically stated, “the unrepresented American Freedholder will not only be deprived of the Rights
belonging to the Freeholders of Great Britain, Rights, for which English Patriots have bled, and English
Monarchs been dethroned, but even reduced to a State much worse even than that of the unrepresented
Rabble of this Kingdom; for immense is the Difference between a Nation but imperfectly represented, and
a People who have no Representation.” Not only did Bancroft focus on the distinction Adams later made
between those imperfectly versus those entirely not represented, but in doing so he invoked the
proposition that taxes or “Tributes” must be imposed by “a free People” on itself through the
representatives that the people select, relying on “the great Sidney” and Discourses on Government as
his august authority. Remarks on the Review of the Controversy Between great Britain and Her Colonies.
In Which the Errors of Its Author Are Exposed, and the Claims of the Colonies Vindicated, upon the
Evidence of Historical Facts and Authentic Records, Pamphlet 17 in The American Revolution: Writings
from the Pamphlet Debate, Vol. I: 1764-1772, Gordon S. Wood, ed. (New York: The Library of America,
2015), pp. 667-742, 723-24.
The rub was that in “forty years,” following the logic of M’s argument, the result would be the transfer of
the “supream legislature … translated, crown and all, to America,” – a “sublime system for America.”
Adams, Novanglus VII, PJA, Vol. 2, pp. 309-10. As Adams put it in the closing paragraph of Novanglus
VII, “The time may not be so far off, however, as [M] imagines, when the colonies may have the balance
of numbers and wealth in their favour.” Hoisting M by his own petard, Adams concluded, “But when that
shall happen, if we should attempt to rule her by an American parliament, without an adequate
representation in it, she will infallibly resist us by her arms.” Id, p. 326. (Amazingly, this was a possibility
that Adams had forecast in a letter to a grammar school friend twenty years earlier. When the nineteenyear-old Adams was mulling over his future while teaching in Worcester, describing “the produce” of one
of his “reveries,” Adams mused, “our People according to the exactest Computations, will in another
Century, become more numerous than England itself. Should this be the Case, since we have (I may
say) all the naval Stores of the nation in our hands, it will be easy to obtain the mastery of the seas, and
then the united force of all Europe, will not be able to subdue us. The only way to keep us from setting up
for ourselves, is to disunite Us. Divide et impera. Keep us in distinct Colonies, and then, some great
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men, in each Colony, desiring the Monarchy of the Whole, they will destroy each others influence and
keep the Country in Equilibrio.” Adams to Nathan Webb, October 1755, JA Rev. Writings I, p. 3.)
In legal negotiations two parties often take irreconcilable positions. Just to provide one example of many,
Adams and M, representing the position of the colonial whigs, versus M’s “friends the tories,” disagreed
on who was causing the problem in the first place, and therefore why Britain was interceding. M, for
example, argued that it was “notorious” that it was the whigs who “had usurped the power of the province
in a great measure, and exercised it by revenging themselves on their opponents, or in compelling them
to enlist under their banners.” Various other offenses were cited. The British regulations, in response,
were intended “to enable us to recover from anarchy.” Obviously, this was not Adams’ perspective. As he
said in Novanglus No. IV, “This writer has a faculty of insinuating errors into the mind, almost
imperceptibly, he dresses them so in the guise of truth.” Massachusettensis No. X, JA Rev. Writings I, p.
430. As one author succinctly put it, “For patriots and loyalists alike, this was personal.” Nathaniel
Philbrick, Bunker Hill: A City, A Siege, A Revolution (New York: Viking, 2013), p. xvi. On the reference to
tories, see Adams, Novanglus No. IV, PJA: Vol. 2, pp 256-68, 257; on the guise of truth, see id, p. 258.
How, then, can one resolve their dispute short of litigation, i.e., a fight? Analogously, here we have
irreconcilable political positions based on law that could lead, indeed seemed to be ineluctably leading to
a physical fight: war. The answer for Adams, as for most attorneys, was a practical one. A solution had
to address the “defect” that Britain “had after 150 years, discovered…in her government,” and it had to do
so “by some just and reasonable means.” What were those means? In Adams’ view, it was “the consent
of the Colonies.” As much as “metaphysicians and politicians may dispute forever, but they will never find
any other moral principle or foundation of rule or obedience, than the consent of governors and
governed.” Emphasizing the pragmatic (albeit through metaphor), Adams continued, Britain “has found
out that the great machine will not go any longer without a new wheel.” Wisely, “she will make this
herself.” Unwisely, “We think she is making it of such materials and workmanship as will tear the whole
machine to pieces.” The colonies were “willing, if she can convince us of the necessity of such a wheel,
to assist with artists and materials, in making it, so that it may answer the end,” viz., solve the problem.
But foolishly, Britain “says, we shall have no share in it; and if we,” the colonies, “will not let her patch it up
as she pleases, her Massachusettensis’s and other advocates tell us, she will tear it to pieces herself, by
cutting our throats.” Adams hurled the threat back: “To this kind of reasoning we can only answer, that
we will not stand still to be butchered. We will defend our lives as long as providence shall enable us.”
Adams, Novanglus No. VII, PJA, Vol. 2, pp. 315-16. Once again Adams was repeating his assertions in
Novanglus III: “this continent might defend itself against all the world. We have men enough, and those
men have as good natural understandings and as much natural courage as any other men. If they were
wholly ignorant now, they might learn the art of war.” It is in this context that Adams concluded in
Novanglus III, “Obsta principiis – Nip the shoots of arbitrary power in the bud.” Adams, Novanglus No. III,
id, pp. 253-55. Recovering his equanimity, Adams proposed, “let the colonies be treated like reasonable
creatures.” If the parties could only shed the public debate and quit the propaganda battlefield, the
argument “might be settled forever, in a few hours.”
Scholars have debated just when Adams gave up on reconciliation with Britain and sought independence.
We can definitely say that it was sometime between his fourth Novanglus letter in February 1775 and the
Oliver Branch Petition less than five months later, in early July. In Novanglus No. IV Adams stated, “What
does he mean by independence! ... he knows there is not a man in the province among the whigs, nor
ever was, who harbours a wish of that sort.” Id, p. 263. Even if there was such a man, there is no reason
to think it was Adams. In 1807, writing to Mercy Otis Warren, Adams recollected that, “When, after fifteen
years’ exertion of all my faculties, and the faculties of all my friends, to bring the English nation to hearken
to reason and respect justice, on the 19th of April, 1775, I found hostilities commenced, and the blood of
our citizens barbarously spilt [at Lexington and Concord], I concluded what I had long foreseen, – that we
must resist in arms the whole force of the British empire.” John Adams to Mercy Warren, July 20, 1807,
Correspondence Between John Adams and Mercy Warren, pp. 332-54, 349. This perspective is echoed
in Adams’ autobiographical account: “the Battle of Lexington on the 19th of April, changed the Instruments
of Warfare from the Penn to the Sword.” Autobiography, JA D&A, Vol. III, p. 314. Cf. Barzilay, “John
Adams in the Continental Congress,” p. 92 (“It is impossible to say at what moment John Adams began
unequivocally to support the colonies’ independence from Britain…. By late 1775, he had made up his
mind.”).
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So what was Adams’ proposed workable settlement, his pragmatic solution? Notwithstanding the fact
that “our provincial legislatures are the only supream authorities in our colonies,” the colonies would
“consent” to the Parliament “assum[ing]a jurisdiction over them,” utilizing “a line fairly drawn between the
rights of Britain and the rights of the colonies.” The proposed “line” would be a physical one, viz., the
“banks of the ocean or low water mark,” which would give Parliament authority “over the high seas.” In
short, contrary to M’s assertion that, “There is no arbiter between us but the sword,” Adams proposed
one. Leonard, Massachusettensis No. XI, JA Rev. Writings I, pp. 448-52, 448. With his legal thinking cap
firmly attached to his head, Adams turned to a legal standard with which the colonies and the metropole
had great familiarity and experience, the division of authority that both jurisdictions had utilized for
centuries to define when common law applied in contrast to maritime law, which relied on civil law. This
well-established line determined the court into which many legal actions properly belonged. In short, this
was a practical solution in part because it was objective, but also because it was tried and tested. But
Adams did not stop there. He was not stuck to his solution but was happy to listen, adding in his
commonsensical, attorney-negotiating mode, “If this is not sufficient,” then “treat[] us like reasonable
creatures, and we will find another answer.” He even suggested one, “e.g., the acts of trade and
navigation might be confirmed by provincial laws, and carried into execution by our own courts and
juries,” cutting up “the roots” of “illicit trade” forever. Adams, Novanglus No. VII, PJA, Vol. 2, pp. 313-14.
In short, let’s negotiate; let’s solve the problem together.
We can answer the question now as to whom Adams was writing. As Adams often did, in the Novanglus
letters he utilized the public forum to fully apprise the public, at whatever level of the community he
sought to influence, of the factual and legal matters at issue and their consequences: the stakes. He was
good at it, which no doubt contributed to his sense of responsibility to do so. In the Novanglus letters
Adams not only believed in his cause; he also believed there was a peaceable way out. Consequently,
his proposed solution was also addressed to another audience, his adversary – the royal leadership of
the Bay and other colonies, their ministerial leadership, other Parliamentary leaders, and perhaps even
King George himself.
In précis, it scarcely does Adams justice to describe him as a curmudgeon – a cantankerous, ill-tempered
person. Adams worked epically hard, and no doubt was often exhausted; he also was argumentative –
passionately so. But this legal trait was counterbalanced by his pragmatism, and an optimistic and fierce
belief in the people, including their right and ability to make informed political decisions. Given the lucid
arguments of M, Adams felt compelled to respond in full, which he certainly did in his Novanglus work. To
enable the people to reach informed political decisions he assumed the role of public educator par
excellence, first in the Bay, then in the colonies and, ultimately, beyond. He became the people’s lawyer,
serving as their public voice albeit in his highly legalistic way; he did so to achieve a legitimate, viable
legal solution, a compromise with Britain that would be in America and its people’s best interest. Adams
spoke, too, to Britain, ardently seeking a way out that would reconcile the parties.
n. 241: While the terminology came up in Novanglus V and VII, it is in Thoughts on Government that
Adams effectively labelled himself an advocate of republicanism: “[T]here is no good government but
what is Republican. That the only valuable part of British constitution is so; because the very definition of
a Republic, is ‘an Empire of Laws, and not of men.’” Thoughts on Government, JA Papers, Vol. 4, pp. 6593, p 87. Following Pocock’s reliance on Harrington, Ryerson placed great emphasis on Adams’
references to James Harrington in Novanglus VII: “The key to John Adams’s new view of empires,
monarchies, and republics, and of colonies and their parent nations, was a work that he had long known
by reputation but had evidently acquired and studied only recently – James Harrington’s Commonwealth
of Oceana ….Adams quotes from Oceana three times before yoking Harrington with Aristotle and Livy as
the ultimate authorities on the nature of republics.” A page later Ryerson said, “Harrington’s teachings
and the tradition behind them lay at the center of John Adams’s political writings.” Ryerson, John
Adams’s Republic, pp. 146-47. There is virtually nothing in this perspective with which I can agree.
As a preliminary matter, pace Ryerson, Adams’ view of the relationship between the colonies and the
metropole were not a “new view,” a sudden change of tactics by Adams. Id, p. 145. In Novanglus VII
Adams was following the argument of M, as Ryerson noted. Id, p. 144. In Novanglus II, Adams was
already discussing the power of the king in his dominions, also in response to statements by M. See
Adams, Novanglus III, PJA, Vol. 2: Dec. 1773-Apr. 1775, p. 251. In the passages in question in
Novanglus VII, Adams actually referred to Harrington four times, not three. See Adams, Novanglus VII,
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PJA, Vol. II: Dec. 1773-Apr. 1775, pp. 311, 313, 314. The subject was “the law of nations” – how past
colonizers viewed their colonies. None of these references indicated an endorsement of Harrington’s
ideas about the best kind of republic set forth in his book Oceana – as Ryerson put it, “Harrington’s
teachings.” They were all references to comments by Harrington that reflected his understanding of
miscellaneous, other things. In legal parlance, this is what would be called the use of dicta. Dicta refers
to the Latin term obiter dictum, which means an incidental comment, a judge’s expression of opinion that
is neither essential to the decision made by the judge nor does it establish precedent. “OBITER DICTUM:
A latin term meaning said in passing, it is a judge’s statement that is based on some established facts,
but does not affect the judgement.” Black’s Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd Ed.,
www.thelawdictionary.org/letter/o/page/2/ (1-24-17). Adams’ references in Novanglus VII to Harrington
probably were a bit lazy, and I, like Ryerson, suspect that Adams may have been reading Oceana at the
time he wrote Novanglus VII and so it was easy, perhaps facile, to add Harrington’s name to the list of
authorities to which he referred. Harrington made several comments in Oceana that were useful for
Adams to quote in this letter; but this was not an endorsement of the utopia that Harrington set forth in
Oceana.
Adams also provided a definition of a republic, but one that was far from new to him or new in any way.
The very first book Adams owned was Cicero’s de Officiis, in which this famous statement appears. In
this passage, as Ryerson noted, Adams referred to Aristotle, Livy and Harrington in connection with that
definition – a republic as “a government of laws, and not of men.” But as discussed in Chapter Three and
further explained in Chapter Five, Harrington was a utopian thinker whose book described the perfect
republic, a world that was highly controlled in many ways that Adams would have rejected, and that had
little applicability to the world in which Adams functioned. No doubt there also was wisdom in Harrington,
although he was not viewed as particularly sensible in his own time. The fact is, however, as Adams well
knew, the definition of a republic that he quoted was first articulated by Aristotle and then greatly
emphasized by Cicero. Other republican authors embraced the definition, including Machiavelli and
Sidney. Indeed, in Thoughts on Government, Adams provided a string cite of authorities, “modern
Englishmen,” who endorsed this proposition; the string cite began with Sidney. Thoughts on Government
in JA Papers, Vol. 4, p. 87. In short, while Harrington endorsed the definition, this was hardly a
“teaching” or a lesson that can be attributed to Harrington, nor does it do justice to the fantastical republic
that Harrington embraced.
Adams’ third reference to Harrington to which Ryerson referred was the theorists’ assessment that, “the
commonwealth of Rome, by planting colonies of its citizens within the bounds of Italy, took the best way
of propagating itself.” Adams, Novanglus VII, PJA, Vol. 2: Dec. 1773-Apr. 1775, p. 311. In this passage
Adams also referred to Harrington when he explained that absolute monarchies are irrelevant to his
argument in Novanglus VII about the relationship between the British American colonies and the
metropole. “[F]or as Harrington observes, ‘Absolute monarchy, as that of the Turks, neither plants its
people at home nor abroad.” Again, Harrington’s commentary on the way in which Rome colonized
territory and the fact that absolute monarchies did not colonize – they conquered – were both useful
arrows in Adams’ bow, clear dicta from the book that he was reading; they did not represent an
endorsement of Harrington’s views on how to organize a republic.
The fourth Harrington reference related to a point previously addressed in this chapter, namely that the
“colonies in the Indies, …they are yet babes.” Once again, we have useful dicta that Adams pounced on,
Harrington’s clever turn of phrase, because it was useful to Adams in making his argument. Thus Adams
stated, “the colonies are now nearer manhood than even Harrington foresaw.” Id, p. 313.
Finally, Ryerson asserted that Adams turned away from Sidney and Locke towards Harrington because
the latter’s ideas “were deeply rooted in both the political theory and the political experience of ancient
Greece and Rome, and of Renaissance Italy. His teachers were Aristotle, Polybius, Livy, and
Machiavelli.” In contrast, Ryerson asserted, Sidney and Locke belonged to a group, “the more
speculative social contract theorists – a group that included Sidney as well as Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau.” Ryerson, John Adams’s Republic, p. 147. This statement is similarly far afield. It is correct
that Locke did not rely on the history of ancient Rome or Greece in his work, or for that matter history at
all. As suggested in Chapter Three, perhaps this was a milieu with which Locke was uncomfortable; he
was, after all, trained as a doctor and likely did not study history at Oxford. None of this was true about
Sidney. Indeed, one can hardly peruse a page of Discourses Concerning Government and not dive
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deeply into history, ancient and otherwise. Additionally, it is incorrect and frankly confusing to create the
division that Ryerson did in this passage between political theorists who linked their world “to the
republican past” and those who relied on social contract theory. Sidney and others did both. For
Thoughts on Government, see PJA, Vol. 4: Feb.-Aug. 1776, pp. 65-93. Adams’ anonymous pamphlet
edition of Thoughts on Government also appears in John Adams Revolutionary Writings 1775-1783, pp.
50-56.
Adams recognized, however, that there were “an inexhaustible variety” of Republics, but that “that form of
government, which is best contrived to secure an impartial and exact execution of the laws, is the best of
Republics.” Thoughts on Government in PJA, Vol. 4: : Feb.-Aug. 1776, p. 87. A confederacy was
probably what America needed, Adams remembered thinking at the time, after the example of the
Greeks, the Dutch and the Swiss. And while Massachusetts Bay’s need was most urgent, “it could not be
long before every other Colony must follow her Example.” Adams suspected, however, that both ancient
and modern confederacies had been “huddled up in a hurry by a few Chiefs.” America, however, could
not rely on Chiefs; it “had a People of more Intelligence, Curiosity and Enterprize, who must be all
consulted.” Measures therefore had to be taken immediately to ensure that America could function, even
if its people chose to view the formation of new legitimate colonial governments in terms of “exercis[ing]
the Powers of Government, untill a Governor of his Majestys Appointment will consent to govern the
colony according to its Charter” – the most conservative way to characterize the situation in which the
colonies found themselves, and the way the June 1775 Congressional resolution on the matter had
described the colonies’ predicament. While it was important to “realize the Theories of the Wisest
Writers,” Adams argued that America must “invite the People, to erect the whole Building with their own
hands upon the broadest foundation,” which could only be done by “Conventions of Representatives” that
the people selected in each colony.
Adams’ leadership on the intimidating matter of transitioning peaceably from one form of civil government
to another is manifest in his November 15, 1775 letter to Richard Henry Lee of Virginia in response to
Lee’s request for advice, based on Adams’ Bay experience, on how to facilitate the peaceable transition
of governments without falling into a state of lawlessness and chaos. Historian John Howe began his
book on Adams with the statement, “One theme more than any other occupied the attention of John
Adams and informed both his thought and action; this was a concern with maintaining order and stability
in American society.” Howe’s statement contains truth, but is far too negatively expressed. If one just
looks at Adams’ remarks in response to passage of the Prohibitory Acts, and one could reference many
other contexts, the major theme more than any other that occupied the attention of Adams and informed
his thought and action was recognition of the political rights of British Americans, which later became the
determination to achieve independence, not a concern with maintaining order and stability. At the same
time, Adams sought to achieve independence while, at the same time, maintaining order and stability – a
secondary, albeit vital secondary goal and one for which there was no precedent. See John R. Howe, Jr.,
The Changing Political Thought of John Adams (Princeton University Press, 1966), p. xi.
Adams provided Lee with an outline of his ideas. This correspondence preceded the publication of
Common Sense. Adams’ ideas remained constant, and will be analyzed in Chapter Five, but what is
important here is to understand the Founders shared view that, “The Course of Events, naturally turns the
Thoughts of Gentlemen to the Subjects of Legislation and Jurisprudence, and it is a curious Problem what
Form of Government, is most readily and easily adopted by a Colony, upon a Sudden Emergency.”
Adams sought to reassure his peers that, “Nature and Experience have already pointed out the Solution
of this Problem,” and that the Solution was not difficult. Indeed, after quickly outlining the legal
components of the process, Adams counseled Lee, “In this Way a Single Month is Sufficient without the
least Convulsion or even Animosity to accomplish a total Revolution in the Government of a Colony.”
John Adams to Richard Henry Lee, Nov. 15, 1775, PJA, Vol. 3: May 1775-Jan. 1776, pp. 307-08. The
same subject, how to lawfully transition from one form of government to another without anarchy, was
percolating in Congress in March 1776 in connection with Congress’ efforts to have Canada both form a
new government independent from Great Britain and join the united colonies. See “Instructions to the
Commissioners to Canada,” March 20, 1776, in PJA, Vol. 4: Feb.-Aug. 1776, pp. 6-9. Years later, in
1783, and quite unintentionally, Benjamin Franklin paid Adams a huge compliment when he described to
Robert Livingston how various European countries were interested in establishing treaties with America.
Franklin then noted,
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By March 1776, unable to break free from the Continental army’s land vise, the British evacuated Boston
by sea, sailing to Halifax. Philbrick, Bunker Hill, Chapters Eleven and Twelve, passim.
In this same time frame, March and April 1776, Adams wrote a series of letters that were very similar but
not identical editions of what became the pamphlet Thoughts on Government, Applicable to the Present
State of the American Colonies. In a Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend, published by Lee in
Philadelphia in April 1776. The first two versions of Adams’ Thoughts on Government were written to
William Hooper and John Penn, two Congressional delegates from North Carolina. George Wythe of
Virginia then asked for a copy after seeing one of the first two letters, followed by the same request from
Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant of New Jersey. The third and fourth editions of Adams’ Thoughts have not
been found. The copy that went to Lee, which he published with Adams’ approval on condition that it was
unattributed (anonymous), was probably based on the lost Wythe edition. The convoluted history of this
particular Adams’ work, including the matter of Adams’ precise recollections about which conversation
and draft preceded which, what was and was not copied from what version of his Thoughts on
Government, the contents of the actual letters to Hooper and Penn, and an explanation of the various
publications of the pamphlet edition, is carefully laid out by the editors of The Adams Papers. See Editors’
note, Thoughts on Government, PJA, Vol. 4: Feb.-Aug. 1776, pp. 65-73.
What bears emphasis here is that Thoughts on Government constituted another material contribution in
Adams’ campaign to inform and educate the citizenry and colonial leadership about how to proceed
lawfully in the face of an intransigent king and metropole. In this case, the issue was implementing law so
as to facilitate the accomplishment of independence without anarchy. As Adams wrote in Thoughts on
Government, sent to George Wythe, friend and Congressional delegate from Virginia, “You and I have
been sent into life, at a time when the greatest lawgivers of antiquity would have wished to have lived.
How few of the human race have ever enjoyed an opportunity of making an election of government, more
than of air, soil, or climate, for themselves or their children! When, before the present epocha, had three
millions of people full of power and a fair opportunity to form and establish the wisest and happiest
government that human wisdom can contrive?”
But in early 1776 Adams was intent upon having Congress invite each of the colonies to undertake its first
constitution-making process. He was successful. Accordingly, he introduced a Congressional resolution,
subsequently adopted, that recommended that each colony form a government. There would be no
further delay: Adams also “procured the Appointment of a Committee, to prepare a resolution
recommending to the People of the States to institute Govern-ments.” Autobiography, in JA D&A, Vol. III,
p. 335. Adams’ preamble to the Congressional resolution stated quite bluntly that royal authority should
be “totally suppressed.” May 15, 1776 Resolution of the United Colonies, PJA, Vol. 4: Feb.-Aug. 1776, p.
185. In “A John Adams Paradox: Provincial Lawyer, Cosmopolitan Reader, Ardent Nationalist,” Ryerson
suggested that it was because of the request of colonial constituencies to their Congressional delegates
for advice on to how to set up a government that Thoughts on Government was written. This reverses
the order of events. Adams convinced the Congress to suggest to the colonies that they needed to have
a government in place other than the royal one that historically had functioned in each of the provinces.
Thoughts on Government was then supplied, presumably after discussion between Congressional
delegates and their colonial leadership and then on request or unilaterally by Congressional delegates in
order to effectuate this constitutional change. See Richard Alan Ryerson, “A John Adams Paradox:
Provincial Lawyer, Cosmopolitan Reader, Ardent Nationalist,” in The Libraries, Leadership, & Legacy of
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, Robert C. Baron and Conrad Edick Wright, eds. (Golden, CO:
Fulcrum Publishing and the Massachusetts Historical Society, 2010), pp. 179-205, 194.Because “his
Britannic Majesty, in conjunction with the Lords and Commons of Great-Britain, has, by a late Act of
Parliament, excluded the inhabitants of these United Colonies from the protection of his crown,” the
United Colonies had no choice; in colonies in which “Government sufficient to the exigencies of their
affairs” had not been established, Congress recommended that they needed to do so. Id. In sum, this
happened. By August 1776, for example, John was writing to Abigail, “We are now approaching rapidly
to the autumnal Æquinox and no great blow has yet been struck … Winter will do much for Us too. We
shall have more and better soldiers – We shall be better armed –,” etc. etc., and “Our American
Commonwealths will be compleatly form’d and organised, and every Thing, I hope will go on, with greater
Vigour.” John to Abigail, Aug. 25, 1776, My Dearest Friend, pp. 143-45, 144.
n. 280: Law professor José Luis Martí has argued that “republican democratization” of criminal law and
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justice allows for public participation in policy decisions related to these matters by “creat[ing] the
conditions necessary to enable the rational and reasonable exercise of public autonomy.” For example, in
his view “the participation of the community and neighbourhood in policing, part of what has been known
in Britain as ‘reassurance policing,’” which is distinct from populist claims for neighborhood patrols, is one
way to make the people feel a “sense of belonging to a democratic political community.” Martí’s political
theory is the classic liberal one that relies, in the first instance, on an almost unbounded faith in the nature
of man, whether singularly or collectively. While he recognized “all the conditions that make people
irrational, outraged, and politically illiterate,” he believed that in a democratic society, the system could
overcome these qualities in man. Hearing this argument Adams would have placed substantial faith in the
common man and certainly the electorate; but no doubt he also would have said that Martí ‘s viewpoint
was unrealistic. See José Luis Martí, “The Republican Democratizatiion of Criminal Law and Justice,”
Legal Republicanism, pp. 123-46, 133, 145-46; see also Roberto Gargarella, “Tough on Punishment:
Criminal Justice, Deliberation, and Legal Alienation,” id, pp. 167-84; compare Sellers, “The Republican
Foundations of International Law,” id, pp. 187-204, 202 (“Institutions that disregard the republican
safeguards of representation, popular sovereignty, governmental checks and balances, an independent
judiciary, and the rule of law reveal themselves as in need of reform before they can be trusted to guide
public deliberations about justice”); see also Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu,
Complete Works, Vol. I, The Spirit of Laws [1748], The Online Library of Liberty A Project Of Liberty Fund,
Inc., e http://oll.libertyfund.org (9-14-17), p. 215 (“The great advantage of representatives is, their capacity
of discussing public affairs. For this, the people collectively are extremely unfit, which is one of the chief
inconveniences of a democracy.”)
n. 238: As the adage goes, sometimes timing is everything, and the timing of Paine’s manifesto could not
have been more felicitous, contemporaneous with the adoption and publishing of the Bay Proclamation,
news of the King’s October 1775 speech, and the burning down of Norfolk, Virginia by British troops that
was the third such appalling act, the British having done the same thing in Falmouth (now Portland),
Maine and in Charlestown, Massachusetts in conjunction with the Battle of Bunker Hill.
Common Sense was a sensation, inspiring and impelling the American public in favor of independence.
In a flamboyant, populist style, Paine argued that as long as Britain had that “Royal Brute of England,” the
hereditary king, ruling its empire, the colonists would never have the freedom that they sought. “The
cause of America is, in a great measure, the cause of all mankind…. The laying a country desolate with
fire and sword, declaring war against the natural rights of all mankind, and extirpating the defenders
thereof from the face of the earth, is the concern of every man.” [Thomas Paine], Common Sense;
addressed to the INHABITANTS of AMERICA. Philadelphia: W. & T. Bradford. February 14, 1776.
Available online at https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/147 (2-23-17), p. 7. In Paine’s view, no monarchy,
especially one that was hereditary, could ever be constrained in ways that allowed for the rights claimed
by the British Americans. “[G]overnment even in its best state is but a necessary evil…a mode rendered
necessary by the inability of moral virtue to govern the world.” Id, pp. 9, 14. Challenging the merits of the
colonists’ centuries-old fundamental commitment to the British constitution, and finding monarchy in
general to be “exceedingly ridiculous,” Paine argued that its maintenance was “felo de se,” that is,
suicidal.. “[T]hough we have [been] wise enough to shut and lock a door against absolute monarchy, we
at the same time have been foolish enough to put the crown in possession of the key.” Id, pp. 18-20.
Relying pervasively on Scripture, Paine declaimed, “The sun never shined on a cause of greater worth….
The blood of the slain, the weeping voice of nature cries, ‘TIS TIME TO PART.” Id, pp. 42, 51. Paine
advocated simplicity in America’s formation of a new government based on equal representation, annual
state assembly elections, and a unicameral Continental Congress.
In response to Abigail’s inquiry, in a March 19, 1776 letter Adams summarized his thoughts on Paine’s
pamphlet which, as John noted in his letter, many people assumed he had written. In his typical way,
Adams described the strengths and the weaknesses of Common Sense. On the one hand, Adams was
critical of the “Whims,” “sophisms,” “artfull Addresses to superstitious Notions,” and “keen attempts upon
the Passions” included in the popular pamphlet – comments resting not only in Adams’ ideas, but also
likely in his competitive jealousy of Common Sense’s wild popularity, not to mention Adams’ own comfort
zone, viz., the lawyer’s highly rational, legalistic, and precise method of argument. On the other hand, he
told Abigail, “all agree there is a great deal of good sense, delivered in a clear, simple, concise and
nervous Style…. I could not have written any Thing in so manly and striking a style.” He articulated the
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same thoughts in a letter to William Tudor, Adams’ former clerk and a wealthy Boston lawyer and friend: “I
could not reach the Strength and Brevity of his style, nor his elegant Symplicity, nor his piercing Pathos.”
John Adams to William Tudor, April 12, 1776, PJA, Vol. 4: Feb.-Aug. 1776, p. 118. On the other hand, as
he told Abigail, “I flatter myself I should have made a more respectable Figure as an Architect, if I had
undertaken such a Work.” John to Abigail, March 19, 1776, in My Dearest Friend, p. 107. What did Adams
mean when he spoke about being an architect? The fact is that the political impact, Paine’s very effusive
“sentiments of the Abilities of America, and of the Difficulty of a Reconciliation with G.B. [Great Britain],”
were great.” Id. This was crucial; it was the expression of idealism needed to motivate a revolution. But
from a lawyer’s perspective, especially Adams’, while Common Sense was very useful and perhaps even
necessary, it certainly was not sufficient.
What weighed on Adams was that Paine had not articulated a practical and sensible now what proffer –
now what were the colonies supposed to do? Literally, what was to be done at the precipice on which the
colonies stood at that precise moment in history for them to become successfully independent? Indeed,
Adams felt that the citizenry could be misguided by Common Sense: “This Writer seems to have very
inadequate Ideas of what is proper and necessary to be done, in order to form Constitutions for single
Colonies, as well as a great Model of Union for the whole.” Id. He said the same thing to Tudor: While the
essay had been attributed to Adams and was “a very meritorious Production,” it was not his work: “I am
as innocent of it as a Babe.” And for good reason, because “in other Respects, the Pamphlet would do
not Honour even to me. The old Testament Reasoning against Monarchy would have never come from
me. The Attempt to frame a Continental Constitution, is feeble indeed. It is poor, and despicable.” John
Adams to William Tudor, April 12, 1776, PJA, Vol. 4: Feb.-Aug. 1776, p. 118. As John put it to Abigail,
“his Notions and Plans of Continental Government are not much applauded. Indeed this Writer has a
better Hand at pulling down than building.” John to Abigail, March 19, 1776, My Dearest Friend, p. 107.
There is a similar description by Adams in his Autobiography of his reaction to Paine’s pamphlet. Adams
also makes clear in this recitation that he disapproved of Paine, “a Star of Disaster” because of certain
traits that he had, viz., “a Contempt of the Old Testament and indeed of the Bible at large,” questions
about “his Veracity, which the subsequent histories of his Writings and publications in England when he
was in the Custom house, did not remove,” and the fact that “he was very intemperate and could not write
untill he had quickened his Thoughts with large draughts of Rum and Water,” a view expressed to Adams
by Dr. Witherspoon, “the President of New Jersey Colledge” (later named Princeton), who at the time was
a delegate to the Second Continental Congress and “knew the Man and his Communications.”
Autobiography, JA D&A, Vol. III, pp. 330-35.
Given what Adams felt was a gaping hole in Paine’s pamphlet, this inspirational call to break all ties with
the motherland that offered no wisdom or practical guidance on how to do so was potentially dangerous.
Who knows how colonial governments would try to respond to the crisis they faced? A chasm had
opened that was not only daunting, but scary. For Adams, this was personal and communal. It
threatened Adams’ view of himself as a law-abiding man, as well as his recognition of the necessity for
legitimate not misbegotten governance much less anarchy. It was at this juncture that Adams became
more vocal about his own thoughts on precisely how the colonies should and could go about realizing
their chosen form of government, which would enable them to achieve independence. In stating his
thoughts, prepared by Adams in the midst of the intensity of the Second Continental Congress by
“borrow[ing] a little Time from his Sleep,” Adams was straight-forward, simple, and uncharacteristically
brief. Autobiography, JA D&A, Vol. III, pp. 331 n.3. Once again, we have Adams the legal instructor, the
man who was informing the citizenry how to accomplish lawfully what it was that they wanted to do.
Adams’ statements and conversations with his peers on this subject quickly turned to “sketches,” as he
called them, “imperfect Hints,” set forth in brief letters requested of him by members of the Congress with
whom he was discussing these weighty matters. Prof. Pocock seems to have agreed with Adams on the
critical nature of this juncture: “If there was a moment at which an American Revolution became
inevitable, it was the moment at which it became unalterable that the colonies thought of themselves as
(to use a phrase of the time) ‘perfect states,’ which must – democratically or otherwise – generate
legislative governments with all the attributes of sovereignty.” Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History, p.
84. Adding fuel to the fire, shortly after Common Sense flooded the political marketplace the Americans
learned in February 1776 of the December 22, 1775 passage of the Prohibitory Act, which Adams dubbed
the “Act of Independency.” The statute outlawed all commerce with and among the colonies, declared
open season on American vessels, and announced that the colonies were now outside the King’s
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protection. On March 8, 1776, Gates humorously wrote to Adams, “I am disappointed in not receiving
your High Mightiness’s Act of Independency by the Last Post.” In reply, Adams wrote, “Independency is
an Hobgoblin, of So frightful Mein, that it would throw a delicate Person into Fits to look it in the Face.”
Nevertheless, he continued, “I know not whether you have seen the Act of Parliament called the
restraining Act, prohibitory Act, or piratical Act, or plundering Act, or Act of Independency, for by all these
Titles is it call’d. I think the most apposite is the Act of Independency, for King Lords and Commons have
united in Sundering this Country and that I think forever. It is a compleat Dismemberment of the British
Empire. It throws thirteen Colonies out of the Royal Protection, levels all Distinctions and makes us
independent in Spight of all our supplications and Entreaties.” Ironically, he added, “It may be fortunate
that the Act of Independency should come from the British Parliament, rather than the American
congress: But it is very odd that Americans should hesitate at accepting Such a Gift from them.” Horatio
Gates to John Adams, March 8, 1776 and reply from John Adams, March 23, 1776, in PJA, Vol. 4: Feb.Aug. 1776, pp. 49, 59.
n. 294: Note Rev. Jonathan Mayhew’s statement about power in his 1766 sermon entitled Snare Broken
that was delivered after the revocation of the Stamp Act:
History, one may presume to say, affords no example of any nation, country or people long free,
who did not take some care of themselves; and endeavour to guard and secure their own
liberties. Power is of a grasping, encroaching nature, in all beings, except in him, to whom it
emphatically “belongeth”; and who is the only King that, in a religious or moral sense, “can do
no wrong.” Power aims at extending itself, and operating according to mere will, where-ever it
meets with no ballance, check, controul or opposition of any kind. For which reason it will
always be necessary, as was said before, for those who would preserve and perpetuate their
liberties, to guard them with a wakeful attention; and in all righteous, just and prudent ways, to
oppose the first encroachments on them. “Obsta principiis.” After a while it will be too late. For in
the states and kingdoms of this world, it happens as it does in the field or church, according to
the well-known parable, to this purpose; That while men sleep, then the enemy cometh and
soweth tares, which cannot be rooted out again till the end of the world, without rooting out the
wheat with them.
Jonathan Mayhew, The Snare Broken (Boston, 1766), Political Sermons of the American Founding Era:
1730-1805, 2 Vols., Ellis Sandoz, foreword (2nd ed. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1998), Vol. I,
http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/1766-mayhew-the-snare-broken-sermon (9-2-17).
n. 301: See, e.g., PJA Vol. 1: Sept. 1755-Oct. 1773, p. 53 (Feb. 9, 1772) (Adams’ analysis of a
statement by Shakespeare, which he characterized as “a striking Representation of that Struggle which I
believe always happens, between Virtue and Ambition, when a Man first commences a Courtier….
Human Nature, depraved as it is, has interwoven in its very Frame, a Love of Truth, Sincerity, and
Integrity”); The Works of John Adams, Vol. 2 (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1850), p. 488
(March 4, 1776 Congressional Debates) (“resentment is a Passion, implanted by Nature for the
Preservation of the Individual…. Injustice, Wrong, Injury excites the Feeling of Resentment, as naturally
and necessarily as Frost and Ice excite the feeling of cold, as fire excites heat, and as both excite Pain. A
Man may have the Faculty of concealing his Resentment, or suppressing it, but he must and ought to feel
it. Nay he ought to indulge it, to cultivate it. It is a Duty. His Person, his Property, his Liberty, his
Reputation are not safe without it…. It is the same with Communities”); letter from John Adams to
Benjamin Rush, in Spur of Fame, pp.189-90, 189 (“I agree that rulers become tyrants from passion, not
instinct”); letter from John Adams to Benjamin Rush, July 7, 1812, id, pp. 248-49, 249 (“I believe with you
that wars are the natural and unavoidable effects of the constitution of human nature and the fabric of the
globe it is destined to inhabit and to rule. I believe further that wars, at times, are as necessary for the
preservation and perfection, the prosperity, liberty, happiness, virtue, and independence of nations as
gales of wind to the salubrity of the atmosphere, or the agitations of the ocean to prevent its stagnation
and putrefaction. As I believe this to be the constitution of God Almighty and the constant order of his
Providence, I must esteem all the speculations of divines and philosophers about universal and perpetual
peace as shortsighted, frivolous romances….”).
n. 335: On liberal theory see Philip Pettit, “Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On a Difference with
Quentin Skinner,” Political Theory, Vol. 30 No. 3 (Jun. 2002), pp. 339-56; Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory
of Freedom and Government (Oxford University Press, 1997); Pettit, “Liberalism and Republicanism,”
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Australian Journal of Political Science 29 (1993), pp. 162-89; Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism
(Cambridge University Press, 1998). See also Hannah F. Pitkin, “Are Freedom and Liberty Twins,”
Political Theory 16 (Nov. 1998), pp. 523-56; Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty: An Inaugural Lecture
Delivered Before the University of Oxford on 31 October 1958 (Oxford University Press, 1958);
Furstenberg, “Beyond Freedom and Slavery: Autonomy, Virtue, and Resistance in Early American
Political Discourse.” The Journal of American History, Vol. 89, No. 4 (March 2003), pp. 1295-1330. For
liberty beyond America (particularly in Britain), see Part I citation above. For liberty in America, see
Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution ((Cambridge, MA & London: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967, 1992), particularly Ch. VI, “The Contagion of Liberty,”
pp. 230-319; works by James Kloppenberg, including Towards Democracy; “The Virtues of Liberalism:
Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse,” Journal of American
History 74 (June 1987), pp. 9-33.
n. 372: Calvin’s Case, decided by Sir Edward Coke in 1608, decided the question of whether a Scot born
after James I’s accession to the thrones of Scotland and England, called a postnati (as opposed to an
antenati, born after that occurrence), could assert a legal claim to English property. Coke concluded that
the postnati Scot could lay claim to English land. Coke classified acquired land as conquered Christian
territory, conquered infidel territory, and inherited kingdoms. “There was some fear abroad in the colonies
that if the colonies were regarded as conquered countries the inhabitants might be held to have forfeited
part of their English liberties. On May 26, 1768, it was accordingly resolved in the Maryland lower house
that ‘this province is not under the circumstances of a conquered country;’ that ‘if there be any pretence of
conquest, it can be only supposed against the native indian infidels; which supposition cannot be
admitted, because the Christian inhabitants purchased great part of the land they at first took up, from the
indians, as well as from the lord proprietary;’ that ‘this province hath always hitherto had the common law,
and such general statutes of England as are securitative of the rights and liberties of the subject, and
such acts of assembly as were made in the province to suit its particular constitution, as the rule and
standard of its government and judicature’ (61 MD. Archives, 330-31).” Joseph Henry Smith, Appeals to
the Privy Council from the American Plantations, Julius Goebel, Jr., intro. (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1950), pp. v, 522, n.231. NB: there is an issue, still debated among scholars, about the situations
posited by Coke in which the king did or did not have the authority to grant or change the law with or
without legislative consent. Was he talking about the English Parliament in his analysis or, rather, to a
(local) parliament, possibly but not necessarily the English one? See Barbara A. Black “The Constitution
of Empire: The Case for the Colonists,” 124 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1157-1211, 1186-98
(1976). On the matter of colonial versus English law, see generally Mary Sarah Bilder, The Transatlantic
Constitution: Colonial Legal Culture and Empire (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press,
2004). Calvin’s Case was actually less directly applicable to the American colonies than the 1693 case,
published in 1717, Blankard v. Galdy, 2 Salkeld 411, 91 English Reports 356 (King’s Bench 1693), in
which John Holt, the chief judge of the King’s bench, created another category of land: uninhabited
territory discovered by Englishmen. In fine, there was a continuing debate in the col-onies and in England
on many fronts about legal uniformity vs. diversity, viz., when American legislative and judicial decisions
were improperly “repugnant” to English law (and England) versus when they legitimately “diverged” – the
issue of “transatlantic accommodation.” See Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution, pp. 35-50 & notes
therein Mary Sarah Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution: Colonial Legal Culture and Empire (Cambridge,
MA & London: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 35-50 & notes therein; see also Barbara A.. Black on
the continuing vitality of McIlwain’s thesis in support of the colonists, including John Adams, “The
Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists,” 124 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1157-98
(1976).
n. 411: Thus, for example, in Adams’ early series of Governor Winthrop letters in which the subject was
the legitimacy of the Bay Governor (Bernard) refusing to administer the oath of office to two men who had
been elected to the Massachusetts assembly from the town of Newbury, Adams utilized English history to
explain how “the sole right of judging with regard to elections belonged to the house itself.” Honing in on
the bottom-line, Adams explained, “The only question is, who shall judge?” This alluded to both a phrase
taken from the Bible, and one elaborated upon in detail by Locke and others. Isaiah 2:4 described the end
of war, and how nations will not take up the sword against each other but, instead, turn their swords into
plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Peace. In this context, God is the Judge. Hobbes, Locke
and others considered the matter in the context of early modern civil society. In his Second Treatise, for
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example, Locke stated, “Here, tis like, the common Question will be made, Who shall be Judge whether
the Prince or Legislative act contrary to their Trust? …The People shall be Judge. Locke, “Second
Treatise,” Two Treatises of Government, Ch. XIX, §240, pp. 426-27. From the religious lord to the civil
one, the focus shifted to the people, viz., the sovereignty of the people. Whether a governor, king, or
other type of magistrate succeeded in usurping the authority of the legislature was irrelevant. The
absence of interference or what the political theorists call “negative liberty” was insufficient. It was
absolutely necessary that for the legislature to function freely there be no infringement on its entitlement
to act should it choose to do so and however it chose to do so. “That the Governor did not succeed in his
attempt,” an attempt to “judge of these things,” was in Adams’ view, “no proof that he did not make it,” i.e.,
try. Analogizing the colonial confrontation between the local legislature and the Bay Governor to that of
Parliament and James I, Adams wrote, “Our thanks are not due to him, but to the house, that this
Dedimus was not received; all the members sworn by virtue of it, and itself lodged on file, as a precedent,
to silence all envious and revengeful declaimers, both for himself and all his successors. It is equally true
that King James did not succeed in his attempt, but gave it up. Yet all historians have recorded that
attempt as a direct, and formidable attack on the freedom of elections, and as one proof that he aimed at
demolishing the constitution, at stretching prerogative beyond its just bounds, and at abridging the
constitutional rights and liberties of the nation.” In short, said Adams, “What should hinder but that a
Governor’s attempt should be recorded too? “X. Governor Winthrop to Governor Bradford,” Feb. 9, 1767
and and “Xi. Governor Winthrop to Governor Bradford,” Feb. 16, 1767, PJA Vol. I, pp. 198-211.
n. 471: Nelson’s thesis in The Royalist Revolution was that the American patriots, who prior to the
revolution had thought of themselves as allied with the interests of Parliament vis-à-vis the king, in fact
analytically switched sides, advocating “Royalist” arguments rooted in the century-old views of the
Cavaliers who had supported a strong Stuart monarchy under Charles I in bloody opposition to the
Roundheads – the Parliamentarians – in the English Civil Wars. Identifying an important shift in the
language of the colonists in opposition to the British empire, Nelson’s starting point was the debate
between the Bay legislature and Governor Hutchinson. Nelson effectively made the case that in both
centuries, the debate “pitted defenders of the royal prerogative against the proponents of parliamentary
power and ‘popular sovereignty’ and focused particularly on trade.” Eric Nelson, The Royalist Revolution:
Monarchy and the American Founding (Cambridge, MA & London, EN, 2014), p. 39. What Nelson
established is that the colonial patriots, in a classic use of adroit legal strategy and advocacy, cherrypicked arguments from seventeenth-century figures who were royalists opposed to a sharing of power by
the monarch with a Parliament grasping for more power.
A critical footnote to Nelson’s argument, however, is that the colonists were using this “royalist” language
for an entirely different purpose that the goal sought by Charles I and the Cavaliers. This fact in no way
challenges Nelson’s important reminder that we should “adopt the supposition that historical agents
generally mean what they say and that their actions in the political realm do indeed tend to reflect their
advertised commitments.” Id, p. 25.Neither does this suggest, as Nelson critiqued others for doing, that
the Americans “simply deployed a variety of different strategies of legitimation in order to secure” what
they knew they wanted, viz., a scattergun approach, although I do think that different strategies to achieve
their goals were used as circumstances changed, and language was selected that best supported those
evolving strategies; in short, discourse, unsurprisingly, changed. Id, p. 27.Of course the use of discourse
is complex; and while the same language can be used, as Kloppenberg reminded us, the same words
can be used to mean something other than what was originally intended. In other words, just because
the Americans selected “royalist” language does not mean that they agreed with the purpose for which
that language was originally invoked, viz., favoring a strong, if not absolute monarchy. In short, because
arguments were originally used for the purpose of supporting “the tyrannical Stuarts” does not mean that
the American colonists sought the rule of a tyrannical Hanoverian monarch! Id, p. 42. The Americans
would have equally opposed a strong British monarchy or a dominating Parliament that sought to closely
control their affairs. It was the view of the patriots that it was in the best interest of the colonies and the
British people generally for there to be no power center, whether executive, legislative or judicial, that was
excessively powerful, and therefore controlling. As John Adams stated in a letter to Mercy Otis Warren, “I
knew that absolute power was tyranny, delirious tyranny wherever it was placed…. In America I have
always thought that a mixed government was necessary…. But I have always advocated a mixed elective
government in three branches.” John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, July 7, 1807, Correspondence
Between John Adams and Mercy Warren, p. 321-28, 325.
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As Nelson recognized, by the time the colonists were arguing their cause a century or more after the
events that originally spawned Nelson’s thesis, it was Parliament, not the King, that was the primary
threat to Americans’ liberty. Thus, while Nelson’s argument cleverly established that “the patriots were
consistently appealing to a ‘seventeenth-century constitution’ of customary right and checks on arbitrary
power against an ‘eighteenth-century constitution’ of uncontrolled parliamentary supremacy,” pace
Nelson’s inference and his interpretation of legal scholar John Phillip Reid’s argument, the Americans
were not “in effect, siding with the seventeenth-century whigs against the eighteenth-century whigs.” Id,
p. 238 n.27. The shift that had occurred was the locus of political power in Britain, not opposition to
oppressive power. In that sense, the patriot position was not “straightforwardly Royalist,” – “the political
and constitutional theory of those who defended Charles I.” Id, p. 238-39, ns.27 and 29. Indeed, it was
not straightforward or Royalist at all. Something else was going on here, and that was classic legal
advocacy.
First of all, it is important to keep in mind John Adams’ observation, quoted by Nelson, that, “The
principles of the American Revolution may be said to have been as various as the thirteen States that
went through it.” John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, July 20, 1807, in Correspondence Between John
Adams and Mercy Otis Warren Relating to Her History of the American Revolution, Charles Francis
Adams, ed. (1878; repr., New York 1972)(“John and Mercy Correspondence”), p. 338, cited by Nelson in
The Royalist Revolution at p. 239 n.30. n that sense there certainly was no uniform “patriot” strategy or
choice of argument to persuade the British prime minister and Parliament that they should return to
simpler times when the colonial backwaters were not particularly profitable and therefore less interesting
to the metropole. By this juncture, you not only had a mother country in dire need of funds, but you had
an obvious place for it to go to get them. In retrospect, returning to the status quo ante and significantly
loosening the metropole’s control over the American colonies may have been wise, but it probably was no
longer a realistic option. Perhaps in recognition of this fact, and utilizing a variety of arguments – natural
rights, the ancient constitution and yes, the arguments used against the overreaching Stuarts but applying
them to the overreaching Parliament – the patriots sought to persuade the British government to allow the
colonial legislatures to decide local matters, including taxes, because, it was maintained, the right to tax
was contingent on the consent of the governed. Such consent could not be obtained through Parliament;
not realistically.
Turning to this specific “switch” that is the essence of The Royalist Revolution and which relied in part on
the Hutchinson debates, the colonists utilized the seventeenth-century royalists’ arguments originally
made in support of the Stuarts, who opposed a weak seventeenth-century Parliament determined to
obtain more power. The reason that the patriots hijacked this language was because it was another
instance of what lawyers would term helpful “dicta” that could be applied to the Americans’ own changed
circumstances, viz., in seeking to motivate a weak king, George III, to defend the colonists against the
dominance and intrusion into colonial life of not a weak, but a powerful Parliament. (Recall Adams’ own
explanation of the use (and misuse) of dicta in the context of the Brattle letters when he excoriated Brattle
for his misuse of an authority, failing to distinguish between reliance on dicta as an “ornament” of
legitimate legal advocacy, on the one hand, and the ruling of a judge or other legal authority that settles a
matter in controversy, on the other.) As discussed in Part I, using the terminology of “whig” carries with it
enormous baggage, and so it would be sensible to simply jettison that terminology here. What the
American colonists were doing in the Hutchinson papers, for example, was struggling to find legal
language that could be cited as precedent to support their conviction that the British Parliament was
overreaching. As Nelson pointed out, Adams clearly stated that the colonists’ purpose was to oppose
“the unlimited claims of Parliament.” John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, July 20, 1807, in John and Mercy
Correspondence, p. 352, cited by Nelson in The Royalist Revolution at p. 239 n.30. The sensible solution,
not intended in any way to endorse a monarchy that functioned as the Stuarts did, was to use the
language of the Cavaliers in their defense of the royal prerogative; for it was through some sort of
exercise of the royal prerogative, which by Adams’ time was dormant and virtually a nullity, that the
colonists sought to escape the all-powerful clutches of Parliament. To the extent that the colonists were
making “an unprecedented turn towards the ‘prerogativism’ of the Stuarts,” which Nelson argued, it was a
pragmatic turn not a constitutional one, and certainly not the constitutional turn that was behind the
original use of the language. Id, p. 239 n. 29. As a constitutional matter, for example, the colonists’ views
of James I’s thesis on the king’s constitutional right to rule as an absolute monarch in no way “switched”
because they were using the Cavaliers’ language on prerogative. Furthermore, one could just as clearly
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argue that the use of the Cavaliers’ language was extremely consistent with the struggle the century
before in that in both instances, while the facts on the ground had changed, viz., Parliament was now the
overreaching party not the king, the legal issue had not; and that issue was the absence of balance.
Regardless of how that the balance in government unjustly was tipped, whether in favor of a monarch or
the Parliament, the issue was the same; there was, in this sense, absolutely no switch.
In the Hutchinson debate context, the colonists were faced with evolving circumstances. Just looking at
Massachusetts Bay, and there are parallel circumstances in other British colonies, the citizenry first faced
taxes that they did not believe they should pay; but as Nelson documents, the issue became much bigger
than taxes. Having a standing army in their midst, for example, stationed in Boston and located there not
to protect the people but to confront and “handle” them, was a calculated affront to the colonists’ sense of
freedom. As Adams dolefully commented, “My daily Reflections, for two Years, at the Sight of those
Soldiers before my door were serious enough. Their very Appearance in Boston was a strong proof to
me, that the determination in Great Britain to subjugate Us, was too deep and inveterate ever to be
altered by Us.” JA D&A, Vol. III, p. 290. The idea that a British American would be treated differently than
a Brit living in England or elsewhere was insulting to the Americans. Add to this the colonists’ deepening
resentment that they were not given the ordinary right to consent to either representatives who
participated in lawmaking on their behalf or, alternatively, to vote directly for or against proposed laws that
directly impacted them, a right considered to be an indisputable part of their British heritage inculcated by
and embodied in Magna Carta etc., etc., and then, to add injury to insult, accompany this constitutional
affront with huge encroachments on colonial trade and Americans’ livelihood, including the policy of
“impressing” sailors on American ships and later enforcing Britain’s punitive measures, most
conspicuously closing Boston harbor after the Boston Tea Party, and you have all the necessary
ingredients for an explosion. There is an entire literature on the necessary ingredients for revolution.
Setting aside the innumerable monographs devoted to a specific revolution, among the many analyses,
see Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies, 3rd ed., Jack A. Goldstone, ed.
(Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2003); James DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary
Movements, 5th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2015); John Dunn, Modern Revolutions: An
Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1989);
Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, (London: Penguin Classics, 2006); Lawrence Stone, The Causes of the
English Revolution 1529-1642 (London & NYC: Routledge, 1996), chapter one on theories of revolution.
None of this has anything to do with an embracing of old-fashioned royalism beyond pleading for King
George to do something to help his subjects in America.
n. 489: Adams’ successful representation of Hancock in Sewell v. Hancock led to his being hired (along
with Otis, who by this time was becoming “unlucid”) by Michael Corbet, an Irishman, and several other
seamen accused of the murder of a British lieutenant who boarded their merchant vessel, the Pitt Packet
to impress the sailors. The criminal defendants were to be tried in a Specialty Court of Admiralty that
heard major felonies committed at sea. (On the mental state of Otis at this point, compare, e.g., Reid, In
a Defiant State, at p. 102, with id. p. 200 n.5, citing a letter from Colonial Jones Robertson to General
Thomas Gage, 24 May 1769, Gage Papers (MS, Clements Library). Rex v. Corbet, 1769, Legal Papers
of John Adams, pp. 276-335. Adams’ recollection was that the case “cost me no small Portion of
Anxiety.” Adams to Jedidiah Morse, Jan. 20, 1816, JA Works, Vol. 10, pp. 207-08,
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/adams-the-works-of-john-adams-vol-10-letters-1811-1825-indexes#lf143110_head_089 (3-2-19). Adams argued that the impressment was illegal and therefore that the seamen
had the right to defend themselves. The Court agreed, issuing a decree of justifiable homicide. What was
so curious about the case was the Court’s unwillingness to have a public hearing. In a letter written
almost fifty years later Adams described the scene to his friend. “When the Court opened the next day,
and the prisoners ordered to the bar, all the world expected that the trial would commence, and the
argument on the law and the evidence proceed. But after a solemn pause and total silence, Governor
Bernard, the President of the Court, arose, and with a countenance so solemn and gloomy as made the
audience shudder, as if a sentence of death was coming, addressed himself to the prisoners by name,
and pronounced, ‘The Court have considered the evidence in support of the libel against you, and are
unanimously of opinion that it amounts only to justifiable homicide; you are accordingly acquitted and
discharged from your imprisonment.’” Bizarrely, “Not another word was said.” Reflecting back on the
case all those years later, Adams remained mystified at the proceeding. “This trial, Dr. Morse, is a
mystery never yet explained, -- a labyrinth without a clue! an enigma that never can be unriddled… First,
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Where can you find a secret court of judicature? In court martials, in the Inquisition, or in the Lion’s
mouth at Venice? The star chamber and the high commission court in England, even Jeffreys’s courts
were open and public. Second,” said Adams, all of the Bay officials, from the Governor on down, were
“skulking and hiding in total silence from open court to secret council chamber.” Third, “Upon what law,
upon what principle were the prisoners acquitted of piracy and murder? No body knew, nobody could
conjecture.” Fourth said Adams, and reflecting the reliance in his republicanism on layers of law, the
subject of Chapter Six of this study, Adams mused, “Was the decision according to the law of nature, the
law of nations, the civil law, the common law, or the statute law? No man could answer any of these
questions.” Fifth, “There was an act of parliament expressly forbidding impressments in America, then
lying on the table before the judges, produced by the counsel for the prisoners, and ready to be read at a
moment’s warning, which would have justified the decision of the Court, to the king, the English nation,
and the American public… Why did not the Court permit this statute to be read or mentioned?” Sixth,
Adams queried, could it be possible that the Court, its counsel and the crown, including its navy and
custom-house officials, were ignorant of this statute? Seventh, “Was the sentence of the Court founded
on the principle of the universal illegality of impressment? I sincerely believed it was, and, moreover, that
no one judge upon the bench would have dared to give an opinion of its legality.” In sum, “every thing
relative to this great event must remain mysterious.” Id.
In this context, we also have an instance in which an historian completely misunderstood Adams’
commentary about the outcome of a case. According to William Pencak, “To keep Adams from
contesting the constitutionality of impressment into the British navy in a 1769 case, where seaman
Michael Corbet killed a naval officer who was trying to seize him, Adams claimed that Hutchinson ‘in
indecorous haste’ adjourned the court to arrange a verdict of justifiable homicide, ‘like a conclave of
cardinals, in secret intrigue,’ or ‘like Indians fighting behind bushes … to avoid detection.” In Pencak view
this was another incident evidencing Adams’ bias; for from Adams’ perspective, it showed the despicable
character of the Governor (Bernard) and the despised Lieutenant Governor (Hutchinson). In fact, what
Adams’ commentary reflects is fifty-years worth of glee, having so admirably defended the case in his
court filings that it forced the judges to end the prosecution of Adams’ client. See WILLIAM Pencak,
“John Adams and the Massachusetts Provincial Elite,” John Adams and the Founding of the Republic, p.
61. On impressment generally and the “long tradition of rioting against impressment in the American
colonies,” see Denver Brunsman, “The Knowles Atlantic Impressment Riots of the 1740s,” Stanley N.
Katz et al eds., Colonial America: Essays in Politics and Social Development, Sixth Edition (New York &
London, Routledge, 2011), Ch. 26, pp. 552-75. The editors of Adams’ legal papers have a somewhat
different view: “Adams always remembered Corbet’s case warmly. He consider[ed] it more important than
the Massacre trials, and he never forgot the honest testimony of the British sailors (some of whom
testified in behalf of the prisoners)” who had been on board the Rose “and their apparent abhorrence of
the press gang.” “No. 56, Rex v. Corbet,” JA Legal Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 275-335, 278 and 281.
Years after Corbet, in 1809, Adams published a letter in the Boston Globe in which he explained the
intricate legal history of the practice of British impressment on the high seas. Adams’ 1809 views likely
originated in his work on the Corbet case. Rigorous lawyer that he was, Adams reviewed English
common law, the opinions of some of the greatest English jurists on the subject, particularly Lord
Mansfield, the highly influential Commentaries on the Laws of England by William Blackstone, [check] as
well as the applicability of Magna Carta. Overall Adams noted how Lord Mansfield “most manifestly
dreaded the question” of the legality of impressment, “carefully avoided the use of the word right [of
impressment]” because Mansfield “knew the sense, force and power of words too well to profane that
sacred expression, by applying to a practice so loose and undefined, so irregular and capricious, so
repugnant to the inherent, hereditary, unalienable and indefensible birth rights of British subjects,” and
therefore called it “a practice and a power,” but not even a “prerogative” of the crown. In short, to Adams
it was very clear that the British practice of impressment was unlawful. “Upon the whole, …the pride in the
navy has got the better of their sense of law and justice… sacrificing the principles of justice and law to
reasons of state, by countenancing this branch of arbitrary power.” Raison d’état – the nemesis of civil
liberties. John Adams letter to the Boston Patriot, April 25, 1809, Founders Online, National Archives last
modified Dec. 28, 2016, National Archives, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-025348 (3-14-17). Reid’s In a Defiant Stance effectively concurs with Adams 1809 assessment: “British
imperial law may have been the law of the empire but it had not been formulated to rule an empire. It was
a flaccid law – flaccid in two senses that lent an aura of legitimacy or extralegality to the violence of whig
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mobs. One was an abulia in enforcement that opened imperial law to challenge. The other was a flaw in
formulation exposing it to emasculative questioning. It was in many respects a ‘confused’ law, more
easily broken than upheld, as easily ignored as obeyed.” In the Corbet case, there was no whig mob; the
killing took place on the high seas. “Surely from the evidence it was a simple case of murder.” However,
“Adams intended to base his case on the argument that impressment was illegal under the statute of
1707.” In a fascinating turn of events, however, Adams was not given the opportunity to do so. The
bench interrupted Adams’ summation in a clear determination not to reach this substantive question.
Given the common-law right to resist unlawful restraint, there was no way to rule affirmatively on
impressment and not run headlong into this well-recognized common-law principle. In short, the law that
the court was “expected to enforce was unenforceable”; and trying to do so “would have added the navy
to the boiling pot of contemporary politics.” The Special Court of Admiralty … took another tack. It
punted. See Reid, In a Defiant Stance, Ch. 11, “Disjointed and Independent of Each Other: The
Conditions of Imperial Law,” pp. 100-17; cf. Hiller B. Zobel, “Law under Pressure: Boston 1769-1771,” in
Law and Authority in Colonial America 192 (George Athan Billias, ed., 1965).
n. 482: In one of his earliest political pieces, the 1765 Instructions adopted by the Town of Braintree,
written in the context of the Stamp Act, Adams wrote about the issue of taxation without representation:
“no freeman can be separated from his property but by his own act or fault. We take it clearly, therefore,
to be inconsistent with the spirit of the common law, and of the essential fundamental principles of the
British constitution, that we should be subject to any tax imposed by the British Parliament; because we
are not represented in that assembly in any sense, unless it be by a fiction of law, as insensible in theory
as it would be injurious in practice, if such a taxation should be grounded on it.” “II. Instructions Adoptee
by the Braintree Town Meeting,” Sept. 1765, PJA Vol. I, p. 138.
The first article of “A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,”
the first part of the Massachusetts Constitution and drafted by Adams in 1779, stated, “All men are born
free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights, among which may be
reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.” “Part the First,”
Massachusetts Constitution, A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts,” https://malegislature.gov/Laws/Contitution (3-14-19). There is perhaps no clearer
statement of the linkage among rights, liberty, property, and safety or security. The reference to property
in this context seems to be the modern one – the acquisition of real, corporeal things. But the familiar
interconnected trio of “life, liberty, and property” also appeared in Articles X and XIII of the Declaration. In
Article XXIX, the stated interconnected rights were “life, liberty, property, and character,” the preservation
of which required “an impartial interpretation of the laws, and administration of justice.” In Article XII,
Adams compiled these related concepts differently: “No subject [of the commonwealth] shall be arrested,
imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of
the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the
land.”
In his 1775 Novanglus letters, Adams referred to the English people’s determination to protect
themselves from the exercise of arbitrary power. The people will tolerate a great deal, said Adams, but
there were limits; and they will rid themselves of legislators who “have acted contrary to their trust, by
invading their property,” referring to their right to be free from subjugation by arbitrary power, and the
exercise of rights founded “in the constitutions and laws of the government.” “VI. To the Inhabitants of the
Colony of Massachusetts-Bay, Feb. 27, 1775 (“Novanglus VI”) PJA Vol. 2, pp.288-307, 292. Here we
seem to have the use of property in the eighteenth-century sense articulated by Reid as “a means of
survival and of well-being,” but not necessary a source of capital. (On the other hand, the issue was
unlawful taxation, and so perhaps Adams was using “property” to describe money.) See Reid, The
Concept of Liberty, p. 72.
In an Aug. 13, 1813 letter to William Tudor, Adams wrote about Otis’s famous 1764 pamphlet, The Rights
of the British Colonies Asserted and Approved, in which the firebrand declared, “The absolute rights of
Englishmen, as frequently declared in parliament, from Magna Charta, to this time, are the rights of
personal security, personal liberty and of private property.” The British Americans “transplant[ed] themselves and their posterity,” Otis had explained, but remained “entitled to all the essential rights of the
mother country,” including the rights to liberty and property.
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In Adams’ Preface to Defence, Adams grouped “the liberty, property, and safety of the people” in his
discussion of the American states’ adoption of English customs considered beneficial. Adams,
“Preliminary Observations,” Defence, Vol. I, p. 5. In his discussion of law, and the entitlement of the
majority to adopt laws that might not be uniformly beneficial to the people, Adams offered another
clustering: “We may go farther, and say that a nation may be unanimous in consenting to a law
restraining its natural liberty, property, and commerce, and its moral and religious liberties too, to a
degree that may be prejudicial to the nation and to every individual in it.” “Dr. Price,” id, p. 123. In
discussing the concept of empire in Defence, Adams explained that per Harrington, “Domestic empire is
founded upon dominion, and dominion is property, real or personal; that is to say, in lands, or in money
and goods.” In this context, property is meant in its corporeal sense, a source of capital. “ Referencing
Solons’ laws in A Defence, Adams grouped “the property, liberty, equality, and security of the citizens.”
“Ancient Republics, and Opinions of Philosophers, id, p. 161. In discussing the ancient Greek states,
Adams said, “Through the whole of Tacitus and Homer, the three orders are visible both in Germany and
Greece; and the continual fluctuations of law, the uncertainty of life, liberty, and property, and the
contradictory claims and continual revolutions, arose entirely from the want of having the prerogatives
and privileges of those orders defined, from the want of independence in each of them, and a balance
between them.” “Ithaca,” Defence of the Constitution, The Works of John Adams, Second President of
the United States: with a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, by his Grandson Charles Francis
Adams (Boston: Little, Brown, 1856) [repr. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2011), Vol. 4, p. 368. In his
Defence conclusions, Adams remarked that, “no man, after all, would consider his life, liberty, or property,
safe” before a unicameral legislature that also served as the administrator of justice. Id, p. 371.
In sum, liberty was invariably associated with property, and sometimes with other associated rights and
values.
n. 671: Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson; Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party
Ideology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978); Bernard A. Weisberger, America Afire: Jefferson,
Adams, and the Election of 1800 (New York: William Morrow, 2001); Merrill D. Peterson, Adams and
Jefferson: A Revolutionary Dialogue (New York: Oxford, 1975); Richard Samuelson, “What John Adams
Saw Over Jefferson’s Wall,” Commentary 104 (Aug. 1997), pp. 52-54; Samuelson, Poles Together: John
Adams and Thomas Jefferson (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Continuing Education Seminar
Press, 1997); Joseph Ellis, American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Vintage,
1998); Conor Cruise O’Brien, The Long Affair: Thomas Jefferson and the French Revolution, 1785-1800
(Chicago University Press, 1996). Stephen G. Kurtz, The Presidency of. John Adams: The Collapse of
Federalism 1795-1800 (Philadelphia: University of. Pennsylvania Press, 1957).
n. 676: In “John Locke, Carolina, and the ‘Two Treatises of Government,” Political Theory, Vol. 32, No. 5
(Oct. 2004), pp. 602-67, David Armitage analyzed the relationship of slavery and Locke’s political ideas,
its relationship to Locke’s views in Two Treatises, and his role in drafting the Fundamental Constitutions
of Carolina, initially written in 1669 when Locke was secretary to the Lords Proprietors of Carolina, both
an executive and administrative role that, “combined with Locke’s closeness to Anthony Ashley Cooper,
the Proprietor most intimately associated with the Fundamental Constitutions, makes it inconceivable that
he would not have played at the very least a major supervisory role in their drafting.” Of course, the
reason for the disquiet about the Fundamental Constitutions was because they “assumed the existence
of slavery and affirmed the absolute powers of life and death of slaveholders. They also erected the first
hereditary nobility on North American soil.” Indeed, Shaftesbury constitutionalized himself as one of eight
such men! Describing the position of Locke’s enemies, Armitage noted, “What worse commonwealth for
a philosopher to have designed than this anti-democratic slave society dominated by a ‘tyrannical
Aristocracy’?” Id, p. 607. Locke was knowledgeable and often involved in the business of the Carolina
colony over an extensive period of time, and certainly had an “enduring albeit intermittent” interest in the
Fundamental Constitutions, including during the summer of 1682 when Armitage argued Locke was most
likely to have composed Chapter V of his Second Treatise, “Of Property.” Id, pp. 607, 611.
Recently, Holly Brewer raised interesting but ultimately unpersuasive arguments on the compatibility of
Locke’s liberalism and his slavery-related activities. See Ch. One, n. 503. Perhaps Locke changed his
mind about slavery late in his life, as Brewer suggested. But he neither acted nor spoke out forcefully on
the subject. Notwithstanding Brewer’s thoughtful and intricate analysis of Locke’s liberalism and the
Carolina Constitutions, the fact is that Locke advocated one thing, and in his lifetime he effectively did
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another. As always, Locke was timid, largely retreating into theory; he even delayed publishing his own
political work until after his death. Brewer also tended to aggrandize the liberalism of the Glorious
Revolution. Pace its potential, the Glorious Revolution installed a king who sought as much power as he
could get away with, recognizing a similar goal by Parliament. See Ch. One, ns. 686 & 696 and
accompanying text. Note that Brewer also turned to Jefferson in support of her position – an ironic
reference. Finally, as Armitage’s noted, there is a “range of treatments of Locke on slavery” by a number
of scholars, something Brewer recognized as well. See Holly Brewer, “Slavery, Sovereignty, and
‘Inheritable Blood’: Reconsidering John Locke and the Origins of American Slavery,” American Historical
Review (Oct. 2017), 1038-78, 1076, 1052 n.34; Armitage, “John Locke, Carolina, and the ‘Two Treatises
of Government,” p. 626 n. 88. Indeed, Brewer particularly endorsed the work of James Farr on Locke and
slavery, stating that Farr , “has written the best discussion about how the Fundamental Constitutions
should shape how we think about Locke’s thought on slavery.” Farr, however, comes out very differently
than Brewer! Just to give a flavor of his thought, he begins his 2008 article with the following statement:
“In an 1819 letter, Thomas Jefferson paraphrased John Locke’s definition of a ‘madman’ as ‘someone
who has a kink in his head on some particular subject, which neither reason nor fact can untangle.’
Jefferson had certain Calvinists in mind; Locke, those enthusiasts persuaded of divine inspiration. But
with respect to slavery, Locke as well as Jefferson had a ‘kink in the head’ and ‘neither reason nor fact’
can untangle the contradictions of his conduct and writings.” James Farr, “Locke, Natural Law, and New
World Slavery,” Political Theory 36, No. 4 (2008), pp. 495-522, 495; accord, Farr, “’So Vile and Miserable
an Estate’: The Problem of Slavery in Locke’s Political Thought,” Political Theory 14, No. 2 (1986), pp.
263-89. On the Brewer article, see also Ch. Two, n.208. On Jefferson, see also n. 516 & accompanying
text.
n. 686: On slavery, consider, for example, Adams’ 1785 comments to Jefferson about the latter’s privately
printed Notes on the State of Virginia: “I thank you kindly for your Book. It is our Meditation all the Day
long. I cannot now say much about it, but I think it will do its Author and his Country great Honour. The
Passages upon slavery, are worth Diamonds. They will have more effect than Volumes written by mere
Philosophers.” Adams to Jefferson, May 22, 1785, The Adams-Jefferson Letters, p. 21. There are other
comments in Adams’ correspondence to the same effect. Adams’ felicitations are intriguing and perhaps
cheeky given his knowledge of Jefferson’s position as “a lifetime participant in an ancient system that
made him the master of hundreds of people over whom he had near-absolute power. He could buy and
sell human beings.” Gordon-Reed & Onuf, “Most Blessed of the Patriarchs,” p. xv.
On women, the very famous statement by Abigail to John on the subject was, “Remember the Ladies.”
Abigail was funny, shrewd and probably very serious in her plea that the “New Code of Laws which I
suppose it will be necessary for you to make … be more generous and favourable to them than your
ancestors. Do not put such unlimited power into the hands of the Husbands. Remember all Men would
be tyrants if they could.” Abigail did not hold back, returning volley to John in her tongue-in-cheek threat
that, “If particular care and attention is not paid to the Laidies we are determined to foment a Rebelion,
and will not hold ourselves bound by any Laws in which we have no voice, or Representation.” Abigail to
John, March 31, 1776, My Dearest Friend, pp. 109-11, 110. John responded in kind, with humor but also
seriousnous.
As to your extraordinary Code of Laws, I cannot but laugh. We have been told that our Struggle
has loosened the bands of Government every Where. That Children and Apprentices were
disobedient – that schools and Colledges were grown turbulent – that Indians slighted their
Guardians and Negroes grew insolent to their Masters. But your Letter was the first Intimation
that another Tribe more numerous and powerfull than all the rest were grown discontented.
This is rather too coarse a Compliement but you are so saucy, I wont blot it out.
Depend upon it, We know better than to repeal our Masculine systems. Although they are in full
Force, you know they are little more than Theory. We dare not expert our Power in its full
Latitude. We are obliged to go fair, and softly, and in Practice you know We are the subjects.
We have only the Name of Masters, and rather than give up this, which would compleatly
subject Us to the Despotism of the Peticoat, I hope George Washington, and all our brave
Heroes would fight. …. I begin to think the [British] Ministry as deep as they are wicked. After
Stirring up Tories, Landjobbers, Trimmers, Bigots, Canadians Indians, Negroes, Hanoverians,
Hessians, Russians, Irish Roman Catholicks, Scotch Renegadoes, at last they have stimulated
the ______ [viz., women] to demand new Priviledges and threaten to rebell.
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John heard Abigail; but clearly he was not ready for any sort of change in the legal status of women, nor
did he think “General Washington, and all our brave Heroes” were ready, either. John to Abigail, April 14,
1776, My Dearest Friend, pp. 111-13. Finally, note also Adams’ recognition in 1813 that, “female
Aristocrats are nearly as formidable in Society as male…. Millions of Examples might be quoted from
History sacred and profane, from Eve, Hannah, Deborah Susanna Abigail, Judith, Ruth, down to Hellen
Madame de Maintenon and Mrs. Fitcherbert.” Adams to Jefferson, Nov. 15, 1813, The Adams-Jefferson
Letters, pp. 397-402, 398-99.
Chapter Six
n. 16: “In the Middle Ages litigants were entitled to petition the king, who relied on the advice of his
Chancellor, commonly an ecclesiastic (“the keeper of the king's conscience”), to do justice in each case.
By the 15th century, petitions were referred directly to the Chancellor, who dealt with cases on a flexible
basis: he was more concerned with the fair result than with rigid principles of law (hence the jurist John
Selden's jibe that “equity varied with the length of the Chancellor's foot”). The seventeenth-century
brought conflicts between those exercising common-law justice versus equitable relief. “In the 17th
century conflict arose between the common-law judges and the Chancellor as to who should prevail;
James I resolved the dispute in favour of the Chancellor. General principles began to emerge, and by the
early 19th century the Court of Chancery was more organized and its jurisdiction, once flexible, had
ossified into a body of precedent with fixed principles.” The Court of Chancery encompasses “varying
types of jurisdiction (see auxiliary jurisdiction; concurrent jurisdiction; exclusive jurisdiction) and many of
its general principles were stated in the form of maxims of equity; equity had (and still has) certain
doctrines (see election; conversion; reconversion; performance of contract; satisfaction).” The Court of
Chancery was abolished pursuant to the Judicature Acts 1873–75, “with the establishment of the High
Court of Justice to administer both common law and equity,” although “much of its work is still carried out
by the Chancery Division.” Interestingly, the Judicature Acts also “provided that in cases in which there
was a conflict between the rules of law and equity, the rules of equity should prevail.” Today, the “main
areas of equitable jurisdiction now include trusts, equitable interests over property, relief against forfeiture
and penalties, and equitable remedies.” Jonathan Law and Elizabeth A. Martin, in A Dictionary of Law (7
ed.) (Oxford University Press, online January 2009),
www.http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/10.1093/acref/9780199551248.001.0001 (10-1-17).
n. 19: On the nature of law and, particularly, its relationship to liberty, see also Mortimer N. S. Sellers,
“The Value and Purpose of Law,” Baltimore Law Journal 33 (2004), p. 145; The Sacred Fire Of Liberty:
Republicanism, Liberalism And The Law (Ny: Nyu Press, 1998) Or American Republicanism (Ny: Nyu
Press, 1994). See the body of work by John Phillip Reid: Reid, John Phillip. The Ancient Constitution
and the Origins of Anglo-American Liberty (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2005); Reid,
Rule of Law: The Jurisprudence of Liberty in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (DeKalb, IL:
Northern Illinois University Press. 2004); Reid, "The Jurisprudence of Liberty: The Ancient Constitution in
the Legal Historiography of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," The Roots of Liberty: Magna
Carta, Ancient Constitution, and the Anglo-American Tradition of Rule of Law, Ellis Sandoz, ed.
(Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press,1993), pp. 147-231; Reid, "Law and History." Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review 27 (Nov. 1993), pp. 193-223; Reid, Constitutional History of the American
Revolution: The Authority of Law: Volume 4. (Madison, WI, University of Wisconsin Press, 1993); Reid,
Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority to Legislate: Volume 3 (Madison, WI.
University of Wisconsin Press, 1991); Reid, The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American
Revolution (The University of Chicago Press. 1989); Reid, Constitutional History of the American
Revolution: The Authority to Tax: Volume 2 (Madison, WI, University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); Reid,
Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority of Rights: Volume 1. (Madison, WI.
University of Wisconsin Press, 1986); Reid, “The Ordeal by Law of Thomas Hutchinson,” Hendrik Hartog,
ed., Law in the American Revolution and the Revolution in Law (New York & London: New York
University Press, 1981), pp. 20-45; Reid, “The Irrelevance of the Declaration,” in Hendrik Hartog, ed.,
Law in the American Revolution and the Revolution in Law (New York & London: New York University
Press, 1981), pp. 46-89; Reid, "In the Taught Tradition: The Meaning of Law in Massachusetts Bay Two
Hundred Years Ago," Suffolk University Law Review Vol. 14 (Summer 1980), pp. 931-74; Reid, "In
Legitimate Stirps: The Concept of 'Arbitrary,' the Supremacy of the Parliament and the Coming of the
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American Revolution." Hofstra Law Review 5 (1977), pp. 459-99; Reid, In a Defiant Stance: The
Conditions of Law in Massachusetts Bay, the Irish Comparison, and the Coming of the American
Revolution (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1977); Reid, "'In Our Contracted
Sphere': The Constitutional Contract, the Stamp Act Crisis, and the Coming of the American Revolution."
Columbia Law Review 76 (1976), pp. 21-47; Reid, "In Accordance with Usage: The Authority of Custom,
the Stamp Act Debater, and the Coming of the American Revolution." Fordham Law Review 45 (1976),
pp. 335-68; Reid, Legal History, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Jul. 1974), pp. 189-207.
n. 22: Note, for example, the commitment of Adams, the college student, reflected in his Diary at age
twenty that, “I am resolved to rise with the Sun and to study Scriptures, on Thurdsday, Fryday, Saturday,
and Sunday mornings,” although he also would “study some Latin author the other 3 mornings.” JA D&A
Vol. I, July 21, 1756, p. 35. Note his Diary entries four years later: “Finished the History of the Common
Law, the second Time”; and yet continuing to be dissatisfied with himself: “I must form a serious
Resolution of beginning and pursuing quite thro, the Plans of my Lords Hale, and Revve. Woods
Ins[itutes] of common Law I never read but ponce, and my Ld. Coke’s Com[mentary] on Lit]tleton] I never
read but once. These two Authors I must get, and read, over and over again.” Etc., etc. And he did
study with enormous discipline, developing the scholarship for which he later became renown.
As for the clergy, Adams was a realist and he figured out that he was not cut out for the job. Among other
things, he became disenchanted with various aspects of organized religion, and did not believe that man
could pierce the veil of the metaphysical world and wasted his time trying to do so. (Here again, Adams
remained remarkably consistent throughout his life. As he wrote in 1814, “Mr. Adams leaves to Homer
and Virgil, to Tacitus and Quintilian, to Mahomet and Calvin, to Edwards and Priestly, or, if you will, to
Milton’s angels reasoning high in pandemonium, all their acute speculations about fate, destiny,
foreknowledge, absolute, necessity, and predestination. He thinks it problematical, whether there is, or
ever will be, more than one Being capable of understanding this vast subject.” Letter from John Adams to
John Taylor, April 15, 1814, The Portable John Adams, p. 413.) At the same time, Adams was a very
religiously tolerant man, and he did not reject religion; to the contrary, he attended church virtually every
week of his life. For example, as a delegate to the 1820 Massachusetts constitutional convention, he
tried unsuccessfully to add a provision to the Commonwealth’s constitution that, “all men of all religions,
demeaning themselves peaceably, and as good subjects of the Commonwealth, shall be equally under
the protection of the law.” Bernstein, “John Adams: The Life and the Biographers,” p. 24, citing Journal of
Debates and Proceedings in the Convention of Delegates, Chosen to Revise the Constitution of
Massachusetts, Begun and Holden at Boston, November 15, 1820, and Continued by Adjournment to
January 9, 1821. Reported for the Boston Daily Advertiser (Boston, MA), p. 209.
n. 31: In “’Bringing Philosophy down from the Heavens’: Natural Right in the Roman Law,” The Review of
Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter, 1989), pp. 70-85, Michael Zuckert analyzed the way in which jurists have
endeavored to integrate the philosophical concept of natural law with Roman law, including Justinian’s
Institutes and the Digest. Fundamentally, the question that the jurists faced was how to create a coherent
doctrine of jus naturale. Zuckert believed that it was essential to set aside both the earlier Stoic and the
later Thomist natural law doctrines in order to appreciate, without anachronism, what the post-Institutes
and Digest jurists were trying to do, which was to include both objective rights – “’the right or just thing
itself,’ that is, the correct assignment or relation of things to persons,” or “being ‘in the right’” – as well as
subjective rights or claims – “having a right” within the scope of jus naturale, and to then integrate these
concepts with civil law. Id, pp. 74, 78-79. “The Roman jurists attempt to carry forward the effort which,
according to Cicero, was initiated by Socrates, of ‘bringing philosophy down from the heavens,’ and
making it useful to men in the cities. They attempt to use philosophy – and to tame it.” Id, p. 79, citing
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations. Grotius was doing the same thing. As discussed infra at n. 685 and
associated text, “He did not look upon civil society as an artificial creation; it was, rather, an
extension or an improvement made in order to render natural society more serviceable to men's
needs. Civil society was built upon the universal human society that existed in nature.”
In parallel with the way that Sidney and other early modern republicans approached the multi-faceted
aspects of law, Zuckert described Roman jurists’ perception of a hierarchy of law, beginning with the most
“universalistic,” in the form of jus naturale, and then continuing to jus gentium, which “’recedes from’ the
jus naturale in that it applies only to all the human peoples and not to all animal beings as such,” and then
receded again to the jus civile, which is “yet more restricted, for it is the jus belonging only to some
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particular people or other.” Id, p. 76. The interesting question that Zuckert’s analysis raised was, when,
and in what ways, is it lawful in civil society to restrict a natural right, the most conspicuous being
freedom, and when is that restriction unlawful? The obvious example is slavery, which was lawful under
Roman law although not lawful in the state of nature, viz., in the state of nature, people are free. This is
an issue with which the early modern English grappled, too. What natural law required in non-natural
circumstances, i.e., not in the state of nature, could be viewed as self-evident – as one scholar stated, “a
body of immortal rules superior to positive law.” A. G. Chloros, “What is Natural Law?” The Modern Law
Review, Vol. 21, No. 6 (Nov., 1958), pp. 609-22, 609. It was Blackstone, in the eighteenth century, who
similarly wrote that, “This law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of
course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe in all countries and at all times:
no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force
and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from the original.’” Id, p. 610, quoting Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England I, at pp. 40-41. Clearly, this was not how Romans applied natural
law to civil society, and for Grotius and the early modern English republicans, the matter was more
complicated.
n. 42: In the first instance, for example, while nations are obligated to contribute to the wellbeing of each
other, a nation’s first priority is to its own welfare. Accordingly, “[w]hen therefore she cannot contribute to
the welfare of another nation without doing an essential injury to herself, her obligation ceases.” Following
Grotius explicitly, Vattel sought to determine which laws were immutable with respect to nations., such as
the law that, “whatever is lawful for one nation, is equally lawful for any other,” and that nations were
bound to leave each other in the “peacable enjoyment of that liberty which she inherits from nature. The
natural society of nations cannot subsist,” said Vattel, “unless the natural rights of each be duly
respected.” See Emer de Vattel, “Preliminaries: Idea and general Principles of the Law of Nations,” §§115, in The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of
Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury,
edited and with an Introduction by Béla Kapossy and Richard Whitmore (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund,
2008) http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2246 (8/24/17), which was originally published in French in 1746.
Also in the eighteenth century, the British jurist Sir William Blackstone also focused on natural law,
asserting that man-made law had no validity if it was contrary to natural law. Zuckert, ’Bringing Philosophy
down from the Heavens’: Natural Right in the Roman Law,”, p. 610, quoting Blackstone’s Commentaries
on the Laws of England I, at pp. 40-41.
n. 100: By January 1773, back in Boston, Adams wet his political feet again, penning seven articles under
his own name that were published in the Boston Gazette in weekly installments. By now Adams’ public
discourse was well recognized. For instance, chatting with his learned friend Judge Trowbridge one
evening over a year earlier, in June 1771, the judge told Adams that he would “never get [his] Health, till
your Mind is at ease. If you tire yourself with Business, but especially with Politicks, you wont get well.”
Adams told Trowbridge that he didn’t “meddle with Politicks, nor think about ‘em.” The judge responded,
“Except…by Writing in the Papers.” Id, p. 38 (June 22, 1771).
The subject of Adams’ early 1773 articles is best described as both political and very much legal,
addressing an issue on which Adams felt characteristically adamant: his opposition to Britain and its
colonial proxies’ determination to change the law so that the British government would now directly pay
the salaries of Bay judges rather than their salary coming from the province’s coffers under the watchful
eye of the Massachusetts assembly. It was not simply the issue of taxes that drove a wedge between
Massachusetts Bay and its mother country; other significant action by the British government was
alienating. In this instance a prominent Boston attorney, William Brattle, who was “widely regarded as a
staunch defender of colonial liberties,” publicly and aggressively argued that miscreant judges could be
dismissed at will; consequently, in Brattle’s view, there was no problem with the Crown paying judges’
salaries because if a judge was engaged in misconduct the colonists would bring the matter to the
attention of the authorities and the judge would be dismissed. In the March 4, 1773 entry in his Diary,
Adams explained in detail why he decided to write the essays and “silence” Mr. Brattle. In sum, Brattle’s
“vain and frothy Harrangues and Scribblings” were influencing a lot of people. Id, p. 78 (March 4, 1773).
Brattle made this statement in a Cambridge Town Meeting, and followed it up with an essay in the Boston
Globe?? In his defense of the crown’s payment of judges’ salaries, Brattle singled out Adams for
disparagement/criticism. Adams vociferously disagreed with Brattle’s position, convinced that a shift in
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financial control over provincial judges to the metropole dangerously compromised the independence of
the colonial judiciary and was illegal, [unconstitutional] at odds with English statutory law.
In the 1773 Brattle letters Adams analyzed the legally technical subsidiary question of whether British
judges, including those in Massachusetts Bay, held their positions for life absent misconduct, in Latin,
quamdiu bene se gesserint, or was it the case that judges could be dismissed at will by the King (or in the
Bay by his surrogate, the Governor), termed durante beneplacito. One would think that Adams would
have disfavored appointments for life – a notion that sounds suspiciously monarchic. But with a focus by
Adams (and others) on the independence of the judiciary, if a judge could be dismissed at will, something
Adams described as a “horrid fragment of the feudal despotism,” that judge would be even more
beholden to the king than if he could not be, and much less likely to exercise independent judgment in the
conduct of his judicial responsibilities. Adams expresses this idea repeatedly, e.g., “It shews the tendency
of holding offices at pleasure. It shews what sordid, nauseaous and impious adulations to superiours,
what malicious, envious, and cruel invectimes, against honest Coke, or any other brave and honest man,
whom the courtiers are determined to hunt down, are inspired by this dependent state of mind.”2 Control
of the opinions of judges had been a constant problem in pre-William-and-Mary England, a history of
which Adams was well aware. See, e.g., in these 1773 letters, discussion? of the ship money case. PJA,
Vol. I: Sept. 1755-Oct. 1773, p. 284. Furthermore, in Massachusetts, with men like Hutchinson and Oliver
at the top of the judiciary, royal bias was built in to the judicial system. The solution to this problem, the
only practicable one, was to appoint judges for life. Once again, we are touching upon the issue of
balance, an integral part of Adams’ views on government; in this case, the subject was the need to
balance the power of the executive – monarch or otherwise – through the independent authority of the
judiciary.
First and foremost, the Brattle letters revealed an amazing breadth of legal knowledge and perspective,
from King Alfred – called Magnus Juris Anglicani Conditor because he was the ninth century “great
founder of the laws of England” – to the advice of Alfred’s “wise men, collected out of the laws of Ina,
Offa, and Æthelbert; the roles of Edward the Confessor and William the Conqueror vis-à-vis English
common law; Magna Charta; English statutory law; and, of course, the commentaries of Blackstone and
the judicial wisdom of Coke, Fortescue, various Chief Justices of England, and others. Admittedly,
Adams’ analysis was didactic, and in that regard, albeit unintentionally, the Brattle essays were
patronizing. Nevertheless, they constitute yet again another window into Adams’ effulgent legal mind, and
his development as a superb attorney. Chapter 2 in Volume 1 the treatise, The History of Legal Education
in the United States: Commentaries and Primary Sources (Oakland, CA & Hackensack NJ: Salem Press,
Inc., 1999), written by legal historian and judicial expert Daniel R. Coquillette, is entitled “Justinian in
Braintree: John Adams, Civilian Learning, and Legal Elitism 1758-1775,” a study originally published by
the Massachusetts Historical Society in 1984. Coquillette studied legal history and took a law degree at
Oxford, attended Harvard Law School, clerked for Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, practiced law, and was
Dean of Boston College Law School from 1985 to 1993. At the time of the treatise’s publication
Coquillette was a professor at Boston College and a visiting professor at Harvard Law School.
Characterizing Adams as an admittedly atypical “barn yard Justinian” in colonial America, Coquillette
considered Adams’ breadth of knowledge and use of not only English common law, the well-recognized
foundation of the English legal system, but also civil law, the law that developed from the Roman Emperor
Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis or Body of Civil Law, one book of which was a legal textbook, the
Institutes, that became the foundation for much of southern European law, ecclesiastical law and, as well,
also highly influenced northern European law, further spreading its tentacles to influence the law of
countries throughout the world that were colonized by Europeans. One area of particular relevance to
Adams’ work in which civil law applied was admiralty law. After reviewing Adams’ invocation of civil law in
various legal cases, Coquillette concluded that Adams was not required to study civil law but he took it
upon himself to do so; that he worked hard at it, as evidenced by painstaking illustrations of Adams’ self2

Elsewhere in his Brattle essays, Adams stated, “in the one case a judge may be removed, suddenly and
silently, in a Council of seven only; in the other, not without an hearing and tryal, and an opportunity to
defend himself before a fuller board, knowing his accuser and the accusation: And this would be a restraint
even to corruption itself, for in the most abandoned state of it, there is always some regard shewn to
appearances.” PJA, Vol. I: Sept. 1755-Oct. 1773, pp. 302, 306. On the “horrid fragment,” see p. 294.
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study with which the author empathized that are reflected in his legal commonplace books; and that
Adams often applied “his civilian learning in the ‘trenches’ of active practice, and he employed them
effectively. Of that there can be no doubt.” See The History of Legal Education in the United States, Ch.
2, pp. 75-87, 87; on Coquillette see also “Biographical Notes on Contributors,” in Law in Colonial
Massachusetts 1630-1800, Frederick S. Allis, ed (Boston: The Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1984),
pp. lxv-lxviii, lxvi. Ryerson is probably correct, although it hardly seems provable, that with the possible
exception of Trowbridge, Adams was “the most learned legal mind in Massachusetts in the early 1770s.”
Ryerson, John Adams’s Republic, p. 457 n.53. He clearly was both learned and successful. On the
influence of Cicero on the New England legal profession in the revolutionary period, see Stephen Botein,
“Cicero. As Role Model for Early. American Lawyers: A Case Study in Classical “Influence,” The
Classical Journal, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Apr.-May, 1978), pp. 312-21.
In general, Adams observed, no matter how much one might want a legal conclusion to be founded on
either common law or tradition –the two most glorified components of English law – wishing did not make
it so, even if the issue involved an essential feature of government. Acknowledging the respect he had for
both Brattle and the authorities on which he relied, Adams was unequivocal that Brattle’s “sentiments
when erroneous and of dangerous tendency, should be considered, with entire freedom, and the
examination be made as public, as the error.” PJA, Vol. I, p. 256.This explains why Adams published not
only his “bottom line,” but the sometimes abstruse basis for his legal conclusions, which had political
ramifications. As he noted in a March 1773 Diary entry, “My own Determination had been to decline all
Invitations to public Affairs and Enquiries, but Brattles rude, indecent, and unmeaning Challenge of me in
Particular, laid me under peculiar Obligations to undeceive the People, and changed my resolution. I
hope that some good will come out of it. – God knows.” JA D&A, Vol. II (March 4, 1773), p. 78. It also
explains why Adams went for the jugular when he delineated how Brattle has misused an authority, not
making the critical distinction between legal advocacy, on the one hand – an argument made by a lawyer
on behalf of his client in a case – and the determination of a judge or other legal authority, on the other.
“It is enough for me to say, that these expressions were used by him, when arguing a cause for his client
at the bar, not when he was determining a cause as a judge….[I]t appears to me, extraordinary, that a
gentleman, educated under the great Gamaliel, Mr. Reed,” who was an early Bay legal expert, “should
ever adduce the simple dictum, of a council at the bar, uttered arguendo, and as an ornament to his
discourse too, rather than any pertinent branch of his reasoning, as evidence of a point ‘settled and
determined by the greatest sages of the law formerly and more lately,’” quoting Brattle. While this may
have seemed like a technical and obscure point to a layman, it was (and is) the province of the lawyer:
When a court decides something it does not yet need to, or articulates an opinion that is not
logically necessary to its disposition of the case, it is seen to be exceeding its mandate to
decide cases as it becomes necessary to do so… When it does, it is referred to in Latin as an
obiter dictum, an incidental remark.
The idea of obiter dictum is a requirement for judges to walk the walk, not just talk the talk,
when they engage in precedent-based judicial legislation. While judges often feel the need to
be eloquent, and to speak of high principles, it is the job of the case law analyst to ignore all that
and try to focus on the facts and the resulting ratio decidendi… Latin for the “rule of decision.”
… In fact, identifying obiter dictum is simply the converse of identifying the ratio decidendi:
anything the decision-maker said that is not part of the ratio decidendi is obiter dictum.
Trachtman, The Tools of Argument, pp. 118-19, 184; cf. Schauer, Thinking Like A Lawyer, pp.
54-57.
In short, Adams analytically outflanked Brattle, and he did so publicly – a means of impressing and
influencing some, but also possibly alienating others. Moreover, Adams was not content with that
achievement. Being the superlative lawyer that he had become, Adams then utterly demolished Brattle’s
legal position: “Does he produce, any legal authority,” referencing a series of famous English jurists, or any
antiquarian, “or any other, or even the single opinion of one historian, to give a colour to his doctrine?” “I
would not be understood however to lay any great stress, on the opinions of historians, and compilers of
antiquities, because it must be confessed, that the Saxon constitution, is involved in much obscurity….” JA
Papers, Vol. I: Sept. 1755-Oct. 1733, pp, 279-80. The editors of the John Adams papers explain Adams’
obscure authorities: “Hengham, Britton, and Fleta are early standard authorities on English law. Sir Ralph
de Hengham, Summae Magna Hengham et Parva vulgo Nuncupatae cum Seldeni Notis, London 1737;
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Johnannes Britton, Britton [on the laws of England], ed. David Wilkins, London, 1726. All three are listed
in Catalogue of John Adams’ Library. Fleta and Britton are abridgments of Bracton,” viz., Henry de
Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae London, 1640, also in the Adams library. JA Papers, Vol.
I, September 1755-October 1733, pp. 286 ns. 3 & 9. To the contrary, said Adams, if anything, history
proved Brattle wrong. Here Adams went even further, citing Paul de Rapin-Thoyras’ The History of
England, 2 vols., London 1732-1733, part of Adams’ library, to the effect that in Anglo-Saxon law, “very
probably, it was in the king’s power to change these officers, according to his pleasure,” a particularly
powerful reference because Rapin was much more of the “democratical faction” than the “monarchical”
one, and therefore his statement was quite a concession. Id, pp. 279-80, 286 n.4.
In précis, by this juncture Adams was a powerful legal adversary, and in the Brattle essays he proved, at
least to the Massachusetts Bay public, his exceptional legal ability, including his analytical skill and
thoroughness – the utterly complete preparation and scholarship that underlay his forceful legal
arguments. Another example in the 1773 letters of the honing of Adams’ traditional legal skills is his
classic comment that, “it is my desire to lay before the public, every thing I know of, which favours
General Brattle’s hypothesis, and to assist his argument to the utmost of my power. I will help him to
some other authorities….” He also showed off his legal acumen, e.g., providing a definition of common
law: “I think it has been determined by all the judges of England, that time of memory should be limited to
the reign of king Richard the first, and every rule of common law, must be beyond the time of memory,
that is as ancient as the reign of that king, and continued down generally until it is altered by authority of
parliament.” Id, pp. 282-83, 300.
Adams had become a member of the legal cognoscenti and people knew it. He was blessed with an
esemplastic mind: a man with the ability to pull together diverse and sometimes complex, even arcane
legal concepts, and then to simplify and present them to the public as a unified whole. In this case, for
example, Adams quipped at one point in the Brattle letters that it would have been “music in my ears” if
certain authorities were correct that the ancient constitution protected judges from dismissal in the
absence of misbehavior; but unfortunately, after reviewing ad nauseam Brattle’s legal arguments, Adams
concluded that “the whole stream of law and history is against them.” Id, pp. 263-64.
Thus, on the eve of the advent of the American Revolution, thirty-eight-year-old Adams was at the
beginning of his professional prime and the Massachusetts Bay citizenry was well aware of his legal
talent. Adams was smart, learned, percipient and indefatigable; he worked exceptionally hard; he fought
for his clients; and he could and did express his ideas effectively and forcefully, both orally and in writing.
The “common law analysis process…can be an intellectual marathon: grinding analytical persistence is
often rewarded with victory.” Trachtman, The Tools of Argument, p. 116.Adams had become a truly
formidable adversary – a force to be reckoned with. He also was a man who was well-aware of the
powerful impact of the unfolding events in New England. In a March 4, 1773 Diary entry he commented,
“It is thus that little Incidents produce great Events. I have never known a Period, in which the Seeds of
great Events have been so plentifully sown as this Winter…. The Court of Inquisition at Rhode Island, the
Judges Salaries, the Massachusetts Bay Town Meetings, General Brattles Folly, all conspired in a
remarkable, a wonderfull Manner.” JA D&A, Vol. II (March 4, 1773), p. 78
n. 112: See Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist, the Gideon Edition,
George W. Carey and James McClellan, eds. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2001); Colleen A. Sheehan
and Gary L. McDowell, Friends of the Constitution: Writings of the “Other” Federalists 1787-1788
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1998); Ralph Ketcham, ed. & intro., The Anti-Federalist Papers and the
Constitutional Convention Debates (New York: Signet Classic, 2003); see also Pauline Maier,
Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788(New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks,
2010); Joyce Appleby, Inheriting the Revolution: The First Generation of Americans, (PUB, 2000); Stanley
Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1993); Daniel Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire: New York and the
Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664-1830 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of NC
Press, 2005); Jack P. Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended
Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788 (New York & London: W.W. Norton and
Company, 1990); Alison L. LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism (Cambridge, MA &
London: Harvard University Press, 2010).
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n.137: There were many books on the ancient constitution in the Adams Library, including Tacitus texts,
Sir Henry Spelman’s The Roman antiquities, of course works by Coke and Selden, Edward Montagu’s
Reflections on the rise and fall of the antient republicks, works by Joseph Addison, Paul de RapinThoyras’ History of England, Lord Kames’ Essays upon several subjects concerning British antiquities
and Historical law-tracts, Roger Acherley’s The Britannic constitution, Lord John Somers’ The Judgment
of whole kingdoms and nations, and select volumes of Sir James Tyrrell’s The general history of England,
both ecclesiastical and civil. See Catalogue of the John Adams Library, pp. 240-41, 76, 54, 170, 6, 207,
124, 122, 1, 233, 248. See generally Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience, Ch. II, “The Colonial
Perspective: Ancient and Medieval,” pp. 25-47; see also id, pp. 259-62 (history selections from John
Adams Library). He also had books, such as The history of England by David Hume, that rejected the
notion that British liberty originated in an ancient constitution. See M. M. Goldsmith, “Liberty, Virtue, and
the Rule of Law, 1689-1770,” Ch. 5, Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776, pp.
197-232, 219. See Appendix B, Ch. Five, n.
n. 162: There are significantly different schools of thought in legal history as to how the law operated in
America, particularly if one looks beyond the American revolution into the early nineteenth century. One
school, made up of the so-called traditional humanistic scholars and sometimes dubbed the conservative
tradition, “best” represented, according to law professor Peter R. Teachout, by the non-lawyer Bernard
Bailyn, emphasized “the absolute centrality of law – the thought and activity of law – as a sustaining and
creative force in the service of the Revolution.” The humanistic historian “has a more complex view of
law”; Bailyn “recognizes its destructive potential in the hands of the stupid and corrupt, but sees it also as
a medium for the expression of important human values and ideals, and as a positive and powerful force
for justice and good in the world.” Teachout, “Light in Ashes,” in Law in the American Revolution and the
Revolution in the Law, pp. 171-73.
In contrast, the so-called new school, of whom Harvard law professor Morton Horwitz is the regulus,
maintained that in revolutionary America the law was “not … creatively employed as a medium for the
expression of the new vision of society,” which did not occur until the nineteenth century. Most
significantly, the new school has a radically different, “dark” vision of the role of law in America. This
vision completely undermined the legitimacy of a republic reliant on the rule of law. According to Horwitz,
“American legal historians … tend toward an excessively reverential and apologetic attitude towards law.”
Horwitz’s “anti-legalism” advances the view that law is “a force for the destruction of those human values
we hold most sacred in a civilization – of individual dignity, equality, and community.” From what
Teachout dubbed this “Doestoyevskyan” perspective, Horwitz argued that the law is subject to complete
manipulation. The rule of law promotes procedural justice but in so doing, it advantages “the shrewd, the
calculating, and the wealthy.” The rule of law also “ratifies and legitimates an adversarial, competitive,
and atomistic conception of human relations.” In sum, concluded Horwitz, “I do not see how [one] can
describe the rule of law as ‘an unqualified human good’!” Morton Horwitz, "The Rule of Law: An
Unqualified Human Good?" Yale Law Journal 86 (Jan. 1977), pp. 562-66, 565-66 n.3. The ramifications
of these different perspectives about legal history continue to play out today. See Transformations in
American Legal History: Essays in Honor of Professor Morton J. Horwitz, Vol. II, Daniel W. Hamilton and
Alfred L. Brophy, eds.
Fortunately, since we are focused on pre-revolutionary and revolutionary America, this cavernous
philosophical divide is largely irrelevant. In the interest of full disclosure, however, my own views lean
much closer to Bailyn and the humanists, not to mention Algernon Sidney and John Adams, than to the
Doestoyevskan Prof. Horwitz. I see only a self-fulfilling and socially destructive prophecy in maintaining a
“center of gravity” in political theory that is so cynical about human motivation that no law is better than
“real” law, viz., that thinks only in terms of complete corruption of the legal system. Not that as Adams
recognized, corruption was not always a tangible risk that required vigilance to avoid, and institutional
mechanisms to seek out and destroy; nevertheless, law was the mechanism by which to endeavor to
avoid, usually with some if not complete success, the very consequences that Horwitz attributed to the
rule of law. See Teachout, “Light in Ashes,” supra, pp. 171-72 and n. 17; see also the discussion of legal
scholar Mortimer Sellers’ appealing pragmatic approach.
n. 194: Both Sidney and Adams were acutely aware of the horrific history of the wars of religion, including
events of the Dutch war of independence. As did Sidney, Adams spent substantial time in the Low
Countries; he attended various churches there, and commented in his Diary on Dutch tolerance (and
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intolerance). The Dutch enshrined the principle of freedom of conscience in the 1579 Union of Utrecht.
Van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Republic, p. 217. While Catholic worship became illegal
once Dutch Protestantism predominated, the actual policy of the Dutch was relatively tolerant. Adams
wrote about this in a Sept. 18, 1818 letter to William Tudor, his former law clerk and successful
Massachusetts attorney. “Our ancestors had been so long abroad, that they had acquired comfortable
establishments, especially in Holland, that singular region of toleration, that glorious asylum for
persecuted Huguenots and Puritans; that country where priests have been eternally worrying one
another; and alternately teazing the government to persecute their antagonists, but where enlightened
statesmen have constantly and intrepidly resisted their wild fanaticism.” Shifting, in this context to
England, Adams noted, “Independence of English church and state, was the fundamental principle of the
first colonization, has been its general principle for two hundred years, and now I hope is past dispute.”
Adams to Tudor, Sept. 18, 1818, Novanglus and Massachusettensis; or Political Essays, Published in the
Years 1774 and 1775, On the Principal Points of Controversy, Between Great Britain and Her Colonies.
The Former by John Adams, Late President of the United States; the Latter by Jonathan Sewall, Then
King’s Attorney General of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, to which are added a number of Letters,
lately Written by President Adams, to the Honourable William Tudor; some of which were never before
published (Boston: Hews & Goss, 1819)(“Adams Introduction, 1818 Political Essays”), pp. 308-10. On
the Adams’ library collection, see Catalogue of the John Adams Library in the Public Library of the City of
Boston (Boston: Boston Public Library Trustees, 1917), and much more recently, “List of Books in John
Adams’s Library in Braintree, June 1790,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18,
2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-1007. [This is an Early Access
document from The Adams Papers. It is not an authoritative final version] (3-2-19).
n. 292: Adams, “VI. The right Constitution of a Commonwealth, examined,” Defence, Vol. III, pp. 349-50,
states:
This is a good argument in favor of a government in which the people have an essential
part of the sovereign power; but none at all for one in which they exercise the whole. When
they have a part, balanced by a senate and a distinct executive power, it is true they have
more magnanimity, activity, and spirit; they have a regard to their own immediate share in
the public interest; they have an apprehension of that security they possess in the enjoyment of their private fortunes, free from the reach of any arbitrary power. Whenever
success betides the public, and the commonwealth conquers, thrives in dominion, wealth,
or honor, the citizen reckons all his own. If he sees honors, offices, rewards, distributed to
valiant, virtuous, or learned men, he esteems them his own, as long as the door is left open
to succeed in the same dignities and enjoyments, if he can attain to the same measure of
desert. Men aspire to great actions when rewards depend on merit; and merit is more certain of reward in a mixed government than in any simple one. Rewards depend on the will
and pleasure of particular persons, in standing powers of monarchy or aristocracy. But they
depend equally on the will and pleasure of the principes populi, the reigning demagogues,
in simple democracies, and for obvious reasons are oftener distributed in an arbitrary manner. In a mixed government, the ministers of the executive power are always responsible,
and gross corruption in the distribution of offices is always subject to inquiry and to
punishment; but in simple governments, the reigning characters are accountable to nobody.
n. 671: E.g., Forrest McDonald, E Pluribus Unum: The Formation of the American Republic, 1776-1790,
2nd ed (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1979); Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic;
Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon, eds,, Neither Separate Nor Equal: Congress in the 1790s
(Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2000). On Alexander Hamilton, see Ron Chernow, Alexander
Hamilton (New York: Penguin Books, 2005); Forrest McDonald, Alexander Hamilton (New York: Norton,
1982). For a summary view of events leading up to the 1800 election, see John Ferling, Adams vs.
Jefferson: The Tumultuous Election of 1800 (Oxford University Press, 2004), esp. Ch. 3, “’Dark and
Menacing Evils’: Creating the New National System, 1786-1792,” pp. 36-56. For the quotation on
Hamilton’s impact on the 1800 election, see id, p. 168.
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